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THE  INFLUENCE 


OF 


SEA  POWER  UPON  HISTORY 


i 660- i 783 


BY 

CAPTAIN  A.  T.  MAHAN,  D.C.L.,  LL.D. 

UNITED  STATES  NAVY 

AUTHOR  OF  “THE  INFLUENCE  OF  SEA  POWER  UPON  THE  FRENCH  REVOLUTION 

AND  EMPIRE,  1793-1812,”  ETC. 


TWENT V-SECOND  EDITION 
* 


BOSTON 

LITTLE,  BROWN,  AND  COMPANY 

1911 


Copyright ,  1890, 

By  Captain  A.  T.  Mahan. 


\ 


printers 

8.  J.  Pabkhill  &  Co.,  Boston,  U.  S.  A. 


PREFACE. 


y 


the  water  forced  Hannibal  to  that  long,  perilous  inarch 
through  Gaul  in  which  more  than  half  his  veteran 
troops  wasted  away ;  it  enabled  the  elder  Scipio,  while 
sending  his  army  from  the  Rhone  on  to  Spain,  to  inter¬ 
cept  Hannibal's  communications,  to  return  in  person 
and  face  the  invader  at  the  Trebia.  Throughout  the 
war  the  legions  passed  by  water,  unmolested  and  un¬ 
wearied,  between  Spain,  which  was  Hannibal’s  base,  and 
Italy ;  while  the  issue  of  the  decisive  battle  of  the  Me- 
taurus,  hinging  as  it  did  upon  the  interior  position  of 
the  Roman  armies  with  reference  to  the  forces  of  Has- 
drubal  and  Hannibal,  was  ultimately  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  younger  brother  could  not  bring  his  succor¬ 
ing  reinforcements  by  sea,  but  only  by  the  land  route 
through  Gaul.  Hence  at  the  critical  moment  the  two 
Carthaginian  armies  were  separated  by  the  length  of 
Italy,  and  one  was  destroyed  by  the  combined  action 
of  the  Roman  generals. 

On  the  other  hand,  naval  historians  have  troubled 
themselves  little  about  the  connection  between  general 
history  and  their  own  particular  topic,  limiting  them¬ 
selves  generally  to  the  duty  of  simple  chroniclers  of 
naval  occurrences.  This  is  less  true  of  the  French 
than  of  the  English ;  the  genius  and  training  of  the 
former  people  leading  them  to  more  careful  inquiry 
into  the  causes  of  particular  results  and  the  mutual 
relation  of  events. 

There  is  not,  however,  within  the  knowledge  of  the 
author  any  work  that  professes  the  particular  object 
here  sought ;  namely,  an  estimate  of  the  effect  of  sea 
power  upon  the  course  of  history  and  the  prosperity  of 


VI 


PREFACE. 


nations.  As  other  histories  deal  with  the  wars,  politics, 
social  and  economical  conditions  of  countries,  touching 
upon  maritime  matters  only  incidentally  and  generally 
unsympathetically,  so  the  present  work  aims  at  putting 
maritime  interests  in  the  foreground,  without  divorcing 
them,  however,  from  their  surroundings  of  cause  and 
effect  in  general  history,  but  seeking  to  show  how  they 
modified  the  latter,  and  were  modified  by  them. 

The  period  embraced  is  from  1660,  when  the  sailing- 
ship  era,  with  its  distinctive  features,  had  fairly  begun, 
to  1783,  the  end  of  the  American  Revolution.  While 
the  thread  of  general  history  upon  which  the  successive 
maritime  events  is  strung  is  intentionally  slight,  the 
effort  has  been  to  present  a  clear  as  well  as  accurate 
outline.  Writing  as  a  naval  officer  in  full  sympathy 
with  his  profession,  the  author  has  not  hesitated  to  di¬ 
gress  freely  on  questions  of  naval  policy,  strategy,  and 
tactics ;  but  as  technical  language  has  been  avoided,  it 
is  hoped  that  these  matters,  simply  presented,  will  be 
found  of  interest  to  the  unprofessional  reader. 

A.  T.  MAHAN. 

December,  1889. 


CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTORY. 

Pass 

^History  of  Sea  Power  one  of  contest  between  nations,  therefore 


largely  military . 1 

Permanence  of  the  teachings  of  history  .  . 2 

K  Unsettled  condition  of  modern  naval  opinion . 2 

/  Contrasts  between  historical  classes  of  war-ships . 2 

Essential  distinction  between  weather  and  lee  gage . 5 

Analogous  to  other  offensive  and  defensive  positions . 6 

?  Consequent  effect  upon  naval  policy . 6 

Wessons  of  history  apply  especially  to  strategy . 7 

^/Eess  obviously  to  tactics,  but  still  applicable . 9 

Illustrations: 

The  battle  of  the  Nile,  a.d.  1798  .  10 

Trafalgar,  a.d.  1805  .  11 

Siege  of  Gibraltar,  a.d.  1779-1782  .  12 

Actium,  b.c.  31,  and  Lepanto,  a.d.  1571 . 13 

Second  Punic  War,  b.c.  218-201 . 14 

^  Naval  strategic  combinations  surer  now  than  formerly . 22 

i/Wide  scope  of  naval  strategy . 22 


CHAPTER  I. 

Discussion  of  the  Elements  of  Sea  Power. 


The  sea  a  great  common . 25 

Advantages  of  water-carriage  over  that  by  land . 25 

A'  Navies  exist  for  the  protection  of  commerce . 26 

Dependence  of  commerce  upon  secure  seaports . 27 

Development  of  colonies  and  colonial  posts . 28 


Links  in  the  chain  of  Sea  Power:  production,  shipping,  colonies  .  .  28 


CONTENTS. 


Pagi 

General  conditions  affecting  Sea  Power  : 

I.  Geographical  position . 29 

II.  Physical  conformation . 35 

III.  Extent  of  territory . 42 

IV.  Number  of  population . 44 

V.  National  character . 50 

VI.  Character  and  policy  of  governments . 58 

England . 59 

VHolland . 67 

France . 69 

>  Influence  of  colonies  on  Sea  Power . 82 

./The  United  States  : 

Its  weakness  in  Sea  Power . 83 

Its  chief  interest  in  internal  development . 84 

Danger  from  blockades . 85 

Dependence  of  the  navy  upon  the  shipping  interest  ....  87 
Conclusion  of  the  discussion  of  the  elements  of  Sea  Power  ...  88 
Purpose  of  the  historical  narrative . 89 

CHAPTER  II. 

State  of  Europe  in  1660. —Second  Anglo-Dutch  War,  1665- 
1667.  —  Sea  Battles  of  Lowestoft  and  of  the  Four  Days. 

Accession  of  Charles  II.  and  Louis  XIV . 90 

Followed  shortly  by  general  wars . 91 

French  policy  formulated  by  Henry  IV.  and  Richelieu . 92 

Condition  of  France  in  1660  93 

Condition  of  Spain . 94 

Condition  of  the  Dutch  United  Provinces . 96 

Their  commerce  and  colonies . 97 

Character  of  their  government . 98 

Parties  in  the  State . 99 

Condition  of  England  in  1660  .  99 

Characteristics  of  French,  English,  and  Dutch  ships . 101 

Conditions  of  other  European  States . 102 

Louis  XIV.  the  leading  personality  in  Europe . 103 

His  policy . 104 

Colbert’s  administrative  acts . 105 

v  Second  Anglo-Dutch  War,  1665  107 

'vBattle  of  Lowestoft,  1665  108 

vFire-ships,  compared  with  torpedo-cruisers . 109 

The  group  formation . 112 


CONTENTS. 


ix 

Page 


*^fhe  order  of  battle  for  sailing-ships . 115 

The  Four  Days’  Battle,  1666  .  117 

Military  merits  of  the  opposing  fleets . 126 

Soldiers  commanding  fleets,  discussion . 127 

Ruyter  in  the  Thames,  1667  .  132 

Peace  of  Breda,  1667  .  132 

Military  value  of  commerce- destroying . 132 


CHAPTER  III. 

War  of  England  and  France  in  Alliance  against  the  United 
Provinces,  1672-1674.  —  Finally,  of  France  against  Com¬ 
bined  Europe,  1674-1678.  —  Sea  Battles  of  Solebay,  the 
Texel,  and  Stromboli. 


Aggressions  of  Louis  XIV.  on  Spanish  Netherlands . 139 

Policy  of  the  United  Provinces . 139 

Triple  alliance  between  England,  Holland,  and  Sweden  ....  140 

Anger  of  Louis  XIV . 140 

Leibnitz  proposes  to  Louis  to  seize  Egypt . 141 

His  memorial . 142 

Bargaining  between  Louis  XIV.  and  Charles  II . 143 

The  two  kings  declare  war  against  the  United  Provinces  ....  144 

Military  character  of  this  war . 144 

v^Naval  strategy  of  the  Dutch . 144 

Tactical  combinations  of  De  Ruyter . 145 

Inefficiency  of  Dutch  naval  administration . 145 

f  Battle  of  Solebay,  1672  .  146 

\  Tactical  comments . 147 

Effect  of  the  battle  on  the  course  of  the  war . 148 

Land  campaign  of  the  French  in  Holland . 149 

Murder  of  John  De  Witt,  Grand  Pensionary  of  Holland  ....  150 

Accession  to  power  of  William  of  Orange . 150 

Uneasiness  among  European  States . 150 

/  Naval  battles  off  Schone veldt,  1673  .  151 

T  Naval  battle  of  the  Texel,  1673  152 

s  Effect  upon  the  general  war . 154 

Equivocal  action  of  the  French  fleet . 155 

General  ineffectiveness  of  maritime  coalitions . 156 

Military  character  of  De  Ruyter . 157 

Coalition  against  France . 158 


X 


CONTENTS. 


Pagk 

Peace  between  England  and  the  United  Provinces . 158 

Sicilian  revolt  against  Spain . * . 159 

Battle  of  Stromboli,  1676  .  161 

Illustration  of  Clerk’s  naval  tactics . 163 

De  Ruyter  killed  off  Agosta . 165 

England  becomes  hostile  to  France . 166 

Sufferings  of  the  United  Provinces . 167 

Peace  of  Nimeguen,  1678  .  168 

Effects  of  the  war  on  France  and  Holland . 169 

Notice  of  Comte  d’Estrees . 170 

CHAPTER  IV. 

English  Revolution. — War  of  the  League  of  Augsburg,  1688- 
1697.  —  Sea  Battles  of  Beachy  Head  and  La  Hougue. 

Aggressive  policy  of  Louis  XIV . 173 

v  State  of  French,  English,  and  Dutch  navies . 174 

Accession  of  James  II . 175 

Formation  of  the  League  of  Augsburg . 176 

Louis  declares  war  against  the  Emperor  of  Germany . 177 

Revolution  in  England . 178 

Louis  declares  war  against  the  United  Provinces . 178 

William  and  Mary  crowned . 178 

James  II.  lands  in  Ireland . 179 

Misdirection  of  French  naval  forces . '  ...  180 

William  III.  lands  in  Ireland . 181 

Naval  battle  of  Beachy  Head,  1690  .  182 

Tourville’s  military  character . 184 

Battle  of  the  Boyne,  1690  . .  186 

End  of  the  struggle  in  Ireland . 186 

Naval  battle  of  La  Hougue,  1692  . .  189 

Destruction  of  French  ships . 199 

Influence  of  Sea  Power  in  this  war . 191 

Attack  and  defence  of  commerce . 193 

Peculiar  characteristics  of  French  privateering . 195 

Peace  of  Ryswick,  1697  . . 

Exhaustion  of  France :  its  causes . 198 


CONTENTS. 


xi 


CHAPTER  V. 

War  of  the  Spanish  Succession,  1702-1713.  —  Sea  Battle  of 

Malaga. 

Pagb 

Failure  of  the  Spanish  line  of  the  House  of  Austria . 201 

King  of  Spain  wills  the  succession  to  the  Duke  of  Anjou  ....  202 

•  Death  of  the  King  of  Spain . 202 

Louis  XIV.  accepts  the  bequests . .  .  203 

He  seizes  towns  in  Spanish  Netherlands . 203 

Offensive  alliance  between  England,  Holland,  and  Austria  .  .  .  204 

Declarations  of  war . 205 

The  allies  proclaim  Carlos  IH.  King  of  Spain . .  .  206 

Affair  of  the  Vigo  galleons . 207 

Portugal  joins  the  allies . 208 

Character  of  the  naval  warfare . 209 

Capture  of  Gibraltar  by  the  English . 210 

Naval  battle  of  Malaga,  1704  .  211 

wXDecay  of  the  French  navy . 212 

Progress  of  the  land  war . 213 

Allies  seize  Sardinia  and  Minorca . .  .  •  215 

Disgrace  of  Marlborough . 216 

England  offers  terms  of  peace . 217 

Peace  of  Utrecht,  1713 . 218 

Terms  of  the  peace . 219 

Results  of  the  war  to  the  different  belligerents . 219 

Commanding  position  of  Great  Britain . 224 

Sea  Power  dependent  upon  both  commerce  and  naval  strength  .  .  225 

Peculiar  position  of  France  as  regards  Sea  Power . 226 

Depressed  condition  of  France . 227 

Commercial  prosperity  of  England . 228 

Ineffectiveness  of  commerce-destroying . 229 

Duguay-Trouin’s  expedition  against  Rio  de  Janeiro,  1711 ....  230 
War  between  Russia  and  Sweden . 231 


Xll 


CONTENTS . 


CHAPTER  VI. 

The  Regency  in  France.  —  Alberoni  in  Spain.  —  Policies  op 
Walpole  and  Fleuri.  —  War  of  the  Polish  Succession. — 
English  Contraband  Trade  in  Spanish  America.  —  Great 
Britain  declares  War  against  Spain. — 1715-1739. 

Page 

Death  of  Queen  Anne  and  Louis  XIV . 232 

Accession  of  George  1 . 232 

Regency  of  Philip  of  Orleans . . . 233 

Administration  of  Alberoni  in  Spain . 234 

Spaniards  invade  Sardinia . 235 

Alliance  of  Austria,  England,  Holland,  and  France . 235 

Spaniards  invade  Sicily . 236 

Destruction  of  Spanish  navy  off  Cape  Passaro,  1718 . 237 

Failure  and  dismissal  of  Alberoni . 239 

Spain  accepts  terms . 239 

Great  Britain  interferes  in  the  Baltic . 239 

Death  of  Philip  of  Orleans . .  241 

Administration  of  Fleuri  in  France . 241 

Growth  of  French  commerce . 242 

France  in  the  East  Indies . 243 

Troubles  between  England  and  Spain . 244 

English  contraband  trade  in  Spanish  America . 245 

Illegal  search  of  English  ships . 246 

Walpole’s  struggles  to  preserve  peace . 247 

War  of  the  Polish  Succession . 247 

Creation  of  the  Bourbon  kingdom  of  the  Two  Sicilies . 248 

Bourbon  family  compact . 248 

France  acquires  Bar  and  Lorraine . 219 

England  declares  war  against  Spain . 250 

Morality  of  the  English  action  toward  Spain . 250 

j/Decay  of  the  French  navy . 252 

Death  of  Walpole  and  of  Fleuri . 253 


CONTENTS. 


•  •  • 
Xlll 


/ 

/ 


CHAPTER  VII. 

War  between  Great  Britain  and  Spain,  1739. — War  of  the 
Austrian  Succession,  1740. — France  joins  Spain  against 
Great  Britain,  1744. — Sea  Battles  of  Matthews,  Anson, 
and  Hawke.  —  Peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  1748. 


Pag* 

Characteristics  of  the  wars  from  1739  to  1783  .  254 

Neglect  of  the  navy  by  French  government . 254 

Colonial  possessions  of  the  French,  English,  and  Spaniards  .  .  .  255 

Dupleix  and  La  Bourdonnais  in  India . 258 

Condition  of  the  contending  navies . 259 

Expeditions  of  Vernon  and  Anson . 261 

Outbreak  of  the  War  of  the  Austrian  Succession . 262 

England  allies  herself  to  Austria . 262 

Naval  affairs  in  the  Mediterranean . 263 

Influence  of  Sea  Power  on  the  war . 264 

/Naval  battle  off  Toulon,  1744  .  265 

(Causes  of  English  failure . 267 

Courts-martial  following  the  action . 268 

Inefficient  action  of  English  navy . .  269 

Capture  of  Louisburg  by  New  England  colonists,  1745  ....  269 

Causes  which  concurred  to  neutralize  England’s  Sea  Power  .  .  .  269 

France  overruns  Belgium  and  invades  Holland . 270 

^  Naval  actions  of  Anson  and  Hawke . 271 

Brilliant  defence  of  Commodore  l’Etenduere . 272 

Projects  of  Dupleix  and  La  Bourdonnais  in  the  East  Indies  .  .  .  273 

Influence  of  Sea  Power  in  Indian  affairs . 275 

La  Bourdonnais  reduces  Madras . 276 

Peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  1748  277 

Madras  exchanged  for  Louisburg . 277 

Results  of  the  war . 278 

l/Effect  of  Sea  Power  on  the  issue . 279 


XIV 


CONTENTS . 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

Seven  Years’  War,  1756-1763.  —  England’s  Overwhelming 
Power  and  Conquests  on  the  Seas,  in  North  America, 
Europe,  and  East  and  West  Indies.  —  Sea  Battles  :  Byng 
off  Minorca  ;  Hawke  and  Conflans  ;  Pocock  and  D’Ache 
in  East  Indies. 

Pagjb 

Peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  leaves  many  questions  unsettled  .  .  .  281 

Dupleix  pursues  his  aggressive  policy . 281 

He  is  recalled  from  India . 282 

His  policy  abandoned  by  the  French . 282 

Agitation  in  North  America . 283 

Braddock’s  expedition,  1755  284 

Seizure  of  French  ships  by  the  English,  while  at  peace  ....  285 

French  expedition  against  Port  Mahon,  1756  .  285 

Byng  sails  to  relieve  the  place . 286 

Byng’s  action  off  Port  Mahon,  1756  .  286 

Characteristics  of  the  French  naval  policy . 287 

Byng  returns  to  Gibraltar . • . 290 

He  is  relieved,  tried  by  court-martial,  and  shot . 290 

Formal  declarations  of  war  by  England  and  France . 291 

England’s  appreciation  of  the  maritime  character  of  the  war  .  .  .  291 

France  is  drawn  into  a  continental  struggle . 292 

The  Seven  Years’  War  (1756-1763)  begins . 293 

Pitt  becomes  Prime  Minister  of  England . 293 

Operations  in  North  America . 293 

Fall  of  Louisburg,  1758  .  294 

Fall  of  Quebec,  1759,  and  of  Montreal,  1760  .  294 

Influence  of  Sea  Power  on  the  continental  war . 295 

English  plans  for  the  general  naval  operations . 296 

Choiseul  becomes  Minister  in  France . 297 

He  plans  an  invasion  of  England . 297 

Sailing  of  the  Toulon  fleet,  1759  .  298 

Its  disastrous  encounter  with  Boscawen . 299 

Consequent  frustration  of  the  invasion  of  England . 300 

Project  to  invade  Scotland . 300 

Sailing  of  the  Brest  fleet . 300 

Hawke  falls  in  with  it  and  disperses  it,  1759  .  302 

Accession  of  Charles  III.  to  Spanish  throne . 304 

"-Death  of  George  II . 304 


CONTENTS. 


xv 


Pagk 

Clive  in  India . 305 

Battle  of  Plassey,  1757  .  306 

Decisive  influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  the  issues  in  India  ....  307 

Naval  actions  between  Pocock  and  D’Ache,  1758,  1759  .  307 

Destitute  condition  of  French  naval  stations  in  India . 309 

The  French  fleet  abandons  the  struggle . 310 

Final  fall  of  the  French  power  in  India . 310 

Ruined  condition  of  the  French  navy . 311 

Alliance  between  France  and  Spain . 313 

England  declares  war  against  Spain . 313 

Rapid  conquest  of  French  and  Spanish  colonies . 314 

French  and  Spaniards  invade  Portugal . 316 

The  invasion  repelled  by  England . 316 

Severe  reverses  of  the  Spaniards  in  all  quarters . 316 

Spain  sues  for  peace . 317 

Losses  of  British  mercantile  shipping . 317 

Increase  of  British  commerce . 318 

Commanding  position  of  Great  Britain . .  319 

Relations  of  England  and  Portugal . 320 

Terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris . 321 

Opposition  to  the  treaty  in  Great  Britain . 322 

fc/ftesults  of  the  maritime  war . 323 

Results  of  the  continental  war . 324 

Influence  of  Sea  Power  in  countries  politically  unstable  ....  324 

Interest  of  the  United  States  in  the  Central  American  Isthmus  .  .  325 


Effects  of  the  Seven  Years’  War  on  the  later  history  of  Great  Britain  326 

Subsequent  acquisitions  of  Great  Britain . 327 

^British  success  due  to  maritime  superiority . 328 

J/Mutual  dependence  of  seaports  and  fleets . 329 


CHAPTER  IX. 


Course  of  Events  from  the  Peace  of  Paris  to  1778.  —  Mari¬ 
time  War  Consequent  upon  the  American  Revolution.  —  Sea 
Battle  off  Ushant. 

French  discontent  with  the  Treaty  of  Paris . 330 

Revival  of  the  French  navy . 331 

Discipline  among  French  naval  officers  of  the  time . 332 

Choiseul’s  foreign  policy . 333 

Domestic  troubles  in  Great  Britain . 334 

Controversies  with  the  North  American  colonies . 334 


XVI 


CONTENTS. 


Page 

Genoa  cedes  Corsica  to  France . 334 

Dispute  between  England  and  Spain  about  the  Falkland  Islands  .  335 

Choiseul  dismissed . 330 

Death  of  Louis  XV . 336 

Naval  policy  of  Louis  XVI . 337 

Characteristics  of  the  maritime  war  of  1778  .  338 

Instructions  of  Louis  XVI.  to  the  French  admirals . 339 

^/Strength  of  English  navy . 341 

Characteristics  of  the  military  situation  in  America . 341 

The  line  of  the  Hudson . . . 342 

Burgoyne’s  expedition  from  Canada . 343 

Howe  carries  his  army  from  New  York  to  the  Chesapeake  .  .  .  343 

Surrender  of  Burgoyne,  1777  343 

yAmerican  privateering . 344 

Clandestine  support  of  the  Americans  by  France . 345 

Treaty  between  France  and  the  Americans . 346 

Vital  importance  of  the  French  fleet  to  the  Americans . 347 

The  military  situation  in  the  different  quarters  of  the  globe  .  .  .  347 

Breach  between  France  and  England . 350 

'■"  Sailing  of  the  British  and  French  fleets . 350 

/Battle  of  Ushant,  1778  .  351 

Position  of  a  naval  commander-in-chief  in  battle . 353 


CHAPTER  X. 


Maritime  War  in  North  America  and  West  Indies,  1778-1781. 
—  Its  Influence  upon  the  Course  of  the  American  Revo¬ 
lution.  —  Fleet  Actions  off  Grenada.  Dominica,  and  Chesa¬ 
peake  Bay. 


D’Estaing  sails  from  Toulon  for  Delaware  Bay,  1778  . 

British  ordered  to  evacuate  Philadelphia . 

Rapidity  of  Lord  Howe’s  movements . 

D’Estaing  arrives  too  late . .  • 

Follows  Howe  to  New  York . 

Fails  to  attack  there  and  sails  for  Newport . 

Howe  follows  him  there . 

Both  fleets  dispersed  by  a  storm . 

D’Estaing  takes  his  fleet  to  Boston . 

Howe’s  activity  foils  D’Estaing  at  all  points . 

D’Estaing  sails  for  the  West  Indies . 

The  English  seize  Sta.  Lucia . 


359 

359 

360 
360  ' 

360 

361 

362 

362 

363 
363 
365 
365 


CONTENTS. 


xvii 

Pag* 

Ineffectual  attempts  of  D’Estaing  to  dislodge  them . 336 

D’Estaing  captures  Grenada . 367 

Naval  battle  of  Grenada,  1779  ;  English  ships  crippled  ....  367 

D’Estaing  fails  to  improve  his  advantages . 370 

Reasons  for  his  neglect . 371 

French  naval  policy . 372 

English  operations  in  the  Southern  States  .  . . 375 

D’Estaing  takes  his  fleet  to  Savannah . 375 

His  fruitless  assault  on  Savannah . 376 

D’Estaing  returns  to  France . 376 

Fall  of  Charleston . 376 

De  Guichen  takes  command  in  the  West  Indies . 376 

Rodney  arrives  to  command  English  fleet . 377 

His  military  character . 377 

First  action  between  Rodney  and  De  Guichen,  1780  .  378 

Breaking  the  line . 380 

Subsequent  movements  of  Rodney  and  De  Guichen . 381 

Rodney  divides  his  fleet . 381 

Goes  in  person  to  New  York . 381 

De  Guichen  returns  to  France . 381 

Arrival  of  French  forces  in  Newport . 382 

Rodney  returns  to  the  West  Indies . 382 

War  between  England  and  Holland . 382 

Disasters  to  the  United  States  in  1780  .  382 

De  Grasse  sails  from  Brest  for  the  West  Indies,  1781  .  383 

Engagement  with  English  fleet  off  Martinique . 383 

Cornwallis  overruns  the  Southern  States . 384 

He  retires  upon  Wilmington,  N.  C.,  and  thence  to  Virginia  .  .  .  385 

Arnold  on  the  James  River . 385 

The  French  fleet  leaves  Newport  to  intercept  Arnold . 38© 

Meets  the  English  fleet  off  the  Chesapeake,  1781  .  386 

French  fleet  returns  to  Newport . 387 

Cornwallis  occupies  Yorktown  .  387 

vDe  Grasse  sails  from  Hayti  for  the  Chesapeake . 388 

{Action  with  the  British  fleet,  1781  .  389 

Surrender  of  Cornwallis,  1781  .  390 

Criticism  of  the  British  naval  operations . 390 

Energy  and  address  shown  by  De  Grasse . 392 

Difficulties  of  Great  Britain’s  position  in  the  war  of  1778  ....  392 

The  military  policy  best  fitted  to  cope  with  them . 393 

Position  of  the  French  squadron  in  Newport,  R.  I.,  1780  .  .  .  .  394 

Great  Britain’s  defensive  position  and  inferior  numbers  .  .  .  .  396 

Consequent  necessity  for  a  vigorous  initiative . 396 

/Washington’s  opinions  as  to  the  influence  of  Sea  Power  on  the 

American  contest . 397 

b 


CONTENTS. 


xviii 


CHAPTER  XI. 


Maritime  War  in  Europe,  1779-1782. 

Page 

Objectives  of  the  allied  operations  in  Europe . 401 

Spain  declares  war  against  England . 401 

Allied  fleets  enter  the  English  Channel,  1779  .  402 

Abortive  issue  of  the  cruise . 403 

Rodney  sails  with  supplies  for  Gibraltar . 403 

Defeats  the  Spanish  squadron  of  Langara  and  relieves  the  place  .  404 

The  allies  capture  a  great  British  convoy . 404 

The  armed  neutrality  of  the  Baltic  powers,  1780  . .  405 

England  declares  war  against  Holland . 406 

Gibraltar  is  revictualled  by  Admiral  Derby . 407 

The  allied  fleets  again  in  the  Channel,  1781  .  408 

They  retire  without  effecting  any  damage  to  England . 408 

Destruction  of  a  French  convoy  for  the  West  Indies . 408 

Fall  of  Port  Mahon,  1782  .  409 

The  allied  fleets  assemble  at  Algesiras . 409 

Grand  attack  of  the  allies  on  Gibraltar,  which  fails,  1782  .  .  .  .  410 

Lord  Howe  succeeds  in  revictualling  Gibraltar . 412 

Action  between  his  fleet  and  that  of  the  allies . 412 

/Conduct  of  the  war  of  1778  by  the  English  government  ....  412 

Influence  of  Sea  Power . 416 

^/Proper  use  of  the  naval  forces . 416 


CHAPTER  XII. 

Events  in  the  East  Indies,  1778-1781.  —  Suffren  sails  from 
Brest  for  India,  1781. — His  Brilliant  Naval  Campaign 
in  the  Indian  Seas,  1782,  1783. 


Neglect  of  India  by  the  French  government . 419 

England  at  war  with  Mysore  and  with  the  Mahrattas . 420 

Arrival  of  the  French  squadron  under  Comte  d’Orves  .....  420 

It  effects  nothing  and  returns  to  the  Isle  of  France . 420 

Suffren  sails  from  Brest  with  five  ships-of-the-line,  1781  ....  421 

Attacks  an  English  squadron  in  the  Cape  Verde  Islands,  1781  .  .  422 

Conduct  and  results  of  this  attack . 424 

Distinguishing  merits  of  Suffren  as  a  naval  leader . 425 

Suffren  saves  the  Cape  Colony  from  the  English . 427 


CONTENTS.  xix 

Page 

He  reaches  the  Isle  of  France . 427 

Succeeds  to  the  chief  command  of  the  French  fleet . 427 

Meets  the  British  squadron  under  Hughes  at  Madras . 427 

Analysis  of  the  naval  strategic  situation  in  India . 428 

The  first  battle  between  Suffren  and  Hughes,  Feb.  17,  1782  .  .  .  430 

Suffren’s  views  of  the  naval  situation  in  India . 433 

Tactical  oversights  made  by  Suffren . 434 

Inadequate  support  received  by  him  from  his  captains . 435 

Suffren  goes  to  Pondicherry,  Hughes  to  Trincomalee . 436 

The  second  battle  between  Suffren  and  Hughes,  April  12,  1782  .  .  437 

Suffren’s  tactics  in  the  action . 439 

Relative  in j  uries  received  by  the  opposing  fleets . 441 

Contemporaneous  English  criticisms  upon  Hughes’s  conduct  .  .  442 

Destitute  condition  of  Suffren’s  fleet . 443 

His  activity  and  success  in  supplying  wants . 443 

He  communicates  with  Hyder  Ali,  Sultan  of  Mysore . 443 

Firmness  and  insight  shown  by  Suffren . 445 

His  refusal  to  obey  orders  from  home  to  leave  the  Indian  Coast  .  446 

The  third  battle  between  Suffren  and  Hughes,  July  6,  1782  .  .  .  447 

Qualities  shown  by  Hughes . 449 

Stubborn  fighting  by  the  British  admiral  and  captains . 449 

Suffren  deprives  three  captains  of  their  commands . 449 

Dilatory  conduct  of  Admiral  Hughes . 450 

Suffren  attacks  and  takes  Trincomalee . 450 

Strategic  importance  of  this  success . 451 

Comparative  condition  of  the  two  fleets  in  material  for  repairs  .  .  451 

The  English  government  despatches  powerful  reinforcements  .  .  452 

The  French  court  fails  to  support  Suffren . 452 

The  fourth  battle  between  Suffren  and  Hughes,  Sept.  3,  1782  .  - .  453 

Mismanagement  and  injuries  of  the  French . 455 

Contrast  between  the  captains  in  the  opposing  fleets  ......  456 

Two  ships  of  Suffren’s  fleet  grounded  and  lost . 457 

Arrival  of  British  reinforcements  under  Admiral  Bickerton  .  .  .  458 

Approach  of  bad-weather  season  ;  Hughes  goes  to  Bombay  .  .  .  458 

Military  situation  of  French  and  English  in  India . 459 

Delays  of  the  French  reinforcements  under  Bussy . 460 

Suffren  takes  his  fleet  to  Achem,  in  Sumatra . .  460 

He  returns  to  the  Indian  coast  . 461 

Arrival  of  Bussy . 461 

Decline  of  the  French  power  on  shore . 461 

The  English  besiege  Bussy  in  Cuddalore  by  land  and  sea  ....  462 

Suffren  relieves  the  place . 462 

The  fifth  battle  between  Suffren  and  Hughes,  June  20,  1783  .  .  .  463 

Decisive  character  of  Suffren’s  action . 463 


XX 


CONTENTS.  • 


Page 

News  of  the  peace  received  at  Madras . 463 

Suffren  sails  for  France . 464 

His  flattering  reception  everywhere . 464 

His  distinguishing  military  qualities . 465 

His  later  career  and  death . 466 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

Events  in  the  West  Indies  after  the  Surrender  of  York- 
town.  —  Encounters  of  De  Grasse  with  Hood.  —  The  Sea 
Battle  of  the  Saints.  —  1781-1782. 

Maritime  struggle  transferred  from  the  continent  to  West  Indies  .  468 

De  Grasse  sails  for  the  islands . 469 

French  expedition  against  the  island  of  St.  Christopher,  January, 

1782  .  469 

Hood  attempts  to  relieve  the  garrison . 470 

Manoeuvres  of  the  two  fleets . 471 

Action  between  De  Grasse  and  Hood . 472 

Hood  seizes  the  anchorage  left  by  De  Grasse . 473 

De  Grasse  attacks  Hood  at  his  anchorage . 474 

Hood  maintains  his  position . 475 

Surrender  of  the  garrison  and  island . 475 

Merits  of  Hood’s  action . 476 

Criticism  upon  De  Grasse’s  conduct . 477 

Rodney  arrives  in  West  Indies  from  England . 479 

Junction  of  Rodney  and  Hood  at  Antigua . 479 

De  Grasse  returns  to  Martinique . 479 

Allied  plans  to  capture  Jamaica . 479 

Rodney  takes  his  station  at  Sta.  Lucia . 4S0 

The  French  fleet  sails  and  is  pursued  by  Rodney . 480 

Action  of  April  9,  1782  .  481 

Criticism  upon  the  action . 483 

The  chase  continued  ;  accidents  to  French  ships . 484 

The  naval  battle  of  the  Saints,  April  12,  1782  .  485 

Rodney  breaks  the  French  line . 488 

Capture  of  the  French  commander-in-chief  and  five  ships-of-the-line  489 

Details  of  the  action . 489 

Analysis  of  the  effects  of  Rodney’s  manoeuvre . 491 

Tactical  bearing  of  improvements  in  naval  equipment . 493 

Lessons  of  this  short  naval  campaign . 495 

Rodney’s  failure  to  pursue  the  French  fleet . 496 


CONTENTS . 


Examination  of  his  reasons  and  of  the  actual  conditions  .  . 

Probable  effect  of  this  failure  upon  the  conditions  of  peace  . 

Rodney’s  opinions  upon  the  battle  of  April  12 . 

Successes  achieved  by  Rodney  during  his  command  .  .  .  . 

He  is  recalled  by  a  new  ministry . .  .  . 

Exaggerated  view  of  the  effects  of  this  battle  upon  the  war  . 

Subsequent  career  of  De  Grasse . 

Court-martial  ordered  upon  the  officers  of  the  French  fleet .  . 

Findings  of  the  court  . . 

De  Grasse  appeals  against  the  finding . 

He  is  severely  rebuked  by  the  king . 

Deaths  of  De  Grasse,  Rodney,  and  Hood . 


xxi 

Pagk 

497 

498 

499 

500 
500 

500 

501 

502 

502 

503 

503 

504 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

Critical  Discussion  of  the  Maritime  War  of  1778. 


The  war  of  1778  purely  maritime . 

Peculiar  interest  therefore  attaching  to  it . 

Successive  steps  in  the  critical  study  of  a  war . 

Distinction  between  “object  ”  and  “ objective” . 

Parties  to  the  war  of  1778  . 

Objects  of  the  different  belligerents . 

Foundations  of  the  British  Empire  of  the  seas . 

Threatened  by  the  revolt  of  the  colonies . 

The  British  fleet  inferior  in  numbers  to  the  allies . 

Choice  of  objectives . 

The  fleets  indicated  as  the  keys  of  the  situation  everywhere  . 

Elements  essential  to  an  active  naval  war . 

The  bases  of  operations  in  the  war  of  1778 :  — 

In  Europe . 

On  the  American  continent . 

In  the  West  Indies . 

In  the  East  Indies . 

Strategic  bearing  of  the  trade-winds  and  monsoons  .  .  .  . 

The  bases  abroad  generally  deficient  in  resources . 

Consequent  increased  importance  of  the  communications  . 

The  navies  the  guardians  of  the  communications . 

Need  of  intermediate  ports  between  Europe  and  India  .  .  . 

Inquiry  into  the  disposition  of  the  naval  forces . 

Difficulty  of  obtaining  information  at  sea . 

Perplexity  as  to  the  destination  of  a  naval  expedition  .  .  , 

Disadvantages  of  the  defensive . 


.  .  505 
.  .  506 
.  .  507 
.  .  507 
.  .  507 
.  .  508 
.  .  510 
.  .  510 
.  .  511 
.  .  511 
.  .  513 
.  .  514 

.  .  515 
.  .  515 
.  .  516 
.  .  518 
.  .  518 
.  .  519 
.  .  519 
.  .  520 
.  .  520 
.  .  521 
.  .  521 
.  .  522 
.  .  523 


CONTENTS. 


xxii 

Pag* 

England  upon  the  defensive  in  1778  . ■ . 523 

Consequent  necessity  for  wise  and  vigorous  action . 524 

The  key  of  the  situation . 525 

British  naval  policy  in  the  Napoleonic  wars . 525 

British  naval  policy  in  the  Seven  Years’  War . 527 

Difficulties  attending  this  policy . 527 

Disposition  of  the  British  navy  in  the  war  of  1778  .  528 

Resulting  inferiority  on  many  critical  occasions . 528 

Effect  on  the  navy  of  the  failure  to  fortify  naval  bases . 529 

The  distribution  of  the  British  navy  exposes  it  to  being  out¬ 
numbered  at  many  points . 531 

The  British  naval  policy  in  1778  and  in  other  wars  compared  .  .  .  532 

Naval  policy  of  the  allies . 535 

Divergent  counsels  of  the  coalition . 536 

“  Ulterior  objects  ” . 537 

The  allied  navies  systematically  assume  a  defensive  attitude  .  .  .  538 

Dangers  of  this  line  of  action . 538 

Glamour  of  commerce -destroying . 539 

The  conditions  of  peace,  1783  540 


Index  .  *  .  .  . . 543 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS. 

_  W1' 

LIST  OF  MAPS. 

Page 

I.  Mediterranean  Sea . 15 

II.  English  Channel  and  North  Sea . 107 

III.  Indian  Peninsula  and  Ceylon . 257 

IV.  North  Atlantic  Ocean . 532 


PLANS  OF  NAVAL  BATTLES. 

In  these  plans,  when  the  capital  letters  A,  B,  C,  and  D  are  used ,  all  positions  marlcect 
by  the  same  capital  are  simultaneous. 

I.  Four  Days’  Battle,  1666  .  119 

II.  Four  Days’  Battle,  1666  .  124 

III.  Battle  of  Solebay,  1672  .  146 

IV.  Battle  of  the  Texel,  1673  153 

V.  Battle  of  Stromboli,  1676  .  161 

V  a.  Pocock  and  D’Ach^,  1758  .  161 

VI.  Battle  of  Beachy  Head,  1690  .  183 

VI  a.  Battle  of  La  Hougue,  1692  183 

VII.  Matthews’s  Action  off  Toulon,  1744  265 

VII  a.  Byng’s  Action  off  Minorca,  1756  .  265 

VIII.  Hawke  and  Conflans,  1759  .  303 

IX.  Battle  of  Ushant,  1778  .  . . 351 

X.  D’Estaing  and  Byron,  1779  368 

XI.  Rodney  and  De  Guichen,  April  17,  1780  378 

XII.  Arbuthnot  and  Destouches,  1781  .  386 

XIII.  Suffren  at  Porto  Praya,  1781  .  423 


XXIV 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS . 


Page 

XIV.  Suffren  and  Hughes,  February  17,  1782  431 

XV.  Suffren  and  Hughes,  April  12,  1782  438 

XVI.  Suffren  and  Hughes,  July  6,  1782  447 

XVII.  Suffren  and  Hughes,  September  3,  1782  454 

XVIH.  Hood  and  De  Grasse,  January,  1782  470 

XIX.  Hood  and  De  Grasse,  January,  1782  472 

XX.  Rodney  and  De  Grasse,  April  9,  1782  .  482 

XXI.  Rodney’s  Victory,  April  12,  1782  486 


INFLUENCE 


OF 


SEA  POWER  UPON  HISTORY. 


♦ 


INTRODUCTORY. 


HE  history  of  Sea  Power  is  largely,  though  by  no  means 


A-  solely,  a  narrative  of  contests  between  nations,  of  mu¬ 
tual  rivalries,  of  violence  frequently  culminating  in  war.  The 
profound  influence  of  sea  commerce  upon  the  wealth  and 
strength  of  countries  was  clearly  seen  long  before  the  true 
principles  which  governed  its  growth'  and  prosperity  were 
detected.  To  secure  to  one’s  own  people  a  disproportionate 
share  of  such  benefits,  every  effort  was  made  to  exclude 
others,  either  by  the  peaceful  legislative  methods  of  mo¬ 
nopoly  or  prohibitory  regulations,  or,  when  these  failed,  by 
direct  violence.  The  clash  of  interests,  the  angry  feelings 
roused  by  conflicting  attempts  thus  to  appropriate  the  larger 
share,  if  not  the  whole,  of  the  advantages  of  commerce,  and 
of  distant  unsettled  commercial  regions,  led  to  wars.  On 
the  other  hand,  wars  arising  from  other  causes  have  been 
greatly  modified  in  their  conduct  and  issue  by  the  control  of 
the  sea.  Therefore  the  history  of  sea  power,  while  embracing 
in  its  broad  sweep  all  that  tends  to  make  a  people  great  upon 
the  sea  or  by  the  sea,  is  largely  a  military  history ;  and  it  is 
in  this  aspect  that  it  will  be  mainly,  though  not  exclusively, 
regarded  in  the  following  pages. 

A  study  of  the  military  history  of  the  past,  such  as  this,  is 
enjoined  by  great  military  leaders  as  essential  to  correct  ideas 


1 


2 


INTRODUCTORY. 


and  to  the  skilful  conduct  of  war  in  the  future.  Napoleon 
names  among  the  campaigns  to  be  studied  by  the  aspiring 
soldier,  those  of  Alexander,  Hannibal,  and  Caesar,  to  whom 
/  gunpowder  was  unknown ;  and  there  is  a  substantial  agree¬ 
ment  among  professional  writers  that,  while  many  of  the  con¬ 
ditions  of  war  vary  from  age  to  age  with  the  progress  of 
weapons,  there  are  certain  teachings  in  the  school  of  history 
which  remain  constant,  and  being,  therefore,  of  universal  ap¬ 
plication,  can  be  elevated  to  the  rank  of  general  principles. 
For  the  same  reason  the  study  of  the  sea  history  of  the  past 
will  be  found  instructive,  by  its  illustration  of  the  general 
principles  of  maritime  war,  notwithstanding  the  great  changes 
that  have  been  brought  about  in  naval  weapons  by  the  scien¬ 
tific  advances  of  the  past  half  century,  and  by  the  introduction 
\  of  steam  as  the  motive  power. 

It  is  doubly  necessary  thus  to  study  critically  the  history 
and  experience  of  naval  warfare  in  the  days  of  sailing-ships, 
because  while  these  will  be  found  to  afford  lessons  of  present 
application  and  value,  steam  navies  have  as  yet  made  no  his¬ 
tory  which  can  be  quoted  as  decisive  in  its  teaching.  Of  the 
one  we  have  much  experimental  knowledge ;  of  the  other, 
practically  none.  Hence  theories  about  the  naval  warfare  of 
the  future  are  almost  wholly  presumptive  ;  and  although  the 
attempt  has  been  made  to  give  them  a  more  solid  basis  by 
dwelling  upon  the  resemblance  between  fleets  of  steamships 
and  fleets  of  galleys  moved  by  oars,  which  have  a  long  and 
well-known  history,  it  will  be  well  not  to  be  carried  away  by 
this  analogy  until  it  has  been  thoroughly  tested.  The  resem¬ 
blance  is  indeed  far  from  superficial.  The  feature  which  the 
steamer  and  the  galley  have  in  common  is  the  ability  to  move 
in  any  direction  independent  of  the  wind.  Such  a  power 
makes  a  radical  distinction  between  those  classes  of  vessels 
and  the  sailing-ship ;  for  the  latter  can  follow  only  a  limited 
number  of  courses  when  the  wind  blows,  and  must  remain 
motionless  when  it  fails.  But  while  it  is  wise  to  observe 
things  that  are  alike,  it  is  also  wise  to  look  for  things  that 
differ ;  for  when  the  imagination  is  carried  away  by  the  de- 


INTRODUCTORY. 


3 


tection  of  points  of  resemblance,  —  one  of  the  most  pleasing  of 
mental  pursuits,— it  is  apt  to  be  impatient  of  any  divergence 
in  its  new-found  parallels,  and  so  may  overlook  or  refuse  to 
recognize  such.  Thus  the  galley  and  the  steamship  have  in 
common,  though  unequally  developed,  the  important  charac¬ 
teristic  mentioned,  but  in  at  least  two  points  they  differ  ;  and 
in  an  appeal  to  the  history  of  the  galley  for  lessons  as  to 
fighting  steamships,  the  differences  as  well  as  the  likeness 
must  be  kept  steadily  in  view,  or  false  deductions  may  be, 
made.  The  motive  power  of  the  galley  when  in  use  neces¬ 
sarily  and  rapidly  declined,  because  human  strength  could 
not  long  maintain  such  exhausting  efforts,  and  consequently 
tactical  movements  could  continue  but  for  a  limited  time ; 1 
and  again,  during  the  galley  period  offensive  weapons  werd 
not  only  of  short  range,  but  were  almost  wholly  confined  to 
hand-to-hand  encounter.  These  two  conditions  led  almost 
necessarily  to  a  rush  upon  each  other,  not,  however,  without 
some  dexterous  attempts  to  turn  or  double  on  the  enemy,  fol¬ 
lowed  by  a  hand-to-hand  melee.  In  such  a  rush  and  such  a 
melee  a  great  consensus  of  respectable,  even  eminent,  naval 
opinion  of  the  present  day  finds  the  necessary  outcome  of 
modern  naval  weapons,  —  a  kind  of  Donnybrook  Fair,  in  which, 
as  the  history  of  melees  shows,  it  will  be  hard  to  know  friend 
from  foe.  Whatever  may  prove  to  be  the  worth  of  this  opin¬ 
ion,  it  cannot  claim  an  historical  basis  in  the  sole  fact  that 
galley  and  steamship  can  move  at  any  moment  directly  upon 
the  enemy,  and  carry  a  beak  upon  their  prow,  regardless  of 
the  points  in  which  galley  and  steamship  differ.  As  yet  this 
opinion  is  only  a  presumption,  upon  which  final  judgment 
may  well  be  deferred  until  the  trial  of  battle  has  given  fur¬ 
ther  light.  Until  that  time  there  is  room  for  the  opposite 

1  Thus  Hermocrates  of  Syracuse,  advocating  the  policy  of  thwarting  the 
Athenian  expedition  against  his  city  (b.c.  413)  by  going  boldly  to  meet  it,  and 
keeping  on  the  flank  of  its  line  of  advance,  said  :  “  As  their  advance  must  be  slow, 
we  shall  have  a  thousand  opportunities  to  attack  them ;  but  if  they  clear  their 
ships  for  action  and  in  a  body  bear  down  expeditiously  upon  us,  they  must  ply 
hard  at  their  oars,  and  when  spent  with  toil  we  can  fall  upon  them.” 


4 


INTRODUCTORY. 


view,  —  that  a  melee  between  numerically  equal  fleets,  in  which 
skill  is  reduced  to  a  minimum,  is  not  the  best  that  can  be  done 
with  the  elaborate  and  mighty  weapons  of  this  age.  The 
surer  of  himself  an  admiral  is,  the  finer  the  tactical  develop¬ 
ment  of  his  fleet,  the  better  his  captains,  the  more  reluctant 
must  he  necessarily  be  to  enter  into  a  melee  with  equal  forces, 
in  which  all  these  advantages  will  be  thrown  away,  chance 
reign  supreme,  and  his  fleet  be  placed  on  terms  of  equality 
with  an  assemblage  of  ships  which  have  never  before  acted 
together.1  History  has  lessons  as  to  when  melees  are,  or  are 
not,  in  order. 

The  galley,  then,  has  one  striking  resemblance  to  the  steamer, 
but  differs  in  other  important  features  which  are  not  so  im¬ 
mediately  apparent  and  are  therefore  less  accounted  of.  In 
the  sailing-ship,  on  the  contrary,  the  striking  feature  is  the 
difference  between  it  and  the  more  modern  vessel ;  the  points 
of  resemblance,  though  existing  and  easy  to  find,  are  not  so 
obvious,  and  therefore  are  less  heeded.  This  impression  is 
enhanced  by  the  sense  of  utter  weakness  in  the  sailing-ship 
as  compared  with  the  steamer,  owing  to  its  dependence  upon 
the  wind ;  forgetting  that,  as  the  former  fought  with  its 
equals,  the  tactical  lessons  are  valid.  The  galley  was  never 
reduced  to  impotence  by  a  calm,  and  hence  receives  more 
respect  in  our  day  than  the  sailing-ship ;  yet  the  latter  dis¬ 
placed  it  and  remained  supreme  until  the  utilization  of  steam. 
The  powers  to  injure  an  enemy  from  a  great  distance,  to 
manoeuvre  for  an  unlimited  length  of  time  without  wearing 
out  the  men,  to  devote  the  greater  part  of  the  crew  to  the 
offensive  weapons  instead  of  to  the  oar,  are  common  to  the 
sailing  vessel  and  the  steamer,  and  are  at  least  as  important, 
tactically  considered,  as  thn  power  of  the  galley  to  move  in 
a  calm  or  against  the  wind. 

1  The  writer  must  guard  himself  from  appearing  to  advocate  elaborate  tactical 
movements  issuing  in  barren  demonstrations.  He  believes  that  a  fleet  seeking 
a  decisive  result  must  close  with  its  enemy,  but  not  until  some  advantage  has  been 
obtained  for  the  collision,  which  will  usually  be  gained  by  manoeuvring,  and  will 
fall  to  the  best  drilled  and  managed  fleet.  In  truth,  barren  results  have  as  often 
followed  upon  headlong,  close  encounters  as  upon  the  most  timid  tactical  trifling. 


INTRODUCTORY. 


5 


In  tracing  resemblances  there  is  a  tendency  not  only  to 
overlook  points  of  difference,  but  to  exaggerate  points  of  like* 
ness,  —  to  be  fanciful.  It  may  be  so  considered  to  point  out 
that  as  the  sailing-ship  had  guns  of  long  range,  with  compar¬ 
atively  great  penetrative  power,  and  carronades,  which  were 
of  shorter  range  but  great  smashing  effect,  so  the  modern 
steamer  has  its  batteries  of  long-range  guns  and  of  torpedoes, 
the  latter  being  effective  only  within  a  limited  distance  and 
then  injuring  by  smashing,  while  the  gun,  as  of  old,  aims  at 
penetration.  Yet  these  are  distinctly  tactical  considerations, 
which  must  affect  the  plans  of  admirals  and  captains  ;  and 
the  analogy  is  real,  not  forced.  So  also  both  the  sailing-ship 
and  the  steamer  contemplate  direct  contact  with  an  enemy’s 
vessel, —  the  former  to  carry  her  by  boarding,  the  latter  to 
sink  her  by  ramming  ;  and  to  both  this  is  the  most  difficult  of 
their  tasks,  for  to  effect  it  the  ship  must  be  carried  to  a  single 
point  of  the  field  of  action,  whereas  projectile  weapons  may  be 
used  from  many  points  of  a  wide  area. 

The  relative  positions  of  two  sailing-ships,  or  fleets,  with 
reference  to  the  direction  of  the  wind  involved  most  important 
tactical  questions,  and  were  perhaps  the  chief  care  of  the 
seamen  of  that  age.  To  a  superficial  glance  it  may  appear 
that  since  this  has  become  a  matter  of  such  indifference  to 
ihe  steamer,  no  analogies  to  it  are  to  be  found  in  present  con¬ 
ditions,  and  the  lessons  of  history  in  this  respect  are  value¬ 
less.  A  more  careful  consideration  of  the  distinguishing 
characteristics  of  the  lee  and  the  weather  “  gage,”  1  directed 
to  their  essential  features  and  disregarding  secondary  details, 
will  show  that  this  is  a  mistake.  The  distinguishing  feature 
of  the  weather-gage  was  that  it  conferred  the  power  of  giving 

1  A  ship  was  said  to  have  the  weather-gage,  or  “  the  advantage  of  the  wind,” 
or  “  to  be  to  windward,”  when  the  wind  allowed  her  to  steer  for  her  opponent, 
and  did  not  let  the  latter  head  straight  for  her.  The  extreme  case  was  when  the 
wind  blew  direct  from  one  to  the  other ;  but  there  was  a  large  space  on  either 
side  of  this  line  to  which  the  term  “  weather-gage  ”  applied.  If  the  lee  ship  be 
taken  as  the  centre  of  a  circle,  there  were  nearly  three  eighths  of  its  area  in 
which  the  other  might  be  and  still  keep  the  advantage  of  the  wind  to  a  greater 
or  less  degree.  Lee  is  the  opposite  of  weather. 


6 


INTRODUCTORY. 


or  refusing  battle  at  will,  which  in  turn  carries  the  usual 
advantage  of  an  offensive  attitude  in  the  choice  of  the  method  ' 
of  attack.  This  advantage  was  accompanied  by  certain 
drawbacks,  such  as  irregularity  introduced  into  the  order, 
exposure  to  raking  or  enfilading  cannonade,  and  the  sacrifice 
of  part  or  all  of  the  artillery-fire  of  the  assailant,  —  all  which 
were  incurred  in  approaching  the  enemy.  The  ship,  or  fleet, 
with  the  lee-gage  could  not  attack ;  if  it  did  not  wish  to  re¬ 
treat,  its  action  was  confined  to  the  defensive,  and  to  receiv¬ 
ing  battle  on  the  enemy’s  terms.  This  disadvantage  was 
compensated  by  the  comparative  ease  of  maintaining  the 
order  of  battle  undisturbed,  and  by  a  sustained  artillery-fire 
to  which  the  enemy  for  a  time  was  unable  to  reply.  Histori¬ 
cally,  these  favorable  and  unfavorable  characteristics  have 
their  counterpart  and  analogy  in  the  offensive  and  defensive 
operations  of  all  ages.  The  offence  undertakes  certain  risks 
and  disadvantages  in  order  to  reach  and  destroy  the  enemy  ; 
the  defence,  so  long  as  it  remains  such,  refuses  the  risks  of 
advance,  holds  on  to  a  careful,  well-ordered  position,  and 
avails  itself  of  the  exposure  to  which  the  assailant  submits 
himself.  These  radical  differences  between  the  weather  and 
the  lee  gage  were  so  clearly  recognized,  through  the  cloud  of 
lesser  details  accompanying  them,  that  the  former  was  ordi¬ 
narily  chosen  by  the  English,  because  their  steady  policy  was 
to  assail  and  destroy  their  enemy  ;  whereas  the  French  sought 
the  lee-gage,  because  by  so  doing  they  were  usually  able  to 
cripple  the  enemy  as  he  approached,  and  thus  evade  decisive 
encounters  and  preserve  their  ships.  The  French,  with  rare 
exceptions,  subordinated  the  action  of  the  navy  to  other 
military  considerations,  grudged  the  money  spent  upon  it,  and 
therefore  sought  to  economize  their  fleet  by  assuming  a  de¬ 
fensive  position  and  limiting  its  efforts  to  the  repelling  of 
•  _ 

assaults.  For  this  course  the  lee-gage,  skilfully  used,  was 
admirably  adapted  so  long  as  an  enemy  displayed  more  cour¬ 
age  than  conduct ;  but  when  Rodney  showed  an  intention  to 
use  the  advantage  of  the  wind,  not  merely  to  attack,  but  to 
make  a  formidable  concentration  on  a  part  of  the  enemy's 


INTRODUCTORY . 


7 


line,  his  wary  opponent,  De  Guichen,  changed  his  tactics.  In 
the  first  of  their  three  actions  the  Frenchman  took  the  lee- 
gage  ;  but  after  recognizing  Rodney’s  purpose  he  manoeuvred 
for  the  advantage  of  the  wind,  not  to  attack,  but  to  refuse 
action  except  on  his  own  terms.  The  power  to  assume  the 
offensive,  or  to  refuse  battle,  rests  no  longer  with  the  wind, 
but  with  the  party  which  has  the  greater  speed ;  which  in  a 
fleet  will  depend  not  only  upon  the  speed  of  the  individual 
ships,  but  also  upon  their  tactical  uniformity  of  action. 
Henceforth  the  ships  which  have  the  greatest  speed  will  have 
the  weather-gage. 

It  is  not  therefore  a  vain  expectation,  as  many  think,  to 
look  for  useful  lessons  in  the  history  of  sailing-ships  as  well 
as  in  that  of  galleys.  Both  have  their  points  of  resemblance 
to  the  modern  ship  ;  both  have  also  points  of  essential  differ¬ 
ence,  which  make  it  impossible  to  cite  their  experiences  or 
modes  of  action  as  tactical  precedents  to  be  followed.  But  a 
precedent  is  different  from  and  less  valuable  than  a  principle. 
The  former  may  be  originally  faulty,  or  may  cease  to  apply 
through  change  of  circumstances ;  the  latter  has  its  root 
in  the  essential  nature  of  things,  and,  however  various  its 
application  as  conditions  change,  remains  a  standard  to  which 
action  must  conform  to  attain  success.  War  has  such  prin¬ 
ciples  ;  their  existence  is  detected  by  the  study  of  the  past, 
which  reveals  them  in  successes  and  in  failures,  the  same 
from  age  to  age.  Conditions  and  weapons  change ;  but  to 
cope  with  the  one  or  successfully  wield  the  others,  respect 
must  be  had  to  these  constant  teachings  of  history  in  the 
tactics  of  the  battlefield,  or  in  those  wider  operations  of  war 
i  which  are  comprised  under  the  name  of  strategy. 

It  is  however  in  these  wider  operations,  which  embrace  a 
whole  theatre  of  war,  and  in  a  maritime  contest  may  cover  a 
large  portion  of  the  globe,  that  the  teachings  of  history  have 
a  more  evident  and  permanent  value,  because  the  conditions 
remain  more  permanent.  The  theatre  of  war  may  be  larger 
or  smaller,  its  difficulties  more  or  less  pronounced,  the  con¬ 
tending  armies  more  or  less  great,  the  necessary  movements 


8 


INTRODUCTORY. 


more  or  less  easy,  but  these  are  simply  differences  of  scale, 
of  degree,  not  of  kind.  As  a  wilderness  gives  place  to 
civilization,  as  means  of  communication  multiply,  as  roads 
are  opened,  rivers  bridged,  food-resources  increased,  the 
operations  of  war  become  easier,  more  rapid,  more  exten¬ 
sive  ;  but  the  principles  to  which  they  must  be  conformed 
remain  the  same.  When  the  march  on  foot  was  replaced  by 
carrying  troops  in  coaches,  when  the  latter  in  turn  gave  place 
to  railroads,  the  scale  of  distances  was  increased,  or,  if  you 
will,  the  scale  of  time  diminished ;  but  the  principles  which 
dictated  the  point  at  which  the  army  should  be  concentrated, 
the  direction  in  which  it  should  move,  the  part  of  the  enemy’s 
position  which  it  should  assail,  the  protection  of  communi¬ 
cations,  were  not  altered.  So,  on  the  sea,  the  advance  from 
the  galley  timidly  creeping  from  port  to  port  to  the  sailing- 
ship  launching  out  boldly  to  the  ends  of  the  earth,  and  from 
the  latter  to  the  steamship  of  our  own  time,  has  increased 
the  scope  and  the  rapidity  of  naval  operations  without  neces¬ 
sarily  changing  the  principles  which  should  direct  them ;  and 
the  speech  of  Hermocrates  twenty-three  hundred  years  ago, 
before  quoted,  contained  a  correct  strategic  plan,  which  is  as 
applicable  in  its  principles  now  as  it  was  then.  Before  hos¬ 
tile  armies  or  fleets  are  brought  into  con  tact  (a  word  which 
perhaps  better  than  any  other  indicates  the  dividing  line 
between  tactics  and  strategy),  there  are  a  number  of  ques¬ 
tions  to  be  decided,  covering  the  whole  plan  of  operations 
throughout  the  theatre  of  war.  Among  these  are  the 
proper  function  of  the  navy  in  the  war ;  its  true  objective ; 
the  point  or  points  upon  which  it  should  be  concentrated ; 
the  establishment  of  depots  of  coal  and  supplies ;  the  main¬ 
tenance  of  communications  between  these  depots  and  the 
home  base ;  the  military  value  of  commerce-destroying  as  a 
decisive  or  a  secondary  operation  of  war ;  the  system  upon 
which  commerce-destroying  can  be  most  efficiently  conducted, 
whether  by  scattered  cruisers  or  by  holding  in  force  some 
vital  centre  through  which  commercial  shipping  must  pass. 
All  these  are  strategic  questions,  and  upon  all  these  history 


INTRODUCTORY. 


9 


has  a  great  deal  to  say.  There  has  been  of  late  a  valuable 
discussion  in  English  naval  circles  as  to  the  comparative 
merits  of  the  policies  of  two  great  English  admirals,  Lord 
Howe  and  Lord  St.  Vincent,  in  the  disposition  of  the  English 
navy  when  at  war  with  France.  The  question  is  purely 
strategic,  and  is  not  of  mere  historical  interest ;  it  is  of  vital 
importance  now,  and  the  principles  upon  which  its  decision 
rests  are  the  same  now  as  then.  St.  Vincent’s  policy  saved 
England  from  invasion,  and  in  the  hands  of  Nelson  and  his 
brother  admirals  led  straight  up  to  Trafalgar. 

It  is  then  particularly  in  the  field  of  naval  strategy  that 
the  teachings  of  the  past  have  a  value  which  is  in  no  degree 
lessened.  They  are  there  useful  not  only  as  illustrative  of 
principles,  but  also  as  precedents,  owing  to  the  comparative 
permanence  of  the  conditions.  This  is  less  obviously  true  as 
to  tactics,  when  the  fleets  come  into  collision  at  the  point 
to  which  strategic  considerations  have  brought  them.  The 
unresting  progress  of  mankind  causes  continual  change  in  the 
weapons  ;  and  with  that  must  come  a  continual  change  in 
the  manner  of  fighting,  — in  the  handling  and  disposition  of 
troops  or  ships  on  the  battlefield.  Hence  arises  a  tendency 
on  the  part  of  many  connected  with  maritime  matters  to  think 
that  no  advantage  is  to  be  gained  from  the  study  of  former 
experiences ;  that  time  so  used  is  wasted.  This  view,  though 
natural,  not  only  leaves  wholly  out  of  sight  those  broad  strate¬ 
gic  considerations  which  lead  nations  to  put  fleets  afloat,  which 
direct  the  sphere  of  their  action,  and  so  have  modified  and 
will  continue  to  modify  the  history  of  the  world,  but  is  one¬ 
sided  and  narrow  even  as  to  tactics.  The  battles  of  the  past 
succeeded  or  failed  according  as  they  were  fought  in  con¬ 
formity  with  the  principles  of  war;  and  the  seaman  who  care¬ 
fully  studies  the  causes  of  success  or  failure  will  not  only 
detect  and  gradually  assimilate  these  principles,  but  will  also 
acquire  increased  aptitude  in  applying  them  to  the  tactical 
use  of  the  ships  and  weapons  of  his  own  day.  He  will  observe 
also  that  changes  of  tactics  have  not  only  taken  place  after 
changes  in  weapons,  which  necessarily  is  the  case,  but  that  the 


10 


INTRODUCTORY. 


interval  between  such  changes  has  been  unduly  long.  This 
doubtless  arises  from  the  fact  that  an  improvement  of  weapons 
is  due  to  the  energy  of  one  or  two  men,  while  changes  in  tac¬ 
tics  have  to  overcome  the  inertia  of  a  conservative  class ;  but 
it  is  a  great  evil.  It  can  be  remedied  only  by  a  candid  recog¬ 
nition  of  each  change,  by  careful  study  of  the  powers  and 
limitations  of  the  new  ship  or  weapon,  and  by  a  consequent 
adaptation  of  the  method  of  using  it  to  the  qualities  it  pos¬ 
sesses,  which  will  constitute  its  tactics.  History  shows  that  it 
is  vain  to  hope  that  military  men  generally  will  be  at  the  pains 
to  do  this,  but  that  the  one  who  does  will  go  into  battle  with 
a  great  advantage,  —  a  lesson  in  itself  of  no  mean  value. 

We  may  therefore  accept  now  the  words  of  a  French  tacti¬ 
cian,  Morogues,  who  wrote  a  century  and  a  quarter  ago: 
“  Naval  tactics  are  based  upon  conditions  the  chief  causes 
of  which,  namely  the  arms,  may  change  ;  which  in  turn  causes 
necessarily  a  change  in  the  construction  of  ships,  in  the  man¬ 
ner  of  handling  them,  and  so  finally  in  the  disposition  and 
handling  of  fleets.”  His  further  statement,  that  “  it  is  not 
a  science  founded  upon  pjjjnciples  absolutely  invariable,”  is 
more  open  to  criticism.  It  would  be  more  correct  to  say 
that  the  application  of  its  principles  varies  as  the  weapons 
change.  The  application  of  the  principles  doubtless  varies 
also  in  strategy  from  time  to  time,  but  the  variation  is  far 
less  ;  and  hence  the  recognition  of  the  underlying  principle 
is  easier.  This  statement  is  of  sufficient  importance  to  our 
subject  to  receive  some  illustrations  from  historical  events. 

The  battle  of  the  Nile,  in  1798,  was  not  only  an  overwhelm¬ 
ing  victory  for  the  English  over  the  French  fleet,  but  had  also 
the  decisive  effect  of  destroying  the  communications  between 
France  and  Napoleon’s  army  in  Egypt.  In  the  battle  itself 
the  English  admiral,  Nelson,  gave  a  most  brilliant  example  of 
grand  tactics,  if  that  be,  as  has  been  defined,  “  the  art  of 
making  good  combinations  preliminary  to  battles  as  well  as 
during  their  progress.”  The  particular  tactical  combination 
depended  upon  a  condition  now  passed  away,  which  was  the 
inability  of  the  lee  ships  of  a  fleet  at  anchor  to  come  to  the 


INTRODUCTORY. 


11 


help  of  the  weather  ones  before  the  latter  were  destroyed  ;  but 
the  principles  which  underlay  the  combination,  namely,  to 
choose  that  part  of  the  enemy’s  order  which  can  least  easily 
be  helped,  and  to  attack  it  with  superior  forces,  has  not  passed 
away.  The  action  of  Admiral  Jervis  at  Cape  St.  Vincent, 
when  with  fifteen  ships  he  won  a  victory  over  twenty-seven, 
was  dictated  by  the  same  principle,  though  in  this  case  the 
enemy  was  not  at  anchor,  but  under  way.  Yet  men’s  minds 
are  so  constituted  that  they  seem  more  impressed  by  the 
transiency  of  the  conditions  than  by  the  undying  principle 
which  coped  with  them.  In  the  strategic  effect  of  Nelson’s 
victory  upon  the  course  of  the  war,  on  the  contrary,  the  prin¬ 
ciple  involved  is  not  only  more  easily  recognized,  but  it  is  at 
once  seen  to  be  applicable  to  our  own  day.  The  issue  of  the 
enterprise  in  Egypt  depended  upon  keeping  open  the  com¬ 
munications  with  France.  The  victory  of  the  Nile  destroyed 
the  naval  force,  by  which  alone  the  communications  could  be 
assured,  and  determined  the  final  failure  ;  and  it  is  at  once 
seen,  not  only  that  the  blow  was  struck  in  accordance  with  the 
principle  of  striking  at  the  ene«ay’s  line  of  communication, 
but  also  that  the  same  principle  is  valid  now,  and  would  be 
equally  so  in  the  days  of  the  galley  as  of  the  sailing-ship  or 
steamer. 

Nevertheless,  a  vague  feeling  of  contempt  for  the  past,  sup¬ 
posed  to  be  obsolete,  combines  with  natural  indolence  to  blind 
men  even  to  those  permanent  strategic  lessons  which  lie  close 
to  the  surface  of  naval  history.  For  instance,  how  many  look 
upon  the  battle  of  Trafalgar,  the  crown  of  Nelson’s  glory  and 
the  seal  of  his  genius,  as  other  than  an  isolated  event  of 
.exceptional  grandeur  ?  How  many  ask  themselves  the  stra¬ 
tegic  question,  u  How  did  the  ships  come  to  be  just  there  ?” 
How  many  realize  it  to  be  the  final  act  in  a  great  strategic 
drama,  extending  over  a  year  or  more,  in  which  two  of  the 
greatest  leaders  that  ever  lived,  Napoleon  and  Nelson,  were 
pitted  against  each  other  ?  At  Trafalgar  it  was  not  Villeneuve 
that  failed,  but  Napoleon  that  was  vanquished  ;  not  Nelson 
that  won,  but  England  that  was  saved  ;  and  why  ?  Because 


12 


INTRODUCTORY. 


Napoleon’s  combinations  failed,  and  Nelson’s  intuitions  and 
activity  kept  the  English  fleet  ever  on  the  track  of  the  enemy, 
and  brought  it  up  in  time  at  the  decisive  moment.1  The  tac¬ 
tics  at  Trafalgar,  while  open  to  criticism  in  detail,  were  in 
their  main  features  conformable  to  the  principles  of  war,  and 
their  audacity  was  justified  as  well  by  the  urgency  of  the  case 
as  by  the  results  ;  but  the  great  lessons  of  efficiency  in  prepa¬ 
ration,  of  activity  and  energy  in  execution,  and  of  thought 
and  insight  on  the  part  of  the  English  leader  during  the 
previous  months,  are  strategic  lessons,  and  as  such  they  still 
remain  good. 

In  these  two  cases  events  were  worked  out  to  their  natural 
and  decisive  end.  A  third  may  be  cited,  in  which,  as  no  such 
definite  end  was  reached,  an  opinion  as  to  what  should  have 
been  done  may  be  open  to  dispute.  In  the  war  of  the  Ameri¬ 
can  Revolution,  France  and  Spain  became  allies  against  Eng¬ 
land  in  1779.  The  united  fleets  thrice  appeared  in  the 
English  Channel,  once  to  the  number  of  sixty-six  sail  of  the 
line,  driving  the  English  fleet  to  seek  refuge  in  its  ports  be¬ 
cause  far  inferior  in  numbers.  Now,  the  great  aim  of  Spain 
was  to  recover  Gibraltar  and  Jamaica;  and  to  the  former  end 
immense  efforts  both  by  land  and  sea  were  put  forth  by  the 
allies  against  that  nearly  impregnable  fortress.  They  were 
fruitless.  The  question  suggested  —  and  it  is  purely  one  of 
naval  strategy  —  is  this :  W ould  not  Gibraltar  have  been  more 
surely  recovered  by  controlling  the  English  Channel,  attacking 
the  British  fleet  even  in  its  harbors,  and  threatening  England 
with  annihilation  of  commerce  and  invasion  at  home,  than  by 
far  greater  efforts  directed  against  a  distant  and  very  strong 
outpost  of  her  empire  ?  The  English  people,  from  long  im¬ 
munity,  were  particularly  sensitive  to  fears  of  invasion,  and 
their  great  confidence  in  their  fleets,  if  rudely  shaken,  would 
have  left  them  proportionately  disheartened.  However  de¬ 
cided,  the  question  as  a  point  of  strategy  is  fair ;  and  it  is 
proposed  in  another  form  by  a  French  officer  of  the  period, 
who  favored  directing  the  great  effort  on  a  West  India  island 

1  See  note  at  end  of  Introductory  Chapter,  page  23. 


INTRODUCTORY. 


13 


which  might  be  exchanged  against  Gibraltar.  It  is  not,  how¬ 
ever,  likely  that  England  would  have  given  up  the  key  of  the 
Mediterranean  for  any  other  foreign  possession,  though  she  - 
might  have  yielded  it  to  save  her  firesides  and  her  capital. 
Napoleon  once  said  that  he  would  reconquer  Pondicherry  on 
the  banks  of  the  Vistula.  Could  he  have  controlled  the  Eng¬ 
lish  Channel,  as  the  allied  fleet  did  for  a  moment  in  1779, 
can  it  be  doubted  that  he  would  have  conquered  Gibraltar  on 
the  shores  of  England  ? 

To  impress  more  strongly  the  truth  that  history  both  sug¬ 
gests  strategic  study  and  illustrates  the  principles  of  war  by 
the  facts  which  it  transmits,  two  more  instances  will  be  taken, 
which  are  more  remote  in  time  than  the  period  specially  con¬ 
sidered  in  this  work.  How  did  it  happen  that,  in  two  great 
contests  between  the  powers  of  the  East  and  of  the  West  in 
the  Mediterranean,  in  one  of  which  the  empire  of  the  known 
world  was  at  stake,  the  opposing  fleets  met  on  spots  so  near 
each  other  as  Actium  and  Lepanto  ?  Was  this  a  mere  coin¬ 
cidence,  or  was  it  due  to  conditions  that  recurred,  and  may 
recur  again  ? 1  If  the  latter,  it  is  worth  while  to  study  out  the 
reason ;  for  if  there  should  again  arise  a  great  eastern  power 
of  the  sea  like  that  of  Antony  or  of  Turkey,  the  strategic 
questions  would  be  similar.  At  present,  indeed,  it  seems  that 
the  centre  of  sea  power,  resting  mainly  with  England  and 
France,  is  overwhelmingly  in  the  West ;  but  should  any 
chance  add  to  the  control  of  the  Black  Sea  basin,  which  Rus¬ 
sia  now  has,  the  possession  of  the  entrance  to  the  Mediterra¬ 
nean,  the  existing  strategic  conditions  affecting  sea  power 
would  all  be  modified.  Now,  were  the  West  arrayed  against 
the  East,  England  and  France  would  go  at  once  unopposed  to 
the  Levant,  as  they  did  in  1854,  and  as  England  alone  went  in 
1878;  in  case  of  the  change  suggested,  the  East,  as  twice 
before,  would  meet  the  West  half-way. 

At  a  very  conspicuous  and  momentous  period  of  the  world’s 
history,  Sea  Power  had  a  strategic  bearing  and  weight  which 

1  The  battle  of  Navarino  (1827)  between  Turkey  and  the  Western  Power* 
was  fought  in  this  neighborhood. 


14 


INTRODUCTORY. 


lias  received  scant  recognition.  There  cannot  now  be  had 

the  full  knowledge  necessary  for  tracing  in  detail  its  influence 

> 

upon  the  issue  of  the  second  Punic  War;  but  the  indications 
which  remain  are  sufficient  to  warrant  the  assertion  that  it 
was  a  determining  factor.  An  accurate  judgment  upon  this 
point  cannot  be  formed  by  mastering  only  such  facts  of  the 
particular  contest  as  have  been  clearly  transmitted,  for  as 
usual  the  naval  transactions  have  been  slightingly  passed 
over  ;  there  is  needed  also  familiarity  with  the  details  of  gen¬ 
eral  naval  history  in  order  to  draw,  from  slight  indications, 
correct  inferences  based  upon  a  knowledge  of  what  has  been 
possible  at  periods  whose  history  is  well  known.  The  con¬ 
trol  of  the  sea,  however  real,  does  not  imply  that  an  enemy’s 
single  ships  or  small  squadrons  cannot  steal  out  of  port, 
cannot  cross  more  or  less  frequented  tracts  of  ocean,  make 
harassing  descents  upon  unprotected  points  of  a  long  coast¬ 
line,  enter  blockaded  harbors.  On  the  contrary,  history  has 
shown  that  such  evasions  are  always  possible,  to  some  ex¬ 
tent,  to  the  weaker  party,  however  great  the  inequality  of 
naval  strength.  It  is  not  therefore  inconsistent  with  the  gen¬ 
eral  control  of  the  sea,  or  of  a  decisive  part  of  it,  by  the  Roman 
fleets,  that  the  Carthaginian  admiral  Bomilcar  in  the  fourth 
year  of  the  w^ar,  after  the  stunning  defeat  of  Cannae,  landed 
four  thousand  men  and  a  body  of  elephants  in  south  Italy  ; 
nor  that  in  the  seventh  year,  flying  from  the  Roman  fleet  off 
Syracuse,  he  again  appeared  at  Tarentum,  then  in  Hannibal’s 
hands  ;  nor  that  Hannibal  sent  despatch  vessels  to  Carthage  ; 
nor  even  that,  at  last,  he  withdrew  in  safety  to  Africa  with 
his  wasted  army.  None  of  these  things  prove  that  the  govern¬ 
ment  in  Carthage  could,  if  it  wished,  have  sent  Hannibal 
the  constant  support  which,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  he  did  not 
receive  ;  but  they  do  tend  to  create  a  natural  impression  that 
such  help  could  have  been  given.  Therefore  the  statement, 
that  the  Roman  preponderance  at  sea  had  a  decisive  effect 
upon  the  course  of  the  war,  needs  to  be  made  good  by  an  ex¬ 
amination  of  ascertained  facts.  Thus  the  kind  and  degree  of 
its  influence  may  be  fairly  estimated. 


INTRODUCTORY. 


15 


At  the  beginning  of  the  war,  Mommsen  says,  Rome  con¬ 
trolled  the  seas.  To  whatever  cause,  or  combination  of 
causes,  it  be  attributed,  this  essentially  non-maritime  state 
had  in  the  first  Punic  War  established  over  its  sea-faring 
rival  a  naval  supremacy,  which  still  lasted.  In  the  second  war 
there  was  no  naval  battle  of  importance,  —  a  circumstance 
which  in  itself,  and  still  more  in  connection  with  other  well- 
ascertained  facts,  indicates  a  superiority  analogous  to  that 
which  at  other  epochs  has  been  marked  by  the  same  feature. 

As  Hannibal  left  no  memoirs,  the  motives  are  unknown 
which  determined  him  to  the  perilous  and  almost  ruinous 
march  through  Gaul  and  across  the  Alps.  It  is  certain,  how¬ 
ever,  that  his  fleet  on  the  coast  of  Spain  was  not  strong 
enough  to  contend  with  that  of  Rome.  Had  it  been,  he  might 
still  have  followed  the  road  he  actually  did,  for  reasons  that 
weighed  with  him ;  but  had  he  gone  by  the  sea,  he  would  not 
have  lost  thirty-three  thousand  out  of  the  sixty  thousand 
veteran  soldiers  with  whom  he  started. 

While  Hannibal  was  making  this  dangerous  march,  the 
Romans  were  sending  to  Spain,  under  the  two  elder  Scipios, 
one  part  of  their  fleet,  carrying  a  consular  army.  This  made 
the  voyage  without  serious  loss,  and  the  army  established 
itself  successfully  north  of  the  Ebro,  on  Hannibal’s  line  of 
communications.  At  the  same  time  another  squadron,  with 
an  army  commanded  by  the  other  consul,  was  sent  to  Sicily. 
The  two  together  numbered  two  hundred  and  twenty  ships. 
On  its  station  each  met  and  defeated  a  Carthaginian  squad¬ 
ron  with  an  ease  which  may  be  inferred  from  the  slight 
mention  made  of  the  actions,  and  which  indicates  the  actual 
superiority  of  the  Roman  fleet. 

After  the  second  year  the  war  assumed  the  following 
shape :  Hannibal,  having  entered  Italy  by  the  north,  after  a 
series  of  successes  had  passed  southward  around  Rome  and 
fixed  himself  in  southern  Italy,  living  off  the  country,  — 
a  condition  which  tended  to  alienate  the  people,  and  was  es¬ 
pecially  precarious  when  in  contact  with  the  mighty  politi¬ 
cal  and  military  system  of  control  which  Rome  had  there 


16 


INTRODUCTORY . 


established.  It  was  therefore  from  the  first  urgently  neces¬ 
sary  that  he  should  establish,  between  himself  and  some 
reliable  base,  that  stream  of  supplies  and  reinforcements 
which  in  terms  of  modern  war  is  called  “  communications.” 
There  were  three  friendly  regions  which  might,  each  or  all, 
serve  as  such  a  base,  —  Carthage  itself,  Macedonia,  and  Spain. 
With  the  first  two,  communication  could  be  had  only  by  sea. 
From  Spain,  where  his  firmest  support  was  found,  he  could 
be  reached  by  both  land  and  sea,  unless  an  enemy  barred  the 
passage ;  but  the  sea  route  was  the  shorter  and  easier. 

In  the  first  years  of  the  war,  Rome,  by  her  sea  power,  con¬ 
trolled  absolutely  the  basin  between  Italy,  Sicily,  and  Spain, 
known  as  the  Tyrrhenian  and  Sardinian  Seas.  The  sea- 
coast  from  the  Ebro  to  the  Tiber  was  mostly  friendly  to  her. 
In  the  fourth  year,  after  the  battle  of  CannaB,  Syracuse  for¬ 
sook  the  Roman  alliance,  the  revolt  spread  through  Sicily,  and 
Macedonia  also  entered  into  an  offensive  league  with  Hannibal. 
These  changes  extended  the  necessary  operations  of  the  Ro¬ 
man  fleet,  and  taxed  its  strength.  What  disposition  was  made 
of  it,  and  how  did  it  thereafter  influence  the  struggle  ? 

The  indications  are  clear  that  Rome  at  no  time  ceased  to 
control  the  Tyrrhenian  Sea,  for  her  squadrons  passed  un¬ 
molested  from  Italy  to  Spain.  On  the  Spanish  coast  also 
she  had  full  sway  till  the  younger  Scipio  saw  fit  to  lay  up 
the  fleet.  In  the  Adriatic,  a  squadron  and  naval  station 
were  established  at  Brindisi  to  check  Macedonia,  which  per¬ 
formed  their  task  so  well  that  not  a  soldier  of  the  phalanxes 
ever  set  foot  in  Italy.  “  The  want  of  a  war  fleet,”  says 
Mommsen,  “  paralyzed  Philip  in  all  his  movements.”  Here 
the  effect  of  Sea  Power  is  not  even  a  matter  of  inference. 

In  Sicily,  the  struggle  centred  about  Syracuse.  The  fleets 
of  Carthage  and  Rome  met  there,  but  the  superiority  evi¬ 
dently  lay  with  the  latter ;  for  though  the  Carthaginians  at 
times  succeeded  in  throwing  supplies  into  the  city,  they 
avoided  meeting  the  Roman  fleet  in  battle.  With  Lilybaeum, 
Palermo,  and  Messina  in  its  hands,  the  latter  was  well  based 
in  the  north  coast  of  the  island.  Access  by  the  south  was 


INTRODUCTORY . 


17 


left  open  to  the  Carthaginians,  and  they  were  thus  able  to 
maintain  the  insurrection. 

Putting  these  facts  together,  it  is  a  reasonable  inference, 
and  supported  by  the  whole  tenor  of  the  history,  that  the 
Roman  sea  power  controlled  the  sea  north  of  a  line  drawn 
from  Tarragona  in  Spain  to  Lilybaeum  (the  modern  Mar¬ 
sala),  at  the  west  end  of  Sicily,  thence  round  by  the  north 
side  of  the  island  through  the  straits  of  Messina  down  to 
Syracuse,  and  from  there  to  Brindisi  in  the  Adriatic.  This 
control  lasted,  unshaken,  throughout  the  war.  It  did  not 
exclude  maritime  raids,  large  or  small,  such  as  have  been 
spoken  of ;  but  it  did  forbid  the  sustained  and  secure  com¬ 
munications  of  which  Hannibal  was  in  deadly  need. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  seems  equally  plain  that  for  the  first 
ten  years  of  the  war  the  Roman  fleet  was  not  strong  enough 
for  sustained  operations  in  the  sea  between  Sicily  and  Car¬ 
thage,  nor  indeed  much  to  the  south  of  the  line  indicated. 
When  Hannibal  started,  he  assigned  such  ships  as  he  had  to 
*  maintaining  the  communications  between  Spain  and  Africa, 
which  the  Romans  did  not  then  attempt  to  disturb. 

The  Roman  sea  power,  therefore,  threw  Macedonia  wholly 
out  of  the  war.  It  did  not  keep  Carthage  from  maintaining  a 
useful  and  most  harassing  diversion  in  Sicily  ;  but  it  did  pre¬ 
vent  her  sending  troops,  when  they  would  have  been  most  use¬ 
ful,  to  her  great  general  in  Italy.  How  was  it  as  to  Spain  ? 

Spain  was  the  region  upon  which  the  father  of  Hannibal 
and  Hannibal  himself  had  based  their  intended  invasion  of 
Italy.  For  eighteen  years  before  this  began  they  had  occu¬ 
pied  the  country,  extending  and  consolidating  their  power, 
both  political  and  military,  with  rare  sagacity.  They  had 
raised,  and  trained  in  local  wars,  a  large  and  now  veteran 
army.  Upon  his  own  departure,  Hannibal  intrusted  the 
government  to  his  younger  brother,  Hasdrubal,  who  pre¬ 
served  toward  him  to  the  end  a  loyalty  and  devotion  which 
he  had  no  reason  to  hope  from  the  faction-cursed  mother-city 
in  Africa. 

At  the  time  of  his  starting,  the  Carthaginian  power  in 

2 


18 


INTRODUCTORY . 


Spain  was  secured  from  Cadiz  to  the  river  Ebro.  The  re¬ 
gion  between  this  river  and  the  Pyrenees  was  inhabited  by 
tribes  friendly  to  the  Romans,  but  unable,  in  the  absence 
of  the  latter,  to  oppose  a  successful  resistance  to  Hannibal. 
He  put  them  down,  leaving  eleven  thousand  soldiers  under 
Hanno  to  keep  military  possession  of  the  country,  lest  the 
Romans  should  establish  themselves  there,  and  thus  disturb 
liis  communications  with  his  base. 

Cnseus  Scipio,  however,  arrived  on  the  spot  by  sea  the 
same  year  with  twenty  thousand  men,  defeated  Hanno,  and 
occupied  both  the  coast  and  interior  north  of  the  Ebro.  The 
Romans  thus  held  ground  by  which  they  entirely  closed  the 
road  between  Hannibal  and  reinforcements  from  Hasdrubal, 
and  whence  they  could  attack  the  Carthaginian  power  in 
Spain ;  while  their  own  communications  with  Italy,  being  by 
water,  were  secured  by  their  naval  supremacy.  They  made 
a  naval  base  at  Tarragona,  confronting  that  of  Hasdrubal 
at  Cartagena,  and  then  invaded  the  Carthaginian  dominions. 
The  war  in  Spain  went  on  under  the  elder  Scipios,  seem¬ 
ingly  a  side  issue,  with  varying  fortune  for  seven  years ;  at 
the  end  of  which  time  Hasdrubal  inflicted  upon  them  a 
crushing  defeat,  the  two  brothers  were  killed,  and  the  Car¬ 
thaginians  nearly  succeeded  in  breaking  through  to  the 
Pyrenees  with  reinforcements  for  Hannibal.  The  attempt, 
however,  was  checked  for  the  moment ;  and  before  it  could 
be  renewed,  the  fall  of  Capua  released  twelve  thousand 
veteran  Romans,  who  were  sent  to  Spain  under  Claudius 
Nero,  a  man  of  exceptional  ability,  to  whom  was  due  later 
the  most  decisive  military  movement  made  by  any  Roman 
general  during  the  Second  Punic  War.  This  seasonable 
reinforcement,  which  again  assured  the  shaken  grip  on 
Hasdrubal’s  line  of  march,  came  by  sea, —  a  way  which, 
though  most  rapid  and  easy,  was  closed  to  the  Carthaginians 
by  the  Roman  navy. 

Two  years  later  the  younger  Publius  Scipio,  celebrated 
afterward  as  Africanus,  received  the  command  in  Spain,  and 
captured  Cartagena  by  a  combined  military  and  naval  attack ; 


INTRODUCTORY. 


19 


after  which  he  took  the  most  extraordinary  step  of  breaking 
up  his  fleet  and  transferring  the  seamen  to  the  army.  Not 
contented  to  act  merely  as  the  “  containing  ”  1  force  against 
Hasdrubal  by  closing  the  passes  of  the  Pyrenees,  Scipio 
pushed  forward  into  southern  Spain,  and  fought  a  severe 
but  indecisive  battle  on  the  Guadalquivir ;  after  which 
Hasdrubal  slipped  away  from  him,  hurried  north,  crossed  the 
Pyrenees  at  their  extreme  west,  and  pressed  on  to  Italy, 
where  Hannibal’s  position  was  daily  growing  weaker,  the 
natural  waste  of  his  army  not  being  replaced. 

The  war  had  lasted  ten  years,  when  Hasdrubal,  having  met 
little  loss  on  the  way,  entered  Italy  at  the  north.  The  troops 
he  brought,  could  they  be  safely  united  with  those  under  the 
command  of  the  unrivalled  Hannibal,  might  give  a  decisive 
turn  to  the  war,  for  Rome  herself  was  nearly  exhausted  ;  the 
iron  links  which  bound  her  own  colonies  and  the  allied  States 
to  her  were  strained  to  the  utmost,  and  some  had  already 
snapped.  But  the  military  position  of  the  two  brothers  was 
also  perilous  in  the  extreme.  One  being  at  the  river 
Metaurus,  the  other  in  Apulia,  two  hundred  miles  apart,  each 
was  confronted  by  a  superior  enemy,  and  both  these  Roman 
armies  were  between  their  separated  opponents.  This  false 
situation,  as  well  as  the  long  delay  of  Hasdrubal’s  coming, 
was  due  to  the  Roman  control  of  the  sea,  which  throughout 
the  war  limited  the  mutual  support  of  the  Carthaginian 
brothers  to  the  route  through  Gaul.  At  the  very  time  that 
Hasdrubal  was  making  his  long  and  dangerous  circuit  by 
land,  Scipio  had  sent  eleven  thousand  men  from  Spain  by  sea 
to  reinforce  the  army  opposed  to  him.  The  upshot  was  that 
messengers  from  Hasdrubal  to  Hannibal,  having  to  pass  over 
so  wide  a  belt  of  hostile  country,  fell  into  the  hands  of  Clau¬ 
dius  Nero,  commanding  the  southern  Roman  army,  who  thus 
learned  the  route  which  Hasdrubal  intended  to  take.  Nero 
correctly  appreciated  the  situation,  and,  escaping  the  vigilance 

1  A  “  containing  ”  force  is  one  to  which,  in  a  military  combination,  is  assigned 
the  duty  of  stopping,  or  delaying  the  advance  of  a  portion  of  the  enemy,  while 
the  main  effort  of  the  army  or  armies  is  being  exerted  in  a  different  quarter. 


20 


INTRODUCTORY. 


of  Hannibal,  made  a  rapid  march  with  eight  thousand  of  his 
best  troops  to  join  the  forces  in  the  north.  The  junction 
being  effected,  the  two  consuls  fell  upon  Hasdrubal  in  over¬ 
whelming  numbers  and  destroyed  his  army  ;  the  Carthaginian 
leader  himself  falling  in  the  battle.  Hannibal’s  first  news  of 
the  disaster  was  by  the  head  of  his  brother  being  thrown  into 
his  camp.  He  is  said  to  have  exclaimed  that  Rome  would 
now  be  mistress  of  the  world  ;  and  the  battle  of  Metaurus  is 
generally  accepted  as  decisive  of  the  struggle  between  the  two 
States. 

The  military  situation  which  finally  resulted  in  the  battle 
of  the  Metaurus  and  the  triumph  of  Rome  may  be  summed  up 
as  follows :  To  overthrow  Rome  it  was  necessary  to  attack  her 
in  Italy  at  the  heart  of  her  power,  and  shatter  the  strongly 
linked  confederacy  of  which  she  was  the  head.  This  was  the 
objective.  To  reach  it,  the  Carthaginians  needed  a  solid  base 
of  operations  and  a  secure  line  of  communications.  The  for¬ 
mer  was  established  in  Spain  by  the  genius  of  the  great  Barca 
family  ;  the  latter  was  never  achieved.  There  were  two  lines 
possible,  —  the  one  direct  by  sea,  the  other  circuitous  through 
Gaul.  The  first  was  blocked  by  the  Roman  sea  power,  the 
second  imperilled  and  finally  intercepted  through  the  occupa¬ 
tion  of  northern  Spain  by  the  Roman  army.  This  occupation 
was  made  possible  through  the  control  of  the  sea,  which  the 
Carthaginians  never  endangered.  With  respect  to  Hannibal 
and  his  base,  therefore,  Rome  occupied  two  central  positions, 
Rome  itself  and  northern  Spain,  joined  by  an  easy  interior 
line  of  communications,  the  sea ;  by  which  mutual  support 
was  continually  given. 

Had  the  Mediterranean  been  a  level  desert  of  land,  in 
which  the  Romans  held  strong  mountain  ranges  in  Corsica  and 
Sardinia,  fortified  posts  at  Tarragona,  Lilybasum,  and  Messina, 
the  Italian  coast-line  nearly  to  Genoa,  and  allied  fortresses  in 
Marseilles  and  other  points  ;  had  they  also  possessed  an  armed 
force  capable  by  its  character  of  traversing  that  desert  at  will, 
but  in  which  their  opponents  were  very  inferior  and  therefore 
compelled  to  a  great  circuit  in  order  to  concentrate  their 


INTRODUCTORY. 


21 


troops,  the  military  situation  would  have  been  at  once  recog¬ 
nized,  and  no  words  would  have  been  too  strong  to  express 
the  value  and  effect  of  that  peculiar  force.  It  would  have 
been  perceived,  also,  that  the  enemy’s  force  of  the  same 
kind  might,  however  inferior  in  strength,  make  an  inroad, 
or  raid,  upon  the  territory  thus  held,  might  burn  a  village 
or  waste  a  few  miles  of  borderland,  might  even  cut  off  a 
convoy  at  times,  without,  in  a  military  sense,  endangering 
the  communications.  Such  predatory  operations  have  been 
carried  on  in  all  ages  by  the  weaker  maritime  belligerent,  but 
they  by  no  means  warrant  the  inference,  irreconcilable  with 
the  known  facts,  “  that  neither  Rome  nor  Carthage  could  be 
said  to  have  undisputed  mastery  of  the  sea,”  because  “  Roman 
fleets  sometimes  visited  the  coasts  of  Africa,  and  Carthaginian 
fleets  in  the  same  way  appeared  off  the  coast  of  Italy.”  In 
the  case  under  consideration,  the  navy  played  the  part  of  such 
a  force  upon  the  supposed  desert ;  but  as  it  acts  on  an 
element  strange  to  most  writers,  as  its  members  have  been 
from  time  immemorial  a  strange  race  apart,  without  prophets 
of  their  own,  neither  themselves  nor  their  calling  understood, 
its  immense  determining  influence  upon  the  history  of  that 
era,  and  consequently  upon  the  history  of  the  world,  has 
been  overlooked.  If  the  preceding  argument  is  sound,  it  is 
as  defective  to  omit  sea  power  from  the  list  of  principal 
factors  in  the  result,  as  it  would  be  absurd  to  claim  for  it  an 
exclusive  influence. 

Instances  such  as  have  been  cited,  drawn  from  widely 
separated  periods  of  time,  both  before  and  after  that  specially 
treated  in  this  work,  serve  to  illustrate  the  intrinsic  interest 
of  the  subject,  and  the  character  of  the  lessons  which  history 
has  to  teach.  As  before  observed,  these  come  more  often 
under  the  head  of  strategy  than  of  tactics ;  they  bear  rather 
upon  the  conduct  of  campaigns  than  of  battles,  and  hence  are 
fraught  with  more  lasting  value.  To  quote  a  great  authority 
in  this  connection,  Jomini  says :  “  Happening  to  be  in  Paris 
near  the  end  of  1851,  a  distinguished  person  did  me  the  honor 
to  ask  my  opinion  as  to  whether  recent  improvements  in  fire- 


22 


INTRODUCTORY. 


arms  would  cause  any  great  modifications  in  the  way  of  mak¬ 
ing  war.  I  replied  that  they  would  probably  have  an  influence 
upon  the  details  of  tactics,  but  that  in  great  strategic  operations 
and  the  grand  combinations  of  battles,  victory  would,  now  as 
ever,  result  from  the  application  of  the  principles  which  had 
led  to  the  success  of  great  generals  in  all  ages  ;  of  Affixed  er 
and  Caesar,  as  well  as  of  Frederick  and  Napoleon.”  This  study 
has  become  more  than  ever  important  now  to  navies,  because  of 
the  great  and  steady  power  of  movement  possessed  by  the  mod¬ 
ern  steamer.  The  best-planned  schemes  might  fail  through 
stress  of  weather  in  the  days  of  the  galley  and  the  sailing-ship ; 
but  this  difficulty  has  almost  disappeared.  The  principles  which 
should  direct  great  naval  combinations  have  been  applicable  to 
all  ages,  and  are  deducible  from  history  ;  but  the  power  to  carry 
them  out  with  little  regard  to  the  weather  is  a  recent  gain. 

The  definitions  usually  given  of  the  word  “  strategy  ”  con¬ 
fine  it  to  military  combinations  embracing  one  or  more  fields 
of  operations,  either  wholly  distinct  or-mutually  dependent,  but 
always  regarded  as  actual  or  immediate  scenes  of  war.  How¬ 
ever  this  may  be  on  shore,  a  recent  French  author  is  quite 
right  in  pointing  out  that  such  a  definition  is  too  narrow  for 
naval  strategy.  “  This,”  he  says,  “  differs  from  military 
strategy  in  that  it  is  as  necessary  in  peace  as  in  war.  Indeed, 
in  peace  it  may  gain  its  most  decisive  victories  by  occupying 
in  a  country,  either  by  purchase  or  treaty,  excellent  positions 
which  would  perhaps  hardly  be  got  by  war.  It  learns  to 
profit  by  all  opportunities  of  settling  on  some  chosen  point  of 
a  coast,  and  to  render  definitive  an  occupation  which  at  first 
was  only  transient.”  A  generation  that  has  seen  England 
within  ten  years  occupy  successively  Cyprus  and  Egypt,  under 
terms  and  conditions  on  their  face  transient,  but  which  have 
not  yet  led  to  the  abandonment  of  the  positions  taken,  can 
readily  agree  with  this  remark  ;  which  indeed  receives  con¬ 
stant  illustration  from  the  quiet  persistency  with  which  all 
the  great  sea  powers  are  seeking  position  after  position,  less 
noted  and  less  noteworthy  than  Cyprus  and  Egypt,  in  the 
different  seas  to  which  their  people  and  their  ships  penetrate. 


INTRODUCTORY. 


23 


«  Naval  strategy  has  indeed  for  its  end  to  found,  support,  and 
increase,  as  well  in  peace  as  in  war,  the  sea  power  of  a 
country  ;  ”  and  therefore  its  study  has  an  interest  and  value 
for  all  citizens  of  a  free  country,  but  especially  for  those  who 
are  charged  with  its  foreign  and  military  relations. 

Tl^  general  conditions  that  either  are  essential  to  or 
powerfully  affect  the  greatness  of  a  nation  upon  the  sea  will 
now  be  examined  ;  after  which  a  more  particular  considera¬ 
tion  of  the  various  maritime  nations  of  Europe  at  the  middle 
of  the  seventeenth  century,  where  the  historical  survey  begins, 
will  serve  at  once  to  illustrate  and  give  precision  to  the 
conclusions  upon  the  general  subject. 


Note. —  The  brilliancy  of  Nelson’s  fame,  dimming  as  it  does  that  of  all 
his  contemporaries,  and  the  implicit  trust  felt  by  England  in  him  as  the  one 
man  able  to  save  her  from  the  schemes  of  Napoleon,  should  not  of  course 
obscure  the  fact  that  only  one  portion  of  the  field  was,  or  could  be,  oc¬ 
cupied  by  him.  Napoleon’s  aim,  in  the  campaign  which  ended  at  Trafal¬ 
gar,  was  to  unite  in  the  West  Indies  the  French  fleets  of  Brest,  Toulon,  and 
Rochefort,  together  with  a  strong  body  of  Spanish  ships,  thus  forming  an 
overwhelming  force  which  he  intended  should  return  together  to  the  English 
Channel  and  cover  the  crossing  of  the  French  army.  He  naturally  ex¬ 
pected  that,  with  England’s  interests  scattered  all  over  the  world,  confusion 
and  distraction  would  arise  from  ignorance  of  the  destination  of  the  French 
squadrons,  and  the  English  navy  be  drawn  away  from  his  objective  point. 
The  portion  of  the  field  committed  to  Nelson  was  the  Mediterranean,  where 
he  watched  the  great  arsenal  of  Toulon  and  the  highways  alike  to  the  East 
and  to  the  Atlantic.  This  was  inferior  in  consequence  to  no  other,  and  as¬ 
sumed  additional  importance  in  the  eyes  of  Nelson  from  his  conviction  that 
the  former  attempts  on  Egypt  would  be  renewed.  Owing  to  this  persuasion 
he  took  at  first  a  false  step,  which  delayed  his  pursuit  of  the  Toulon  fleet 
when  it  sailed  under  the  command  of  Villeneuve  ;  and  the  latter  was  further 
favored  by  a  long  continuance  of  fair  winds,  while  the  English  had  head 
winds.  But  while  all  this  is  true,  while  the  failure  of  Napoleon’s  combinations 
must  be  attributed  to  the  tenacious  grip  of  the  English  blockade  off  Brest,  as 
well  as  to  Nelson’s  energetic  pursuit  of  the  Toulon  fleet  when  it  escaped  to 
the  West  Indies  and  again  on  its  hasty  return  to  Europe,  the  latter  is  fairly 
entitled  to  the  eminent  distinction  which  history  has  accorded  it,  and  which 
is  asserted  in  the  text.  Nelson  did  not,  indeed,  fathom  the  intentions  of 
Napoleon.  This  may  have  been  owing,  as  some  have  said,  to  lack  of  insight; 
but  it  may  be  more  simply  laid  to  the  usual  disadvantage  under  which  the 


24 


INTRODUCTORY. 


defence  lies  before  the  blow  has  fallen,  of  ignorance  as  to  the  point  threat, 
ened  by  the  offence.  It  is  insight  enough  to  fasten  on  the  key  of  a  situation  ; 
and  this  Nelson  rightly  saw  was  the  fleet,  not  the  station.  Consequently, 
his  action  has  afforded  a  striking  instance  of  how  tenacity  of  purpose  and 
untiring  energy  in  execution  can  repair  a  first  mistake  and  baffle  deeply 
laid  plans.  His  Mediterranean  command  embraced  many  duties  and  cares  ; 
but  amid  and  dominating  them  all,  he  saw  clearly  the  Toulon  fleet  as  the 
controlling  factor  there,  and  an  important  factor  in  any  naval  combination 
of  the  Emperor.  Hence  his  attention  was  unwaveringly  fixed  upon  it ;  so 
much  so  that  he  called  it  “  his  fleet,”  a  phrase  which  has  somewhat  vexed 
the  sensibilities  of  French  critics.  This  simple  and  accurate  view  of  the 
military  situation  strengthened  him  in  taking  the  fearless  resolution  and 
bearing  the  immense  responsibility  of  abandoning  his  station  in  order  to 
follow  “  his  fleet.”  Determined  thus  on  a  pursuit  the  undeniable  wisdom 
of  which  should  not  obscure  the  greatness  of  mind  that  undertook  it,  he 
followed  so  vigorously  as  to  reach  Cadiz  on  his  return  a  week  before 
Yilleneuve  entered  Ferrol,  despite  unavoidable  delays  arising  from  false  in¬ 
formation  and  uncertainty  as  to  the  enemy’s  movements.  The  same  untir¬ 
ing  ardor  enabled  him  to  bring  up  his  own  ships  from  Cadiz  to  Brest  in 
time  to  make  the  fleet  there  superior  to  Villeneuve’s,  had  the  latter  persisted 
in  his  attempt  to  reach  the  neighborhood.  The  English,  very  inferior  in 
aggregate  number  of  vessels  to  the  allied  fleets,  were  by  this  seasonable  re¬ 
inforcement  of  eight  veteran  ships  put  into  the  best  possible  position  strate¬ 
gically,  as  will  be  pointed  out  in  dealing  with  similar  conditions  in  the  war 
of  the  American  Revolution.  Their  forces  were  united  in  one  great  fleet  in 
the  Bay  of  Biscay,  interposed  between  the  two  divisions  of  the  enemy  in 
Brest  and  Ferrol,  superior  in  number  to  either  singly,  and  with  a  strong 
probability  of  being  able  to  deal  with  one  before  the  other  could  come  up. 
This  was  due  to  able  action  all  round  on  the  part  of  the  English  authori¬ 
ties  ;  but  above  all  other  factors  in  the  result  stands  Nelson’s  single-minded 
pursuit  of  “  his  fleet.” 

This  interesting  series  of  strategic  movements  ended  on  the  14  th  of 
August,  when  Yilleneuve,  in  despair  of  reaching  Brest,  headed  for  Cadiz, 
where  he  anchored  on  the  20th.  As  soon  as  Napoleon  heard  of  this,  after 
an  outburst  of  rage  against  the  admiral,  he  at  once  dictated  the  series  of 
movements  which  resulted  in  Ulm  and  Austerlitz,  abandoning  his  purposes 
against  England.  The  battle  of  Trafalgar,  fought  October  21,  w^as  there¬ 
fore ’separated  by  a  space  of  two  months  from  the  extensive  movements  of 
which  it  was  nevertheless  the  outcome.  Isolated  from  them  in  point  of 
time,  it  was  none  the  less  the  seal  of  Nelson’s  genius,  affixed  later  to  the 
record  he  had  made  in  the  near  past.  With  equal  truth  it  is  said  that 
England  was  saved  at  Trafalgar,  though  the  Emperor  had  then  given  up 
his  intended  invasion  ;  the  destruction  there  emphasized  and  sealed  the 
3trategic  triumph  which  had  noiselessly  foiled  Napoleon’s  plans. 


CHAPTER  I. 


Discussion  of  the  Elements  of  Sea  Power. 

r  |  'HE  first  and  most  obvious  light  in  which  the  sea  presents 

itself  from  the  political  and  social  point  of  view  is  that 

of  a  great  highway  ;  or  better,  perhaps,  of  a  wide  common, 

over  which  men  may  pass  in  all  directions,  but  on  which  some 

well-worn  paths  show  that  controlling  reasons  have  led  them 

to  choose  certain  lines  of  travel  rather  than  others.  These 

* 

lines  of  travel  are  called  trade-routes  ;  and  the  reasons  which 
have  determined  them  are  to.  'be  sought  in  the  history  of  the 
world. 

Notwithstanding  all  the  familiar  and  unfamiliar  dangers 
of  the  sea,  both  travel  and  traffic  by  water  have  always  been 
easier  and  cheaper  than  by  land.  The  commerciaLgreatness 
of  Holland  was  due  not  only  to  her  shipping  at  sea,  but  also 
to  the  numerous  tranquil  water-ways  which  gave  such  cheap 
and  easy  access  to  her  own  interior  and  to  that  of  Germany. 
This  advantage  of  carriage  by  water  over  that  by  land  was 
yet  more  marked  in  a  period  when  roads  were  few  and  very 
bad,  wars  frequent  and  society  unsettled,  as  was  the  case  two 
hundred  years  ago.  Sea  traffic  then  went  in  peril  of  robbers, 
but  was  nevertheless  safer  and  quicker  than  that  by  land.  A 
Dutch  writer  of  that  time,  estimating  the  chances  of  his  coun¬ 
try  in  a  war  with  England,  notices  among  other  things  that 
the  water-ways  of  England  failed  to  penetrate  the  country  suf¬ 
ficiently  ;  therefore,  the  roads  being  bad,  goods  from  one  part 
of  the  kingdom  to  the  other  must  go  by  sea,  and  be  exposed 
to  capture  by  the  way.  As  regards  purely  internal  trade,  this 
danger  has  generally  disappeared  at  the  present  day.  In  most 
civilized  countries,  now,  the  destruction  or  disappearance  of 


26 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


the  coasting  trade  would  only  be  an  inconvenience,  although 
water  transit  is  still  the  cheaper.  Nevertheless,  as  late  as  the 
wars  of  the  French  Republic  and  the  First  Empire,  those  who 
are  familiar  with  the  history  of  the  period,  and  the  light  naval 
literature  that  has  grown  up  around  it,  know  how  constant  is 
the  mention  of  convoys  stealing  from  point  to  point  along  the 
French  coast,  although  the  sea  swarmed  with  English  cruisers 
and  there  were  good  inland  roads. 

Under  modern  conditions,  however,  home  trade  is  but  a 
part  of  the  business  of  a  country  bordering  on  the  sea.  For¬ 
eign  necessaries  or  luxuries  must  be  brought  to  its  ports, 
either  in  its  own  or  in  foreign  ships,  which  will  return, 
bearing  in  exchange  the  products  of  the  country,  whether 
they  be  the  fruits  of  the  earth  or  the  works  of  men’s  hands ; 
and  it  is  the  wish  of  every  nation  that  this  shipping  business 
should  be  done  by  its  own  vessels.  The  ships  that  thus  sail 
to  and  fro  must  have  secure  ports  to  which  to  return,  and 
must,  as  far  as  possible,  be  followed  by  the  protection  of  their 
country  throughout  the  voyage. 

This  protection  in  time  of  war  must  be  extended  by  armed 
.shipping.  The  necessity  of  a  navy,  in  the  restricted  sense  of 
the  word,  springs,  therefore,  from  the  existence  of  a  peaceful 
shipping,  and  disappears  with  it,  except  in  the  case  of  a  nation 
which  has  aggressive  tendencies,  and  keeps  up  a  navy  merely 
us  a  branch  of  the  military  establishment.  As  the  United 
States  has  at  present  no  aggressive  purposes,  and  as  its  mer¬ 
chant  service  has  disappeared,  the  dwindling  of  the  armed 
fleet  and  general  lack  of  interest  in  it  are  strictly  logical  con¬ 
sequences.  When  for  any  reason  sea  trade  is  again  found  to 
pay,  a  large  enough  shipping  interest  will  reappear  to  compel 
the  revival  of  the  war  fleet.  It  is  possible  that  when  a  canal 
route  through  the  Central-American  Isthmus  is  seen  to  be  a 
near  certainty,  the  aggressive  impulse  may  be  strong  enough 
to  lead  to  the  same  result.  This  is  doubtful,  however,  be¬ 
cause  a  peaceful,  gain-loving  nation  is  not  far-sighted,  and 
far-sightedness  is  needed  for  adequate  military  preparation, 
especially  in  these  days. 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


27 


Asa  nation,  with  its  unarmed  and  armed  shipping, launches 
forth  from  its  own  shores,  the  need  is  soon  felt  of  points  upon 
which  the  ships  can  rely  for  peaceful  trading,  for  refuge  and 
supplies.  In  the  present  day  friendly,  though  foreign,  ports 
are  to  be  found  all  over  the  world  ;  and  their  shelter  is  enough 
while  peace  prevails.  It  was  not  always  so,  nor  does  peace 
always  endure,  though  the  United  States  have  been  favored 
by  so  long  a  continuance  of  it.  In  earlier  times  the  merchant 
seaman,  seeking  for  trade  in  new  and  unexplored  regions, 
made  his  gains  at  risk  of  life  and  liberty  from  suspicious  or 
hostile  nations,  and  was  under  great  delays  in  collecting  a  full 
and  profitable  freight.  He  therefore  intuitively  sought  at  the 
far  end  of  his  trade  route  one  or  more  stations,  to  be  given  to 
him  by  force  or  favor,  where  he  could  fix  himself  or  his  agents 
in  reasonable  security,  where  his  ships  could  lie  in  safety,  and 
where  the  merchantable  products  of  the  land  could  be  con¬ 
tinually  collecting,  awaiting  the  arrival  of  the  home  fleet,  which 
should  carry  them  to  the  mother-country.  As  there  was  im¬ 
mense  gain,  as  well  as  much  risk,  in  these  early  voyages,  such 
establishments  naturally  multiplied  and  grew  until  they  became 
colonies  ;  whose  ultimate  development  and  success  depended 
upon  the  genius  and  policy  of  the  nation  from  which  they 
sprang,  and  form  a  very  great  part  of  the  history,  and  particu¬ 
larly  of  the  sea  history,  of  the  world.  All  colonies  had  not 
the  simple  and  natural  birth  and  growth  above  described. 
Many  were  more  formal,  and  purely  political,  in  their  concep¬ 
tion  and  founding,  the  act  of  the  rulers  of  the  people  rather 
than  of  private  individuals  ;  but  the  trading-station  with  its 
after  expansion,  the  work  simply  of  the  adventurer  seeking 
gain,  was  in  its  reasons  and  essence  the  same  as  the  elabo¬ 
rately  organized  and  chartered  colony.  In  both  cases  the 
mother-country  had  won  a  foothold  in  a  foreign  land,  seeking 
a  new  outlet  for  what  it  had  to  sell,  a  new  sphere  for  its  ship¬ 
ping,  more  employment  for  its  people,  more  comfort  and 
wealth  for  itself. 

The  needs  of  commerce,  however,  were  not  all  provided  for 
when  safety  had  been  secured  at  the  far  end  of  the  road. 


28 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


The  voyages  were  long  and  dangerous,  the  seas  often  beset  with 
enemies.  In  the  most  active  days  of  colonizing  there  prevailed 
on  the  sea  a  lawlessness  the  very  memory  of  which  is  now 
almost  lost}  and  the  days  of  settled  peace  between  maritime 
nations  were  few  and  far  between.  Thus  arose  the  demand 
for  stations  along  the  road,  like  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  St. 
Helena,  and  Mauritius,  not  primarily  for  trade,  but  for  defence 
and  war ;  the  demand  for  the  possession  of  posts  like  Gibral¬ 
tar,  Malta,  Louisburg,  at  the  entrance  of  the  Gulf  of  St.  Law¬ 
rence,  —  posts  whose  value  was  chiefly  strategic,  though  not 
necessarily  wholly  so.  Colonies  and  colonial  posts  were 
sometimes  commercial,  sometimes  military  in  their  character ; 
and  it  was  exceptional  that  the  same  position  was  equally 
important  in  both  points  of  view,  as  New  York  was. 

In  these  three  things  —  production,  with  the  necessity  of  ex¬ 
changing  products,  shipping,  whereby  the  exchange  is  carried 
on,  and  colonies,  which  facilitate  and  enlarge  the  operations 
of  shipping  and  tend  to  protect  it  by  multiplying  points  of 
safety — is  to  be  found  the  key  to  much  of  the  history,  as  well 
as  of  the  policy,  of  nations  bordering  upon  the  sea.  The  policy 
has  varied  both  with  the  spirit  of  the  age  and  with  the  char¬ 
acter  and  clear-sightedness  of  the  rulers ;  but  the  history  of 
the  seaboard  nations  has  been  less  determined  by  the  shrewd¬ 
ness  and  foresight  of  governments  than  by  conditions  of  posi¬ 
tion,  extent,  configuration,  number  and  character  of  their 
people,  —  by  what  are  called,  in  a  word,  natural  conditions.  It 
must  however  be  admitted,  and  will  be  seen,  that  the  wise  or 
unwise  action  of  individual  men  has  at  certain  periods  had  a 
great  modifying  influence  upon  the  growth  of  sea  power  in 
the  broad  sense,  which  includes  not  only  the  military  strength 
afloat,  that  rules  the  sea  or  any  part  of  it  by  force  of  arms, 
but  also  the  peaceful  commerce  and  shipping  from  which 
alone  a  military  fleet  naturally  and  healthfully  springs,  and 
on  which  it  securely  rests. 

The  principal  conditions  affecting  the  sea  power  of  nations 
may  be  enumerated  as  follows :  I.  Geographical  Position. 
II.  Physical  Conformation,  including,  as  connected  therewith,. 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER.  29 

natural  productions  and  climate.  III.  Extent  of  Territory. 
IY.  Number  of  Population.  Y.  Character  of  the  People. 
YI.  Character  of  the  Government,  including  therein  the 
national  institutions. 

I.  Geographical  Position.  —  It  may  be  pointed  out,  in  the 
first  place,  that  if  a  nation  be  so  situated  that  it  is  neither 
forced  riefpriH  by  Inrul  nor  induced  to  ,seek  extension 

of  its  territory  by  way  of  the  land,  it  has,  by  the  very  unity  of 
its  aim  directed  upon  the  sea,  an  advantage  as  compared  with 
a  people  one  of  whose  boundaries  is  continental.  This  has 
been  a  great  advantage  to  England  over  both  France  and 
Holland  as  a  sea  power.  The  strength  of  the  latter  was  early 
exhausted  by  the  necessity  of  keeping  up  a  large  army  and 
carrying  on  expensive  wars  to  preserve  her  independence ; 
while  the  policy  of  France  was  constantly  diverted,  sometimes 
wisely  and  sometimes  most  foolishly,  from  the  sea  to  projects 
of  continental  extension.  These  military  efforts  expended 
wealth  ;  whereas  a  wiser  and  consistent  use  of  her  geographical 
position  would  have  added  to  it. 

The'  geographical  position  may  be  such  as  of  itself  to  pro¬ 
mote  a  concentration,  or  to  necessitate  a  dispersion,  of  the 
naval  forces.  Here  again  the  British  Islands  have  an  advan¬ 
tage  over  France.  The  position  of  the  latter,  touching  the 
Mediterranean  as  well  as  the  ocean,  while  it  has  its  advan¬ 
tages,  is  on  the  whole  a  source  of  military  weakness  at  sea. 
The  eastern  and  western  French  fleets  have  only  been  able  to 
unite  after  passing  through  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar,  in  at¬ 
tempting  which  they  have  often  risked  and  sometimes  suffered 
loss.  The  position  of  the  United  States  upon  the  two  oceans 
would  be  either  a  source  of  great  weakness  or  a  cause  of  enor¬ 
mous  expense,  had  it  a  large  sea  commerce  on  both  coasts. 

England,  by  her  immense  colonial  empire,  has  sacrificed 
much  of  this  advantage  of  concentration  of  force  around  her 
own  shores  ;  but  the  sacrifice  was  wisely  made,  for  the  gain 
was  greater  than  the  loss,  as  the  event  proved.  With  the 
growth  of  her  colonial  system  her  war  fleets  also  grew,  but 


30 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


her  merchant  shipping  and  wealth  grew  yet  faster.  Still,  in 
the  wars  of  the  American  Revolution,  and  of  the  French  Re¬ 
public  and  Empire,  to  use  the  strong  expression  of  a  French 
author,  “  England,  despite  the  immense  development  of  her 
navy,  seemed  ever,  in  the  midst  of  riches,  to  feel  all  the  em¬ 
barrassment  of  poverty.”  The  might  of  England  was  suffi¬ 
cient  to  keep  alive  the  heart  and  the  members ;  whereas 
the  equally  extensive  colonial  empire  of  Spain,  through  her 
maritime  weakness,  but  offered  so  many  points  for  insult  and 
injury. 

/  The  geographical  position  of  a  country  may  not  only  favor 
I  the  concentration  of  its  forces,  but  give  the  further  strategic 
,  advantage  of  a  central  position  and  a  good  base  for  hostile 
operations  against  its  probable  enemies.  This  again  is  the 
case  with  England  ;  on  the  one  hand  she  faces  Holland  and 
the  northern  powers,  on  the  other  France  and  the  Atlantic. 
When  threatened  with  a  coalition  between  France  and  the 
naval  powers  of  the  North  Sea  and  the  Baltic,  as  she  at  times 
was,  her  fleets  in  the  Downs  and  in  the  Channel,  and  even 
that  off  Brest,  occupied  interior  positions,  and  thus  were 
readily  able  to  interpose  their  united  force  against  either  one 
of  the  enemies  which  should  seek  to  pass  through  the  Channel 
to  effect  a  junction  with  its  ally.  On  either  side,  also,  Nature 
gave  her  better  ports  and  a  safer  coast  to  approach.  Formerly 
this  was  a  very  serious  element  in  the  passage  through  the 
Channel ;  but  of  late,  steam  and  the  improvement  of  her  har¬ 
bors  have  lessened  the  disadvantage  under  which  France 
once  labored.  In  the  days  of  sailing-ships,  the  English  fleet 
operated  against  Brest  making  its  base  at  Torbay  and  Ply¬ 
mouth.  The  plan  was  simply  this  :  in  easterly  or  moderate 
weather  the  blockading  fleet  kept  its  position  without  diffi¬ 
culty  ;  but  in  westerly  gales,  when  too  severe,  they  bore  up 
for  English  ports,  knowing  that  the  French  fleet  could  not 
get  out  till  the  wind  shifted,  which  equally  served  to  bring 
them  back  to  their  station. 

s  Jhe  advantage  of  geographical  nearness  to  an  enemy,  or  to 
the  object  of  attack,  is  nowhere  more  apparent  than  in  that 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


31 


form  of  warfare  which  has  lately  received  the  name  of  com¬ 
merce-destroying,  which  the  French  call  guerre  de  course . 
This  operation  of  war,  being  directed  against  peaceful  mer¬ 
chant  vessels  which  are  usually  defenceless,  calls  for  ships 
of  small  military  force.  Such  ships,  having  little  power  to 
defend  themselves,  ne^d_a  refuge  or  point  of  support  near 
at-hand ;  which  will  be  found  either  in  certain  parts  of  the 
sea  controlled  by  the  fighting  ships  of  their  country,  or  in 
friendly  harbors.  The  latter  give  the  strongest  support, 
because  they  are  always  in  the  same  place,  and  the  approaches 
to  them  are  more  familiar  to  the  commerce-destroyer  than  to 
his  enemy.  The  nearness  of  France  to  England  has  thus 
greatly  facilitated  her  guerre  de  course  directed  against  the 
latter.  Having  ports  on_tlie  North  Sea,  on  the  Channel,  and 
on  the  Atlantic,  her  cruisers  started  from  points  near  the 
focus  of  English  trade,  both  coming  and  going.  The  distance 
of  these  ports  from  each  other,  disadvantageous  for  regular 
military  combinations,  is  an  advantage  for  this  irregular 
secondary  operation ;  for  the  essence  of  the  one  is  concentra¬ 
tion  of  effort,  whereas  for  commerce-destroying  diffusion  of 
effort  is  the  rule.  Commerce-destroyers  scatter,  that  they 
may  see  and  seize  more  prey.  These  truths  receive  illustra¬ 
tion  from  the  history  of  the  great  French  privateers,  whose 
bases  and  scenes  of  action  were  largely  on  the  Channel  and 
North  Sea,  or  else  were  found  in  distant  colonial  regions, 
where  islands  like  Guadaloupe  and  Martinique  afforded  simi¬ 
lar  near  refuge.  The  necessity  of  renewing  coal  makes  the 
cruiser  of  the  present  day  even  more  dependent  than  of  old 
on  his  port.  Public  opinion  in  the  United  States  has  great 
faith  in  war  directed  against  an  enemy’s  commerce  ;  but  it 
must  be  remembered  that  the  Republic  has  no  ports  very  near 
the  great  centres  of  trade  abroad.  Her  geographical  position 
is  therefore  singularly  disadvantageous  for  carrying  on  suc¬ 
cessful  commerce-destroying,  unless  she  find  bases  in  the 
ports  of  an  ally. 

If,  in  addition  to  facility  for  offence,  Nature  has  so  placed  a 
country  that  it  has  easy  access  tojthe  high  sea  itself,  while  at 


i 


32 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


the  same  time  it  controls  one  of  the  great  thoroughfares  of 
the  world’s  traffic,  it  is  evident  that  the  strategic  value  of  its 
position  is  very  high.  Such  again  is,  and  to  a  greater  degree 
was,  the  position  of  England.  The  trade  of  Holland,  Sweden, 
Russia,  Denmark,  and  that  which  went  up  the  great  rivers  to 
the  interior  of  Germany,  had  to  pass  through  the  Channel 
close  by  her  doors  ;  for  sailing-ships  hugged  the  English  coast. 
This  northern  trade  had,  moreover,  a  peculiar  bearing  upon 
sea  power  ;  for  naval  stores,  as  they  are  commonly  called,  were 
mainly  drawn  from  the  Baltic  countries. 

But  for  the  loss  of  Gibraltar,  the  position  of  Spain  would 
have  been  closely  analogous  to  that  of  England.  Looking  at 
once  upon  the' Atlantic  and  the  Mediterranean,  with  Cadiz  on 
the  one  side  and  Cartagena  on  the  other,  the  trade  to  the 
Levant  must  have  passed  under  her  hands,  and  that  round  the 
Cape  of  Good  Hope  not  far  from  her  doors.  But  Gibraltar 
not  only  deprived  her  of  the  control  of  the  Straits,  it  also 
imposed  an  obstacle  to  the  easy  junction  of  the  two  divisions 
of  her  fleet. 

At  the  present  day,  looking  only  at  the  geographical  posi¬ 
tion  of  Italy,  and  not  at  the  other  conditions  affecting  her  sea 
power,  it  would  seem  that  with  her  extensive  sea-coast  and 
good  ports  she  is  very  well  placed  for  exerting  a  decisive 
influence  on  the  trade  route  to  the  Levant  and  by  the  Isthmus 
of  Suez.  This  is  true  in  a  degree,  and  would  be  much  more 
so  did  Italy  now  hold  all  the  islands  naturally  Italian  ;  but 
with  Malta  in  the  hands  of  England,  and  Corsica  in  those  of 
France,  the  advantages  of  her  geographical  position  are  largely 
neutralized.  From  race  affinities  and  situation  those  two 
islands  are  as  legitimately  objects  of  desire  to  Italy  as  Gibral¬ 
tar  is  to  Spain.  If  the  Adriatic  were  a  great  highway  of  com¬ 
merce,  Italy’s  position  would  be  still  more  influential.  These 
defects  in  her  geographical  completeness,  combined  with 
other  causes  injurious  to  a  full  and  secure  development  of 
sea  power,  make  it  more  than  doubtful  whether  Italy  can  for 
some  time  be  in  the  front  rank  among  the  sea  nations. 

As  the  aim  here  is  not  an  exhaustive  discussion,  but  merely 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


33 


an  attempt  to  show,  by  illustration,  how  vitally  the  situation 
of  a  country  may  affect  its  career  upon  the  sea,  this  division 
of  the  subject  may  be  dismissed  for  the  present ;  the  more  so 
as  instances  which  will  further  bring  out  its  importance  will 
continually  recur  in  the  historical  treatment.  Two  remarks, 
however,  are  here  appropriate. 

Circumstances  have  caused  the  Mediterranean  Sea  to  play 
a  greater  part  in  the  history  of  the  world,  both  in  a  com- 
mercialjmd  a  military"  point  of  view,  than  any  other  sheet  of 
water  of  the  same  size.  Nation  after  nation  has  striven  to 
control  it,  and  the  strife  still  goes  on.  Therefore  a  study  of 
the  conditions  upon  which  preponderance  in  its  waters  has 
rested,  and  now  rests,  and  of  the  relative  military  values  of 
different  points  upon  its  coasts,  will  be  more  instructive  than 
the  same  amount  of  effort  expended  in  another  field.  Fur¬ 
thermore,  it  has  at  the  present  time  jajvery  marked  analogy  in 
many  respects  to  the  Caribbean  Sea,  —  an  analogy  which  will 
be  still  closer  if  a  Panama  canal-route  ever  be  completed.  A 
study  oF  the  strategic  conditions  irf "Th^Medifef^nea^,  which 
have  received  ample  illustration,  will  be  an  excellent  prelude 
to  a  similar  study  of  the  Caribbean,  which  has  comparatively 
little  history. 

The  second  remark  bears  upon  the  geographical  position 
of  the  United  States  relatively  to  a  Central- American  canal. 
If  one  be  made,  and  fulfil  the  hopes  of  its  builders,  the  Carib¬ 
bean  will  be  changed  from  a  terminus,  and  place  of  local 
traffic,  or  at  best  a  broken  and  imperfect  line  of  travel,  as  it 
now  is,  into  one  of  the  great  highways  of  the  world.  Along 
this  path  a  great  commerce  will  travel,  bringing  the  interests 
of  the  other  great  nations,  the  European  nations,  close  along 
our  shores,  as  they  have  never  been  before.  With  this  it  will 
not  be  so  easy  as  heretofore  to  stand  aloof  from  international 
complications.  The  position  of  the  United  States  with  refer¬ 
ence  to  this  route  will  resemble  that  of  England  to  the  Chan¬ 
nel,  and  of  the  Mediterranean  countries  to  the  Suez  route.  As 
regards  influence  and  control  over  it,  depending  upon  geograph¬ 
ical  position,  it  is  of  course  plain  that  the  centre  of  the  national 


34 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


power,  the  permanent  base,1  is  much  nearer  than  that  of  other 
great  nations.  The  positions  now  or  hereafter  occupied  by 
them  on  island  or  mainland,  however  strong,  will  be  but  out¬ 
posts  of  their  power ;  while  in  all  the  raw  materials  of  mili¬ 
tary  strength  no  nation  is  superior  to  the  United  States.  She 
is,  however,  weak  in  a  confessed  unpreparedness  for  war ;  and 
her  geographical  nearness  to  the  point  of  contention  loses 
some  of  its  value  by  the  character  of  the  Gulf  coast,  which  is 
deficient  in  ports  combining  security  from  an  enemy  with 
facility  for  repairing  war-ships  of  the  first  class,  without  which 
ships  no  country  can  pretend  to  control  any  part  of  the  sea. 
In  case  of  a  contest  for  supremacy  in  the  Caribbean,  it  seems 
evident  from  the  depth  of  the  South  Pass  of  the  Mississippi, 
the  nearness  of  New  Orleans,  and  the  advantages  of  the  Mis¬ 
sissippi  Valley  for  water  transit,  that  the  main  effort  of  the 
country  must  pour  down  that  valley,  and  its  permanent  base 
of  operations  be  found  there.  The  defence  of  the  entrance  to 
the  Mississippi,  however,  prpsp.ntg  pqQu1iar*'^ffip.nltipg  •  wiiilp 
the  only  two  rival  ports,  Key  West  and”  Pensacola,  have  too 
little  depth  of  water,  and  are  much  less  advantageously  placed 
with  reference  to  the  resources  of  the  country.  To  get  the 
full  benefit  of  superior  geographical  position,  these  defects 
must  be  overcome.  Furthermore,  as  huer  distance  from  the 

Isthmus^  though  Relatively  less,  is _ still  considerable,  _the. 

United  States  will  Jhave  to  obtain  in  the  Caribbean  stations 
jit  for  contingent,  or  secondary,  bases  ot  which 

by  their  natural  advantages,  susceptibility  of  defence,  and 
nearness  to  the  central  strategic  issue,  will  enable  her  fleets 
to  remain  as  near  the  scene  as  any  opponent.  With  ingress 
and  egress  from  the  Mississippi  sufficiently  protected,  with 
such  outposts  in  her  hands,  and  with  the  communications 
between  them  and  the  home  base  secured,  in  short,  with 
proper  military  preparation,  for  which  she  has  all  necessary 
means,  the  preponderance  of  the  United  States  on  this  field 

1  By  a  base  of  permanent  operations  “  is  understood  a  country  whence  come 
all  the  resources,  where  are  united  the  great  lines  of  communication  by  land  and 
water,  where  are  the  arsenals  and  armed  posts.” 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


35 


follows,  from  her  geographical  position  and  her  power,  with 
mathematical  certainty. 


II.  Physical  Conformation.  —  The  peculiar  features  of  the 
Gulf  coast,  just  alluded  to,  come  properly  under  the  head  of 
Physical  Conformation  of  a  country,  which  is  placed  second 
for  discussion  among  the  conditions  which  affect  the  develop¬ 
ment  of  sea  power. 

The  seaboard  of  a  country  is  one  of  its  frontiers  ;  and  the 
easier  the  access  offered  by  the  frontier  to  the  region  beyond, 
in  this  case  the  sea,  the  greater  will  be  the  tendency  of  a 
people  toward  intercourse  with  the  rest  of  the  world  by  it. 
fff  a  country  be  imagined  having  a  long  seaboard,  but  entirely 
without  a  harbor,  such  a  country  can  have  no  sea  trade  of  its 
own,  no  shipping,  no  navy.)  This  was  practically  the  case 
with  Belgium  when  it  was  a  Spanish  and  an  Austrian  province. 
The  Dutch,  in  1648,  as  a  condition  of  peace  after  a  successful 
war,  exacted  that  the  Scheldt  should  be  closed  to  sea  com¬ 
merce.  This  closed  the  harbor  of  Antwerp  and  transferred 
the  sea  trade  of  Belgium  to  Holland.  The  Spanish  Nether¬ 
lands  ceased  to  be  a  sea  power. 

Numerous  and  deep  harbors  are  a  source  of  strength  and 
wealth,  and  doubly  so  if  they  are  the  outlets  of  navigable 
streams,  which  facilitate  the  concentration  in  them  of  a  coun-  / 
try’s  internal  trade ;  but  by  their  very  accessibility  they  be¬ 
come  a  source  of  weakness  in  war,  if  not  properly  defended. 
The  Dutch  in  1667  found  little  difficulty  in  ascending  the  7 
Thames  and  burning  a  large  fraction  of  the  English  navy 
within  sight  of  London ;  whereas  a  few  years  later  the  com¬ 
bined  fleets  of  England  and  France,  when  attempting  a  land¬ 
ing  in  Holland,  were  foiled  by  the  difficulties  of  the  coast  as 
much  as  by  the  valor  of  the  Dutch  fleet.  In  1778  the  harbor 
of  New  York,  and  with  it  undisputed  control  of  the  Hudson 
Biver,  would  have  been  lost  to  the  English,  who  were  caught 
at  disadvantage,  but  for  the  hesitancy  of  the  French  admiral. 
With  that  control,  New  England  would  have  been  restored  to 
close  and  safe  communication  with  New  York,  New  Jersey, 


36 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


and  Pennsylvania;  and  this  blow,  following  so  closely  on 
Burgoyne’s  disaster  of  the  year  before,  would  probably  have 
led  the  English  to  make  an  earlier  peace.  The  Mississippi  is 
a  mighty  source  of  wealth  and  strength  to  the  United  States ; 
‘but  the  feeble  defences  of  its  mouth  and  the  number  of  its 
subsidiary  streams  penetrating  the  country  made  it  a  weak¬ 
ness  and  source  of  disaster  to  the'  Southern  Confederacy. 
And  lastly,  in  1814,  the  occupation  of  the  Chesapeake  and  the 
destruction  of  Washington  gave  a  sharp  lesson  of  the  dangers 
incurred  through  the  noblest  water-ways,  if  their  approaches  be 
undefended ;  a  lesson  recent  enough  to  be  easily  recalled,  but 
which,  from  the  present  appearance  of  the  coast  defences, 
seems  to  be  yet  more  easily  forgotten.  Nor  should  it  be 
thought  that  conditions  have  changed ;  circumstances  and  de¬ 
tails  of  offence  and  defence  have  been  modified,  in  these  days 
as  before,  but  the  great  conditions  remain  the  same. 

Before  and  during  the  great  Napoleonic  wars,  France  had 
no  port  for  sliips-of-the-line  east  of  Brest.  How  great  the 
advantage  to  England,  which  in  the  same  stretch  has  two 
great  arsenals,  at  Plymouth  and  at  Portsmouth,  besides  other 
harbors  of  refuge  and  supply.  This  defect  of  conformation 
has  since  been  remedied  by  the  works  at  Cherbourg. 

Besides  the  contour  of  the  coast,  involving  easy  access  to 
the  sea,  there  are  other  physical  conditions  which  lead  people 
to  the  sea  or  turn  them  from  it.  Although  France  was 
deficient  in  military  ports  on  the  Channel,  she  had  both  there 
and  on  the  ocean,  as  well  as  in  the  Mediterranean,  excellent 
harbors,  favorably  situated  for  trade  abroad,  and  at  the 
outlet  of  large  rivers,  which  would  foster  internal  traffic.  But 
when  Richelieu  had  put  an  end  to  civil  war,  Frenchmen  did 
not  take  to  the  sea  with  the  eagerness  and  success  of  the 
English  and  Dutch.  A  principal  reason  for  this  has  been ' 
plausibly  found  in  the  physical  conditions  which  have  made 
France  a  pleasant  land,  with  a  delightful  climate,  producing 
within  itself  more  than  its  people  needed.  England,  on  the 
other  hand,  received  from  Nature  but  little,  and,  until  her 
manufactures  were  developed,  had  little  to  export.  Their 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


37 


many  wants,  combined  with  their  restless  activity  and  other 
conditions  that  favored  maritime  enterprise,  led  her  people 
abroad  ;  and  they  there  found  lands  more  pleasant  and  richer 
than  their  own.  Their  needs  and  genius  made  them  merchants 
and  colonists,  then  manufacturers  and  producers  ;  and  between 
products  and  colonies  shipping  is  the  inevitable  link.  So  their 
sea  power  grew.  But  if  England  was  drawn  to  the  sea,  Hol¬ 
land  was  driven  to  it ;  without  the  sea  England  languished, 
but  Holland  died.  In  the  height  of  her  greatness,  when  she 
was  one  of  the  chief  factors  in  European  politics,  a  competent 
native  authority  estimated  that  the  soil  of  Holland  could  not 
support  more  than  one  eighth  of  her  inhabitants.  The  manu¬ 
factures  of  the  country  were  then  numerous  and  important, 
but  they  had  been  much  later  in  their  growth  than  the  ship 
ping  interest.  The  poverty  of  the  soil  and  the  exposed  nature 
of  the  coast  drove  the  Dutch  first  to  fishing.  Then  the  dis¬ 
covery  of  the  process  of  curing  the  fish  gave  them  material 
for  export  as  well  as  home  consumption,  and  so  laid  the 
corner-stone  of  their  wealth.  Thus  they  had  become  traders 
at  the  time  that  the  Italian  republics,  under  the  pressure  of 
Turkish  power  and  the  discovery  of  the  passage  round  the 
Cape  of  Good  Hope,  were  beginning  to  decline,  and  they  fell 
heirs  to  the  great  Italian  trade  of  the  Levant.  Further 
favored  by  their  geographical  position,  intermediate  between 
the  Baltic,  France,  and  the  Mediterranean,  and  at  the  mouth 
of  the  German  rivers,  they  quickly  absorbed  nearly  all  the 
carrying-trade  of  Europe.  The  wheat  and  naval  stores  of  the 
Baltic,  the  trade  of  Spain  with  her  colonies  in  the  New  World, 
the  wines  of  France,  and  the  French  coasting-trade  were,  little 
more  than  two  hundred  years  ago,  transported  in  Dutch 
shipping.  Much  of  the  carrying-trade  of  England,  even,  was 
then  done  in  Dutch  bottoms.  It  will  not  be  pretended  that 
all  this  prosperity  proceeded  only  from  the  poverty  of  Hol¬ 
land’s  natural  resources.  Something  does  not  grow  from 
nothing.  What  is  true,  is,  that  by  the  necessitous  condition 
of  her  people  they  were  driven  to  the  sea,  and  were,  from 
their  mastery  of  the  shipping  business  and  the  size  of  their 


38 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


fleets,  in  a  position  to  profit  by  the  sudden  expansion  of  com¬ 
merce  and  the  spirit  of  exploration  which  followed  on  the  dis¬ 
covery  of  America  and  of  the  passage  round  the  Cape.  Other 
causes  concurred,  but  their  whole  prosperity  stood  on  the 
sea  power  to  which  their  poverty  gave  birth.  Their  food, 
their  clothing,  the  raw  material  for  their  manufactures,  the 
very  timber  and  hemp  with  which  they  built  and  rigged  their 
ships  (and  they  built  nearly  as  many  as  all  Europe  besides), 
were  imported ;  and  when  a  disastrous  war  with  England 
in  1653  and  1654  had  lasted  eighteen  months,  and  their 
shipping  business  was  stopped,  it  is  said  “  the  sources  of 
revenue  which  had  always  maintained  the  riches  of  the  State, 
such  as  fisheries  and  commerce,  were  almost  dry.  Work¬ 
shops  were  closed,  work  was  suspended.  The  Zuyder  Zee 
became  a  forest  of  masts ;  the  country  was  full  of  beggars ; 
grass  grew  in  the  streets,  and  in  Amsterdam  fifteen  hundred 
houses  were  untenanted.”  A  humiliating  peace  alone  saved 
them  from  ruin. 

This  sorrowful  result  shows  the  weakness  of  a  country  de¬ 
pending  wholly  upon  sources  external  to  itself  for  the  part 
it  is  playing  in  the  world.  With  large  deductions,  owing  to 
differences  of  conditions  which  need  not  here  be  spoken  of, 
the  case  of  Holland  then  has  strong  points  of  resemblance 
to  that  of  Great  Britain  now ;  and  they  are  true  prophets, 
though  they  seem  to  be  having  small  honor  in  their  own 
country,  who  warn  her  that  the  continuance  of  her  prosperity 
at  home  depends  primarily  upon  maintaining  her  power 
abroad.  Men  may  be  discontented  at  the  lack  of  political 
privilege ;  they  will  be  yet  more  uneasy  if  they  come  to  lack 
bread.  It  is  of  more  interest  to  Americans  to  note  that  the 
result  to  France,  regarded  as  a  power  of  the  sea,  caused  by 
the  extent,  delightfulness,  and  richness  of  the  land,  has  been 
reproduced  in  the  United  States.  In  the  beginning,  their 
forefathers  held  a  narrow  strip  of  land  upon  the  sea,  fertile 
in  parts  though  little  developed,  abounding  in  harbors  and 
near  rich  fishing-grounds.  These  physical  conditions  com¬ 
bined  with  an  inborn  love  of  the  sea,  the  pulse  of  that  English 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


39 


blood  which  still  beat  in  their  veins,  to  keep  alive  all  those 
tendencies  and  pursuits  upon  which  a  healthy  sea  power 
depends.  Almost  every  one  of  the  original  colonies  was  on 
the  sea  or  on  one  of  its  great  tributaries.  All  export  and 
import  tended  toward  one  coast.  Interest  in  the  sea  and 
an  intelligent  appreciation  of  the  part  it  played  in  the  public 
welfare  were  easily  and  widely  spread  ;  and  a  motive  more 
influential  than  care  for  the  public  interest  was  also  active, 
for  the  abundance  of  ship-building  materials  and  a  relative 
fewness  of  other  investments  made  shipping  a  profitable 
private  interest.  How  changed  the  present  condition  is,  all 
know.  The  centre  of  power  is  no  longer  on  the  seaboard. 
Books  and  newspapers  vie  with  one  another  in  describing  the 
wonderful  growth,  and  the  still  undeveloped  riches,  of  the 
interior.  Capital  there  finds  its  best  investments,  labor  its 
largest  opportunities.  The  frontiers  are  neglected  and  politi¬ 
cally  weak  ;  the  Gulf  and  Pacific  coasts  actually  so,  the  At¬ 
lantic  coast  relatively  to  the  central  Mississippi  Valley.  When 
the  day  comes  that  shipping  again  pays,  when  the  three  sea 
frontiers  find  that  they  are  not  only  militarily  weak,  but 
poorer  for  lack  of  national  shipping,  their  united  efforts  may — 
avail  to  lay  again  the  foundations  of  our  sea  power.  Till— 
then,  those  who  follow  the  limitations  which  lack-o£— sea 
power  placed  upon  the  career  of  France  may  mourn  that_ 
their  own  country  is  being  led,  by  a  like  redundancy  of  home 
wealth,  into  the  same  neglect  of  that  great  instrument. 

Among  modifying  physical  conditions  may  be  noted  a  form 
like  that  of  Italy,  —  a  long  peninsula,  with  a  central  range  of 
mountains  dividing  it  into  two  narrow  strips,  along  which  the 
'roads  connecting  the  different  ports  necessarily  run.  Only 
an  absolute  control  of  the  sea  can  wholly  secure  such  commu¬ 
nications,  since  it  is  impossible  to  know  at  what  point  an 
enemy  coming  from  beyond  the  visible  horizon  may  strike  ; 
but  still,  with  an  adequate  naval  force  centrally  posted,  there 
will  be  good  hope  of  attacking  his  fleet,  which  is  at  once  his 
base  and  line  of  communications,  before  serious  damage  has 
been  donek,  The  long,  narrow  peninsula  of  Florida,  with  Key 


40 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


West  at  its  extremity,  though  flat  and  thinly  populated,  pre¬ 
sents  at  first  sight  conditions  like  those  of  Italy.  The  resem¬ 
blance  may  be  only  superficial,  but  it  seems  probable  that  if 
the  chief  scene  of  a  naval  war  were  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  the 
communications  by  land  to  the  end  of  the  peninsula  might 
be  a  matter  of  consequence,  and  open  to  attack. 

When  the  sea  not  only  borders,  or  surrouads,  but  also  sepa¬ 
rates  a  country  into  two  or  more  parts,  the  control  of  it 
becomes  not  only  desirable,  but  vitally  necessary.  Such  a 
physical  condition  either  gives  birth  and  strength  to  sea 
power,  or  makes  the  country  powerless.  Such  is  the  condi¬ 
tion  of  the  present  kingdom  of  Italy,  with  its  islands  of  Sar¬ 
dinia  and  Sicily  ;  and  hence  in  its  youth  and  still  existing 
financial  weakness  it  is  seen  to  put  forth  such  vigorous  and 
intelligent  efforts  to  create  a  military  navy.  It  has  even  been 
argued  that,  with  a  navy  decidedly  superior  to  her  enemy’s, 
Italy  could  better  base  her  power  upon  her  islands  than 
upon  her  mainland ;  for  the  insecurity  of  the  lines  of  commu¬ 
nication  in  the  peninsula,  already  pointed  out,  would  most 
seriously  embarrass  an  invading  army  surrounded  by  a  hostile 
people  and  threatened  from  the  sea. 

The  Irish  Sea,  separating  the  British  Islands,  rather  resem¬ 
bles  an  estuary  than  an  actual  division  ;  but  history  has  shown 
the  danger  from  it  to  the  United  Kingdom.  In  the  days  of 
Louis  XI Y.,  when  the  French  navy  nearly  equalled  the  com¬ 
bined  English  and  Dutch,  the  gravest  complications  existed 
in  Ireland,  which  passed  almost  wholly  under  the  control  of 
the  natives  and  the  French.  Nevertheless,  the  Irish  Sea  was 
rather  a  danger  to  the  English  —  a  weak  point  in  their  com¬ 
munications  —  than  an  advantage  to  the  French.  The  latter 
did  not  venture  their  ships-of-the-line  in  its  narrow  waters, 
and  expeditions  intending  to  land  were  directed  upon  the 
ocean  ports  in  the  south  and  west.  At  the  supreme  moment 
the  great  French  fleet  was  sent  upon  the  south  coast  of  Eng¬ 
land,  where  it  decisively  defeated  the  allies,  and  at  the  same 
time  twenty-five  frigates  were  sent  to  St.  George’s  Channel, 
against  the  English  communications.  In  the  midst  of  a  hos- 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


41 


tile  people,  the  English  army  in  Ireland  was  seriously  imper¬ 
illed,  but  was  saved  by  the  battle  of  the  Boyne  and  the  flight 
of  James  II.  This  movement  against  the  enemy’s  communi¬ 
cations  was  strictly  strategic,  and  would  be  just  as  dangerous 
to  England  now  as  in  1690. 

Spain,  in  the  same  century,  afforded  an  impressive  lesson  of 
the  weakness  caused  by  such  separation  when  the  parts  are  not 
knit  together  by  a  strong  sea  power.  She  then  still  retained, 
as  remnants  of  her  past  greatness,  the  Netherlands  (now 
Belgium),  Sicily,  and  other  Italian  possessions,  not  IcPspeak 
of  her  vast  colonies  in  the  New  World.  Yet  so  low  had  the 
Spanish  sea  power  fallen,  that  a  well-informed  and  sober- 
minded  Hollander  of  the  day  could  claim  that  “  in  Spain  all 
the  coast  is  navigated  by  a  few  Dutch  ships ;  and  since  the 
peace  of  1648  their  ships  and  seamen  are  so  few  that  they 
have  publicly  begun  to  hire  our  ships  to  sail  to  the  Indies, 
whereas  they  were  formerly  careful  to  exclude  all  foreigners 
from  there.  ...  It  is  manifest,”  he  goes  on,  “that  the  West 
Indies,  being  as  the  stomach  to  Spain  (for  from  it  nearly  all 
the  revenue  is  drawn),  must  be  Joined  to  the  Spanish  head  by 
a  sea  force ;  and  that  Naples  and  the  Netherlands,  being  like 
two  arms,  they  cannot  lay  out  their  strength  for  Spain,  nor 
receive  anything  thence  but  by  shipping,  —  all  which  may 
easily  be  done  by  our  shipping  in  peace,  and  by  it  obstructed 
in  war.”  Half  a  century  before,  Sully,  the  great  minister  of 
Henry  IV.,  had  characterized  Spain  “  as  one  of  those  States 
whose  legs  and  arms  are  strong  and  powerful,  but  the  heart 
infinitely  weak  and  feeble.”  Since  his  day  the  Spanish  navy 
had  suffered  not  only  disaster,  but  annihilation  ;  not  only 
humiliation,  but  degradation.  The  consequences  briefly  were 
that  shipping  was  destroyed ;  manufactures  perished  with  it. 
The  government  depended  for  its  support,  not  upon  a  wide¬ 
spread  healthy  commerce  and  industry  that  could  survive 
many  a  staggering  blow,  but  upon  a  narrow  stream  of  silver 
trickling  through  a  few  treasure-ships  from  America,  easily 
and  frequentlyftntercepted  by  an  enemy’s  cruisers.  The  loss 
of  half  a  dozen  galleons  more  than  once  paralyzed  its  move* 


42 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


merits  for  a  year.  While  the  war  in  the  Netherlands  lasted, 
the  Dutch  control  of  the  sea  forced  Spain  to  send  her  troops 
by  a  long  and  costly  journey  overland  instead  of  by  sea ;  and 
the  same  cause  reduced  her  to  such  straits  for  necessaries 
that,  by  a  mutual  arrangement  which  seems  very  odd  to  mod¬ 
ern  ideas,  her  wants  were  supplied  by  Dutch  ships,  which 
thus  maintained  the  enemies  of  their  country,  but  received 
in  return  specie  which  was  welcome  in  the  Amsterdam  ex¬ 
change.  In  America,  the  Spanish  protected  themselves  as 
best  they  might  behind  masonry,  unaided  from  home ;  while 
in  the  Mediterranean  they  escaped  insult  and  injury  mainly 
through  the  indifference  of  the  Dutch,  for  the  French  and 
English  had  not  yet  begun  to  contend  for  mastery  there.  In 
the  course  of  history  the  Netherlands,  Naples,  Sicily,  Minorca, 
Havana,  Manila,  and  Jamaica  were  wrenched  away,  at  one 
time  or  another,  from  this  empire  without  a  shipping.  In 
short,  while  Spain’s  maritime  impotence  may  have  been  pri¬ 
marily  a  symptom  of  her  general  decay,  it  became  a  marked 
factor  in  precipitating  her  into  the  abyss  from  which  she  has 
not  yet  wholly  emerged. 

Except  Alaska,  the  United  States  has  no  outlying  posses¬ 
sion, —  no  foot  of  ground  inaccessible  by  land.  Its  contour  is 
such  as  to  present  few  points  specially  weak  from  their  sa- 
liency,  and  all  important  parts  of  the  frontiers  can  be  readily 
attained,  —  cheaply  by  water,  rapidly  by  rail.  The  weakest 
frontier,  the  Pacific,  is  far  removed  from  the  most  dangerous 
of  possible  enemies.  The  internal  resources  are  boundless  as 
compared  with  present  needs ;  we  can  live  off  ourselves  indefi¬ 
nitely  in  “  our  little  corner,”  to  use  the  expression  of  a  French 
officer  to  the  author.  Yet  should  that  little  corner  be  invaded 
by  a  new  commercial  route  through  the  Isthmus,  the  United 
States  in  her  turn  may  have  the  rude  awakening  of  those  who 
have  abandoned  their  share  in  the  common  birthright  of  all 
people,  the  sea. 

III.  Extent  of  Territory.  —  The  last  of  the  conditions 
affecting  the  development  of  a  nation  as  a  sea  power,  and 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


43 


touching  the  country  itself  as  distinguished  from  the  people 
who  dwell  there,  is  Extent  of  Territory.  This  may  be  dismissed 
with  comparatively  few  words. 

As  regards  the  development  of  sea  power,  it  is  not  the  total 
number  of  square  miles  which  a  country  contains,  but  the  " 
"'length  of  its  coast-line  and  the  character  of  its  harbors  that 
are  to  be  considered.  As  to  these  it  is  to  be  said  that,  the 
,  geographical  and  physical  conditions  being  the  same,  extent  h 
;  of  sea-coast  is  a  source  of  strength  or  weakness  according  as 
the  population  is  large  or  small.  A  country  is  in  this  like  a 
fortress ;  the  garrison  must  be  proportioned  to  the  enceinte. 

A  recent  familiar  instance  is  found  in  the  American  War  of 
Secession.  Had  the  South  had  a  people  as  numerous  as  it 
was  warlike,  and  a  navy  commensurate  to  its  other  resources 
as  a  sea  power,  the  great  extent  of  its  sea-coast  and  its  nu¬ 
merous  inlets  would  have  been  elements  of  great  strength. 
The  people  of  the  United  States  and  the  Government  of  that 
day  justly  prided  themselves  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  block¬ 
ade  of  the  whole  Southern  coast.  It  was  a  great  feat,  a  very 
great  feat ;  but  it  would  have  been  an  impossible  feat  had  the 
Southerners  been  more  numerous,  and  a  nation  of  seamen. 
What  was  there  shown  was  not,  as  has  been  said,  how  such 
a  blockade  can  be  maintained,  but  that  such  a  blockade  is 
possible  in  the  face  of  a  population  not  only  unused  to  the 
sea,  but  also  scanty  in  numbers.  Those  who  recall  how  the 
blockade  was  maintained,  and  the  class  of  ships  that  block¬ 
aded  during  great  part  of  the  war,  know  that  the  plan,  correct 
under  the  circumstances,  could  not  have  been  carried  out  in 
the  face  of  a  real  navy.  Scattered  unsupported  along  the 
coast,  the  United  States  ships  kept  their  places,  singly  or  in 
small  detachments,  in  face  of  an  extensive  network  of  inland 
water  communications  which  favored  secret  concentration  of 
the  enemy.  Behind  the  first  line  of  water  communications 
were  long  estuaries,  and  here  and  there  strong  fortresses, 
upon  either  of  which  the  enemy’s  ships  could  always  fall 
back  to  elude  pursuit  or  to  receive  protection.  Had  there 
been  a  Southern  navy  to  profit  by  such  advantages,  or  by  the 


44 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


scattered  condition  of  the  United  States  ships,  the  latter 
could  not  have  been  distributed  as  they  were ;  and  being 
forced  to  concentrate  for  mutual  support,  many  small  but 
useful  approaches  would  have  been  left  open  to  commerce. 
But  as  the  Southern  coast,  from  its  extent  and  many  inlets, 
might  have  been  a  source  of  strength,  so,  from  those  very 
characteristics,  it  became  a  fruitful  source  of  injury.  The 
great  story  of  the  opening  of  the  Mississippi  is  but  the  most 
striking  illustration  of  an  action  that  was  going  on  inces¬ 
santly  all  over  the  South.  At  every  breach  of  the  sea  fron¬ 
tier,  war-ships  were  entering.  The  streams  that  had  carried 
the  wealth  and  supported  the  trade  of  the  seceding  States 
turned  against  them,  and  admitted  their  enemies  to  their 
hearts.  Dismay,  insecurity,  paralysis,  prevailed  in  regions 
that  might,  under  happier  auspices,  have  kept  a  nation  alive 
through  the  most  exhausting  war.  Never  did  sea  power  play 
a  greater  or  a  more  decisive  part  than  in  the  contest  which 
determined  that  the  course  of  the  world’s  history  would  be 
modified  by  the  existence  of  one  great  nation,  instead  of 
several  rival  States,  in  the  North  American  continent.  But 
while  just  pride  is  felt  in  the  well-earned  glory  of  those  days, 
and  the  greatness  of  the  results  due  to  naval  preponderance 
is  admitted,  Americans  who  understand  the  facts  should  never 
fail  to  remind  the  over-confidence  of  their  countrymen  that 
the  South  not  only  had  no  navy,  not  only  was  not  a  seafaring  ) 
people,  but  that  also  its  population  was  not  proportioned  to  / 
the  extent  of  the  sea-coast  which  it  had  to  defend.  ^ 


IY.  Number  of  Population.  —  After  the  consideration  of 
the  natural  conditions  of  a  country  should  follow  an  exami¬ 
nation  of  the  characteristics  of  its  population  as  affecting 
the  development  of  sea  power ;  and  first  among  these  will  be 
taken,  because  of  its  relations  to  the  extent  of  the  territory, 
which  has  just  been  discussed,  the  number  of  the  people  who 
live  in  it.  It  has  been  said  that  in  respect  of  dimensions  it 
is  not  merely  the  number  of  square  miles,  but  the  extent  and 
character  of  the  sea-coast  that  is  to  be  considered  with  refer-. 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


45 

ence  to  sea  power ;  and  so,  in  point  of  population,  it  is  not 
x  only  the  grand  total,  but  the  number  following  the  sea,  or  at 
1  least  readily  available  for  employment  on  ship-board  and  for 
the  creation  of  naval  material,  that  must  be  counted. 

For  example,  formerly  and  up  to  the  end  of  the  great  wars 
following  the  French  Revolution,  the  population  of  France 
was  much  greater  than  that  of  England;  but  in  respect  of 
sea  power  in  general,  peaceful  commerce  as  well  as  military 
efficiency,  France  was  much  inferior  to  England.  In  the 
matter  of  military  efficiency  this  fact  is  the  more  remarkable 
because  at  times,  in  point  of  military  preparation  at  the  out¬ 
break  of  war,  France  had  the  advantage ;  but  she  was  not 
able  to  keep  it.  Thus  in  1778,  when  war  broke  out,  France, 
through  her  maritime  inscription,  was  able  to  man  at  once 
fifty  ships-of-the-line.  England,  on  the  contrary,  by  reason  of 
the  dispersal  over  the  globe  of  that  very  shipping  on  which 
her  naval  strength  so  securely  rested,  had  much  trouble 
in  manning  forty  at  home;  but  in  1782  she  had  one  hun¬ 
dred  and  twenty  in  commission  or  ready  for  commission, 
while  France  had  never  been  able  to  exceed  seventy-one. 
Again,  as  late  as  1840,  when  the  two  nations  were  on  the 
verge  of  war  in  the  Levant,  a  most  accomplished  French  offi¬ 
cer  of  the  day,  while  extolling  the  high  state  of  efficiency  of 
the  French  fleet  and  the  eminent  qualities  of  its  admiral, 
and  expressing  confidence  in  the  results  of  an  encounter  with 
an  equal  enemy,  goes  on  to  say :  “  Behind  the  squadron  of 
twenty-one  ships-of-the-line  which  we  could  then  assemble, 


there  was  no  reserve ;  not  another  ship  could  have  been  com¬ 
missioned  within  six  months.”  And  this  was  due  not  only 
to  lack  of  ships  and  of  proper  equipments,  though  both  were 
wanting.  “  Our  maritime  inscription,”  he  continues,  “  was 
so  exhausted  by  what  we  had  done  [in  manning  twenty-one 
ships],  that  the  permanent  levy  established  in  all  quarters 
did  not  supply  reliefs  for  the  men,  who  were  already  more 
than  three  years  on  cruise.” 

A  contrast  such  as  this  shows  a  difference  in  what  is  called 
staying  power,  or  reserve  force,  which  is  even  greater  than 


46 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


appears  on  the  surface ;  for  a  great  shipping  afloat  neces¬ 
sarily  employs,  besides  the  crews,  a  large  number  of  people 
engaged  in  the  various  handicrafts  which  facilitate  the  mak¬ 
ing  and  repairing  of  naval  material,  or  following  other  callings 
more  or  less  closely  connected  with  the  water  and  writh  craft  of 
all  kinds.  Such  kindred  callings  give  an  undoubted  aptitude 
for  the  sea  from  the  outset.  There  is  an  anecdote  showing 
curious  insight  into  this  matter  on  the  part  of  one  of  Eng¬ 
land’s  distinguished  seamen,  Sir  Edward  Pellew.  When  the 
war  broke  out  in  1793,  the  usual  scarceness  of  seamen  was 
met.  Eager  to  get  to  sea  and  unable  to  fill  his  complement 
otherwise  than  with  landsmen,  he  instructed  his  officers  to 
seek  for  Cornish  miners ;  reasoning  from  the  conditions  and 
dangers  of  their  calling,  of  which  he  had  personal  knowledge, 
that  they  would  quickly  fit  into  the  demands  of  sea  life.  The 
result  showed  his  sagacity,  for,  thus  escaping  an  otherwise 
unavoidable  delay,  he  was  fortunate  enough  to  capture  the 
first  frigate  taken  in  the  war  in  single  combat ;  and  what  is 
especially  instructive  is,  that  although  but  a  few  weeks  in 
commission,  while  his  opponent  had  been  over  a  year,  the 
losses,  heavy  on  both  sides,  were  nearly  equal. 

It  may  be  urged  that  such  reserve  strength  has  now  nearly 
lost  the  importance  it  once  had,  because  modern  ships  and 
weapons  take  so  long  to  make,  and  because  modern  States 
aim  at  developing  the  whole  power  of  their  armed  force,  on 
the  outbreak  of  war,  with  such  rapidity  as  to  strike  a  dis¬ 
abling  blow  before  the  enemy  can  organize  an  equal  effort. 
To  use  a  familiar  phrase,  there  will  not  be  time  for  the  whole 
resistance  of  the  national  fabric  to  come  into  play ;  the  blow 
will  fall  on  the  organized  military  fleet,  and  if  that  yield,  the 
solidity  of  the  rest  of  the  structure  will  avail  nothing.  To  a 
certain  extent  this  is  true;  but  then  it  has  always  been  true, 
though  to  a  less  extent  formerly  than  now.  Granted  the 
meeting  of  two  fleets  which  represent  practically  the  whole 
present  strength  of  their  two  nations,  if  one  of  them  be  de¬ 
stroyed,  while  the  other  remains  fit  for  action,  there  will  be 
much  less  hope  now  than  formerly  that  the  vanquished  can 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


47 


restore  his  navy  for  that  war ;  and  the  result  will  be  disas¬ 
trous  just  in  proportion  to  the  dependence  of  the  nation  upon 
her  sea  power.  A  Trafalgar  would  have  been  a  much  more 
fatal  blow  to  England  than  it  was  to  France,  had  the  English 
fleet  then  represented,  as  the  allied  fleet  did,  the  bulk  of  the 
nation’s  power.  Trafalgar  in  such  a  case  would  have  been  to 
England  what  Austerlitz  was  to  Austria,  and  Jena  to  Prus¬ 
sia  ;  an  empire  would  have  been  laid  prostrate  by  the  destruc¬ 
tion  or  disorganization  of  its  military  forces,  which,  it  is  said, 
were  the  favorite  objective  of  Napoleon. 

But  does  the  consideration  of  such  exceptional  disasters  in 
the  past  justify  the  putting  a  low  value  upon  that  reserve 
strength,  based  upon  the  number  of  inhabitants  fitted  for  a 
certain  kind  of  military  life,  which  is  here  being  considered  ? 
The  blows  just  mentioned  were  dealt  by  men  of  exceptional 
genius,  at  the  head  of  armed  bodies  of  exceptional  training, 
esprit  de-corps,  and  prestige,  and  were,  besides,  inflicted  upon 
opponents  more  or  less  demoralized  by  conscious  inferiority 
and  previous  defeat.  Austerlitz  had  been  closely  preceded  by 
Uim,  where  thirty  thousand  Austrians  laid  down  their  arms 
without  a  battle ;  and  the  history  of  the  previous  years  had 
been  one  long  record  of  Austrian  reverse  and  French  success. 
Trafalgar  followed  closely  upon  a  cruise,  justly  called  a  cam¬ 
paign,  of  almost  constant  failure  ;  and  farther  back,  but  still 
recent,  were  the  memories  of  St.  Vincent  for  the  Spaniards, 
and  of  the  Nile  for  the  French,  in  the  allied  fleet.  Except  the 
case  of  Jena,  these  crushing  overthrows  were  not  single 
disasters,  but  final  blows  ;  and  in  the  Jena  campaign  there 
was  a  disparity  in  numbers,  equipment,  and  general  prepara¬ 
tion  for  war,  which  makes  it  less  applicable  in  considering 
what  may  result  from  a  single  victory. 

England  is  at  the  present  time  the  greatest  maritime  nation 
in  the  world  ;  in  steam  and  iron  she  has  kept  the  superiority 
she  had  in  the  days  of  sail  and  wood.  France  and  England 
are  the  two  powers  that  have  the  largest  military  navies ; 
and  it  is  so  far  an  open  question  which  of  the  two  is  the  more 
powerful,  that  they  may  be  regarded  as  practically  of  equal 


48 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


strength  in  material  for  a  sea  war.  In  the  case  of  a  collision 
can  there  be  assumed  such  a  difference  of  personnel ,  or  of 
preparation,  as  to  make  it  probable  that  a  decisive  inequality 
will  result  from  one  battle  or  one  campaign  ?  If  not,  the 
reserve  strength  will  begin  to  tell ;  organized  reserve  first, 
then  reserve  of  seafaring  population,  reserve  of  mechanical 
skill,  reserve  of  wealth.  It  seems  to  have  been  somewhat 
forgotten  that  England’s  leadership  in  mechanical  arts  gives 
her  a  reserve  of  mechanics,  who  can  easily  familiarize  them¬ 
selves  with  the  appliances  of  modern  iron-clads  ;  and  as  her 
commerce  and  industries  feel  the  burden  of  the  war,  the  sur¬ 
plus  of  seamen  and  mechanics  will  go  to  the  armed  shipping. 

The  whole  question  of  the  value  of  a  reserve,  developed  or 
undeveloped,  amounts  now  to  this :  Have  modern  conditions 
of  warfare  made  it  probable  that,  of  two  nearly  equal  adver¬ 
saries,  one  will  be  so  prostrated  in  a  single  campaign  that  a 
decisive  result  will  be  reached  in  that  time  ?  Sea  warfare 
has  given  no  answer.  The  crushing  successes  of  Prussia 
against  Austria,  and  of  Germany  against  France,  appear  to 
have  been  those  of  a  stronger  over  a  much  weaker  nation, 
whether  the  weakness  were  due  to  natural  causes,  or  to  offi¬ 
cial  incompetency.  How  would  a  delay  like  that  of  Plevna 
have  affected  the  fortune  of  war,  had  Turkey  had  any  reserve 
of  national  power  upon  which  to  call  ? 

If  time  be,  as  is  everywhere  admitted,  a  supreme  factor  in 
war,  it  behooves  countries  whose  genius  is  essentially  not 
military,  whose  people,  like  all  free  people,  object  to  pay  for 
large  military  establishments,  to  see  to  it  that  they  are  at 
least  strong  enough  to  gain  the  time  necessary  to  turn  the 
spirit  and  capacity  of  their  subjects  into  the  new  activities 
which  war  calls  for.  If  the  existing  force  by  land  or  sea  is 
strong  enough  so  to  hold  out,  even  though  at  a  disadvantage, 
the  country  may  rely  upon  its  natural  resources  and  strength 
coming  into  play  for  whatever  they  are  worth,  —  its  numbers, 
its  wealth,  its  capacities  of  every  kind.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
what  force  it  has  can  be  overthrown  and  crushed  quickly,  the 
most  magnificent  possibilities  of  natural  power  will  not  save 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


49 


ft  from  humiliating  conditions,  nor,  if  its  foe  be  wise,  from 
guarantees  which  will  postpone  revenge  to  a  distant  future. 
The  story  is  constantly  repeated  on  the  smaller  fields  of  war  : 
u  If  so-and-so  can  hold  out  a  little  longer,  this  can  be  saved 
or  that  can  be  done ;  ”  as  in  sickness  it  is  often  said  :  “  If 
the  patient  can  only  hold  out  so  long,  the  strength  of  his 
constitution  may  pull  him  through.” 

England  to  some  extent  is  now  such  a  country.  Holland 
was  such  a  country ;  she  would  not  pay,  and  if  she  escaped, 
it  was  but  by  the  skin  of  her  teeth.  “  Never  in  time  of 
peace  and  from  fear  of  a  rupture,”  wrote  their  great  states¬ 
man,  De  Witt,  “  will  they  take  resolutions  strong  enough  to 
lead  them  to  pecuniary  sacrifices  beforehand.  The  character 
of  the  Dutch  is  such  that,  unless  danger  stares  them  in  the 
face,  they  are  indisposed  to  lay  out  money  for  their  own  de¬ 
fence.  I  have  to  do  with  a  people  who,  liberal  to  profusion 
where  they  ought  to  economize,  are  often  sparing  to  avarice 
where  they  ought  to  spend.” 

That  our  own  country  is  open  to  the  same  reproach,  is  pa¬ 
tent  to  all  the  world.  The  United  States  has  not  that  shield 
of  defensive  power  behind  which  time  can  be  gained  to  develop 
its  reserve  of  strength.  As  for  a  seafaring  population  ade¬ 
quate  to  her  possible  needs,  where  is  it  ?  Such  a  resource, 
proportionate  to  her  coast-line  and  population,  is  to  be  found 
only  in  a  national  merchant  shipping  and  its  related  industries, 
which  at  present  scarcely  exist.  It  will  matter  little  whether 
the  crews  of  such  ships  are  native  or  foreign  born,  provided 
they  are  attached  to  the  flag,  and  her  power  at  sea  is  sufficient 
to  enable  the  most  of  them  to  get  back  in  case  of  war.  When 
.foreigners  by  thousands  are  admitted  to  the  ballot,  it  is  of  little 
moment  that  they  are  given  fighting-room  on  board  ship. 

Though  the  treatment  of  the  subject  has  been  somewhat 
discursive,  it  may  be  admitted  that  a  great  population  follow¬ 
ing  callings  related  to  the  sea  is,  now  as  formerly,  a  great 
element  of  sea  power  ;  that  the  United  States  is  deficient  in 
that  element ;  and  that  its  foundations  can  be  laid  only  in  a 
large  commerce  under  her  own  flag. 

4 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


National  Character.  —  The  effect  of  national  character 
and  aptitudes  upon  the  development  of  sea  power  will  next 
be  considered. 

If  sea  power  be  really  based  upon  a  peaceful  and  extensive 
commerce^  aptitude  for  commercial  pursuits  must  b€T~a  dis¬ 
tinguishing  feature  of  the  nations  that  have  at  one  time  or 
another  been  great  upon  the  sea.  History  almost  without 
exception  affirms  that  this  is  true.  Save  the  Romans,  there 
is  no  marked  instance  to  the  contrary. 

All  men  seek  gain  and,  more  or  less,  love  money  ;  but  the 
wjiy  in  which  gain  is  ^sought  will  have  a  markecLeffect  upon 
the  commercial  fortunes  and  the  history  of  the  people  inhabit¬ 
ing  a  country. 

If  history  may  be  believed,  the  way  in  which  the  Spaniards 
and  their  kindred  nation,  the  Portuguese,  sought  wealth,  not 
only  brought  a  blot_Jipon  the  national  character,  but  was  also 
fatal  to  the  growth  of  a  healthy  commerce  ;  and  so  to  the 
industries  upon  which  commerce  lives,  and  ultimately  to  that 
national  wealth  which  was  sought  by  mistaken  paths.  The 
desire  for  gain  rose  in  them  to  fierce  avarice ;  so  they  sought 
in  the  new-found_worlds  which  gave  such  an  impetus  to  the 
commercial  and  maritime  development  of  the  countries  of 
Europe,  not  new  fields  of  industry,  not  even  the  healthy 
excitement_of  exploration  arid  adventure,  but  gold  and  silver. 
They  had  many  great  qualities ;  they  were  bold,  enterprising, 
temperate,  patient  of  suffering,  enthusiastic,  and  gifted  with 
intense  national  feeling.  When  to  these  qualities  are  added 
the  advantages  of  Spain’s  position  and  well-situated  ports,  the 
fact  that  she  was  first  to  occupy  large  and  rich  portions  of 
the  new  worlds  and  long  remained  without  a  competitor,  and 
that  for  a  hundred  years  after  the  discovery  of  America  she 
was  the  leading  State  in  Europe,  she  might  have  been  ex¬ 
pected  to  take  the  foremost  place  among  the  sea  powers. 
Exactly  the  contrary  was  the  result,  as  all  know.  Since  the 
battle  of  Lepanto  in  1571,  though  engaged  in  many  wars,  no 
sea  victory  of  any  consequence  shines  on  the  pages  of  Spanish 
history  ;  and  the  decay  of  her  commerce  sufficiently  accounts 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


51 


for  the  painful  and  sometimes  ludicrous  inaptness  shown  on 
the  decks  of  her  ships  of  war.  Doubtless  such  a  result  is  not 
to  be  attributed  to  one  cause  only.  Doubtless  the  govern^ 
ment  of  Spain  was  in  many  ways  such  as  to  cramp  and  blight  ) 
a  free  and  healthy  development  of  private  enterprise ;  but  ' 
the  character  of  a  great  people  breaks  through  or  shapes  the 
character  of  its  government,  and  it  can  hardly  be  doubted 
that  had  the  bent  of  the  people  been  toward  trade,  the  action 
of  government  would  have  been  drawn  into  the  same  current,' 
The  great  field  of  the  colonies,  also,  was  remote  from  the 
centre  of  that  despotism  which  blighted  the  growth  of  old 
Spain.  As  it  was,  thousands  of  Spaniards,  of  the  working 
as  well  as  the  upper  classes,  left  Spain  ;  and  the  occupa¬ 
tions  in  which  they  engaged  abroad  sent_Jiome  little  but 
specie,  or  merchandise  of  small  bulk,  requiring  but  small 
tonnage.  The  mother-country  herself  produced  little  but 
wool,  fruit,  and  iron ;  her  manufactures  were  naught ;  her 
industries  suffered  ;  her  population  steadily  decreased.  Both 
she  and  her  colonies  depended  upon  the  Dutch  for  so  many 
of  the  necessaries  of  life,  that  the  products  of  their  scanty  in¬ 
dustries  could  not  suffice  to  pay  for  them.  “  So  that  Holland 
merchants,”  writes  a  contemporary,  “  who  carry  money  to 
most  parts  of  the  world  to  buy  commodities,  must  out  of 
this  single  country  of  Europe  carry  home  money,  which  they 
receive  in  payment  of  their  goods.”  Thus  their  eagerly 
sought  emblem  of  wealth  passed  quickly  from  their  hands. 
It  has  already  been  pointed  out  how  weak,  from  a  military 
point  of  view,  Spain  was  from  this  decay  of  her  shipping. 
Her  wealth  being  in  small  bulk  on  a  few  ships,  following 
more  or  less  regular  routes,  was  easily  seized  by  an  enemy, 
and  the  sinews  of  war  paralyzed  ;  whereas  the  wealth  of 
England  and  Holland,  scattered  over  thousands  of  ships  in 
all  parts  of  the  world,  received  many  bitter  blows  in  many 
exhausting  wars,  without  checking  a  growth  which,  though 
painful,  was  steady.  The  fortunes  of  Portugal,  united  to 
Spain  during  a  most  critical  period  of  her  history,  followed 
the  same  downward  path  ;  although  foremost  in  the  begin* 


52 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


ning  of  the  race  for  development  by  sea,  she  fell  utterly 
behind.  “  The  mines  of  Brazil  were  the  ruin  of  Portugal,  as 
those  of  Mexico  and  Peru  had  been  of  Spain ;  all  manufac¬ 
tures  fell  into  insane  contempt ;  ere  long  the  English  sup¬ 
plied  the  Portuguese  not  only  with  clothes,  but  with  all  mer¬ 
chandise,  all  commodities,  even  to  salt-fish  and  grain.  After 
their  gold,  the  Portuguese  abandoned  their  very  soil ;  the 
vineyards  of  Oporto  were  finally  bought  by  the  English  with 
Brazilian  gold,  which  had  only  passed  through  Portugal  to 
be  spread  throughout  England.”  We  are  assured  that  in  fifty 
years,  five  hundred  millions  of  dollars  were  extracted  from 
“  the  mines  of  Brazil,  and  that  at  the  end  of  the  time  Portugal 
had  but  twenty-five  millions  in  specie,”  —  a  striking  example 
of  the  difference  between  real  and  fictitious  wealth. 

The  English  and  Dutch  were  no  less  desirous  of  gain  than 
the  southern  nations.  Each  in  turn  has  been  called  “  a  na¬ 
tion  of  shopkeepers ;  ”  but  the  jeer,  in  so  far  as  it  is  just,  is 
to  the  credit  of  their  wisdom  and  uprightness.  They  were  no 
less  bold,  no  less  enterprising,  no  less  patient.  Indeed,  they 
were  more  patient,  in  that  they  sought  riches  not  by  the  sword 
but  by  labor,  which  is  the  reproach  meant  to  be  implied  by 
the  epithet ;  for  thus  they  took  the  longest,  instead  of  what 
seemed  the  shortest,  road  to  wealth.  But  these  two  peoples, 
radically  of  the  same  race,  had  other  qualities,  no  less  impor¬ 
tant  than  those  just  named,  which  combined  with  their  sur¬ 
roundings  to  favor  their  development  by  sea.  They  were  by 
nature  business-men,  traders,  producers,  negotiators.  There¬ 
fore  both  in  their  native  country  and  abroad,  whether  settled 
in  the  ports  of  civilized  nations,  or  of  barbarous  eastern 
rulers,  or  in  colonies  of  their  own  foundation,  they  every¬ 
where  strove  to  draw  out  all  the  resources  of  the  land,  to 
develop  and  increase  them.  The  quick  instinct  of  the  born 
trader,  shopkeeper  if  you  will,  sought  continually  new  articles 
to  exchange  ;  and  this  search,  combined  with  the  industrious 
character  evolved  through  generations  of  labor,  made  them 
necessarily  producers.  At  home  they  became  great  as  manu¬ 
facturers  ;  abroad,  where  they  controlled,  the  land  grew  richer 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


53 


continually,  products  multiplied,  and  the  necessary  exchange 
between  home  and  the  settlements  called  for  more  ships. 
Their  shipping  therefore  increased  with  these  demands  of 
trade,  and  nations  with  less  aptitude  for  maritime  enterprise, 
even  France  herself,  great  as  she  has  been,  called  for  their 
products  and  for  the  service  of  their  ships.  Thus  in  many 
ways  they  advanced  to  power  at  sea.  This  natural  tendency 
and  growth  were  indeed  modified  and  seriously  checked  at 
times  by  the  interference  of  other  governments,  jealous  of  a 
prosperity  which  their  own  people  could  invade  only  by  the 
aid  of  artificial  support,  —  a  support  which  will  be  considered 
under  the  head  of  governmental  action  as  affecting  sea 
power. 

The  tendency  to  trade,  involving  of  necessity  the  produc¬ 
tion  of  something  to  trade  with,  is  the  national  characteristic 
most  important  to  the  development  of  sea  power.  Granting 
it  and  a  good  seaboard,  it  is  not  likely  that  the  dangers  of  the 
sea,  or  any  aversion  to  it,  will  deter  a  people  from  seeking 
wealth  by  the  paths  of  ocean  commerce.  Where  wealth  is 
sought  by  other  means,  it  may  be  found;  but  it  will  not  ne¬ 
cessarily  lead  to  sea  power.  Take  France.  France  has  a  fine 
country,  an  industrious  people,  an  admirable  position.  The 
French  navy  has  known  periods  of  great  glory,  and  in  its 
lowest  estate  has  never  dishonored  the  military  reputation  so 
dear  to  the  nation.  Yet  as  a  maritime  State,  securely  resting 
upon  a  broad  basis  of  sea  commerce,  France,  as  compared 
with  other  historical  sea-peoples,  has  never  held  more  than  a 
respectable  position.  The  chief  reason  for  this,  so  far  as 
national  character  goes,  is  the  way  in  which  wealth  is  sought. 
As  Spain  and  Portugal  sought  it  by  digging  gold  out  of  the 
ground,  the  temper  of  the  French  people  leads  them  to  seek 
it  by  thrift,  economy,  hoarding.  It  is  said  to  be  harder  to 
keep  than  to  make  a  fortune.  Possibly ;  but  the  adventurous 
temper,  which  risks  what  it  has  to  gain  more,  has  much  in 
common  with  the  adventurous  spirit  that  conquers  worlds  for 
commerce.  The  tendency  to  save  and  put  aside,  to  venture 
timidly  and  on  a  small  scale,  may  lead  to  a  general  diffusion 


54 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


of  wealth  on  a  like  small  scale,  but  not  to  the  risks  and  de¬ 
velopment  of  external  trade  and  shipping  interests.  To  illus¬ 
trate,  —  and  the  incident  is  given  only  for  what  it  is  worth, — 
a  French  officer,  speaking  to  the  author  about  the  Panama 
Canal,  said  :  “  I  have  two  shares  in  it.  In  France  we  don’t 
do  as  you,  where  a  few  people  take  a  great  many  shares  each. 
With  us  a  large  number  of  people  take  one  share  or  a  very 
few.  When  these  were  in  the  market  my  wife  said  to  me, 
‘  You  take  two  shares,  one  for  you  and  one  for  me.’  ”  As 
regards  the  stability  of  a  man’s  personal  fortunes  this  kind 
of  prudence  is  doubtless  wise ;  but  when  excessive  prudence 
or  financial  timidity  becomes  a  national  trait,  it  must  tend  to 
hamper  the  expansion  of  commerce  and  of  the  nation’s  ship¬ 
ping.  The  same  caution  in  money  matters,  appearing  in  an¬ 
other  relation  of  life,  has  checked  the  production  of  children, 
and  keeps  the  population  of  France  nearly  stationary. 

The  noble,, classes  of  Europe  inherited  from  the  Middle  Ages 
a  supercilious  contempt  for  peaceful  trade,  which  has  exer¬ 
cised  a  modifying  influence  upon  its  growth,  according  to  the 
national  character  of  different  countries.  The  pride  of  the 
Spaniards  fell  easily  in  with  this  spirit  of  contempt,  and  co¬ 
operated  with  that  disastrous  unwillingness  to  work  and  wait 
for  wealth  which  turned  them  away  from  commerce.  In 
France,  the  vanity  which  is  conceded  even  by  Frenchmen  to 
be  a  national  trait  led  in  the  same  direction.  The  numbers 
and  brilliancy  of  the  nobility,  and  the  consideration  enjoyed 
by  them,  set  a  seal  of  inferiority  upon  an  occupation  which 
they  despised.  Rich  merchants  and  manufacturers  sighed  for 
the  honors  of  nobility,  and  upon  obtaining  them,  abandoned 
their  lucrative  professions.  Therefore,  while  the  industry  of 
the  people  and  the  fruitfulness  of  the  soil  saved  commerce 
from  total  decay,  it  was  pursued  under  a  sense  of  humiliation 
which  caused  its  best  representatives  to  escape  from  it  as 
soon  as  they  could.  Louis  XIV.,  under  the  influence  of 
Colbert,  put  forth  an  ordinance  “  authorizing  all  noblemen  to 
take  an  interest  in  merchant  ships,  goods  and  merchandise, 
without  being  considered  as  having  derogated  from  nobility, 

7 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER.  55 

provided  they  did  not  sell  at  retail ;  ”  and  the  reason  given 
for  this  action  was,  “  that  it  imports  the  good  of  our  subjects 
and  our  own  satisfaction,  to  efface  the  relic  of  a  public  opin¬ 
ion,  universally  prevalent,  that  maritime  commerce  is  incom¬ 
patible  with  nobility.”  But  a  prejudice  involving  conscious 
and  open  superiority  is  not  readily  effaced  by  ordinances, 
especially  when  vanity  is  a  conspicuous  trait  in  national  char¬ 
acter;  and  many  years  later  Montesquieu  taught  that  it  is 
contrary  to  the  spirit  of  monarchy  that  the  nobility  should 
engage  in  trade. 

In  Holland  there  was  a  nobility ;  but  the  State  was  repub¬ 
lican  in  name,  allowed  large  scope  to  personal  freedom  and 
enterprise,  and  the  centres  of  power  were  in  the  great  cities. 
The  foundation  of  the  national  greatness  was  money  —  or 
rather  wealth.  Wealth,  as  a  source  of  civic  distinction,  car¬ 
ried  with  it  also  power  in  the  State ;  and  with  power  there 
went  social  position  and  consideration.  In  England  the  same 
result  obtained.  The  nobility  were  proud ;  but  in  a  repre- 

sentative._government  the  power  of  wealth  could  be  neither 

— 

put  down  nor  overshadowed.  It  was  patent  to  the  eyes  of  all, 
it  was  honored  by  all ;  and  in  England,  as  well  as  Holland, 
the  occupations  which  were  the  source  of  wealth  shared  in 
the  honor  given  to  wealth  itself.  Thus,  in  all  the  countries 
named,  social  sentiment,  the  outcome  of^ national  character¬ 
istics,  had  a  marked  influence  upon  the  national  attitude 
toward  trade. 

In  yet  another  way  does  the  national  genius  affect  the 
growth  of  sea  power  in  its  broadest  sense  ;  and  that  is  in  so  far 
as  it  possesses  the  capacity  for  planting  healthy  colonies.  Of 
colonization,  as  of  all  other  growths,  it  is  true  that  it  is  most 
healthy  when  it  is  most  natural.  Therefore  colonies  that 
spring  from  the  felt  wants  and  natural  impulses  of  a  whole 
people  will  have  the  most  solid  foundations  ;  and  their  sub¬ 
sequent  growth  will  be  surest  when  they  are  least  trammelled 
from  home,  if  the  people  have  the  genius  for  independent 
action.  Men  of  the  past  three  centuries  have  keenly  felt  the 
value  to  the  mother-country  of  colonies  as  outlets  for  tho 


56 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


home  products  and  as  a  nursery  for  commerce  and  shipping ; 
but  efforts  at  colonization  have  not  had  the  same  general 
origin,  nor  have  different  systems  all  had  the  same  success. 
The  efforts  of  statesmen,  however  far-seeing  and  careful, 
have  not  been  able  to  supply  the  lack  of  strong  natural  im¬ 
pulse  ;  nor  can  the  most  minute  regulation  from  home  pro¬ 
duce  as  good  results  as  a  happier  neglect,  when  the  germ  of 
self-development  is  found  in  the  national  character.  There 
has  been  no  greater  display  of  wisdom  in  the  national  ad¬ 
ministration  of  successful  colonies  than  in  that  of  unsuc¬ 
cessful.  Perhaps  there  has  been  even  less.  If  elaborate 
system  and  supervision,  careful  adaptation  of  means  to  ends, 
diligent  nursing,  could  avail  for  colonial  growth,  the  genius 
of  England  has  less  of  this  systematizing  faculty  than  the 
genius  of  France;  but  England,  not  France,  has  been  the 
great  colonizer  of  the  world.  Successful  colonization,  with 
its  consequent  effect  upon  commerce  and  sea  power,  depends 
essentially  upon  national  character ;  because  colonies  grow 
best  when  they  grow  of  themselves,  naturally.  The  char¬ 
acter  of  the  colonist,  not  the  care  of  the  home  government,  is 
the  principle  of  the  colony’s  growth. 

This  truth  stands  out  the  clearer  because  the  general  atti¬ 
tude  of  all  the  home  governments  toward  their  colonies  was 
entirely  selfish.  However  founded,  as  soon  as  it  was  recog¬ 
nized  to  be  of  consequence,  the  colony  became  to  the  home 
country  a  cow  to  be  milked ;  to  be  cared  for,  of  course,  but 
chiefly  as  a  piece  of  property  valued  for  the  returns  it  gave. 
Legislation  was  directed  toward  a  monopoly  of  its  external 
trade ;  the  places  in  its  government  afforded  posts  of  value 
for  occupants  from  the  mother-country  ;  and  the  colony  was 
looked  upon,  as  the  sea  still  so  often  is,  as  a  fit  place  for 
those  who  were  ungovernable  or  useless  at  home.  The  mili¬ 
tary  administration,  however,  so  long  as  it  remains  a  colony,  is 
the  proper  and  necessary  attribute  of  the  home  government. 

The  fact  of  England’s  unique  and  wonderful  success  as  a 
great  colonizing  nation  is  too  evident  to  be  dwelt  upon  ;  and 
the  reason  for  it  appears  to  lie  chiefly  in  two  traits  of  the 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER . 


57 


national  character.  The  English  colonist  naturally  and  readily 
settles  down  in  his  new  country,  identifies  his  interest  jwitli 
it,  and  though  keeping  an  affectionate  remembrance  of  the 
home  from  which  he  came,  has  no  restless  eagerness  to  re¬ 
turn.  In  the  second  place,  the  Englishman  at  once  and  in¬ 
stinctively  seeks  to  develop  the  resources  of  the  new  country 
in  the  broadest  sense.  In  the  former  particular  he  differs 
from  the  French,  who  were  ever  longingly  looking  back  to  the 
delights  of  their  pleasant  land ;  in  the  latter,  from  the 
Spaniards,  whose  range  of  interest  and  ambition  was  too 
narrow  for  the  full  evolution  of  the  possibilities  of  a  new 
country. 

The  character  and  the  necessities  of  the  Dutch  led  them 
naturally  to  plant  colonies ;  and  by  the  year  1650  they  had  in 
the  East  Indies,  in  Africa,  and  in  America  a  large  number, 
only  to  name  which  would  be  tedious.  They  were  then  far 
ahead  of  England  in  this  matter.  But  though  the  origin  of 
these  colonies,  purely  commercial  in  its  character,  was  natural, 
there  seems  to  have  been  lacking  to  them  a  principle  of 
growth.  “  In  planting  them  they  never  sought  an  extension 
of  empire,  but  merely  an  acquisition  of  trade  and  commerce. 
They  attempted  conquest  only  when  forced  by  the  pressure  of 
circumstances.  Generally  they  were  content  to  trade  under 
the  protection  of  the  sovereign  of  the  country.”  This  placid 
satisfaction  with  gain  alone,  unaccompanied  by  political  ambi¬ 
tion,  tended,  like  the  despotism  of  France  and  Spain,  to  keep 
the  colonies  mere  commercial  dependencies  upon  the  mother- 
country,  and  so  killed  the  natural  principle  of  growth. 

Before  quitting  this  head  of  the  inquiry,  it  is  well  to  ask 
how  far  the  national  character  of  Americans  is  fitted  to  de¬ 
velop  a  great  sea  power,  should  other  circumstances  become 
favorable. 

It  seems  scarcely  necessary,  however,  to  do  more  than 
appeal  to  a  not  very  distant  past  to  prove  that,  if  legislative 
hindrances  be  removed,  and  more  remunerative  fields  of 
enterprise  filled  up,  the  sea  power  will  not  long  delay  its 
appearance.  The  instinct  for  commerce,  bold  enterprise  in 


58 


DISCUSSION  OF  THF 


the  pursuit  of  gain,  and  a  keen  scent  for  the  trails  that  lead 
to  it,  all  exist ;  and  if  there  be  in  the  future  any  fields  calling 
for  colonization,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  Americans  will 
carry  to  them  all  their  inherited  aptitude  for  self-government 
and  independent  growth. 

VI.  Character  of  the  Grovernment.  —  In  discussing  the  ef¬ 
fects  upon  the  development  of  a  nation’s  sea  power  exerted  by 
its  government  and  institutions,  it  will  be  necessary  to  avoid  a 
tendency  to  over-philosophizing,  to  confine  attention  to  obvious 
and  immediate  causes  and  their  plain  results,  without  prying 
too  far  beneath  the  surface  for  remote  and  ultimate  influences. 

Nevertheless,  it  must  be  noted  that  particular  forms  of 
government  with  their  accompanying  institutions,  and  the 
character  of  rulers  at  one  time  or  another,  have  exercised  a 
very  marked  influence  upon  the  development  of  sea  power. 
The  various  traits  of  a  country  and  its  people  which  have  so 
far  been  considered  constitute  the  natural  characteristics 
with  which  a  nation,  like  a  man,  begins  its  career ;  the  con¬ 
duct  of  the  government  in  turn  corresponds  to  the  exercise 
of  the  intelligent  will-power,  which,  according  as  it  is  wise, 
energetic  and  persevering,  or  the  reverse,  causes  success  or 
failure  in  a  man’s  life  or  a  nation’s  history. 

It  would  seem  probable  that  a  government  in  full  accord 
with  the  natural  bias  of  its  people  would  most  successfully 
advance  its  growth  in  every  respect ;  and,  in  the  matter  of 
sea  power,  the  most  brilliant  successes  have  followed  where 
there  has  been  intelligent  direction  by  a  government  fully 
imbued  with  the  spirit  of  the  people  and  conscious  of  its  true 
general  bent.  Such  a  government  is  most  certainly  secured 
when  the  will  of  the  people,  or  of  their  best  natural  exponents, 
has  some  large  share  in  making  it ;  but  such  free  govern¬ 
ments  have  sometimes  fallen  short,  while  on  the  other  hand 
despotic  power,  wielded  with  judgment  and  consistency,  has 
created  at  times  a  great  sea  commerce  and  a  brilliant  navy 
with  greater  directness  than  can  be  reached  by  the  slower 
processes  of  a  free  people.  The  difficulty  in  the  latter  case 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


59 


is  to  insure  perseverance  after  the  death  of  a  particular 
despot. 

England  having  undoubtedly  reached  the  greatest  height  of 
sea  power  of  any  modern  nation,  the  action  of  her  government 
first  claims  attention.  In  general  direction  this  action  has 
been  consistent,  though  often  far  from  praiseworthy.  It 
has  aimed  steadily  at  the  control  of  the  sea.  One  of  its 
most  arrogant  expressions  dates  back  as  far  as  the  reign  of 
James  I.,  when  she  had  scarce  any  possessions  outside  her 
own  islands ;  before  Virginia  or  Massachusetts  was  settled. 
Here  is  Richelieu’s  account  of  it :  — 

“  The  Duke  of  Sully,  minister  of  Henry  IV.  [one  of  the  most 
chivalrous  princes  that  ever  lived],  having  embarked  at  Calais  in  a 
French  ship  wearing  the  French  flag  at  the  main,  was  no  sooner  in 
the  Channel  than,  meeting  an  English  despatch-boat  which  was  there 
to  receive  him,  the  commander  of  the  latter  ordered  the  French  ship 
to  lower  her  flag.  The  Duke,  considering  that  his  quality  freed  him 
from  such  an  affront,  boldly  refused ;  but  this  refusal  was  followed 
by  three  cannon-shot,  which,  piercing  his  ship,  pierced  the  heart  like¬ 
wise  of  all  good  Frenchmen.  Might  forced  him  to  yield  what  right 
forbade,  and  for  all  the  complaints  he  made  he  could  get  no  better 
reply  from  the  English  captain  than  this :  ‘  That  just  as  his  duty 
obliged  him  to  honor  the  ambassador’s  rank,  it  also  obliged  him  to 
exact  the  honor  due  to  the  flag  of  his  master  as  sovereign  of  the  sea.’ 
If  the  words  of  King  James  himself  were  more  polite,  they  neverthe¬ 
less  had  no  other  effect  than  to  compel  the  Duke  to  take  counsel  of 
his  prudence,  feigning  to  be  satisfied,  while  his  wound  was  all  the 
time  smarting  and  incurable.  Henry  the  Great  had  to  practise  mod¬ 
eration  on  this  occasion  ;  but  with  the  resolve  another  time  to  sustain 
the  rights  of  his  crown  by  the  force  that,  with  the  aid  of  time,  he 
should  be  able  to  put  upon  the  sea.” 

This  act  of  unpardonable  insolence,  according  to  modern 
ideas,  was  not  so  much  out  of  accord  with  the  spirit  of  nations 
in  that  day.  It  is  chiefly  noteworthy  as  the  most  striking,  as 
well  as  one  of  the  earliest  indications  of  the  purpose  of  Eng¬ 
land  to  assert  herself  at  all  risks  upon  the  sea ;  and  the  insult 
was  offered  under  one  of  her  most  timid  kings  to  an  ambassa* 


60 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


dor  immediately  representing  the  bravest  and  ablest  of  French 
sovereigns.  This  empty  honor  of  the  flag,  a  claim  insignifi¬ 
cant  except  as  the  outward  manifestation  of  the  purpose  of  a 
government,  was  as  rigidly  exacted  under  Cromwell  as  under 
the  kings.  It  was  one  of  the  conditions  of  peace  yielded  by 
the  Dutch  after  their  disastrous  war  of  1654.  Cromwell,  a 
despot  in  everything  but  name,  was  keenly  alive  to  all  that 
concerned  England’s  honor  and  strength,  and  did  not  stop 
at  barren  salutes  to  promote  them.  Hardly  yet  possessed  of 
power,  the  English  navy  sprang  rapidly  into  a  new  life  and 
vigor  under  his  stern  rule.  England’s  rights,  or  reparation 
for  her  wrongs,  were  demanded  by  her  fleets  throughout  the 
world,  —  in  the  Baltic,  in  the  Mediterranean,  against  the  Bar¬ 
bary  States,  in  the  West  Indies;  and  under  him  the  conquest 
of  Jamaica  began  that  extension  of  her  empire,  by  force  of 
arms,  which  has  gone  on  to  our  own  days.  Nor  were  equally 
strong  peaceful  measures  for  the  growth  of  English  trade  and 
shipping  forgotten.  Cromwell’s  celebrated  Navigation  Act  de¬ 
clared  that  all  imports  into  England  or  her  colonies  must  be 
conveyed  exclusively  in  vessels  belonging  to  England  herself, 
or  to  the  country  in  which  the  products  carried  were  grown  or 
manufactured.  This  decree,  aimed  specially  at  the  Dutch,  the 
common  carriers  of  Europe,  was  resented  throughout  the  com¬ 
mercial  world  ;  but  the  benefit  to  England,  in  those  days  of 
national  strife  and  animosity,  was  so  apparent  that  it  lasted 
long  under  the  monarchy.  A  century  and  a  quarter  later  we 
find  Nelson,  before  his  famous  career  had  begun,  showing  his 
zeal  for  the  welfare  of  England’s  shipping  by  enforcing  this 
same  act  in  the  West  Indies  against  American  merchant-ships. 
When  Cromwell  was  dead,  and  Charles  II.  sat  on  the  throne 
of  his  father,  this  king,  false  to  the  English  people,  was  yet 
true  to  England’s  greatness  and  to  the  traditional  policy  of 
her  government  on  the  sea.  In  his  treacherous  intrigues  with 
Louis  XIV.,  by  which  he  aimed  to  make  himself  independent 
of  Parliament  and  people,  he  wrote  to  Louis  :  “  There  are  two 
impediments  to  a  perfect  union.  The  first  is  the  great  care 
France  is  now  taking  to  create  a  commerce  and  to  be  an  im- 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


61 


posing  maritime  power.  This  is  so  great  a  cause  of  suspicion 
with  us,  who  can  possess  importance  only  by  our  commerce 
and  our  naval  force,  that  every  step  which  France  takes  in 
this  direction  will  perpetuate  the  jealousy  between  the  two 
nations.”  In  the  midst  of  the  negotiations  which  preceded 
the  detestable  attack  of  the  two  kings  upon  the  Dutch  repub¬ 
lic,  a  warm  dispute  arose  as  to  who  should  command  the 
united  fleets  of  France  and  England.  Charles  was  inflexible 
on  this  point.  “  It  is  the  custom  of  the  English,”  said  he, 
“  to  command  at  sea ;  ”  and  he  told  the  French  ambassador 
plainly  that,  were  he  to  yield,  his  subjects  would  not  obey 
him.  In  the  projected  partition  of  the  United  Provinces  he 
reserved  for  England  the  maritime  plunder  in  positions  that 
controlled  the  mouths  of  the  rivers  Scheldt  and  Meuse.  The 
navy  under  Charles  preserved  for  some  time  the  spirit  and 
discipline  impressed  on  it  by  Cromwell’s  iron  rule ;  though 
later  it  shared  in  the  general  decay  of  morale  which  marked 
this  evil  reign.  Monk,  having  by  a  great  strategic  blunder 
sent  off  a  fourth  of  his  fleet,  found  himself  in  1666  in  pres¬ 
ence  of  a  greatly  superior  Dutch  force.  Disregarding  the 
odds,  he  attacked  without  hesitation,  and  for  three  days  main¬ 
tained  the  fight  with  honor,  though  with  loss.  Such  conduct 
is  not  war ;  but  in  the  single  eye  that  looked  to  England’s 
naval  prestige  and  dictated  his  action,  common  as  it  was  to 
England’s  people  as  well  as  to  her  government,  has  lain 
the  secret  of  final  success  following  many  blunders  through 
the  centuries.  Charles’s  successor,  James  II.,  was  himself 
a  seaman,  and  had  commanded  in  two  great  sea-fights. 
When  William  III.  came  to  the  throne,  the  governments  of 
^England  and  Holland  were  under  one  hand,  and  continued 
united  in  one  purpose  against  Louis  XI Y.  until  the  Peace  of 
Utrecht  in  1713  ;  that  is,  for  a  quarter  of  a  century.  The 
English  government  more  and  more  steadily,  and  with  con¬ 
scious  purpose,  pushed  on  the  extension  of  her  sea  dominion 
and  fostered  the  growth  of  her  sea  power.  While  as  an  open 
enemy  she  struck  at  France  upon  the  sea,  so  as  an  artful 
friend,  many  at  least  believed,  she  sapped  the  power  of  Hoi- 


62 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


land  afloat.  The  treaty  between  the  two  countries  provided 
that  of  the  sea  forces  Holland  should  furnish  three  eighths, 
England  five  eighths,  or  nearly  double.  Such  a  provision, 
coupled  with  a  further  one  which  made  Holland  keep  up 
an  army  of  102,000  against  England’s  40,000,  virtually  threw 
the  land  war  on  one  and  the  sea  war  on  the  other.  The 
tendency,  whether  designed  or  not,  is  evident ;  and  at  the 
peace,  while  Holland  received  compensation  by  land,  Eng¬ 
land  obtained,  besides  commercial  privileges  in  France, 
Spain,  and  the  Spanish  West  Indies,  the  important  maritime 
concessions  of  Gibraltar  and  Port  Mahon  in  the  Mediterra¬ 
nean  ;  of  Newfoundland,  Nova  Scotia,  and  Hudson’s  Bay  in 
North  America.  The  naval  power  of  France  and  Spain  had 
disappeared ;  that  of  Holland  thenceforth  steadily  declined. 
Posted  thus  in  America,  the  West  Indies,  and  the  Medi¬ 
terranean,  the  English  government  thenceforth  moved  firmly 
forward  on  the  path  which  made  of  the  English  kingdom  the 
British  Empire.  For  the  twent}r-five  years  following  the 
Peace  of  Utrecht,  peace  was  the  chief  aim  of  the  ministers 
who  directed  the  policy  of  the  two  great  seaboard  nations, 
France  and  England  ;  but  amid  all  the  fluctuations  of  conti¬ 
nental  politics  in  a  most  unsettled  period,  abounding  in  petty 
wrars  and  shifty  treaties,  the  eye  of  England  was  steadily  fixed 
on  the  maintenance  of  her  sea  power.  In  the  Baltic,  her 
fleets  checked  the  attempts  of  Peter  the  Great  upon  Sweden, 
and  so  maintained  a  balance  of  power  in  that  sea,  from  which 
she  drew  not  only  a  great  trade  but  the  chief  part  of  her  naval 
stores,  and  which  the  Czar  aimed  to  make  a  Russian  lake. 
Denmark  endeavored  to  establish  an  East  India  company  aided 
by  foreign  capital ;  England  and  Holland  not  only  forbade  their 
subjects  to  join  it,  but  threatened  Denmark,  and  thus  stopped 
an  enterprise  they  thought  adverse  to  their  sea  interests.  In 
the  Netherlands,  which  by  the  Utrecht  Treaty  had  passed  to 
Austria,  a  similar  East  India  company,  having  Ostend  for 
its  port,  was  formed,  with  the  emperor’s  sanction.  This  step, 
meant  to  restore  to  the  Low  Countries  the  trade  lost  to  them 
through  their  natural  outlet  of  the  Scheldt,  was  opposed  by 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


63 


the  sea  powers  England  and  Holland  ;  and  their  greediness 
for  the  monopoly  of  trade,  helped  in  this  instance  by  France, 
stifled  this  company  also  after  a  few  years  of  struggling  life. 
In  the  Mediterranean,  the  Utrecht  settlement  was  c  isturbed 
by  the  emperor  of  Austria,  England’s  natural  ally  in  ^he  then 
existing  state  of  European  politics.  Backed  by  England,  he, 
having  already  Naples,  claimed  also  Sicily  in  exchange  for 
Sardinia.  Spain  resisted  ;  and  her  navy,  just  beginning  to 
revive  under  a  vigorous  minister,  Alberoni,  was  crushed  and 
annihilated  by  the  English  fleet  off  Cape  Passaro  in  1718  ; 
while  the  following  year  a  French  army,  at  the  bidding  of 
England,  crossed  the  Pyrenees  and  completed  the  work  by 
destroying  the  Spanish  dock-yards.  Thus  England,  in  addi¬ 
tion  to  Gibraltar  and  Mahon  in  her  own  hands,  saw  Naples 
and  Sicily  in  those  of  a  friend,  while  an  enemy  was  struck 
down.  In  Spanish  America,  the  limited  privileges  to  English 
trade,  wrung  from  the  necessities  of  Spain,  were  abused  by  an 
extensive  and  scarcely  disguised  smuggling  system  ;  and  when 
the  exasperated  Spanish  government  gave  way  to  excesses  in 
the  mode  of  suppression,  both  the  minister  who  counselled 
peace  and  the  opposition  which  urged  war  defended  their 
opinions  by  alleging  the  effects  of  either  upon  England’s  sea 
power  and  honor.  While  England’s  policy  thus  steadily  aimed 
at  widening  and  strengthening  the  bases  of  her  sway  upon  the 
ocean,  the  other  governments  of  Europe  seemed  blind  to  the 
dangers  to  be  feared  from  her  sea  growth.  The  miseries  re¬ 
sulting  from  the  overweening  power  of  Spain  in  days  long 
gone  by  seemed  to  be  forgotten  ;  forgotten  also  the  more  re¬ 
cent  lesson  of  the  bloody  and  costly  wars  provoked  by  the 
ambition  and  exaggerated  power  of  Louis  XIV.  Under  the 
eyes  of  the  statesmen  of  Europe  there  was  steadily  and  visibly 
being  built  up  a  third  overwhelming  power,  destined  to  be 
used  as  selfishly,  as  aggressively,  though  not  as  cruelly,  and 
much  more  successfully  than  any  that  had  preceded  it.  This 
was  the  power  of  the  sea,  whose  workings,  because  more 
silent  than  the  clash  of  arms,  are  less  often  noted,  though 
lying  clearly  enough  on  the  surface.  It  can  scarcely  be  denied 


64 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


that  England’s  uncontrolled  dominion  of  the  seas,  during 
almost  che  whole  period  chosen  for  our  subject,  was  by  long 
odds  the  chief  among  the  military  factors  that  determined  the 
final  issue.1  So  far,  however,  was  this  influence  from  "being 
foreseen  after  Utrecht,  that  France  for  twelve  years,  moved 
by  personal  exigencies  of  her  rulers,  sided  with  England 
against  Spain  ;  and  when  Fleuri  came  into  power  in  1726, 
though  this  policy  was  reversed,  the  navy  of  France  received 
no  attention,  and  the  only  blow  at  England  was  the  establish¬ 
ment  of  a  Bourbon  prince,  a  natural  enemy  to  her,  upon  the 
throne  of  the  two  Sicilies  in  1736.  When  war  broke  out  with 
Spain  in  1739,  the  navy  of  England  was  in  numbers  more 
than  equal  to  the  combined  navies  of  Spain  and  France  ;  and 
during  the  quarter  of  a  century  of  nearly  uninterrupted  war 
that  followed,  this  numerical  disproportion  increased.  In 
these  wars  England,  at  first  instinctively,  afterward  with  con¬ 
scious  purpose  under  a  government  that  recognized  her  oppor¬ 
tunity  and  the  possibilities  of  her  great  sea  power,  rapidly  built 
up  that  mighty  colonial  empire  whose  foundations  were  already 
securely  laid  in  the  characteristics  of  her  colonists  and  the 
strength  of  her  fleets.  In  strictly  European  affairs  her  wealth, 
the  outcome  of  her  sea  power,  made  her  play  a  conspicuous 
part  during  the  same  period.  The  system  of  subsidies,  which 
began  half  a  century  before  in  the  wars  of  Marlborough  and 
received  its  most  extensive  development  half  a  century  later 
in  the  Napoleonic  wars,  maintained  the  efforts  of  her  allies, 
which  would  have  been  crippled,  if  not  paralyzed,  without 
them.  Who  can  deny  that  the  government  which  with  one 
hand  strengthened  its  fainting  allies  on  the  continent  with 
the  life-blood  of  money,  and  with  the  other  drove  its  own 
enemies  off  the  sea  and  out  of  their  chief  possessions,  Canada, 
Martinique,  Guadeloupe,  Havana,  Manila,  gave  to  its  country 

1  An  interesting  proof  of  the  weight  attributed  to  the  naval  power  of  Great 
Britain  by  a  great  military  authority  will  be  found  in  the  opening  chapter  of 
Jomini’s  “  History  of  the  Wars  of  the  French  Revolution.”  He  lavs  down,  as  a 
fundamental  principle  of  European  policy,  that  an  unlimited  expansion  of  naval 
force  should  not  be  permitted  to  any  nation  which  cannot  be  approached  by 
land, — a  description  which  can  apply  only  to  Great  Britain. 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER . 


65 


the  foremost  rdle  in  European  politics  ;  and  who  can  fail  to 
see  that  the  power  which  dwelt  in  that  government,  with  a 
land  narrow  in  extent  and  poor  in  resources,  sprang  directly 
from  the  sea  ?  The  policy  in  which  the  English  government 
carried  on  the  war  is  shown  by  a  speech  of  Pitt,  the  master¬ 
spirit  during  its  course,  though  he  lost  office  before  bringing 
it  to  an  end.  Condemning  the  Peace  of  1763,  made  by  his 
political  opponent,  he  said  :  44  France  is  chiefly,  if  not  exclu¬ 
sively,  formidable  to  us  as  a  maritime  and  commercial  power. 
What  we  gain  in  this  respect  is  valuable  to  us,  above  all, 
through  the  injury  to  her  which  results  from  it.  You  have 
left  to  France  the  possibility  of  reviving  her  navy.”  Yet  Eng¬ 
land’s  gains  were  enormous  ;  her  rule  in  India  was  assured, 
and  all  North  America  east  of  the  Mississippi  in  her  hands. 
By  this  time  the  onward  path  of  her  government  was  clearly 
marked  out,  had  assumed  the  force  of  a  tradition,  and  was 
consistently  followed.  The  war  of  the  American  Revolution 
was,  it  is  true,  a  great  mistake,  looked  at  from  the  point  of 
view  of  sea  power ;  but  the  government  was  led  into  it  in¬ 
sensibly  by  a  series  of  natural  blunders.  Putting  aside  polit¬ 
ical  and  constitutional  considerations,  and  looking  at  the 
question  as  purely  military  or  naval,  the  case  was  this  :  The 
American  colonies  were  large  and  growing  communities  at  a 
great  distance  from  England.  So  long  as  they  remained  at¬ 
tached  to  the  mother-country,  as  they  then  were  enthusiasti¬ 
cally,  they  formed  a  solid  base  for  her  sea  power  in  that  part 
of  the  world  ;  but  their  extent  and  population  were  too  great, 
when  coupled  with  the  distance  from  England,  to  afford  any 
hope  of  holding  them  by  force,  if  any  powerful  nations  were 
willing  to  help  them.  This  44  if,”  however,  involved  a  noto¬ 
rious  probability  ;  the  humiliation  of  France  and  Spain  was  so 
bitter  and  so  recent  that  they  were  sure  to  seek  revenge,  and 
it  was  well  known  that  France  in  particular  had  been  care¬ 
fully  and  rapidly  building  up  her  navy.  Had  the  colonies 
been  thirteen  islands,  the  sea  power  of  England  would  quickly 
have  settled  the  question  ;  but  instead  of  such  a  physical  bar¬ 
rier  they  were  separated  only  by  local  jealousies  which  a  com- 

5 


66 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


raon  danger  sufficiently  overcame.  To  enter  deliberately  on 

such  a  contest,  to  try  to  hold  by  force  so  extensive  a  territory 

*  / 

with  a  large  *  hostile  population,  so  far  from  home,  was  to 
renew  the  Seven  Years’  War  with  France  and  Spain,  and  with 
the  Americans,  against,  instead  of  for,  England.  The  Seven 
Years’  War  had  been  so  heavy  a  burden  that  a  wise  govern¬ 
ment  would  have  known  that  the  added  weight  could  not  be 
borne,  and  have  seen  it  was  necessary  to  conciliate  the  colo- 
'nists.  The  government  of  the  day  was  not  wise,  and  a  large 
element  of  England’s  sea  power  was  sacrificed ;  but  by  mis¬ 
take,  not  wilfully ;  through  arrogance,  not  through  weakness. 

This  steady  keeping  to  a  general  line  of  policy  was  doubt¬ 
less  made  specially  easy  for  successive  English  governments 
by  the  clear  indications  of  the  country’s  conditions.  Single¬ 
ness  of  purpose  was  to  some  extent  imposed.  The  firm  main¬ 
tenance  of  her  sea  power,  the  haughty  determination  to  make 
it  felt,  the  wise  state  of  preparation  in  which  its  military  ele¬ 
ment  was  kept,  were  yet  more  due  to  that  feature  of  her 
political  institutions  which  practically  gave  the  government, 
during  the  period  in  question,  into  the  hands  of  a  class,  —  a 
landed  aristocracy.  Such  a  class,  whatever  its  defects  other 
wise,  readily  takes  up  and  carries  on  a  sound  political  tradition, 
is  naturally  proud  of  its  country’s  glory,  and  comparatively 
insensible  to  the  sufferings  of  the  community  by  which  that 
glory  is  maintained.  It  readily  lays  on  the  pecuniary  burden 
necessary  for  preparation  and  for  endurance  of  war.  Being 
as  a  body  rich,  it  feels  those  burdens  less.  Not  being  com¬ 
mercial,  the  sources  of  its  own  wealth  are  not  so  immediately 
endangered,  and  it  does  not  share  that  political  timidity  which 
characterizes  those  whose  property  is  exposed  and  business 
threatened,  —  the  proverbial  timidity  of  capital.  Yet  in  Eng¬ 
land  this  class  was  not  insensible  to  anything  that  touched  her 
trade  for  good  or  ill.  Both  houses  of  Parliament  vied  in 
careful  watchfulness  over  its  extension  and  protection,  and  to 
the  frequency  of  their  inquiries  a  naval  historian  attributes 
the  increased  efficiency  of  the  executive  power  in  its  manage¬ 
ment  of  the  navy.  Such  a  class  also  naturally  imbibes  anc 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


67 


keeps  up  a  spirit  of  military  honor,  which  is  of  the  first  im¬ 
portance  in  ages  when  military  institutions  have  not  yet  pro¬ 
vided  the  sufficient  substitute  in  what  is  called  esprit-de-corps. 
But  although  full  of  class  feeling  and  class  prejudice,  which 
made  themselves  felt  in  the  navy  as  well  as  elsewhere,  their 
practical  sense  left  open  the  way  of  promotion  to  its  highest 
honors  to  the  more  humbly  born  ;  and  every  age  saw  admirals 
who  had  sprung  from  the  lowest  of  the  people.  In  this  the 
temper  of  the  English  upper  class  differed  markedly  from  that 
of  the  French.  As  late  as  1789,  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Revo¬ 
lution,  the  French  Navy  List  still  bore  the  name  of  an  official 
whose  duty  was  to  verify  the  proofs  of  noble  birth  on  the  part 
of  those  intending  to  enter  the  naval  school. 

Since  1815,  and  especially  in  our  own  day,  the  government 
of  England  has  passed  very  much  more  into  the  hands  of  the 
people  at  large.  Whether  her  sea  power  will  suffer  there¬ 
from  remains  to  be  seen.  Its  broad  basis  still  remains  in  a 
great  trade,  large  mechanical  industries,  and  an  extensive 
colonial  system.  Whether  a  democratic  government  will  have 
the  foresight,  the  keen  sensitiveness  to  national  position  and 
credit,  the  willingness  to  insure  its  prosperity  by  adequate 
outpouring  of  money  in  times  of  peace,  all  which  are  necessary 
for  military  preparation,  is  yet  an  open  question.  Popular 
governments  are  not  generally  favorable  to  military  expendi¬ 
ture,  however  necessary,  and  there  are  signs  that  England 
tends  to  drop  behind. 

It  has  already  been  seen  that  the  Dutch  Republic,  even 
more  than  the  English  nation,  drew  its  prosperity  and  its 
very  life  from  the  sea.  The  character  and  policy  of  its  gov¬ 
ernment  were  far  less  favorable  to  a  consistent  support  of  sea 
power.  Composed  of  seven  provinces,  with  the  political  name 
of  the  United  Provinces,  the  actual  distribution  of  power  may 
be  roughly  described  to  Americans  as  an  exaggerated  example 
of  States  Rights.  Each  of  the  maritime  provinces  had  its  own 
fleet  and  its  own  admiralty,  with  consequent  jealousies.  This 
disorganizing  tendency  was  partly  counteracted  by  the  great 
preponderance  of  the  Province  of  Holland,  which  alone  con- 


68 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


tributed  five  sixths  of  the  fleet  and  fifty-eight  per  cent  of  the 
taxes,  and  consequently  had  a  proportionate  share  in  directing 
the  national  policy.  Although  intensely  patriotic,  and  capa¬ 
ble  of  making  the  last  sacrifices  for  freedom,  the  commercial 
spirit  of  the  people  penetrated  the  government,  which  indeed 
might  be  called  a  commercial  aristocracy,  and  made  it  averse 
to  war,  and  to  the  expenditures  which  are  necessary  in  prepar¬ 
ing  for  war.  As  has  before  been  said,  it  was  not  until  danger 
stared  them  in  the  face  that  the  burgomasters  were  willing 
to  pay  for  their  defences.  While  the  republican  government 
lasted,  however,  this  economy  was  practised  least  of  all  upon 
the  fleet ;  and  until  the  death  of  John  De  Witt,  in  1672,  and 
the  peace  with  England  in  1674,  the  Dutch  navy  was  in  point 
of  numbers  and  equipment  able  to  make  a  fair  show  against 
the  combined  navies  of  England  and  France.  Its  efficiency  at 
this  time  undoubtedly  saved  the  country  from  the  destruction 
planned  by  the  two  kings.  With  De  Witt’s  death  the  repub¬ 
lic  passed  away,  and  was  followed  by  the  practically  monarchi¬ 
cal  government  of  William  of  Orange.  The  life-long  policy  of 
this  prince,  then  only  eighteen,  was  resistance  to  Louis  XIY. 
and  to  the  extension  of  French  power.  This  resistance  took 
shape  upon  the  land  rather  than  the  sea,  —  a  tendency  pro¬ 
moted  by  England’s  withdrawal  from  the  war.  As  early  as 
1676,  Admiral  De  Ruyter  found  the  force  given  him  unequal 
to  cope  with  the  French  alone.  With  the  eyes  of  the  govern¬ 
ment  fixed  on  the  land  frontier,  the  navy  rapidly  declined. 
In  1688,  when  William  of  Orange  needed  a  fleet  to  convoy 
him  to  England,  the  burgomasters  of  Amsterdam  objected 
that  the  navy  was  incalculably  decreased  in  strength,  as  well 
as  deprived  of  its  ablest  commanders.  When  king  of  Eng¬ 
land,  William  still  kept  his  position  as  stadtholder,  and  with 
it  his  general  European  policy.  He  found  in  England  the  sea 
power  he  needed,  and  used  the  resources  of  Holland  for  the 
land  war.  This  Dutch  prince  consented  that  in  the  allied 
fleets,  in  councils  of  war,  the  Dutch  admirals  should  sit  below 
the  junior  English  captain ;  and  Dutch  interests  at  sea  were 
sacrificed  as  readily  as  Dutch  pride  to  the  demands  of  Eng- 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


69 


land.  When  William  died,  his  policy  was  still  followed  by 
the  government  which  succeeded  him.  Its  aims  were  wholly 
centred  upon  the  land,  and  at  the  Peace  of  Utrecht,  which 
closed  a  series  of  wars  extending  over  forty  years,  Holland, 
having  established  no  sea  claim,  gained  nothing  in  the  way 
of  sea  resources,  of  colonial  extension,  or  of  commerce. 

Of  the  last  of  these  wars  an  English  historian  says :  “  The 
economy  of  the  Dutch  greatly  hurt  their  reputation  and  their 
trade.  Their  men-of-war  in  the  Mediterranean  were  always 
victualled  short,  and  their  convoys  were  so  weak  and  ill- 
provided  that  for  one  ship  that  we  lost,  they  lost  five,  which 
begat  a  general  notion  that  we  were  the  safer  carriers,  which 
certainly  had  a  good  effect.  Hence  it  was  that  our  trade 
rather  increased  than  diminished  in  this  war.” 

From  that  time  Holland  ceased  to  have  a  great  sea  power, 
and  rapidly  lost  the  leading  position  among  the  nations  which 
that  power  had  built  up.  It  is  only  just  to  say  that  no  pol¬ 
icy  could  have  saved  from  decline  this  small,  though  deter¬ 
mined,  nation,  in  face  of  the  persistent  enmity  of  Louis  XIV. 
The  friendship  of  France,  insuring  peace  on  her  landward 
frontier,  would  have  enabled  her,  at  least  for  a  longer  time,  to 
dispute  with  England  the  dominion  of  the  seas  ;  and  as  allies 
the  navies  of  the  two  continental  States  might  have  checked 
the  growth  of  the  enormous  sea  power  which  has  just  been 
considered.  Sea  peace  between  England  and  Holland  was 
only  possible  by  the  virtual  subjection  of  one  or  the  other,  for 
both  aimed  at  the  same  object.  Between  France  and  Holland 
it  was  otherwise ;  and  the  fall  of  Holland  proceeded,  not 
necessarily  from  her  inferior  size  and  numbers,  but  from 
faulty  policy  on  the  part  of  the  two  governments.  It  does 
not  concern  us  to  decide  which  was  the  more  to  blame. 

France,  admirably  situated  for  the  possession  of  sea  power, 
received  a  definite  policy  for  the  guidance  of  her  government 
from  two  great  rulers,  Henry  IV.  and  Richelieu.  With  cer¬ 
tain  well-defined  projects  of  extension  eastward  upon  the  land 
were  combined  a  steady  resistance  to  the  House  of  Austria, 
which  then  ruled  in  both  Austria  and  Spain,  and  an  equal 


70 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


purpose  of  resistance  to  England  upon  the  sea.  To  further 
this  latter  end,  as  well  as  for  other  reasons,  Holland  was 
to  be  courted  as  an  ally.  Commerce  and  fisheries  as  the 
basis  of  sea  power  were  to  be  encouraged,  and  a  military 
navy  was  to  be  built  up.  Richelieu  left  what  he  called  his 
political  will,  in  which  he  pointed  out  the  opportunities  of 
France  for  achieving  sea  power,  based  upon  her  position  and 
resources ;  and  French  writers  consider  him  the  virtual  founder 
of  the  navy,  not  merely  because  he  equipped  ships,  but  from 
the  breadth  of  his  views  and  his  measures  to  insure  sound  in¬ 
stitutions  and  steady  growth.  After  his  death,  Mazarin  inher¬ 
ited  his  views  and  general  policy,  but  not  his  lofty  and  martial 
spirit,  and  during  his  rule  the  newly  formed  navy  disappeared. 
When  Louis  XIV.  took  the  government  into  his  own  hands, 
in  1661,  there  were  but  thirty  ships  of  war,  of  which  only 
three  had  as  many  as  sixty  guns.  Then  began  a  most  as¬ 
tonishing  manifestation  of  the  work  which  can  be  done  by 
absolute  government  ably  and  systematically  wielded.  That 
part  of  the  administration  which  dealt  with  trade,  manufac¬ 
tures,  shipping,  and  colonies,  was  given  to  a  man  of  great 
practical  genius,  Colbert,  who  had  served  with  Richelieu  and 
had  drunk  in  fully  his  ideas  and  policy.  He  pursued  his  aims 
in  a  spirit  thoroughly  French.  Everything  was  to  be  organ¬ 
ized,  the  spring  of  everything  was  in  the  minister’s  cabinet. 
“  To  organize  producers  and  merchants  as  a  powerful  army, 
subjected  to  an  active  and  intelligent  guidance,  so  as  to  secure 
an  industrial  victory  for  France  by  order  and  unity  of  efforts, 
and  to  obtain  the  best  products  by  imposing  on  all  workmen 
the  processes  recognized  as  best  by  competent  men.  ...  To 
organize  seamen  and  distant  commerce  in  large  bodies  like 
the  manufactures  and  internal  commerce,  and  to  give  as  a 
support  to  the  commercial  power  of  France  a  navy  established 
on  a  firm  basis  and  of  dimensions  hitherto  unknown,”  — such, 
we  are  told,  were  the  aims  of  Colbert  as  regards  two  of  the 
three  links  in  the  chain  of  sea  power.  For  the  third,  the  col¬ 
onies  at  the  far  end  of  the  line,  the  same  governmental 
direction  and  organization  were  evidently  purposed;  for  the 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


71 


government  began  by  buying  back  Canada,  Newfoundland, 
Nova  Scotia,  and  the  French  West  India  Islands  from  the 
parties  who  then  owned  them.  Here,  then,  is  seen  pure,  ab¬ 
solute,  uncontrolled  power  gathering  up  into  its  hands  all  the 
reins  for  the  guidance  of  a  nation’s  course,  and  proposing  so  to 
direct  it  as  to  make,  among  other  things,  a  great  sea  power. 

To  enter  into  the  details  of  Colbert’s  action  is  beyond  our 
purpose.  It  is  enough  to  note  the  chief  part  played  by  the 
government  in  building  up  the  sea  power  of  the  State,  and 
that  this  very  great  man  looked  not  to  any  one  of  the  bases 
on  which  it  rests  to  the  exclusion  of  the  others,  but  embraced 
them  all  in  his  wise  and  provident  administration.  Agricul¬ 
ture,  which  increases  the  products  of  the  earth,  and  manufac¬ 
tures,  which  multiply  the  products  of  man’s  industry ;  internal 
trade  routes  and  regulations,  by  which  the  exchange  of  prod¬ 
ucts  from  the  interior  to  the  exterior  is  made  easier;  ship¬ 
ping  and  customs  regulations  tending  to  throw  the  carrying- 
trade  into  French  hands,  and  so  to  encourage  the  building  of 
French  shipping,  by  which  the  home  and  colonial  products 
should  be  carried  back  and  forth ;  colonial  administration  and 
development,  by  which  a  far-off  market  might  be  continually 
growing  up  to  be  monopolized  by  the  home  trade  ;  treaties 
with  foreign  States  favoring  French  trade,  and  imposts  on 
foreign  ships  and  products  tending  to  break  down  that  of 
rival  nations,- — all  these  means,  embracing  countless  details, 
were  employed  to  build  up  for  France  (1)  Production  ;  (2) 
Shipping;  (3)  Colonies  and  Markets,  —  in  a  word,  sea  power. 
The  study  of  such  a  work  is  simpler  and  easier  when  thus  done 
by  one  man,  sketched  out  by  a  kind  of  logical  process,  than 
>when  slowly  wrought  by  conflicting  interests  in  a  more  com¬ 
plex  government.  In  the  few  years  of  Colbert’s  administra¬ 
tion  is  seen  the  whole  theory  of  sea  power  put  into  practice 
in  the  systematic,  centralizing  French  way ;  while  the  illus¬ 
tration  of  the  same  theory  in  English  and  Dutch  history  is 
spread  over  generations.  Such  growth,  however,  was  forced, 
and  depended  upon  the  endurance  of  the  absolute  power 
which  watched  over  it ;  and  as  Colbert  was  not  king,  his  con- 


72 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


trol  lasted  only  till  he  lost  the  king’s  favor.  It  is,  however, 
most  interesting  to  note  the  results  of  his  labors  in  the  proper 
field  for  governmental  action  —  in  the  navy.  It  has  been  said 
that  in  1661,  when  he  took  office,  there  were  but  thirty  armed 
ships,  of  which  three  only  had  over  sixty  guns.  In  1666 
there  were  seventy,  of  which  fifty  were  ships  of  the  line  and 
twenty  were  fire-ships ;  in  1671,  from  seventy  the  number  had 
increased  to  one  hundred  and  ninety-six.  In  1683  there  were 
one  hundred  and  seven  ships  of  from  twenty-four  to  one  hun¬ 
dred  and  twenty  guns,  twelve  of  which  carried  over  seventy- 
six  guns,  besides  many  smaller  vessels.  The  order  and 
system  introduced  into  the  dock-yards  made  them  vastly 
more  efficient  than  the  English.  An  English  captain,  a  pris¬ 
oner  in  France  while  the  effect  of  Colbert’s  work  still  lasted 
in  the  hands  of  his  son,  writes:  — 

“  When  I  was  first  brought  prisoner  thither,  I  lay  four  months  in  a 
hospital  at  Brest  for  care  of  my  wounds.  W7hile  there  I  was  aston¬ 
ished  at  the  expedition  used  in  manning  and  fitting  out  their  ships, 
which  till  then  I  thought  could  be  done  nowhere  sooner  than  in  Eng¬ 
land,  where  we  have  ten  times  the  shipping,  and  consequently  ten 
times  the  seamen,  they  have  in  France ;  but  there  I  saw  twenty  sail 
of  ships,  of  about  sixty  guns  each,  got  ready  in  twenty  days’  time ; 
they  were  brought  in  and  the  men  were  discharged ;  and  upon  an 
order  from  Paris  they  were  careened,  keeled  up,  rigged,  victualled, 
manned,  and  out  again  in  the  said  time  with  the  greatest  ease  imagi¬ 
nable.  I  likewise  saw  a  ship  of  one  hundred  guns  that  had  all  her 
guns  taken  out  in  four  or  five  hours’  time ;  which  I  never  saw  done 
in  England  in  twenty-four  hours,  and  this  with  the  greatest  ease  and 
less  hazard  than  at  home.  This  I  saw  under  my  hospital  window.” 

A  French  naval  historian  cites  certain  performances  which 
are  simply  incredible,  such  as  that  the  keel  of  a  galley  was 
laid  at  four  o’clock,  and  that  at  nine  she  left  port,  fully  armed. 
These  traditions  may  be  accepted  as  pointing,  with  the  more 
serious  statements  of  the  English  officer,  to  a  remarkable  de¬ 
gree  of  system  and  order,  and  abundant  facilities  for  work. 

Yet  all  this  wonderful  growth,  forced  by  the  action  of  the 
government,  withered  away  like  Jonah’s  gourd  when  the  gov- 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


73 


ernment’s  favor  was  withdrawn.  Time  was  not  allowed  for 
its  roots  to  strike  down  deep  into  the  life  of  the  nation.  Col¬ 
bert’s  work  was  in  the  direct  line  of  Richelieu’s  policy,  and 
for  a  time  it  seemed  there  would  continue  the  course  of  action 
which  would  make  France  great  upon  the  sea  as  well  as  pre¬ 
dominant  upon  the  land.  For  reasons  which  it  is  not  yet 
necessary  to  give,  Louis  came  to  have  feelings  of  bitter  enmity 
against  Holland;  and  as  these  feelings  were  shared  by 
Charles  II.,  the  two  kings  determined  on  the  destruction  of 
the  United  Provinces.  This  war,  which  broke  out  in  1672, 
though  more  contrary  to  natural  feeling  on  the  part  of  Eng¬ 
land,  was  less  of  a  political  mistake  for  her  than  for  France, 
and  especially  as  regards  sea  power.  France  was  helping  to 
destroy  a  probable,  and  certainly  an  indispensable,  ally ; 
England  was  assisting  in  the  ruin  of  her  greatest  rival  on 
the  sea,  at  this  time,  indeed,  still  her  commercial  superior. 
France,  staggering  under  debt  and  utter  confusion  in  her 
finances  when  Louis  mounted  the  throne,  was  just  seeing  her 
way  clear  in  1672,  under  Colbert’s  reforms  and  their  happy 
results.  The  war,  lasting  six  years,  undid  the  greater  part  of 
his  work.  The  agricultural  classes,  manufactures,  commerce, 
and  the  colonies,  all  were  smitten  by  it ;  the  establishments 
of  Colbert  languished,  and  the  order  he  had  established  in  the 
finances  was  overthrown.  Thus  the  action  of  Louis  —  and  he 
alone  was  the  directing  government  of  France  —  struck  at  the 
roots  of  her  sea  power,  and  alienated  her  best  sea  ally.  The 
territory  and  the  military  power  of  France  were  increased, 
but  the  springs  of  commerce  and  of  a  peaceful  shipping  had 
been  exhausted  in  the  process ;  and  although  the  military 
navy  was  for  some  years  kept  up  with  splendor  and  effi¬ 
ciency,  it  soon  began  to  dwindle,  and  by  the  end  of  the  reign 
had  practically  disappeared.  The  same  false  policy,  as  re¬ 
gards  the  sea,  marked  the  rest  of  this  reign  of  fifty-four  years. 
Louis  steadily  turned  his  back  upon  the  sea  interests  of 
France,  except  the  fighting-ships,  and  either  could  not  or 
would  not  see  that  the  latter  were  of  little  use  and  uncertain 
life,  if  the  peaceful  shipping  and  the  industries,  by  which  they 


74 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


were  supported,  perished.  His  policy,  aiming  at  supreme 
power  in  Europe  by  military  strength  and  territorial  exten¬ 
sion,  forced  England  and  Holland  into  an  alliance,  which,  as 
has  before  been  said,  directly  drove  France  off  the  sea,  and 
indirectly  swamped  Holland’s  power  thereon.  Colbert’s  navy 
perished,  and  for  the  last  ten  years  of  Louis’  life  no  great 
French  fleet  put  to  sea,  though  there  was  constant  war.  The 
simplicity  of  form  in  an  absolute  monarchy  thus  brought  out 
strongly  how  great  the  influence  of  government  can  be  upon 
both  the  growth  and  the  decay  of  sea  power. 

The  latter  part  of  Louis’  life  thus  witnessed  that  power  fail¬ 
ing  by  the  weakening  of  its  foundations,  of  commerce,  and  of 
the  wealth  that  commerce  brings.  The  government  that  fol¬ 
lowed,  likewise  absolute,  of  set  purpose  and  at  the  demand 
of  England,  gave  up  all  pretence  of  maintaining  an  effective 
navy.  The  reason  for  this  was  that  the  new  king  was  a 
minor ;  and  the  regent,  being  bitterly  at  enmity  with  the 
king  of  Spain,  to  injure  him  and  preserve  his  own  power, 
entered  into  alliance  with  England.  He  aided  her  to  estab¬ 
lish  Austria,  the  hereditary  enemy  of  France,  in  Naples  and 
Sicily  to  the  detriment  of  Spain,  and  in  union  with  her  de¬ 
stroyed  the  Spanish  navy  and  dock-yards.  Here  again  is 
found  a  personal  ruler  disregarding  the  sea  interests  of 
France,  ruining  a  natural  ally,  and  directly  aiding,  as  Louis 
XIV.  indirectly  and  unintentionally  aided,  the  growth  of  a 
mistress  of  the  seas.  This  transient  phase  of  policy  passed 
away  with  the  death  of  the  regent  in  1726;  but  from  that 
time  until  1760  the  government  of  France  continued  to  dis¬ 
regard  her  maritime  interests.  It  is  said,  indeed,  that  owing 
to  some  wise  modifications  of  her  fiscal  regulations,  mainly 
in  the  direction  of  free  trade  (and  due  to  Law,  a  minister  of 
Scotch  birth),  commerce  with  the  East  and  West  Indies  won¬ 
derfully  increased,  and  that  the  islands  of  Guadeloupe  and 
Martinique  became  very  rich  and  thriving ;  but  both  com¬ 
merce  and  colonies  lay  at  the  mercy  of  England  when  war 
came,  for  the  navy  fell  into  decay.  In  1756,  when  things 
were  no  longer  at  their  worst,  France  had  but  forty-five  ships- 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


75 


of-the-line,  England  nearly  one  hundred  and  thirty ;  and 
when  the  forty-five  were  to  be  armed  and  equipped,  there  was 
found  to  be  neither  material  nor  rigging  nor  supplies  ;  not 
even  enough  artillery.  Nor  was  this  all. 

“Lack  of  system  in  the  government,”  says  a  French  writer, 
“  brought  about  indifference,  and  opened  the  door  to  disorder  and  lack 
of  discipline.  Never  had  unjust  promotions  been  so  frequent ;  so  also 
never  had  more  universal  discontent  been  seen.  Money  and  intrigue 
took  the  place  of  all  else,  and  brought  in  their  train  commands  and 
power.  Nobles  and  upstarts,  with  influence  at  the  capital  and  self- 
sufficiency  in  the  seaports,  thought  themselves  dispensed  with  merit. 
Waste  of  the  revenues  of  the  State  and  of  the  dock-yards  knew  no 
bounds.  Honor  and  modesty  were  turned  into  ridicule.  As  if  the 
evils  were  not  thus  great  enough,  the  ministry  took  pains  to  efface  the 
heroic  traditions  of  the  past  which  had  escaped  the  general  wreck. 
To  the  energetic  fights  of  the  great  reign  succeeded,  by  order  of  the 
court,  ‘affairs  of  circumspection/  To  preserve  to  the  wasted  material 
a  few  armed  ships,  increased  opportunity  was  given  to  the  enemy. 
From  this  unhappy  principle  we  were  bound  to  a  defensive  as  advan 
tageous  to  the  enemy  as  it  was  foreign  to  the  genius  of  our  people. 
This  circumspection  before  the  enemy,  laid  down  for  us  by  orders, 
betrayed  in  the  long  run  the  national  temper  ;  and  the  abuse  of  the 
system  led  to  acts  of  indiscipline  and  defection  under  fire,  of  which  a 
single  instance  would  vainly  be  sought  in  the  previous  century.” 

A  false  policy  of  continental  extension  swallowed  up  the 
resources  of  the  country,  and  was  doubly  injurious  because, 
by  leaving  defenceless  its  colonies  and  commerce,  it  exposed 
the  greatest  source  of  wealth  to  be  cut  off,  as  in  fact  hap¬ 
pened.  The  small  squadrons  that  got  to  sea  were  destroyed 
by  vastly  superior  force ;  the  merchant  shipping  was  swept 
away,  and  the  colonies,  Canada,  Martinique,  Guadeloupe, 
India,  fell  into  England’s  hands.  If  it  did  not  take  too  much 
space,  interesting  extracts  might  be  made,  showing  the  woful 
misery  of  France,  the  country  that  had  abandoned  the  sea, 
and  the  growing  wealth  of  England  amid  all  her  sacrifices 
and  exertions.  A  contemporary  writer  has  thus  expressed 
his  view  of  the  policy  of  France  at  this  period  :  — 


76 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


11  France,  by  engaging  so  heartily  as  she  has  done  in  the  German 
war,  has  drawn  away  so  much  of  her  attention  and  her  revenue  from 
her  navy  that  it  enabled  us  to  give  such  a  blow  to  her  maritime 
strength  as  possibly  she  may  never  be  able  to  recover.  Her  engage¬ 
ment  in  the  German  war  has  likewise  drawn  her  from  the  defence  of 
her  colonies,  by  which  means  we  have  conquered  some  of  the  most 
considerable  she  possessed.  It  has  withdrawn  her  from  the  protec¬ 
tion  of  her  trade,  by  which  it  is  entirely  destroyed,  while  that  of 
England  has  never,  in  the  profoundest  peace,  been  in  so  flourishing  a 
condition.  So  that,  by  embarking  in  this  German  war,  France  has 
suffered  herself  to  be  undone,  so  far  as  regards  her  particular  and 
immediate  quarrel  with  England.” 

In  the  Seven  Years’  War  France  lost  thirty-seven  ships-of- 
the-line  and  fifty-six  frigates,  —  a  force  three  times  as  numer¬ 
ous  as  the  whole  navy  of  the  United  States  at  any  time  in  the 
days  of  sailing-ships.  “  For  the  first  time  since  the  Middle 
Ages,”  says  a  French  historian,  speaking  of  the  same  war, 
“  England  had  conquered  France  single-handed,  almost  with¬ 
out  allies,  France  having  powerful  auxiliaries.  She  had  con¬ 
quered  solely  by  the  superiority  of  her  government.”  Yes  ;  but 
it  was  by  the  superiority  of  her  government  using  the  tremen¬ 
dous  weapon  of  her  sea  power,  —  the  reward  of  a  consistent 
policy  perseveringly  directed  to  one  aim. 

The  profound  humiliation  of  France,  which  reached  its 
depths  between  1760  and  1763,  at  which  latter  date  she  made 
peace,  has  an  instructive  lesson  for  the  United  States  in  this 
our  period  of  commercial  and  naval  decadence.  We  have  been 
spared  her  humiliation  ;  let  us  hope  to  profit  by  her  subsequent 
example.  Between  the  same  years  (1760  and  1763)  the  French 
people  rose,  as  afterward  in  1793,  and  declared  they  would 
have  a  navy.  “  Popular  feeling,  skilfully  directed  by  the 
government,  took  up  the  cry  from  one  end  of  France  to  the 
other,  4  The  navy  must  be  restored.’  Gifts  of  ships  were 
made  by  cities,  bv  corporations,  and  by  private  subscriptions. 
A  prodigious  activity  sprang  up  in  the  lately  silent  ports ; 
everywhere  ships  were  building  or  repairing.”  This  activity 
was  sustained  ;  the  arsenals  were  replenished,  the  material 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


77 


of  every  kind  was  put  on  a  satisfactory  footing,  the  artillery 
reorganized,  and  ten  thousand  trained  gunners  drilled  and 
maintained. 

The  tone  and  action  of  the  naval  officers  of  the  day  in¬ 
stantly  felt  the  popular  impulse,  for  which  indeed  some  lof¬ 
tier  spirits  among  them  had  been  not  only  waiting  but  working. 
At  no  time  was  greater  mental  and  professional  activity  found 
among  French  naval  officers  than  just  then,  when  their  ships 
had  been  suffered  to  rot  away  by  governmental  inaction. 
Thus  a  prominent  French  officer  of  our  own  day  writes :  — 

“  The  sad  condition  of  the  navy  in  the  reign  of  Louis  XV.,  by 
closing  to  officers  the  brilliant  career  of  bold  enterprises  and  success¬ 
ful  battles,  forced  them  to  fall  back  upon  themselves.  They  drew 
from  study  the  knowledge  they  were  to  put  to  the  proof  some  years 
later,  thus  putting  into  practice  that  fine  saying  of  Montesquieu, 
‘Adversity  is  our  mother,  Prosperity  our  step-mother.’  .  .  .  By  the 
year  1769  was  seen  in  all  its  splendor  that  brilliant  galaxy  of  officers 
whose  activity  stretched  to  the  ends  of  the  earth,  and  who  embraced 
in  their  works  and  in  their  investigations  all  the  branches  of  human 
knowledge.  The  Academie  de  Marine,  founded  in  1752,  was  re¬ 
organized.”  1 

The  Acaddmie’s  first  director,  a  post-captain  named  Bigot 
de  Morogues,  wrote  an  elaborate  treatise  on  naval  tactics,  the 
first  original  work  on  the  subject  since  Paul  Hoste’s,  which  it 
was  designed  to  supersede.  Morogues  must  have  been  study¬ 
ing  and  formulating  his  problems  in  tactics  in  days  when 
France  had  no  fleet,  and  was  unable  so  much  as  to  raise  her 
head  at  sea  under  the  blows  of  her  enemy.  At  the  same  time 
England  had  no  similar  book  ;  and  an  English  lieutenant,  in 
1762,  was  just  translating  a  part  of  Hoste’s  great  work,  omit¬ 
ting  by  far  the  larger  part.  It  was  not  until  nearly  twenty 
years  later  that  Clerk,  a  Scotch  private  gentleman,  published 
an  ingenious  study  of  naval  tactics,  in  which  he  pointed  out 
to  English  admirals  the  system  by  which  the  French  had 
thwarted  their  thoughtless  and  ill-combined  attacks.2  “  The 

1  Gougeard :  La  Marine  de  Guerre ;  Richelieu  et  Colbert. 

2  Whatever  may  be  thought  of  Clerk’s  claim  to  originality  in  constructing  a 
system  of  naval  tactics,  and  it  has  been  seriously  impugned,  there  can  be  no  doubt 


78 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


researches  of  the  Acaddmie  de  Marine,  and  the  energetic  im¬ 
pulse  which  it  gave  to  the  labors  of  officers,  were  not,  as  we 
hope  to  show  later,  without  influence  upon  the  relatively 
prosperous  condition  in  which  the  navy  was  at  the  beginning 
of  the  American  war.” 

It  has  already  been  pointed  out  that  the  American  War  of 
Independence  involved  a  departure  from  England’s  traditional 
and  true  policy,  by  committing  her  to  a  distant  .land  war, 
while  powerful  enemies  were  waiting  for  an  opportunity  to 
attack  her  at  sea.  Like  France  in  the  then  recent  German 
wars,  like  Napoleon  later  in  the  Spanish  war,  England,  through 
undue  self-confidence,  was  about  to  turn  a  friend  into  an 
enemy,  and  so  expose  the  real  basis  of  her  power  to  a  rude 
proof.  The  French  government,  on  the  other  hand,  avoided 
the  snare  into  which  it  had  so  often  fallen.  Turning  her 
back  on  the  European  continent,  having  the  probability  of 
neutrality  there,  and  the  certainty  of  alliance  with  Spain  by 
her  side,  France  advanced  to  the  contest  with  a  fine  navy  and 
a  brilliant,  though  perhaps  relatively  inexperienced,  body  of  " 
officers.  On  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic  she  had  the  sup^ 
port  of  a  friendly  people,  and  of  her  own  or  allied  ports,  both 
in  the  West  Indies  and  on  the  continent.  The  wisdom  of  this 
policy,  the  happy  influence  of  this  action  of  the  government 
upon  her  sea  power,  is  evident ;  but  the  details  of  the  war 
do  not  belong  to  this  part  of  the  subject.  To  Americans,  the 
chief  interest  of  that  war  is  found  upon  the  land  ;  but  to  naval 
officers  upon  the  sea,  for  it  was  essentially  a  sea  war.  The 
intelligent  and  systematic  efforts  of  twenty  years  bore  their 
due  fruit ;  for  though  the  warfare  afloat  ended  with  a  great 
disaster,  the  combined  efforts  of  the  French  and  Spanish  fleets 
undoubtedly  bore  down  England’s  strength  and  robbed  her 
of  her  colonies.  In  the  various  naval  undertakings  and 
battles  the  honor  of  France  was  upon  the  whole  maintained  ; 
though  it  is  difficult,  upon  consideration  of  the  general 

that  his  criticisms  on  the  past  were  sound.  So  far  as  the  author  knows,  he  in 
this  respect  deserves  credit  for  an  originality  remarkable  in  one  who  had  the 
training  neither  of  a  seaman  nor  of  a  military  man. 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER.  79 

subject,  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  the  inexperience  of 
French  seamen  as  compared  with  English,  the  narrow  spirit 
of  jealousy  shown  by  the  noble  corps  of  officers  toward  those 
of  different  antecedents,  and  above  all,  the  miserable  tradi¬ 
tions  of  three  quarters  of  a  century  already  alluded  to,  the 
miserable  policy  of  a  government  which  taught  them  first  to 
save  their  ships,  to  economize  the  material,  prevented  French 
admirals  from  reaping,  not  the  mere  glory,  but  the  positive 
advantages  that  more  than  once  were  within  their  grasp. 
When  Monk  said  the  nation  that  would  rule  upon  the  sea 
must  always  attack,  he  set  the  key-note  to  England’s  naval 
policy ;  and  had  the  instructions  of  the  French  government 
consistently  breathed  the  same  spirit,  the  war  of  1778  might 
have  ended  sooner  and  better  than  it  did.  It  seems  ungra¬ 
cious  to  criticise  the  conduct  of  a  service  to  which,  under  God, 
our  nation  owes  that  its  birth  was  not  a  miscarriage  ;  but 
writers  of  its  own  country  abundantly  reflect  the  spirit  of  the 
/  y  remark.  A  French  officer  who  served  afloat  during  this  war, 
'  ^  in  a  work  of  calm  and  judicial  tone,  says:  — 

“  What  must  the  young  officers  have  thought  who  were  at  Sandy 
Hook  with  D’Estaing,  at  St.  Christopher  with  De  Grasse,  even  those 
who  arrived  at  Rhode  Island  with  De  Ternay,  when  they  saw  that 
these  officers  were  not  tried  at  their  return  ?  ” 1 

Again,  another  French  officer,  of  much  later  date,  justifies 
the  opinion  expressed,  when  speaking  of  the  war  of  the 
American  Revolution  in  the  following  terms  :  — 

“  It  was  necessary  to  get  rid  of  the  unhappy  prejudices  of  the 
days  of  the  regency  and  of  Louis  XV. ;  but  the  mishaps  of  which  they 
were  full  were  too  recent  to  be  forgotten  by  our  ministers.  Thanks 
to  a  wretched  hesitation,  fleets,  which  had  rightly  alarmed  England, 
became  reduced  to  ordinary  proportions.  Intrenching  themselves  in 
a  false  economy,  the  ministry  claimed  that,  by  reason  of  the  excessive 
expenses  necessary  to  maintain  the  fleet,  the  admirals  must  be  ordered 
to  maintain  the  ( greatest  circumspection as  though  in  war  half 
measures  have  not  always  led  to  disasters.  So,  too,  the  orders  given 
to  our  squadron  chiefs  were  to  keep  the  sea  as  long  as  possible,  with* 

1  La  Serre  :  Essais  Hist,  et  Crit.  sur  la  Marine  Fran9aise. 


80 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


out  engaging  in  actions  which  might  cause  the  loss  of  vessels  difficult 
to  replace ;  so  that  more  than  once  complete  victories,  which  would 
have  crowned  the  skill  of  our  admirals  and  the  courage  of  our  cap¬ 
tains,  were  changed  into  successes  of  little  importance.  A  system 
which  laid  down  as  a  principle  that  an  admiral  should  not  use  the 
force  in  his  hands,  which  sent  him  against  the  enemy  with  the  fore¬ 
ordained  purpose  of  receiving  rather  than  making  the  attack,  a  sys¬ 
tem  which  sapped  moral  power  to  save  material  resources,  must  have 
unhappy  results.  ...  It  is  certain  that  this  deplorable  system  was 
one  of  the  causes  of  the  lack  of  discipline  and  startling  defections 
wrhich  marked  the  periods  of  Louis  XVI.,  of  the  [first]  Republic,  and 
of  the  [first]  Empire.” 1 

Within  ten  years  of  the  peace  of  1T83  came  the  French 
Revolution  ;  but  that  great  upheaval  which  shook  the  founda¬ 
tions  of  States,  loosed  the  ties  of  social  order,  and  drove  out 
of  the  navy  nearly  all  the  trained  officers  of  the  monarchy 
who  were  attached  to  the  old  state  of  things,  did  not  free  the 
French  navy  from  a  false  system.  It  was  easier  to  overturn 
the  form  of  government  than  to  uproot  a  deep-seated  tradition. 
Hear  again  a  third  French  officer,  of  the  highest  rank  and 
literary  accomplishments,  speaking  of  the  inaction  of  Ville- 
neuve,  the  admiral  who  commanded  the  French  rear  at  the 
battle  of  the  Nile,  and  who  did  not  leave  his  anchors  while 
the  head  of  the  column  was  being  destroyed :  — 

“  A  day  was  to  come  [Trafalgar]  in  which  Villeneuve  in  his  turn, 
like  De  Grasse  before  him,  and  like  Duchayla,  would  complain  of 
being  abandoned  by  part  of  his  fleet.  We  have  come  to  suspect 
some  secret  reason  for  this  fatal  coincidence.  It  is  not  natural  that 
among  so  many  honorable  men  there  should  so  often  be  found  ad¬ 
mirals  and  captains  incurring  such  a  reproach.  If  the  name  of  some 
of  them  is  to  this  very  day  sadly  associated  with  the  memory  of  our 
disasters,  we  may  be  sure  the  fault  is  not  wholly  their  own.  We 
must  rather  blame  the  nature  of  the  operations  in  which  they  were 
engaged,  and  that  system  of  defensive  war  prescribed  by  the  French 
government,  which  Pitt,  in  the  English  Parliament,  proclaimed  to  be 
the  forerunner  of  certain  ruin.  That  system,  when  we  wished  to 
renounce  it,  had  already  penetrated  our  habits ;  it  had,  so  to  say, 

1  Lapeyrouse.Bonfils  :  Hist,  de  la  Marine  Fran^aise. 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


81 


weakened  our  arms  and  paralyzed  our  self-reliance.  Too  often  did 
our  squadrons  leave  port  with  a  special  mission  to  fulfil,  and  with  the 
intention  of  avoiding  the  enemy ;  to  fall  in  with  him  was  at  once  a 
piece  of  bad  luck.  It  was  thus  that  our  ships  went  into  action ;  they 
submitted  to  it  instead  of  forcing  it.  .  .  .  Fortune  would  have  hesi¬ 
tated  longer  between  the  two  fleets,  and  not  have  borne  in  the  end  so 
heavily  against  ours,  if  Brueys,  meeting  Nelson  half  way,  could  have 
gone  out  to  fight  him.  This  fettered  and  timid  war,  which  Villaret 
and  Martin  had  carried  on,  had  lasted  long,  thanks  to  the  circumspec¬ 
tion  of  some  English  admirals  and  the  traditions  of  the  old  tactics. 
It  was  with  these  traditions  that  the  battle  of  the  Nile  had  broken ; 
the  hour  for  decisive  action  had  come.”  1 

Some  years  later  came  Trafalgar,  and  again  the  government 
of  France  took  up  a  new  policy  with  the  navy.  The  author 
last  quoted  speaks  again  :  — 

“The  emperor,  whose  eagle  glance  traced  plans  of  campaign  for 
his  fleets  as  for  his  armies,  was  wearied  by  these  unexpected  reverses. 
He  turned  his  eyes  from  the  one  field  of  battle  in  which  fortune  was 
faithless  to  him,  and  decided  to  pursue  England  elsewhere  than  upon 
the  seas ;  he  undertook  to  rebuild  his  navy,  but  without  giving  it  any 
part  in  the  struggle  which  became  more  furious  than  ever.  .  .  .  Never¬ 
theless,  far  from  slackening,  the  activity  of  our  dock-yards  redoubled. 
Every  year  ships-of-the-line  were  either  laid  down  or  added  to  the 
fleet.  Venice  and  Genoa,  under  his  control,  saw  their  old  splendors 
rise  again,  and  from  the  shores  of  the  Elbe  to  the  head  of  the  Adriatic 
all  the  ports  of  the  continent  emulously  seconded  the  creative  thought 
of  the  emperor.  Numerous  squadrons  were  assembled  in  the  Scheldt, 
in  Brest  Roads,  and  in  Toulon.  .  .  .  But  to  the  end  the  emperor 
refused  to  give  this  navy,  full  of  ardor  and  self-reliance,  an  oppor¬ 
tunity  to  measure  its  strength  with  the  enemy.  .  .  .  Cast  down  by 
constant  reverses,  he  had  kept  up  our  armed  ships  only  to  oblige  our 
enemies  to  blockades  whose  enormous  cost  must  end  by  exhausting 
their  finances.” 

When  the  empire  fell,  France  had  one  hundred  and  three 
ships-of-the-line  and  fifty-five  frigates. 

To  turn  now  from  the  particular  lessons  drawn  from  the 
history  of  the  past  to  the  general  question  of  the  influence  of 

1  Jurien  de  la  Graviere :  Guerres  Maritimes. 

6 


82 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


government  upon  the  sea  career  of  its  people,  it  is  seen  that 
that  influence  can  work  in  two  distinct  but  closely  related 
ways. 

First,  in  peace :  The  government  by  its  policy  can  favor 
the  natural  growth  of  a  people’s  industries  and  its  tendencies 
to  seek  adventure  and  gain  by  way  of  the  sea ;  or  it  can  try 
to  develop  such  industries  and  such  sea-going  bent,  when  they 
do  not  naturally  exist ;  or,  on  the  other  hand,  the  government 
may  by  mistaken  action  check  and  fetter  the  progress  which 
the  people  left  to  themselves  would  make.  In  any  one  of 
these  ways  the  influence  of  the  government  will  be  felt,  mak¬ 
ing  or  marring  the  sea  power  of  the  country  in  the  matter  of 
peaceful  commerce ;  upon  which  alone,  it  cannot  be  too  often 
insisted,  a  thoroughly  strong  navy  can  be  based. 

Secondly,  for  war :  The  influence  of  the  government  will 
be  felt  in  its  most  legitimate  manner  in  maintaining  an 
armed  navy,  of  a  size  commensurate  with  the  growth  of  its 
shipping  and  the  importance  of  the  interests  connected  with 
it.  More  ipriportia.pt_p.ven  than  the  size  pf  the  navy  is  the 
question  of  its^ Jn^ijjfljons^a^gdjig. a^healtliful TplrilTand 
activity,  and  providing  for  rapid  developmerrTTh'tfme  of  war 
j^arPadequate  reserve  of  men  and  of  ships  and  by  measures 
for  drawing  out  that  general  reserve  power  which  has  before 
been  pointed  to,  when  considering  the  character  and  pursuits 
of  the  people.  Undoubtedly  uijder^this  second  head  of  war- 
lij£ftJ3reparation  must  come  the  maintenance^ofTuitable  naval  _ 
stationsIjnThosePlistant  parts  of~The  world  to  which  _the. 
armed  shipping  must  follow  the  peaceful  ifiasels.-of-Commerce. 
The  protection  of  such  stations  must  depend  either  upon 
direct  military  force,  as  do  Gibraltar  and  Malta,  or  upon  a 
surrounding  friendly  population,  such  as  the  American  colo¬ 
nists  once  were  to  England,  and,  it  may  be  presumed,  the 
Australian  colonists  now  are.  Such  friendly  surroundings 
and  backing,  joined  to  a  reasonable  military  provision,  are 
the  best  of  defences,  and  when  combined  with  decided  pre¬ 
ponderance  at  sea,  make  a  scattered  and  extensive  empire, 
like  that  of  England,  secure ;  for  while  it  is  true  that  an 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


83 


unexpected  attack  may  cause  disaster  in  some  one  quarter, 
the  actual  superiority  of  naval  power  prevents  such  disaster 
from  being  general  or  irremediable.  History  has  sufficiently 
proved  this.  England’s  naval  bases  have  been  in  all  parts 
of  the  world ;  and  her  fleets  have  at  once  protected  them, 
kept  open  the  communications  between  them,  and  relied  upon 
them  for  shelter. 

Colonies  attached  to  the  mother-country  afford,  therefore, 
the  surest  means  of  supporting  abroad  the  sea  power  of  a 
country.  In  peace,  the  influence  of  the  government  should 
be  felt  in  promoting  by  all  means  a  warmth  of  attachment 
and  a  unity  of  interest  which  will  make  the  welfare  of  one 
the  welfare  of  all,  and  the  quarrel  of  one  the  quarrel  of  all ; 
and  in  war,  or  rather  for  war,  by  inducing  such  measures 
of  organization  and  defence  as  shall  be  felt  by  all  to  be  a  fair 
distribution  of  a  burden  of  which  each  reaps  the  benefit. 

Such  colonies  the  United  States  has  not  and  is  not  likely 
to  have.  As  regards  purely  military  naval  stations,  the 
feeling  of  her  people  was  probably  accurately  expressed  by 
an  historian  of  the  English  navy  a  hundred  years  ago,  speak¬ 
ing  then  of  Gibraltar  and  Port  Mahon.  “  Military  govern¬ 
ments,”  said  he,  “  agree  so  little  with  the  industry  of  a 
trading  people,  and  are  in  themselves  so  repugnant  to  the 
genius  of  the  British  people,  that  I  do  not  wonder  that  men  of 
good  sense  and  of  all  parties  have  inclined  to  give  up  these, 
as  Tangiers  was  given  up.”  Having  therefore  no  foreign  es¬ 
tablishments,  either  colonial  or  military,  the  ships  of  war  of 
the  United  States,  in  war,  will  be  like  land  birds,  unable  to 
fly  far  from  their  own  shores.  To  provide  resting-places  for 
them,  where  they  can  coal  and  repair,  would  be  one  of  the 
first  duties  of  a  government  proposing  to  itself  the  develop¬ 
ment  of  the  power  of  the  nation  at  sea. 

As  the  practical  object  of  this  inquiry  is  to  draw  from  the 
lessons  of  history  inferences  applicable  to  one’s  own  country 
and  service,  it  is  proper  now  to  ask  how  far  the  conditions  of 
the  United  States  involve  serious  danger,  and  call  for  action 
on  the  part  of  the  government,  in  order  to  build  again  her 


84 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


sea  power.  It  will  not  be  too  much  to  say  that  the  action  of 
the  government  since  the  Civil  War,  and  up  to  this  day,  has 
been  effectively  directed  solely  to  what  has  been  called  the 
first  link  in  the  chain  which  makes  sea  power.  Internal 
development,  great  production,  with  the  accompanying  aim 
and  boast  of  self-sufficingness,  such  has  been  the  object,  such 
to  some  extent  the  result.  In  this  the  government  has  faith¬ 
fully  reflected  the  bent  of  the  controlling  elements  of  the 
country,  though  it  is  not  always  easy  to  feel  that  such  con¬ 
trolling  elements  are  truly  representative,  even  in  a  free 
country.  However  that  may  be,  there  is  no  doubt  that, 
besides  having  no  colonies,  the  intermediate  link  of  a  peaceful 
shipping,  and  the  interests  involved  in  it,  are  now  likewise 
lacking.  In  short,  the  United  States  has  only  one  link  of 
the  three. 

The  circumstances  of  naval  war  have  changed  so  much 
within  the  last  hundred  years,  that  it  may  be  doubted  whether 
such  disastrous  effects  on  the  one  hand,  or  such  brilliant 
prosperity  on  the  other,  as  were  seen  in  the  wars  between 
England  and  France,  could  now  recur.  In  her  secure  and 
haughty  sway  of  the  seas  England  imposed  a  yoke  on  neu¬ 
trals  which  will  never  again  be  borne ;  and  the  principle  that 
the  flag  covers  the  goods  is  forever  secured.  The  commerce 
of  a  belligerent  can  therefore  now  be  safely  carried  on  in 
neutral  ships,  except  when  contraband  of  war  or  to  blockaded 
ports ;  and  as  regards  the  latter,  it  is  also  certain  that  there 
will  be  no  more  paper  blockades.  Putting  aside  therefore  the 
question  of  defending  her  seaports  from  capture  or  contribu¬ 
tion,  as  to  which  there  is  practical  unanimity  in  theory  and 
entire  indifference  in  practice,  what  need  has  the  United 
States  of  sea  power  ?  Her  commerce  is  even  now  carried  on 
by  others ;  why  should  her  people  desire  that  which,  if  pos¬ 
sessed,  must  be  defended  at  great  cost  ?  So  far  as  this  ques¬ 
tion  is  economical,  it  is  outside  the  scope  of  this  work ;  but 
conditions  which  may  entail  suffering  and  loss  on  the  country 
by  war  are  directly  pertinent  to  it.  Granting  therefore  that 
the  foreign  trade  of  the  United  States,  going  and  coming,  is 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


85 


on  board  ships  which  an  enemy  cannot  touch  except  when 
bound  to  a  blockaded  port,  what  will  constitute  an  efficient 
blockade  ?  The  present  definition  is,  that  it  is  such  as  to 
constitute  a  manifest  danger  to  a  vessel  seeking  to  enter  or 
leave  the  port.  This  is  evidently  very  elastic.  Many  can  re¬ 
member  that  during  the  Civil  War,  after  a  night  attack  on  the 
United  States  fleet  off  Charleston,  the  Confederates  next  morn¬ 
ing  sent  out  a  steamer  with  some  foreign  consuls  on  board, 
who  so  far  satisfied  themselves  that  no  blockading  vessel 
was  in  sight  that  they  issued  a  declaration  to  that  effect. 
On  the  strength  of  this  declaration  some  Southern  authorities 
claimed  that  the  blockade  was  technically  broken,  and  could 
not  be  technically  re-established  without  a  new  notification. 
Is  it  necessary,  to  constitute  a  real  danger  to  blockade- 
runners,  that  the  blockading  fleet  should  be  in  sight  ?  Half 
a  dozen  fast  steamers,  cruising  twenty  miles  off-shore  between 
the  New  Jersey  and  Long  Island  coast,  would  be  a  very  real 
danger  to  ships  seeking  to  go  in  or  out  by  the  principal 
entrance  to  New  York ;  and  similar  positions  might  effec¬ 
tively  blockade  Boston,  the  Delaware,  and  the  Chesapeake. 
The  main  body  of  the  blockading. fleet,  prepared  not  only  to 
capture  merchant-ships  but  to  resist  military  attempts  to 
break  the  blockade,  need  not  be  within  sight,  nor  in  a  posi¬ 
tion  known  to  the  shore.  The  bulk  of  Nelson’s  fleet  was  fifty 
miles  from  Cadiz  two  days  before  Trafalgar,  with  a  small 
detachment  watching  close  to  the  harbor.  The  allied  fleet 
began  to  get  under  way  at  7  a.m.,  and  Nelson,  even  under 
the  conditions  of  those  days,  knew  it  by  9.30.  The  English 
fleet  at  that  distance  was  a  very  real  danger  to  its  enemy.  It 
seems  possible,  in  these  days  of  submarine  telegraphs,  that 
the  blockading  forces  in-shore  and  off-shore,  and  from  one 
port  to  another,  might  be  in  telegraphic  communication  with 
one  another  along  the  whole  coast  of  the  United  States, 
readily  giving  mutual  support ;  and  if,  by  some  fortunate 
military  combination,  one  detachment  were  attacked  in  force, 
it  could  warn  the  others  and  retreat  upon  them.  Granting 
that  such  a  blockade  off  one  port  were  broken  on  one  day,  by 


86 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


fairly  driving  away  the  ships  maintaining  it,  the  notification 
of  its  being  re-established  could  be  cabled  all  over  the  world 
the  next,  To  avoid  such  blockades  there  must  be  a  military 
force  afloat  that  will  at  all  times  so  endanger  a  blockading 
fleet  that  it  can  by  no  means  keep  its  place.  Then  neutral 
ships,  except  those  laden  with  contraband  of  war,  can  come 
and  go  freely,  and  maintain  the  commercial  relations  of  the 
country  with  the  world  outside. 

It  may  be  urged  that,  with  the  extensive  sea-coast  of  the 
United  States,  a  blockade  of  the  whole  line  cannot  be  effec¬ 
tively  kept  up.  No  one  will  more  readily  concede  this  than 
officers  who  remember  how  the  blockade  of  the  Southern 
coast  alone  was  maintained.  But  in  the  present  condition  of 
the  navy,  and,  it  may  be  added,  with  any  additions  not  ex¬ 
ceeding  those  so  far  proposed  by  the  government,1  the  attempt 
to  blockade  Boston,  New  York,  the  Delaware,  the  Chesapeake, 
and  the  Mississippi,  in  other  words,  the  great  centres  of 
export  and  import,  would  not  entail  upon  one  of  the  large 
maritime  nations  efforts  greater  than  have  been  made  before. 
England  has  at  the  same  time  blockaded  Brest,  the  Biscay 
coast,  Toulon,  and  Cadiz,  when  there  were  powerful  squadrons 
lying  within  the  harbors.  It  is  true  that  commerce  in  neutral 
ships  can  then  enter  other  ports  of  the  United  States  than 
those  named ;  but  what  a  dislocation  of  the  carrying  traffic  of 
the  country,  what  failure  of  supplies  at  times,  what  inadequate 
means  of  transport  by  rail  or  water,  of  dockage,  of  lighterage, 
of  warehousing,  will  be  involved  in  such  an  enforced  change 
of  the  ports  of  entry !  Will  there  be  no  money  loss,  no 
suffering,  consequent  upon  this  ?  And  when  with  much  pain 
and  expense  these  evils  have  been  partially  remedied,  the 
enemy  may  be  led  to  stop  the  new  inlets  as  he  did  the  old. 
The  people  of  the  United  States  will  certainly  not  starve,  but 
they  may  suffer  grievously.  As  for  supplies  which  are  con¬ 
traband  of  war,  is  there  not  reason  to  fear  that  the  United 

1  Since  the  above  was  written,  the  secretary  of  the  uavy,  in  his  report  for 
1889,  has  recommended  a  fleet  which  would  make  such  a  blockade  as  here  sug¬ 
gested  very  hazardous. 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER.  87 

States  is  not  now  able  to  go  alone  if  an  emergency  should 
arise  ? 

The  question  is  eminently  one  in  which  the  influence  of  the 
government  should  make  itself  felt,  to  build  up  for  the  nation 
a  navy  which,  if  not  capable  of  reaching  distant  countries, 
shall  at  least  be  able  to  keep  clear  the  chief  approaches  to  its 
own.  The  eyes  of  the  country  have  for  a  quarter  of  a  cen¬ 
tury  been  turned  from  the  sea ;  the  results  of  such  a  policy 
and  of  its  opposite  will  be  shown  in  the  instance  of  France 
and  of  England.  Without  asserting  a  narrow  parallelism  be¬ 
tween  the  case  of  the  United  States  and  either  of  these,  it 
may  safely  be  said  that  it  is  essential  to  the  welfare  of  the 
whole  country  that  the  conditions  of  trade  and  commerce 
should  remain,  as  far  as  possible,  unaffected  by  an  external 
war.  In  order  to  do  this,  the  enemy  must  be  kept  not  only 
out  of  our  ports,  but  far  away  from  our  coasts.1 

Can  this  navy  be  had  without  restoring  the  merchant  ship- 

1  The  word  “  defence  ”  in  war  involves  two  ideas,  which  for  the  sake  of  pre¬ 
cision  in  thought  should  be  kept  separated  in  the  mind.  There  is  defence  pure 
and  simple,  which  strengthens  itself  and  awaits  attack.  This  may  be  called 
passive  defence.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  view  of  defence  w  hich  asserts 
that  safety  for  one’s  self,  the  real  object  of  defensive  preparation,  is  best  secured 
by  attacking  the  enemy.  In  the  matter  of  sea-coast  defence,  the  former  method 
is  exemplified  by  stationary  fortifications,  submarine  mines,  and  generally  all 
immobile  works  destined  simply  to  stop  an  enemy  if  he  tries  to  enter.  The 
second  method  comprises  all  those  means  and  weapons  which  do  not  wait  for 
attack,  but  go  to  meet  the  enemy's  fleet,  whether  it  be  but  for  a  few  miles,  or 
whether  to  his  own  shores.  Such  a  defence  may  seem  to  be  really  offensive  war, 
but  it  is  not;  it  becomes  offensive  only  when  its  object  of  attack  is  changed 
from  the  enemy’s  fleet  to  the  enemy’s  country.  England  defended  her  own 
coasts  and  colonies  by  stationing  her  fleets  off  the  French  ports,  to  fight  the 
French  fleet  if  it  came  out.  The  United  States  in  the  Civil  War  stationed  her 
fleets  off  the  Southern  ports,  not  because  she  feared  for  her  own,  but  to  break 
down  the  Confederacy  by  isolation  from  the  rest  of  the  world,  and  ultimately  by 
attacking  the  ports.  The  methods  were  the  same ;  but  the  purpose  in  one  case 
was  defensive,  in  the  other  offensive. 

The  confusion  of  the  two  ideas  leads  to  much  unnecessary  wrangling  as  to 
the  proper  sphere  of  army  and  navy  in  coast-defence.  Passive  defences  belong 
to  the  army ;  everything  that  moves  in  the  water  to  the  navy,  which  has  the 
prerogative  of  the  offensive  defence.  If  seamen  are  used  to  garrison  forts,  they 
become  part  of  the  land  forces,  as  surely  as  troops,  when  embarked  as  part  of. 
the  complement,  become  part  of  the  sea  forces. 


88 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE 


ping  ?  It  is  doubtful.  History  lias  proved  that  such  a  purely 
military  sea  power  can  be  built  up  by  a  despot,  as  was  done 
by  Louis  XIV. ;  but  though  so  fair  seeming,  experience 
showed  that  his  navy  was  like  a  growth  which  having  no  root 
soon  withers  away.  But  in  a  representative  government  any 
military  expenditure  must  have  a  strongly  represented  in¬ 
terest  behind  it,  convinced  of  its  necessity.  Such  an  interest 
in  sea  power  does  not  exist,  cannot  exist  here  without  action 
by  the  government.  How  such  a  merchant  shipping  should 
be  built  up,  whether  by  subsidies  or  by  free  trade,  by  constant 
administration  of  tonics  or  by  free  movement  in  the  open  air, 
is  not  a  military  but  an  economical  question.  Even  had  the 
United  States  a  great  national  shipping,  it  may  be  doubted 
whether  a  sufficient  navy  would  follow  ;  the  distance  which 
separates  her  from  other  great  powers,  in  one  way  a  protec¬ 
tion,  is  also  a  snare.  The  motive,  if  any  there  be,  which  will 
give  the  United  States  a  navy,  is  probably  now  quickening  in 
the  Central  American  Isthmus.  Let  us  hope  it  will  not  come 
to  the  birth  too  late. 

Here  concludes  the  general  discussion  of  the  principal 
elements  which  affect,  favorably  or  unfavorably,  the  growth 
of  sea  power  in  nations.  The  aim  has  been,  first  to  consider 
those  elements  in  their  natural  tendency  for  or  against,  and 
then  to  illustrate  by  particular  examples  and  by  the  ex¬ 
perience  of  the  past.  Such  discussions,  while  undoubtedly 
embracing  a  wider  field,  yet  fall  mainly  within  the  province 
of  strategy,  as  distinguished  from  tactics.  The  considera¬ 
tions  and  principles  which  enter  into  them  belong  to  the 
unchangeable,  or  unchanging,  order  of  things,  remaining  the 
same,  in  cause  and  effect,  from  age  to  age.  They  belong, 
as  it  were,  to  the  Order  of  Nature,  of  whose  stability  so 
much  is  heard  in  our  day ;  whereas  tactics,  using  as  its 
instruments  the  weapons  made  by  man,  shares  in  the  change 
and  progress  of  the  race  from  generation  to  generation. 
From  time  to  time  the  superstructure  of  tactics  has  to  be 
altered  or  wholly  torn  down  ;  but  the  old  foundations  of 
strategy  so  far  remain,  as  though  laid  upon  a  rock.  There 


ELEMENTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


89 


will  next  be  examined  the  general  history  of  Europe  and 
America,  with  particular  reference  to  the  effect  exercised 
upon  that  history,  and  upon  the  welfare  of  the  people,  by 
sea  power  in  its  broad  sense.  From  time  to  time,  as  occasion 
offers,  the  aim  will  be  to  recall  and  reinforce  the  general 
teaching,  already  elicited,  by  particular  illustrations.  The 
general  tenor  of  the  study  will  therefore  be  strategical,  in 
that  broad  definition  of  naval  strategy  which  has  before 
been  quoted  and  accepted :  “  Naval  strategy  has  for  its  end 
to  found,  support,  and  increase,  as  well  in  peace  as  in  war, 
the  sea  power  of  a  country.”  In  the  matter  of  particular 
battles,  while  freely  admitting  that  the  change  of  details 
has  made  obsolete  much  of  their  teaching,  the  attempt  will 
be  made  to  point  out  where  the  application  or  neglect  of 
true  general  principles  has  produced  decisive  effects ;  and, 
other  things  being  equal,  those  actions  will  be  preferred 
which,  from  their  association  with  the  names  of  the  most 
distinguished  officers,  may  be  presumed  to  show  how  far 
just  tactical  ideas  obtained  in  a  particular  age  or  a  particular 
service.  It  will  also  be  desirable,  where  analogies  between 
ancient  and  modern  weapons  appear  on  the  surface,  to  derive 
such  probable  lessons  as  they  offer,  without  laying  undue 
stress  upon  the  points  of  resemblance.  Finally,  it  must  be 
remembered  that,  among  all  changes,  the  nature  of  man 
remains  much  the  same ;  the  personal  equation,  though 
uncertain  in  quantity  and  quality  in  the  particular  instance, 
is  sure  always  to  be  found. 


CHAPTER  II. 


State  of  Europe  in  1660.  —  Second  Anglo-Dutch  "War,  1665-1667. 

Sea  Battles  of  Lowestoft  and  of  The  Four  Days. 

period  at  which  our  historical  survey  is  to  begin  has 
been  loosely  stated  as  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth 
century.  The  year  1660  will  now  be  taken  as  the  definite 
date  at  which  to  open.  In  May  of  that  year  Charles  II. 
was  restored  to  the  English  throne  amid  the  general  rejoic¬ 
ing  of  the  people.  In  March  of  the  following  year,  upon 
the  death  of  Cardinal  Mazarin,  Louis  XIY.  assembled  his 
ministers  and  said  to  them :  “  I  have  summoned  you  to  tell 
you  that  it  has  pleased  me  hitherto  to  permit  my  affairs 
to  be  governed  by  the  late  cardinal ;  I  shall  in  future  be 
my  own  prime  minister.  I  direct  that  no  decree  be  sealed 
except  by  my  orders,  and  I  order  the  secretaries  of  State 
and  the  superintendent  of  the  finances  to  sign  nothing  with¬ 
out  my  command.”  The  personal  government  thus  assumed 
was  maintained,  in  fact  as  well  as  in  name,  for  over  half  a 
century. 

Within  one  twelvemonth  then  are  seen,  setting  forward  upon 
a  new  stage  of  national  life,  after  a  period  of  confusion  more 
or  less  prolonged,  the  two  States  which,  amid  whatever  in¬ 
equalities,  have  had  the  first  places  in  the  sea  history  of  modern 
Europe  and  America,  indeed,  of  the  world  at  large.  Sea  history, 
however,  is  but  one  factor  in  that  general  advance  and  decay 
of  nations  which  is  called  their  history ;  and  if  sight  be  lost 
of  the  other  factors  to  which  it  is  so  closely  related,  a  dis¬ 
torted  view,  either  exaggerated  or  the  reverse,  of  its  im¬ 
portance  will  be  formed.  It  is  with  the  belief  that  that 
importance  is  vastly  underrated,  if  not  practically  lost  sight 


STATE  OF  EUROPE  IN  1660. 


91 


of,  by  people  unconnected  with  the  sea,  and  particularly  by 
the  people  of  the  United  States  in  our  own  day,  that  this 
study  has  been  undertaken. 

The  date  taken,  1660,  followed  closely  another  which 
marked  a  great  settlement  of  European  affairs,  setting  the 
seal  of  treaty  upon  the  results  of  a  general  war,  known  to 
history  as  the  Thirty  Years’  War.  This  other  date  was  that 
of  the  Treaty  of  Westphalia,  or  Munster,  in  1648.  In  this 
the  independence  of  the  Dutch  United  Provinces,  long  before 
practically  assured,  was  formally  acknowledged  by  Spain ;  and 
it  being  followed  in  1659  by  the  Treaty  of  the  Pyrenees  be¬ 
tween  France  and  Spain,  the  two  gave  to  Europe  a  state  of 
general  external  peace,  destined  soon  to  be  followed  by  a 
series  of  almost  universal  wars,  which  lasted  as  long  as 
Louis  XIY.  lived,  —  wars  which  were  to  induce  profound 
changes  in  the  map  of  Europe  ;  during  which  new  States 
were  to  arise,  others  to  decay,  and  all  to  undergo  large 
modifications,  either  in  extent  of  dominion  or  in  political 
power.  In  these  results  maritime  power,  directly  or  indi¬ 
rectly,  had  a  great  share. 

We  must  first  look  at  the  general  condition  of  European 
States  at  the  time  from  which  the  narrative  starts.  In  the 
struggles,  extending  over  nearly  a  century,  whose  end  is 
marked  by  the  Peace  of  Westphalia,  the  royal  family  known 
as  the  House  of  Austria  had  been  the  great  overwhelm¬ 
ing  power  which  all  others  feared.  During  the  long  reign, 
of  the  Emperor  Charles  V.,  who  abdicated  a  century  before, 
the  head  of  that  house  had  united  in  his  own  person  the 
two  crowns  of  Austria  and  Spain,  which  carried  with  them, 
among  other  possessions,  the  countries  we  now  know  as  Hol¬ 
land  and  Belgium,  together  with  a  preponderating  influence 
in  Italy.  After  his  abdication  the  two  great  monarchies  of 
Austria  and  Spain  were  separated ;  but  though  ruled  b\v 
different  persons,  they  were  still  in  the  same  family,  and 
tended  toward  that  unity  of  aim  and  sympathy  which  marked 
dynastic  connections  in  that  and  the  following  century.  To 
this  bond  of  union  was  added  that  of  a  common  religion. 


92 


STATE  OF  EUROPE  IN  1660. 


During  the  century  before  the  Peace  of  Westphalia,  the  ex¬ 
tension  of  family  power,  and  the  extension  of  the  religion 
professed,  were  the  two  strongest  motives  of  political  action. 
This  was  the  period  of  the  great  religious  wars  which  arrayed 
nation  against  nation,  principality  against  principality,  and 
often,  in  the  same  nation,  faction  against  faction.  Religious 
persecution  caused  the  revolt  of  the  Protestant  Dutch  Prov¬ 
inces  against  Spain,  which  issued,  after  eighty  years  of  more 
or  less  constant  war,  in  the  recognition  of  their  independ¬ 
ence.  Religious  discord,  amounting  to  civil  war  at  times, 
distracted  France  during  the  greater  part  of  the  same 
period,  profoundly  affecting  not  only  her  internal  but  her 
external  policy.  These  were  the  days  of  St.  Bartholomew, 
of  the  religious  murder  of  Henry  IV.,  of  the  siege  of  La 
Rochelle,  of  constant  intriguing  between  Roman  Catholic 
Spain  and  Roman  Catholic  Frenchmen.  As  the  religious 
motive,  acting  in  a  sphere  to  which  it  did  not  naturally 
belong,  and  in  which  it  had  no  rightful  place,  died  away, 
the  political  necessities  and  interests  of  States  began  to 
have  juster  weight;  not  that  they  had  been  wholly  lost 
sight  of  in  the  mean  time,  but  the  religious  animosities  had 
either  blinded  the  eyes,  or  fettered  the  action,  of  statesmen. 
It  was  natural  that  in  France,  one  of  the  greatest  sufferers 
from  religious  passions,  owing  to  the  number  and  character 
of  the  Protestant  minority,  this  reaction  should  first  and 
most  markedly  be  seen.  Placed  between  Spain  and  the 
German  States,  among  which  Austria  stood  foremost  with¬ 
out  a  rival,  internal  union  and  checks  upon  the  power  of 
the  House  of  Austria  were  necessities  of  political  existence. 
Happily,  Providence  raised  up  to  her  in  close  succession  two 
great  rulers,  Henry  IV.  and  Richelieu,  —  men  in  whom  religion 
fell  short  of  bigotry,  and  who,  when  forced  to  recognize  it 
in  the  sphere  of  politics,  did  so  as  masters  and  not  as  slaves. 
Under  them  French  statesmanship  received  a  guidance,  which 
Richelieu  formulated  as  a  tradition,  and  which  moved  on  the 
following  general  lines, —  (1)  Internal  union  of  the  kingdom, 
appeasing  or  putting  down  religious  strife  and  centralizing 


STATE  OF  EUROPE  IN  1660. 


93 


authority  in  the  king;  (2)  Resistance  to  the  power  of  the 
House  of  Austria,  which  actually  and  necessarily  carried  with 
it  alliance  with  Protestant  German  States  and  with  Holland  ; 
(3)  Extension  of  the  boundaries  of  France  to  the  eastward,  at 
the  expense  mainly  of  Spain,  which  then  possessed  not  only  the 
present  Belgium,  but  other  provinces  long  since  incorporated 
with  France  ;  and  (4)  The  creation  and  development  of  a  great 
sea  power,  adding  to  the  wealth  of  the  kingdom,  and  intended 
specially  to  make  head  against  France’s  hereditary  enemy,  Eng- 
land  ;  for  which  end  again  the  alliance  with  Holland  was  to 
be  kept  in  view.  Such  were  the  broad  outlines  of  policy  laid 
down  by  statesmen  in  the  front  rank  of  genius  for  the  guid¬ 
ance  of  that  country  whose  people  have,  not  without  cause, 
claimed  to  be  the  most  complete  exponent  of  European 
civilization,  foremost  in  the  march  of  progress,  combining 
political  advance  with  individual  development.  This  tradi¬ 
tion,  carried  on  by  Mazarin,  was  received  from  him  by 
Louis  XIY. ;  it  will  be  seen  how  far  he  was  faithful  to  it, 
and  what  were  the  results  to  France  of  his  action.  Mean¬ 
while  it  may  be  noted  that  of  these  four  elements  necessary 
to  the  greatness  of  France,  sea  power  was  one  ;  and  as  the 
second  and  third  were  practically  one  in  the  means  employed, 
it  may  be  said  that  sea  power  was  one  of  the  two  great  means 
by  which  France’s  external  greatness  was  to  be  maintained. 
England  on  the  sea,  Austria  on  the  land,  indicated  th? 
direction  that  French  effort  was  to  take. 

As  regards  the  condition  of  France  in  1660,  and  her  readi 
ness  to  move  onward  in  the  road  marked  by  Richelieu,  it  may 
be  said  that  internal  peace  was  secured,  the  power  of  the 
nobles  wholly  broken,  religious  discords  at  rest ;  the  tolerant 
edict  of  Nantes  was  still  in  force,  while  the  remaining  Prot¬ 
estant  discontent  had  been  put  down  by  the  armed  hand. 
All  power  was  absolutely  centred  in  the  throne.  In  other 
respects,  though  the  kingdom  was  at  peace,  the  condition  was 
less  satisfactory.  There  was  practically  no  navy  ;  commerce, 
internal  and  external,  was  not  prosperous  ;  the  finances  were 
in  disorder ;  the  army  small. 


94 


STATE  OF  EUROPE  IN  1660. 


Spain,  the  nation  before  which  all  others  had  trembled  less 
than  a  century  before,  was  now  long  in  decay  and  scarcely 
formidable  ;  the  central  weakness  had  spread  to  all  parts 
of  the  administration.  In  extent  of  territory,  however,  she 
was  still  great.  The  Spanish  Netherlands  still  belonged  to 
her  ;  she  held  Naples,  Sicily,  and  Sardinia ;  Gibraltar  had  not 
yet  fallen  into  English  hands ;  her  vast  possessions  in  Amer¬ 
ica —  with  the  exception  of  Jamaica,  conquered  by  England 
a  few  years  before  —  were  still  untouched.  The  condition 
of  her  sea  power,  both  for  peace  and  war,  has  been  already 
alluded  to.  Many  years  before,  Richelieu  had  contracted  a 
temporary  alliance  with  Spain,  by  virtue  of  which  she  placed 
forty  ships  at  his  disposal ;  but  the  bad  condition  of  the  ves¬ 
sels,  for  the  most  part  ill  armed  and  ill  commanded,  com¬ 
pelled  their  withdrawal.  The  navy  of  Spain  was  then  in  full 
decay,  and  its  weakness  did  not  escape  the  piercing  eye  of  the 
cardinal.  An  encounter  which  took  place  between  the  Span¬ 
ish  and  Dutch  fleets  in  1639  shows  most  plainly  the  state  of 
degradation  into  which  this  once  proud  navy  had  fallen. 

“  Her  navy  at  this  time,”  says  the  narrative  quoted,  “  met  one  of 
those  shocks,  a  succession  of  which  during  this  war  degraded  her 
from  her  high  station  of  mistress  of  the  seas  in  both  hemispheres, 
to  a  contemptible  rank  among  maritime  powers.  The  king  was 
fitting  out  a  powerful  fleet  to  carry  the  war  to  the  coasts  of  Sweden, 
and  for  its  equipment  had  commanded  a  reinforcement  of  men  and 
provisions  to  be  sent  from  Dunkirk.  A  fleet  accordingly  set  sail, 
but  were  attacked  by  Yon  Tromp,  some  captured,  the  remainder 
forced  to  retire  within  the  harbor  again.  Soon  after,  Tromp  seized 
three  English  [neutral]  ships  carrying  1070  Spanish  soldiers  from 
Cadiz  to  Dunkirk ;  he  took  the  troops  out,  but  let  the  ships  go  free. 
Leaving  seventeen  vessels  to  blockade  Dunkirk,  Tromp  with  the  re¬ 
maining  twelve  advanced  to  meet  the  enemy’s  fleet  on  its  arrival.  It 
was  soon  seen  entering  the  Straits  of  Dover  to  the  number  of  sixty- 
seven  sail,  and  having  two  thousand  troops.  Being  joined  by  De 
Witt  with  four  more  ships,  Tromp  with  his  small  force  made  a  reso¬ 
lute  attack  upon  the  enemy.  The  fight  lasted  till  four  p.m.,  when  the 
Spanish  admiral  took  refuge  in  the  Downs.  Tromp  determined  to 
engage  if  they  should  come  out;  but  Oquendo  with  his  powerful 


STATE  OF  EUROPE  IN  1660. 


95 


fleet,  many  of  which  carried  from  sixty  to  a  hundred  guns,  suffered 
himself  to  be  blockaded ;  and  the  English  admiral  told  Tromp  he  was 
ordered  to  join  the  Spaniards  if  hostilities  began.  Tromp  sent  home 
for  instructions,  and  the  action  of  England  only  served  to  call  out 
the  vast  maritime  powers  of  the  Dutch.  Tromp  was  rapidly  rein¬ 
forced  to  ninety-six  sail  and  twelve  fire-ships,  and  ordered  to  attack. 
Leaving  a  detached  squadron  to  observe  the  English,  and  to  attack 
them  if  they  helped  the  Spaniards,  he  began  the  fight  embarrassed  by 
a  thick  fog,  under  cover  of  which  the  Spaniards  cut  their  cables  to 
escape.  Many  running  too  close  to  shore  went  aground,  and  most 
of  the  remainder  attempting  to  retreat  were  sunk,  captured,  or  driven 
on  the  French  coast.  Never  was  victory  more  complete.”  1 

When  a  navy  submits  to  such  a  line  of  action,  all  tone  and 
pride  must  have  departed ;  but  the  navy  only  shared  in  the 
general  decline  which  made  Spain  henceforward  have  an 
ever  lessening  weight  in  the  policy  of  Europe. 

“  In  the  midst  of  the  splendors  of  her  court  and  language,”  says 
Guizot,  “  the  Spanish  government  felt  itself  weak,  and  sought  to  hide 
its  weakness  under  its  immobility.  Philip  IV.  and  his  minister, 
weary  of  striving  only  to  be  conquered,  looked  but  for  the  security 
of  peace,  and  only  sought  to  put  aside  all  questions  which  would  call 
for  efforts  of  which  they  felt  themselves  incapable.  Divided  and 
enervated,  the  house  of  Austria  had  even  less  ambition  than  power, 
and  except  when  absolutely  forced,  a  pompous  inertia  became  the 
policy  of  the  successors  of  Charles  V.”  2 

Such  was  the  Spain  of  that  day.  That  part  of  the  Spanish 
dominions  which  was  then  known  as  the  Low  Countries,  or 
the  Roman  Catholic  Netherlands  (our  modern  Belgium),  was 
about  to  be  a  fruitful  source  of  variance  between  France  and 
her  natural  ally,  the  Dutch  Republic.  This  State,  whose 
political  name  was  the  United  Provinces,  had  now  reached 
the  summit  of  its  influence  and  power,  —  a  power  based,  as 
has  already  been  explained,  wholly  upon  the  sea,  and  upon 
the  use  of  that  element  made  by  the  great  maritime  and  com¬ 
mercial  genius  of  the  Dutch  people.  A  recent  French  author 

1  Davies :  History  of  Holland. 

2  Republique  d’Angleterre. 


96 


STATE  OF  EUROPE  IN  1660. 


thus  describes  the  commercial  and  colonial  conditions,  at  the 
accession  of  Louis  XIV.,  of  this  people,  which  beyond  any 
other  in  modern  times,  save  only  England,  has  shown  how 
the  harvest  of  the  sea  can  lift  up  to  wealth  and  power  a 
country  intrinsically  weak  and  without  resources :  — 

“  Holland  had  become  the  Phoenicia  of  modern  times.  Mistresses 
of  the  Scheldt,  the  United  Provinces  closed  the  outlets  of  Antwerp 
to  the  sea,  and  inherited  the  commercial  power  of  that  rich  city, 
which  an  ambassador  of  Venice  in  the  fifteenth  century  had  compared 
to  Venice  herself.  They  received  besides  in  their  principal  cities  the 
workingmen  of  the  Low  Countries  who  fled  from  Spanish  tyranny 
of  conscience.  The  manufactures  of  clothes,  linen  stuffs,  etc.,  which 
employed  six  hundred  thousand  souls,  opened  new  sources  of  gain  to 
a  people  previously  content  with  the  trade  in  cheese  and  fish.  Fish¬ 
eries  alone  had  already  enriched  them.  The  herring  fishery  supported 
nearly  one  fifth  of  the  population  of  Holland,  producing  three  hun¬ 
dred  thousand  tons  of  salt-fish,  and  bringing  in  more  than  eight 
million  francs  annually. 

“  The  naval  and  commercial  power  of  the  republic  developed 
rapidly.  The  merchant  fleet  of  Holland  alone  numbered  10,000 
sail,  168,000  seamen,  and  supported  260,000  inhabitants.  She  had 
taken  possession  of  the  greater  part  of  the  European  carrying-trade, 
and  had  added  thereto,  since  the  peace,  all  the  carriage  of  mer 
chandise  between  America  and  Spain,  did  the  same  service  for  the 
French  ports,  and  maintained  an  importation  traffic  of  thirty-six 
million  francs.  The  north  countries,  Brandenburg,  Denmark,  Swe¬ 
den,  Muscovy,  Poland,  access  to  which  was  opened  by  the  Baltic  to 
the  Provinces,  were  for  them  an  inexhaustible  market  of  exchange. 
They  fed  it  by  the  produce  they  sold  there,  and  by  purchase  of  the 
products  of  the  North,  —  wheat,  timber,  copper,  hemp,  and  furs. 
The  total  value  of  merchandise  yearly  shipped  in  Dutch  bottoms,  in 
all  seas,  exceeded  a  thousand  million  francs.  The  Dutch  had  made 
themselves,  to  use  a  contemporary  phrase,  the  wagoners  of  all  seas.”  1 

It  was  through  its  colonies  that  the  republic  had  been  able 
thus  to  develop  its  sea  trade.  It  had  the  monopoly  of  all  the 
products  of  the  East.  Produce  and  spices  from  Asia  were 
by  her  brought  to  Europe  of  a  yearly  value  of  sixteen  million 

1  Lefevre-Pontalis  :  Jean  de  Witt. 


STATE  OF  EUROPE  IN  1660. 


97 


francs.  The  powerful  East  India  Company,  founded  in  1602, 
had  built  up  in  Asia  an  empire,  with  possessions  taken  from 
the  Portuguese.  Mistress  in  1650  of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope, 
which  guaranteed  it  a  stopping-place  for  its  ships,  it  reigned 
as  a  sovereign  in  Ceylon,  and  upon  the  coasts  of  Malabar  and 
Coromandel.  It  had  made  Batavia  its  seat  of  government, 
and  extended  its  traffic  to  China  and  Japan.  Meanwhile  the 
West  India  Company,  of  more  rapid  rise,  but  less  durable, 
had  manned  eight  hundred  ships  of  war  and  trade.  It  had 
used  them  to  seize  the  remnants  of  Portuguese  power  upon 
the  shores  of  Guinea,  as  well  as  in  Brazil. 

The  United  Provinces  had  thus  become  the  warehouse 
wherein  were  collected  the  products  of  all  nations. 

The  colonies  of  the  Dutch  at  this  time  were  scattered 
throughout  the  eastern  seas,  in  India,  in  Malacca,  in  Java,  the 
Moluccas,  and  various  parts  of  the  vast  archipelago  lying  to 
the  northward  of  Australia.  They  had  possessions  on  the 
west  coast  of  Africa,  and  as  yet  the  colony  of  New  Amster¬ 
dam  remained  in  their  hands.  In  South  America  the  Dutch 
West  India  Company  had  owned  nearly  three  hundred  leagues 
of  coast  from  Bahia  in  Brazil  northward ;  but  much  had 
recently  escaped  from  their  hands. 

The  United  Provinces  owed  their  consideration  and  power 
to  their  wealth  and  their  fleets.  The  sea,  which  beats  like 
an  inveterate  enemy  against  their  shores,  had  been  subdued 
and  made  a  useful  servant ;  the  land  was  to  prove  their 
destruction.  A  long  and  fierce  strife  had  been  maintained 
with  an  enemy  more  cruel  than  the  sea,  —  the  Spanish  king¬ 
dom  ;  the  successful  ending,  with  its  delusive  promise  of  rest 
and  peace,  but  sounded  the  knell  of  the  Dutch  Republic.  So 
long  as  the  power  of  Spain  remained  unimpaired,  or  at  least 
great  enough  to  keep  up  the  terror  that  she  had  long  inspired, 
it  was  to  the  interest  of  England  and  of  France,  both  sufferers 
from  Spanish  menace  and  intrigue,  that  the  United  Prov¬ 
inces  should  be  strong  and  independent.  When  Spain  fell,  — 
and  repeated  humiliations  showed  that  her  weakness  wa3 
real  and  not  seeming,  —  other  motives  took  the  place  of  fear. 

7 


98 


STATE  OF  EUROPE  IN  1660. 


England  coveted  Holland’s  trade  and  sea  dominion  ;  France 
desired  the  Spanish  Netherlands.  The  United  Provinces  had 
reason  to  oppose  the  latter  as  well  as  the  former. 

Under  the  combined  assaults  of  the  two  rival  nations,  the 
intrinsic  weakness  of  the  United  Provinces  was  soon  to  be 
felt  and  seen.  Open  to  attack  by  the  land,  few  in  numbers, 
and  with  a  government  ill  adapted  to  put  forth  the  united 
strength  of  a  people,  above  all  unfitted  to  keep  up  adequate 
preparation  for  war,  the  decline  of  the  republic  and  the  nation 
was  to  be  more  striking  and  rapid  than  the  rise.  As  yet, 
however,  in  1660,  no  indications  of  the  coming  fall  were 
remarked.  The  republic  was  still  in  the  front  rank  of  the 
great  powers  of  Europe.  If,  in  1654,  the  war  with  England 
had  shown  a  state  of  unreadiness  wonderful  in  a  navy  that 
had  so  long  humbled  the  pride  of  Spain  on  the  seas,  on  the 
other  hand  the  Provinces,  in  1657,  had  effectually  put  a  stop 
to  the  insults  of  France  directed  against  her  commerce  ;  and 
a  year  later,  “  by  their  interference  in  the  Baltic  between 
Denmark  and  Sweden,  they  had  hindered  Sweden  from  es¬ 
tablishing  in  the  North  a  preponderance  disastrous  to  them. 
They  forced  her  to  leave  open  the  entrance  to  the  Baltic,  of 
which  they  remained  masters,  no  other  navy  being  able  to 
dispute  its  control  with  them.  The  superiority  of  their  fleet, 
the  valor  of  their  troops,  the  skill  and  firmness  of  their 
diplomacy,  had  caused  the  prestige  of  their  government  to  be 
recognized.  Weakened  and  humiliated  by  the  last  English 
war,  they  had  replaced  themselves  in  the  rank  of  great 
powers.  At  this  moment  Charles  II.  was  restored.” 

The  general  character  of  the  government  has  been  before 
mentioned,  and  need  here  only  be  recalled.  It  was  a  loosely 
knit  confederacy,  administered  by  what  may  not  inaccurately 
be  called  a  commercial  aristocracy,  with  all  the  political 
timidity  of  that  class,  which  has  so  much  to  risk  in  war.  The 
effect  of  these  two  factors,  sectional  jealousy  and  commercial 
spirit,  upon  the  military  navy  was  disastrous.  It  was  not 
kept  up  properly  in  peace,  there  were  necessarily  rivalries  in 
a  fleet  which  was  rather  a  maritime  coalition  than  a  united 


STATE  OF  EUROPE  IN  1660. 


99 


navy,  and  there  was  too  little  of  a  true  military  spirit  among 
the  officers.  A  more  heroic  people  than  the  Dutch  never 
existed ;  the  annals  of  Dutch  sea-fights  give  instances  of 
desperate  enterprise  and  endurance  certainly  not  excelled, 
perhaps  never  equalled,  elsewhere ;  but  they  also  exhibit 
instances  of  defection  and  misconduct  which  show  a  lack 
of  military  spirit,  due  evidently  to  lack  of  professional  pride 
and  training.  This  professional  training  scarcely  existed  in 
any  navy  of  that  day,  but  its  place  was  largely  supplied  in 
monarchical  countries  by  the  feeling  of  a  military  caste.  It 
remains  to  be  noted  that  the  government,  weak  enough 
from  the  causes  named,  was  yet  weaker  from  the  division 
of  the  people  into  two  great  factions  bitterly  hating  each 
other.  The  one,  which  was  the  party  of  the  merchants 
(burgomasters),  and  now  in  power,  favored  the  confederate 
republic  as  described  ;  the  other  desired  a  monarchical  gov¬ 
ernment  under  the  House  of  Orange.  The  Republican  party 
wished  for  a  French  alliance,  if  possible,  and  a  strong  navy ; 
the  Orange  party  favored  England,  to  whose  royal  house  the 
Prince  of  Orange  was  closely  related,  and  a  powerful  army. 
Under  these  conditions  of  government,  and  weak  in  numbers, 
the  United  Provinces  in  1660,  with  their  vast  wealth  and  ex¬ 
ternal  activities,  resembled  a  man  kept  up  by  stimulants. 
Factitious  strength  cannot  endure  indefinitely ;  but  it  is 
wonderful  to  see  this  small  State,  weaker  by  far  in  numbers 
than  either  England  or  France,  endure  the  onslaught  of  either 
singly,  and  for  two  years  of  both  in  alliance,  not  only  without 
being  destroyed,  but  without  losing  her  place  in  Europe.  She 
owed  this  astonishing  result  partly  to  the  skill  of  one  or  two 
men,  but  mainly  to  her  sea  power. 

The  conditions  of  England,  with  reference  to  her  fitness  to 
enter  upon  the  impending  strife,  differed  from  those  of  both 
Holland  and  France.  Although  monarchical  in  government, 
and  with  much  real  power  in  the  king’s  hands,  the  latter  was 
not  able  to  direct  the  policy  of  the  kingdom  wholly  at  his 
will.  He  had  to  reckon,  as  Louis  had  not,  with  the  temper 
and  wishes  of  his  people.  What  Louis  gained  for  France, 


100 


STATE  OF  EUROPE  IN  1660. 


he  gained  for  himself ;  the  glory  of  France  was  his  glory. 
Charles  aimed  first  at  his  own  advantage,  then  at  that  of 
England  ;  but,  with  the  memory  of  the  past  ever  before  him, 
he  was  determined  above  all  not  to  incur  his  father’s  fate 
nor  a  repetition  of  his  own  exile.  Therefore,  when  danger 
became  imminent,  he  gave  way  before  the  feeling  of  the 
English  nation.  Charles  himself  hated  Holland  ;  he  hated 
it  as  a  republic ;  he  hated  the  existing  government  because 
opposed  in  internal  affairs  to  his  connections,  the  House  of 
Orange ;  and  he  hated  it  yet  more  because  in  the  days  of  his 
exile,  the  republic,  as  one  of  the  conditions  of  peace  with 
Cromwell,  had  driven  him  from  her  borders.  He  was  drawn 
to  France  by  the  political  sympathy  of  a  would-be  absolute 
ruler,  possibly  by  his  Roman  Catholic  bias,  and  very  largely 
by  the  money  paid  him  by  Louis,  which  partially  freed  him 
from  the  control  of  Parliament.  In  following  these  tenden¬ 
cies  of  his  own,  Charles  had  to  take  account  of  certain  de¬ 
cided  wishes  of  his  people.  The  English,  of  the  same  race  as 
the  Dutch,  and  with  similar  conditions  of  situation,  were 
declared  rivals  for  the  control  of  the  sea  and  of  commerce ; 
and  as  the  Dutch  were  now  leading  in  the  race,  the  English 
were  the  more  eager  and  bitter.  A  special  cause  of  grievance 
was  found  in  the  action  of  the  Dutch  East  India  Company, 
“  which  claimed  the  monopoly  of  trade  in  the  East,  and  had 
obliged  distant  princes  with  whom  it  treated  to  close  their 
States  to  foreign  nations,  who  were  thus  excluded,  not  only 
from  the  Dutch  colonies,  but  from  all  the  territory  of  the 
Indies.”  Conscious  of  greater  strength,  the  English  also 
wished  to  control  the  action  of  Dutch  politics,  and  in  the 
days  of  the  English  Republic  had  even  sought  to  impose 
a  union  of  the  two  governments.  At  the  first,  therefore, 
popular  rivalry  and  enmity  seconded  the  king’s  wishes ;  the 
more  so  as  France  had  not  for  some  years  been  formidable 
on  the  continent.  As  soon,  however,  as  the  aggressive  policy 
of  Louis  XI Y.  was  generally  recognized,  the  English  people, 
both  nobles  and  commons,  felt  the  great  danger  to  be  there, 
as  a  century  before  it  had  been  in  Spain.  The  transfer  of  the 


STATE  OF  EUROPE  IN  1660. 


101 


Spanish  Netherlands  (Belgium)  to  France  would  tend  toward 
the  subjection  of  Europe,  and  especially  would  be  a  blow  to 
the  sea  power  both  of  the  Dutch  and  English  ;  for  it  was  not 
to  be  supposed  that  Louis  would  allow  the  Scheldt  and  port  of 
Antwerp  to  remain  closed,  as  they  then  were,  under  a  treaty 
wrung  by  the  Dutch  from  the  weakness  of  Spain.  The  re¬ 
opening  to  commerce  of  that  great  city  would  be  a  blow  alike 
to  Amsterdam  and  to  London.  With  the  revival  of  inherited 
opposition  to  France  the  ties  of  kindred  began  to  tell ;  the 
memory  of  past  alliance  against  the  tyranny  of  Spain  was 
recalled  ;  and  similarity  of  religious  faith,  still  a  powerful 
motive,  drew  the  two  together.  At  the  same  time  the  great 
and  systematic  efforts  of  Colbert  to  build  up  the  commerce 
and  the  navy  of  France  excited  the  jealousy  of  both  the  sea 
powers ;  rivals  themselves,  they  instinctively  turned  against 
a  third  party  intruding  upon  their  domain.  Charles  was 
unable  to  resist  the  pressure  of  his  people  under  all  these 
motives;  wars  between  England  and  Holland  ceased,  and 
were  followed,  after  Charles’s  death,  by  close  alliance. 

Although  her  commerce  was  less  extensive,  the  navy  of 
England  in  1660  was  superior  to  that  of  Holland,  particu¬ 
larly  in  organization  and  efficiency.  The  stern,  enthusiastic 
religious  government  of  Cromwell,  grounded  on  military 
strength,  had  made  its  mark  both  on  the  fleet  and  army. 
The  names  of  several  of  the  superior  officers  under  the  Pro¬ 
tector,  among  which  that  of  Monk  stands  foremost,  appear 
in  the  narrative  of  the  first  of  the  Dutch  wars  under  Charles. 
This  superiority  in  tone  and  discipline  gradually  disappeared 
under  the  corrupting  influence  of  court  favor  in  a  licentious 
government ;  and  Holland,  which  upon  the  whole  was 
worsted  by  England  alone  upon  the  sea  in  1665,  successfully 
resisted  the  combined  navies  of  England  and  France  in  1672. 
As  regards  the  material  of  the  three  fleets,  we  are  told  that 
the  French  ships  had  greater  displacement  than  the  English 
relatively  to  the  weight  of  artillery  and  stores  ;  hence  they 
could  keep,  when  fully  loaded,  a  greater  height  of  battery. 
Their  hulls  also  had  better  lines.  These  advantages  would 


102 


STATE  OF  EUROPE  IN  1660. 


naturally  follow  from  the  thoughtful  and  systematic  way  in 
which  the  French  navy  at  that  time  was  restored  from  a 
state  of  decay,  and  has  a  lesson  of  hope  for  us  in  the  present 
analogous  condition  of  our  own  navy.  The  Dutch  ships,  from 
the  character  of  their  coast,  were  flatter-bottomed  and  of  less 
draught,  and  thus  were  able,  when  pressed,  to  find  a  refuge 
among  the  shoals ;  hut  they  were  in  consequence  less 
weatherly  and  generally  of  lighter  scantling  than  those  of , 
either  of  the  other  nations. 

Thus  as  briefly  as  possible  have  been  sketched  the  condi¬ 
tions,  degree  of  power,  and  aims  which  shaped  and  controlled 
the  policy  of  the  four  principal  seaboard  States  of  the  day,  — 
Spain,  France,  England,  and  Holland.  From  the  point  of 
view  of  this  history,  these  will  come  most  prominently  and 
most  often  into  notice ;  but  as  other  States  exercised  a  power¬ 
ful  influence  upon  the  course  of  events,  and  our  aim  is  not 
merely  naval  history  but  an  appreciation  of  the  effect  of 
naval  and  commercial  power  upon  the  course  of  general 
history,  it  is  necessary  to  state  shortly  the  condition  of  the 
rest  of  Europe.  America  had  not  yet  begun  to  play  a  promi¬ 
nent  part  in  the  pages  of  history  or  in  the  policies  of 
cabinets. 

Germany  was  then  divided  into  many  small  governments, 
with  the  one  great  empire  of  Austria.  The  policy  of  the 
smaller  States  shifted,  and  it  was  the  aim  of  France  to  com¬ 
bine  as  many  of  them  as  possible  under  her  influence,  in 
pursuance  of  her  traditional  opposition  to  Austria.  With 
France  thus  working  against  her  on  the  one  side,  Austria 
was  in  imminent  peril  on  the  other  from  the  constant  assaults 
of  the  Turkish  Empire,  still  vigorous  though  decaying.  The 
policy  of  France  had  long  inclined  to  friendly  relations  with 
Turkey,  not  only  as  a  check  upon  Austria,  but  also  from  her 
wish  to  engross  the  trade  with  the  Levant.  Colbert,  in  his 
extreme  eagerness  for  the  sea  power  of  France,  favored  this 
alliance.  It  will  be  remembered  that  Greece  and  Egypt  were 
then  parts  of  the  Turkish  Empire. 

Prussia  as  now  known  did  not  exist.  The  foundations  of 


j 


POLICY  OF  LOUIS  XIV. 


103 


the  future  kingdom  were  then  being  prepared  by  the  Elector 
of  Brandenburg,  a  powerful  minor  State,  which  was  not  yet 
able  to  stand  quite  alone,  but  carefully  avoided  a  formally 
dependent  position.  The  kingdom  of  Poland  still  existed,  a 
most  disturbing  and  important  factor  in  European  politics, 
because  of  its  weak  and  unsettled  government,  which  kept 
every  other  State  anxious  lest  some  unforeseen  turn  of  events 
there  should  tend  to  the  advantage  of  a  rival.  It  was  the 
traditional  policy  of  France  to  keep  Poland  upright  and 
strong.  Russia  was  still  below  the  horizon  ;  coming,  but  not 
yet  come,  within  the  circle  of  European  States  and  their  living 
interests.  She  and  the  other  powers  bordering  upon  the 
Baltic  were  naturally  rivals  for  preponderance  in  that  sea, 
in  which  the  other  States,  and  above  all  the  maritime  States, 
had  a  particular  interest  as  the  source  from  which  naval 
stores  of  every  kind  were  chiefly  drawn.  Sweden  and  Den¬ 
mark  were  at  this  time  in  a  state  of  constant  enmity,  and 
were  to  be  found  on  opposite  sides  in  the  quarrels  that  pre¬ 
vailed.  For  many  years  past,  and  during  the  early  wars  of 
Louis  XIV.,  Sweden  was  for  the  most  part  in  alliance  with 
France ;  her  bias  was  that  way. 

The  general  state  of  Europe  being  as  described,  the  spring 
that  was  to  set  the  various  wheels  in  motion  was  in  the  hands 
of  Louis  XIV.  The  weakness  of  his  immediate  neighbors,  the 
great  resources  of  his  kingdom,  only  waiting  for  development, 
the  unity  of  direction  resulting  from  his  absolute  power,  his 
own  practical  talent  and  untiring  industry,  aided  during  the 
first  half  of  his  reign  by  a  combination  of  ministers  of  singular 
ability,  all  united  to  make  every  government  in  Europe  hang 
more  or  less  upon  his  action,  and  be  determined  by,  if  not 
follow,  his  lead.  The  greatness  of  France  was  his  object,  and 
he  had  the  choice  of  advancing  it  by  either  of  two  roads,  —  by 
the  land  or  by  the  sea  ;  not  that  the  one  wholly  forbade  the 
other.,  but  that  France,  overwhelmingly  strong  as  she  then 
was,  had  not  power  to  move  with  equal  steps  on  both  paths. 

Louis  chose  extension  by  land.  He  had  married  the  eldest 
daughter  of  Philip  IV.,  the  then  reigning  king  of  Spain  ;  and 

'N 

i 


104 


POLICY  OF  LOUIS  XIV. 


though  by  the  treaty  of  marriage  she  had  renounced  all  claim 
to  her  father’s  inheritance,  it  was  not  difficult  to  find  reasons 
for  disregarding  this  stipulation.  Technical  grounds  were 
found  for  setting  it  aside  as  regarded  certain  portions  of  the 
Netherlands  and  Franche  Corntd,  and  negotiations  were 
entered  into  with  the  court  of  Spain  to  annul  it  altogether. 
The  matter  was  the  more  important  because  the  male  heir  to 
the  throne  was  so  feeble  that  it  was  evident  that  the  Austrian 
line  of  Spanish  kings  would  end  in  him.  The  desire  to  put  a 
French  prince  on  the  Spanish  throne  —  either  himself,  thus 
uniting  the  two  crowns,  or  else  one  of  his  family,  thus  putting 
the  House  of  Bourbon  in  authority  on  both  sides  of  the  Pyre¬ 
nees  —  was  the  false  light  which  led  Louis  astray  during  the 
rest  of  liis  reign,  to  the  final  destruction  of  the  sea  power  of 
France  and  the  impoverishment  and  misery  of  his  people. 
Louis  failed  to  understand  that  he  had  to  reckon  with  all 
Europe.  The  direct  project  on  the  Spanish  throne  had  to 
wait  for  a  vacancy ;  but  he  got  ready  at  once  to  move  upon  the 
Spanish  possessions  to  the  east  of  France. 

In  order  to  do  this  more  effectually,  he  cut  off  from  Spain 
every  possible  ally  by  skilful  diplomatic  intrigues,  the  study 
of  which  would  give  a  useful  illustration  of  strategy  in  the 
realm  of  politics,  but  he  made  two  serious  mistakes  to  the 
injury  of  the  sea  power  of  France.  Portugal  had  until  twenty 
years  before  been  united  to  the  crown  of  Spain,  and  the 
claim  to  it  had  not  been  surrendered.  *Louis  considered  that 
were  Spain  to  regain  that  kingdom  she  would  be  too  strong 
for  him  easily  to  carry  out  his  aims.  Among  other  means 
of  prevention  he  promoted  a  marriage  between  Charles  II. 
and  the  Infanta  of  Portugal,  in  consequence  of  which  Portu¬ 
gal  ceded  to  England,  Bombay  in  India,  and  Tangiers  in  the 
Straits  of  Gibraltar,  which  was  reputed  an  excellent  port. 
We  see  here  a  French  king,  in  his  eagerness  for  extension  by 
land,  inviting  England  to  the  Mediterranean,  and  forwarding 
her  alliance  with  Portugal.  The  latter  was  the  more  curious, 
as  Louis  already  foresaw  the  failure  of  the  Spanish  royal 
house,  and  should  rather  have  wished  the  union  of  the  penin- 


ADMINISTRATION  OF  COLBERT. 


105 


sular  kingdoms.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Portugal  became  a  de* 
pendent  and  outpost  of  England,  by  which  she  readily  landed 
in  the  Peninsula  down  to  the  days  of  Napoleon.  Indeed,  if 
independent  of  Spain,  she  is  too  weak  not  to  be  under  the 
control  of  the  power  that  rules  the  sea  and  so  has  readiest 
access  to  her.  Louis  continued  to  support  her  against  Spain, 
and  secured  her  independence.  He  also  interfered  with  the 
Dutch,  and  compelled  them  to  restore  Brazil,  which  they  had 
taken  from  the  Portuguese. 

On  the  other  hand,  Louis  obtained  from  Charles  II.  the 
cession  of  Dunkirk  on  the  Channel,  which  had  been  seized 
and  used  by  Cromwell.  This  surrender  was  made  for  money, 
and  was  inexcusable  from  the  maritime  point  of  view.  Dun¬ 
kirk  was  for  the  English  a  bridge-head  into  France.  To 
France  it  became  a  haven  for  privateers,  the  bane  of  Eng 
land’s  commerce  in  the  Channel  and  the  North  Sea.  As 
the  French  sea  power  waned,  England  in  treaty  after  treaty 
exacted  the  dismantling  of  the  works  of  Dunkirk,  which  it 
may  be  said  in  passing  was  the  home  port  of  the  celebrated 
Jean  Bart  and  other  great  French  privateersmen. 

Meanwhile  the  greatest  and  wisest  of  Louis’  ministers, 
Colbert,  was  diligently  building  up  that  system  of  administra¬ 
tion,  which,  by  increasing  and  solidly  basing  the  wealth  of  the 
State,  should  bring  a  surer  greatness  and  prosperity  than  the 
king’s  more  showy  enterprises.  With  those  details  that  con¬ 
cern  the  internal  development  of  the  kingdom  this  history  has 
no  concern,  beyond  the  incidental  mention  that  production, 
both  agricultural  and  manufacturing,  received  his  careful 
attention;  but  upon  the  sea  a  policy  of  skilful  aggression 
upon  the  shipping  and  commerce  of  the  Dutch  and  English 
quickly  began,  and  was  instantly  resented.  Great  trading 
companies  were  formed,  directing  French  enterprise  to  the 
Baltic,  to  the  Levant,  to  the  East  and  West  Indies  ;  customs 
regulations  were  amended  to  encourage  French  manufactures, 
and  to  allow  goods  to  be  stored  in  bond  in  the  great  ports,  by 
which  means  it  was  hoped  to  make  France  take  Holland’s 
place  as  the  great  warehouse  for  Europe,  a  function  for 


106 


PROPOSITION  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


which  her  geographical  position  eminently  fitted  her ;  while 
tonnage  duties  on  foreign  shipping,  direct  premiums  on  home- 
built  ships,  and  careful,  rigorous  colonial  decrees  giving 
French  vessels  the  monopoly  of  trade  to  and  from  the  colo¬ 
nies,  combined  to  encourage  the  growth  of  her  mercantile 
marine.  England  retaliated  at  once ;  the  Dutch,  more  seri¬ 
ously  threatened  because  their  carrying-trade  was  greater  and 
their  home  resources  smaller,  only  remonstrated  for  a  time  ; 
but  after  three  years  they  also  made  reprisals.  Colbert,  rely¬ 
ing  on  the  great  superiority  of  France  as  an  actual,  and  still 
more  as  a  possible  producer,  feared  not  to  move  steadily  on 
the  grasping  path  marked  out ;  which,  in  building  up  a  great 
merchant  shipping,  would  lay  the  broad  base  for  the  military 
shipping,  which  was  being  yet  more  rapidly  forced  on  by  the 
measures  of  the  State.  Prosperity  grew  apace.  At  the  end 
of  twelve  years  everything  was  flourishing,  everything' rich  in 
the  State,  which  was  in  utter  confusion  when  he  took  charge 
of  the  finances  and  marine. 

“Under  him,”  says  a  French  historian,  “France  grew  by  peace  as 
she  had  grown  by  war.  ...  The  warfare  of  tariffs  and  premiums 
skilfully  conducted  by  him  tended  to  reduce  within  just  limits  the 
exorbitant  growth  of  commercial  and  maritime  power  which  Holland 
had  arrogated  at  the  expense  of  other  ^nations ;  and  to  restrain  Eng¬ 
land,  which  was  burning  to  wrest  this  supremacy  from  Holland  in 
order  to  use  it  in  a  manner  much  more  dangerous  to  Europe.  The 
interest  of  France  seemed  to  be  peace  in  Europe  and  America ;  a 
mysterious  voice,  at  once  the  voice  of  the  past  and  of  the  future, 
called  for  her  warlike  activity  on  other  shores.”  1 

This  voice  found  expression  through  the  mouth  of  Leibnitz, 
one  of  the  world’s  great  men,  who  pointed  out  to  Louis  that 
to  turn  the  arms  of  France  against  Egypt  would  give  her,  in 
the  dominion  of  the  Mediterranean  and  the  control  of  Eastern 
trade,  a  victory  over  Holland  greater  than  the  most  success¬ 
ful  campaign  on  land ;  and  while  insuring  a  much  needed 
peace  within  his  kingdom,  would  build  up  a  power  on  the  sea 
that  would  insure  preponderance  in  Europe.  This  memorial 

1  Martin  :  History  of  France. 


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• 

SECOND  ANGLO-DUTCH  WAR . 


107 


called  Louis  from  the  pursuit  of  glory  on  the  land  to  seek  the 
durable  grandeur  of  France  in  the  possession  of  a  great  sea 
power,  the  elements  of  which,  thanks  to  the  genius  of  Colbert, 
he  had  in  his  hands.  A  century  later  a  greater  man  than 
Louis  sought  to  exalt  himself  and  France  by  the  path  pointed 
out  by  Leibnitz  ;  but  Napoleon  did  not  have,  as  Louis  had,  a 
navy  equal  to  the  task  proposed.  This  project  of  Leibnitz 
will  be  more  fully  referred  to  when  the  narrative  reaches 
the  momentous  date  at  which  it  was  broached ;  when  Louis, 
with  his  kingdom  and  navy  in  the  highest  pitch  of  efficiency, 
stood  at  the  point  where  the  roads  parted,  and  then  took  the 
one  which  settled  that  France  should  not  be  the  power  of  the 
sea.  This  decision,  which  killed  Colbert  and  ruined  the  pros¬ 
perity  of  France,  was  felt  in  its  consequences  from  generation 
to  generation  afterward,  as  the  great  navy  of  England,  in 
war  after  war,  swept  the  seas,  insured  the  growing  wealth  of 
the  island  kingdom  through  exhausting  strifes,  while  drying 
up  the  external  resources  of  French  trade  and  inflicting 
consequent  misery.  The  false  line  of  policy  that  began  with 
Louis  XIV.  also  turned  France  away  from  a  promising  career 
in  India,  in  the  days  of  his  successor. 

Meanwhile  the  two  maritime  States,  England  and  Holland, 
though  eying  France  distrustfully,  had  greater  and  growing 
grudges  against  each  other,  which  under  the  fostering  care  of 
Charles  II.  led  to  war.  The  true  cause  was  doubtless  commer¬ 
cial  jealousy,  and  the  conflict  sprang  immediately  from  colli¬ 
sions  between  the  trading  companies.  Hostilities  began  on 
the  west  coast  of  Africa  ;  and  an  English  squadron,  in  1664, 
after  subduing  several  Dutch  stations  there,  sailed  to  New 
Amsterdam  (now  New  York),  and  seized  it.  All  these  affairs 
took  place  before  the  formal  declaration  of  war  in  February, 
1665.  This  war  was  undoubtedly  popular  in  England  ;  the  in¬ 
stinct  of  the  people  found  an  expression  by  the  lips  of  Monk, 
who  is  reported  to  have  said,  u  What  matters  this  or  that 
reason  ?  What  we  want  is  more  of  the  trade  which  the  Dutch 
now  have.”  There  is  also  little  room  to  doubt  that,  despite 
the  pretensions  of  the  trading  companies,  the  government  of 


108 


SECOND  ANGLO-DUTCI1  WAR. 


the  United  Provinces  would  gladly  have  avoided  the  war;  the 
able  man  who  was  at  their  head  saw  too  clearly  the  delicate 
position  in  which  they  stood  between  England  and  France. 
They  claimed,  however,  the  support  of  the  latter  in  virtue  of 
a  defensive  treaty  made  in  1662.  Louis  allowed  the  claim, 
but  unwillingly  ;  and  the  still  young  navy  of  France  gave 
practically  no  help. 

The  war  between  the  two  sea  States  was  wholly  maritime, 
and  had  the  general  characteristics  of  all  such  wars.  Three, 
great  battles  were  fought,  —  the  first  off  Lowestoft,  on  the’ 
Norfolk  coast,  June  13,  1665;  the  second,  known  as  the 
Four  Days’  Battle  in  the  Straits  of  Dover,  often  spoken  of 
by  French  writers  as  that  of  the  Pas  de  Calais,  lasting  from 
the  11th  to  the  14th  of  June,  1666;  and  the  third,  off  the 
North  Foreland,  August  4  of  the  same  year.  In  the  first  and 
last  of  these  the  English  had  a  decided  success  ;  in  the  sec¬ 
ond  the  advantage  remained  with  the  Dutch.  This  one  only 
will  be  described  at  length,  because  of  it  alone  has  been  found 
such  a  full,  coherent  account  as  will  allow  a  clear  and  accurate 
tactical  narrative  to  be  given.  There  are  in  these  fights  points 
of  interest  more  generally  applicable  to  the  present  day  than 
are  the  details  of  somewhat  obsolete  tactical  movements. 

In  the  first  battle  off  Lowestoft,  it  appears  that  the  Dutch 
commander,  Opdam,  who  was  not  a  seaman  but  a  cavalry 
officer,  had  very  positive  orders  to  fight;  the  discretion 
proper  to  a  commander-in-chief  on  the  spot  was  not  intrusted 
to  him.  To  interfere  thus  with  the  commander  in  the  field 
or  afloat  is  one  of  the  most  common  temptations  to  the 
government  in  the  cabinet,  and  is  generally  disastrous. 
Tourville,  the  greatest  of  Louis  XIV. ’s  admirals,  was  forced 
thus  to  risk  the  whole  French  navy  against  his  own  judg¬ 
ment  ;  and  a  century  later  a  great  French  fleet  escaped  from 
the  English  admiral  Keith,  through  his  obedience  to  impera¬ 
tive  orders  from  his  immediate  superior,  who  was  sick  in  port. 

In  the  Lowestoft  fight  the  Dutch  van  gave  way ;  and  a 
little  later  one  of  the  junior  admirals  of  the  centre,  Opdam’s 
own  squadron,  being  killed,  the  crew  was  seized  with  a  panic, 


BATTLE  OF  LOWESTOFT. 


109 


took  the  command  of  the  ship  from  her  officers,  and  carried 
her  out  of  action.  This  movement  was  followed  by  twelve  or 
thirteen  other  ships,  leaving  a  great  gap  in  the  Dutch  line. 
The  occurrence  shows,  what  has  before  been  pointed  out,  that 
the  discipline  of  the  Dutch  fleet  and  the  tone  of  the  officers 
were  not  high,  despite  the  fine  fighting  qualities  of  the  nation, 
and  although  it  is  probably  true  that  there  were  more  good 
seamen  among  the  Dutch  than  among  the  English  captains. 
The  natural  steadfastness  and  heroism  of  the  Hollanders 
could  not  wholly  supply  that  professional  pride  and  sense 
of  military  honor  which  it  is  the  object  of  sound  military 
institutions  to  encourage.  Popular  feeling  in  the  United 
States  is  pretty  much  at  sea  in  this  matter ;  there  is  with  it 
no  intermediate  step  between  personal  courage  with  a  gun  in 
its  hand  and  entire  military  efficiency. 

Opdanr,  seeing  the  battle  going  against  him,  seems  to  have 
yielded  to  a  feeling  approaching  despair.  He  sought  to  grap¬ 
ple  the  English  commander-in-chief,  who  on  this  day  was  the 
Duke  of  York,  the  king’s  brother.  He  failed  in  this,  and 
in  the  desperate  struggle  which  followed,  his  ship  blew  up. 
Shortly  after,  three,  or  as  one  account  says  four,  Dutch  ships 
ran  foul  of  one  another,  and  this  group  was  burned  by  one 
fire-ship ;  three  or  four  others  singly  met  the  same  fate  a  little 
later.  The  Dutch  fleet  was  now  in  disorder,  and  retreated 
under  cover  of  the  squadron  of  Van  Tromp,  son  of  the  famous 
old  admiral  who  in  the  days  of  the  Commonwealth  sailed 
through  the  Channel  with  a  broom  at  his  masthead. 

Fire-ships  are  seen  here  to  have  played  a  very  conspicuous 
part,  more  so  certainly  than  in  the  war  of  1653,  though  at 
both  periods  they  formed  an  appendage  to  the  fleet.  There  is 
on  the  surface  an  evident  resemblance  between  the  role  of 
the  fire-ship  and  the  part  assigned  in  modern  warfare  to  the 
torpedo-cruiser.  The  terrible  character  of  the  attack,  the 
comparative  smallness  of  the  vessel  making  it,  and  the  large 
demands  upon  the  nerve  of  the  assailant,  are  tne  chief  points 
of  resemblance ;  the  great  points  of  difference  are  the  com¬ 
parative  certainty  with  which  the  modern  vessel  can  be 


110 


FIRE-SHIPS. 


handled,  which  is  partly  met  by  the  same  advantage  in  the 
iron-clad  over  the  old  ship-of-the-line,  and  the  instantaneous¬ 
ness  of  the  injury  by  torpedo,  whose  attack  fails  or  succeeds 
at  once,  whereas  that  of  the  fire-ship  required  time  for  effect¬ 
ing  the  object,  which  in  both  cases  is  total  destruction  of  the 
hostile  ship,  instead  of  crippling  or  otherwise  reducing  it.  An 
appreciation  of  the  character  of  fire-ships,  of  the  circumstances 
under  which  they  attained  their  greatest  usefulness,  and  of 
the  causes  which  led  to  their  disappearance,  may  perhaps  help 
in  the  decision  to  which  nations  must  come  as  to  whether  the 
torpedo-cruiser,  pure  and  simple,  is  a  type  of  weapon  destined 
to  survive  in  fleets. 

A  French  officer,  who  has  been  examining  the  records  of 
the  French  navy,  states  that  the  fire-ship  first  appears,  incor¬ 
porated  as  an  arm  of  the  fleet,  in  1636. 

“  Whether  specially  built  for  the  purpose,  or  whether  altered  from 
other  purposes  to  be  fitted  for  their  particular  end,  they  received  a 
special  equipment.  The  command  was  given  to  officers  not  noble, 
with  the  grade  of  captain  of  fire-ship.  Five  subordinate  officers  and 
twenty-five  seamen  made  up  the  crew.  Easily  known  by  grappling- 
irons  which  were  always  fitted  to  their  yards,  the  fire-ship  saw  its  role 
growing  less  in  the  early  years  of  the  eighteenth  century.  It  was 
finally  to  disappear  from  the  fleets  whose  speed  it  delayed  and  whose 
evolutions  were  by  it  complicated.  As  the  ships-of-war  grew  larger, 
their  action  in  concert  with  fire-ships  became  daily  more  difficult.  On 
the  other  hand,  there  had  already  been  abandoned  the  idea  of  com¬ 
bining  them  with  the  fighting-ships  to  form  a  few  groups ,  each  pro¬ 
vided  with  all  the  means  of  attack  and  defence.  The  formation  of 
the  close-hauled  line-of-battle,  by  assigning  the  fire-ships  a  place  in  a 
second  line  placed  half  a  league  on  the  side  farthest  from  the  enemy, 
made  them  more  and  more  unfitted  to  fulfil  their  office.  The  official 
plan  of  the  battle  of  Malaga  (1704),  drawn  up  immediately  after  the 
battle,  shows  the  fire-ship  in  this  position  as  laid  down  by  Paul  Hoste. 
Finally  the  use  of  shells,  enabling  ships  to  be  set  on  fire  more  surely 
and  quickly,  and  introduced  on  board  at  the  period  of  which  we  are 
now  treating,  though  the  general  use  did  not  obtain  until  much  later, 
was  the  last  blow  to  the  fire-ship.”  1 

1  Gougeard  :  Marine  de  Guerre. 


FIRE-SHIPS  AND  TORPEDO-CRUISERS. 


Ill 


Those  who  are  familiar  with  the  theories  and  discussions 
of  our  own  day  on  the  subject  of  fleet  tactics  and  weapons, 
will  recognize  in  this  short  notice  of  a  long  obsolete  type  cer¬ 
tain  ideas  which  are  not  obsolete.  The  fire-ship  disappeared 
from  fleets  “whose  speed  it  delayed. ”  In  heavy  weather 
small  bulk  must  always  mean  comparatively  small  speed.  In  a 
moderate  sea,  we  are  now  told,  the  speed  of  the  torpedo-boat 
falls  from  twenty  knots  to  fifteen  or  less,  and  the  seventeen  to 
nineteen  knot  cruiser  can  either  run  away  from  the  pursuing 
boats,  or  else  hold  them  at  a  distance  under  fire  of  machine 
and  heavy  guns.  These  boats  are  sea-going,  “  and  it  is 
thought  can  keep  the  sea  in  all  weathers ;  but  to  be  on  board 
a  110-foot  torpedo-boat,  when  the  sea  is  lively,  is  said  to  be  far 
from  agreeable.  The  heat,  noise,  and  rapid  vibrations  of  the 
engines  are  intense.  Cooking  seems  to  be  out  of  the  question, 
and  it  is  said  that  if  food  were  well  cooked  few  would  be  able 
to  appreciate  it.  To  obtain  necessary  rest  under  these  con¬ 
ditions,  added  to  the  rapid  motions  of  the  boat,  is  most  diffi¬ 
cult.”  Larger  boats  are  to  be  built ;  but  the  factor  of  loss 
of  speed  in  rough  weather  will  remain,  unless  the  size  of  the 
torpedo-cruiser  is  increased  to  a  point  that  will  certainly  lead 
to  fitting  them  with  something  more  than  torpedoes.  Like 
fire-ships,  small  torpedo-cruisers  will  delay  the  speed  and  com¬ 
plicate  the  evolutions  of  the  fleet  with  which  they  are  asso¬ 
ciated.1  The  disappearance  of  the  fire-ship  was  also  hastened, 
we  are  told,  by  the  introduction  of  shell  firing,  or  incendiary 
projectiles ;  and  it  is  not  improbable  that  for  deep-sea  fight¬ 
ing  the  transfer  of  the  torpedo  to  a  class  of  larger  ships  will 
put  an  end  to  the  mere  torpedo-cruiser.  The  fire-ship  con¬ 
tinued  to  be  used  against  fleets  at  anchor  down  to  the  days 
of  the  American  Civil  War;  and  the  torpedo-boat  will  always 
be  useful  within  an  easy  distance  of  its  port. 

A  third  phase  of  naval  practice  two  hundred  years  ago,  men¬ 
tioned  in  the  extract  quoted,  involves  an  idea  very  familiar 

1  Since  the  above  was  written,  the  experience  of  the  English  autumn  manoeu¬ 
vres  of  1888  has  verified  this  statement ;  not  indeed  that  any  such  experiment  was 
needed  to  establish  a  self-evident  fact. 


112 


GROUP  FORMATIONS. 


to  modern  discussions ;  namely,  the  group  formation.  “  The 
idea  of  combining  fire-ships  with  the  fighting-ships  to  form  a 
few  groups,  each  provided  with  all  the  means  of  attack  and 
defence,”  was  for  a  time  embraced ;  for  we  are  told  that  it 
was  later  on  abandoned.  The  combining  of  the  ships  of  a 
fleet  into. groups  of  two,  three,  or  four  meant  to  act  specially 
together  is  now  largely  favored  in  England  ;  less  so  in  France, 
where  it  meets  strong  opposition.  No  question  of  this  sort, 
ably  advocated  on  either  side,  is  to  be  settled  by  one  man’s 
judgment,  nor  until  time  and  experience  have  applied  their 
infallible  tests.  It  may  be  remarked,  however,  that  in  a  well- 
organized  fleet  there  are  two  degrees  of  command  which  are 
in  themselves  both  natural  and  necessary,  that  can  be  neither 
done  away  nor  ignored  ;  these  are  the  command  of  the  whole 
fleet  as  one  unit,  and  the  command  of  each  ship  as  a  unit  in 
itself.  When  a  fleet  becomes  too  large  to  be  handled  by  one 
man,  it  must  be  subdivided,  and  in  the  heat  of  action  become 
practically  two  fleets  acting  to  one  common  end ;  as  Nelson, 
in  his  noble  order  at  Trafalgar,  said,  “  The  second  in  com¬ 
mand  will,  after  my  intentions  are  made  known  to  him  ” 
(mark  the  force  of  the  “  after,”  which  so  well  protects  the 
functions  both  of  the  commander-in-chief  and  the  second), 
“  have  the  entire  direction  of  his  line,  to  make  the  attack 
upon  the  enemy,  and  to  follow  up  the  blow  until  they  are 
captured  or  destroyed.” 

The  size  and  cost  of  the  individual  iron-clad  of  the  present 
day  makes  it  unlikely  that  fleets  will  be  so  numerous  as  to 
require  subdivision ;  but  whether  they  are  or  not  does  not 
affect  the  decision  of  the  group  question.  Looking  simply 
to  the  principle  underlying  the  theory,  and  disregarding  the 
seeming  tactical  clumsiness  of  the  special  groups  proposed, 
the  question  is :  Shall  there  be  introduced  between  the  natu¬ 
ral  commands  of  the  admiral  and  of  the  captains  of  indi¬ 
vidual  ships  a  third  artificial  contrivance,  which  on  the  one 
hand  will  in  effect  partly  supersede  the  supreme  authority, 
and  on  the  other  will  partly  fetter  the  discretion  of  com¬ 
manders  of  ships  ?  A  further  difficulty  springing  from  the 


FIRE-SIIIPS. 


113 


narrow  principle  of  support  specially  due  to  particular  ships, 
on  which  the  group  system  rests,  is  this :  that  when  signals 
can  no  longer  be  seen,  the  duty  of  the  captain  to  his  own  ship 
and  to  the  fleet  at  large  will  be  complicated  by  his  duty  to  ob¬ 
serve  certain  relations  to  particular  ships;  which  particular 
ships  must  in  time  come  to  have  undue  prominence  in  his 
views.  The  group  formation  had  its  day  of  trial  in  old  times, ' 
and  disappeared  before  the  test  of  experience ;  whether  in  its 
restored  form  it  will  survive,  time  will  show.  It  may  be  said, 
before  quitting  the  subject,  that  as  an  order  of  sailing,  corre¬ 
sponding  to  the  route-step  of  an  army  in  march,  a  loose  group 
formation  has  some  advantages ;  maintaining  some  order  with¬ 
out  requiring  that  rigid  exactness  of  position,  to  observe  which 
by  day  and  night  must  be  a  severe  strain  on  captain  and  deck- 
officers.  Such  a  route-order  should  not,  however,  be  permitted 
until  a  fleet  has  reached  high  tactical  precision. 

To  return  to  the  question  of  fire-ships  and  torpedo-boats, 
the  role  of  the  latter,  it  is  often  said,  is  to  be  found  in  that 
melee  which  is  always  to  succeed  a  couple  of  headlong  passes 
between  the  opposing  fleets.  In  the  smoke  and  confusion  of 
that  hour  is  the  opportunity  of  the  torpedo-boat.  This  cer¬ 
tainly  sounds  plausible,  and  the  torpedo  vessel  certainly  has 
a  power  of  movement  not  possessed  by  the  fire-ship.  A  melee 
of  the  two  fleets,  however,  was  not  the  condition  most  favor¬ 
able  for  the  fire-ship.  I  shall  quote  here  from  another  French 
officer,  whose  discussion  of  these  Anglo-Dutch  sea-fights,  in  a 
late  periodical,  is  singularly  clear  and  suggestive.  He  says: 

“Far  from  impeding  the  direct  action  of  the  fire-ship,  which  was 
, naught  or  nearly  so  during  the  confused  battles  of  the  war  of  1652, 
the  regularity  and  ensemble  newly  attained  in  the  movements  of 
squadrons  seem  rather  to  favor  it.  The  fire-ships  played  a  very 
important  part  at  the  battles  of  Lowestoft,  Pas  de  Calais,  and  the 
North  Foreland.  Thanks  to  the  good  order  preserved  by  the  ships- 
of-the-line,  these  incendiary  ships  can  indeed  be  better  protected  by 
the  artillery ;  much  more  efficiently  directed  than  before  toward  a 
distinct  and  determined  end.”  1 

1  Chabaud-Arnault :  Revue  Mar.  et  Col.  1885. 

8 


114 


FIRE-SHIPS. 


In  the  midst  of  the  confused  melees  of  1652  the  fire-ship 
“  acted,  so  to  speak,  alone,  seeking  by  chance  an  enemy  to 
grapple,  running  the  risk  of  a  mistake,  without  protection 
against  the  guns  of  the  enemy,  nearly  sure  to  be  sunk  by 
him  or  else  burned  uselessly.  All  now,  in  1665,  has  become 
different.  Its  prey  is  clearly  pointed  out ;  it  knows  it,  fol¬ 
lows  it  easily  into  the  relatively  fixed  position  had  by  it  in 
the  enemy’s  line.  On  the  other  hand,  the  ships  of  his  own 
division  do  not  lose  sight  of  the  fire-ship.  They  accompany 
it  as  far  as  possible,  cover  it  with  their  artillery  to  the  end 
of  its  course,  and  disengage  it  before  burning,  if  the  fruitless¬ 
ness  of  the  attempt  is  seen  soon  enough.  Evidently  under 
such  conditions  its  action,  always  uncertain  (it  cannot  be 
otherwise),  nevertheless  acquires  greater  chances  of  success.”” 
These  instructive  comments  need  perhaps  the  qualifying,  or 
additional,  remark  that  confusion  in  the  enemy’s  order  at 
the  time  that  your  own  remains  good  gives  the  best  open¬ 
ing  for  a  desperate  attack.  The  writer  goes  on  to  trace  the 
disappearance  of  the  fire-ship :  — 

“  Here  then  we  see  the  fire-ship  at  the  point  of  its  highest  impor¬ 
tance.  That  importance  will  decrease,  the  fire-ship  itself  will  end  by 
disappearing  from  engagements  in  the  open  sea ,  when  naval  artillery 
becoming  more  perfect  shall  have  greater  range,  be  more  accurate 
and  more  rapid ; 1  when  ships  receiving  better  forms,  greater  steering 
power,  more  extensive  and  better  balanced  sail  power,  shall  be  able, 
thanks  to  quicker  speed  and  handling,  to  avoid  almost  certainly  the 
fire-ships  sent  against  them ;  when,  finally,  fleets  led  on  principles  of 
tactics  as  skilful  as  they  were  timid,  a  tactics  which  will  predominate 
a  century  later  during  the  whole  war  of  American  Independence, 
when  these  fleets,  in  order  not  to  jeopardize  the  perfect  regularity  of 
their  order  of  battle,  will  avoid  coming  to  close  quarters,  and  will 
leave  to  the  cannon  alone  to  decide  the  fate  of  an  action.” 

In  this  discussion  the  writer  has  in  view  the  leading  feature 
which,  while  aiding  the  action  of  the  fire-ship,  also  gives  this 

1  The  recent  development  of  rapid-firing  and  machine  guns,  with  the  great 
increase  of  their  calibre  and  consequent  range  and  penetration,  reproduces  this 
same  step  in  the  cycle  of  progress. 


ORDERS  OF  BATTLE. 


115 


war  of  1665  its  peculiar  interest  in  the  history  of  naval  tac¬ 
tics.  In  it  is  found  for  the  first  time  the  close-hauled  line-of- 
battle  undeniably  adopted  as  the  fighting  order  of  the  fleets. 
It  is  plain  enough  that  when  those  fleets  numbered,  as  they 
often  did,  from  eighty  to  a  hundred  ships,  such  lines  would  be 
very  imperfectly  formed  in  every  essential,  both  of  line  and 
interval ;  but  the  general  aim  is  evident,  amid  whatever  imper¬ 
fections  of  execution.  The  credit  for  this  development  is 
generally  given  to  the  Duke  of  York,  afterward  James  II. ; 
but  the  question  to  whom  the  improvement  is  due  is  of  little 
importance  to  sea-officers  of  the  present  day  when  compared 
with  the  instructive  fact  that  so  long  a  time  elapsed  between 
the  appearance  of  the  large  sailing-ship,  with  its  broadside 
battery,  and  the  systematic  adoption  of  the  order  which  was 
best  adapted  to  develop  the  full  power  of  the  fleet  for  mutual 
support.  To  us,  having  the  elements  of  the  problem  in  our 
hands,  together  with  the  result  finally  reached,  that  result 
seems  simple  enough,  almost  self-evident.  Why  did  it  take 
so  long  for  the  capable  men  of  that  day  to  reach  it  ?  The  rea¬ 
son  —  and  herein  lies  the  lesson  for  the  officer  of  to-day  — 
was  doubtless  the  same  that  leaves  the  order  of  battle  so 
uncertain  now ;  namely,  that  the  necessity  of  war  did  not  force 
men  to  make  up  their  minds,  until  the  Dutch  at  last  met 
in  the  English  their  equals  on  the  sea.  The  sequence  of 
ideas  which  resulted  in  the  line-of-battle  is  clear  and  logical. 
Though  familiar  enough  to  seamen,  it  will  be  here  stated  in 
the  words  of  the  writer  last  quoted,  because  they  have  a  neat¬ 
ness  and  precision  entirely  French  :  — 

“  With  the  increase  of  power  of  the  ship-of-war,  and  with  the  per¬ 
fecting  of  its  sea  and  warlike  qualities,  there  has  come  an  equal 
progress  in  the  art  of  utilizing  them.  .  .  .  As  naval  evolutions 
become  more  skilful,  their  importance  grows  from  day  to  day.  To 
these  evolutions  there  is  needed  a  base,  a  point  from  which  they  de¬ 
part  and  to  which  they  return.  A  fleet  of  war-ships  must  be  always 
ready  to  meet  an  enemy  ;  logically,  therefore,  this  point  of  departure 
for  naval  evolutions  must  be  the  order  of  battle.  Now,  since  the 
disappearance  of  galleys,  almost  all  the  artillery  is  found  upon  the 


116 


ORDERS  OF  BATTLE. 


sides  of  a  ship  of  war.  Hence  it  is  the  beam  that  must  necessarily 
and  always  be  turned  toward  the  enemy.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is 
necessary  that  the  sight  of  the  latter  must  never  be  interrupted  by  a 
friendly  ship.  Only  one  formation  allows  the  ships  of  the  same  fleet 
to  satisfy  fully  these  conditions.  That  formation  is  the  line  ahead 
[column].  This  line,  therefore,  is  imposed  as  the  only  order  of 
battle,  and  consequently  as  the  basis  of  all  fleet  tactics.  In  order 
that  this  order  of  battle,  this  long  thin  line  of  guns,  may  not  be  in¬ 
jured  or  broken  at  some  point  weaker  than  the  rest,  there  is  at  the 
same  time  felt  the  necessity  of  putting  in  it  only  ships  which,  if  not  of 
equal  force,  have  at  least  equally  strong  sides.  Logically  it  follows, 
at  the  same  moment  in  which  the  line  ahead  became  definitively  the 
order  for  battle,  there  was  established  the  distinction  between  the  ships 
*  of  the  line/  alone  destined  for  a  place  therein,  and  the  lighter  ships 
meant  for  other  uses.” 

If  to  these  we  add  the  considerations  which  led  to  making 
the  line-of-battle  a  close-hauled  line,  we  have  the  problem  fully 
worked  out.  But  the  chain  of  reasoning  was  as  clear  two  hun¬ 
dred  and  fifty  years  ago  as  it  is  now ;  why  then  was  it  so  long 
in  being  worked  out  ?  Partly,  no  doubt,  because  old  traditions  — 
in  those  days  traditions  of  galley-fighting  —  had  hold  of  and 
confused  men’s  minds ;  chiefly  because  men  are  too  indolent 
to  seek  out  the  foundation  truths  of  the  situation  in  their  day, 
and  develop  the  true  theory  of  action  from  its  base  up.  As 
a  rare  instance  of  clear-sightedness,  recognizing  such  a  funda¬ 
mental  change  in  conditions  and  predicting  results,  words  of 
Admiral  Labrousse  of  the  French  navy,  written  in  1840,  are 
most  instructive.  “  Thanks  to  steam,”  he  wrote,  “  ships  will 
be  able  to  move  in  any  direction  with  such  speed  that  the  effects 
of  collision  may,  and  indeed  must,  as  they  formerly  did,  take 
the  place  of  projectile  weapons  and  annul  the  calculations  of 
the  skilful  manoeuvrer.  The  ram  will  be  favorable  to  speed, 
without  destroying  the  nautical  qualities  of  a  ship.  As  soon 
as  one  power  shall  have  adopted  this  terrible  weapon,  all 
others  must  accept  it,  under  pain  of  evident  inferiority,  and 
thus  combats  will  become  combats  of  ram  against  ram.” 
While  forbearing  the  unconditional  adhesion  to  the  ram  as 


BATTLE  OF  THE  FOUR  DAYS. 


117 


tlie  controlling  weapon  of  the  day,  which  the  French  navy  has 
yielded,  the  above  brief  argument  may  well  be  taken  as  an  in¬ 
stance  of  the  way  in  which  researches  into  the  order  of  battle 
of  the  future  should  be  worked  out.  A  French  writer,  com¬ 
menting  on  Labrousse’s  paper,  says  :  — 

“  Twenty -seven  years  were  scarce  enough  for  our  fathers,  counting 
from  1638,  the  date  of  building  the  ‘Couronne,’  to  1665,  to  pass  from 
the  tactical  order  of  the  line  abreast,  the  order  for  galleys,  to  that 
of  the  line  ahead.  We  ourselves  needed  twenty-nine  years  from 
1830,  when  the  first  steamship  was  brought  into  our  fleet,  to  1859, 
when  the  application  of  the  principle  of  ram-fighting  was  affirmed  by 
laying  down  the  4  Solferino  ’  and  the  4  Magenta’  to  work  a  revolution  in 
the  contrary  direction ;  so  true  it  is  that  truth  is  always  slow  in  get¬ 
ting  to  the  light.  .  .  .  This  transformation  was  not  sudden,  not  only 
because  the  new  material  required  time  to  be  built  and  armed,  but 
above  all,  it  is  sad  to  say,  because  the  necessary  consequences  of  the 
new  motive  power  escaped  most  minds.”  1 

We  come  now  to  the  justly  celebrated  Four  Days’  Battle  of 
June,  1666,  which  claims  special  notice,  not  only  on  account 
of  the  great  number  of  ships  engaged  on  either  side,  nor  yet 
only  for  the  extraordinary  physical  endurance  of  the  men  who 
kept  up  a  hot  naval  action  for  so  many  successive  days,  but 
also  because  the  commanders-in-chief  on  either  side,  Monk 
and  De  Ruyter,  were  the  most  distinguished  seamen,  or  rather 
sea-commanders,  brought  forth  by  their  respective  countries 
in  the  seventeenth  century.  Monk  was  possibly  inferior  to 
Blake  in  the  annals  of  the  English  navy ;  but  there  is  a  gen¬ 
eral  agreement  that  De  Ruyter  is  the  foremost  figure,  not  only 
in  the  Dutch  service,  but  among  all  the  naval  officers  of  that 
age.  The  account  about  to  be  given  is  mainly  taken  from  a 
recent  number  of  the  “  Revue  Maritime  et  Coloniale,”  2  and  is 
there  published  as  a  letter,  recently  discovered,  from  a  Dutch 
gentleman  serving  as  volunteer  on  board  De  Ruyter’s  ship,  to 
a  friend  in  France.  The  narrative  is  delightfully  clear  and 
probable,  —  qualities  not  generally  found  in  the  description  of 

1  Gougeard  :  Marine  de  Guerre. 

2  Vol.  Ixxxii.  p.  137. 


118 


SECOND  ANGLO-DUTCII  WAR. 


those  long-ago  fights ;  and  the  satisfaction  it  gave  was  in* 
creased  by  finding  in  the  Memoirs  of  the  Count  de  Guiche, 
who  also  served  as  volunteer  in  the  fleet,  and  was  taken  to  De 
Ruyter  after  his  own  vessel  had  been  destroyed  by  a  fire-ship, 
an  account  confirming  the  former  in  its  principal  details.1 
This  additional  pleasure  was  unhappily  marred  by  recognizing 
certain  phrases  as  common  to  both  stories ;  and  a  comparison 
showed  that  the  two  could  not  be  accepted  as  independent 
narratives.  There  are,  however,  points  of  internal  difference 
which  make  it  possible  that  the  two  accounts  are  by  different 
eye-witnesses,  who  compared  and  corrected  their  versions  be¬ 
fore  sending  them  out  to  their  friends  or  writing  them  in  their 
-journals. 

The  numbers  of  the  two  fleets  were  :  English  about  eighty 
ships,  the  Dutch  about  one  hundred  ;  but  the  inequality  in 
numbers  was  largely  compensated  by  the  greater  size  of  many 
of  the  English.  A  great  strategic  blunder  by  the  government 
in  London  immediately  preceded  the  fight.  The  king  was 
informed  that  a  French  squadron  was  on  its  way  from  the 
Atlantic  to  join  the  Dutch.  He  at  once  divided  his  fleet, 
sending  twenty  ships  under  Prince  Rupert  to  the  westward 
to  meet  the  French,  while  the  remainder  under  Monk  were  to 
go  east  and  oppose  the  Dutch. 

A  position  like  that  of  the  English  fleet,  threatened  with  an 
attack  from  two  quarters,  presents  one  of  the  subtlest  tempta¬ 
tions  to  a  commander.  The  impulse  is  very  strong  to  meet 
both  by  dividing  his  own  numbers  as  Charles  did ;  but  unless 
in  possession  of  overwhelming  force  it  is  an  error,  exposing 
both  divisions  to  be  beaten  separately,  which,  as  we  are  about 
to  see,  actually  happened  in  this  case.  The  result  of  the  first 
two  days  was  disastrous  to  the  larger  English  division  under 
Monk,  which  was  then  obliged  to  retreat  toward  Rupert ;  and 
probably  the  opportune  return  of  the  latter  alone  saved  the 
English  fleet  from  a  very  serious  loss,  or  at  the  least  from 
being  shut  up  in  their  own  ports.  A  hundred  and  forty  years 

1  Memoires  du  Cte.  de  Guiche.  A  Londres,  chez  P.  Changuion.  1743. 
pp.  234-264. 


BATTLE  OF  THE  FOUR  DAYS. 


119 


later,  in  the  exciting  game  of  strategy  that  was  played  in  the 
Bay  of  Biscay  before  Trafalgar,  the  English  admiral  Corn¬ 
wallis  made  precisely  the  same  blunder,  dividing  his  fleet  into 
two  equal  parts  out  of  supporting  distance,  which  Napoleon  at 
the  time  characterized  as  a  glaring  piece  of  stupidity.  The 
lesson  is  the  same  in  all  ages. 

The  Dutch  had  sailed  for  the  English  coast  with  a  fair 
easterly  wind,  but  it  changed  later  to  southwest  with  thick 
weather,  and  freshened,  so  that  De  Ruyter,  to  avoid  being 
driven  too  far,  came  to  anchor  between  Dunkirk  and  the 
Downs.1  The  fleet  then  rode  with  its  head  to  the  south-south¬ 
west  and  the  van  on  the  right ;  while  Tromp,  who  commanded 
the  rear  division  in  the  natural  order,  was  on  the  left.  For 
some  cause  this  left  was  most  to  windward,  the  centre  squad¬ 
ron  under  Ruyter  being  to  leeward,  and  the  right,  or  van,  to 
leeward  again  of  the  centre.2  This  was  the  position  of  the 
Dutch  fleet  at  daylight  of  June  11,  1666;  and  although  not 
expressly  so  stated,  it  is  likely,  from  the  whole  tenor  of  the 
narratives,  that  it  was  not  in  good  order. 

The  same  morning  Monk,  who  was  also  at  anchor,  made 
out  the  Dutch  fleet  to  leeward,  and  although  so  inferior  in 
numbers  determined  to  attack  at  once,  hoping  that  by  keeping 
the  advantage  of  the  wind  he  would  be  able  to  commit  himself 
only  so  far  as  might  seem  best.  He  therefore  stood  along  the 
Dutch  line  on  the  starboard  tack,  leaving  the  right  and  centre 
out  of  cannon-shot,  until  he  came  abreast  of  the  left,  Tromp’ s 
squadron.  Monk  then  had  thirty-five  ships  well  in  hand ;  but 
the  rear  had  opened  and  was  straggling,  as  is  apt  to  be  the 
case  with  long  columns.  With  the  thirty-five  he  then  put  his 
helm  up  and  ran  down  for  Tromp,  whose  squadron  cut  their 
cables  and  made  sail  on  the  same  tack  ;  the  two  engaged 

1  See  Map  of  English  Channel  and  North  Sea,  page  107. 

2  Plate  I.,  June  11,  1666,  Fig.  1.  V,  van;  C,  centre;  R,  rear:  in  this  part 
of  the  action  the  Dutch  order  was  inverted,  so  that  the  actual  van  was  the  proper 
rear.  The  great  number  of  ships  engaged  in  the  fleet  actions  of  these  Anglo- 
Dutch  wars,  make  it  impossible  to  represent  each  ship  and  at  the  same  time  pre¬ 
serve  clearness  in  the  plans.  Each  figure  of  a  ship  therefore  represents  a  group 
more  or  less  numerous. 


120 


SECOND  ANGLO-DUTCH  WAR. 


lines  thus  standing  over  toward  the  French  coast,  and  the 
breeze  heeling  the  ships  so  that  the  English  could  not  use 
their  lower-deck  guns  (Fig.  2,  V").  The  Dutch  centre  and 
rear  also  cut  (Fig.  1,  C'),  and  followed  the  movement,  but 
being  so  far  to  leeward,  could  not  for  some  time  come  into 
action.  It  was  during  this  time  that  a  large  Dutch  ship, 
becoming  separated  from  her  own  fleet,  was  set  on  fire  and 
burned,  doubtless  the  ship  in  which  was  Count  de  Guiche. 

As  they  drew  near  Dunkirk  the  English  went  about,  prob¬ 
ably  all  together ;  for  in  the  return  to  the  northward  and 
westward  the  proper  English  van  fell  in  with  and  was  roughly 
handled  by  the  Dutch  centre  under  Ruyter  himself  (Fig.  2, 
C").  This  fate  would  be  more  likely  to  befalLthe  rear,  and 
indicates  that  a  simultaneous  movement  had  reversed  the 
order.  The  engaged  ships  had  naturally  lost  to  leeward,  thus 
enabling  Ruyter  to  fetch  up  with  them.  Two  English  flag¬ 
ships  were  here  disabled  and  cut  off ;  one,  the  “  Swiftsure,” 
hauled  down  her  colors  after  the  admiral,  a  young  man  of 
only  twenty-seven,  was  killed.  66  Highly  to  be  admired,” 
says  a  contemporary  writer,  “  was  the  resolution  of  Vice- 
Admiral  Berkeley,  who,  though  cut  off  from  the  line,  sur¬ 
rounded  by  enemies,  great  numbers  of  his  men  killed,  his 
ship  disabled  and  boarded  on  all  sides,  yet  continued  fighting 
almost  alone,  killed  several  with  his  own  hand,  and  would 
accept  no  quarter ;  till  at  length,  being  shot  in  the  throat 
with  a  musket-ball,  he  retired  into  the  captain’s  cabin,  where 
he  was  found  dead,  extended  at  his  full  length  upon  a  table, 
and  almost  covered  with  his  own  blood.”  Quite  as  heroic, 
but  more  fortunate  in  its  issue,  was  the  conduct  of  the  other 
English  admiral  thus  cut  off ;  and  the  incidents  of  his  strug¬ 
gle,  though  not  specially  instructive  otherwise,  are  worth 
quoting,  as  giving  a  lively  picture  of  the  scenes  which  passed 
in  the  heat  of  the  contests  of  those  days,  and  afford  coloring 
to  otherwise  dry  details. 

“Being  in  a  short  time  completely  disabled,  one  of  the  enemy’s 
fire-ships  grappled  him  on  the  starboard  quarter ;  he  was,  however, 
freed  by  the  almost  incredible  exertions  of  his  lieutenant,  who,  hav* 


BATTLE  OF  THE  FOUR  DAYS. 


121 


lng  in  the  midst  of  the  flames  loosed  the  grappling-irons,  swung  back 
on  board  his  own  ship  unhurt.  The  Dutch,  bent  on  the  destruction 
of  this  unfortunate  ship,  sent  a  second  which  grappled  her  on  the 
larboard  side,  and  with  greater  success  than  the  former  ;  for  the  sails 
instantly  taking  fire,  the  crew  were  so  terrified  that  nearly  fifty  of 
them  jumped  overboard.  The  admiral,  Sir  John  Harman,  seeing 
this  confusion,  ran  with  his  sword  drawn  among  those  who  remained, 
and  threatened  with  instant  death  the  first  man  who  should  attempt 
to  quit  the  ship,  or  should  not  exert  himself  to  quench  the  flames. 
The  crew  then  returned  to  their  duty  and  got  the  fire  under ;  but 
the  rigging  being  a  good  deal  burned,  one  of  the  topsail  yards  fell 
and  broke  Sir  John’s  leg.  In  the  midst  of  this  accumulated  distress, 
a  third  fire-ship  prepared  to  grapple  him,  but  was  sunk  by  the  guns 
before  she  could  effect  her  purpose.  The  Dutch  vice-admiral, 
Evertzen,  now  bore  down  to  him  and  offered  quarter  ;  but  Sir  John 
replied,  4  No,  no,  it  is  not  come  to  that  yet,’  and  giving  him  a  broad¬ 
side,  killed  the  Dutch  commander;  after  which  the  other  enemies 
sheered  off.” 1 

It  is  therefore  not  surprising  that  the  account  we  have  been 
following  reported  two  English  flag-ships  lost,  one  by  a  fire¬ 
ship.  “  The  English  chief  still  continued  on  the  port  tack, 
and,”  says  the  writer,  “  as  night  fell  we  could  see  him  proudly 
leading  his  line  past  the  squadron  of  North  Holland  and  Zea¬ 
land  [the  actual  rear,  but  proper  van] ,  which  from  noon  up  to 
that  time  had  not  been  able  to  reach  the  enemy  [Fig.  2,  R  "] 
from  their  leewardly  position.”  The  merit  of  Monk’s  attack 
as  a  piece  of  grand  tactics  is  evident,  and  bears  a  strong  re¬ 
semblance  to  that  of  Nelson  at  the  Nile.  Discerning  quickly 
the  weakness  of  the  Dutch  order,  he  had  attacked  a  vastly 
superior  force  in  such  a  way  that  only  part  of  it  could  come 
into  action ;  and  though  the  English  actually  lost  more 
heavily,  they  carried  off  a  brilliant  prestige  and  must  have 
left  considerable  depression  and  heart-burning  among  the 
Dutch.  The  eye-witness  goes  on :  “  The  affair  continued 
until  ten  p.  m.,  friends  and  foes  mixed  together  and  as  likely 
to  receive  injury  from  one  as  from  the  other.  It  will  be  re¬ 
marked  that  the  success  of  the  day  and  the  misfortunes  of 


1  Campbell :  Lives  of  the  Admirals. 


122 


SECOND  ANGLO-DUTCH  WAR. 


the  English  came  from  their  being  too  much  scattered,  too 
extended  in  their  line  ;  but  for  which  we  could  never  have 
cut  off  a  corner  of  them,  as  we  did.  The  mistake  of  Monk 
was  in  not  keeping  his  ships  better  together ;  ”  that  is,  closed 
up.  The  remark  is  just,  the  criticism  scarcely  so  ;  the  open¬ 
ing  out  of  the  line  was  almost  unavoidable  in  so  long  a  column 
of  sailing-ships,  and  was  one  of  the  chances  taken  by  Monk 
wdien  he  offered  battle. 

The  English  stood  off  on  the  port  tack  to  the  west  or  west- 
northwest,  and  next  day  returned  to  the  fight.  The  Dutch 
were  now  on  the  port  tack  in  natural  order,  the  right  leading, 
and  were  to  windward ;  but  the  enemy,  being  more  weatherly 
and  better  disciplined,  soon  gained  the  advantage  of  the  wind. 
The  English  this  day  had  forty-four  ships  in  action,  the  Dutch 
about  eighty ;  many  of  the  English,  as  before  said,  larger.  The 
two  fleets  passed  on  opposite  tacks,  the  English  to  windward  ; 1 
but  Tromp,  in  the  rear,  seeing  that  the  Dutch  order  of  battle 
was  badly  formed,  the  ships  in  two  or  three  lines,  overlapping 
and  so  masking  each  other’s  fire,  went  about  and  gained  to 
windward  of  the  enemy’s  van  (R')  ;  which  he  was  able  to  do 
from  the  length  of  the  line,  and  because  the  English,  running 
parallel  to  the  Dutch  order,  were  off  the  wind.  “At  this 
moment  two  flag-officers  of  the  Dutch  van  kept  broad  off, 
presenting  their  sterns  to  the  English  (V').  Ruyter,  greatly 
astonished,  tried  to  stop  them,  but  in  vain,  and  therefore  felt 
obliged  to  imitate  the  manoeuvre  in  order  to  keep  his  squad¬ 
ron  together ;  but  he  did  so  with  some  order,  keeping  some 
ships  around  him,  and  was  joined  by  one  of  the  van  ships,  dis¬ 
gusted  with  the  conduct  of  his  immediate  superior.  Tromp 
was  now  in  great  danger,  separated  [by  his  own  act  first 
and  then  by  the  conduct  of  the  van]  from  his  own  fleet  by 
the  English,  and  would  have  been  destroyed  but  for  Ruyter, 
who,  seeing  the  urgency  of  the  case,  hauled  up  for  him,”  the 
van  and  centre  thus  standing  back  for  the  rear  on  the  oppo¬ 
site  tack  to  that  on  which  they  entered  action.  This  pre¬ 
vented  the  English  from  keeping  up  the  attack  on  Tromp,  lest 

1  Plate  L,  June  12,  Fig.  1,  V,  C,  R. 


BATTLE  OF  THE  FOUR  DAYS. 


123 


Ruyter  should  gain  the  wind  of  them,  which  they  could  not 
afford  to  yield  because  of  their  very  inferior  numbers.  Both 
the  action  of  Tromp  and  that  of  the  junior  flag-officers  in  the 
van,  though  showing  very  different  degrees  of  warlike  ardor, 
bring  out  strongly  the  lack  of  subordination  and  of  military 
feeling  which  has  been  charged  against  the  Dutch  officers  as 
a  body ;  no  signs  of  which  appear  among  the  English  at  this 
time. 

How  keenly  Ruyter  felt  the  conduct  of  his  lieutenants  was 
manifested  when  “  Tromp,  immediately  after  this  partial  ac¬ 
tion,  went  on  board  his  flagship.  The  seamen  cheered  him  ; 
but  Ruyter  said, 4  This  is  no  time  for  rejoicing,  but  rather  for 
tears.’  Indeed,  our  position  was  bad,  each  squadron  acting 
differently,  in  no  line,  and  all  the  ships  huddled  together  like 
a  flock  of  sheep,  so  packed  that  the  English  might  have  sur¬ 
rounded  all  of  them  with  their  forty  ships  [June  12,  Fig.  2]. 
The  English  were  in  admirable  order,  but  did  not  push  their 
advantage  as  they  should,  whatever  the  reason.”  The  reason 
no  doubt  was  the  same  that  often  prevented  sailing-ships 
from  pressing  an  advantage, —  disability  from  crippled  spars 
and  rigging,  added  to  the  inexpediency  of  such  inferior  num¬ 
bers  risking  a  decisive  action. 

Ruyter  was  thus  able  to  draw  his  fleet  out  into  line  again, 
although  much  maltreated  by  the  English,  and  the  two  fleets 
passed  again  on  opposite  tacks,  the  Dutch  to  leeward,  and 
Ruyter’s  ship  the  last  in  his  column.  As  he  passed  the 
English  rear,  he  lost  his  maintopmast  and  mainyard.  After 
another  partial  rencounter  the  English  drew  away  to  the 
northwest  toward  their  own  shores,  the  Dutch  following 
them  ;  the  wind  being  still  from  southwest,  but  light.  The 
English  were  now  fairly  in  retreat,  and  the  pursuit  continued 
all  night,  Ruyter’s  own  ship  dropping  out  of  sight  in  the  rear 
from  her  crippled  state. 

The  third  day  Monk  continued  retreating  to  the  westward. 
He  burned,  by  the  English  accounts,  three  disabled  ships,  sent 
ahead  those  that  were  most  crippled,  and  himself  brought  up 
the  rear  with  those  that  were  in  fighting  condition,  which  are 


124 


SECOND  ANGLO-DUTCH  WAR . 


variously  stated,  again  by  the  English,  at  twenty-eight  and 
sixteen  in  number  (Plate  II.,  June  18).  One  of  the  largest 
and  finest  of  the  English  fleet,  the  “  Royal  Prince,”  of  ninety 
guns,  ran  aground  on  the  Galloper  Shoal  and  was  taken  by 
Tromp  (Plate  II.  a)  ;  but  Monk’s  retreat  was  so  steady  and 
orderly  that  he  was  otherwise  unmolested.  This  shows  that 
the  Dutch  had  suffered  very  severely.  Toward  evening  Ru¬ 
pert’s  squadron  was  seen ;  and  all  the  ships  of  the  English 
fleet,  except  those  crippled  in  action,  were  at  last  united. 

The  next  day  the  wind  came  out  again  very  fresh  from  the 
southwest,  giving  the  Dutch  the  weather-gage.  The  English, 
instead  of  attempting  to  pass  upon  opposite  tacks,  came  up 
from  astern  relying  upon  the  speed  and  handiness  of  their 
ships.  So  doing,  the  battle  engaged  all  along  the  line  on  the 
port  tack,  the  English  to  leeward.1  The  Dutch  fire-ships  were 
badly  handled  and  did  no  harm,  whereas  the  English  burned 
two  of  their  enemies.  The  two  fleets  ran  on  thus,  exchang¬ 
ing  broadsides  for  two  hours,  at  the  end  of  which  time  the 
bulk  of  the  English  fleet  had  passed  through  the  Dutch  line.2 
All  regularity  of  order  was  henceforward  lost.  “  At  this  mo¬ 
ment,”  says  the  eye-witness,  “  the  lookout  was  extraordinary, 
for  all  were  separated,  the  English  as  well  as  we.  But  luck 
would  have  it  that  the  largest  of  our  fractions  surrounding 
the  admiral  remained  to  windward,  and  the  largest  fraction 
of  the  English,  also  with  their  admiral,  remained  to  leeward 
[Figs.  1  and  2,  C  and  C'].  This  was  the  cause  of  our  victory 
and  their  ruin.  Our  admiral  had  with  him  thirty-five  or  forty 
ships  of  his  own  and  of  other  squadrons,  for  the  squadrons 
were  scattered  and  order  much  lost.  The  rest  of  the  Dutch 
ships  had  left  him.  The  leader  of  the  van,  Yan  Ness,  had 
gone  off  with  fourteen  ships  in  chase  of  three  or  four  English 
ships,  which  under  a  press  of  sail  had  gained  to  windward  of 
the  Dutch  van  [Fig.  1,  V].  Yan  Tromp  with  the  rear  squad- 

1  Plate  II.,  June  14,  Fig.  1,  E,  D. 

2  Fig.  1,  V,  C,  R.  This  result  was  probably  due  simply  to  the  greater  weather- 
liness  of  the  English  ships.  It  would  perhaps  be  more  accurate  to  say  that  the 
Dutch  had  sagged  to  leeward  so  that  they  drifted  through  the  English  line. 


BATTLE  OF  THE  FOUR  DAYS. 


125 


ron  had  fallen  to  leeward,  and  so  had  to  keep  on  [to  leeward 
of  Ruyter  and  the  English  main  body,  Fig.  1,  R]  after  Van 
Ness,  in  order  to  rejoin  the  admiral  by  passing  round  the 
English  centre.”  De  Ruyter  arid  the  English  main  body  kept 
up  a  sharp  action,  beating  to  windward  all  the  time.  Tromp, 
having  carried  sail,  overtook  Van  Ness,  and  returned  bringing 
the  van  back  with  him  (V',  R ')  ;  but  owing  to  the  constant 
plying  to  windward  of  the  English  main  body  he  came  up  to 
leeward  of  it  and  could  not  rejoin  Ruyter,  who  was  to  wind¬ 
ward  (Fig.  3,  V",  R").  Ruyter,  seeing  this,  made  signal  to 
the  ships  around  him,  and  the  main  body  of  the  Dutch  kept 
away  before  the  wind  (Fig  3,  C "),  which  was  then  very 
strong.  “  Thus  in  less  than  no  time  we  found  ourselves  in 
the  midst  of  the  English ;  who,  being  attacked  on  both  sides, 
were  thrown  into  confusion  and  saw  their  whole  order  de¬ 
stroyed,  as  well  by  dint  of  the  action,  as  by  the  strong  wind 
that  was  then  blowing.  This  was  the  hottest  of  the  fight 
[Fig.  3].  We  saw  the  high  admiral  of  England  separated 
from  his  fleet,  followed  only  by  one  fire-ship.  With  that  he 
gained  to  windward,  and  passing  through  the  North  Holland 
squadron,  placed  himself  again  at  the  head  of  fifteen  or  twenty 
ships  that  rallied  to  him.” 

Thus  ended  this  great  sea-fight,  the  most  remarkable,  in 
some  of  its  aspects,  that  has  ever  been  fought  upon  the  ocean. 
Amid  conflicting  reports  it  is  not  possible  to  do  more  than 
estimate  the  results.  A  fairly  impartial  account  says :  “  The 
States  lost  in  these  actions  three  vice-admirals,  two  thousand 
men,  and  four  ships.  The  loss  of  the  English  was  five  thou¬ 
sand  killed  and  three  thousand  prisoners  ;  and  they  lost  besides 
seventeen  ships,  of  which  nine  remained  in  the  hands  of  the 
victors.” 1  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  English  had  much  the 
worst  of  it,  and  that  this  was  owing  wholly  to  the  original 
blunder  of  weakening  the  fleet  by  a  great  detachment  sent  in 
another  direction.  Great  detachments  are  sometimes  neces¬ 
sary  evils,  but  in  this  case  no  necessity  existed.  Granting 
the  approach  of  the  French,  the  proper  course  for  the  English 

1  Lefevre-Pontalis ;  Jean  de  Witt. 


126 


SECOND  ANGLO-DUTCH  WAR. 


was  to  fall  with  their  whole  fleet  upon  the  Dutch  before  their 
allies  could  come  up.  This  lesson  is  as  applicable  to-day  as 
it  ever  was.  A  second  lesson,  likewise  of  present  application, 
is  the  necessity  of  sound  military  institutions  for  implanting 
correct  military  feeling,  pride,  and  discipline.  Great  as  was 
the  first  blunder  of  the  English,  and  serious  as  was  the  disas¬ 
ter,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  consequences  would  have 
been  much  worse  but  for  the  high  spirit  and  skill  with  which 
the  plans  of  Monk  were  carried  out  by  his  subordinates,  and 
the  lack  of  similar  support  to  Ruyter  on  the  part  of  the  Dutch 
subalterns.  In  the  movements  of  the  English,  we  hear  noth¬ 
ing  of  two  juniors  turning  tail  at  a  critical  moment,  nor  of  a 
third,  with  misdirected  ardor,  getting  on  the  wrong  side  of 
the  enemy’s  fleet.  Their  drill  also,  their  tactical  precision, 
was  remarked  even  then.  The  Frenchman  De  Guiche,  after 
witnessing  this  Four  Days’  Fight,  wrote :  — 

“  Nothing  equals  the  beautiful  order  of  the  English  at  sea.  Never 
was  a  line  drawn  straighter  than  that  formed  by  their  ships  ;  thus 
they  bring  all  their  fire  to  bear  upon  those  who  draw  near  them.  .  .  . 
They  fight  like  a  line  of  cavalry  which  is  handled  according  to  rule, 
and  applies  itself  solely  to  force  back  those  who  oppose ;  whereas 
the  Dutch  advance  like  cavalry  whose  squadrons  leave  their  ranks 
and  come  separately  to  the  charge.” 1 

The  Dutch  government,  averse  to  expense,  unmilitary  in  its 
tone,  and  incautious  from  long  and  easy  victory  over  the 
degenerate  navy  of  Spain,  had  allowed  its  fleet  to  sink  into 
a  mere  assembly  of  armed  merchantmen.  Things  were  at 
their  worst  in  the  days  of  Cromwell.  Taught  by  the  severe 
lessons  of  that  war,  the  United  Provinces,  under  an  able 
ruler,  had  done  much  to  mend  matters,  but  full  efficiency 
had  not  yet  been  gained. 

“In  1666  as  in  1653,”  says  a  French  naval  writer,  “the  fortune 
of  war  seemed  to  lean  to  the  side  of  the  English.  Of  the  three  great 
battles  fought  two  were  decided  victories7;  and  the  third,  though 
adverse,  had  but  increased  the  glory  of  her  seamen.  This  was  due 
to  the  intelligent  boldness  of  Monk  and  Rupert,  the  talents  of  part 

1  Memoires,  pp.  249,  251,  266,  267. 


SOLDIERS  COMMANDING  SHIPS. 


127 


of  the  admirals  and  captains,  and  the  skill  of  the  seamen  and  soldiers 
under  them.  The  wise  and  vigorous  efforts  made  by  the  government 
of  the  United  Provinces,  and  the  undeniable  superiority  of  Ruyter  in 
experience  and  genius  over  any  one  of  his  opponents,  could  not  com¬ 
pensate  for  the  weakness  or  incapacity  of  part  of  the  Dutch  officers, 
and  the  manifest  inferiority  of  the  men  under  their  orders.”  1 

England,  as  has  been  said  before,  still  felt  the  impress  of 
Cromwell’s  iron  band  upon  her  military  institutions  ;  but  that 
impress  was  growing  weaker.  Before  the  next  Dutch  war 
Monk  was  dead,  and  was  poorly  replaced  by  the  cavalier 
Rupert.  Court  extravagance  cut  down  the  equipment  of  the 
navy  as  did  the  burgomaster’s  parsimony,  and  court  corrup¬ 
tion  undermined  discipline  as  surely  as  commercial  indiffer¬ 
ence.  The  effect  was  evident  when  the  fleets  of  the  two 
countries  met  again,  six  years  later. 

There  was  one  well-known  feature  of  all  the  military  navies 
of  that  day  which  calls  for  a  passing  comment ;  for  its  correct 
bearing  and  value  is  not  always,  perhaps  not  generally,  seen. 
The  command  of  fleets  and  of  single  vessels  was  often  given 
to  soldiers,  to  military  men  unaccustomed  to  the  sea,  and 
ignorant  how  to  handle  the  ship,  that  duty  being  intrusted  to 
another  class  of  officer.  Looking  closely  into  the  facts,  it  is 
seen  that  this  made  a  clean  division  between  the  direction  of 
the  fighting  and  of  the  motive  power  of  the  ship.  This  is  the 
essence  of  the  matter ;  and  the  principle  is  the  same  whatever 
the  motive  power  may  be.  The  inconvenience  and  inefficiency 
of  such  a  system  was  obvious  then  as  it  is  now,  and  the  logic 
of  facts  gradually  threw  the  two  functions  into  the  hands  of 
one  corps  of  officers,  the  result  being  the  modern  naval  officer, 
as  that  term  is  generally  understood.2  Unfortunately,  in  this 
process  of  blending,  the  less  important  function  was  allowed 
to  get  the  upper  hand  ;  the  naval  officer  came  to  feel  more 

1  Chabaud-Arnault :  Revue  Mar.  et  Col.  1885. 

2  The  true  significance  of  this  change  has  often  been  misunderstood,  and  hence 
erroneous  inferences  as  to  the  future  have  been  drawn.  It  was  not  a  case  of  the 
new  displacing  the  old,  but  of  the  military  element  in  a  military  organization 
asserting  its  necessary  and  inevitable  control  over  all  other  functions. 


128 


MILITARY  QUALITIES  OF 


proud  of  his  dexterity  in  managing  the  motive  power  of  his 
ship  than  of  his  skill  in  developing  her  military  efficiency. 
The  bad  effects  of  this  lack  of  interest  in  military  science 
became  most  evident  when  the  point  of  handling  fleets  was 
reached,  because  for  that  military  skill  told  most,  and  previous 
study  was  most  necessary  ;  but  it  was  felt  in  the  single  ship  as 
well.  Hence  it  came  to  pass,  and  especially  in  the  English 
navy,  that  the  pride  of  the  seaman  took  the  place  of  the  pride 
of  the  military  man.  The  English  naval  officer  thought  more 
of  that  which  likened  him  to  the  merchant  captain  than  of  that 
which  made  him  akin  to  the  soldier.  In  the  French  navy 
this  result  was  less  general,  owing  probably  to  the  more  mili¬ 
tary  spirit  of  the  government,  and  especially  of  the  nobility, 
to  whom  the  rank  of  officer  was  reserved.  It  was  not  possible 
that  men  whose  whole  association  was  military,  all  of  whose 
friends  looked  upon  arms  as  the  one  career  for  a  gentleman, 
could  think  more  of  the  sails  and  rigging  than  of  the  guns 
or  the  fleet.  The  English  corps  of  officers  was  of  different 
origin.  There  was  more  than  the  writer  thought  in  Ma¬ 
caulay’s  well-known  saying  :  “  There  were  seamen  and  there 
were  gentlemen  in  the  navy  of  Charles  II . ;  but  the  seamen 
were  not  gentlemen,  and  the  gentlemen  were  not  seamen.” 
The  trouble  was  not  in  the  absence  or  presence  of  gentlemen 
as  such,  but  in  the  fact  that  under  the  conditions  of  that  day 
the  gentleman  was  pre-eminently  the  military  element  of 
society ;  and  that  the  seaman,  after  the  Dutch  wars,  gradually 
edged  the  gentleman,  and  with  him  the  military  tone  and 
spirit  as  distinguished  from  simple  courage,  out  of  the  service. 
Even  “such  men  of  family  as  Herbert  and  Russell,  William 
III.’s  admirals,”  says  the  biographer  of  Lord  Hawke,  “  were 
sailors  indeed,  but  only  able  to  hold  their  own  by  adopting 
the  boisterous  manners  of  the  hardy  tarpaulin.”  The  same 
national  traits  which  made  the  French  inferior  as  seamen 
made  them  superior  as  military  men  ;  not  in  courage,  but  in 
skill.  To  this  day  the  same  tendency  obtains  ;  the  direction 
of  the  motive  power  has  no  such  consideration  as  the  military 
functions  in  the  navies  of  the  Latin  nations.  The  studious 


FRENCH  AND  ENGLISH  OFFICERS.  129 

and  systematic  side  of  the  French  character  also  inclined  the 
French  officer,  when  not  a  trifler,  to  consider  and  develop 
tactical  questions  in  a  logical  manner ;  to  prepare  himself  to 
handle  fleets,  not  merely  as  a  seaman  but  as  a  military  man. 
The  result  showed,  in  the  American  Revolutionary  War,  that 
despite  a  mournful  history  of  governmental  neglect,  men  who 
were  first  of  all  military  men,  inferior  though  they  were  in 
opportunities  as  seamen  to  their  enemies,  could  meet  them  on 
more  than  equal  terms  as  to  tactical  skill,  and  were  practically 
their  superiors  in  handling  fleets.  The  false  theory  has 
already  been  pointed  out,  which  directed  the  action  of  the 
French  fleet  not  to  crushing  its  enemy,  but  to  some  ulterior 
aim ;  but  this  does  not  affect  the  fact  that  in  tactical  skill  the 
military  men  were  superior  to  the  mere  seamen,  though  their 
tactical  skill  was  applied  to  mistaken  strategic  ends.  The 
source  whence  the  Dutch  mainly  drew  their  officers  does  not 
certainly  appear  ;  for  while  the  English  naval  historian  in  1666 
says  that  most  of  the  captains  of  their  fleet  were  sons  of  rich 
burgomasters,  placed  there  for  political  reasons  by  the  Grand 
Pensionary,  and  without  experience,  Duquesne,  the  ablest 
French  admiral  of  the  day,  comments  in  1676  on  the  precision 
and  skill  of  the  Dutch  captains  in  terms  very  disparaging  to 
his  own.  It  is  likely,  from  many  indications,  that  they  were 
generally  merchant  seamen,  with  little  original  military  feel¬ 
ing  ;  but  the  severity  with  which  the  delinquents  were  pun¬ 
ished  both  by  the  State  and  by  popular  frenzy,  seems  to  have 
driven  these  officers,  who  were  far  from  lacking  the  highest 
personal  courage,  into  a  sense  of  what  military  loyalty  and 
subordination  required.  They  made  a  very  different  record 
in  1672  from  that  of  1666. 

Before  finally  leaving  the  Four  Days’  Fight,  the  conclu¬ 
sions  of  another  writer  may  well  be  quoted :  — 

“  Such  was  that  bloody  Battle  of  the  Four  Days,  or  Straits  of 
Calais,  the  most  memorable  sea-fight  of  modern  days  ;  not,  indeed,  by 
its  results,  but  by  the  aspect  of  its  different  phases ;  by  the  fury  of 
the  combatants  ;  by  the  boldness  and  skill  of  the  leaders ;  and  by  the 
new  character  which  it  gave  to  sea  warfare.  More  than  any  other 

9 


130 


CHANGES  IN  TACTICS . 


this  fight  marks  clearly  the  passage  from  former  methods  to  the  tactics 
of  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  eentury.  For  the  first  time  we  can  fol¬ 
low.  as  though  traced  upon  a  plan,  the  principal  movements  of  the 
contending  fleets.  It  seems  quite  clear  that  to  the  Dutch  as  well 
as  to  the  British  have  been  given  a  tactical  book  and  a  code  of  sig¬ 
nals  ;  or,  at  the  least,  written  instructions,  extensive  and  precise,  to 
serve  instead  of  such  a  code.  We  feel  that  each  admiral  now  has 
his  squadron  in  hand,  and  that  even  the  commander-in-chief  disposes 
at  his  will,  during  the  fight,  of  the  various  subdivisions  of  his  fleet. 
Compare  this  action  with  those  of  1652,  and  one  plain  fact  stares  you 
in  the  face,  —  that  between  the  two  dates  naval  tactics  have  under¬ 
gone  a  revolution. 

“Such  were  the  changes  that  distinguish  the  war  of  1665  from  that 
of  1652.  As  in  the  latter  epoch,  the  admiral  still  thinks  the  weather- 
gage  an  advantage  for  his  fleet ;  but  it  is  no  longer,  from  the  tactical 
point  of  view,  the  principal,  we  might  almost  say  the  sole,  preoccu¬ 
pation.  Now  he  wishes  above  all  to  keep  his  fleet  in  good  order  and 
compact  as  long  as  possible,  so  as  to  keep  the  power  of  combining , 
during  the  action,  the  movements  of  the  different  squadrons.  Look 
at  Ruyter,  at  the  end  of  the  Four  Days’  Fight;  wflth  great  difficulty 
he  has  kept  to  windward  of  the  English  fleet,  yet  he  does  not  hesitate 
to  sacrifice  this  advantage  in  order  to  unite  the  two  parts  of  his  fleet, 
which  are  separated  by  the  enemy.  If  at  the  later  fight  off  the 
North  Foreland  great  intervals  exist  between  the  Dutch  squadrons, 
if  the  rear  afterward  continues  to  withdraw  from  the  centre,  Ruyter 
deplores  such  a  fault  as  the  chief  cause  of  his  defeat.  He  so  deplores 
it  in  his  official  report;  he  even  accuses  Tromp  [who  was  his  personal 
enemy]  of  treason  or  cowardice,  —  an  unjust  accusation,  but  which 
none  the  less  shows  the  enormous  importance  thenceforth  attached, 
during  action,  to  the  reunion  of  the  fleet  into  a  whole  strictly  and 
regularly  maintained.”  1 

This  commentary  is  justified  in  so  far  as  it  points  out  gen¬ 
eral  aims  and  tendencies ;  but  the  results  were  not  as  com¬ 
plete  as  might  be  inferred  from  it. 

The  English,  notwithstanding  their  heavy  loss  in  the  Four 
Days’  Battle,  were  at  sea  again  within  two  months,  much 
to  the  surprise  of  the  Dutch ;  and  on  the  4th  of  August 

1  Chabaud-Arnault :  Revue  Mar.  et  Col.  1885. 


RUYTER  IN  THE  THAMES. 


131 


another  severe  fight  was  fought  off  the  North  Foreland,  end¬ 
ing  in  the  complete  defeat  of  the  latter,  who  retired  to  their 
own  coasts.  The  English  followed,  and  effected  an  entrance 
into  one  of  the  Dutch  harbors,  where  they  destroyed  a  large 
fleet  of  merchantmen  as  well  as  a  town  of  some  importance. 
Toward  the  end  of  1666  both  sides  were  tired  of  the  war, 
which  was  doing  great  harm  to  trade,  and  weakening  both 
navies  to  the  advantage  of  the  growing  sea  power  of  France. 
Negotiations  looking  toward  peace  were  opened ;  but  Charles 
II.,  ill  disposed  to  the  United  Provinces,  confident  that  the 
growing  pretensions  of  Louis  XIY.  to  the  Spanish  Nether¬ 
lands  would  break  up  the  existing  alliance  between  Holland 
and  France,  and  relying  also  upon  the  severe  reverses  suf¬ 
fered  at  sea  by  the  Dutch,  was  exacting  and  haughty  in  his 
demands.  To  justify  and  maintain  this  line  of  conduct  he 
should  have  kept  up  his  fleet,  the  prestige  of  which  had  been 
so  advanced  by  its  victories.  Instead  of  that,  poverty,  the 
result  of  extravagance  and  of  his  home  policy,  led  him  to  per¬ 
mit  it  to  decline ;  ships  in  large  numbers  were  laid  up ;  and 
he  readily  adopted  an  opinion  which  chimed  in  with  his 
penury,  and  which,  as  it  has  had  advocates  at  all  periods 
of  sea  history,  should  be  noted  and  condemned  here.  This 
opinion,  warmly  opposed  by  Monk,  was :  — 

“  That  as  the  Dutch  were  chiefly  supported  by  trade,  as  the  supply 
of  their  navy  depended  upon  trade,  and,  as  experience  showed,  nothing 
provoked  the  people  so  much  as  injuring  their  trade,  his  Majesty 
should  therefore  apply  himself  to  this,  which  would  effectually  hum¬ 
ble  them,  at  the  same  time  that  it  would  less  exhaust  the  English  than 
fitting  out  such  mighty  fleets  as  had  hitherto  kept  the  sea  every  sum¬ 
mer.  .  .  .  Upon  these  motives  the  king  took  a  fatal  resolution  of 
laying  up  his  great  ships  and  keeping  only  a  few  frigates  on  the 
cruise.”  1 

In  consequence  of  this  economical  theory  of  carrying  on  a 
war,  the  Grand  Pensionary  of  Holland,  De  Witt,  who  had 
the  year  before  caused  soundings  of  the  Thames  to  be  made, 


1  Campbell :  Lives  of  the  Admirals. 


132 


PEACE  OF  BREDA. 


sent  into  the  river,  under  De  Ruyter,  a  force  of  sixty  or 
seventy  ships-of-the-line,  which  on  the  14th  of  June,  1667, 
went  up  as  high  as  Gravesend,  destroying  ships  at  Chatham 
and  in  the  Medway,  and  taking  possession  of  Sheerness.  The 
light  of  the  fires  could  be  seen  from  London,  and  the  Dutch 
fleet  remained  in  possession  of  the  mouth  of  the  river  until 
the  end  of  the  month.  LTnder  this  blow,  following  as  it  did 
upon  the  great  plague  and  the  great  fire  of  London,  Charles 
consented  to  peace,  which  was  signed  July  31,  1667,  and  is 
known  as  the  Peace  of  Breda.  The  most  lasting  result  of  the 
war  was  the  transfer  of  New  York  and  New  Jersey  to  Eng¬ 
land,  thus  joining  her  northern  and  southern  colonies  in 
North  America. 

Before  going  on  again  with  the  general  course  of  the  history 
of  the  times,  it  will  be  well  to  consider  for  a  moment  the 
theory  which  worked  so  disastrously  for  England  in  1667  ; 
that,  namely,  of  maintaining  a  sea-war  mainly  by  preying 
upon  the  enemy’s  commerce.  This  plan,  which  involves  only 
the  maintenance  of  a  few  swift  cruisers  and  can  be  backed  by 
the  spirit  of  greed  in  a  nation,  fitting  out  privateers  without 
direct  expense  to  the  State,  possesses  the  specious  attractions 
which  economy  always  presents.  The  great  injury  done  to  the 
wealth  and  prosperity  of  the  enemy  is  also  undeniable ;  and 
although  to  some  extent  his  merchant-ships  can  shelter  them¬ 
selves  ignobly  under  a  foreign  flag  while  the  war  lasts,  this 
guerre  de  course ,  as  the  French  call  it,  this  commerce-destroy¬ 
ing,  to  use  our  own  phrase,  must,  if  in  itself  successful,  greatly 
embarrass  the  foreign  government  and  distress  its  people. 
Such  a  war,  however,  cannot  stand  alone  ;  it  must  be  sup¬ 
ported,  to  use  the  military  phrase  ;  unsubstantial  and  evanes¬ 
cent  in  itself,  it  cannot  reach  far  from  its  base.  That  base 
must  be  either  home  ports,  or  else  some  solid  outpost  of  the 
national  power,  on  the  shore  or  the  sea ;  a  distant  dependency 
or  a  powerful  fleet.  Failing  such  support,  the  cruiser  can 
only  dash  out  hurriedly  a  short  distance  from  home,  and  its 
blows,  though  painful,  cannot  be  fatal.  It  was  not  the  policy 
of  1667,  but  Cromwell’s  powerful  fleets  of  ships-of-the-line  in 


COMMERCE-DESTROYING  WAR. 


133 


1652,  that  shut  the  Dutch  merchantmen  in  their  ports  and 
caused  the  grass  to  grow  in  the  streets  of  Amsterdam.  When, 
instructed  by  the  suffering  of  that  time,  the  Dutch  kept-large 
fleets  afloat  through  two  exhausting  wars,  though  their  com¬ 
merce  suffered  greatly,  they  bore  up  the  burden  of  the  strife 
against  England  and  France  united.  Forty  years  later,  Louis 
XIV.  was  driven,  by  exhaustion,  to  the  policy  adopted  by 
Charles  II.  through  parsimony.  Then  were  the  days  of  the 
great  French  privateers,  Jean  Bart,  Forbin,  Duguay-Trouin, 
Du  Casse,  and  others.  The  regular  fleets  of  the  French  navy 
were  practically  withdrawn  from  the  ocean  during  the  great 
War  of  the  Spanish  Succession  (1702-1712).  The  French 
naval  historian  says  :  — 

“  Unable  to  renew  the  naval  armaments,  Louis  XIV.  increased  the 
number  of  cruisers  upon  the  more  frequented  seas,  especially  the  Chan¬ 
nel  and  the  German  Ocean  [not  far  from  home,  it  will  be  noticed]. 
In  these  different  spots  the  cruisers  were  always  in  a  position  to  in¬ 
tercept  or  hinder  the  movements  of  transports  laden  with  troops,  and 
of  the  numerous  convoys  carrying  supplies  of  all  kinds.  In  these 
seas,  in  the  centre  of  the  commercial  and  political  world,  there  is 
always  work  for  cruisers.  Notwithstanding  the  difficulties  they  met, 
owing  to  the  absence  of  large  friendly  fleets,  they  served  advanta¬ 
geously  the  cause  of  the  two  peoples  [French  and  Spanish].  These 
cruisers,  in  the  face  of  the  Anglo-Dutch  power,  needed  good  luck, 
boldness,  and  skill.  These  three  conditions  were  not  lacking  to  our 
seamen ;  but  then,  what  chiefs  and  what  captains  they  had  !  ”  1 

The  English  historian,  on  the  other  hand,  while  admitting 
how  severely  the  people  and  commerce  of  England  suffered 
from  the  cruisers,  bitterly  reflecting  at  times  upon  the  admin¬ 
istration,  yet  refers  over  and  over  again  to  the  increasing 
prosperity  of  the  whole  country,  and  especially  of  its  commer¬ 
cial  part.  In  the  preceding  war,  on  the  contrary,  from  1689 
to  1697,  when  France  sent  great  fleets  to  sea  and  disputed  the 
supremacy  of  the  ocean,  how  different  the  result !  The  samo 
English  writer  says  of  that  time  :  — 


1  Lapeyrouse-Bonfils  :  Hist,  de  la  Marine  Fran9aise. 


134 


MILITARY  VALUE  OF 


u  With  respect  to  our  trade  it  is  certain  that  we  suffered  infinitely 
more,  not  merely  than  the  French,  for  that  was  to  be  expected  from 
the  greater  number  of  our  merchant-ships,  but  than  we  ever  did  in 
any  former  war.  .  .  .  This  proceeded  in  great  measure  from  the  vigi¬ 
lance  of  the  French,  who  carried  on  the  war  in  a  piratical  way.  It 
is  out  of  all  doubt  that,  taking  all  together,  our  traffic  suffered  exces¬ 
sively  ;  our  merchants  were  many  of  them  ruined.”  1 

Macaulay  says  of  this  period :  “  During  many  months  of 
1693  the  English  trade  with  the  Mediterranean  had  been  in¬ 
terrupted  almost  entirely.  There  was  no  chance  that  a  mer¬ 
chantman  from  London  or  Amsterdam  would,  if  unprotected, 
reach  the  Pillars  of  Hercules  without  being  boarded  by  a 
French  privateer  ;  and  the  protection  of  armed  vessels  was 
not  easily  obtained.”  Why  ?  Because  the  vessels  of  Eng¬ 
land’s  navy  were  occupied  watching  the  French  navy,  and 
this  diversion  of  them  from  the  cruisers  and  privateers  con¬ 
stituted  the  support  which  a  commerce-destroying  war  must 
have.  A  French  historian,  speaking  of  the  same  period  in 
England  (1696),  says  :  “  The  state  of  the  finances  was  deplora¬ 
ble  ;  money  was  scarce,  maritime  insurance  thirty  per  cent, 
the  Navigation  Act  was  virtually  suspended,  and  the  English 
shipping  reduced  to  the  necessity  of  sailing  under  the  Swedish 
and  Danish  flags.”  2  Half  a  century  later  the  French  govern¬ 
ment  was  again  reduced,  by  long  neglect  of  the  navy,  to  a 
cruising  warfare.  With  what  results  ?  First,  the  French 
historian  says :  “From  June,  1756,  to  June,  1760,  French  pri¬ 
vateers  captured  from  the  English  more  than  twenty-five  hun¬ 
dred  merchantmen.  In  1761,  though  France  had  not,  so  to 
speak,  a  single  ship-of-the-line  at  sea,  and  though  the  English 
had  taken  two  hundred  and  forty  of  our  privateers,  their 
comrades  still  took  eight  hundred  and  twelve  vessels.  But,” 
he  goes  on  to  say,  “  the  prodigious  growth  of  the  English 
shipping  explains  the  number  of  these  prizes.”  3  In  other 
words,  the  suffering  involved  to  England  in  such  numerous 

V 

1  Campbell :  Lives  of  the  Admirals.  2  Martin :  History  of  France. 

3  Martin  :  History  of  France. 


COMMER  CE-DES  TR  0  YING. 


135 


captures,  which  must  have  caused  great  individual  injury  and 
discontent,  did  not  really  prevent  the  growing  prosperity  of 
the  State  and  of  the  community  at  large.  The  English  naval 
historian,  speaking  of  the  same  period,  says  :  “  While  the 
commerce  of  France  was  nearly  destroyed,  the  trading-fleet  of 
England  covered  the  seas.  Every  year  her  commerce  was 
increasing ;  the  money  which  the  war  carried  out  was  returned1 
by  the  produce  of  her  industry.  Eight  thousand  merchant 
vessels  were  employed  by  the  English  merchants.”  And 
again,  summing  up  the  results  of  the  war,  after  stating  the 
immense  amount  of  specie  brought  into  the  kingdom  by  for¬ 
eign  conquests,  he  says  :  “  The  trade  of  England  increased 
gradually  every  year,  and  such  a  scene  of  national  prosperity, 
while  waging  a  long,  bloody,  and  costly  war,  was  never  before 
shown  by  any  people  in  the  world.”  On  the  other  hand,  the 
historian  of  the  French  navy,  speaking  of  an  earlier  phase  of 
the  same  wars,  says  :  “  The  English  fleets,  having  nothing  to 
resist  them,  swept  the  seas.  Our  ‘privateers  and  single  cruis¬ 
ers,  having  no  fleet  to  keep  down  the  abundance  of  their  ene¬ 
mies,  ran  short  careers.  Twenty  thousand  French  seamen 
lay  in  English  prisons.”  1  When,  on  the  other  hand,  in  the 
War  of  the  American  Revolution  France  resumed  the  policy  of 
Colbert  and  of  the  early  reign  of  Louis  XIV.,  and  kept  large 
battle-fleets  afloat,  the  same  result  again  followed  as  in  the 
days  of  Tourville.  “For  the  first  time,”  says  the  Annual 
Register,  forgetting  or  ignorant  of  the  experience  of  1693,  and 
remembering  only  the  glories  of  the  later  wars,  “  English 
merchant-ships  were  driven  to  take  refuge  under  foreign 
flags.”  2  Finally,  in  quitting  this  part  of  the  subject,  it  may  be 
^remarked  that  in  the  island  of  Martinique  the  French  had  a 
powerful  distant  dependency  upon  which  to  base  a  cruising 
warfare;  and  during  the  Seven  Years’  War,  as  afterward 
during  the  First  Empire,  it,  with  Guadeloupe,  was  the  refuge 
of  numerous  privateers.  “  The  records  of  the  English  admi¬ 
ralty  raise  the  losses  of  the  English  in  the  West  Indies  during 
the  first  years  of  the  Seven  Years’  War  to  fourteen  hundred 
1  Lapeyrouse-Bonfils.  2  Annual  Reg.,  vol.  xxvii.  p.  10. 


136 


MILITARY  VALUE  OF 


merchantmen  taken  or  destroyed.”  The  English  fleet  was 
therefore  directed  against  the  islands,  both  of  which  fell,  in- 
volving  a  loss  to  the  trade  of  France  greater  than  all  the  dep¬ 
redations  of  her  cruisers  on  the  English  commerce,  besides 
breaking  up  the  system;  but  in  the  war  of  17T8  the  great 
fleets  protected  the  islands,  which  were  not  even  threatened 
at  any  time. 

So  far  we  have  been  viewing  the  effect  of  a  purely  cruising 
warfare,  not  based  upon  powerful  squadrons,  only  upon  that 
particular  part  of  the  enemy’s  strength  against  which  it  is  theo¬ 
retically  directed,  —  upon  his  commerce  and  general  wealth  ; 
upon  the  sinews  of  war.  The  evidence  seems  to  show  that 
even  for  its  own  special  ends  such  a  mode  of  war  is  inconclu¬ 
sive,  worrying  but  not  deadly  ;  it  might  almost  be  said  that 
it  causes  needless  suffering.  What,  however,  is  the  effect  of 
this  policy  upon  the  general  ends  of  the  war,  to  which  it  is 
one  of  the  means,  and  to  which  it  is  subsidiary  ?  How,  again, 
does  it  react  upon  the  people  that  practise  it  ?  As  the  his¬ 
torical  evidences  will  come  up  in  detail  from  time  to  time,  it 
need  here  only  be  summarized.  The  result  to  England  in  the 
days  of  Charles  II.  has  been  seen,  —  her  coast  insulted,  her 
shipping  burned  almost  within  sight  of  her  capital.  In  the 
War  of  the  Spanish  Succession,  when  the  control  of  Spain  was 
the  military  object,  while  the  French  depended  upon  a  cruis¬ 
ing  war  against  commerce,  the  navies  of  England  and  Hol¬ 
land,  unopposed,  guarded  the  coasts  of  the  peninsula,  blocked 
the  port  of  Toulon,  forced  the  French  succors  to  cross  the 
Pyrenees,  and  by  keeping  open  the  sea  highway,  neutralized 
the  geographical  nearness  of  France  to  the  seat  of  war. 
Their  fleets  seized  Gibraltar,  Barcelona,  and  Minorca,  and  co¬ 
operating  with  the  Austrian  army  failed  by  little  of  reducing 
Toulon.  In  the  Seven  Years’  War  the  English  fleets  seized, 
or  aided  in  seizing,  all  the  most  valuable  colonies  of  France 
and  Spain,  and  made  frequent  descents  on  the  French  coast. 
The  War  of  the  American  Revolution  affords  no  lesson,  the 
fleets  being  nearly  equal.  The  next  most  striking  instance  to 
Americans  is  the  War  of  1812.  Everybody  knows  how  our 


COMMER  CE-DESTR  0  YiNG. 


137 


privateers  swarmed  over  the  seas,  and  that  from  the  small¬ 
ness  of  our  navy  the  war  was  essentially,  indeed  solely,  a 
cruising  war.  Except  upon  the  lakes,  it  is  doubtful  if  more 
than  two  of  our  ships  at  any  time  acted  together.  The  injury 
done  to  English  commerce,  thus  unexpectedly  attacked  by  a 
distant  foe  which  had  been  undervalued,  may  be  fully  con¬ 
ceded  ;  but  on  the  one  hand,  the  American  cruisers  were 
powerfully  supported  by  the  French  fleet,  which  being  assem¬ 
bled  in  larger  or  smaller  bodies  in  the  many  ports  under  the 
emperor’s  control  from  Antwerp  to  Venice,  tied  the  fleets  of 
England  to  blockade  duty  ;  and  on  the  other  hand,  when  the 
fall  of  the  emperor  released  them,  our  coasts  were  insulted  in 
every  direction,  the  Chesapeake  entered  and  controlled,  its 
shores  wasted,  the  Potomac  ascended,  and  Washington  burned. 
The  Northern  frontier  was  kept  in  a  state  of  alarm,  though 
there  squadrons,  absolutely  weak  but  relatively  strong,  sus¬ 
tained  the  general  defence  ;  while  in  the  South  the  Mississippi 
was  entered  unopposed,  and  New  Orleans  barely  saved.  When 
negotiations  for  peace  were  opened,  the  bearing  of  the  English 
toward  the  American  envoys  was  not  that  of  men  who  felt 
their  country  to  be  threatened  with  an  unbearable  evil.  The 
late  Civil  War,  with  the  cruises  of  the  “Alabama”  and 
“  Sumter  ”  and  their  consorts,  revived  the  tradition  of  com¬ 
merce-destroying.  In  so  far  as  this  is  one  means  to  a  gen¬ 
eral  end,  and  is  based  upon  a  navy  otherwise  powerful,  it  is 
well ;  but  we  need  not  expect  to  see  the  feats  of  those  ships 
repeated  in  the  face  of  a  great  sea  power.  In  the  first  place, 
those  cruises  were  powerfully  supported  by  the  determination 
of  the  United  States  to  blockade,  not  only  the  chief  centres 
of  Southern  trade,  but  every  inlet  of  the  coast,  thus  leaving 
few  ships  available  for  pursuit ;  in  the  second  place,  had 
there  been  ten  of  those  cruisers  where  there  was  one,  they 
would  not  have  stopped  the  incursion  in  Southern  waters  of 
the  Union  fleet,  which  penetrated  to  every  point  accessible 
from  the  sea ;  and  in  the  third  place,  the  undeniable  injury, 
direct  and  indirect,  inflicted  upon  individuals  and  upon  one 
branch  of  the  nation’s  industry  (and  how  high  that  shipping 


138 


POWER  OF  GREAT  NAVIES. 


industry  stands  in  the  writer’s  estimation  need  not  be  re¬ 
peated),  did  not  in  the  least  influence  or  retard  the  event  ol 
the  war.  Such  injuries,  unaccompanied  by  others,  are  more 
irritating  than  weakening.  On  the  other  hand,  will  any  refuse 
to  admit  that  the  work  of  the  great  Union  fleets  powerfully 
modified  and  hastened  an  end  which  was  probably  inevita¬ 
ble  in  any  case  ?  As  a  sea  power  the  South  then  occupied 
the  place  of  France  in  the  wars  we  have  been  considering, 
while  the  situation  of  the  North  resembled  that  of  England; 
and,  as  in  France,  the  sufferers  in  the  Confederacy  were  not  a 
class,  but  the  government  and  the  nation  at  large.  It  is  not 
the  taking  of  individual  ships  or  convoys,  be  they  few  or 
many,  that  strikes  down  the  money  power  of  a  nation ;  it  is 
the  possession  of  that  overbearing  power  on  the  sea  which 
drives  the  enemy’s  flag  from  it,  or  allows  it  to  appear  only  as 
a  fugitive  ;  and  which,  by  controlling  the  great  common,  closes 
the  highways  by  which  commerce  moves  to  and  from  the 
enemy’s  shores.  This  overbearing  power  can  only  be  exer¬ 
cised  by  great  navies,  and  by  them  (on  the  broad  sea)  less 
efficiently  now  than  in  the  days  when  the  neutral  flag  had  not 
its  present  immunity.  It  is  not  unlikely  that,  in  the  event  of 
a  war  between  maritime  nations,  an  attempt  may  be  made  by 
the  one  having  a  great  sea  power  and  wishing  to  break  down 
its  enemy’s  commerce,  to  interpret  the  phrase effective 
blockade  ”  in  the  manner  that  best  suits  its  interests  at  the 
time  ;  to  assert  that  the  speed  and  disposal  of  its  ships  make 
the  blockade  effective  at  much  greater  distances  and  with 
fewer  ships  than  formerly.  The  determination  of  such  a  ques¬ 
tion  wflll  depend,  not  upon  the  weaker  belligerent,  but  upon 
neutral  powers ;  it  will  raise  the  issue  between  belligerent  and 
neutral  rights ;  and  if  the  belligerent  have  a  vastly  overpower¬ 
ing  navy  he  may  carry  his  point,  just  as  England,  when  pos¬ 
sessing  the  mastery  of  the  seas,  long  refused  to  admit  the 
doctrine  of  the  neutral  flag  covering  the  goods. 


CHAPTER  III. 


War  of  England  and  France  in  Alliance  against  the  United 
Provinces,  1672-1674.  —  Finally,  of  France  against  Combined 
Europe,  1674-1678.  —  Sea  Battles  of  Solebay,  the  Texel,  and 
Stromboli. 

SHORTLY  before  the  conclusion  of  the  Peace  of  Breda, 
Louis  XI V.  made  his  first  step  toward  seizing  parts  of  the 
Spanish  Netherlands  and  Franche  ComtA  At  the  same  time 
that  his  armies  moved  forward,  he  sent  out  a  State  paper  setting 
forth  his  claims  upon  the  territories  in  question.  This  paper 
showed  unmistakably  the  ambitious  character  of  the  young 
king,  roused  the  anxiety  of  Europe,  and  doubtless  increased  the 
strength  of  the  peace  party  in  England.  Under  the  leader¬ 
ship  of  Holland,  but  with  the  hearty  co-operation  of  the  Eng¬ 
lish  minister,  an  alliance  was  formed  between  the  two  countries 
and  Sweden,  hitherto  the  friend  of  France,  to  check  Louis’ 
advance  before  his  power  became  too  great.  The  attack  first 
on  the  Netherlands  in  1667,  and  then  on  Franche  Comte  in 
1668,  showed  the  hopeless  weakness  of  Spain  to  defend  her 
possessions  ;  they  fell  almost  without  a  blow. 

The  policy  of  the  United  Provinces,  relative  to  the  claims 
of  Louis  at  this  time,  was  summed  up  in  the  phrase  that 
“  France  was  good  as  a  friend,  but  not  as  a  neighbor.”  They 
were  unwilling  to  break  their  traditional  alliance,  but  still  more 
unwilling  to  have  her  on  their  border.  The  policy  of  the  Eng¬ 
lish  people,  though  not  of  their  king,  turned  toward  the  Dutch. 
In  the  increased  greatness  of  Louis  they  saw  danger  to  all 
Europe  ;  to  themselves  more  especially  if,  by  a  settled  prepon¬ 
derance  on  the  continent,  his  hands  were  free  to  develop  his  sea 
power.  “  Flanders  once  in  the  power  of  Louis  XIV.,”  wrote  the 


140 


TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  BETWEEN 


English  ambassador  Temple,  44  the  Dutch  feel  that  their  coun¬ 
try  will  be  only  a  maritime  province  of  France ;  ”  and  shar¬ 
ing  that  opinion,  44  he  advocated  the  policy  of  resistance  to  the 
latter  country,  whose  domination  in  the  Low  Countries  he  con¬ 
sidered  as  a  threatened  subjection  of  all  Europe.  He  never 
ceased  to  represent  to  his  government  how  dangerous  to  Eng¬ 
land  would  be  the  conquest  of  the  sea  provinces  by  France, 
and  he  urgently  pointed  out  the  need  of  a  prompt  understand¬ 
ing  with  the  Dutch.  4  This  would  be  the  best  revenge,’  said 
he, 4  for  the  trick  France  has  played  us  in  involving  us  in  the 
last  war  with  the  United  Provinces.’  ”  These  considerations 
brought  the  two  countries  together  in  that  Triple  Alliance 
with  Sweden  which  has  been  mentioned,  and  which  for  a  time 
checked  the  onward  movement  of  Louis.  But  the  wars  be¬ 
tween  the  two  sea  nations  were  too  recent,  the  humiliation  of 
England  in  the  Thames  too  bitter,  and  the  rivalries  that  still 
existed  too  real,  too  deeply  seated  in  the  nature  of  things,  to 
make  that  alliance  durable.  It  needed  the  dangerous  power 
of  Louis,  and  his  persistence  in  a  course  threatening  to  both, 
to  weld  the  union  of  these  natural  antagonists.  This  was  not 
to  be  done  without  another  bloody  encounter. 

Louis  vras  deeply  angered  at  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  his 
wrath  was  turned  mainly  upon  Holland,  in  which  from  the 
necessities  of  her  position  he  recognized  his  most  steadfast 
opponent.  For  the  time,  however,  he  seemed  to  yield ;  the 
more  readily  because  of  the  probable  approaching  failure  of 
the  Spanish  royal  line,  and  the  ambition  he  had  of  getting 
more  than  merely  the  territory  lying  to  the  east  of  France, 
when  the  throne  became  vacant.  But,  though  he  dissembled 
and  yielded,  from  that  time  he  set  his  mind  upon  the  destruc¬ 
tion  of  the  republic.  This  policy  was  directly  contrary  to 
that  laid  down  by  Richelieu,  and  to  the  true  welfare  of 
France.  It  was  to  England’s  interest,  at  least  just  then,  that 
the  United  Provinces  should  not  be  trodden  down  by  France  ; 
but  it  was  much  more  to  the  interest  of  France  that  they 
should  not  be  subjected  to  England.  England,  free  from  the 
continent,  might  stand  alone  upon  the  seas  contending  with 


ENGLAND ,  HOLLAND,  AND  SWEDEN. 


141 


France  ;  but  France,  hampered  by  her  continental  politics, 
could  not  hope  to  wrest  the  control  of  the  seas  from  Eng¬ 
land  without  an  ally.  This  ally  Louis  proposed  to  destroy, 
and  he  asked  England  to  help  him.  The  final  result  is 
already  known,  but  the  outlines  of  the  contest  must  nowr 
be  followed. 

Before  the  royal  purpose  had  passed  into  action,  and  while 
there  was  still  time  to  turn  the  energies  of  France  into  an¬ 
other  channel,  a  different  course  was  proposed  to  the  king. 
This  was  the  project  of  Leibnitz,  before  spoken  of,  which  has 
special  interest  for  our  subject  because,  in  proposing  to  re¬ 
verse  the  lines  which  Louis  then  laid  down,  to  make  conti¬ 
nental  expansion  secondary  and  growth  beyond  the  sea  the 
primary  object  of  France,  the  tendency  avowedly  and  necessa¬ 
rily  was  to  base  the  greatness  of  the  country  upon  the  control 
of  the  sea  and  of  commerce.  The  immediate  object  offered  to 
the  France  of  that  day,  with  the  attainment  of  which,  how¬ 
ever,  she  could  not  have  stopped  short,  was  the  conquest  of 
Egypt ;  that  country  which,  facing  both  the  Mediterranean 
and  Eastern  seas,  gave  control  of  the  great  commercial  route 
which  in  our  own  day  has  been  completed  by  the  Suez  Canal. 
That  route  had  lost  much  of  its  value  by  the  discovery  of  the 
way  round  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  and  yet  more  by  the  un¬ 
settled  and  piratical  conditions  of  the  seas  through  which  it 
lay ;  but  with  a  really  strong  naval  power  occupying  the  key 
of  the  position  it  might  have  been  largely  restored.  Such  a 
power  posted  in  Egypt  would,  in  the  already  decaying  condi¬ 
tion  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  have  controlled  the  trade  not 
only  of  India  and  the  far  East,  but  also  of  the  Levant ;  but  the 
enterprise  could  not  have  stopped  there.  The  necessity  of 
mastering  the  Mediterranean  and  opening  the  Red  Sea,  closed 
to  Christian  vessels  by  Mohammedan  bigotry,  would  have 
compelled  the  occupation  of  stations  on  either  side  of  Egypt ; 
and  France  would  have  been  led  step  by  step,  as  England  has 
been  led  by  the  possession  of  India,  to  the  seizure  of  points 
like  Malta,  Cyprus,  Aden,  in  short,  to  a  great  sea  power.  That 
is  clear  now  ;  but  it  will  be  interesting  to  hear  the.  arguments 


142 


PROPOSITION  OF  LEIBNITZ. 


by  which  Leibnitz  sought  to  convince  the  French  king  two 
hundred  years  ago. 

After  pointing  out  the  weakness  of  the  Turkish  Empire, 
and  the  readiness  with  which  it  might  be  further  embarrassed 
by  stirring  up  Austria  and  Poland,  the  latter  the  traditional 
ally  of  France  ;  after  showing  that  France  had  no  armed  enemy 
in  the  Mediterranean,  and  that  on  the  other  side  of  Egypt  she 
would  meet  the  Portuguese  colonies,  longing  to  obtain  protec¬ 
tion  against  the  Dutch  in  India,  the  memorial  proceeds  :  — 

“  The  conquest  of  Egypt,  that  Holland  of  the  East,  is  infinitely 
easier  than  that  of  the  United  Provinces.  France  needs  peace  in  the 
west,  war  at  a  distance.  War  with  Holland  will  probably  ruin  the 
Dew  Indian  companies  as  well  as  the  colonies  and  commerce  lately 
revived  by  France,  and  will  increase  the  burdens  of  the  people  while 
diminishing  their  resources.  The  Dutch  will  retire  into  their  mari¬ 
time  towns,  stand  there  on  the  defensive  in  perfect  safety,  and  assume 
the  offensive  on  the  sea  with  great  chance  of  success.  If  France 
does  not  obtain  a  complete  victory  over  them,  she  loses  all  her  influ¬ 
ence  in  Europe,  and  by  victory  she  endangers  that  influence.  In 
Egypt,  on  the  contrary,  a  repulse,  almost  impossible,  will  be  of  no  great 
consequence,  and  victory  will  give  the  dominion  of  the  seas,  the 
commerce  of  the  East  and  of  India,  the  preponderance  in  Christendom, 
and  even  the  empire  of  the  East  on  the  ruins  of  the  Ottoman  power. 
The  possession  of  Egypt  opens  the  way  to  conquests  worthy  of 
Alexander ;  the  extreme  weakness  of  the  Orientals  is  no  longer  a 
secret.  Whoever  has  Egypt  will  have  all  the  coasts  and  islands  of 
the  Indian  Ocean.  It  is  in  Egypt  that  Holland  will  be  conquered  ; 
it  is  there  she  will  be  despoiled  of  what  alone  renders  her  prosperous, 
the  treasures  of  the  East.  She  will  be  struck  without  being  able  to 
ward  off  the  blow.  Should  she  wish  to  oppose  the  designs  of  France 
upon  Egypt,  she  would  be  overwhelmed  with  the  universal  hatred  of 
Christians ;  attacked  at  home,  on  the  contrary,  not  only  could  she  ward 
off  the  aggression,  but  she  could  avenge  herself  sustained  by  universal 
public  opinion,  which  suspects  the  views  of  France  of  ambition.”  1 

The  memorial  had  no  effect.  “  All  that  the  efforts  of  am¬ 
bition  and  human  prudence  could  do  to  lay  the  foundations 
for  the  destruction  of  a  nation,  Louis  XIV.  now  did.  Diplo- 

1  Martin :  History  of  France. 


BARGAINS  BETWEEN  LOUIS  AND  CHARLES.  143 


matic  strategy  on  a  vast  scale  was  displayed  in  order  to  isolate 
and  hem  in  Holland.  Louis,  who  had  been  unable  to  make 
Europe  accept  the  conquest  of  Belgium  by  France,  now  hoped 
to  induce  it  to  see  without  trembling  the  fall  of  Holland.” 
His  efforts  were  in  the  main  successful.  The  Triple  Alliance 
was  broken  ;  the  King  of  England,  though  contrary  to  the 
wishes  of  his  people,  made  an  offensive  alliance  with  Louis  ; 
and  Holland,  when  the  war  began,  found  herself  without  an 
ally  in  Europe,  except  the  worn-out  kingdom  of  Spain  and  the 
Elector  of  Brandenburg,  then  by  no  means  a  first-class  State. 
But  in  order  to  obtain  the  help  of  Charles  II.,  Louis  not  only 
engaged  to  pay  him  large  sums  of  money,  but  also  to  give  to 
England,  from  the  spoils  of  Holland  and  Belgium,  Walclieren, 
Sluys,  and  Cadsand,  and  even  the  islands  of  Goree  and  Yoorn  ; 
the  control,  that  is,  of  the  mouths  of  the  great  commercial 
rivers  the  Scheldt  and  the  Meuse.  With  regard  to  the  united 
fleets  of  the  two  nations,  it  was  agreed  that  the  officer  bear¬ 
ing  the  admiral’s  flag  of  England  should  command  in  chief. 
The  question  of  naval  precedence  was  reserved,  by  not 
sending  the  admiral  of  France  afloat ;  but  it  was  practically 
yielded.  It  is  evident  that  in  his  eagerness  for  the  ruin  of 
Holland  and  his  own  continental  aggrandizement  Louis  was 
playing  directly  into  England’s  hand,  as  to  power  on  the  sea. 
A  French  historian  is  justified  in  saying :  “  These  negotia¬ 
tions  have  been  wrongly  judged.  It  has  been  often  repeated 
that  Charles  sold  England  to  Louis  XIY.  This  is  true  only 
of  internal  policy.  Charles  indeed  plotted  the  political  and  re¬ 
ligious  subjugation  of  England  with  the  help  of  a  foreign 
power  ;  but  as  to  external  interests,  he  did  not  sell  them,  for 
the  greater  share  in  the  profit  from  the  ruin  of  the  Hutch  was 
to  go  to  England.”  1 

During  the  years  preceding  the  war  the  Dutch  made  every 
diplomatic  effort  to  avert  it,  but  the  hatred  of  Charles  and 
Louis  prevented  any  concession  being  accepted  as  final.  An 
English  royal  yacht  was  ordered  to  pass  through  the  Dutch 
ships-of-war  in  the  Channel,  and  to  fire  on  them  if  they  did 

1  Martin  :  History  of  France. 


144 


WAR  OF  ENGLAND  AND  FRANCE  IN 


not  strike  their  flags.  In  January,  1672,  England  sent  an 
ultimatum,  summoning  Holland  to  acknowledge  the  right  of 
the  English  crown  to  the  sovereignty  of  the  British  seas,  and 
to  order  its  fleets  to  lower  their  flags  to  the  smallest  English 
man-of-war ;  and  demands  such  as  these  received  the  support 
of  a  French  king.  The  Dutch  continued  to  yield,  but  seeing  at 
length  that  all  concessions  were  useless,  they  in  February 
ordered  into  commission  seventy-five  ships-of-the-line,  besides 
'smaller  vessels.  On  the  23d  of  March  the  English,  without 
declaration  of  war,  attacked  a  fleet  of  Dutch  merchantmen  ; 
and  on  the  29th  the  king  declared  war.  This  was  followed, 
April  6th,  by  the  declaration  of  Louis  XIV. ;  and  on  the  28th 
of  the  same  month  he  set  out  to  take  command  in  person  of 
his  army. 

The  war  which  row  began,  including  the  third  and  last  of 
the  great  contests  between  the  English  and  Dutch  upon  the 
ocean,  was  not,  like  those  before  it,  purely  a  sea  war ;  and  it 
will  be  necessary  to  mention  its  leading  outlines  on  the  land 
also,  not  only  in  order  to  clearness  of  impression,  but  also 
to  bring  out  the  desperate  straits  to  which  the  republic  was 
reduced,  and  the  final  deliverance  through  its  sea  power  in 
the  hands  of  the  great  seaman  De  Ruyter. 

The  naval  war  differs  from  those  that  preceded  it  in  more 
than  one  respect ;  but  its  most  distinctive  feature  is  that  the 
Dutch,  except  on  one  occasion  at  the  very  beginning,  did  not 
send  out  their  fleet  to  meet  the  enemy,  but  made  what  may 
properly  be  called  a  strategic  use  of  their  dangerous  coast  and 
shoals,  upon  which  were  based  their  sea  operations.  To  this 
course  they  were  forced  by  the  desperate  odds  under  which 
they  were  fighting ;  but  they  did  not  use  their  shoals  as  a 
mere  shelter,  —  the  warfare  they  waged  was  the  defensive- 
offensive.  When  the  wind  was  fair  for  the  allies  to  attack, 
Ruyter  kept  under  cover  of  his  islands,  or  at  least  on  ground 
where  the  enemy  dared  not  follow ;  but  when  the  wind  served 
so  that  he  might  attack  in  his  own  way,  he  turned  and  fell 
upon  them.  There  are  also  apparent  indications  of  tactical 
combinations,  on  his  part,  of  a  higher  order  than  have  yet 


ALLIANCE  AGAINST  THE  UNITED  PROVINCES.  145 


been  met ;  though  it  is  possible  that  the  particular  acts  re¬ 
ferred  to,  consisting  in  partial  attacks  amounting  to  little 
more  than  demonstrations  against  the  French  contingent,  may 
have  sprung  from  political  motives.  This  solution  for  the 
undoubted  fact  that  the  Dutch  attacked  the  French  lightly 
has  not  been  met  with  elsewhere  by  the  writer ;  but  it  seems 
possible  that  the  rulers  of  the  United  Provinces  may  have 
wished  not  to  increase  the  exasperation  of  their  most  dan¬ 
gerous  enemy  by  humiliating  his  fleet,  and  so  making  it  less 
easy  to  his  pride  to  accept  their  offers.  There  is,  however, 
an  equally  satisfactory  military  explanation  in  the  supposition 
that,  the  French  being  yet  inexperienced,  Ruyter  thought 
it  only  necessary  to  contain  them  while  falling  in  force  upon 
the  English.  The  latter  fought  throughout  with  their  old 
gallantry,  but  less  than  their  old  discipline  ;  whereas  the 
attacks  of  the  Dutch  were  made  with  a  sustained  and  unani¬ 
mous  vigor  that  showed  a  great  military  advance.  The  action 
of  the  French  was  at  times  suspicious  ;  it  has  been  alleged 
that  Louis  ordered  his  admiral  to  economize  his  fleet,  and 
there  is  good  reason  to  believe  that  toward  the  end  of  the 
two  years  that  England  remained  in  his  alliance  he  did 
do  so. 

The  authorities  of  the  United  Provinces,  knowing  that  the 
French  fleet  at  Brest  was  to  join  the  English  in  the  Thames, 
made  great  exertions  to  fit  out  their  squadron  so  as  to  attack 
the  latter  before  the  junction  was  made ;  but  the  wretched 
lack  of  centralization  in  their  naval  administration  caused 
this  project  to  fail.  The  province  of  Zealand  was  so  back¬ 
ward  that  its  contingent,  a  large  fraction  of  the  whole,  was 
not  ready  in  time  ;  and  it  has  been  charged  that  the  delay 
was  due,  not  merely  to  mismanagement,  but  to  disaffection 
to  the  party  in  control  of  the  government.  A  blow  at  the 
English  fleet  in  its  own  waters,  by  a  superior  force,  before  its 
ally  arrived,  was  a  correct  military  conception ;  judging  from 
the  after-history  of  this  war,  it  might  well  have  produced  a 
profound  effect  upon  the  whole  course  of  the  struggle.  Ruyter 
finally  got  to  sea  and  fell  in  with  the  allied  fleets,  but  though 

10 


146 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SOLEBAY. 


fully  intending  to  fight,  fell  back  before  them  to  his  own  coast. 
The  allies  did  not  follow  him  there,  but  retired,  apparently  in 
full  security,  to  Southwold  Bay,  on  the  east  coast  of  England, 
some  ninety  miles  north  of  the  mouth  of  the  Thames.  There 
they  anchored  in  three  divisions,  —  two  English,  the  rear  and 
centre  of  the  allied  line,  to  the  northward,  and  the  van,  com¬ 
posed  of  French  ships,  to  the  southward.  Ruyter  followed 
them,  and  on  the  early  morning  of  June  7, 1672,  the  Dutch 
fleet  was  signalled  by  a  French  lookout  frigate  in  the  north¬ 
ward  and  eastward ;  standing  down  before  a  northeast  wind 
for  the  allied  fleet,  from  which  a  large  number  of  boats  and 
men  were  ashore  in  watering  parties.  The  Dutch  order  of 
battle  was  in  two  lines,  the  advanced  one  containing  eighteen 
ships  with  fire-ships  (Plate  III.,  A).  Their  total  force  was 
ninety-one  ships-of-the-line  ;  that  of  the  allies  one  hundred 
and  one. 

The  wind  was  blowing  toward  the  coast,  which  here  trends 
nearly  north  and  south,  and  the  allies  were  in  an  awkward  posi¬ 
tion.  They  had  first  to  get  under  way,  and  they  could  not 
fall  back  to  gain  time  or  room  to  establish  their  order.  Most 
of  the  ships  cut  their  cables,  and  the  English  made  sail  on 
the  starboard  tack,  heading  about  north-northwest,  a  course 
which  forced  them  soon  to  go  about  ;  whereas  the  French 
took  the  other  tack  (Plate  III.,  B).  The  battle  began  therefore 
by  the  separation  of  the  allied  fleet.  Ruyter  sent  one  division 
to  attack  the  French,  or  rather  to  contain  them;  for  these 
opponents  exchanged  only  a  distant  cannonade,  although  the 
Dutch,  being  to  windward,  had  the  choice  of  closer  action  if 
they  wished  it.  As  their  commander,  Bankert,  was  not  cen¬ 
sured,  it  may  be  supposed  he  acted  under  orders  ;  and  he  was 
certainly  in  command  a  year  later,  and  acting  with  great  judg¬ 
ment  and  gallantry  at  the  battle  of  the  Texel.  Meanwhile 
Ruyter  fell  furiously  upon  the  two  English  divisions,  and  ap¬ 
parently  with  superior  forces  ;  for  the  English  naval  historians 
claim  that  the  Dutch  were  in  the  proportion  of  three  to  two.1 

1  Ledyard,  vol.  ii.  p.  599  ;  Campbell :  Lives  of  the  Admirals.  See  also  letter 
of  Sir  Richard  Haddock,  Naval  Chronicle,  vol.  xvii.  p.  121. 


June  7,  1672.  1  Feb.  14, 1797 

Pi.  IE. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SOLE  BAY. 


ur 


If  this  can  be  accepted,  it  gives  a  marked  evidence  of  Ruy- 
ter’s  high  qualities  as  a  general  officer,  in  advance  of  any 
other  who  appears  in  this  century. 

The  results  of  the  battle,  considered  simply  as  an  engage¬ 
ment,  were  indecisive  ;  both  sides  lost  heavily,  but  the  honors 
and  the  substantial  advantages  all  belonged  to  the  Dutch, 
or  rather  to  De  Ruyter.  He  had  outgeneralled  the  allies  by 
his  apparent  retreat,  and  then  returning  had  surprised  them 
wholly  unprepared.  The  false  move  by  which  the  English, 
two  thirds  of  the  whole,  stood  to  the  northward  and  westward, 
while  the  other  third,  the  French,  went  off  to  the  east  and 
south,  separated  the  allied  fleet ;  Ruyter  threw  his  whole 
force  into  the  gap,  showing  front  to  the  French  with  a  divi¬ 
sion  probably  smaller  in  numbers,  but  which,  from  its  position 
to  windward,  had  the  choice  of  coming  to  close  action  or  not, 
while  with  the  remainder  ho  fell  in  much  superior  strength 
upon  the  English  (Plate  III.,  B).  Paul  Hoste  says 1  that  Vice- 
Admiral  d’Estr^es,  commanding  the  French,  had  taken  meas¬ 
ures  for  tacking  and  breaking  through  the  Dutch  division 
opposed  to  him  so  as  to  rejoin  the  Duke  of  York,  the  allied 
commander-in-chief.  It  may  be  so,  for  D’Estr^es  was  a  very 
brave  man,  and  not  enough  of  a  seaman  to  appreciate  the 
dangers  of  the  attempt ;  but  no  such  move  was  begun,  and 
both  the  English  and  Ruyter  thought  that  the  French  rather 
avoided  than  sought  close  action.  Had  D’Estrees,  however, 
gone  about,  and  attempted  to  break  through  the  line  of  expe¬ 
rienced  Dutchmen  to  windward  of  him  with  the  still  raw  sea¬ 
men  of  France,  the  result  would  have  been  as  disastrous  as 
that  which  overtook  the  Spanish  admiral  at  the  battle  of  St. 
Vincent  a  hundred  and  twenty-five  years  later,  when  he  tried 
to  reunite  his  broken  fleet  by  breaking  through  the  close  order 
of  Jervis  and  Nelson.  (See  Plate  III.,  a.)  The  truth,  which 
gradually  dawns  through  a  mass  of  conflicting  statements,  is, 
that  the  Duke  of  York,  though  a  fair  seaman  and  a  brave 
man,  was  not  an  able  one  ;  that  his  fleet  was  not  in  good 
order  and  was  thus  surprised ;  that  his  orders  beforehand 


1  Hoste  :  Naval  Tactics. 


148 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SOLEBAY. 


were  not  so  precise  as  to  make  the  French  admiral  techni¬ 
cally  disobedient  in  taking  the  opposite  tack  from  the  com¬ 
mander-in-chief,  and  so  separating  the  squadrons ;  and  that 
Ruyter  profited  most  ably  by  the  surprise  which  he  had  him¬ 
self  prepared,  and  by  the  further  opportunity  given  him  by 
the  ineptness  of  his  enemies.  Unless  for  circumstances  that 
are  not  stated,  the  French  admiral  took  the  right  tack,  with 
a  northeast  wind,  for  it  led  out  to  sea  and  would  give  room 
for  manoeuvring;  had  the  Duke  of  York  chosen  the  same,  the 
allied  fleet  would  have  gone  out  together,  with  only  the  dis¬ 
advantage  of  the  wind  and  bad  order.  In  that  case,  however, 
Ruyter  could,  and  probably  would,  have  done  just  what  he  did 
at  the  Texel  a  year  later, —  check  the  van,  the  French,  with 
a  small  containing  force,  and  fall  with  the  mass  of  his  fleet 
upon  the  centre  and  rear.  It  is  the  similarity  of  his  action  in 
both  cases,  under  very  different  conditions,  that  proves  he 
intended  at  Southwold  Bay  merely  to  keep  the  French  in 
check  while  he  destroyed  the  English. 

In  this  battle,  called  indifferently  Southwold  Bay  and  Sole- 
bay,  Ruyter  showed  a  degree  of  skill  combined  with  vigor 
which  did  not  appear  upon  the  sea,  after  his  death,  until  the 
days  of  Suffren  and  Nelson.  His  battles  of  the  war  of  1672 
were  no  “affairs  of  circumspection,”  though  they  were  fought 
circumspectly  ;  his  aim  was  no  less  than  the  enemy’s  total 
overthrow,  by  joining  good  combinations  to  fury  of  attack. 
At  Solebay  he  was  somewhat,  though  not  greatly,  inferior  to 
his  enemies ;  afterward  much  more  so. 

The  substantial  results  of  Solebay  fight  were  wholly  favora¬ 
ble  to  the  Dutch.  The  allied  fleets  were  to  have  assisted  the 
operations  of  the  French  army  by  making  a  descent  upon  the 
coast  of  Zealand.  Ruyter’s  attack  had  inflicted  an  amount  of 
damage,  and  caused  an  expenditure  of  ammunition,  which 
postponed  the  sailing  of  the  fleet  for  a  month  ;  it  was  a  diver¬ 
sion,  not  only  important,  but  vital  in  the  nearly  desperate 
condition  to  which  the  United  Provinces  were  reduced  ashore. 
It  may  be  added,  as  an  instructive  comment  on  the  theory  of 
commerce-destroying,  that  after  this  staggering  check  to  the 


THE  FRENCH  CAMPAIGN  IN  HOLLAND. 


149 


enemy’s  superior  forces,  Ruyter  met  and  convoyed  safely  to 
port  a  fleet  of  Dutch  merchantmen. 

The  progress  of  the  land  campaign  must  now  be  briefly 
described.1  Early  in  May  the  French  army  in  several  corps 
moved  forward,  passing  through  the  outskirts  of  the  Spanish 
Netherlands,  and  directing  their  attack  upon  Holland  from 
the  south  and  east.  The  republican  party  which  was  in 
power  in  Holland  had  neglected  the  army,  and  now  made 
the  mistake  of  scattering  the  force  they  had  among  many  for¬ 
tified  towns,  trusting  that  each  would  do  something  toward 
delaying  the  French.  Louis,  however,  under  the  advice  of 
Turenne,  simply  observed  the  more  important  places,  while 
the  second-rate  towns  surrendered  nearly  as  fast  as  they 
were  summoned  ;  the  army  of  the  Provinces,  as  well  as  their 
territory,  thus  passing  rapidly,  by  fractions,  into  the  power  of 
the  enemy.  Within  a  month  the  French  were  in  the  heart 
of  the  country,  having  carried  all  before  them,  and  with  no 
organized  force  remaining  in  their  front  sufficient  of  itself 
to  stop  them.  In  the  fortnight  following  the  battle  of 
Solebay,  terror  and  disorganization  spread  throughout  the 
republic.  On  the  15th  of  June  the  Grand  Pensionary  ob¬ 
tained  permission  of  the  States-General  to  send  a  deputation 
‘to  Louis  XIV.,  begging  him  to  name  the  terms  on  which  he 
would  grant  them  peace ;  any  humiliation  to  the  foreigner 
was  better  in  the  eyes  of  the  politician  than  to  see  the  oppo¬ 
site  party,  the  House  of  Orange,  come  into  power  on  his 
downfall.  While  negotiations  were  pending,  the  Dutch  towns 
continued  to  surrender ;  and  on  the  20th  of  June  a  few  French 
soldiers  entered  Muyden,  the  key  to  Amsterdam.  They  were 
only  stragglers,  though  the  large  body  to  which  they  belonged 
was  near  at  hand ;  and  the  burghers,  who  had  admitted  them 
under  the  influence  of  the  panic  prevailing  throughout  the 
land,  seeing  that  they  were  alone,  soon  made  them  drunk  and 
put  them  out.  The  nobler  feeling  that  animated  Amsterdam 
now  made  itself  felt  in  Muyden ;  a  body  of  troops  hurried  up 
from  the  capital,  and  the  smaller  city  was  saved.  “  Situated 

1  See  Map,  p.  107. 


150 


THE  FRENCH  CAMPAIGN  IN  HOLLAND. 


on  the  Zuyder  Zee,  two  hours  distant  from  Amsterdam,  at  the 
junction  of  a  number  of  rivers  and  canals,  Muyden  not  only 
held  the  key  of  the  principal  dykes  by  which  Amsterdam 
could  surround  herself  with  a  protecting  inundation,  it  also 
held  the  key  of  the  harbor  of  this  great  city,  all  the  ships 
which  went  from  the  North  Sea  to  Amsterdam  by  the  Zuyder 
Zee  being  obliged  to  pass  under  its  guns.  Muyden  saved  and 
its  dykes  open,  Amsterdam  had  time  to  breathe,  and  remained 
free  to  break  off  her  communications  by  land  and  to  maintain 
them  by  sea.”  1  It  was  the  turning-point  of  the  invasion  ;  but 
what  would  have  been  the  effect  upon  the  spirit  of  the  Dutch, 
oppressed  by  defeat  and  distracted  in  council,  if  in  that  fateful 
fortnight  which  went  before,  the  allied  fleet  had  attacked  their 
coasts  ?  From  this  they  were  saved  by  the  battle  of  Solebay. 

Negotiations  continued.  The  burgomasters  —  the  party  rep¬ 
resenting  wealth  and  commerce  —  favored  submission  ;  they 
shrank  from  the  destruction  of  their  property  and  trade. 
New  advances  were  made ;  but  while  the  envoys  were  still  in 
the  camp  of  Louis,  the  populace  and  the  Orange  party  rose, 
and  with  them  the  spirit  of  resistance.  On  the  25th  of  June 
Amsterdam  opened  the  dykes,  and  her  example  was  followed 
by  the  other  cities  of  Holland  ;  immense  loss  was  entailed, 
but  the  flooded  country  and  the  cities  contained  therein, 
standing  like  islands  amid  the  waters,  were  safe  from  attack 
by  land  forces  until  freezing  weather.  The  revolution  con¬ 
tinued.  William  of  Orange,  afterward  William  III.  of  Eng¬ 
land,  was  on  the  8th  of  July  made  stadtholder,  and  head  of 
the  army  and  navy  ;  and  the  two  De  Witts,  the  heads  of  the 
republican  party,  were  murdered  by  a  mob  a  few  weeks  later. 

The  resistance  born  of  popular  enthusiasm  and  pride  of 
country  was  strengthened  by  the  excessive  demands  of  Louis 
XI Y.  It  was  plain  that  the  Provinces  must  conquer  or  be 
destroyed.  Meanwhile  the  other  States  of  Europe  were  wak¬ 
ing  up  to  the  danger,  and  the  Emperor  of  Germany,  the 
Elector  of  Brandenburg,  and  the  King  of  Spain  declared  for 
Holland ;  while  Sweden,  though  nominally  in  alliance  with 

1  Martin  :  History  of  France. 


NAVAL  BATTLES  OFF  SCHONEVELDT. 


151 


France,  was  unwilling  to  see  the  destruction  of  the  Provinces, 
because  that  would  be  to  the  advantage  of  England’s  sea 
power.  Nevertheless  the  next  year,  1673,  opened  with  prom¬ 
ise  for  France,  and  the  English  king  was  prepared  to  fulfil 
his  part  of  the  compact  on  the  seas  ;  but  the  Dutch,  under 
the  firm  leadership  of  William  of  Orange,  and  with  their 
hold  on  the  sea  unshaken,  now  refused  to  accept  conditions  of 
peace  which  had  been  offered  by  themselves  the  year  before. 

Three  naval  battles  were  fought  in  1673,  all  near  the  coast 
of  the  United  Provinces  ;  the  first  two,  June  7  and  June  14, 
off  Schoneveldt,  from  which  place  they  have  taken  their  name  ; 
the  third,  known  as  the  battle  of  the  Texel,  August  21.  In 
all  three  Ruyter  attacked,  choosing  his  own  time,  and  retir¬ 
ing  when  it  suited  him  to  the  protection  of  his  own  shores. 
For  the  allies  to  carry  out  their  objects  and  make  any  diver¬ 
sion  upon  the  seaboard,  or  on  the  other  hand  to  cripple  the 
sea  resources  of  the  hard-pressed  Provinces,  it  was  necessary 
first  to  deal  successfully  with  Ruyter’s  fleet.  The  great  ad¬ 
miral  and  his  government  both  felt  this,  and  took  the  reso¬ 
lution  that  “the  fleet  should  be  posted  in  the  passage  of 
Schoneveldt,  or  a  little  farther  south  toward  Ostend,  to  ob¬ 
serve  the  enemy,  and  if  attacked,  or  seeing  the  enemy’s  fleet 
disposed  to  make  a  descent  upon  the  shores  of  the  United 
Provinces,  should  resist  vigorously,  by  opposing  his  designs 
and  destroying  his  ships.”1  From  this  position,  with  good 
lookouts,  any  movement  of  the  allies  would  be  known. 

The  English  and  French  put  to  sea  about  the  1st  of  June, 
under  the  command  of  Prince  Rupert,  first  cousin  to  the 
king,  the  Duke  of  York  having  been  obliged  to  resign  his 
office  on  account  of  the  passage  of  the  Test  Act,  directed 
against  persons  of  the  Roman  Catholic  faith  holding  any 
public  employment.  The  French  were  under  Vice' Admiral 
d’Estr^es,  the  same  who  had  commanded  them  at  Solebay.  A 
force  of  six  thousand  English  troops  at  Yarmouth  was  ready 
to  embark  if  De  Ruyter  was  worsted.  On  the  7th  of  June  the 
Dutch  were  made  out,  riding  within  the  sands  at  Schoneveldt 

1  Brandt :  Life  of  De  Ruyter. 


152 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  TEXEL. 


A  detached  squadron  was  sent  to  draw  them  out,  but  Ruyter 
needed  no  invitation ;  the  wind  served,  and  he  followed  the 
detached  squadron  with  such  impetuosity  as  to  attack  before 
the  allied  line  was  fairly  formed.  On  this  occasion  the  French 
occupied  the  centre.  The  affair  was  indecisive,  if  a  battle  can 
be  called  so  in  which  an  inferior  force  attacks  a  superior,  in¬ 
flicts  an  equal  loss,  and  frustrates  the  main  object  of  the 
enemy.  A  week  later  Ruyter  again  attacked,  with  results 
which,  though  indecisive  as  before  as  to  the  particular  action, 
forced  the  allied  fleet  to  return  to  the  English  coast  to  refit, 
and  for  supplies.  The  Dutch  in  these  encounters  had  fifty- 
five  ships-of-the-line  ;  their  enemies  eighty-one,  fifty-four  of 
which  were  English. 

The  allied  fleets  did  not  go  to  sea  again  until  the  latter  part 
of  July,  and  this  time  they  carried  with  them  a  body  of  troops 
meant  for  a  landing.  On  the  20th  of  August  the  Dutch  fleet 
was  seen  under  way  between  the  Texel  and  the  Meuse.  Ru¬ 
pert  at  once  got  ready  to  fight ;  but  as  the  wind  was  from  the 
northward  and  westward,  giving  the  allies  the  weather-gage, 
and  with  it  the  choice  of  the  method  of  attack,  Ruyter 
availed  himself  of  his  local  knowledge,  keeping  so  close  to 
the  beach  that  the  enemy  dared  not  approach,  —  the  more 
so  as  it  was  late  in  the  day.  During  the  night  the  wind 
shifted  to  east-southeast  off  the  land,  and  at  daybreak,  to  use 
the  words  of  a  French  official  narrative,  the  Dutch  “  made 
all  sail  and  stood  down  boldly  into  action.’’ 

The  allied  fleet  was  to  leeward  on  the  port  tack,  heading 
about  south,  —  the  French  in  the  van,  Rupert  in  the  centre, 
and  Sir  Edward  Spragge  commanding  the  rear.  De  Ruyter 
divided  his  fleet  into  three  squadrons,  the  leading  one  of 
which,  of  ten  or  twelve  ships  only,  he  sent  against  the 
French ;  while  with  the  rest  of  his  force  he  attacked  the 
English  in  the  centre  and  rear  (Plate  IV.,  A,  Af,  A").  If  we 
accept  the  English  estimate  of  the  forces,  which  gives  the  Eng¬ 
lish  sixty  ships,  the  French  thirty,  and  the  Dutch  seventy, 
Ruyter’s  plan  of  attack,  by  simply  holding  the  French  in 
check  as  at  Solebav,  allowed  him  to  engage  the  English  on 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  TEXEL. 


153 


equal  terms.  The  battle  took  on  several  distinct  phases, 
which  it  is  instructive  to  follow.  M.  de  Martel,  commanding 
the  van  of  the  French,  and  consequently  the  leading  sub¬ 
division  of  the  allied  fleet,  was  ordered  to  stretch  ahead,  go 
about  and  gain  to  windward  of  the  Dutch  van,  so  as  to  place 
it  between  two  fires.  This  he  did  (B)  ;  but  as  soon  as 
Bankert  —  the  same  who  had  manoeuvred  so  judiciously  at 
Solebay  the  year  before  —  saw  the  danger,  he  put  his  helm  up 
and  ran  through  the  remaining  twenty  ships  of  D’Estrees’ 
squadron  with  his  own  twelve  (C),  —  a  feat  as  creditable  to 
him  as  it  was  discreditable  to  the  French  ;  and  then  wearing 
round  stood  down  to  De  Ruyter,  who  was  hotly  engaged  with 
Rupert  ((7)-  He  was  not  followed  by  D’Estr^es,  who  suf¬ 
fered  him  to  carry  this  important  reinforcement  to  the  Dutch 
main  attack  undisturbed.  This  practically  ended  the  French 
share  in  the  fight. 

Rupert,  during  his  action  with  De  Ruyter,  kept  off  con¬ 
tinually,  with  the  object  of  drawing  the  Dutch  farther  away 
from  their  coast,  so  that  if  the  wind  shifted  they  might  not 
be  able  to  regain  its  shelter.  De  Ruyter  followed  him,  and 
the  consequent  separation  of  the  centre  from  the  van  (B,  B') 
was  one  of  the  reasons  alleged  by  D’Estr^es  for  his  delay. 
It  does  not,  however,  seem  to  have  prevented  Bankert  from 
joining  his  chief. 

In  the  rear  an  extraordinary  action  on  the  part  of  Sir 
Edward  Spragge  increased  the  confusion  in  the  allied  fleet. 
For  some  reason  this  officer  considered  Tromp,  who  com¬ 
manded  the  Dutch  rear,  as  his  personal  antagonist,  and  in 
order  to  facilitate  the  latter’s  getting  into  action,  he  hove- 
to  (stopped)  the  whole  English  rear  to  wait  for  him.  This 
ill-timed  point  of  honor  on  Spragge’s  part  seems  to  have 
sprung  from  a  promise  he  had  made  to  the  king  that  he 
would  bring  back  Tromp  alive  or  dead,  or  else  lose  his  own 
life.  The  stoppage,  which  recalls  the  irresponsible  and  insub¬ 
ordinate  action  of  the  junior  Dutch  flag-officers  in  the  former 
war,  of  course  separated  the  rear  (A",  B",  C"),  which  also 
drifted  rapidly  to  leeward,  Spragge  and  Tromp  carrying  on  a 


154 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  TEXEL. 


hot  private  action  on  their  own  account.  These  two  junior 
admirals  sought  each  other  personally,  and  the  battle  be¬ 
tween  their  flags  was  so  severe  that  Spragge  twice  had  to 
shift  his  own  to  another  ship;  on  the  second  occasion  the 
boat  in  which  he  was  embarked  was  sunk  by  a  shot,  and  he 
himself  drowned. 

Rupert,  thus  forsaken  by  his  van  and  rear,  found  himself 
alone  with  Ruyter  (B')  ;  who,  reinforced  by  his  van,  had  the 
address  further  to  cut  off  the  rear  subdivision  of  the  allied 
centre,  and  to  surround  the  remaining  twenty  ships  with 
probably  thirty  or  forty  of  his  own  (C').  It  is  not  creditable 
to  the  gunnery  of  the  day  that  more  substantial  results  did 
not  follow ;  but  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  all  Ruyter’s 
skill  could  secure,  except  for  probably  a  very  short  time,  was 
an  action  on  equal  terms  with  the  English ;  his  total  inferi¬ 
ority  in  numbers  could  not  be  quite  overcome.  The  damage 
to  the  English  and  Dutch  may  therefore  have  been  great,  and 
was  probably  nearly  equal. 

Rupert  finally  disengaged  himself,  and  seeing  that  the 
English  rear  (C")  was  not  replying  well  to  its  immediate 
opponents,  ran  down  toward  it,  Ruyter  following  him  ;  the 
two  opposing  centres  steering  parallel  courses,  and  within 
cannon-shot,  but  by  mutual  consent,  induced  perhaps  by 
ammunition  running  short,  refraining  from  firing.  At  four 
p.  m.  the  centres  and  rears  united,  and  toward  five  a  fresh 
engagement  began,  which  continued  till  seven,  when  Ruyter 
withdrew,  probably  because  of  the  approach  of  the  French, 
who,  by  their  own  accounts,  rejoined  Rupert  about  that 
time.  This  ended  the  battle,  which,  like  all  that  preceded 
it  in  this  war,  may  be  called  a  drawn  fight,  but  as  to  which 
the  verdict  of  the  English  naval  historian  is  doubtless  cor¬ 
rect  :  “  The  consequences  which  the  Dutch,  through  the 
prudence  of  their  admiral,  drew  from  this  battle  were  ex¬ 
ceedingly  great ;  for  they  opened  their  ports,  which  were 
entirely  blocked  up,  and  put  an  end  to  all  thoughts,  by  re¬ 
moving  the  possibility,  of  an  invasion.”  1 

1  Campbell :  Lives  of  the  Admirals. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  TEXEL. 


155 


The  military  features  of  the  action  have  sufficiently  ap¬ 
peared  in  the  account  that  has  been  given,  — -  the  skill  of  De 
Ruyter;  the  firmness  and  promptness  of  Bankert,  first  in 
checking  and  then  in  passing  through  the  French  division ; 
the  apparent  disloyalty  or,  at  the  best,  inefficiency  of  the  lat¬ 
ter  ;  the  insubordination  and  military  blundering  of  Spragge  ; 
the  seeming  lack  of  everything  but  hard  fighting  on  Rupert’s 
part.  The  allies  indulged  in  bitter  mutual  recriminations. 
Rupert  blamed  both  D’Estr^es  and  Spragge ;  D’Estrees  found 
fault  with  Rupert  for  running  to  leeward  ;  and  D’Estrees’  own 
second,  Martel,  roundly  called  his  chief  a  coward,  in  a  letter 
which  earned  him  an  imprisonment  in  the  Bastille.  The 
French  king  ordered  an  inquiry  by  the  intendant  of  the  navy 
at  Brest,  who  made  a  report 1  upon  which  the  account  here 
given  has  mainly  rested,  and  which  leaves  little  doubt  of  the 
dishonor  of  the  French  arms  in  this  battle.  “  M.  d’Estrees 
gave  it  to  be  understood,”  says  the  French  naval  historian, 
“  that  the  king  wished  his  fleet  spared,  and  that  the  English 
should  not  be  trusted.  Was  he  wrong  in  not  relying  upon 
the  sincerity  of  the  English  alliance,  when  he  was  receiving 
from  all  quarters  warnings  that  the  people  and  the  nobles 
were  murmuring  against  it,  and  Charles  II.  was  perhaps 
alone  in  his  kingdom  in  wishing  it  ?  ”  2  Possibly  not ;  but  he 
was  surely  wrong  if  he  wished  any  military  man,  or  body  of 
men,  to  play  the  equivocal  part  assigned  to  the  French  admiral 
on  this  day  ;  the  loss  of  the  fleet  would  have  been  a  lighter 
disaster.  So  evident  to  eye-witnesses  was  the  bad  faith  or 
cowardice  (and  the  latter  supposition  is  not  admissible),  that 
one  of  the  Dutch  seamen,  as  they  discussed  among  themselves 
why  the  French  did  not  come  down,  said  :  “  You  fools  !  they 
have  hired  the  English  to  fight  for  them,  and  all  their  business 
here  is  to  see  that  they  earn  their  wages.”  A  more  sober- 
minded  and  significant  utterance  is  that  with  which  the  in¬ 
tendant  at  Brest  ends  the  official  report  before  mentioned : 
“  It  would  appear  in  all  these  sea-fights  Ruyter  has  never 
cared  to  attack  the  French  squadron,  and  that  in  this  last 


1  Troude :  Batailles  Navales  de  la  France,  year  1673. 


2  Ibid. 


156 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  TEXEL. 


action  he  had  detached  ten  ships  of  the  Zealand  squadron  to 
keep  it  in  play.”  1  No  stronger  testimony  is  needed  to  Ruyter’s 
opinion  of  the  inefficiency  or  faithlessness  of  that  contingent 
to  the  allied  forces. 

Another  chapter  in  the  history  of  maritime  coalitions  was 
closed,  on  the  21st  of  August,  1673,  by  the  battle  of  the 
Texel.  In  it,  as  in  others,  were  amply  justified  the  words 
with  which  a  modern  French  naval  officer  has  stamped 
them  :  “  United  by  momentary  political  interests,  but  at  bot¬ 
tom  divided  to  the  verge  of  hatred,  never  following  the  same 
path  in  counsel  or  in  action,  they  have  never  produced  good 
results,  or  at  least  results  proportioned  to  the  efforts  of  the 
powers  allied  against  a  common  enemy.  The  navies  of 
France,  Spain,  and  Holland  seem,  at  several  distinct  times, 
to  have  joined  only  to  make  more  complete  the  triumph  of 
the  British  arms.” 2  When  to  this  well-ascertained  tendency 
of  coalitions  is  added  the  equally  well  known  jealousy  of 
every  country  over  the  increasing  power  of  a  neighbor,  and 
the  consequent  unwillingness  to  see  such  increase  obtained 
by  crushing  another  member  of  the  family  of  nations,  an 
approach  is  made  to  the  measure  of  naval  strength  required 
by  a  State.  It  is  not  necessary  to  be  able  to  meet  all  others 
combined,  as  some  Englishmen  have  seemed  to  think ;  it 
is  necessary  only  to  be  able  to  meet  the  strongest  on  favor¬ 
able  terms,  sure  that  the  others  will  not  join  in  destroying  a 
factor  in  the  political  equilibrium,  even  if  they  hold  aloof. 
England  and  Spain  were  allies  in  Toulon  in  1793,  when 
the  excesses  of  Revolutionary  France  seemed  to  threaten  the 
social  order  of  Europe ;  but  the  Spanish  admiral  told  the 
English  flatly  that  the  ruin  of  the  French  navy,  a  large  part  of 
which  was  there  in  their  hands,  could  not  fail  to  be  injurious 
to  the  interests  of  Spain,  and  a  part  of  the  French  ships 
was  saved  by  his  conduct,  which  has  been  justly  character¬ 
ized  as  not  only  full  of  firmness,  but  also  as  dictated  by  the 
highest  political  reason.3 

1  Troude  :  Batailles  Navales  de  la  France,  year  1673. 

2  Chabaud-Arnault :  Revue  Mar.  et  Col.  July,  1885. 

3  Jurien  de  la  Graviere  :  Guerres  Maritimes. 


DE  RUYTER'S  MILITARY  CHARACTER.  157 

The  battle jol  ihe  Texel,  closing  the  long  series  of  wars  in 
which  the  Dutch  and  English  contended  on  equal  terms-  for 
the  mastery  of  the  seas,  saw  the  Dutch  navy  in  its  highest  effi¬ 
ciency,  and  its  greatest  ornament,  De  Ruvter,  at  the  summit 
of  his  glory.  Long  since  old  in  years,  for  lie  was  now  sixty- 
six,  he  had  lost  none  of  his  martial  vigor ;  his  attack  was  as 
furious  as  eight  years  before,  and  his  judgment  apparently 
had  ripened  rapidly  through  the  experience  of  the  last  war, 
for  there  is  far  more  evidence  of  plan  and  military  insight 
than  before.  To  him,  under  the  government  of  the  great 
Pensionary  De  Witt,  with  whom  he  was  in  close  sympathy, 
the  increase  of  discipline  and  sound  military  tone  now  ap¬ 
parent  in  the  Dutch  navy  must  have  been  largely  due.  He 
went  to  this  final  strife  of  the  two  great  sea-peoples  in  the 
fulness  of  his  own  genius,  with  an  admirably  tempered  instru¬ 
ment  in  his  hands,  and  with  the  glorious  disadvantage  of 
numbers,  to  save  his  country.  The  mission  was  fulfilled  not 
by  courage  alone,  but  by  courage,  forethought,  and  skill. 
The  attack  at  the  Texel  was,  in  its  general  lines,  the  same 
as  that  at  Trafalgar,  the  enemy’s  van  being  neglected  to  fall 
on  the  centre  and  rear,  and  as  at  Trafalgar  the  van,  by  fail¬ 
ing  to  do  its  duty,  more  than  justified  the  conception ;  but  as 
the  odds  against  De  Ruyter  were  greater  than  those  against 
Nelson,  so  was  his  success  less.  The  part  played  by  Bankert 
at  Solebay  was  essentially  the  same  as  that  of  Nelson  at  St. 
Vincent,  when  he  threw  himself  across  the  path  of  the  Span¬ 
ish  division  with  his  single  ship  (see  Plate  III.,  c,  c')  ;  but 
Nelson  took  his  course  without  orders  from  Jervis,  while 
Bankert  was  carrying  out  Ruyter’s  plan.  Once  more,  still 
himself  in  his  bearing,  but  under  sadly  altered  surroundings, 
will  this  simple  and  heroic  man  come  before  us  ;  and  here, 
in  contrast  with  his  glory,  seems  a  proper  place  to  insert  a 
little  description  by  the  Comte  de  Guiche 1  of  his  bearing  in 
the  Four  Days’  Fight,  which  brings  out  at  once  the  homely 
and  the  heroic  sides  of  his  character. 

“  I  never  saw  him  [during  those  last  three  days]  other  than  even- 
tempered  ;  and  when  victory  was  assured,  saying  always  it  was  the 

1  Memoires. 


158 


COALITION  AGAINST  FRANCE. 


good  God  that  gives  it  to  us.  Amid  the  disorders  of  the  fleet  and 
the  appearance  of  loss,  he  seemed  to  be  moved  only  by  the  misfor¬ 
tune  to  his  country,  but  always  submissive  to  the  will  of  God. 
Finally,  it  may  be  said  that  he  has  something  of  the  frankness  and 
lack  of  polish  of  our  patriarchs  ;  and,  to  conclude  what  I  have  to . 
say  of  him,  I  will  relate  that  the  day  after  the  victory  I  found  him 
sweeping  his  own  room  and  feeding  his  chickens.” 

Nine  days  after  the  battle  of  the  Texel,  on  the  80th  of 
August,  1678,  a  formal  alliance  was  made  between  Holland 
on  the  one  hand,  and  Spain,  Lorraine,  and  the  emperor  of 
Germany  on  the  other,  and  the  French  ambassador  was 
dismissed  from  Vienna.  Louis  almost  immediately  offered 
Holland  comparatively  moderate  terms ;  but  the  United 
Provinces,  with  their  new  allies  by  their  sides  and  with  their 
backs,  borne  firmly  upon  the  sea  which  had  favored  and  sup¬ 
ported  them,  set  their  face  steadily  against  him.  In  England 
the  clamor  of  the  people  and  Parliament  became  louder ; 
the  Protestant  feeling  and  the  old  enmity  to  France  were 
daily  growing,  as  was  the  national  distrust  of  the  king. 
Charles,  though  he  had  himself  lost  none  of  his  hatred  of  the 
republic,  had  to  give  way.  Louis,  seeing  the  gathering  storm, 
made  up  his  mind,  by  the  counsel  of  Turenne,  to  withdraw 
from  his  dangerously  advanced  position  by  evacuating  Hol¬ 
land,  and  to  try  to  make  peace  with  the  Provinces  separately 
while  continuing  the  war  with  the  House  of  Austria  in  Spain 
and  Germany.  Thus  he  returned  to  Richelieu’s  policy,  and 
Holland  was  saved.  February  19,  1674,  peace  was  signed 
between  England  and  the  Provinces.  The  latter  recognized 
the  absolute  supremacy  of  the  English  flag  from  Cape  Finis- 
terre  in  Spain  to  Norway,  and  paid  a  war  indemnity. 

The  withdrawal  of  England,  which  remained  neutral  during 
the  remaining  four  years  of  the  war,  necessarily  made  it  less 
maritime.  The  King  of  France  did  not  think  his  navy,  either 
in  numbers  or  efficiency,  able  to  contend  alone  with  that  of 
Holland ;  he  therefore  withdrew  it  from  the  ocean  and  con¬ 
fined  his  sea  enterprises  to  the  Mediterranean,  with  one  or  two 
half-privateering  expeditions  to  the  West  Indies.  The  United 
Provinces  for  their  part,  being  freed  from  danger  on  the  side 


REVOLT  OF  SICILY  AGAINST  SPAIN. 


159 


of  the  sea,  and  not  having,  except  for  a  short  time,  any 
serious  idea  of  operating  against  the  French  coast,  diminished 
their  own  fleets.  The  war  became  more  and  more  conti¬ 
nental,  and  drew  in  more  and  more  the  other  powers  of 
Europe.  Gradually  the  German  States  cast  their  lot  with 
Austria,  and  on  May  28,  1674,  the  Diet  proclaimed  war 
against  France.  The  great  work  of  French  policy  in  the  last 
generations  was  undone,  Austria  had  resumed  her  supremacy 
in  Germany,  and  Holland  had  not  been  destroyed.  On  the 
Baltic,  Denmark,  seeing  Sweden  inclining  toward  France, 
hastened  to  make  common  cause  with  the  German  Empire, 
sending  fifteen  thousand  troops.  There  remained  in  Germany 
only  Bavaria,  Hanover,  and  Wurtemberg  faithful  still  to  their 
French  alliance.  The  land  war  had  thus  drawn  in  nearly 
all  the  powers  of  Europe,  and,  from  the  nature  of  the  case, 
the  principal  theatre  of  the  conflict  was  beyond  the  eastern 
boundary  of  France,  toward  the  Rhine,  and  in  the  Spanish 
Netherlands;  but  while  this  was  raging,  a  maritime  episode 
was  introduced  by  the  fact  of  Denmark  and  Sweden  being 
engaged  on  opposite  sides.  Of  this  it  will  not  be  neces¬ 
sary  to  speak,  beyond  mentioning  that  the  Dutch  sent  a 
squadron  under  Tromp  to  join  the  Danes,  and  that  the  united 
fleets  won  a  great  victory  over  the  Swedes  in  1676,  taking 
from  them  ten  ships.  It  is  therefore  evident  that  the  sea 
superiority  of  Holland  detracted  greatly  from  Sweden’s  value 
as  an  ally  to  Louis  XIV. 

Another  maritime  strife  arose  in  the  Mediterranean  by  the 
revolt  of  the  Sicilians  against  the  Spanish  rule.1  The  help 
they  asked  from  France  was  granted  as  a  diversion  against 
Spain,  but  the  Sicilian  enterprise  never  became  more  than  a 
side  issue.  Its  naval  interest  springs  from  bringing  Ruyter 
once  more  on  the  scene,  and  that  as  the  antagonist  of 
Duquesne,  the  equal,  and  by  some  thought  even  the  superior, 
of  Tourville,  whose  name  has  always  stood  far  above  all 
others  in  the  French  navy  of  that  day. 

Messina  revolted  in  July,  1674,  and  the  French  king  at 

1  See  Map  of  Mediterranean,  p.  15. 


160 


THE  BATTLE  OF  STROMBOLL 


once  took  it  under  his  protection.  The  Spanish  navy  through¬ 
out  seems  to  have  behaved  badly,  certainly  inefficiently ;  and 
early  in  1675  the  French  were  safely  established  in  the  city. 
During  the  year  their  naval  power  in  the  Mediterranean  was 
much  increased,  and  Spain,  unable  to  defend  the  island  herself, 
applied  to  the  United  Provinces  for  a  fleet,  the  expenses  of 
which  she  would  bear.  The  Provinces,  “fatigued  by  the 
war,  involved  in  debt,  suffering  cruelly  in  their  commerce, 
exhausted  by  the  necessity  of  paying  the  emperor  and  all  the 
German  princes,  could  no  longer  fit  out  the  enormous  fleets 
which  they  had  once  opposed  to  France  and  England.”  They 
however  hearkened  to  Spain  and  sent  De  Ruyter,  with  a 
squadron  of  only  eighteen  ships  and  four  fire-ships.  The 
admiral,  who  had  noted  the  growth  of  the  French  navy,  said 
the  force  was  too  small,  and  departed  oppressed  in  spirit,  but 
with  the  calm  resignation  which  was  habitual  to  him.  He 
reached  Cadiz  in  September,  and  in  the  mean  time  the  French 
had  further  strengthened  themselves  by  the  capture  of 
Agosta,  a  port  commanding  the  southeast  of  Sicily.  De 
Ruyter  was  again  delayed  by  the  Spanish  government,  and 
did  not  reach  the  north  coast  of  the  island  until  the  end  of 
December,  when  head  winds  kept  him  from  entering  the 
Straits  of  Messina.  He  cruised  between  Messina  and  the 
Lipari  Islands  in  a  position  to  intercept  the  French  fleet 
convoying  troops  and  supplies,  which  was  expected  under 
Duquesne. 

On  the  7th  of  January,  1676,  the  French  came  in  sight, 
twenty  ships-of-th e-line  and  six  fire-ships ;  the  Dutch  had  but 
nineteen  ships,  one  of  which  was  a  Spaniard,  and  four  fire¬ 
ships  ;  and  it  must  be  remembered  that,  although  there  is  no 
detailed  account  of  the  Dutch  ships  in  this  action,  they  were 
as  a  rule  inferior  to  those  of  England,  and  yet  more  to  those  of 
France.  The  first  day  was  spent  in  manoeuvring,  the  Dutch 
having  the  weather-gage ;  but  during  that  night,  which  was 
squally  and  drove  the  Spanish  galleys  accompanying  the 
Dutch  to  take  refuge  under  Lipari,  the  wind  shifted,  and  com¬ 
ing  out  at  west-southwest,  gave  the  French  the  weather-gage 


STROM  BOLI 

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ENGLISH 


i 


THE  BATTLE  OF  STROMBOLI. 


161 


and  the  power  to  attack.  Duquesne  resolved  to  use  it,  and 
sending  the  convoy  ahead,  formed  his  line  on  the  starboard 
tack  standing  south ;  the  Dutch  did  the  same,  and  waited  for 
him  (Plate  V.,  A,  A,  A). 

An  emotion  of  surprise  must  be  felt  at  seeing  the  great 
Dutch  admiral  surrender  the  choice  of  attack  on  the  7th.  At 
daybreak  of  that  day  he  saw  the  enemy  and  steered  for  hiin ; 
at  three  p.  M.,  a  French  account  says,  he  hauled  his  wind  on  the 
same  tack  as  themselves,  but  out  of  cannon-shot  to  windward. 
How  account  for  the  seeming  reluctance  of  the  man  who 
three  years  before  had  made  the  desperate  attacks  of  Solebay 
and  the  Texel  ?  His  reasons  have  not  been  handed  down ;  it 
may  be  that  the  defensive  advantages  of  the  lee-gage  had  been 
recognized  by  this  thoughtful  seaman,  especially  when  pre¬ 
paring  to  meet,  with  inferior  forces,  an  enemy  of  impetuous 
gallantry  and  imperfect  seamanship.  If  any  such  ideas  did 
influence  him  they  were  justified  by  the  result.  The  battle  of 
Stromboli  presents  a  partial  anticipation  of  the  tactics  of  the 
French  and  English  a  hundred  years  later ;  but  in  this  case 
it  is  the  French  who  seek  the  weather-gage  and  attack  with 
fury,  while  the  Dutch  take  the  defensive.  The  results  were 
very  much  such  as  Clerk  pointed  out  to  the  English  in  his 
celebrated  work  on  naval  tactics,  the  accounts  here  followed 
being  entirely  French.1 

The  two  fleets  being  drawn  up  in  line-of-battle  on  the  star¬ 
board  tack,  heading  south,  as  has  been  said,  De  Ruyter 
awaited  the  attack  which  he  had  refused  to  make.  Being  be¬ 
tween  the  French  and  their  port,  he  felt  they  must  fight.  At 
nine  a.  m.  the  French  line  kept  away  all  together  and  ran  down 
obliquely  upon  the  Dutch,  a  manoeuvre  difficult  to  be  per¬ 
formed  with  accuracy,  and  during  which  the  assailant  re¬ 
ceives  his  enemy’s  fire  at  disadvantage  (A',  A",  A'"').  In 
doing  this,  two  ships  in  the  French  van  were  seriously  dis¬ 
abled.  “  M.  de  la  Fayette,  in  the  4  Prudente,’  began  the  action ; 
but  having  rashly  thrown  himself  into  the  midst  of  the 
enemy’s  van,  he  was  dismantled  and  forced  to  haul  off  ”  (a> 

1  Lapeyrouse,  Bonfils :  Hist,  de  la  Marine  Fran9aise. 

11 


162 


THE  TACTICS  AT  STROMBOLI. 


Confusion  ensued  in  the  French  line,  from  the  difficult  char¬ 
acter  of  the  manoeuvre.  “  Vice-Admiral  de  Preuilli,  com¬ 
manding  the  van,  in  keeping  away  took  too  little  room,  so 
that  in  coming  to  the  wind  again,  the  ships,  in  too  close  order, 
lapped  and  interfered  with  one  another’s  fire  [A'].  The 
absence  of  M.  de  la  Fayette  from  the  line  threw  the  ‘  Parfait 9 
into  peril.  Attacked  by  two  ships,  she  lost  her  maintopmast 
and  had  also  to  haul  off  for  repairs.”  Again,  the  French 
came  into  action  in  succession  instead  of  all  together,  a  usual 
and  almost  inevitable  result  of  the  manoeuvre  in  question. 
“  In  the  midst  of  a  terrible  cannonade,”  that  is,  after  part  of 
his  ships  were  engaged,  “  Duquesne,  commanding  the  centre, 
took  post  on  the  beam  of  Ruyter’s  division.”  The  French  rear 
came  into  action  still  later,  after  the  centre  (A",  A'").  “  Lan- 

geron  and  Bethune,  commanding  leading  ships  of  the  French 
centre,  are  crushed  by  superior  forces.”  How  can  this  be, 
seeing  the  French  had  the  more  ships?  It  was  because,  as 
the  narrative  tells  us,  “  the  French  had  not  yet  repaired  the 
disorder  of  the  first  movement.”  However,  all  at  last  got 
into  action  (B,  B,  B),  and  Duquesne  gradually  restored  order. 
The  Dutch,  engaged  all  along  the  line,  resisted  everywhere, 
and  there  was  not  one  of  their  ships  which  was  not  closely 
engaged ;  more  cannot  be  said  for  the  admiral  and  captains 
of  the  inferior  fleet.  The  remaining  part  of  the  fight  is  not 
very  clearly  related.  Ruyter  is  said  to  have  given  way  con¬ 
tinually  with  his  two  leading  divisions ;  but  whether  this  was 
a  confession  of  weakness  or  a  tactical  move  does  not  appear. 
The  rear  was  separated  (C'),  in  permitting  which  either 
Ruyter  or  the  immediate  commander  was  at  fault ;  but  the 
attempts  made  by  the  French  to  surround  and  isolate  it 
failed,  probably  because  of  damaged  spars,  for  one  French 
ship  did  pass  entirely  around  the  separated  division.  The 
action  ended  at  4.30  p.  m.,  except  in  the  rear,  and  the  Span¬ 
ish  galleys  shortly  after  came  up  and  towed  the  disabled 
Dutch  ships  away.  Their  escape  shows  how  injured  the 
French  must  have  been.  The  positions,  C,  C',  are  intended 
to  show  the  Dutch  rear  far  separated,  and  the  disorder  in 


CLERK’S  NAVAL  TACTICS . 


163 


which  a  fleet  action  under  sail  necessarily  ended  from  loss 
of  spars. 

Those  who  are  familiar  with  Clerk’s  work  on  naval  tac¬ 
tics,  published  about  1780,  will  recognize  in  this  account  of 
the  battle  of  Stromboli  all  the  features  to  which  he  called  the 
attention  of  English  seamen  in  his  thesis  on  the  methods 
of  action  employed  by  them  and  their  adversaries  in  and  be¬ 
fore  his  time.  Clerk’s  thesis  started  from  the  postulate  that 
English  seamen  and  officers  were  superior  in  skill  or  spirit, 
or  both,  to  the  French,  and  their  ships  on  the  whole  as  fast ; 
that  they  were  conscious  of  this  superiority  and  therefore 
eager  to  attack,  while  the  French,  equally  conscious  of  in¬ 
feriority,  or  for  other  reasons,  were  averse  to  decisive  engage¬ 
ments.  With  these  dispositions  the  latter,  feeling  they  could 
rely  on  a  blindly  furious  attack  by  the  English,  had  evolved 
a  crafty  plan  by  which,  while  seeming  to  fight,  they  really 
avoided  doing  so,  and  at  the  same  time  did  the  enemy  much 
harm.  This  plan  was  to  take  the  lee-gage,  the  characteristic 
of  which,  as  has  before  been  pointed  out,  is  that  it  is  a  defen¬ 
sive  position,  and  to  await  attack.  The  English  error,  accord¬ 
ing  to  Clerk,  upon  which  the  French  had  learned  by  experience 
that  they  could  always  count,  was  in  drawing  up  their  line 
parallel  to  the  enemy,  or  nearly  so,  and  then  keeping  away 
all  together  to  attack,  ship  for  ship,  each  its  opposite  in  the 
hostile  line.  By  standing  down  in  this  manner  the  assailant 
lost  the  use  of  most  of  his  artillery,  while  exposed  to  the  full 
fire  of  his  opponent,  and  invariably  came  up  in  confusion,  be¬ 
cause  the  order  of  attack  was  one  difficult  to  maintain  at  any 
time,  and  much  more  so  in  the  smoke  under  fire,  with  torn 
sails  and  falling  masts.  This  was  precisely  the  attack  made 
by  Duquesne  at  Stromboli,  and  it  there  had  precisely  the 
consequences  Clerk  points  out,  —  confusion  in  the  line,  the  van 
arriving  first  and  getting  the  brunt  of  the  fire  of  the  defence, 
disabled  ships  in  the  van  causing  confusion  in  the  rear,  etc. 
Clerk  further  asserts,  and  he  seems  to  be  right,  that  as  the 
action  grew  warm,  the  French,  by  running  off  to  leeward,  in 
their  turn,  led  the  English  to  repeat  the  same  mode  of  at* 


164 


TACTICS  OF  DUQUESNE  AND  RUYTER. 


tack ; 1  and  so  we  find,  at  Stromboli,  Ruyter  giving  ground  in 
the  same  way,  though  his  motive  does  not  appear.  Clerk 
also  points  out  that  a  necessary  corollary  of  the  lee-gage, 
assumed  for  tactical  reasons,  is  to  aim  at  the  assailant’s  spars, 
his  motive  power,  so  that  his  attack  cannot  be  pushed  far¬ 
ther  than  the  defendant  chooses,  and  at  Stromboli  the  crip¬ 
pled  condition  of  the  French  is  evident ;  for  after  Ruyter  had 
fallen  to  leeward,  and  could  no  longer  help  his  separated  rear, 
it  was  practically  unmolested  by  the  French,  although  none 
of  these  had  been  sunk.  While  therefore  there  cannot  with 
certainty  be  attributed  to  Ruyter  the  deliberate  choice  of 
the  lee-gage,  for  which  there  was  as  yet  no  precedent,  it  is 
evident  that  he  reaped  all  its  benefits,  and  that  the  character 
of  the  French  officers  of  his  day,  inexperienced  as  seamen  and 
of  impetuous  valor,  offered  just  the  conditions  that  gave  most 
advantage  to  an  inferior  force  standing  on  the  defensive. 
The  qualities  and  characteristics  of  the  enemy  are  among  the 

1  This  movement,  according  to  Clerk,  was  not  made  by  the  whole  of  a  French 
line  together,  but  in  a  way  much  more  scientific  and  military.  A  group  of  two 
or  three  ships  withdrew  at  a  time,  being  covered  by  the  smoke  and  the  con¬ 
tinued  fire  of  the  rest  of  their  line.  In  time  a  second  line  was  partly  formed, 
which  in  its  turn  protected  the  ships  which  had  remained  on  the  first,  as  they 
executed  the  somewhat  exposed  movement  of  falling  back.  In  Plan  V.,  Dutch 
ships  at  b,  b,  b,  are  represented  as  thus  withdrawing.  English  official  reports  of 
the  eighteenth  century  often  speak  of  French  ships  acting  thus ;  the  English 
officers  attributing  to  their  superior  valor  a  movement  which  Clerk  more  plau¬ 
sibly  considers  a  skilful  military  manoeuvre,  well  calculated  to  give  the  defence 
several  opportunities  of  disabling  the  assailants  as  they  bore  down  on  a  course 
which  impeded  the  use  of  their  artillery.  In  1812  the  frigate  “United  States,” 
commanded  by  Decatur,  employed  the  same  tactics  in  her  fight  with  the  “  Mace¬ 
donian  ;  ”  and  the  Confederate  gunboats  at  Mobile  by  the  same  means  inflicted 
on  Farragut’s  flag-ship  the  greater  part  of  the  heavy  loss  which  she  sustained. 
In  its  essential  features  the  same  line  of  action  can  now  be  followed  by  a 
defendant,  having  greater  speed,  when  the  ardor  of  the  attack,  or  the  necessities 
of  the  case,  force  the  assailant  to  a  direct  approach.  An  indirect  cause  of  a 
lee  line  falling  farther  to  leeward  has  never  been  noticed.  When  a  ship 
in  that  line  (as  at  c)  found  itself  without  an  opponent  abeam,  and  its  next 
ahead  perhaps  heavily  engaged,  the  natural  impulse  would  be  to  put  up  the 
helm  so  as  to  bring  the  broadside  to  bear.  This  advantage  would  be  gained  by 
a  loss  of  ground  to  leeward  and  consequent  disorder  in  the  line ;  which,  if  the 
act  were  repeated  by  several  ships,  could  only  be  restored  by  the  whole  line 
keeping  away 


DE  RUYTER  KILLED  OFF  AGO  ST  A. 


165 


principal  factors  which  a  man  of  genius  considers,  and  it  was 
to  this  as  much  as  to  any  other  one  trait  that  Nelson  owed 
his  dazzling  successes.  On  the  other  hand,  the  French  ad¬ 
miral  attacked  in  a  wholly  unscientific  manner,  ship  against 
ship,  without  an  attempt  to  concentrate  on  a  part  of  the 
enemy,  or  even  trying  to  keep  him  in  play  until  the  French 
squadron  of  eight  sliips-of-the-line  in  Messina,  near  by,  could 
join.  Such  tactics  cannot  be  named  beside  that  of  Sole- 
bay  or  the  Texel ;  but  as  Duquesne  was  the  best  French 
officer  of  the  century,  with  the  possible  exception  of  Tour- 
ville,  this  battle  has  a  value  of  its  own  in  the  history  of  tac¬ 
tics,  and  may  by  no  means  be  omitted.  The  standing  of  the 
commander-in-chief  is  the  warrant  that  it  marks  the  highest 
point  to  which  French  naval  tactics  has  as  yet  attained. 
Before  quitting  this  discussion,  it  may  be  noted  that  the 
remedy  Clerk  proposed  was  to  attack  the  rear  ships  of  the 
enemy’s  line,  and  preferably  to  leeward ;  the  remainder  of 
the  fleet  must  then  either  abandon  them  or  stand  down  for 
a  general  action,  which  according  to  his  postulate  was  all 
that  the  English  seamen  desired. 

After  the  fight  De  Ruyter  sailed  to  Palermo,  one  of  his 
ships  sinking  on  the  way.  Duquesne  was  joined  outside 
Messina  by  the  French  division  that  had  been  lying  there. 
The  remaining  incidents  of  the  Sicilian  war  are  unimportant 
to  the  general  subject.  On  the  22d  of  April,  De  Ruyter  and 
Duquesne  met  again  off  Agosta.  Duquesne  had  twenty-nine 
ships,  the  allied  Spaniards  and  Dutch  twenty-seven,  of  which 
ten  were  Spanish.  Unfortunately  the  Spaniard  commanded 
in  chief,  and  took  the  centre  of  the  line  with  the  ships  of 
his  country,  contrary  to  the  advice  of  Ruyter,  who,  know¬ 
ing  how  inefficient  his  allies  were,  wished  to  scatter  them 
through  the  line  and  so  support  them  better.  Ruyter  himself 
took  the  van,  and  the  allies,  having  the  wind,  attacked  ;  but 
the  Spanish  centre  kept  at  long  cannon  range,  leaving  the 
brunt  of  the  battle  to  fall  on  the  Dutch  van.  The  rear, 
following  the  commander-in-chiefs  motions,  was  also  but 
slightly  engaged.  In  this  sorrowful  yet  still  glorious  fulfil¬ 
ment  of  hopeless  duty,  De  Ruyter,  who  never  before  in  his 


166  ENGLAND  BECOMES  HOSTILE  TO  FRANCE. 


long  career  had  been  struck  by  an  enemy’s  shot,  received  a 
mortal  wound.  He  died  a  week  later  at  Syracuse,  and  with 
him  passed  away  the  last  hope  of  resistance  on  the  sea.  A 
month  later  the  Spanish  and  Dutch  fleets  were  attacked  at 
anchor  at  Palermo,  and  many  of  them  destroyed  ;  while  a 
division  sent  from  Holland  to  reinforce  the  Mediterranean 
fleet  was  met  by  a  French  squadron  in  the  Straits  of  Gib¬ 
raltar  and  forced  to  take  refuge  in  Cadiz. 

The  Sicilian  enterprise  continued  to  be  only  a  diversion, 
and  the  slight  importance  attached  to  it  shows  clearly  how 
entirely  Louis  XIV.  was  bent  on  the  continental  war.  How 
differently  would  the  value  of  Sicily  have  impressed  him,  had 
his  eyes  been  fixed  on  Egypt  and  extension  by  sea.  As  the 
years  passed,  the  temper  of  the  English  people  became  more 
and  more  excited  against  France ;  the  trade  rivalries  with 
Holland  seemed  to  fall  into  the  shade,  and  it  became  likely 
that  England,  which  had  entered  the  war  as  the  ally  of  Louis, 
would,  before  it  closed,  take  up  arms  against  him.  In  addi¬ 
tion  to  other  causes  of  jealousy  she  saw  the  French  navy 
increased  to  a  number  superior  to  her  own.  Charles  for  a 
while  resisted  the  pressure  of  Parliament,  but  in  January, 
1678,  a  treaty  of  alliance,  offensive  and  defensive,  was  made 
between  the  two  sea  countries ;  the  king  recalled  the  English 
troops  which  until  now  had  been  serving  as  part  of  the 
French  army,  and  when  Parliament  opened  again  in  Feb¬ 
ruary,  asked  for  money  to  equip  ninety  ships  and  thirty 
thousand  soldiers.  Louis,  who  was  expecting  this  result,  at 
once  ordered  the  evacuation  of  Sicily.  He  did  not  fear  Eng¬ 
land  by  land,  but  on  the  sea  he  could  not  yet  hold  his  own 
against  the  union  of  the  two  sea  powers.  At  the  same  time 
lie  redoubled  his  attacks  on  the  Spanish  Netherlands.  As 
long  as  there  was  a  hope  of  keeping  the  ships  of  England  out 
of  the  fight,  he  had  avoided  touching  the  susceptibilities  of 
the  English  people  on  the  subject  of  the  Belgian  sea-coast ; 
but  now  that  they  could  no  longer  be  conciliated,  he  thought 
best  to  terrify  Holland  by  the  sharpness  of  his  attack  in  the 
quarter  where  she  dreaded  him  most. 

The  United  Provinces  were  in  truth  the  mainspring  of  the 


SUFFERINGS  OF  THE  UNITED  PROVINCES.  167 


coalition.  Though  among  the  smallest  in  extent  of  the  coun¬ 
tries  arrayed  against  Louis,  they  were  strongest  in  the  char¬ 
acter  and  purpose  of  their  ruler,  the  Prince  of  Orange,  and 
in  the  wealth  which,  while  supporting  the  armies  of  the  con¬ 
federates,  also  kept  the  poor  and  greedy  German  princes 
faithful  to  their  alliance.  Almost  alone,  by  dint  of  mighty 
sea  power,  by  commercial  and  maritime  ability,  they  bore  the 
burden  of  the  war;  and  though  they  staggered  and  com¬ 
plained,  they  still  bore  it.  As  in  later  centuries  England,  so 
at  the  time  we  are  now  speaking  of  Holland,  the  great  sea 
power,  supported  the  war  against  the  ambition  of  France  ; 
but  her  sufferings  were  great.  Her  commerce,  preyed  upon 
by  French  privateers,  lost  heavily ;  and  there  was  added  an 
immense  indirect  loss  in  the  transfer  of  the  carrying-trade 
between  foreign  countries,  which  had  contributed  so  much  to 
the  prosperity  of  the  Dutch.  When  the  flag  of  England  be¬ 
came  neutral,  this  rich  business  went  to  her  ships,  which 
crossed  the  seas  the  more  securely  because  of  the  eager  desire 
of  Louis  to  conciliate  the  English  nation.  This  desire  led 
him  also  to  make  very  large  concessions  to  English  exigencies 
in  the  matter  of  commercial  treaties,  undoing  much  of  the 
work  of  protection  upon  which  Colbert  sought  to  nourish  the 
yet  feeble  growth  of  French  sea  power.  These  sops,  however, 
only  stayed  for  a  moment  the  passions  which  were  driving 
England  ;  it  was  not  self-interest,  but  stronger  motives,  which 
impelled  her  to  a  break  with  France. 

Still  less  was  it  to  the  interest  of  Holland  to  prolong  the 
war,  after  Louis  showed  a  wish  for  peace.  A  continental 
war  could  at  best  be  but  a  necessary  evil,  and  source  of  weak¬ 
ness  to  her.  The  money  she  spent  on  her  own  and  the 
allied  armies  was  lost  to  her  navy,  and  the  sources  of  her 
prosperity  on  the  sea  were  being  exhausted.  How  far  the 
Prince  of  Orange  was  justified,  by  the  aims  of  Louis  XIV.,  in 
that  unyielding  attitude  of  opposition  toward  him  which  he 
always  maintained,  may  be  uncertain,  and  there  is  here  no 
need  to  decide  the  question ;  but  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
the  strife  sacrificed  the  sea  power  of  Holland  through  sheer 


168 


PEACE  OF  NIMEGUEN . 


exhaustion,  and  with  it  destroyed  her  position  among  the 
nations  of  the  world.  “  Situated  between  France  and  Eng¬ 
land,”  says  a  historian  of  Holland,  “  by  one  or  other  of  them 
were  the  United  Provinces,  after  they  had  achieved  their 
independence  of  Spain,  constantly  engaged  in  wars,  which 
exhausted  their  finances,  annihilated  their  navy,  and  caused 
the  rapid  decline  of  their  trade,  manufactures,  and  commerce ; 
and  thus  a  peace-loving  nation  found  herself  crushed  by  the 
weight  of  unprovoked  and  long-continued  hostilities.  Often, 
too,  the  friendship  of  England  was  scarcely  less  harmful  to 
Holland  than  her  enmity.  As  one  increased  and  the  other 
lessened,  it  became  the  alliance  of  the  giant  and  the  dwarf.” 1 
Hitherto  we  have  seen  Holland  the  open  enemy  or  hearty 
rival  of  England ;  henceforward  she  appears  as  an  ally,  —  in 
both  cases  a  sufferer  from  her  smaller  size,  weaker  numbers, 
and  less  favored  situation. 

The  exhaustion  of  the  United  Provinces  and  the  clamor  of 
their  merchants  and  peace  party  on  the  one  hand,  aided  on 
the  other  by  the  sufferings  of  France,  the  embarrassment  of 
her  finances,  and  the  threatened  addition  of  England’s  navy 
to  her  already  numerous  enemies,  inclined  to  peace  the  two 
principal  parties  to  this  long  war.  Louis  had  long  been  will¬ 
ing  to  make  peace  with  Holland  alone ;  but  the  States  had 
been  withheld,  at  first  by  fidelity  to  those  who  had  joined 
them  in  their  hour  of  trouble,  and  latterly  by  the  firm  pur¬ 
pose  of  William  of  Orange.  Difficulties  were  gradually 
smoothed  away,  and  the  Peace  of  Nimeguen  between  the 
United  Provinces  and  France  was  signed  August  11,  1678. 
The  other  powers  shortly  afterward  acceded  to  it.  The 
principal  sufferer,  as  was  natural,  was  the  overgrown  but 
feeble  monarchy  whose  centre  was  Spain,  which  gave  up  to 
France  Franche  Comt6  and  a  number  of  fortified  towns  in 
the  Spanish  Netherlands,  thus  extending  the  boundaries  of 
France  to  the  east  and  northeast.  Holland,  for  whose  de¬ 
struction  Louis  began  the  war,  lost  not  a  foot  of  ground  in 
Europe  ;  and  beyond  the  seas  only  her  colonies  on  the  west 

1  Davies :  History  of  Holland. 


EFFECTS  UPON  FRANCE  OF  THE  WAR. 


169 


coast  of  Africa  and  in  Guiana.  She  owed  her  safety  at  first, 
and  the  final  successful  issue,  to  her  sea  power.  That  de¬ 
livered  her  in  the  hour  of  extreme  danger,  and  enabled  her 
afterward  to  keep  alive  the  general  war.  It  may  be  said  to 
have  been  one  of  the  chief  factors,  and  inferior  to  no  other 
one  singly,  in  determining  the  event  of  the  great  war  which 
was  formally  closed  at  Nimeguen. 

The  effort  none  the  less  sapped  her  strength,  and  being 
followed  by  many  years  of  similar  strain  broke  her  down. 
But  what  was  the  effect  upon  the  vastly  greater  state,  the 
extreme  ambition  of  whose  king  was  the  principal  cause  of 
the  exhausting  wars  of  this  time  ?  Among  the  many  activi¬ 
ties  which  illustrated  the  brilliant  opening  of  the  reign  of  the 
then  youthful  king  of  France,  none  was  so  important,  none  so 
intelligently  directed,  as  those  of  Colbert,  who  aimed  first  at 
restoring  the  finances  from  the  confusion  into  which  they  had 
fallen,  and  then  at  establishing  them  upon  a  firm  foundation 
of  national  wealth.  This  wealth,  at  that  time  utterly  beneath 
the  possibilities  of  France,  was  to  be  developed  on  the  lines 
of  production  encouraged,  trade  stimulated  to  healthful  ac¬ 
tivity,  a  large  merchant  shipping,  a  great  navy,  and  colonial 
extension.  Some  of  these  are  sources,  others  the  actual  con 
stituents,  of  sea  power ;  which  indeed  may  be  said  in  a  sea¬ 
board  nation  to  be  the  invariable  accompaniment,  if  it  be  not 
the  chief  source,  of  its  strength.  For  nearly  twelve  years  all 
went  well ;  the  development  of  the  greatness  of  France  in 
all  these  directions  went  forward  rapidly,  if  not  in  all  with 
equal  strides,  and  the  king’s  revenues  increased  by  bounds. 
Then  came  the  hour  in  which  he  had  to  decide  whether  the 
exertions  which  his  ambition  naturally,  perhaps  properly, 
prompted  should  take  the  direction  which,  while  imposing 
great  efforts,  did  nothing  to  sustain  but  rather  hindered  the 
natural  activities  of  his  people,  and  broke  down  commerce  by 
making  control  of  the  sea  uncertain ;  or  whether  he  should 
launch  out  in  pursuits  which,  while  involving  expense,  would 
keep  peace  on  his  borders,  lead  to  the  control  of  the  sea,  and 
by  the  impulse  given  to  trade,  and  all  upon  which  trade  de- 


170  EFFECTS  UPON  FRANCE  OF  THE  WAR. 


pends,  would  bring  in  money  nearly  if  not  quite  equal  to  that 
which  the  State  spent.  This  is  not  a  fanciful  picture  ;  by 
his  attitude  toward  Holland,  and  its  consequences,  Louis  gave 
the  first  impulse  to  England  upon  the  path  which  realized 
to  her,  within  his  own  day,  the  results  which  Colbert  and 
Leibnitz  had  hoped  for  France.  He  drove  the  Hutch  carry¬ 
ing-trade  into  the  ships  of  England  ;  allowed  her  to  settle 
peacefully  Pennsylvania  and  Carolina,  and  to  seize  New  York 
and  New  Jersey  ;  and  he  sacrificed,  to  gain  her  neutrality, 
the  growing  commerce  of  France.  Not  all  at  once,  but 
very  rapidly,  England  pressed  into  the  front  place  as  a  sea 
power ;  and  however  great  her  sufferings  and  the  sufferings 
of  individual  Englishmen,  it  remained  true  of  her  that  even 
in  war  her  prosperity  was  great.  Doubtless  France  could 
not  forget  her  continental  position,  nor  wholly  keep  free 
from  continental  wars  ;  but  it  may  be  believed  that  if  she 
had  chosen  the  path  of  sea  power,  she  might  both  have 
escaped  many  conflicts  and  borne  those  that  were  unavoid¬ 
able  with  greater  ease.  At  the  Peace  of  Nimeguen  the 
injuries  were  not  irreparable,  but  “  the  agricultural  classes, 
commerce,  manufactures,  and  the  colonies  had  alike  been 
smitten  by  the  war ;  and  the  conditions  of  peace,  so  advan¬ 
tageous  to  the  territorial  and  military  power  of  France,  were 
much  less  so  to  manufactures,  the  protective  tariffs  having 
been  lowered  in  favor  of  England  and  Holland,”  1  the  two 
sea  powers.  The  merchant  shipping  was  stricken,  and  the 
splendid  growth  of  the  royal  navy,  that  excited  the  jealousy 
of  England,  was  like  a  tree  without  roots ;  it  soon  withered 
away  under  the  blast  of  war. 

Before  finally  quitting  this  war  with  Holland,  a  short  notice 
of  the  Comte  d’Estrees,  to  whom  Louis  committed  the  charge 
of  the  French  contingent  of  the  allied  fleet,  and  who  com¬ 
manded  it  at  Solebay  and  the  Texel,  will  throw  some  light 
upon  the  qualifications  of  the  French  naval  officers  of  the  day 
before  experience  had  made  seamen  of  many  of  them.  D’ Es¬ 
tates  went  to  sea  for  the  first  time  in  1667,  being  then  a  man 

1  Martin :  History  of  France. 


NOTICE  OF  THE  COMTE  D’ESTRfiES. 


171 


of  mature  years;  but  in  1672  we  find  him  in  the  chief  com¬ 
mand  of  an  important  squadron,  having  under  him  Duquesne, 
who  was  a  seaman,  and  had  been  so  for  nearly  forty  years. 
In  1677,  D’Estrdes  obtained  from  the  king  a  body  of  eight 
ships  which  he  undertook  to  maintain  at  his  own  expense, 
upon  the  condition  of  receiving  half  the  prizes  made.  With 
this  squadron  he  made  an  attack  upon  the  then  Dutch  island 
of  Tobago,  with  a  recklessness  which  showed  that  no  lack  of 
courage  prompted  his  equivocal  conduct  at  the  Texel.  The 
next  year  he  went  out  again  and  contrived  to  run  the  whole 
squadron  ashore  on  the  Aves  Islands.  The  account  given  by 
the  flag-captain  of  this  transaction  is  amusing  as  well  as 
instructive.  In  his  report  he  says  :  — 

“  The  day  that  the  squadron  was  lost,  the  sun  having  been  taken 
by  the  pilots,  the  vice-admiral  as  usual  had  them  put  down  the  posi¬ 
tion  in  his  cabin.  As  I  was  entering  to  learn  what  was  going  on,  I 
met  the  third  pilot,  Bourdaloue,  who  was  going  out  crying.  I  asked 
him  what  the  matter  was,  and  he  answered :  ‘  Because  I  find  more 
drift  than  the  other  pilots,  the  admiral  is  threatening  me  and  abusing 
me,  as  usual ;  yet  I  am  only  a  poor  lad  who  does  the  best  he  can.’ 
When  I  had  entered  the  cabin,  the  admiral,  who  was  very  angry,  said 
to  me,  1  That  scoundrel  of  a  Bourdaloue  is  always  coming  to  me 
with  some  nonsense  or  other ;  I  will  drive  him  out  of  the  ship.  He 
makes  us  to  be  running  a  course,  the  devil  knows  where,  I  don’t.’ 
As  I  did  not  know  which  was  right,”  says  the  captain  of  the  ship, 
rather  naively,  “  I  did  not  dare  to  say  anything  for  fear  of  bringing 
down  a  like  storm  on  my  own  head.”  1 

Some  hours  after  this  scene,  which,  as  the  French  officer 
from  whom  the  extract  is  taken  says,  “appears  now  almost 
grotesque,  but  which  is  only  an  exact  portrayal  of  the  sea 
manners  of  the  day,  the  whole  squadron  was  lost  on  a  group 
of  rocks  known  as  the  Aves  Islands.  Such  were  the  officers.” 
The  flag-captain,  in  another  part  of  his  report,  says :  “  The 
shipwreck  resulted  from  the  general  line  of  conduct  held  by 
Vice-Admiral  d’Estrdes.  It  was  always  the  opinion  of  his 
servants,  or  others  than  the  proper  officers  of  the  ship,  which 

1  Gougeard  :  Marine  de  Guerre. 


172 


NOTICE  OF  THE  COMTE  D'E STRIDES. 


prevailed.  This  manner  of  acting  may  be  understood  in  the 
Comte  d’Estrees,  who,  without  the  necessary  knowledge  of 
a  profession  he  had  embraced  so  late,  always  had  with  him 
obscure  counsellors,  in  order  to  appropriate  the  opinions 
they  gave  him  so  as  to  blind  the  ship’s  company  as  to  his 
capacity.” 1  D’Estrdes  had  been  made  vice-admiral  two  years 
after  he  first  went  aboard  ship. 

i 

1  Troude  :  Batailles  Naval  es. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


English  Revolution.  —  War  of  the  League  of  Augsburg,  1688- 
1697.  —  Sea  Battles  of  Beachy  Head  and  La  Hougue. 

HTHE  Peace  of  Nimeguen  was  followed  by  a  period  of  ten 
years  in  which  no  extensive  war  broke  out.  They 
were,  however,  far  from  being  years  of  political  quiet.  Louis 
XIV.  was  as  intent  upon  pushing  on  his  frontiers  to  the  east¬ 
ward  in  peace  as  in  war,  and  grasped  in  quick  succession 
fragments  of  territory  which  had  not  been  given  him  by  the 
peace.  Claiming  this  and  that  in  virtue  of  ancient  feudal 
ties ;  this  and  that  other  as  implicitly  surrendered  by  the 
treaty,  because  dependent  upon  something  else  that  had  been 
explicitly  surrendered  ;  purchasing  at  one  time,  using  bare 
force  in  other  cases,  and  backing  up  all  the  so-called  peaceful 
methods  of  obtaining  his  asserted  rights  by  the  presence  of 
armed  power,  he  carried  on  this  process  of  extension  between 
1679  and  1682.  The  aggression  most  startling  to  Europe, 
and  above  all  to  the  German  Empire,  was  the  seizure  of  the 
then  imperial  city  of  Strasburg  on  the  30th  of  September, 
1681 ;  and  on  the  same  day  Casale,  in  Italy,  was  sold  to  him 
by  the  Duke  of  Mantua,  showing  that  his  ambitions  were 
directed  that  way  as  well  as  to  the  north  and  east.  Both  of 
these  were  positions  of  great  strategic  importance,  threaten¬ 
ing,  the  one  Germany,  the  other  Italy,  in  case  of  war. 

The  excitement  throughout  Europe  was  very  great ;  in 
every  direction  Louis,  serenely  trusting  to  his  power,  was 
making  new  enemies  and  alienating  former  friends.  The 
king  of  Sweden,  directly  insulted,  and  injured  in  his  duchy 
of  Deux-Ponts,  turned  against  him,  as  did  the  Italian  States ; 
and  the  Pope  himself  sided  with  the  enemies  of  a  king 


174 


AGGRESSIONS  OF  LOUIS  XIV. 


who  was  already  showing  his  zeal  for  the  conversion  of  the 
Protestants,  and  wTas  preparing  for  the  revocation  of  the  Edict 
of  Nantes.  But  the  discontent,  though  deep  and  general, 
had  to  be  organized  and  directed  ;  the  spirit  necessary  to 
give  it  form  and  final  effective  expression  was  found  again 
in  Holland,  in  William  of  Orange.  Time,  however,  was 
needed  to  mature  the  work.  “  No  one  yet  armed  himself ; 
but  every  one  talked,  wrote,  agitated,  from  Stockholm  to 
Madrid.  .  .  .  The  war  of  the  pen  preceded  by  many  years 
the  war  of  the  sword ;  incessant  appeals  were  made  to  Euro¬ 
pean  opinion  by  indefatigable  publicists ;  under  all  forms 
was  diffused  the  terror  of  the  New  Universal  Monarchy,” 
which  was  seeking  to  take  the  place  once  filled  by  the  House 
of  Austria.  It  was  known  that  Louis  sought  to  make  himself 
or  his  son  emperor  of  Germany.  But  complications  of  differ¬ 
ent  kinds,  private  interests,  lack  of  money,  all  combined  to 
delay  action.  The  United  Provinces,  despite  William’s  wishes, 
were  yet  unwilling  to  act  again  as  banker  for  a  coalition, 
and  the  emperor  was  so  threatened  on  his  eastern  frontier 
by  the  rebel  Hungarians  and  the  Turks  that  he  dared  not 
risk  a  western  war. 

Meanwhile  the  armed  navy  of  France  was  daily  growing 
in  strength  and  efficiency  under  Colbert’s  care,  and  acquiring 
the  habit  of  war  by  attacks  upon  the  Barbary  pirates  and 
their  ports.  During  the  same  years  the  navies  both  of  Eng¬ 
land  and  of  Holland  were  declining  in  numbers  and  efficiency. 
It  has  already  been  said  that  in  1688,  when  William  needed 
Dutch  ships  for  his  expedition  to  England,  it  was  objected  that 
the  navy  was  in  a  far  different  condition  from  1672,  “  being 
incalculably  decreased  in  strength  and  deprived  of  its  most 
able  commanders.”  In  England,  the  decline  of  discipline  had 
been  followed  by  an  economical  policy  as  to  material,  grad¬ 
ually  lessening  the  numbers  and  injuring  the  condition  of 
the  fleet ;  and  after  the  little  flare-up  and  expected  war  with 
France  in  1678,  the  king  gave  the  care  of  the  navy  to  a  new 
body  of  men,  concerning  whom  an  English  naval  historian 
says :  “  This  new  administration  lasted  five  years,  and  if 


ACCESSION  OF  JAMES  II. 


175 


It  had  continued  five  years  longer  would  in  all  probability 
have  remedied  even  the  numerous  and  mighty  evils  it  had 
introduced,  by  wearing  out  the  whole  royal  navy,  and  so 
leaving  no  room  for  future  mistakes.  However,  a  just  sense 
of  this  induced  the  king,  in  1684,  to  resume  the  management 
of  the  fleet  into  his  own  hands,  restoring  most  of  the  old 
t officers;  but  before  any  great  progress  in  the  work  of  res¬ 
toration  could  be  made,  'hi&  Majesty  died,”1  —  in  1685.  The 
change  of  sovereigns  was  of  vast  importance,  not  merely  to 
the  English  navy,  but  from  the  ultimate  effect  it  was  to  have 
upon  the  designs  of  Louis  XIV.  and  the  fortune  of  the  gen¬ 
eral  war  which  his  aggressions  were  preparing.  James  II. 
was  peculiarly  interested  in  the  navy,  being  himself  a  sea¬ 
man,  and  having  commanded  in  chief  at  Lowestoft  and  South- 
wold  Bay.  He  knew  its  actual  depressed  condition  ;  and  the 
measures  he  at  once  took  to  restore  it,  both  in  numbers 
and  efficiency,  were  thoughtful  and  thorough.  In  the  three 
years  of  his  reign  very  much  indeed  was  done  to  prepare 
a  weapon  which  was  first  proved  against  himself  and  his 
best  friend. 

The  accession  of  James  II.,  which  promised  fairly  for 
Louis,  precipitated  the  action  of  Europe  against  him.  The 
House  of  Stuart,  closely  allied  to  the  King  of  France,  and 
sympathizing  with  his  absolutist  rule,  had  used  the  still 
great  power  of  the  sovereign  to  check  the  political  and  re¬ 
ligious  enmity  of  the  English  nation  to  France.  James  II. 
added  to  the  same  political  sympathies  a  strength  of  Roman 
Catholic  fervor  which  led  him  into  acts  peculiarly  fitted  to 
revolt  the  feeling  of  the  English  people,  with  the  final 
result  of  driving  him  from  the  throne,  and  calling  to  it,  by 
the  voice  of  Parliament,  his  daughter  Mary,  whose  husband 
was  William  of  Orange. 

In  the  same  year  that  James  became  king,  a  vast  diplo¬ 
matic  combination  against  France  began.  This  movement 
had  two  sides,  religious  and  political.  The  Protestant  States 
were  enraged  at  the  increasing  persecutions  of  the  French 

1  Campbell :  Lives  of  the  Admirals. 


176 


LEAGUE  OF  AUGSBURG. 


Protestants,  and  their  feelings  became  stronger  as  the  policy 
of  James  of  England  showed  itself  more  and  more  bent 
toward  Rome.  The  Protestant  northern  States,  Holland, 
Sweden,  and  Brandenburg,  drew  together  in  alliances ;  and 
they  counted  for  support  upon  the  Emperor  of  Austria  and 
Germany,  upon  Spain  and  other  Roman  Catholic  States  whose 
motives  were  political  apprehension  and  anger.  The  emperor 
had  latterly  been  successful  against  the  Turks,  thus  freeing 
his  hands  for  a  move  -against  France.  July  9,  1686,  there 
was  signed  at  Augsburg  a  secret  agreement  between  the 
emperor,  the  kings  of  Spain  and  Sweden,  and  a  number  of 
German  princes.  Its  object  was  at  first  defensive  only 
against  France,  but  it  could  readily  be  turned  into  an  of¬ 
fensive  alliance.  This  compact  took  the  name  of  the  League 
of  Augsburg,  and  from  it  the  general  war  which  followed  two 
years  later  was  called  the  War  of  the  League  of  Augsburg. 

The  next  year,  1687,  saw  yet  greater  successes  of  the 
Empire  over  the  Turks  and  Hungarians.  It  was  evident 
that  France  could  expect  no  more  from  diversions  in  that 
quarter.  At  the  same  time  the  discontent  of  the  English  and 
the  ambitions  of  the  Prince  of  Orange,  who  hoped  from  his 
accession  to  the  throne  of  England  no  ordinary  personal 
aggrandizement,  but  the  fulfilment  of  his  strongest  politi¬ 
cal  wish  and  conviction,  in  curbing  forever  the  power  of 
Louis  XIY.,  became  more  and  more  plain.  But  for  his 
expedition  into  England,  William  needed  ships,  money,  and 
men  from  the  United  Provinces  ;  and  they  hung  back,  know¬ 
ing  that  the  result  would  be  war  with  the  French  king,  who 
proclaimed  James  his  ally.  Their  action  was  at  last  decided 
by  the  course  of  Louis,  who  chose  this  moment  to  revoke 
concessions  made  at  Nimeguen  to  Dutch  trade.  The  serious 
injury  thus  done  to  Holland’s  material  interests  turned  the 
wavering  scale.  “  This  violation  of  the  conventions  of  Nime¬ 
guen,”  says  a  French  historian,1  “  by  giving  a  severe  blow  to 
Dutch  commerce,  reducing  her  European  trade  more  than 
one  fourth,  removed  the  obstacle  that  religious  passions  still 

1  Martin  :  History  of  France. 


ENGLISH  REVOLUTION. 


177 


encountered  in  material  interests,  and  put  all  Holland  at  the 
disposition  of  William,  none  having  reason  longer  to  concili¬ 
ate  France.”  This  was  in  November,  1687.  In  the  summer 
of  the  following  year  the  birth  of  an  heir  to  the  English 
throne  brought  things  to  an  issue.  English  loyalty  might 
have  put  up  with  the  reign  of  the  father,  now  advanced  in 
years,  but  could  not  endure  the  prospect  of  a  continued 
Roman  Catholic  royalty. 

Matters  had  at  last  reached  the  crisis  to  which  they  had 
been  tending  for  years.  Louis  and  William  of  Orange,  long¬ 
standing  enemies,  and  at  the  moment  the  two  chief  figures 
in  European  politics,  alike  from  their  own  strong  personali¬ 
ties  and  the  cause  which  either  represented,  stood  on  the 
brink  of  great  actions,  whose  effects  were  to  be  felt  through 
many  generations.  William,  despotic  in  temper  himself, 
stood  on  the  shores  of  Holland  looking  hopefully  toward  free 
England,  from  which  he  was  separated  by  the  narrow  belt 
of  water  that  was  the  defence  of  the  island  kingdom,  and 
might  yet  be  an  impassable  barrier  to  his  own  high  aims  ;  for 
the  French  king  at  that  moment  could  control  the  sea  if  he 
would.  Louis,  holding  all  the  power  of  France  in  his  single 
grasp,  facing  eastward  as  before,  saw  the  continent  gathering 
against  him  ;  while  on  his  flank  was  England  heartily  hostile, 
longing  to  enter  on  the  strife  against  him,  but  as  yet  without 
a  leader.  It  still  remained  with  him  to  decide  whether  he 
would  leave  the  road  open  for  the  head  to  join  the  waiting 
body,  and  to  bring  Holland  and  England,  the  two  sea  powers, 
under  one  rule.  If  he  attacked  Holland  by  land,  and  sent 
his  superior  navy  into  the  Channel,  he  might  well  keep 
William  in  his  own  country ;  the  more  so  as  the  English 
navy,  beloved  and  petted  by  the  king,  was  likely  to  have  more 
than  the  usual  loyalty  of  seamen  to  their  chief.  Faithful 
to  the  bias  of  his  life,  perhaps  unable  to  free  himself  from 
it,  he  turned  toward  the  continent,  and  September  24,  1688, 
declared  war  against  Germany  and  moved  his  armies  toward 
the  Rhine.  William,  overjoyed,  saw  removed  the  last  ob¬ 
stacle  to  his  ambition.  Delayed  for  some  weeks  by  contrary 

12 


178 


WILLIAM  LANDS  IN  ENGLAND. 


winds,  he  finally  set  sail  from  Holland  on  the  30th  of  October. 
More  than  five  hundred  transports,  with  fifteen  thousand 
troops,  escorted  by  fifty  men-of-war,  formed  the  expedition ; 
and  it  is  typical  of  its  mingled  political  and  religious  char¬ 
acter,  that  the  larger  part  of  the  army  officers  were  French 
Protestants  who  had  been  driven  from  France  since  the  last 
war,  the  commander-in-chief  under  William  being  the  Hu¬ 
guenot  Schomberg,  late  a  marshal  of  France.  The  first  start 
was  foiled  by  a  violent  storm  ;  but  sailing  again  on  the  10th 
of  November,  a  fresh,  fair  breeze  carried  the  ships  through 
the  Straits  and  the  Channel,  and  William  landed  on  the  15th 
at  Torbay.  Before  the  end  of  the  year,  James  had  fled  from 
his  kingdom.  On  the  21st  of  the  following  April,  William  and 
Mary  were  proclaimed  sovereigns  of  Great  Britain,  and  Eng¬ 
land  and  Holland  were  united  for  the  war,  which  Louis  had 
declared  against  the  United  Provinces  as  soon  as  he  heard  of 
William’s  invasion.  During  all  the  weeks  that  the  expedi¬ 
tion  was  preparing  and  delayed,  the  French  ambassador  at 
the  Hague  and  the  minister  of  the  navy  were  praying  the 
king  to  stop  it  with  his  great  sea  power,  —  a  power  so  great 
that  the  French  fleet  in  the  first  years  of  the  war  outnum¬ 
bered  those  of  England  and  Holland  combined ;  but  Louis 
would  not.  Blindness  seems  to  have  struck  the  kings  of 
England  and  France  alike ;  for  James,  amid  all  his  apprehen¬ 
sions,  steadily  refused  any  assistance  from  the  French  fleet, 
trusting  to  the  fidelity  of  the  English  seamen  to  his  person, 
although  his  attempts  to  have  Mass  celebrated  on  board  the 
ships  had  occasioned  an  uproar  and  mutiny  which  nearly 
ended  in  the  crews  throwing  the  priests  overboard. 

France  thus  entered  the  War  of  the  League  of  Augsburg 
without  a  single  ally.  “  What  her  policy  had  most  feared, 
what  she  had  long  averted,  was  come  to  pass.  England  and 
Holland  were  not  only  allied,  but  united  under  the  same 
chief ;  and  England  entered  the  coalition  with  all  the  eager¬ 
ness  of  passions  long  restrained  by  the  Stuart  policy.”  As 
regards  the  sea  war,  the  different  battles  have  much  less 
tactical  value  than  those  of  De  Ruyter.  The  chief  points 


WAR  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  AUGSBURG . 


179 


of  strategic  interest  are  the  failure  of  Louis,  having  a  de¬ 
cided  superiority  at  sea,  properly  to  support  James  II.  in 
Ireland,  which  remained  faithful  to  him,  and  the  gradual 
disappearance  from  the  ocean  of  the  great  French  fleets, 
which  Louis  XIV.  could  no  longer  maintain,  owing  to  the 
expense  of  that  continental  policy  which  he  had  chosen  for 
himself.  A  third  point  of  rather  minor  interest  is  the  pe¬ 
culiar  character  and  large  proportions  taken  on  by  the 
commerce-destroying  and  privateering  warfare  of  the  French, 
as  their  large  fleets  were  disappearing.  This,  and  the  great 
effect  produced  by  it,  will  appear  at  first  to  contradict  what 
has  been  said  as  to  the  general  inadequacy  of  such  a  warfare 
when  not  supported  by  fleets ;  but  an  examination  of  the 
conditions,  which  will  be  made  later  on,  will  show  that  the 
contradiction  is  rather  apparent  than  real. 

Taught  by  the  experience  of  the  last  conflict,  the  chief 
effort  of  the  French  king,  in  the  general  war  he  had  brought 
upon  himself,  should  have  been  directed  against  the  sea  pow¬ 
ers,  —  against  William  of  Orange  and  the  Anglo-Dutch  alli¬ 
ance.  The  weakest  point  in  William’s  position  was  Ireland ; 
though  in  England  itself  not  only  were  there  many  parti¬ 
sans  of  the  exiled  king,  but  even  those  who  had  called  in 
William  fenced  his  kingship  about  with  jealous  restrictions. 
His  power  was  not  secure  so  long  as  Ireland  was  not  sub¬ 
dued.  James,  having  fled  from  England  in  January,  1689, 
landed  in  Ireland  in  the  following  March,  accompanied  by 
French  troops  and  a  French  squadron,  and  was  enthusias¬ 
tically  welcomed  everywhere  but  in  the  Protestant  North. 
He  made  Dublin  his  capital,  and  remained  in  the  country 
until  July  of  the  next  year.  During  these  fifteen  months 
the  French  were  much  superior  at  sea ;  they  landed  troops 
in  Ireland  on  more  than  one  occasion ;  and  the  English,  at¬ 
tempting  to  prevent  this,  were  defeated  in  the  naval  battle 
of  Bantry  Bay.1  But  although  James  was  so  well  estab¬ 
lished,  and  it  was  of  the  utmost  importance  to  sustain  him ; 
although  it  was  equally  important  to  keep  William  from  get' 

1  See  Map  of  English  Channel,  etc.,  p.  107. 


180 


OPERATIONS  IN  IRELAND. 


ting  a  foothold  till  James  was  further  strengthened  and  Lon¬ 
donderry,  then  passing  through  its  famous  siege,  reduced  ; 
and  although  the  French  were  superior  to  the  united  Eng¬ 
lish  and  Dutch  on  the  seas  in  1689  and  1690 ;  nevertheless, 
the  English  admiral  Rooke  was  able,  unmolested,  to  throw 
succors  and  troops  into  Londonderry,  and  afterward  landed 
Marshal  Schomberg,  with  a  small  army,  near  Carrickfergus. 
Rooke  stopped  intercourse  between  Ireland  and  Scotland, 
where  were  many  Stuart  partisans,  and  then  with  his  small 
squadron  passed  along  the  east  coast  of  Ireland,  attempted 
to  burn  the  shipping  in  Dublin  harbor,  failing  only  through 
lack  of  wind,  and  finally  came  off  Cork,  then  occupied  by 
James,  took  possession  of  an  island  in  the  harbor,  and  re¬ 
turned  in  safety  to  the  Downs  in  October.  These  services, 
which  raised  the  siege  of  Londonderry  and  kept  open  the  com¬ 
munications  between  England  and  Ireland,  extended  through¬ 
out  the  summer  months ;  nor  was  any  attempt  made  by  the 
French  to  stop  them.  There  can  be  little  doubt  than  an 
effective  co-operation  of  the  French  fleet  in  the  summer  of 
1689  would  have  broken  down  all  opposition  to  James  in 
Ireland,  by  isolating  that  country  from  England,  with  cor¬ 
responding  injury  to  William’s  power. 

The  following  year  the  same  strategic  and  political  mis¬ 
take  was  made.  It  is  the  nature  of  an  enterprise  such  as 
James’s,  dependent  upon  a  weaker  people  and  foreign  help, 
to  lose  strength  if  it  does  not  progress;  but  the  chances  were 
still  in  his  favor,  provided  France  co-operated  heartily,  and 
above  all,  with  her  fleet.  It  is  equally  the  nature  of  a  merely 
military  navy  like  that  of  France  to  be  strongest  at  the  begin¬ 
ning  of  hostilities ;  whereas  that  of  the  allied  sea  powers  grew 
daily  stronger,  drawing  upon  the  vast  resources  of  their  mer¬ 
chant  shipping  and  their  wealth.  The  disparity  of  force  was 
still  in  favor  of  France  in  1690,  but  it  was  not  as  great  as  the 
year  before.  The  all-important  question  was  where  to  direct 
it.  There  were  two  principal  courses,  involving  two  views  of 
naval  strategy.  The  one  was  to  act  against  the  allied  fleet, 
whose  defeat,  if  sufficiently  severe,  might  involve  the  fall  of 


WAR  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  AUGSBURG. 


181 


William’s  throne  in  England ;  the  other  was  to  make  the  fleet 
subsidiary  to  the  Irish  campaign.  The  French  king  decided 
upon  the  former,  which  was  undoubtedly  the  proper  course  ; 
but  there  was  no  reason  for  neglecting,  as  he  did,  the  impor¬ 
tant  duty  of  cutting  off  the  communications  between  the  two 
islands.  As  early  as  March  he  had  sent  a  large  fleet  with  six 
thousand  troops  and  supplies  of  war,  which  were  landed  with¬ 
out  any  trouble  in  the  southern  ports  of  Ireland  ;  but  after 
performing  that  service,  the  ships  employed  returned  to  Brest, 
and  there  remained  inactive  during  May  and  June  while  the 
grand  fleet  under  the  Comte  de  Tourville  was  assembling. 
During  those  two  months  the  English  were  gathering  an  army 
on  their  west  coast,  and  on  the  21st  of  June,  William  em¬ 
barked  his  forces  at  Chester  on  board  two  hundred  and  eighty- 
eight  transports,  escorted  by  only  six  men-of-war.  On  the 
24th  he  landed  in  Carrickfergus,  and  the  ships-of-war  were 
dismissed  to  join  the  English  grand  fleet,  which,  however, 
they  were  not  able  to  do;  Tourville’s  ships  having  in  the 
mean  time  got  to  sea  and  occupied  the  channel  to  the  east¬ 
ward.  There  is  nothing  more  striking  than  the  carelessness 
shown  by  both  the  contending  parties,  during  the  time  that 
Ireland  was  in  dispute,  as  to  the  communications  of  their 
opponents  with  the  island ;  but  this  was  especially  strange  in 
the  French,  as  they  had  the  larger  forces,  and  must  have  re¬ 
ceived  pretty  accurate  information  of  what  was  going  on  from 
disaffected  persons  in  England.  It  appears  that  a  squadron 
of  twenty-five  frigates,  to  be  supported  by  ships-of-the-line, 
were  told  off  for  duty  in  St.  George’s  Channel ;  but  they 
never  reached  their  station,  and  only  ten  of  the  frigates  had 
got  as  far  as  Kinsale  by  the  time  James  had  lost  all  at  the 
battle  of  the  Boyne.  The  English  communications  were  not 
even  threatened  for  an  hour. 

Tourville’s  fleet,  complete  in  numbers,  having  seventy-eight 
ships,  of  which  seventy  were  in  the  line-of-battle,  with  twenty- 
two  fire-ships,  got  to  sea  June  22,  the  day  after  William  em¬ 
barked.  On  the  30th  the  French  were  off  the  Lizard,  to  the 
dismay  of  the  English  admiral,  who  was  lying  off  the  Isle 


182 


BATTLE  OF  BE  ACHY  HEAD. 


of  Wight  in  such  an  unprepared  attitude  that  he  had  not  even 
lookout  ships  to  the  westward.  He  got  under  way,  standing 
off-shore  to  the  southeast,  and  was  joined  from  time  to  time, 
during  the  next  ten  days,  by  other  English  and  Dutch  ships. 
The  two  fleets  continued  moving  to  the  eastward,  sighting 
each  other  from  time  to  time. 

The  political  situation  in  England  was  critical.  The  Jaco¬ 
bites  were  growing  more  and  more  open  in  their  demonstra¬ 
tions,  Ireland  had  been  in  successful  revolt  for  over  a  year, 
and  William  was  now  there,  leaving  only  the  queen  in  Lon¬ 
don.  The  urgency  of  the  case  was  such  that  the  council 
decided  the  French  fleet  must  be  fought,  and  o^H^Athat 
effect  were  sent  to  the  English  admiral,  Herbefll^^^Hpfci 
ence  to  his  instructions  he  went  out,  and  on  the  10th  of  July, 
being  to  windward,  with  the  wind  at  northeast,  formed  his  line- 
of-battle,  and  then  stood  down  to  attack  the  French,  who 
waited  for  him,  with  their  foretopsails  aback1  on  the  star¬ 
board  tack,  heading  to  the  northward  and  westward. 

The  fight  that  followed  is  known  as  the  battle  of  Beachy 
Head.  The  ships  engaged  were,  French  seventy,  English  and 
Dutch  according  to  their  own  account  fifty-six,  according  to 
the  French  sixty.  In  the  allied  line  of  battle  the  Dutch  were 
in  the  van ;  the  English,  commanded  in  person  by  Herbert, 
in  the  centre  ;  and  the  rear  was  made  up  partly  of  English 
and  partly  of  Dutch  ships.  The  stages  of  the  battle  were  as 
follows  :  — 

1.  The  allies,  being  to  windward,  bore  down  together  in 
line  abreast.  As  usual,  this  manoeuvre  was  ill  performed, 
and  as  also  generally  happens,  the  van  came  under  fire  be¬ 
fore  the  centre  and  rear,  and  bore  the  brunt  of  the  injury. 

2.  Admiral  Herbert,  though  commander-in-chief,  failed  to 
attack  vigorously  with  the  centre,  keeping  it  at  long  range. 
The  allied  van  and  rear  came  to  close  action  (Plate  VI.,  A). 
Paul  Hoste’s2  account  of  this  manoeuvre  of  the  allies  is  that 
the  admiral  intended  to  fall  mainly  on  the  French  rear.  To 
that  end  he  closed  the  centre  to  the  rear  and  kept  it  to  wind- 

1  That  is,  nearly  motionless,  2  Hoste :  Naval  Tactics. 


WIND.  N.E. 


<7 


. 


■ 


BATTLE  OF  BE  ACHY  HEAD. 


183 


ward  at  long  cannon-shot  (refused  it),  so  as  to  prevent  the 
French  from  tacking  and  doubling  on  the  rear.  If  that  were 
his  purpose,  his  plan,  though  tolerably  conceived  in  the  main, 
was  faulty  in  detail,  for  this  manoeuvre  of  the  centre  left  a 
great  gap  between  it  and  the  van.  He  should  rather  have 
attacked,  as  Ruyter  did  at  the  Texel,  as  many  of  the  rear 
ships  as  he  thought  he  could  deal  with,  and  refused  his  van, 
assigning  to  it  the  part  of  checking  the  French  van.  It  may 
be  conceded  that  an  admiral  who,  from  inferior  numbers,  can¬ 
not  spread  as  long  and  close  a  line  as  his  enemy,  should  not 
let  the  latter  overlap  the  extremities  of  his  fleet  ;  but  he 
should  attain  his  end  not,  as  Herbert  did,  by  leaving  a  great 
opening  in  the  centre,  but  by  increasing  each  interval  between 
the  ships  refused.  The  allied  fleet  was  thus  exposed  to  be 
doubled  on  at  two  points,  both  van  and  centre  ;  and  both 
points  were  attacked. 

3.  The  commander  of  the  French  van,  seeing  the  Dutch 
close  to  his  line  and  more  disabled  than  himself,  pressed  six 
of  his  leading  ships  ahead,  where  they  went  about,  and  so  put 
the  Dutch  between  two  fires  (Plate  VI.  B). 

At  the  same  time  Tourville,  finding  himself  without  adver¬ 
saries  in  the  centre,  having  beaten  off  the  leading  division 
of  the  enemy’s  centre,  pushed  forward  his  own  leading  ships, 
which  Herbert’s  dispositions  had  left  without  opponents;  and 
these  fresh  ships  strengthened  the  attack  upon  the  Dutch  in 
the  van  (B). 

This  brought  about  a  melee  at  the  head  of  the  lines,  in 
which  the  Dutch,  being  inferior,  suffered  heavily.  Luckily 
for  the  allies  the  wind  fell  calm  ;  and  while  Tourville  him¬ 
self  and  other  French  ships  got  out  their  boats  to  tow 
into  action  again,  the  allies  were  shrewd  enough  to  drop 
anchor  with  all  sail  set,  and  before  Tourville  took  in  the 
situation  the  ebb-tide,  setting  southwest,  had  carried  his 
fleet  out  of  action.  He  finally  anchored  a  league  from  his 
enemy. 

At  nine  P.  M.,  when  the  tide  changed,  the  allies  weighed  and 

i 

stood  to  the  eastward.  So  badly  had  many  of  them  been 


184 


SLUGGISH  PURSUIT  BY  THE  FRENCH. 


mauled,  that,  by  English  accounts,  it  was  decided  rather  to 
destroy  the  disabled  ships  than  to  risk  a  general  engagement 
to  preserve  them. 

Tourville  pursued  ;  but  instead  of  ordering  a  general  chase, 
he  kept  the  line-of-battle,  reducing  the  speed  of  the  fleet  to 
that  of  the  slower  ships.  The  occasion  was  precisely  one  of 
those  in  which  a  melee  is  permissible,  indeed,  obligatory.  An 
enemy  beaten  and  in  flight  should  be  pursued  with  ardor,  and 
with  only  so  much  regard  to  order  as  will  prevent  the  chas¬ 
ing  vessels  from  losing  mutual  support, — a  condition  which  by 
no  means  implies  such  relative  bearings  and  distances  as  are 
required  in  the  beginning  or  middle  of  a  well-contested  action. 
The  failure  to  order  such  general  pursuit  indicates  the  side 
on  which  Tourville’s  military  character  lacked  completeness; 
and  the  failure  showed  itself,  as  is  apt  to  be  the  case,  at  the 
supreme  moment  of  his  career.  He  never  had  such  another 
opportunity  as  in  this,  the  first  great  general  action  in  which 
he  commanded  in  chief,  and  which  Hoste,  who  was  on  board 
the  flag-ship,  calls  the  most  complete  naval  victory  ever  gained. 
It  was  so  indeed  at  that  time,  —  the  most  complete,  but  not  the 
most  decisive,  as  it  perhaps  might  have  been.  The  French, 
according  to  Hoste,  lost  not  even  a  boat,  much  less  a  ship, 
which,  if  true,  makes  yet  more  culpable  the  sluggishness  of 
the  pursuit;  while  the  allies  fled,  casting  sixteen  of  their  ships 
ashore  and  burning  them  in  sight  of  the  enemy,  who  pursued 
as  far  as  the  Downs.  The  English  indeed  give  the  allied  loss 
as  only  eight  ships,  —  an  estimate  probably  full  as  much  out 
one  way  as  the  French  the  other.  Herbert  took  his  fleet  to 
the  Thames,  and  baffled  the  enemy’s  further  pursuit  by  remov¬ 
ing  the  buoys.1 

Tourville’s  is  the  only  great  historical  name  among  the 
seamen  of  this  war,  if  we  except  the  renowned  privateersmen 
at  whose  head  was  Jean  Bart.  Among  the  English,  extraor¬ 
dinary  merit  cannot  be  claimed  for  any  one  of  the  gallant 
and  enterprising  men  who  commanded  squadrons.  Tourville, 

1  Ledyard  says  the  order  to  remove  the  buoys  was  not  carried  out  (Naval 
History,  vol.  ii.  p.  636). 


TOURVILLE'S  MILITARY  CHARACTER . 


185 


who  by  this  time  had  served  afloat  for  nearly  thirty  years, 
was  at  once  a  seaman  and  a  military  man.  With  superb 
courage,  of  which  he  had  given  dazzling  examples  in  his 
youth,  he  had  seen  service  wherever  the  French  fleets  had 
fought, —  in  the  Anglo-Dutch  war,  in  the  Mediterranean,  and 
against  the  Barbary  pirates.  Reaching  the  rank  of  admiral, 
he  commanded  in  person  all  the  largest  fleets  sent  out  during 
the  earlier  years  of  this  war,  and  he  brought  to  the  command 
a  scientific  knowledge  of  tactics,  based  upon  both  theory  and 
experience,  joined  to  that  practical  acquaintance  with  the 
seaman’s  business  which  is  necessary  in  order  to  apply  tac¬ 
tical  principles  upon  the  ocean  to  the  best  advantage.  But 
with  all  these  high  qualities  he  seems  to  have  failed,  where 
so  many  warriors  fail,  in  the  ability  to  assume  a  great  re¬ 
sponsibility.1  The  caution  in  his  pursuit  of  the  allies  after 
Beachy  Head,  though  so  different  in  appearance,  came  from 
the  same  trait  which  impelled  him  two  years  later  to  lead 
his  fleet  into  almost  certain  destruction  at  La  Hougue,  be¬ 
cause  he  had  the  king’s  order  in  his  pocket.  He  was  brave 
enough  to  do  anything,  but  not  strong  enough  to  bear  the 
heaviest  burdens.  Tourville  was  in  fact  the  forerunner  of 
the  careful  and  skilful  tacticians  of  the  coming  era,  but 
with  the  savor  still  of  the  impetuous  hard-fighting  which 
characterized  the  sea  commanders  of  the  seventeenth  cen¬ 
tury.  He  doubtless  felt,  after  Beachy  Head,  that  he  had  done 
very  well  and  could  be  satisfied  ;  but  he  could  not  have  acted 
as  he  did  had  he  felt,  to  use  Nelson’ s  words,  that  “  if  we 
had  taken  ten  ships  out  of  the  enemy’s  eleven,  and  let  the 
eleventh  escape,  being  able  to  take  her,  I  could  never  call 
such  a  good  day.” 

The  day  after  the  sea  fight  off  Beachy  Head,  with  its  great 
but  still  partial  results,  the  cause  of  James  II.  was  lost  ashore 
in  Ireland.  The  army  which  William  had  been  allowed  to 
transport  there  unmolested  was  superior  in  number  and  quality 
to  that  of  James,  as  William  himself  was  superior  as  a  leader 

1  Seignelay,  the  French  minister  of  marine  of  the  day,  called  him  “  poltron 
de  tete,  mais  pas  de  cceur.,, 


186 


CAMPAIGN  IN  IRELAND. 


to  the  ex-king.  The  counsel  of  Louis  XIY.  was  that  James 
should  avoid  decisive  action,  retiring  if  necessary  to  the  Shan¬ 
non,  in  the  midst  of  a  country  wholly  devoted  to  him.  It 
was,  however,  a  good  deal  to  ask,  this  abandonment  of  the 
capital  after  more  than  a  year’s  occupancy,  with  all  the 
consequent  moral  effect;  it  would  have  been  much  more  to 
the  purpose  to  stop  William’s  landing.  James  undertook  to 
cover  Dublin,  taking  up  the  line  of  the  river  Boyne,  and 
there  on  the  11th  of  July  the  two  armies  met,  with  the 
result  that  James  was  wholly  defeated.  The  king  himself 
fled  to  Kinsale,  where  he  found  ten  of  those  frigates  that  had 
been  meant  to  control  St.  George’s  Channel.  He  embarked, 
and  again  took  refuge  in  France,  begging  Louis  to  improve 
the  victory  at  Beachy  Head  by  landing  him  with  another 
French  army  in  England  itself.  Louis  angrily  refused,  and 
directed  that  the  troops  still  remaining  in  Ireland  should  be 
at  once  withdrawn. 

The  chances  of  a  rising  in  favor  of  James,  at  least  upon 
the  shores  of  the  Channel,  if  they  existed  at  all,  were  greatly 
exaggerated  by  his  own  imagination.  After  the  safe  retreat 
of  the  allied  fleet  to  the  Thames,  Tourville,  in  accordance 
with  his  instructions,  made  several  demonstrations  in  the 
south  of  England  ;  but  they  were  wholly  fruitless  in  drawing 
out  any  show  of  attachment  to  the  Stuart  cause. 

In  Ireland  it  was  different.  The  Irish  army  with  its 
French  contingent  fell  back,  after  the  battle  of  the  Boyne,  to 
the  Shannon,  and  there  again  made  a  stand ;  while  Louis, 
receding  from  his  first  angry  impulse,  continued  to  send 
reinforcements  and  supplies.  But  the  increasing  urgency  of 
the  continental  war  kept  him  from  affording  enough  support, 
and  the  war  in  Ireland  came  to  a  close  a  little  over  a  year 
later,  by  the  defeat  at  Aghrim  and  capitulation  of  Limerick. 
The  battle  of  the  Boyne,  which  from  its  peculiar  religious 
coloring  has  obtained  a  somewhat  factitious  celebrity,  may 
be  taken  as  the  date  at  which  the  English  crown  was  firmlv 
fixed  on  William’s  head.  Yet  it  would  be  more  accurate  to 
say  that  the  success  of  William,  and  with  it  the  success  of 


WAR  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  AUGSBURG. 


187 


Europe  against  Louis  XIV.  in  the  War  of  the  League  of  Augs¬ 
burg,  was  due  to  the  mistakes  and  failure  of  the  French 
naval  campaign  in  1690 ;  though  in  that  campaign  was  won 
the  most  conspicuous  single  success  the  French  have  ever 
gained  at  sea  over  the  English.  As  regards  the  more  strik¬ 
ing  military  operations,  it  is  curious  to  remark  that  Tourville 
sailed  the  day  after  William  left  Chester,  and  won  Beachv 
Head  the  day  before  the  battle  of  the  Boyne ;  but  the  real 
failure  lay  in  permitting  William  to  transport  that  solid  body 
of  men  without  hindrance.  It  might  have  been  favorable 
to  French  policy  to  let  him  get  into  Ireland,  but  not  with 
such  a  force  at  his  back.  The  result  of  the  Irish  campaign 
was  to  settle  William  safely  on  the  English  throne  and  estab¬ 
lish  the  Anglo-Dutch  alliance  ;  and  the  union  of  the  two 
sea  peoples  under  one  crown  was  the  pledge,  through  their 
commercial  and  maritime  ability,  and  the  wealth  they  drew 
from  the  sea,  of  the  successful  prosecution  of  the  war  by  their 
allies  on  the  continent. 

The  year  1691  was  distinguished  by  only  one  great  mari¬ 
time  event.  This  was  ever  afterward  known  in  France  as 
Tourville’s  “  deep-sea  ”  or  “  off-shore  ”  cruise  ;  and  the  mem¬ 
ory  of  it  as  a  brilliant  strategic  and  tactical  display  remains 
to  this  day  in  the  French  navy.  That  staying  power,  which 
has  already  been  spoken  of  as  distinctive  of  nations  whose 
sea  power  is  not  a  mere  military  institution,  but  based  upon 
the  character  and  pursuits  of  the  people,  had  now  come 
into  play  with  the  allies.  Notwithstanding  the  defeat  and 
loss  of  Beachy  Head,  the  united  fleets  took  the  sea  in  1691 
with  one  hundred  ships-of-the-line  under  the  command  of 
Admiral  Russell.  Tourville  could  only  gather  seventy-two, 
the  same  number  as  the  year  before.  “  With  these  he  left 
Brest  June  25.  As  the  enemy  had  not  yet  appeared  upon 
the  coasts  of  the  Channel,  he  took  up  his  cruising  ground 
at  the  entrance,  sending  lookout  ships  in  all  directions.  In¬ 
formed  that  the  allies  had  stationed  themselves  near  the  Scilly 
Islands  to  cover  the  passage  of  a  convoy  expected  from  the 
Levant,  Tourville  did  not  hesitate  to  steer  for  the  English 


188 


BATTLE  OF  LA  HOUGUE. 


coasts,  where  the  approaching  arrival  of  another  merchant 
fleet  from  Jamaica  was  equally  expected.  Deceiving  the  Eng¬ 
lish  cruisers  by  false  courses,  he  reached  the  latter  fleet,  took 
from  it  several  ships,  and  dispersed  it  before  Russell  could 
come  up  to  fight  him.  When  at  last  Tourville  was  in  pres¬ 
ence  of  the  allied  fleet,  he  manoeuvred  so  skilfully,  always 
keeping  the  weather-gage,  that  the  enemy,  drawn  far  out 
into  the  ocean,  lost  fifty  days  without  finding  an  opportunity 
to  engage.  During  this  time  French  privateers,  scattered 
throughout  the  Channel,  harassed  the  enemy’s  commerce 
and  protected  convoys  sent  into  Ireland.  Worn  out  by  fruit¬ 
less  efforts,  Russell  steered  for  the  Irish  coast.  Tourville, 
after  having  protected  the  return  of  the  French  convoys, 
anchored  again  in  Brest  Roads.” 

The  actual  captures  made  by  Tourville’s  own  fleet  were 
insignificant,  but  its  service  to  the  commerce-destroying  war¬ 
fare  of  the  French,  by  occupying  the  allies,  is  obvious ;  never¬ 
theless,  the  loss  of  English  commerce  was  not  as  great  this 
year  as  the  next.  The  chief  losses  of  the  allies  seem  to  have 
been  in  the  Dutch  North  Sea  trade. 

The  two  wars,  continental  and  maritime,  that  were  being 
waged,  though  simultaneous,  were  as  yet  independent  of  each 
other.  It  is  unnecessary  in  connection  with  our  subject  to 
mention  the  operations  of  the  former.  In  1692  there  oc¬ 
curred  the  great  disaster  to  the  French  fleet  which  is  known 
as  the  battle  of  La  Hougue.  In  itself,  considered  tactically, 
it  possesses  little  importance,  and  the  actual  results  have 
been  much  exaggerated ;  but  popular  report  has  made  it  one 
of  the  famous  sea  battles  of  the  world,  and  therefore  it  can¬ 
not  be  wholly  passed  by. 

Misled  by  reports  from  England,  and  still  more  by  the  rep¬ 
resentations  of  James,  who  fondly  nursed  his  belief  that  the 
attachment  of  many  English  naval  officers  to  his  person  was 
greater  than  their  love  of  country  or  faithfulness  to  their 
trust,  Louis  X1Y.  determined  to  attempt  an  invasion  of  the 
south  coast  of  England,  led  by  James  in  person.  As  a  first 
step  thereto,  Tourville,  at  the  head  of  between  fifty  and  sixty 


BATTLE  OF  LA  HOUGUE. 


189 


ships-of-the-line,  thirteen  of  which  were  to  come  from  Toulon, 
was  to  engage  the  English  fleet ;  from  which  so  many  deser¬ 
tions  were  expected  as  would,  with  the  consequent  demorali¬ 
zation,  yield  the  French  an  easy  and  total  victory.  The  first 
hitch  was  in  the  failure  of  the  Toulon  fleet,  delayed  by  con¬ 
trary  winds,  to  join  ;  and  Tourville  went  to  sea  with  only 
forty-four  ships,  but  with  a  peremptory  order  from  the  king 
to  fight  when  he  fell  in  with  the  enemy,  were  they  few  or 
many,  and  come  what  might. 

On  the  29th  of  May,  Tourville  saw  the  allies  to  the  north¬ 
ward  and  eastward  ;  they  numbered  ninety-nine  sail-of-the- 
line.  The  wind  being  southwest,  he  had  the  choice  of  en¬ 
gaging,  but  first  summoned  all  the  flag-officers  on  board  his 
own  ship,  and  put  the  question  to  them  whether  he  ought 
to  fight.  They  all  said  not,  and  he  then  handed  them  the 
order  of  the  king.1  No  one  dared  dispute  that ;  though,  had 
they  known  it,  light  vessels  with  contrary  orders  were  even 
then  searching  for  the  fleet.  The  other  officers  then  returned 
to  their  ships,  and  the  whole  fleet  kept  away  together  for  the 
allies,  who  waited  for  them,  on  the  starboard  tack,  heading 
south-southeast,  the  Dutch  occupying  the  van,  the  English 
the  centre  and  rear.  When  they  were  within  easy  range, 
the  French  hauled  their  wind  on  the  same  tack,  keeping  the 
weather-gage.  Tourville,  being  so  inferior  in  numbers,  could 
not  wholly  avoid  the  enemy’s  line  extending  to  the  rear  of 


1  The  author  has  followed  in  the  text  the  traditional  and  generally  accepted 
account  of  Tourville’s  orders  and  the  motives  of  his  action.  A  French  writer, 
M.  de  Crisenoy,  in  a  very  interesting  paper  upon  the  secret  history  preceding 
and  accompanying  the  event,  traverses  many  of  these  traditional  statements. 
According  to  him,  Louis  XIV.  was  not  under  any  illusion  as  to  the  loyalty  of 
the  English  officers  to  their  flag ;  and  the  instructions  given  to  Tourville,  while 
peremptory  under  certain  conditions,  did  not  compel  him  to  fight  in  the  situa¬ 
tion  of  the  French  fleet  on  the  day  of  the  battle.  The  tone  of  the  instructions, 
however,  implied  dissatisfaction  with  the  admiral’s  action  in  previous  cruises, 
probably  in  the  pursuit  after  Beaehy  Head,  and  a  consequent  doubt  of  his  vigor 
in  the  campaign  then  beginning.  Mortification  therefore  impelled  him  to  the 
desperate  attack  on  the  allied  fleet ;  and,  according  to  M.  de  Crisenoy,  the  coun¬ 
cil  of  war  in  the  admiral’s  cabin,  and  the  dramatic  production  of  the  king’s 
orders,  had  no  existence  in  fact. 


190 


DESTRUCTION  OF  FRENCH  SHIPS. 


his  own,  which  wras  also  necessarily  weak  from  its  extreme 
length ;  but  he  avoided  Herbert’s  error  at  Beachy  Head, 
keeping  his  van  refused  with  long  intervals  between  the 
ships,  to  check  the  enemy’s  van,  and  engaging  closely  with 
his  centre  and  rear  (Plate  YIa.  A,  A,  A).  It  is  not  neces¬ 
sary  to  follow  the  phases  of  this  unequal  fight;  the  extraor¬ 
dinary  result  was  that  when  the  firing  ceased  at  night,  in 
consequence  of  a  thick  fog  and  calm,  not  a  single  French 
ship  had  struck  her  colors  nor  been  sunk.  No  higher  proof 
of  military  spirit  and  efficiency  could  be  given  by  any  navy, 
and  Tourville’s  seamanship  and  tactical  ability  contributed 
largely  to  the  result,  which  it  must  also  be  confessed  was  not 
creditable  to  the  allies.  The  two  fleets  anchored  at  night¬ 
fall  (B,  B,  B),  a  body  of  English  ships  (B')  remaining  to 
the  southward  and  westward  of  the  French.  Later  on,  these 
cut  their  cables  and  allowed  themselves  to  drift  through  the 
French  line  in  order  to  rejoin  their  main  body  ;  in  doing  which 
they  were  roughly  handled. 

Having  amply  vindicated  the  honor  of  his  fleet,  and  shown 
the  uselessness  of  further  fighting,  Tourville  now  thought  of 
retreat,  which  was  begun  at  midnight  with  a  light  northeast 
wind  and  continued  all  the  next  day.  The  allies  pursued, 
the  movements  of  the  French  being  much  embarrassed  by  the 
crippled  condition  of  the  flag-ship  “  Royal  Sun,”  the  finest 
ship  in  the  French  navy,  which  the  admiral  could  not  make 
up  his  mind  to  destroy.  The  direction  of  the  main  retreat 
was  toward  the  Channel  Islands,  thirty -five  ships  being  with 
the  admiral;  of  them  twenty  passed  with  the  tidal  current 
through  the  dangerous  passage  known  as  the  Race  of  Alder¬ 
ney,  between  the  island  of  that  name  and  the  mainland,  and 
got  safe  to  St.  Malo.  Before  the  remaining  fifteen  could 
follow,  the  tide  changed ;  and  the  anchors  which  had  been 
dropped  dragging,  these  ships  were  carried  to  the  eastward 
and  to  leeward  of  the  enemy.  Three  sought  refuge  in  Cher¬ 
bourg,  which  had  then  neither  breakwater  nor  port,  the  re¬ 
maining  twelve  at  Cape  La  Hougue ;  and  they  were  all 
burned  either  by  their  own  crews  or  by  the  allies.  The 


WAR  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  AUGSBURG. 


191 


French  thus  lost  fifteen  of  the  finest  ships  in  their  navy,  the 
least  of  which  carried  sixty  guns ;  but  this  was  little  more 
than  the  loss  of  the  allies  at  Beachy  Head.  The  impression 
made  upon  the  public  mind,  accustomed  to  the  glories  and 
successes  of  Louis  XIV.,  was  out  of  all  proportion  to  the 
results,  and  blotted  out  the  memory  of  the  splendid  self- 
devotion  of  Tourville  and  his  followers.  La  Hougue  was 
also  the  last  general  action  fought  by  the  French  fleet,  which 
did  rapidly  dwindle  away  in  the  following  years,  so  that  this 
disaster  seemed  to  be  its  death-blow.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
however,  Tourville  went  to  sea  the  next  year  with  seventy 
ships,  and  the  losses  were  at  the  time  repaired.  The  decay 
of  the  French  navy  was  not  dup  to  any  one  defeat,  but  to 
the  exhaustion  of  France  and  the  great  cost  of  the  continental 
war ;  and  this  war  was  mainly  sustained  by  the  two  sea 
peoples  whose  union  was  secured  by  the  success  of  William 
in  the  Irish  campaign.  Without  asserting  that  the  result 
would  have  been  different  had  the  naval  operations  of  France 
been  otherwise  directed  in  1690,  it  may  safely  be  said  that 
their  misdirection  was  the  immediate  cause  of  things  turning 
out  as  they  did,  and  the  first  cause  of  the  decay  of  the  French 
navy. 

The  five  remaining  years  of  the  War  of  the  League  of 
Augsburg,  in  which  all  Europe  was  in  arms  against  France, 
are  marked  by  no  great  sea  battles,  nor  any  single  maritime 
event  of  the  first  importance.  To  appreciate  the  effect  of  the 
sea  power  of  the  allies,  it  is  necessary  to  sum  up  and  condense 
an  account  of  the  quiet,  steady  pressure  which  it  brought  to 
bear  and  maintained  in  all  quarters  against  France.  It  is 
thus  indeed  that  sea  power  usually  acts,  and  just  because 
so  quiet  in  its  working,  it  is  the  more  likely  to  be  unnoticed 
and  must  be  somewhat  carefully  pointed  out. 

The  head  of  the  opposition  to  Louis  XIV.  was  William  III., 
and  his  tastes  being  military  rather  than  naval  combined 
with  the  direction  of  Louis’  policy  to  make  the  active  war 
continental  rather  than  maritime  ;  while  the  gradual  with¬ 
drawal  of  the  great  French  fleets,  by  leaving  the  allied 


192 


ACTION  OF  THE  ALLIED  NAVIES. 


navies  without  enemies  on  the  sea,  worked  in  the  same 
way.  Furthermore,  the  efficiency  of  the  English  navy,  which 
was  double  in  numbers  that  of  the  Dutch,  was  at  this  time 
at  a  low  pitch ;  the  demoralizing  effects  of  the  reign  of 
Charles  II.  could  not  be  wholly  overcome  during  the  three 
years  of  his  brother’s  rule,  and  there  was  a  yet  more  serious 
cause  of  trouble  growing  out  of  the  political  state  of  England. 
It  has  been  said  that  James  believed  the  naval  officers  and 
seamen  to  be  attached  to  his  person  ;  and,  whether  justly 
or  unjustly,  this  thought  was  also  in  the  minds  of  the  present 
rulers,  causing  doubts  of  the  loyalty  and  trustworthiness  of 
many  officers,  and  tending  to  bring  confusion  into  the  naval 
administration.  We  are  told  that  u  the  complaints  made  by 
the  merchants  were  extremely  well  supported,  and  showed  the 
folly  of  preferring  unqualified  men  to  that  board  which 
directed  the  naval  power  of  England ;  and  yet  the  mischief 
could  not  be  amended,  because  the  more  experienced  people 
who  had  been  long  in  the  service  were  thought  disaffected, 
and  it  appeared  the  remedy  might  have  proved  worse  than 
the  disease.”  1  Suspicion  reigned  in  the  cabinet  and  the  city, 
factions  and  irresolution  among  the  officers ;  and  a  man 
who  was  unfortunate  or  incapable  in  action  knew  that  the 
yet  more  serious  charge  of  treason  might  follow  his  mis¬ 
adventure. 

After  La  Hougue,  the  direct  military  action  of  the  allied 
navies  was  exerted  in  three  principal  ways,  the  first  being  in 
attacks  upon  the  French  ports,  especially  those  in  the  Channel 
and  near  Brest.  These  had  rarely  in  view  more  than  local 
injury  and  the  destruction  of  shipping,  particularly  in  the 
ports  whence  the  French  privateers  issued ;  and  although 
on  some  occasions  the  number  of  troops  embarked  was  large, 
William  proposed  to  himself  little  more  than  the  diversion 
which  such  threats  caused,  by  forcing  Louis  to  take  troops 
from  the  field  for  coast  defence.  It  may  be  said  generally 
of  all  these  enterprises  against  the  French  coast,  in  this  and 
later  wars,  that  they  effected  little,  and  even  as  a  diversion 

1  Campbell :  Lives  of  the  Admirals. 


WAR  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  AUGSBURG. 


193 


did  not  weaken  the  French  armies  to  any  great  extent.  If 
the  French  ports  had  been  less  well  defended,  or  French 
water-ways  open  into  the  heart  of  the  country,  like  our  own 
Chesapeake  and  Delaware  bays  and  the  Southern  sounds, 
the  result  might  have  been  different. 

In  the  second  place,  the  allied  navies  were  of  great  direct 
military  value,  though  they  fought  no  battles,  when  Louis  XIY. 
decided  in  1694  to  make  his  war  against  Spain  offensive. 
Spain,  though  so  weak  in  herself,  was  yet  troublesome  from 
her  position  in  the  rear  of  France;  and  Louis  finally  con¬ 
cluded  to  force  her  to  peace  by  carrying  the  war  into  Cata¬ 
lonia,  on  the  northeast  coast.  The  movement  of  his  armies 
was  seconded  by  his  fleet  under  Tourville  ;  and  the  reduction 
of  that  difficult  province  went  on  rapidly  until  the  approach 
of  the  allied  navies  in  largely  superior  force  caused  Tourville 
to  retire  to  Toulon.  This  saved  Barcelona ;  and  from  that 
time  until  the  two  sea  nations  had  determined  to  make  peace, 
they  kept  their  fleets  on  the  Spanish  coast  and  arrested  the 
French  advance.  When,  in  1697,  William  had  become  dis¬ 
posed  to  peace  and  Spain  refused  it,  Louis  again  invaded, 
the  allied  fleet  did  not  appear,  and  Barcelona  fell.  At  the 
same  time  a  French  naval  expedition  was  successfully  di¬ 
rected  against  Cartagena  in  South  America,  and  under  the 
two  blows,  both  of  which  depended  upon  the  control  of  the 
sea,  Spain  yielded. 

The  third  military  function  of  the  allied  navies  was  the 
protection  of  their  sea  commerce  ;  and  herein,  if  history  may 
be  trusted,  they  greatly  failed.  At  no  time  has  war  against 
commerce  been  conducted  on  a  larger  scale  and  with  greater 
results  than  during  this  period ;  and  its  operations  were 
widest  and  most  devastating  at  the  very  time  that  the  great 
French  fleets  were  disappearing,  in  the  years  immediately 
after  La  Hougue,  apparently  contradicting  the  assertion 
that  such  a  warfare  must  be  based  on  powerful  fleets  or 
neighboring  seaports.  A  somewhat  full  discussion  is  due, 
inasmuch  as  the  distress  to  commerce  wrought  by  the  pri¬ 
vateers  was  a  large  factor  in  bringing  the  sea  nations  to  wish 

13 


194 


COMMER  CE-DES  TR  0  YING. 


for  peace  ;  just  as  the  subsidies,  which  their  commerce  en¬ 
abled  them  to  pay  the  continental  armies,  besides  keeping  up 
their  own,  were  the  chief  means  by  which  the  war  was  pro¬ 
longed  and  France  brought  to  terms.  The  attack  and  defence 
of  commerce  is  still  a  living  question. 

In  the  first  place  it  is  to  be  observed  that  the  decay  of  the 
French  fleet  was  gradual,  and  that  the  moral  effect  of  its  ap¬ 
pearance  in  the  Channel,  its  victory  at  Beachy  Head,  and  gal¬ 
lant  conduct  at  La  Hougue  remained  for  some  time  impressed 
on  the  minds  of  the  allies.  This  impression  caused  their 
ships  to  be  kept  together  in  fleets,  instead  of  scattering  in  pur¬ 
suit  of  the  enemy’s  cruisers,  and  so  brought  to  the  latter  a 
support  almost  equal  to  an  active  warfare  on  the  seas.  Again, 
the  efficiency  of  the  English  navy,  as  has  been  said,  was 
low,  and  its  administration  perhaps  worse  ;  while  treason  in 
England  gave  the  French  the  advantage  of  better  information. 
Thus  in  the  year  following  La  Hougue,  the  French,  having 
received  accurate  information  of  a  great  convoy  sailing  for 
Smyrna,  sent  out  Tourville  in  May,  getting  him  to  sea  before 
the  allies  were  ready  to  blockade  him  in  Brest,  as  they  had 
intended.  This  delay  was  due  to  bad  administration,  as  was 
also  the  further  misfortune  that  the  English  government  did 
not  learn  of  Tourville’s  departure  until  after  its  own  fleet  had 
sailed  with  the  trade.  Tourville  surprised  the  convoy  near  the 
Straits,  destroyed  or  captured  one  hundred  out  of  four  hundred 
ships,  and  scattered  the  rest.  This  is  not  a  case  of  simple 
cruising  warfare,  for  Tourville’s  fleet  was  of  seventy-one  ships  ; 
but  it  shows  the  incompetency  of  the  English  administration. 
In  truth,  it  was  immediately  after  La  Hougue  that  the  depre¬ 
dations  of  cruisers  became  most  ruinous ;  and  the  reason  was 
twofold :  first,  the  allied  fleet  was  kept  together  at  Spithead 
for  two  months  and  more,  gathering  troops  for  a  landing 
on  the  continent,  thus  leaving  the  cruisers  unmolested  ;  and 
in  the  second  place,  the  French,  not  being  able  to  send  their 
fleet  out  again  that  summer,  permitted  the  seamen  to  take 
service  in  private  ships,  thus  largely  increasing  the  num¬ 
bers  of  the  latter.  The  two  causes  working  together  gave 


WAR  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  AUGSBURG . 


195 


an  impunity  and  extension  to  commerce-destroying  which 
caused  a  tremendous  outcry  in  England.  “  It  must  be  con¬ 
fessed,”  says  the  English  naval  chronicler,  “that  our  commerce 
suffered  far  less  the  year  before,  when  the  French  were 
masters  at  sea,  than  in  this,  when  their  grand  fleet  was 
blocked  up  in  port.”  But  the  reason  was  that  the  French 
having  little  commerce  and  a  comparatively  large  number 
of  seamen,  mainly  employed  in  the  fleet,  were  able,  when 
this  lay  by,  to  release  them  to  cruisers.  As  the  pressure  of 
the  war  became  greater,  and  Louis  continued  to  reduce  the 
number  of  his  ships  in  commission,  another  increase  was 
given  to  the  commerce-destroyers.  “  The  ships  and  officers 
of  the  royal  navy  were  loaned,  under  certain  conditions,  to 
private  firms,  or  to  companies  who  wished  to  undertake 
privateering  enterprises,  in  which  even  the  cabinet  ministers 
did  not  disdain  to  take  shares ;  ”  indeed,  they  were  urged 
to  do  so  to  please  the  king.  The  conditions  generally  pro¬ 
vided  that  a  certain  proportion  of  the  profits  should  go  to 
the  king,  in  return  for  the  use  of  the  ships.  Such  employ¬ 
ment  would  be  demoralizing  to  any  military  service,  but  not 
necessarily  all  at  once ;  and  the  conditions  imparted  for  the 
time  a  tone  and  energy  to  privateering  that  it  cannot  always 
have.  In  truth,  the  public  treasury,  not  being  able  to  main¬ 
tain  the  navy,  associated  with  itself  private  capital,  risking 
only  material  otherwise  useless,  and  looking  for  returns  to  rob** 
bing  the  enemy.  The  commerce-destroying  of  this  war,  also, 
was  no  mere  business  of  single  cruisers ;  squadrons  of  three 
or  four  up  to  half  a  dozen  ships  acted  together  under  one  man, 
and  it  is  only  just  to  say  that  under  seamen  like  Jean  Bart, 
Forbin,  and  Duguay-Trouin,  they  were  even  more  ready  to 
fight  than  to  pillage.  The  largest  of  these  private  expeditions, 
and  the  only  one  that  went  far  from  the  French  shores,  wras 
directed  in  1697  against  Cartagena,  on  the  Spanish  Main. 
It  numbered  seven  ships-of-the-line  and  six  frigates,  besides 
smaller  vessels,  and  carried  twenty-eight  hundred  troops. 
The  chief  object  was  to  lav  a  contribution  on  the  city  of 
Cartagena ;  but  its  effect  on  the  policy  of  Spain  was  marked. 


196 


EFFECTS  OF  SEA  POWER. 


and  led  to  peace.  Such  a  temper  and  concert  of  action  went 
far  to  supply  the  place  of  supporting  fleets,  but  could  not 
wholly  do  so ;  and  although  the  allies  continued  to  keep  their 
large  fleets  together,  still,  as  the  war  went  on  and  efficiency 
of  administration  improved,  commerce-destroying  was  brought 
within  bounds.  At  the  same  time,  as  an  evidence  of  how 
much  the  unsupported  cruisers  suffered,  even  under  these 
favorable  conditions,  it  may  be  mentioned  that  the  English 
report  fifty-nine  sliips-of-war  captured  against  eighteen  ad¬ 
mitted  by  the  French  during  the  war,  —  a  difference  which 
a  French  naval  historian  attributes,  with  much  probability, 
to  the  English  failing  to  distinguish  between  ships-of-war 
properly  so  called,  and  those  loaned  to  private  firms.  Cap¬ 
tures  of  actual  privateers  do  not  appear  in  the  list  quoted 
from.  “  The  commerce-destroying  of  this  war,  therefore,  was 
marked  by  the  particular  characteristics  of  cruisers  acting 
together  in  squadron,  not  far  from  their  base,  while  the  enemy 
thought  best  to  keep  his  fleet  concentrated  elsewhere ;  not¬ 
withstanding  which,  and  the  bad  administration  of  the  Eng¬ 
lish  navy,  the  cruisers  were  more  and  more  controlled  as  the 
great  French  fleets  disappeared.”  The  results  of  the  war  of 
1689-1697  do  not  therefore  vitiate  the  general  conclusion  that 
“  a  cruising,  commerce-destroying  warfare,  to  be  destructive, 
must  be  seconded  by  a  squadron  warfare,  and  by  divisions  of 
ships-of-the-line;  which,  forcing  the  enemy  to  unite  his  forces, 
permit  the  cruisers  to  make  fortunate  attempts  upon  his  trade. 
Without  such  backing  the  result  will  be  simply  the  capture 
of  the  cruisers.”  Toward  the  end  of  this  war  the  real  ten¬ 
dency  was  becoming  manifest,  and  was  still  more  plainly  seen 
in  the  next,  when  the  French  navy  had  sunk  to  a  yet  lower 
state  of  weakness. 

Notwithstanding  their  losses,  the  sea  nations  made  good 
their  cause.  The  war,  which  began  with  the  French  taking 
the  offensive,  ended  by  reducing  them  everywhere  to  the 
defensive,  and  forced  Louis  to  do  violence  at  once  to  his 
strongest  prejudices  and  his  most  reasonable  political  wishes, 
by  recognizing  as  king  of  England  him  whom  he  looked  upon 


PEACE  OF  RYSWICK, 


197 


as  a  usurper  as  well  as  his  own  inveterate  enemy.  On  its 
surface,  and  taken  as  a  whole,  this  war  will  appear  almost 
wholly  a  land  struggle,  extending  from  the  Spanish  Nether¬ 
lands  down  the  line  of  the  Rhine,  to  Savoy  in  Italy  and 
Catalonia  in  Spain.  The  sea  fights  in  the  Channel,  the  Irish 
struggle  receding  in  the  distance,  look  like  mere  episodes ; 
while  the  underlying  action  of  trade  and  commerce  is  wholly 
disregarded,  or  noticed  only  as  their  outcries  tell  of  their 
sufferings.  Yet  trade  and  shipping  not  only  bore  the  burden 
of  suffering,  but  in  the  main  paid  the  armies  that  were  fight¬ 
ing  the  French ;  and  this  turning  of  the  stream  of  wealth 
from  both  sea  nations  into  the  coffers  of  their  allies  was 
perhaps  determined,  certainly  hastened,  by  the  misdirection 
of  that  naval  supremacy  with  which  France  began  the  war. 
It  was  then  possible,  as  it  will  usually  be  possible,  for  a  really 
fine  military  navy  of  superior  force  to  strike  an  overwhelming 
blow  at  a  less  ready  rival ;  but  the  opportunity  was  allowed 
to  slip,  and  the  essentially  stronger,  better  founded  sea  power 
of  the  allies  had  time  to  assert  itself. 

The  peace  signed  at  Ryswick  in  1697  was  most  disadvanta¬ 
geous  to  France ;  she  lost  all  that  had  been  gained  since 
the  Peace  of  Nimeguen,  nineteen  years  before,  with  the  single 
important  exception  of  Strasburg.  All  that  Louis  XIY.  had 
gained  by  trick  or  force  during  the  years  of  peace  was  given 
up.  Immense  restitutions  were  made  to  Germany  and  to 
Spain.  In  so  far  as  the  latter  were  made  in  the  Netherlands, 
they  were  to  the  immediate  advantage  of  the  United  Provinces, 
and  indeed  of  all  Europe  as  well  as  of  Spain.  To  the  two 
sea  nations  the  terms  of  the  treaty  gave  commercial  benefits, 
which  tended  to  the  increase  of  their  own  sea  power  and  to 
the  consequent  injury  of  that  of  France. 

France  had  made  a  gigantic  struggle ;  to  stand  alone  as  she 
did  then,  and  as  she  has  since  done  more  than  once,  against 
all  Europe  is  a  great  feat.  Yet  it  may  be  said  that  as  the 
United  Provinces  taught  the  lesson  that  a  nation,  however 
active  and  enterprising,  cannot  rest  upon  external  resources 
alone,  if  intrinsically  weak  in  numbers  and  territory,  so 


198 


CONDITION  OF  FRANCE. 


France  in  its  measure  shows  that  a  nation  cannot  subsist  in¬ 
definitely  off  itself,  however  powerful  in  numbers  and  strong 
in  internal  resources. 

It  is  said  that  a  friend  once  found  Colbert  looking  dreamily 
from  his  windows,  and  on  questioning  him  as  to  the  subject 
of  his  meditations,  received  this  reply  :  “  In  contemplating 
the  fertile  fields  before  my  eyes,  I  recall  those  which  I  have 
seen  elsewhere  ;  what  a  rich  country  is  France  !  ”  This  com 
viction  supported  him  amid  the  many  discouragements  of  his 
official  life,  when  struggling  to  meet  the  financial  difficulties 
arising  from  the  extravagance  and  wars  of  the  king ;  and  it 
has  been  justified  by  the  whole  course  of  the  nation’s  history 
since  his  days.  France  is  rich  in  natural  resources  as  well 
as  in  the  industry  and  thrift  of  her  people.  But  neither  indi¬ 
vidual  nations  nor  men  can  thrive  when  severed  from  natural 
intercourse  with  their  kind ;  whatever  the  native  vigor  of  con¬ 
stitution,  it  requires  healthful  surroundings,  and  freedom  to 
draw  to  itself  from  near  and  from  far  all  that  is  conducive  to 
its  growth  and  strength  and  general  welfare.  Not  only  must 
the  internal  organism  work  satisfactorily,  the  processes  of 
decay  and  renewal,  of  movement  and  circulation,  go  on  easily, 
but,  from  sources  external  to  themselves,  both  mind  and  body 
must  receive  healthful  and  varied  nourishment.  With  all  her 
natural  gifts  France  wasted  away  because  of  the  want  of  that 
lively  intercourse  between  the  different  parts  of  her  own  body 
and  constant  exchange  with  other  people,  which  is  known  as 
commerce,  internal  or  external.  To  say  that  war  was  the 
cause  of  these  defects  is  to  state  at  least  a  partial  truth ;  but 
it  does  not  exhaust  the  matter.  War,  with  its  many  acknowl¬ 
edged  sufferings,  is  above  all  harmful  when  it  cuts  a  nation 
off  from  others  and  throws  it  back  upon  itself.  There  may 
indeed  be  periods  when  such  rude  shocks  have  a  bracing  effect, 
but  they  are  exceptional,  and  of  short  duration,  and  they  do 
not  invalidate  the  sreneral  statement.  Such  isolation  was  the 

o 

lot  of  France  during  the  later  wars  of  Louis  XIV.,  and  it  well- 
nigh  destroyed  her  ;  whereas  to  save  her  from  the  possibility 
of  such  stagnation  was  the  great  aim  of  Colbert’s  life. 


CONDITION  OF  FRANCE . 


199 


War  alone  could  not  entail  it,  if  only  war  could  be  post¬ 
poned  until  the  processes  of  circulation  within  and  without  the 
kingdom  were  established  and  in  vigorous  operation.  They  did 
not  exist  when  he  took  office ;  they  had  to  be  both  created  and 
firmly  rooted  in  order  to  withstand  the  blast  of  war.  Time 
was  not  given  to  accomplish  this  great  work,  nor  did  Louis  XIY. 
support  the  schemes  of  his  minister  by  turning  the  budding 
energies  of  his  docile  and  devoted  subjects  into  paths  favor¬ 
able  to  it.  So  when  the  great  strain  came  upon  the  powers 
of  the  nation,  instead  of  drawing  strength  from  every  quar¬ 
ter  and  through  many  channels,  and  laying  the  whole  outside 
world  under  contribution  by  the  energy  of  its  merchants  and 
seamen,  as  England  has  done  in  like  straits,  it  was  thrown 
back  upon  itself,  cut  off  from  the  world  by  the  navies  of  Eng¬ 
land  and  Holland,  and  the  girdle  of  enemies  which  surrounded 
it  upon  the  continent.  The  only  escape  from  this  process  of 
gradual  starvation  was  by  an  effectual  control  of  the  sea ;  the 
creation  of  a  strong  sea  power  which  should  insure  free  play 
for  the  wealth  of  the  land  and  the  industry  of  the  people. 
For  this,  too,  France  had  great  natural  advantages  in  her  three 
seaboards,  on  the  Channel,  the  Atlantic,  and  the  Mediterra¬ 
nean;  and  politically  she  had  had  the  fair  opportunity  of  join¬ 
ing  to  her  own  maritime  power  that  of  the  Dutch  in  friendly 
alliance,  hostile  or  at  least  wary  toward  England.  In  the  pride 
of  his  strength,  conscious  of  absolute  control  in  his  kingdom, 
Louis  cast  away  this  strong  reinforcement  to  his  power,  and 
proceeded  to  rouse  Europe  against  him  by  repeated  aggres¬ 
sions.  In  the  period  which  we  have  just  considered,  France 
justified  his  confidence  by  a  magnificent,  and  upon  the  whole 
successful,  maintenance  of  his  attitude  against  all  Europe  ; 
she  did  not  advance,  but  neither  did  she  greatly  recede.  But 
this  display  of  power  was  exhausting ;  it  ate  away  the  life  of 
the  nation,  because  it  drew  wholly  upon  itself  and  not  upon 
the  outside  world,  with  which  it  could  have  been  kept  in  con¬ 
tact  by  the  sea.  In  the  war  that  next  followed,  the  same 
energy  is  seen,  but  not  the  same  vitality  ;  and  France  was 
everywhere  beaten  back  and  brought  to  the  verge  of  ruin. 


200 


CONDITION  OF  FRANCE. 


The  lesson  of  both  is  the  same  ;  nations,  like  men,  however 
strong,  decay  when  cut  off  from  the  external  activities  and 
resources  which  at  once  draw  out  and  support  their  internal 
powers.  A  nation,  as  we  have  already  shown,  cannot  live 
indefinitely  off  itself,  and  the  easiest  way  by  which  it  can 
communicate  with  other  peoples  and  renew  its  own  strength 
is  the  sea. 


CHAPTER  Y. 


War  of  the  Spanish  Succession,  1702-1713.  —  Sea  Battle  op 

Malaga. 

DURING  the  last  thirty  years  of  the  seventeenth  century, 
amid  all  the  strifes  of  arms  and  diplomacy,  there  had 
been  clearly  foreseen  the  coming  of  an  event  which  would  raise 
new  and  great  issues.  This  was  the  failure  of  the  direct  royal 
line  in  that  branch  of  the  House  of  Austria  which  was  then  on 
the  Spanish  throne;  and  the  issues  to  be  determined  when  the 
present  king,  infirm  both  in  body  and  mind,  should  die,  were 
whether  the  new  monarch  was  to  be  taken  from  the  House  of 
Bourbon  or  from  the  Austrian  family  in  Germany ;  and  whether, 
in  either  event,  the  sovereign  thus  raised  to  the  throne  should 
succeed  to  the  entire  inheritance,  the  Empire  of  Spain,  or  some 
partition  of  that  vast  inheritance  be  made  in  the  interests  of 
the  balance  of  European  power.  But  this  balance  of  power 
was  no  longer  understood  in  the  narrow  sense  of  continental 
possessions ;  the  effect  of  the  new  arrangements  upon  com¬ 
merce,  shipping,  and  the  control  both  of  the  ocean  and  the 
Mediterranean,  was  closely  looked  to.  The  influence  of  the 
two  sea  powers  and  the  nature  of  their  interests  were  becom¬ 
ing  more  evident. 

It  is  necessary  to  recall  the  various  countries  that  were 
ruled  by  Spain  at  that  time  in  order  to  understand  the  strate¬ 
gic  questions,  as  they  may  fairly  be  called,  now  to  be  settled. 
These  were,  in  Europe,  the  Netherlands  (now  Belgium) ;  Naples 
and  the  south  of  Italy ;  Milan  and  other  provinces  in  the  north ; 
and,  in  the  Mediterranean,  Sicily,  Sardinia,  and  the  Balearic 
Isles.  Corsica  at  that  time  belonged  to  Genoa.  In  the  west¬ 
ern  hemisphere,  besides  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico,  Spain  then 


202 


WAR  OF  THE  SPANISH  SUCCESSION. 


held  all  that  part  of  the  continent  now  divided  among  the 
Spanish  American  States,  a  region  whose  vast  commercial 
possibilities  were  coming  to  be  understood  ;  and  in  the  Asian 
archipelago  there  were  large  possessions  that  entered  less  into 
the  present  dispute.  The  excessive  weakness  of  this  empire, 
owing  to  the  decay  of  the  central  kingdom,  had  hitherto  caused 
other  nations,  occupied  as  they  were  with  more  immediate 
interests,  to  regard  with  indifference  its  enormous  extent. 
This  indifference  could  not  last  when  there  was  a  prospect  of 
a  stronger  administration,  backed  possibly  by  alliances  with 
one  of  the  great  powers  of  Europe. 

It  would  be  foreign  to  our  subject  to  enter  into  the  details 
of  diplomatic  arrangement,  which,  by  shifting  about  peoples 
and  territories  from  one  ruler  to  another,  sought  to  reach 
a  political  balance  peacefully.  The  cardinal  points  of  each 
nation’s  policy  may  be  shortly  stated.  The  Spanish  cabinet 
and  people  objected  to  any  solution  which  dismembered  the 
empire.  The  English  and  the  Dutch  objected  to  any  exten¬ 
sion  of  France  in  the  Spanish  Netherlands,  and  to  the  mo¬ 
nopoly  by  the  French  of  the  trade  with  Spanish  America, 
both  which  they  feared  as  the  results  of  placing  a  Bourbon 
on  the  Spanish  throne.  Louis  XIV.  wanted  Naples  and  Sicily 
for  one  of  his  sons,  in  case  of  any  partition  ;  thus  giving 
France  a  strong  Mediterranean  position,  but  one  which  would 
be  at  the  mercy  of  the  sea  powers,  —  a  fact  which  induced 
William  III.  to  acquiesce  in  this  demand.  The  Emperor  of 
Austria  particularly  objected  to  these  Mediterranean  positions 
going  away  from  his  family,  and  refused  to  come  into  any  of 
the  partition  treaties.  Before  any  arrangement  was  perfected, 
the  actual  king  of  Spain  died,  but  before  his  death  was 
induced  by  his  ministers  to  sign  a  will,  bequeathing  all  his 
States  to  the  grandson  of  Louis  XIV.,  then  Duke  of  Anjou, 
known  afterward  as  Philip  V.  of  Spain.  By  this  step  it  was 
hoped  to  preserve  the  whole,  by  enlisting  in  its  defence  the 
nearest  and  one  of  the  most  powerful  States  in  Europe,  —  near¬ 
est,  if  are  excepted  the  powers  ruling  the  sea,  which  are  always 
near  any  country  whose  ports  are  open  to  their  ships. 


LOUIS  XIV.  INVADES  THE  NETHERLANDS.  203 


Louis  XIY.  accepted  the  bequest,  and  in  so  doing  felt  bound 
in  honor  to  resist  all  attempts  at  partition.  The  union  of  the 
two  kingdoms  under  one  family  promised  important  advan¬ 
tages  to  France,  henceforth  delivered  from  that  old  enemy  in 
the  rear,  which  had  balked  so  many  of  her  efforts  to  extend 
her  frontiers  eastward.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  from  that  time, 
with  rare  breaks,  there  existed  between  the  two  kingdoms  an 
alliance,  the  result  of  family  ties,  which  only  the  weakness 
of  Spain  kept  from  being  dangerous  to  the  rest  of  Europe. 
The  other  countries  at  once  realized  the  situation,  and  nothing 
could  have  saved  war  but  some  backward  step  on  the  part  of 
the  French  king.  The  statesmen  of  England  and  Holland, 
the  two  powers  on  whose  wealth  the  threatened  war  must 
depend,  proposed  that  the  Italian  States  should  be  given  to 
the  son  of  the  Austrian  emperor,  Belgium  be  occupied  by 
themselves,  and  that  the  new  king  of  Spain  should  grant 
no  commercial  privileges  in  the  Indies  to  France  above  other 
nations.  To  the  credit  of  their  wisdom  it  must  be  said  that 
this  compromise  was  the  one  which  after  ten  years  of  war 
was  found,  on  the  whole,  best ;  and  in  it  is  seen  the  growing 
sense  of  the  value  of  extension  by  sea.  Louis,  however,  would 
not  yield  ;  on  the  contrary,  he  occupied,  by  connivance  of  the 
Spanish  governors,  towns  in  the  Netherlands  which  had  been 
held  by  Dutch  troops  under  treaties  with  Spain.  Soon  after, 
in  February,  1701,  the  English  Parliament  met,  and  denounced 
any  treaty  which  promised  France  the  dominion  of  the  Medi¬ 
terranean.  Holland  began  to  arm,  and  the  Emperor  of  Austria 
pushed  his  troops  into  northern  Italy,  where  a  campaign  fol¬ 
lowed,  greatly  to  the  disadvantage  of  Louis. 

In  September  of  the  same  year,  1701,  the  two  sea  powers 
and  the  Emperor  of  Austria  signed  a  secret  treaty,  which 
laid  down  the  chief  lines  of  the  coming  war,  with  the  ex¬ 
ception  of  that  waged  in  the  Spanish  peninsula  itself.  By 
it  the  allies  undertook  to  conquer  the  Spanish  Netherlands 
in  order  to  place  a  barrier  between  France  and  the  United 
Provinces ;  to  conquer  Milan  as  a  security  for  the  emperor’s 
other  provinces ;  and  to  conquer  Naples  and  Sicily  for  the 


204 


WAR  OF  THE  SPANISH  SUCCESSION. 


same  security,  and  also  for  the  security  of  the  navigation  and 
commerce  of  the  subjects  of  his  Britannic  Majesty  and  of  the 
United  Provinces.  The  sea  powers  should  have  the  right  to 
conquer,  for  the  utility  of  the  said  navigation  and  commerce, 
the  countries  and  towns  of  the  Spanish  Indies  ;  and  all  that 
they  should  be  able  to  take  there  should  be  for  them  and  re¬ 
main  theirs.  The  war  begun,  none  of  the  allies  could  treat 
without  the  others,  nor  without  having  taken  just  measures  — 
first,  to  prevent  the  kingdoms  of  France  and  Spain  from  ever 
being  united  under  the  same  king ;  second,  to  prevent  the 
French  from  ever  making  themselves  masters  of  the  Spanish 
Indies,  or  from  sending  ships  thither  to  engage,  directly  or 
indirectly,  in  commerce ;  third,  to  secure  to  the  subjects  of 
his  Britannic  Majesty  and  of  the  United  Provinces  the  com¬ 
mercial  privileges  which  they  enjoyed  in  all  the  Spanish  States 
under  the  late  king. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  in  these  conditions  there  is  no  sug¬ 
gestion  of  any  intention  to  resist  the  accession  of  the  Bourbon 
king,  who  was  called  to  the  throne  by  the  Spanish  govern¬ 
ment  and  at  first  acknowledged  by  England  and  Holland;  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  Emperor  of  Austria  does  not  withdraw 
the  Austrian  claim,  which  centred  in  his  own  person.  The 
voice  of  the  sea  powers  was  paramount  in  the  coalition,  as  the 
terms  of  the  treaty  safeguarding  their  commercial  interests 
show,  though,  as  they  were  about  to  use  German  armies  for 
the  land  war,  German  claims  also  had  to  be  considered.  As 
a  French  historian  points  out :  — 

“  This  was  really  a  new  treaty  of  partition.  .  .  .  William  III.,  who 
had  conducted  all,  had  taken  care  not  to  exhaust  England  and  Holland, 
in  order  to  restore  the  Spanish  monarchy,  intact,  to  the  emperor  ;  his 
final  condition  was  to  reduce  the  new  king,  Philip  V.,  to  Spain  proper, 
and  to  secure  to  England  and  Holland  at  once  the  commercial  use  of 
all  the  regions  that  had  been  under  the  Spanish  monarchy,  together 
with  important  military  and  maritime  positions  against  France.”  1 

But  though  war  was  imminent,  the  countries  about  to  en¬ 
gage  hesitated.  Holland  would  not  move  without  England, 

1  Martin :  History  of  France. 


DECLARATIONS  OF  WAR. 


205 


and  despite  the  strong  feeling  of  the  latter  country  against 
France,  the  manufacturers  and  merchants  still  remembered 
the  terrible  sufferings  of  the  last  war.  J ust  then,  as  the  scales 
were  wavering,  James  II.  died.  Louis,  yielding  to  a  sentiment 
of  sympathy  and  urged  by  his  nearest  intimates,  formally  rec¬ 
ognized  the  son  of  James  as  king  of  England;  and  the  English 
people,  enraged  at  what  they  looked  on  as  a  threat  and  an  in¬ 
sult,  threw  aside  all  merely  prudential  considerations.  The 
House  of  Lords  declared  that  “  there  could  be  no  security  till 
the  usurper  of  the  Spanish  monarchy  was  brought  to  reason ;  ” 
and  the  House  of  Commons  voted  fifty  thousand  soldiers  and 
thirty-five  thousand  seamen,  besides  subsidies  for  German  and 
Danish  auxiliaries.  William  III.  died  soon  after,  in  March, 
1702;  but  Queen  Anne  took  up  his  policy,  which  had  become 
that  of  the  English  and  Dutch  peoples. 

Louis  XI Y.  tried  to  break  part  of  the  on-coming  storm  by 
forming  a  league  of  neutrals  among  the  other  German  States ; 
but  the  emperor  adroitly  made  use  of  the  German  feeling,  and 
won  to  his  side  the  Elector  of  Brandenburg  by  acknowledging 
him  as  king  of  Prussia,  thus  creating  a  North-German  Protes¬ 
tant  royal  house,  around  which  the  other  Protestant  States 
naturally  gathered,  and  which  was  in  the  future  to  prove  a 
formidable  rival  to  Austria.  The  immediate  result  was  that 
France  and  Spain,  whose  cause  was  thenceforth  known  as 
that  of  the  two  crowns,  went  into  the  war  without  any  ally 
save  Bavaria.  War  was  declared  in  May  by  Holland  against 
the  kings  of  France  and  Spain ;  by  England  against  France 
and  Spain,  Anne  refusing  to  recognize  Philip  Y.  even  in  de¬ 
claring  war,  because  he  had  recognized  James  III.  as  king  of 
England ;  while  the  emperor  was  still  more  outspoken,  declar¬ 
ing  against  the  King  of  France  and  the  Duke  of  Anjou.  Thus 
began  the  great  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession. 

It  is  far  from  easy,  in  dealing  with  a  war  of  such  propor¬ 
tions,  lasting  for  more  than  ten  years,  to  disentangle  from 
the  general  narrative  that  part  which  particularly  touches 
our  subject,  without  at  the  same  time  losing  sight  of  the 
relation  of  the  one  part  to  the  whole.  Such  a  loss,  however, 


206 


WAR  OF  THE  SPANISH  SUCCESSION. 


is  fatal  to  the  end  in  view,  which  is  not  a  mere  chronicle 
of  naval  events,  nor  even  a  tactical  or  strategic  discussion 
of  certain  naval  problems  divorced  from  their  surroundings  of 
cause  and  effect  in  general  history,  but  an  appreciation  of 
the  effect  of  sea  power  upon  the  general  result  of  the  war  and 
upon  the  prosperity  of  nations.  It  will  conduce  to  clearness, 
however,  to  point  out  again  that  the  aim  of  William  III.  was 
not  to  dispute  the  claim  of  Philip  V.  to  the  throne,  —  a  matter 
of  comparative  indifference  to  the  sea  powers, —  but  to  seize, 
to  the  benefit  of  their  commerce  and  colonial  empire,  such 
portions  of  the  Spanish  American  possessions  as  he  could, 
and  at  the  same  time  to  impose  such  conditions  upon  the  new 
monarchy  as  would  at  least  prevent  any  loss,  to  English  and 
Dutch  commerce,  of  the  privileges  they  had  had  under  the 
Austrian  line.  Such  a  policy  would  not  direct  the  main 
effort  of  the  sea  nations  upon  the  Spanish  peninsula,  but 
upon  America;  and  the  allied  fleets  might  not  have  entered 
the  Straits.  Sicily  and  Naples  were  to  go,  not  to  England, 
but  to  Austria.  Subsequent  causes  led  to  an  entire  change 
in  this  general  plan.  A  new  candidate,  a  son  of  the  Emperor 
of  Germany,  was  set  up  in  1703  by  the  coalition  under  the 
name  of  Carlos  III.,  and  the  peninsula  became  the  scene  of 
a  doubtful  and  bloody  war,  keeping  the  Anglo-Dutch  fleets 
hovering  round  the  coasts ;  with  the  result,  as  regards  the  sea 
powers,  that  nothing  of  decisive  importance  was  done  in 
Spanish  America,  but  that  England  issued  from  the  strife 
with  Gibraltar  and  Port  Mahon  in  her  hands,  to  be  thence¬ 
forth  a  Mediterranean  power.  At  the  same  time  that  Carlos 
III.  was  proclaimed,  a  treaty  was  negotiated  with  Portu¬ 
gal,  known  as  the  Methuen  Treaty,  which  gave  England  the 
practical  monopoly  of  Portuguese  trade,  and  sent  the  gold  of 
Brazil  by  way  of  Lisbon  to  London,  —  an  advantage  so  great 
that  it  aided  materially  in  keeping  up  the  war  on  the  continent 
as  well  as  in  maintaining  the  navy.  At  the  same  time  the 
efficiency  of  the  latter  so  increased  that  the  losses  by  French 
cruisers,  though  still  heavy,  were  at  no  time  unendurable. 

When  the  war  broke  out,  in  pursuance  of  the  original 


CAPTURE  OF  GALLEONS  AT  VIGO. 


207 


policy,  Sir  George  Rooke,  with  a  fleet  of  fifty  ships-of-the- 
line  and  transports  carrying  fourteen  thousand  troops,  was  sent 
against  Cadiz,  which  was  the  great  European  centre  of  the 
Spanish-American  trade ;  there  came  the  specie  and  products 
of  the  West,  and  thence  they  were  dispersed  through  Europe. 
It  had  been  the  purpose  of  William  III.  also  to  seize  Carta¬ 
gena,  one  of  the  principal  centres  of  the  same  trade  in  the 
other  hemisphere  ;  and  to  that  end,  six  months  before  his 
death,  in  September,  1701,  he  had  despatched  there  a  squadron 
under  that  traditional  seaman  of  the  olden  time,  Benbow. 
Benbow  fell  in  with  a  French  squadron  sent  to  supply  and 
strengthen  the  place,  and  brought  it  to  action  north  of  Carta¬ 
gena;  but  though  superior  in  force,  the  treason  of  several 
of  his  captains,  who  kept  out  of  action,  defeated  his  purpose, 
and  after  fighting  till  his  ship  was  helpless  and  he  himself 
had  received  a  mortal  wound,  the  French  escaped  and  Carta¬ 
gena  was  saved.  Before  his  death  Benbow  received  a  let¬ 
ter  from  the  French  commodore  to  this  effect :  “  Yesterday 
morning  I  had  no  hope  but  I  should  have  supped  in  your 
cabin.  As  for  those  cowardly  captains  of  yours,  hang  them 
up,  for,  by  God  !  they  deserve  it.”  And  hanged  two  of  them 
were.  Rooke’s  expedition  against  Cadiz  also  failed,  as  it  was 
nearly  certain  to  do ;  for  his  instructions  were  so  to  act  as 
to  conciliate  the  Spanish  people  and  disincline  them  to  the 
Bourbon  king.  Such  doubtful  orders  tied  his  hands  ;  but 
after  failing  there,  he  learned  that  the  galleons  from  the 
West  Indies,  loaded  with  silver  and  merchandise,  had  put 
into  Vigo  Bay  under  escort  of  French  ships-of-war.  He 
went  there  at  once,  and  found  the  enemy  in  a  harbor  whose 
entrance  was  but  three  quarters  of  a  mile  wide,  defended  by 
fortifications  and  a  heavy  boom ;  but  a  passage  was  forced 
through  the  boom  under  a  hot  fire,  the  place  seized,  and  all 
the  shipping,  with  much  of  the  specie,  either  taken  or  sunk. 
This  affair,  which  is  known  in  history  as  that  of  the  Vigo 
galleons,  was  a  brilliant  and  interesting  feat  of  arms,  but 
has  no  military  features  calling  for  mention,  except  the  blow 
it  gave  to  the  finances  and  prestige  of  the  two  crowns. 


208 


WAR  OF  THE  SPANISH  SUCCESSION. 


The  affair  at  Yigo  had,  however,  important  political  re¬ 
sults,  and  helped  to  that  change  in  the  general  plan  of  the 
sea  powers  which  has  been  mentioned.  The  King  of  Por¬ 
tugal,  moved  by  fear  of  the  French,  had  acknowledged 
Philip  Y. ;  but  his  heart  was  against  him,  for  he  dreaded 
French  influence  and  power  brought  so  near  his  little  and 
isolated  kingdom.  It  had  been  a  part  of  Rooke’s  mission 
to  detach  him  from  the  alliance  of  the  two  crowns ;  and  the 
affair  of  Yigo,  happening  so  near  his  own  frontiers,  impressed 
him  with  a  sense  of  the  power  of  the  allied  navies.  In  truth, 
Portugal  is  nearer  to  the  sea  than  to  Spain,  and  must  fall 
naturally  under  the  influence  of  the  power  controlling  the 
sea.  Inducements  were  offered,  —  by  the  Emperor  of  Austria 
a  cession  of  Spanish  territory,  by  the  sea  powers  a  subsidy ; 
but  the  king  was  not  willing  to  declare  himself  until  the 
Austrian  claimant  should  have  landed  at  Lisbon,  fairly  com¬ 
mitting  the  coalition  to  a  peninsular  as  well  as  a  continental 
war.  The  emperor  transferred  his  claims  to  his  second  son, 
Charles  ;  and  the  latter,  after  being  proclaimed  in  Yienna 
and  acknowledged  by  England  and  Holland,  was  taken  by 
the  allied  fleets  to  Lisbon,  where  he  landed  in  March,  1704. 
This  necessitated  the  important  change  in  the  plans  of  the 
sea  powers.  Pledged  to  the  support  of  Carlos,  their  fleets 
were  thenceforth  tied  to  the  shores  of  the  peninsula  and  the 
protection  of  commerce  ;  while  the  war  in  the  West  Indies, 
becoming  a  side  issue  on  a  small  scale,  led  to  no  results. 
From  this  time  on,  Portugal  was  the  faithful  ally  of  England, 
whose  sea  power  during  this  war  gained  its  vast  preponder¬ 
ance  over  all  rivals.  Her  ports  were  the  refuge  and  support 
of  English  fleets,  and  on  Portugal  was  based  in  later  days 
the  Peninsular  war  with  Napoleon.  In  and  through  all, 
Portugal,  for  a  hundred  years,  had  more  to  gain  and  more 
to  fear  from  England  than  from  any  other  power. 

Great  as  were  the  effects  of  the  maritime  supremacy  of  the 
two  sea  powers  upon  the  general  result  of  the  war,  and  espe¬ 
cially  upon  that  undisputed  empire  of  the  seas  which  Eng¬ 
land  held  for  a  century  after,  the  contest  is  marked  by  no 


CHARACTER  OF  THE  NAVAL  STRUGGLE.  209 

one  naval  action  of  military  interest.  Once  only  did  great 
fleets  meet,  and  then  with  results  that  were  indecisive  ;  after 
which  the  French  gave  up  the  struggle  at  sea,  confining  them¬ 
selves  wholly  to  a  commerce-destroying  warfare.  This  fea¬ 
ture  of  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession  characterizes 
nearly  the  whole  of  the  eighteenth  century,  with  the  excep¬ 
tion  of  the  American  Revolutionary  struggle.  The  noiseless, 
steady,  exhausting  pressure  with  which  sea  power  acts,  cut¬ 
ting  off  the  resources  of  the  enemy  while  maintaining  its 
own,  supporting  war  in  scenes  where  it  does  not  appear  itself, 
or  appears  only  in  the  background,  and  striking  open  blows 
at  rare  intervals,  though  lost  to  most,  is  emphasized  to  the 
careful  reader  by  the  events  of  this  war  and  of  the  half- 
century  that  followed.  The  overwhelming  sea  power  of 
England  was  the  determining  factor  in  European  history 
during  the  period  mentioned,  maintaining  war  abroad  while 
keeping  its  own  people  in  prosperity  at  home,  and  building 
up  the  great  empire  which  is  now  seen;  but  from  its  very 
greatness  its  action,  by  escaping  opposition,  escapes  attention. 
On  the  few  occasions  in  which  it  is  called  to  fight,  its  supe¬ 
riority  is  so  marked  that  the  affairs  can  scarcely  be  called 
battles ;  with  the  possible  exceptions  of  Byng’s  action  at 
Minorca  and  Hawke’s  at  Quiberon,  the  latter  one  of  the 
most  brilliant  pages  in  naval  history,  no  decisive  encounter 
between  equal  forces,  possessing  military  interest,  occurs 
between  1700  and  1778. 

Owing  to  this  characteristic,  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Suc¬ 
cession,  from  the  point  of  view  of  our  subject,  has  to  be 
blocked  out  in  general  outline,  avoiding  narrative  and  in¬ 
dicating  general  bearings,  especially  of  the  actions  of  the 
fleets.  With  the  war  in  Flanders,  in  Germany,  and  in  Italy 
the  navies  had  naturally  no  concern ;  when  they  had  so  pro¬ 
tected  the  commerce  of  the  allies  that  there  was  no  serious 
check  to  that  flow  of  subsidies  upon  which  the  land  war 
depended,  their  part  toward  it  was  done.  In  the  Spanish  pen¬ 
insula  it  was  different.  Immediately  after  landing  Carlos  III. 
at  Lisbon,  Sir  George  Rooke  sailed  for  Barcelona,  which  it 

14 


210 


CAPTURE  OF  GIBRALTAR. 


was  understood  would  be  handed  over  when  the  fleets  ap¬ 
peared  ;  but  the  governor  was  faithful  to  his  king  and  kept 
down  the  Austrian  party.  Rooke  then  sailed  for  Toulon, 
where  a  French  fleet  was  at  anchor.  On  his  way  he  sighted 
another  French  fleet  coming  from  Brest,  which  he  chased  but 
was  unable  to  overtake ;  so  that  both  the  enemy’s  squadrons 
were  united  in  the  port.  It  is  worth  while  to  note  here  that 
the  English  navy  did  not  as  yet  attempt  to  blockade  the  French 
ports  in  winter,  as  they  did  at  a  later  date.  At  this  period 
fleets,  like  armies,  went  into  winter  quarters.  Another  Eng¬ 
lish  admiral,  Sir  Cloudesley  Shovel,  had  been  sent  in  the 
spring  to  blockade  Brest ;  but  arriving  too  late,  he  found  his 
bird  flown,  and  at  once  kept  on  to  the  Mediterranean.  Rooke, 
not  thinking  himself  strong  enough  to  resist  the  combined 
French  squadrons,  fell  back  toward  the  Straits  ;  for  at  this 
time  England  had  no  ports,  no  base,  in  the  Mediterranean,  no 
useful  ally ;  Lisbon  was  the  nearest  refuge.  Rooke  and  Shovel 
met  off  Lagos,  and  there  held  a  council  of  war,  in  which  the 
former,  who  was  senior,  declared  that  his  instructions  forbade 
his  undertaking  anything  without  the  consent  of  the  kings  of 
Spain  and  Portugal.  This  was  indeed  tying  the  hands  of  the 
sea  powers  ;  but  Rooke  at  last,  chafing  at  the  humiliating  inac¬ 
tion,  and  ashamed  to  go  home  without  doing  something,  de¬ 
cided  to  attack  Gibraltar  for  three  reasons  :  because  he  heard 
it  was  insufficiently  garrisoned,  because  it  was  of  infinite 
importance  as  a  port  for  the  present  war,  and  because  its 
capture  would  reflect  credit  on  the  queen’s  arms.  The  place 
was  attacked,  bombarded,  and  then  carried  by  an  assault 
in  boats.  The  English  possession  of  Gibraltar  dates  from 
August  4,  1704,  and  the  deed  rightly  keeps  alive  the  name 
of  Rooke,  to  whose  judgment  and  fearlessness  of  responsi¬ 
bility  England  owes  the  key  of  the  Mediterranean. 

The  Bourbon  king  of  Spain  at  once  undertook  to  retake 
the  place,  and  called  upon  the  French  fleet  in  Toulon  to  sup¬ 
port  his  attack.  Tourville  had  died  in  1701,  and  the  fleet 
was  commanded  by  the  Count  of  Toulouse, —  a  natural  son 
of  Louis  XI Y.,  only  twenty -six  years  old.  Rooke  also  sailed 


NAVAL  BATTLE  OF  MALAGA. 


211 


eastward,  and  the  two  fleets  met  on  the  24th  of  August  off 

Yelez  Malaga.  The  allies  were  to  windward  with  a  northeast 

* 

wind,  both  fleets  on  the  port  tack  heading  to  the  southward  and 
eastward.  There  is  some  uncertainty  as  to  the  numbers  ;  the 
French  had  fifty-two  ships-of-the-line,  their  enemy  probably 
half  a  dozen  more.  The  allies  kept  away  together,  each  ship 
for  its  opposite ;  there  was  apparently  no  attempt  on  Rooke’s 
part  at  any  tactical  combination.  The  battle  of  Malaga  pos¬ 
sesses  indeed  no  military  interest,  except  that  it  is  the  first 
in  which  we  find  fully  developed  that  wholly  unscientific 
method  of  attack  by  the  English  which  Clerk  criticised,  and 
which  prevailed  throughout  the  century.  It  is  instructive 
to  notice  that  the  result  in  it  was  the  same  as  in  all  others 
fought  on  the  same  principle.  The  van  opened  out  from  the 
centre,  leaving  quite  an  interval ;  and  the  attempt  made  to 
penetrate  this  gap  and  isolate  the  van  was  the  only  tactical 
move  of  the  French.  We  find  in  them  at  Malaga  no  trace 
of  the  cautious,  skilful  tactics  which  Clerk  rightly  thought 
to  recognize  at  a  later  day.  The  degeneracy  from  the  able 
combinations  of  Monk,  Ruyter,  and  Tourville  to  the  epoch  of 
mere  seamanship  is  clearly  marked  by  the  battle  of  Malaga, 
and  gives  it  its  only  historical  importance.  In  it  was  real¬ 
ized  that  primitive  mode  of  fighting  which  Macaulay  has 
sung,  and  which  remained  for  many  years  the  ideal  of  the 
English  navy :  — 

“  Then  on  both  sides  the  leaders 
Gave  signal  for  the  charge  ; 

And  on  both  sides  the  footmen 
Strode  forth  with  lance  and  targe ; 

And  on  both  sides  the  horsemen 
Struck  their  spurs  deep  in  gore, 

And  front  to  front  the  armies 
Met  with  a  mighty  roar.” 

Human  movement  is  not  always  advance ;  and  there  are 
traces  of  a  somewhat  similar  ideal  in  the  naval  periodical 
literature  of  our  own  day.  The  fight  was  severe,  lasting  from 
ten  in  the  morning  till  five  in  the  afternoon,  but  was  en¬ 
tirely  indecisive.  The  next  day  the  wind  shifted,  giving  the 


212 


WAR  OF  THE  SPANISH  SUCCESSION. 


weather-gage  to  the  French,  but  they  did  not  use  the  oppor- 
tunity  to  attack ;  for  which  they  were  much  to  blame,  if 
their  claim  of  the  advantage  the  day  before  is  well  founded. 
Rooke  could  not  have  fought ;  nearly  half  his  fleet,  twenty- 
five  ships,  it  is  said,  had  used  up  all  their  ammunition.  Even 
during  the  battle  itself  several  of  the  allied  ships  were  towed 
out  of  line,  because  they  had  not  powder  and  ball  for  a  single 
broadside.  This  was  doubtless  due  to  the  attack  upon  Gibral¬ 
tar,  in  which  fifteen  thousand  shot  were  expended,  and  to  the 
lack  of  any  port  serving  as  a  base  of  supplies,  —  a  deficiency 
which  the  new  possession  would  hereafter  remove.  Rooke,  in 
seizing  Gibraltar,  had  the  same  object  in  view  that  prompted 
the  United  States  to  seize  Port  Royal  at  the  beginning  of 
the  Civil  War,  and  which  made  the  Duke  of  Parma  urge 
upon  his  king,  before  sending  the  Spanish  Great  Armada,  to 
seize  Flushing  on  the  coast  of  Holland,  —  advice  which,  had 
it  been  followed,  would  have  made  unnecessary  that  dreary 
and  disastrous  voyage  to  the  north  of  England.  The  same 
reasons  would  doubtless  lead  any  nation  intending  serious 
operations  against  our  seaboard,  to  seize  points  remote  from 
the  great  centres  and  susceptible  of  defence,  like  Gardiner’s 
Bay  or  Port  Royal,  which  in  an  inefficient  condition  of  our 
navy  they  might  hold  with  and  for  their  fleets. 

Rooke  retired  in  peace  to  Lisbon,  bestowing  by  the  way  on 
Gibraltar  all  the  victuals  and  ammunition  that  could  be  spared 
from  the  fleet.  Toulouse,  instead  of  following  up  his  victory, 
if  it  was  one,  went  back  to  Toulon,  sending  only  ten  ships- 
of-the-line  to  support  the  attack  on  Gibraltar.  All  the  at¬ 
tempts  of  the  French  against  the  place  were  carried  on  in  a 
futile  manner ;  the  investing  squadron  was  finally  destroyed 
and  the  land  attack  converted  into  a  blockade.  “  With  this 
reverse,”  says  a  French  naval  officer,  “  began  in  the  French 
people  a  regrettable  reaction  against  the  navy.  The  wonders 
to  which  it  had  given  birth,  its  immense  services,  were  for¬ 
gotten.  Its  value  was  no  longer  believed.  The  army,  more 
directly  in  contact  with  the  nation,  had  all  its  favor,  all  its 
sympathy.  The  prevailing  error,  that  the  greatness  or  decay 


FALL  OF  BARCELONA. 


213 


of  France  depended  upon  some  Rhenish  positions,  could  not 
but  favor  these  ideas  adverse  to  the  sea  service,  which  have 
made  England’s  strength'  and  our  weakness.”  1 

During  this  year,  1704,  the  battle  of  Blenheim  was  fought, 
in  which  the  French  and  Bavarian  troops  were  wholly  over¬ 
thrown  by  the  English  and  German  under  Marlborough  and 
Prince  Eugene.  The  result  of  this  battle  was  that  Bavaria 
forsook  the  French  alliance,  and  Germany  became  a  second¬ 
ary  theatre  of  the  general  war,  which  was  waged  thereafter 
mainly  in  the  Netherlands,  Italy,  and  the  Peninsula. 

The  following  year,  1705,  the  allies  moved  against  Philip  V. 
by  two  roads, —  from  Lisbon  upon  Madrid,  and  by  way  of  Bar¬ 
celona.  The  former  attack,  though  based  upon  the  sea,  was 
mainly  by  land,  and  resultless  ;  the  Spanish  people  in  that 
quarter  showed  unmistakably  that  they  would  not  welcome 
the  king  set  up  by  foreign  powers.  It  was  different  in  Cata¬ 
lonia.  Carlos  III.  went  there  in  person  with  the  allied  fleet. 
The  French  navy,  inferior  in  numbers,  kept  in  port.  The 
French  army  also  did  not  appear.  The  allied  troops  invested 
the  town,  aided  by  three  thousand  seamen  and  supported  by 
supplies  landed  from  the  fleet,  which  was  to  them  both  base 
of  supplies  and  line  of  communications.  Barcelona  surren¬ 
dered  on  the  9th  of  October ;  all  Catalonia  welcomed  Carlos, 
and  the  movement  spread  to  Aragon  and  Valencia,  the  capital 
of  the  latter  province  declaring  for  Carlos. 

The  following  year,  1706,  the  French  took  the  offensive  in 
Spain  on  the  borders  of  Catalonia,  while  defending  the  passes 
of  the  mountains  toward  Portugal.  In  the  absence  of  the 
allied  fleet,  and  of  the  succors  which  it  brought  and  main¬ 
tained,  the  resistance  was  weak,  and  Barcelona  was  again 
besieged,  this  time  by  the  French  party  supported  by  a  French 
fleet  of  thirty  sail-of-the-line  and  numerous  transports  with 
supplies  from  the  neighboring  port  of  Toulon.  The  siege, 
begun  April  5,  was  going  on  hopefully  ;  the  Austrian  claim¬ 
ant  himself  was  within  the  walls,  the  prize  of  success  ;  but 
on  the  10th  of  May  the  allied  fleet  appeared,  the  French  ships 

1  Lapeyrouse-Bonfils  :  Hist,  de  la  Marine  Fra^aise. 


214 


WAR  OF  THE  SPANISH  SUCCESSION. 


retired,  and  the  siege  was  raised  in  disorder.  The  Bourbon 
claimant  dared  not  retreat  into  Aragon,  and  so  passed  by 
Roussillon  into  France,  leaving  his  rival  in  possession.  At 
the  same  time  there  moved  forward  from  Portugal  —  that 
other  base  which  the  sea  power  of  the  English  and  Dutch  at 
once  controlled  and  utilized  —  another  army  maintained  by 
the  subsidies  earned  from  the  ocean.  This  time  the  western 
attack  was  more  successful ;  many  cities  in  Estremadura  and 
Leon  fell,  and  as  soon  as  the  allied  generals  learned  the  rais¬ 
ing  of  the  siege  of  Barcelona,  they  pressed  on  by  way  of 
Salamanca  to  Madrid.  Philip  V.,  after  escaping  into  France, 
had  returned  to  Spain  by  the  western  Pyrenees  ;  but  on  the 
approach  of  the  allies  he  had  again  to  fly,  leaving  to  them 
his  capital.  The  Portuguese  and  allied  troops  entered  Ma¬ 
drid,  June  26, 1706.  The  allied  fleet,  after  the  fall  of  Bar¬ 
celona,  seized  Alicante  and  Cartagena. 

So  far  success  had  gone ;  but  the  inclinations  of  the  Spanish 
people  had  been  mistaken,  and  the  strength  of  their  purpose 
and  pride,  supported  by  the  natural  features  of  their  country, 
was  not  yet  understood.  The  national  hatred  to  the  Portu¬ 
guese  was  aroused,  as  well  as  the  religious  dislike  to  here¬ 
tics,  the  English  general  himself  being  a  Huguenot  refugee. 
Madrid  and  the  surrounding  country  were  disaffected,  and 
the  south  sent  the  Bourbon  king  assurance  of  its  fidelity. 
The  allies  were  not  able  to  remain  in  the  hostile  capital,  par¬ 
ticularly  as  the  region  around  was  empty  of  supplies  and  full 
of  guerillas.  They  retired  to  the  eastward,  drawing  toward  the 
Austrian  claimant  in  Aragon.  Reverse  followed  reverse,  and 
on  the  25th  of  April,  1707,  the  allied  army  was  disastrously  over¬ 
thrown  at  Almansa,  losing  fifteen  thousand  men.  All  Spain 
fell  back  again  into  the  power  of  Philip  V.,  except  the  prov¬ 
ince  of  Catalonia,  part  of  which  also  was  subdued.  The  next 
vear  1708,  the  French  made  some  progress  in  the  same  quar- 
ter,  but  were  not  able  to  attack  Barcelona;  Valencia  and 
Alicante,  however,  were  reduced. 

The  year  1707  was  not  marked  by  any  naval  event  of 
importance.  During  the  summer  the  allied  fleets  in  the 


SARDINIA  AND  PORT  MAHON  TAKEN. 


215 


Mediterranean  were  diverted  from  the  coast  of  Spain  to 
support  an  attack  upon  Toulon  made  by  the  Austrians  and 
Piedmontese.  The  latter  moved  from  Italy  along  the  coast 
of  the  Mediterranean,  the  fleet  supporting  the  flank  on  the 
sea,  and  contributing  supplies.  The  siege,  however,  failed, 
and  the  campaign  was  inconclusive.  Returning  home,  the 
admiral,  Sir  Cloudesley  Shovel,  with  several  sliips-of-the-line, 
was  lost  on  the  Scilly  Islands,  in  one  of  those  shipwrecks 
which  have  become  historical. 

In  1708  the  allied  fleets  seized  Sardinia,  which  from  its 
fruitfulness  and  nearness  to  Barcelona  became  a  rich  store¬ 
house  to  the  Austrian  claimant,  so  long  as  by  the  allied  help 
he  controlled  the  sea.  The  same  year  Minorca,  with  its  valu¬ 
able  harbor,  Port  Mahon,  was  also  taken,  and  from  that  time 
for  fifty  years  remained  in  English  hands.  Blocking  Cadiz 
and  Cartagena  by  the  possession  of  Gibraltar,  and  facing 
Toulon  with  Port  Mahon,  Great  Britain  was  now  as  strongly 
based  in  the  Mediterranean  as  either  France  or  Spain ;  while, 
with  Portugal  as  an  ally,  she  controlled  the  two  stations  of 
Lisbon  and  Gibraltar,  watching  the  trade  routes  both  of  the 
ocean  and  of  the  inland  sea.  By  the  end  of  1708  the  dis¬ 
asters  of  France  by  land  and  sea,  the  frightful  sufferings  of 
the  kingdom,  and  the  almost  hopelessness  of  carrying  on  a 
strife  which  was  destroying  France,  and  easily  borne  by  Eng¬ 
land,  led  Louis  XIV.  to  offer  most  humiliating  concessions 
to  obtain  peace.  He  undertook  to  surrender  the  whole  Span¬ 
ish  monarchy,  reserving  only  Naples  for  the  Bourbon  king. 
The  allies  refused ;  they  demanded  the  abandonment  of  the 
whole  Spanish  Empire  without  exception  by  the  Duke  of 
Anjou,  refusing  to  call  him  king,  and  added  thereto  ruinous 
conditions  for  France  herself.  Louis  would  not  yield  these, 
and  the  war  went  on. 

During  the  remaining  years  the  strenuous  action  of  the  sea 
power  of  the  allies,  which  had  by  this  time  come  to  be  that 
of  Great  Britain  alone,  with  little  help  from  Holland,  was  less 
than  ever  obtrusive,  but  the  reality  of  its  effect  remained. 
The  Austrian  claimant,  confined  to  Catalonia  for  the  most 


216 


WAR  OF  THE  SPANISH  SUCCESSION. 


part,  was  kept  in  communication  with  Sardinia  and  the  Ital¬ 
ian  provinces  of  Germany  by  the  English  fleet ;  but  the  entire 
disappearance  of  the  French  navy  and  the  evident  intention 
on  the  part  of  Louis  to  keep  no  squadrons  at  sea,  allowed 
some  diminution  of  the  Mediterranean  fleet,  with  the  result 
of  greater  protection  to  trade.  In  the  years  1710  and  1711 
expeditions  were  also  made  against  the  French  colonies  in 
North  America.  Nova  Scotia  was  taken,  but  an  attempt  on 
Quebec  failed. 

During  the  winter  of  1709  and  1710  Louis  withdrew  all  the 
French  troops  from  Spain,  thus  abandoning  the  cause  of  his 
grandson.  But  when  the  cause  of  France  was  at  the  very 
lowest,  and  it  seemed  as  though  she  might  be  driven  to  con¬ 
cessions  which  would  reduce  her  to  a  second-class  power,  the 
existence  of  the  coalition  was  threatened  by  the  disgrace  of 
Marlborough,  who  represented  England  in  it.  His  loss  of 
favor  with  the  queen  was  followed  by  the  accession  to  power 
of  the  party  opposed  to  the  war,  or  rather  to  its  further  con¬ 
tinuance.  This  change  took  place  in  the  summer  of  1710, 
and  the  inclination  toward  peace  was  strengthened  both  by 
the  favorable  position  in  which  England  then  stood  for  treat¬ 
ing,  and  by  the  heavy  burden  she  was  bearing;  which  it 
became  evident  could  bring  in  no  further  advantages  com¬ 
mensurate  to  its  weight.  The  weaker  ally,  Holland,  had 
gradually  ceased  to  contribute  her  stipulated  share  to  the  sea 
forces  ;  and  although  far-sighted  Englishmen  might  see  with 
complacency  the  disappearance  of  a  rival  sea  power,  the  imme¬ 
diate  increase  of  expense  was  more  looked  to  and  felt  by  the 
men  of  the  day.  The  cost  both  of  the  continental  and  Span¬ 
ish  wars  was  also  largely  defrayed  by  England’s  subsidies  ; 
and  while  that  on  the  continent  could  bring  her  no  further 
gain,  it  was  seen  that  the  sympathies  of  the  Spanish  people 
could  not  be  overborne  in  favor  of  Carlos  III.  without  paying 
more  than  the  game  was  worth.  Secret  negotiations  between 
England  and  France  soon  began,  and  received  an  additional 
impulse  by  the  unexpected  death  of  the  Emperor  of  Germany, 
the  brother  of  the  Austrian  claimant  of  the  Spanish  throne. 


BRITISH  CONDITIONS  OF  PEACE. 


217 


There  being  no  other  male  heir,  Carlos  became  at  once 
emperor  of  Austria,  and  was  soon  after  elected  emperor  of 
Germany.  England  had  no  more  wish  to  see  two  crowns 
on  an  Austrian  head  than  on  that  of  a  Bourbon. 

The  demands  made  by  England,  as  conditions  of  peace  in 
1711,  showed  her  to  have  become  a  sea  power  in  the  purest 
sense  of  the  word,  not  only  in  fact,  but  also  in  her  own  con¬ 
sciousness.  She  required  that  the  same  person  should  never 
be  king  both  of  France  and  Spain  ;  that  a  barrier  of  fortified 
towns  should  be  granted  her  allies,  Holland  and  Germany, 
as  a  defensive  line  against  France ;  that  French  conquests 
from  her  allies  should  be  restored ;  and  for  herself  she  de¬ 
manded  the  formal  cession  of  Gibraltar  and  Port  Mahon, 
whose  strategic  and  maritime  value  has  been  pointed  out,  the 
destruction  of  the  port  of  Dunkirk,  the  home  nest  of  the  pri¬ 
vateers  that  preyed  on  English  commerce,  the  cession  of  the 
French  colonies  of  Newfoundland,  Hudson’s  Bay,  and  Nova 
Scotia,  the  last  of  which  she  held  at  that  time,  and  finally, 
treaties  of  commerce  with  France  and  Spain,  and  the  conces¬ 
sion  of  the  monopoly  of  the  slave  trade  with  Spanish  Amer¬ 
ica,  known  as  the  Asiento,  which  Spain  had  given  to  France 
in  1701. 

Negotiations  continued,  though  hostilities  did  not  cease  ; 
and  in  June,  1712,  a  four  months’  truce  between  Great  Britain 
and  France  removed  the  English  troops  from  the  allied  armies 
on  the  continent,  their  great  leader  Marlborough  having  been 
taken  from  their  head  the  year  before.  The  campaign  of  1712 
was  favorable  to  France ;  but  in  almost  any  event  the  with¬ 
drawal  of  Great  Britain  made  the  end  of  the  war  a  question  of 
but  a  short  time.  The  remonstrances  of  Holland  were  met 
by  the  reply  that  since  1707  the  Dutch  had  not  furnished 
more  than  one  third  their  quota  of  ships,  and  taking  the  war 
through,  not  over  one  half.  The  House  of  Commons  in  an 
address  to  the  throne  in  1712  complained  that  — 

“  The  service  at  sea  hath  been  carried  on  through  the  whole  course 
of  the  war  in  a  manner  highly  disadvantageous  to  your  Majesty’s 
kingdom,  for  the  necessity  requiring  that  great  fleets  should  be  fitted 


218 


PEACE  OF  UTRECHT. 


out  every  year  for  maintaining  a  superiority  in  the  Mediterranean 
and  for  opposing  any  force  which  the  enemy  might  prepare  either  at 
Dunkirk  or  in  the  ports  of  west  France ;  your  Majesty’s  readiness, 
in  fitting  out  your  proportion  of  ships  for  all  parts  of  that  service, 
hath  not  prevailed  with  Holland,  which  has  been  greatly  deficient 
every  year  in  proportion  to  what  your  Majesty  hath  furnished.  .  .  . 
Hence  your  Majesty  hath  been  obliged  to  supply  those  deficiencies 
with  additional  reinforcements  of  your  own  ships,  and  your  Majesty’s 
ships  have  been  forced  in  greater  numbers  to  continue  in  remote  seas, 
and  at  unseasonable  times  of  the  year,  to  the  great  damage  of  the 
navy.  This  also  hath  straitened  the  convoys  for  trade ;  the  coasts 
have  been  exposed  for  want  of  cruisers  ;  and  you  have  been  disabled 
from  annoying  the  enemy  in  their  most  beneficial  commerce  with  the 
West  Indies,  whence  they  received  those  vast  supplies  of  treasure, 
without  which  they  could  not  have  supported  the  expenses  of  the 
war.” 

In  fact,  between  1701  and  1716  the  commerce  of  Spanish 
America  had  brought  into  France  forty  million  dollars  in 
specie.  To  these  complaints  the  Dutch  envoy  to  England 
could  only  reply  that  Holland  was  not  in  a  condition  to  fulfil 
her  compacts.  The  reverses  of  1712,  added  to  Great  Brit¬ 
ain’s  fixed  purpose  to  have  peace,  decided  the  Dutch  to  the 
same ;  and  the  English  still  kept,  amid  their  dissatisfaction 
with  their  allies,  so  much  of  their  old  feeling  against  France 
as  to  support  all  the  reasonable  claims  of  Holland.  April 
11,  1713,  an  almost  general  peace,  known  as  the  Peace  of 
Utrecht,  one  of  the  landmarks  of  history,  was  signed  be¬ 
tween  France  on  the  one  hand,  and  England,  Holland,  Prus¬ 
sia,  Portugal,  and  Savoy  on  the  other.  The  emperor  still 
held  out,  but  the  loss  of  British  subsidies  fettered  the  move¬ 
ments  of  his  armies,  and  with  the  withdrawal  of  the  sea 
powers  the  continental  war  might  have  fallen  of  itself ;  but 
France  with  her  hands  freed  carried  on  during  1713  a  bril¬ 
liant  and  successful  campaign  in  Germany.  On  the  7tli  of 
March,  1714,  peace  was  signed  between  France  and  Austria. 
Some  embers  of  the  war  continued  to  burn  in  Catalonia  and 
the  Balearic  Islands,  which  persisted  in  their  rebellion  against 
Philip  Y. ;  but  the  revolt  was  stifled  as  soon  as  the  arms  of 


RESULTS  OF  THE  WAR  TO  FRANCE  AND  SPAIN.  219 

France  were  turned  against  them.  Barcelona  was  taken  by 
storm  in  September,  1714;  the  islands  submitted  in  the  follow¬ 
ing  summer. 

The  changes  effected  by  this  long  war  and  sanctioned  by 
the  peace,  neglecting  details  of  lesser  or  passing  importance, 
may  be  stated  as  follows  :  1.  The  House  of  Bourbon  was 
settled  on  the  Spanish  throne,  and  the  Spanish  empire 
retained  its  West  Indian  and  American  possessions ;  the 
purpose  of  William  III.  against  her  dominion  there  was  frus¬ 
trated  when  England  undertook  to  support  the  Austrian 
prince,  and  so  fastened  the  greater  part  of  her  naval  force 
to  the  Mediterranean.  2.  The  Spanish  empire  lost  its  pos¬ 
sessions  in  the  Netherlands,  Gelderland  going  to  the  new 
kingdom  of  Prussia  and  Belgium  to  the  emperor ;  the 
Spanish  Netherlands  thus  became  the  Austrian  Netherlands. 
3.  Spain  lost  also  the  principal  islands  of  the  Mediterranean  ; 
Sardinia  being  given  to  Austria,  Minorca  with  its  fine  harbor 
to  Great  Britain,  and  Sicily  to  the  Duke  of  Savoy.  4.  Spain 
lost  also  her  Italian  possessions,  Milan  and  Naples  going  to 
the  emperor.  Such,  in  the  main,  were  the  results  to  Spain  of 
the  fight  over  the  succession  to  her  throne. 

France,  the  backer  of  the  successful  claimant,  came  out 
of  the  strife  worn  out,  and  with  considerable  loss  of  terri¬ 
tory.  She  had  succeeded  in  placing  a  king  of  her  own  royal 
house  on  a  neighboring  throne,  but  her  sea  strength  was  ex¬ 
hausted,  her  population  diminished,  her  financial  condition 
ruined.  The  European  territory  surrendered  was  on  her 
northern  and  eastern  boundaries  ;  and  she  abandoned  the  use 
of  the  port  of  Dunkirk,  the  centre  of  that  privateering  warfare 
so  dreaded  by  English  merchants.  In  America,  the  cession 
of  Nova  Scotia  and  Newfoundland  was  the  first  step  toward 
that  entire  loss  of  Canada  which  befell  half  a  century  later ; 
but  for  the  present  she  retained  Cape  Breton  Island,  with  its 
port  Louisburg,  the  key  to  the  Gulf  and  River  St.  Lawrence. 

The  gains  of  England,  by  the  treaty  and  the  war,  corre¬ 
sponded  very  nearly  to  the  losses  of  France  and  Spain,  and  were 
all  in  the  direction  of  extending  and  strengthening  her  sea 


220 


RESULTS  OF  THE  WAR  TO 


power.  Gibraltar  and  Port  Mahon  in  the  Mediterranean,  and 
the  colonies  already  mentioned  in  North  America,  afforded 
new  bases  to  that  power,  extending  and  protecting  her  trade. 
Second  only  to  the  expansion  of  her  own  was  the  injury  to 
the  sea  power  of  France  and  Holland,  by  the  decay  of  their 
navies  in  consequence  of  the  immense  drain  of  the  land  war¬ 
fare  ;  further  indications  of  that  decay  will  be  given  later. 
The  very  neglect  of  Holland  to  fill  up  her  quota  of  ships,  and 
the  bad  condition  of  those  sent,  while  imposing  extra  bur¬ 
dens  upon  England,  may  be  considered  a  benefit,  forcing  the 
British  navy  to  greater  development  and  effort.  The  dispro¬ 
portion  in  military  power  on  the  sea  was  further  increased 
by  the  destruction  of  the  works  at  Dunkirk  ;  for  though  not 
in  itself  a  first-class  port,  nor  of  much  depth  of  water,  it  had 
great  artificial  military  strength,  and  its  position  was  pecu¬ 
liarly  adapted  to  annoy  English  trade.  It  was  but  forty 
miles  from  the  South  Foreland  and  the  Downs,  and  the 
Channel  abreast  it  is  but  twenty  miles  wide.  Dunkirk 
was  one  of  Louis’  earliest  acquisitions,  and  in  its  develop¬ 
ment  was  as  his  own  child  ;  the  dismantling  of  the  works 
and  filling-in  of  the  port  show  the  depth  of  his  humiliation 
at  this  time.  But  it  was  the  wisdom  of  England  not  to  base 
her  sea  power  solely  on  military  positions  nor  even  on  fighting- 
ships,  and  the  commercial  advantages  she  had  now  gained 
by  the  war  and  the  peace  were  very  great.  The  grant  of  the 
slave  trade  with  Spanish  America,  in  itself  lucrative,  became 
yet  more  so  as  the  basis  for  an  immense  smuggling  inter¬ 
course  with  those  countries,  which  gave  the  English  a  par¬ 
tial  recompense  for  their  failure  to  obtain  actual  possession ; 
while  the  cessions  made  to  Portugal  by  France  in  South 
America  were  mainly  to  the  advantage  of  England,  which 
had  obtained  the  control  of  Portuguese  trade  by  the  treaty 
of  1703.  The  North  American  colonies  ceded  were  valuable, 
not  merely  nor  chiefly  as  military  stations,  but  commercially ; 
and  treaties  of  commerce  on  favorable  terms  were  made  both 
with  France  and  Spain.  A  minister  of  the  day,  defending  the 
treaty  in  Parliament,  said  :  “  The  advantages  from  this  peace 


ENGLAND  AND  HOLLAND. 


221 


appear  in  the  addition  made  to  our  wealth  ;  in  the  great 
quantities  of  bullion  lately  coined  in  our  mint ;  by  the  vast 
increase  in  our  shipping  employed  since  the  peace,  in  the  fish¬ 
eries,  and  in  merchandise;  and  by  the  remarkable  growth  of 
the  customs  upon  imports,  and  of  our  manufactures,  and 
the  growth  of  our  country  upon  export ;  ”  in  a  word,  by  the 
impetus  to  trade  in  all  its  branches. 

While  England  thus  came  out  from  the  war  in  good  run¬ 
ning  condition,  and  fairly  placed  in  that  position  of  mari¬ 
time  supremacy  which  she  has  so  long  maintained,  her  old 
rival  in  trade  and  fighting  was  left  hopelessly  behind.  As 
the  result  of  the  war  Holland  obtained  nothing  at  sea,  — 
no  colony,  no  station.  The  commercial  treaty  with  France 
placed  her  on  the  same  terms  as  England,  but  she  received 
no  concessions  giving  her  a  footing  in  Spanish  America  like 
that  obtained  by  her  ally.  Indeed,  some  years  before  the 
peace,  while  the  coalition  was  still  maintaining  Carlos,  a 
treaty  was  made  with  the  latter  by  the  British  minister, 
unknown  to  the  Dutch,  practically  giving  the  British  mo¬ 
nopoly  of  Spanish  trade  in  America  ;  sharing  it  only  with 
Spaniards,  which  was  pretty  much  the  same  as  not  sharing 
it  at  all.  This  treaty  accidentally  became  known,  and  made 
a  great  impression  on  the  Dutch ;  but  England  was  then  so 
necessary  to  the  coalition  that  she  ran  no  risk  of  being  left 
out  by  its  other  members.  The  gain  which  Holland  made 
by  land  was  that  of  military  occupation  only,  of  certain  for¬ 
tified  places  in  the  Austrian  Netherlands,  known  to  his¬ 
tory  as  the  “  barrier  towns  ;  ”  nothing  was  added  by  them 
to  her  revenue,  population,  or  resources ;  nothing  to  that 
•  national  strength  which  must  underlie  military  institutions. 
'Holland  had  forsaken,  perhaps  unavoidably,  the  path  by 
which  she  had  advanced  to  wealth  and  to  leadership  among 
nations.  The  exigencies  of  her  continental  position  had  led 
to  the  neglect  of  her  navy,  which  in  those  days  of  war  ana 
privateering  involved  a  loss  of  carrying-trade  and  commerce ; 
and  although  she  held  her  head  high  through  the  war,  the 
symptoms  of  weakness  were  apparent  in  her  failing  arma- 


222 


GAINS  OF  AUSTRIA. 


merits.  Therefore,  though  the  United  Provinces  attained 
the  great  object  for  which  they  began  the  war,  and  saved 
the  Spanish  Netherlands  from  the  hands  of  France,  the 
success  was  not  worth  the  cost.  Thenceforth  they  withdrew 
for  a  long  period  from  the  wars  and  diplomacy  of  Europe ; 
partly,  perhaps,  because  they  saw  how  little  they  had  gained, 
but  yet  more  from  actual  weakness  and  inability.  After  the 
strenuous  exertions  of  the  war  came  a  reaction,  which  showed 
painfully  the  inherent  weakness  of  a  State  narrow  in  ter¬ 
ritory  and  small  in  the  number  of  its  people.  The  visible 
decline  of  the  Provinces  dates  from  the  Peace  of  Utrecht ;  the 
real  decline  began  earlier.  Holland  ceased  to  be  numbered 
among  the  great  powers  of  Europe,  her  navy  was  no  longer 
a  military  factor  in  diplomacy,  and  her  commerce  also  shared 
in  the  general  decline  of  the  State. 

It  remains  only  to  notice  briefly  the  results  to  Austria, 
and  to  Germany  generally.  France  yielded  the  barrier  of 
the  Rhine,  with  fortified  places  on  the  east  bank  of  the  river. 
Austria  received,  as  has  been  mentioned,  Belgium,  Sardinia, 
Naples,  and  the  Spanish  possessions  in  northern  Italy  ;  dis¬ 
satisfied  in  other  respects,  Austria  was  especially  discontented 
at  her  failure  to  obtain  Sicily,  and  did  not  cease  negotiating 
afterward,  until  she  had  secured  that  island.  A  circumstance 
more  important  to  Germany  and  to  all  Europe  than  this  transi¬ 
tory  acquisition  of  distant  and  alien  countries  by  Austria  was 
the  rise  of  Prussia,  which  dates  from  this  war  as  a  Protestant 
and  military  kingdom  destined  to  weigh  in  the  balance  against 
Austria. 

■f-  Such  were  the  leading  results  of  the  War  of  the  Spanish 
Succession,  “  the  vastest  yet  witnessed  by  Europe  since  the 
Crusades.”  It  was  a  war  whose  chief  military  interest  was 
on  the  land,  —  a  war  in  which  fought  two  of  the  greatest 
generals  of  all  times,  Marlborough  and  Prince  Eugene,  the 
names  of  whose  battles,  Blenheim,  Ramillies,  Malplaquet, 
Turin,  are  familiar  to  the  most  casual  reader  of  history ; 
while  a  multitude  of  able  men  distinguished  themselves  on 
the  other  theatres  of  the  strife,  in  Flanders,  in  Germany,  in 


RESULTS  OF  THE  WAR. 


223 


Italy,  in  Spain.  On  the  sea  only  one  great  battle,  and  that 
scarcely  worthy  of  the  name,  took  place.  Yet  looking  only, 
for  the  moment,  to  immediate  and  evident  results,  who  reaped 
the  benefit  ?  Was  it  France,  whose  only  gain  was  to  seat  a 
Bourbon  on  the  Spanish  throne  ?  Was  it  Spain,  whose  only 
gain  was  to  have  a  Bourbon  king  instead  of  an  Austrian, 
and  thus  a  closer  alliance  with  France  ?  Was  it  Holland, 
with  its  barrier  of  fortified  towns,  its  ruined  navy,  and  its  ex¬ 
hausted  people  ?  Was  it,  lastly,  Austria,  even  though  she  had 
fought  with  the  money  of  the  sea  powers,  and  gained  such 
maritime  States  as  the  Netherlands  and  Naples?  Was  it  with 
these,  who  had  waged  war  more  and  more  exclusively  by  land, 
and  set  their  eyes  more  and  more  on  gains  on  the  land,  or  was 
it  not  rather  with  England,  who  had  indeed  paid  for  that  con¬ 
tinental  war  and  even  backed  it  with  her  troops,  but  who  mean¬ 
while  was  building  up  her  navy,  strengthening,  extending, 
and  protecting  her  commerce,  seizing  maritime  positions,  —  in 
a  word,  founding  and  rearing  her  sea  power  upon  the  ruins 
of  that  of  her  rivals,  friend  and  foe  alike  ?  It  is  not  to  de¬ 
preciate  the  gains  of  others  that  the  eye  fixes  on  England’s 
naval  growth  ;  their  gains  but  bring  out  more  clearly  the 
immenseness  of  hers.  It  was  a  gain  to  France  to  have  a 
friend  rather  than  an  enemy  in  her  rear,  though  her  navy 
and  shipping  were  ruined.  It  was  a  gain  to  Spain  to  be 
brought  in  close  intercourse  with  a  living  country  like 
France  after  a  century  of  political  death,  and  she  had  saved 
the  greater  part  of  her  threatened  possessions.  It  was  a 
gain  to  Holland  to  be  definitively  freed  from  French  aggres¬ 
sion,  with  Belgium  in  the  hands  of  a  strong  instead  of  a 
weak  State.  And  it  doubtless  was  a  gain  to  Austria  not 
only  to  have  checked,  chiefly  at  the  expense  of  others,  the 
progress  of  her  hereditary  enemy,  but  also  to  have  received 
provinces  like  Sicily  and  Naples,  which,  under  wise  gov¬ 
ernment,  might  become  the  foundation  of  a  respectable  sea 
power.  But  not  one  of  these  gains,  nor  all  together,  com¬ 
pared  in  greatness,  and  much  less  in  solidity,  with  the  gain 
to  England  of  that  unequalled  sea  power  which  started  ahead 


224 


COMMANDING  POSITION  OF  ENGLAND. 


during  the  War  of  the  League  of  Augsburg,  and  received  its 
completeness  and  seal  during  that  of  the  Spanish  Succession. 
By  it  she  controlled  the  great  commerce  of  the  open  sea  with 
a  military  shipping  that  had  no  rival,  and  in  the  exhausted 
condition  of  the  other  nations  could  have  none ;  and  that 
shipping  was  now  securely  based  on  strong  positions  in  all 
the  disputed  quarters  of  the  world.  Although  her  Indian 
empire  was  not  yet  begun,  the  vast  superiority  of  her  navy 
would  enable  her  to  control  the  communications  of  other 
nations  with  those  rich  and  distant  regions,  and  to  assert 
her  will  in  any  disputes  arising  among  the  trading-stations 
of  the  different  nationalities.  The  commerce  which  had  sus¬ 
tained  her  in  prosperity,  and  her  allies  in  military  efficiency, 
during  the  war,  though  checked  and  harassed  by  the  enemy’s 
cruisers  (to  which  she  could  pay  only  partial  attention  amid 
the  many -claims  upon  her),  started  with  a  bound  into  new 
life  when  the  war  was  over.  All  over  the  world,  exhausted 
by  their  share  of  the  common  suffering,  people  were  long¬ 
ing  for  the  return  of  prosperity  and  peaceful  commerce ;  and 
there  was  no  country  ready  as  England  was  in  wealth,  capital, 
and  shipping  to  forward  and  reap  the  advantages  of  every 
enterprise  by  which  the  interchange  of  commodities  was  pro¬ 
moted,  either  by  lawful  or  unlawful  means.  In  the  War  of 
the  Spanish  Succession,  by  her  own  wise  management  and 
through  the  exhaustion  of  other  nations,  not  only  her  navy 
but  her  trade  was  steadily  built  up ;  and  indeed,  in  that 
dangerous  condition  of  the  seas,  traversed  by  some  of  the 
most  reckless  and  restless  cruisers  France  ever  sent  out,  the 
efficiency  of  the  navy  meant  safer  voyages,  and  so  more  em¬ 
ployment  for  the  merchant-ships.  The  British  merchant- 
ships,  being  better  protected  than  those  of  the  Dutch,  gained 
the  reputation  of  being  far  safer  carriers,  and  the  carrying- 
trade  naturally  passed  more  and  more  into  their  hands ;  while 
the  habit  of  employing  them  in  preference,  once  established, 
was  likely  to  continue. 

u  Taking  all  things  together,”  says  an  historian  of  the  British 
navy,  “  I  doubt  whether  the  credit  of  the  English  nation  ever 


COMMANDING  POSITION  OF  ENGLAND. 


225 


stood  higher  than  at  this  period,  or  the  spirit  of  the  people  higher. 
The  success  of  our  arms  at  sea,  the  necessity  of  protecting  our 
trade,  and  the  popularity  of  every  step  taken  to  increase  our  mari¬ 
time  power,  occasioned  such  measures  to  be  pursued  as  annually 
added  to  our  force.  Hence  arose  that  mighty  difference  which  at 
the  close  of  the  year  1706  appeared  in  the  Royal  Navy;  this,  not 
only  in  the  number  but  in  the  quality  of  the  ships,  was  much  supe¬ 
rior  to  what  it  had  been  at  the  time  of  the  Revolution  or  even  before. 
Hence  it  was  that  our  trade  rather  increased  than  diminished  during 
the  last  war,  and  that  we  gained  so  signally  by  our  strict  intercourse 
with  Portugal.”  1 

The  sea  power  of  England  therefore  was  not  merely  in  the 
great  navy,  with  which  we  too  commonly  and  exclusively 
associate  it ;  France  had  had  such  a  navy  in  1688,  and  it 
shrivelled  away  like  a  leaf  in  the  fire.  Neither  was  it  in  a 
prosperous  commerce  alone  ;  a  few  years  after  the  date  at 
which  we  have  arrived,  the  commerce  of  France  took  on  fair 
proportions,  but  the  first  blast  of  war  swept  it  off  the  seas 
as  the  navy  of  Cromwell  had  once  swept  that  of  Holland. 
It  was  in  the  union  of  the  two,  carefully  fostered,  that  Eng¬ 
land  made  the  gain  of  sea  power  over  and  beyond  all  other 
States  ;  and  this  gain  is  distinctly  associated  with  and  dates 
from  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession.  Before  that  war 
England  was  one  of  the  sea  powers ;  after  it  she  was  the  sea 
power,  without  any  second.  This  power  also  she  held  alone, 
unshared  by  friend  and  unchecked  by  foe.  She  alone  was 
rich,  and  in  her  control  of  the  sea  and  her  extensive  ship¬ 
ping  had  the  sources  of  wealth  so  much  in  her  hands  that 
there  was  no  present  danger  of  a  rival  on  the  ocean.  Thus 
her  gain  of  sea  power  and  wealth  was  not  only  great  but 
solid,  being  wholly  in  her  own  hands ;  while  the  gains  of  the 
other  States  were  not  merely  inferior  in  degree,  but  weaker 
in  kind,  in  that  they  depended  more  or  less  upon  the  good 
will  of  other  peoples. 

Is  it  meant,  it  may  be  asked,  to  attribute  to  sea  power  alone 
the  greatness  or  wealth  of  any  State  ?  Certainly  not.  The 

1  Campbell :  Lives  of  the  Admirals. 

15 


226 


DEPRESSED  CONDITION  OF  FRANCE. 


due  use  and  control  of  the  sea  is  but  one  link  in  the  chain  of 
exchange  by  which  wrealth  accumulates ;  but  it  is  the  central 
link,  which  lays  under  contribution  other  nations  for  the  bene¬ 
fit  of  the  one  holding  it,  and  which,  history  seems  to  assert, 
most  surely  of  all  gathers  to  itself  riches.  In  England,  this 
control  and  use  of  the  sea  seems  to  arise  naturally,  from  the 
concurrence  of  many  circumstances  ;  the  years  immediately 
preceding  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession  had,  moreover, 
furthered  the  advance  of  her  prosperity  by  a  series  of  fiscal 
measures,  which  Macaulay  speaks  of  as  “  the  deep  and  solid 
foundation  on  which  was  to  rise  the  most  gigantic  fabric  of 
commercial  prosperity  which  the  world  had  ever  seen.”  It 
may  be  questioned,  however,  whether  the  genius  of  the  people, 
inclined  to  and  developed  by  trade,  did  not  make  easier  the 
taking  of  such  measures  ;  whether  their  adoption  did  not  at 
least  partially  spring  from,  as  well  as  add  to,  the  sea  power 
of  the  nation.  However  that  may  be,  there  is  seen,  on  the 
opposite  side  of  the  Channel,  a  nation  which  started  ahead  of 
England  in  the  race,  —  a  nation  peculiarly  well  fitted,  by  situa¬ 
tion  and  resources,  for  the  control  of  the  sea  both  by  war  and 
commerce.  The  position  of  France  is  in  this  peculiar,  that 
of  all  the  great  powers  she  alone  had  a  free  choice ;  the  others 
were  more  or  less  constrained  to  the  land  chiefly,  or  to  the 
sea  chiefly,  for  any  movement  outside  their  own  borders ;  but 
she  to  her  long  continental  frontier  added  a  seaboard  on 
three  seas.  In  1672  she  definitely  chose  expansion  by  land. 
At  that  time  Colbert  had  administered  her  finances  for  twelve 
years,  and  from  a  state  of  terrible  confusion  had  so  restored 
them  that  the  revenue  of  the  King  of  France  was  more  than 
double  that  of  the  King  of  England.  In  those  days  France 
paid  the  subsidies  of  Europe ;  but  Colbert’s  plans  and  hopes 
for  France  rested  upon  making  her  powerful  on  the  sea.  The 
war  with  Holland  arrested  these  plans,  the  onward  movement 
of  prosperity  ceased,  the  nation  was  thrown  back  upon  itself, 
shut  off  from  the  outside  world.  Many  causes  doubtless 
worked  together  to  the  disastrous  result  which  marked  the 
end  of  the  reign  of  Louis  XIV. :  constant  wars,  bad  adminis- 


DEPRESSED  CONDITION  OF  FRANCE. 


227 


tration  in  the  latter  half  of  the  period,  extravagance  through¬ 
out  ;  but  France  was  practically  never  invaded,  the  war  was 
kept  at  or  beyond  her  own  frontiers  with  slight  exceptions, 
her  hoine  industries  could  suffer  little  from  direct  hostili¬ 
ties.  In  these  respects  she  was  nearly  equal  to  England,  and 
under  better  conditions  than  her  other  enemies.  What  made 
the  difference  in  the  results  ?  Why  was  France  miserable  and 
exhausted,  while  England  was  smiling  and  prosperous  ?  Why 
did  England  dictate,  and  France  accept,  terms  of  peace  ?  The 
reason  apparently  was  the  difference  in  wealth  and  credit. 
France  stood  alone  against  many  enemies  ;  but  those  ene¬ 
mies  were  raised  and  kept  moving  by  English  subsidies. 
The  Lord  Treasurer  of  England,  writing  in  1706  to  Marl¬ 
borough,  says  :  — 

“  Though  the  land  and  trade  of  both  England  and  Holland  have 
excessive  burthens  upon  them,  yet  the  credit  continues  good  both  of 
them  and  us  ;  whereas  the  finances  of  France  are  so  much  more  ex¬ 
hausted  that  they  are  forced  to  give  twenty  and  twenty-five  per  cent 
for  every  penny  they  send  out  of  the  kingdom,  unless  they  send  it  in 
specie.” 

In  1712  the  expenditure  of  France  was  240,000,000  francs, 
while  the  taxes  brought  in  only  113,000,000  gross,  of  which, 
after  deducting  losses  and  necessary  expenses,  only  37,000,000 
remained  in  the  treasury ;  the  deficit  was  sought  to  be  met 
by  anticipating  parts  of  the  revenue  for  years  ahead,  and  by 
a  series  of  extraordinary  transactions  tedious  to  name  or  to 
understand. 

“In  the  summer  of  1715  [two  years  after  the  peace]  it  seemed 
as  if  the  situation  could  not  grow  worse,  —  no  more  public  nor  private 
credit ;  no  more  clear  revenue  for  the  State  ;  the  portions  of  the 
revenue  not  pledged,  anticipated  on  the  following  years.  Neither 
labor  nor  consumption  could  be  resumed  for  want  of  circulation  ; 
usury  reigned  on  the  ruins  of  society.  The  alternations  of  high 
prices  and  the  depreciation  of  commodities  finally  crushed  the  people. 
Provision  riots  broke  out  among  them,  and  even  in  the  army.  Manu¬ 
factures  were  languishing  or  suspended ;  forced  mendicity  was  prey- 


228  COMMERCIAL  PROSPERITY  OF  ENGLAND. 

ing  upon  the  cities.  The  fields  were  deserted,  the  lands  fallow  for 
lack  of  instruments,  for  lack  of  manure,  for  lack  of  cattle  ;  the  houses 
were  falling  to  ruin.  Monarchical  France  seemed  ready  to  expire 
with  its  aged  king.”  1 

Thus  it  was  in  France,  with  a  population  of  nineteen  mil¬ 
lions  at  that  time  to  the  eight  millions  of  all  the  British 
Islands ;  with  a  land  vastly  more  fertile  and  productive ;  be¬ 
fore  the  great  days,  too,  of  coal  and  iron.  “  In  England,  on  the 
contrary,  the  immense  grants  of  Parliament  in  1710  struck 
the  French  prodigiously ;  for  while  their  credit  was  low,  or 
in  a  manner  quite  gone,  ours  was  at  its  zenith.”  During  that 
same  war  “  there  appeared  that  mighty  spirit  among  our 
merchants  which  enabled  them  to  carry  on  all  their  schemes 
with  a  vigor  that  kept  a  constant  circulation  of  money 
throughout  the  kingdom,  and  afforded  such  mighty  encour¬ 
agement  to  all  manufactures  as  has  made  the  remembrance 
of  those  times  grateful  in  worse.” 

“By  the  treaty  with  Portugal  we  were  prodigious  gainers.  .  .  .  The 
Portuguese  began  to  feel  the  comfortable  effects  of  their  Brazil  gold 
mines,  and  the  prodigious  commerce  that  followed  with  us  made  their 
good  fortune  in  great  measure  ours ;  and  so  it  has  been  ever  since ; 
otherwise  I  know  not  how  the  expenses  of  the  war  had  been 
borne.  .  .  .  The  running  cash  in  the  kingdom  increased  very  consider¬ 
ably,  which  must  be  attributed  in  great  measure  to  our  Portuguese 
trade ;  and  this,  as  I  have  made  manifest,  we  owed  wholly  to  our 
power  at  sea  [which  took  Portugal  from  the  alliance  of  the  two 
crowns,  and  threw  her  upon  the  protection  of  the  maritime  powers]. 
Our  trade  with  the  Spanish  West  Indies  by  way  of  Cadiz  was  cer¬ 
tainly  much  interrupted  at  the  beginning  of  this  war  ;  but  afterward 
it  was  in  great  measure  restored,  as  well  by  direct  communication 
with  several  provinces  when  under  the  Archduke,  as  through  Portu¬ 
gal,  by  which  a  very  great  though  contraband  trade  was  carried  on. 
We  were  at  the  same  time  very  great  gainers  by  our  commerce  with 
the  Spaniards  in  the  West  Indies  [also  contraband].  .  .  .  Our  colonies, 
though  complaining  of  neglect,  grew  richer,  more  populous,  and 
carried  their  trade  farther  than  in  former  times.  .  .  .  Our  national 

1  Martin :  History  of  France. 


COMMERCIAL  PROSPERITY  OF  ENGLAND. 


229 


end  with  respect  to  England  was  in  this  war  particularly  in  great 
measure  answered,  —  I  mean  the  destruction  of  the  French  power  at 
sea,  for,  after  the  battle  of  Malaga,  we  hear  no  more  of  their  great 
fleets ;  and  though  by  this  the  number  of  their  privateers  was  very 
much  increased,  yet  the  losses  of  our  merchants  were  far  less  in  the 
latter  than  in  the  former  reign.  .  .  .  It  is  certainly  a  matter  of  great 
satisfaction  that  .  .  .  setting  out  at  first  with  the  sight  of  so  great 
a  naval  power  as  the  French  king  had  assembled  in  1688,  while  we 
struggled  under  such  difficulties,  and  when  we  got  out  of  that  trouble¬ 
some  war,  in  1697,  found  ourselves  loaded  with  a  debt  too  heavy 
to  be  shaken  off  in  the  short  interval  of  peace,  yet  by  1706,  instead 
of  seeing  the  navy  of  France  riding  upon  our  coast,  we  sent  every 
year  a  powerful  fleet  to  insult  theirs,  superior  to  them  not  only  in 
the  ocean,  but  in  the  Mediterranean,  forcing  them  entirely  out  of 
that  sea  by  the  mere  sight  of  our  flag.  .  .  .  By  this  we  not  only 
secured  our  trade  with  the  Levant,  and  strengthened  our  interests 
with  all  the  Italian  princes,  but  struck  the  States  of  Barbary  with 
terror,  and  awed  the  Sultan  from  listening  to  any  proposals  from 
France.  Such  were  the  fruits  of  the  increase  of  our  naval  power, 
and  of  the  manner  in  which  it  was  employed.  .  .  .  Such  fleets  were 
necessary  ;  they  at  once  protected  our  flag  and  our  allies,  and  at¬ 
tached  them  to  our  interest ;  and,  what  is  of  greater  importance  than 
all  the  rest,  they  established  our  reputation  for  maritime  force  so 
effectually  that  we  feel  even  to  this  day  [1740]  the  happy  effects 
of  the  fame  thus  acquired.”  1 

It  is  needless  to  add  more.  Thus  stood  the  Power  of  the 
Seas  during  the  years  in  which  the  French  historians  tell  us 
that  their  cruisers  were  battening  on  her  commerce.  The 
English  writer  admits  heavy  losses.  In  1707,  that  is,  in  the 
space  of  five  years,  the  returns,  according  to  the  report  of  a 
committee  of  the  House  of  Lords,  “  show  that  since  the 
beginning  of  the  war  England  had  lost  80  ships-of-war  and 
1146  merchant-ships,  of  wffiich  800  were  retaken  ;  whereas 
we  had  taken  from  them,  or  destroyed,  80  ships-of-war, 
and  1846  merchantmen ;  175  privateers  also  were  taken.” 
The  greater  number  of  the  ships-of-war  were  probably  on 
private  venture,  as  has  been  explained.  But,  be  the  relative 

1  Campbell :  Lives  of  the  Admirals. 


230 


DUGUAY-TROUIN  AT  RIO  JANEIRO. 


numbers  what  they  may,  no  argument  is  needed  beyond  the 
statements  just  given,  to  show  the  inability  of  a  mere  cruising 
warfare,  not  based  upon  large  fleets,  to  break  down  a  great 
sea  power.  Jean  Bart  died  in  1T02  ;  but  in  Forbin,  Du  Casse, 
and  others,  and  above  all  in  Duguay-Trouin,  he  left  worthy 
successors,  the  equals  of  any  commerce-destroyers  the  world 
has  ever  seen. 

The  name  of  Duguay-Trouin  suggests  the  mention,  before 
finally  leaving  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession,  of  his 
greatest  privateering  expedition,  carried  to  a  distance  from 
home  rarely  reached  by  the  seamen  of  his  occupation,  and 
which  illustrates  curiously  the  spirit  of  such  enterprises  in 
that  day,  and  the  shifts  to  which  the  French  government  was 
reduced.  A  small  French  squadron  had  attacked  Rio  Janeiro 
in  1710,  but  being  repulsed,  had  lost  some  prisoners,  who 
were  said  to  have  been  put  to  death.  Duguay-Trouin  sought 
permission  to  avenge  the  insult  to  France.  The  king,  con¬ 
senting,  advanced  the  ships  and  furnished  the  crews ;  and 
a  regular  contract  was  drawn  up  between  the  king  on  the 
one  hand  and  the  company  employing  Duguay-Trouin  on  the 
other,  stipulating  the  expenses  to  be  borne  and  supplies  fur¬ 
nished  on  either  hand ;  among  which  we  find  the  odd,  busi¬ 
ness-like  provision  that  for  every  one  of  the  troops  embarked 
who  shall  die,  be  killed,  or  desert  during  the  cruise,  the 
company  should  pay  a  forfeit  of  thirty  francs.  The  king 
was  to  receive  one  fifth  of  the  net  profits,  and  was  to  bear 
the  loss  of  any  one  of  the  vessels  that  should  be  wrecked,  or 
destroyed  in  action.  Under  these  provisions,  enumerated  in 
full  in  a  long  contract,  Duguay-Trouin  received  a  force  of 
six  sliips-of-the-line,  seven  frigates,  and  over  two  thousand 
troops,  with  which  he  sailed  to  Rio  Janeiro  in  1711 ;  captured 
the  place  after  a  series  of  operations,  and  allowed  it  to  be 
ransomed  at  the  price  of  something  under  four  hundred  thou¬ 
sand  dollars,  probably  nearly  equal  to  a  million  in  the  present 
day,  besides  five  hundred  cases  of  sugar.  The  privateering 
company  cleared  about  ninety-two  per  cent  on  their  venture. 
As  two  of  the  ships-of-the-line  were  never  heard  from  after 


WAR  BETWEEN  RUSSIA  AND  SWEDEN.  231 

sailing  on  the  return  voyage,  the  king’s  profits  were  probably 
small. 

While  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession  was  engaging 
all  western  Europe,  a  strife  which  might  have  had  a  profound 
influence  upon  its  issue  was  going  on  in  the  east.  Sweden 
and  Russia  were  at  war,  the  Hungarians  had  revolted  against 
Austria,  and  Turkey  was  finally  drawn  in,  though  not  till 
the  end  of  the  year  1710.  Had  Turkey  helped  the  Hun¬ 
garians,  she  would  have  made  a  powerful  diversion,  not  for 
the  first  time  in  history,  in  favor  of  France.  The  English 
historian  suggests  that  she  was  .deterred  by  fear  of  the 
English  fleet ;  at  all  events  she  did  not  move,  and  Hungary 
was  reduced  to  obedience.  The  war  between  Sweden  and 
Russia  was  to  result  in  the  preponderance  of  the  latter  upon 
the  Baltic,  the  subsidence  of  Sweden,  the  old  ally  of  France, 
into  a  second-rate  State,  and  the  entrance  of  Russia  defini¬ 
tively  into  European  politics. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


The  Regency  in  France.  —  Alberoni  in  Spain.  —  Policies  of 
Walpole  and  Fleuri.  —  War  of  the  Polish  Succession.  — 
English  Contraband  Trade  in  Spanish  America.  —  Great 
Britain  declares  War  against  Spain.  —  1715-1739. 

'  V  AHE  Peace  of  Utrecht  was  soon  followed  by  the  deaths 
of  the  rulers  of  the  two  countries  which  had  played 
,  the  foremost  part  in  the  "War  of  the  Spanish  Succession. 
Queen  Anne  died  August  1,  1714 ;  Louis  XIY.  on  the  1st 
of  September,  1715. 

The  successor  to  the  English  throne,  the  German  George  I., 
though  undoubtedly  the  choice  of  the  English  people,  was 
far  from  being  their  favorite,  and  was  rather  endured  as  a 
necessary  evil,  giving  them  a  Protestant  instead  of  a  Roman 
Catholic  king.  Along  with  the  coldness  and  dislike  of  his 
own  partisans,  he  found  a  very  considerable  body  of  dis¬ 
affected  men,  who  wished  to  see  the  son  of  James  II.  on  the 
throne.  There  was  therefore  a  lack  of  solidity,  more  ap¬ 
parent  than  real,  but  still  real,  in  his  position.  In  France, 
on  the  contrary,  the  succession  to  the  throne  was  undis¬ 
puted  ;  but  the  heir  was  a  child  of  five  years,  and  there  was 
much  jealousy  as  to  the  possession  of  the  regency,  a  power 
more  absolute  than  that  of  the  King  of  England.  The  re¬ 
gency  was  obtained  and  exercised  by  the  next  in  succession 
to  the  throne,  Philip,  Duke  of  Orleans ;  but  he  had  to  appre¬ 
hend,  not  only  attempts  on  the  part  of  rivals  in  France  to 
shake  his  hold,  but  also  the  active  enmity  of  the  Bourbon 
king  of  Spain,  Philip  V.,  —  an  enmity  which  seems  to  have 
dated  from  an  intrigue  of  Orleans,  during  the  late  war,  to 
supplant  Philip  on  the  Spanish  throne.  There  was  therefore 


POLICY  OF  THE  REGENT. 


233 


a  feeling  of  instability,  of  apprehension,  in  the  governments 
of  England  and  France,  which  influenced  the  policy  of  both. 
As  regards  the  relations  of  France  and  Spain,  the  mutual 
hatred  of  the  actual  rulers  stood  for  a  while  in  the  way  of 
the  friendly  accord  Louis  XIV.  had  hoped  from  family  ties, 
and  was  injurious  to  the  true  interests  of  both  nations. 

The  Regent  Orleans,  under  the  advice  of  the  most  able 
and  celebrated  French  statesman  of  that  day,  the  Abb£  Dubois, 
made  overtures  of  alliance  to  the  King  of  Great  Britain.  He 
began  first  by  commercial  concessions  of  the  kind  generally 
acceptable  to  the  English,  forbidding  French  shipping  to  trade 
to  the  South  Seas  under  penalty  of  death,  and  lowering  the 
duties  on  the  importation  of  English  coal.  England  at  first 
received  these  advances  warily ;  but  the  regent  would  not 
be  discouraged,  and  offered,  further,  to  compel  the  Pretender, 
James  III.,  to  withdraw  beyond  the  Alps.  He  also  undertook 
to  fill  up  the  port  at  Mardyck,  a  new  excavation  by  which  the 
French  government  was  trying  to  indemnify  itself  for  the  loss 
of  Dunkirk.  These  concessions,  all  of  which  but  one,  it  will 
be  noted,  were  at  the  expense  of  the  sea  power  or  commercial 
interests  of  France,  induced  England  to  sign  a  treaty  by 
which  the  two  countries  mutually  guaranteed  the  execution 
of  the  treaties  of  Utrecht  as  far  as  their  respective  interests 
were  concerned  ;  especially  the  clause  by  which  the  House  of 
Orleans  was  to  succeed  to  the  French  throne,  if  Louis  XV. 
died  childless.  The  Protestant  succession  in  England  was 
likewise  guaranteed.  Holland,  exhausted  by  the  war,  was 
unwilling  to  enter  upon  new  engagements,  but  was  at  last 
brought  over  to  this  by  the  remission  of  certain  dues  on  her 
merchandise  entering  France.  The  treaty,  signed  in  Janu¬ 
ary,  1717,  was  known  as  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  bound 
France  to  England  for  some  years  to  come. 

While  France  was  thus  making  overtures  to  England, 
Spain,  under  the  guidance  of  another  able  churchman,  was 
seeking  the  same  alliance  and  at  the  same  time  developing 
her  national  strength  with  the  hope  of  recovering  her  lost 
Italian  States.  The  new  minister,  Cardinal  Alberoni,  promised 


234  ALLIANCE  OF  ENGLAND  AND  FRANCE . 


Philip  Y.  to  put  him  in  a  position  to  reconquer  Sicily  and 
Naples,  if  granted  five  years  of  peace.  He  worked  hard 
to  bring  up  the  revenues,  rebuild  the  navy,  and  re-establish 
the  army,  while  at  the  same  time  promoting  manufactures, 
commerce,  and  shipping,  and  the  advance  made  in  all  these 
was  remarkable ;  but  the  more  legitimate  ambition  of  Spain 
to  recover  her  lost  possessions,  and  with  them  to  establish 
her  power  in  the  Mediterranean,  so  grievously  wounded  by 
the  loss  of  Gibraltar,  was  hampered  by  the  ill-timed  purpose 
of  Philip  to  overthrow  the  regency  of  Orleans  in  France. 
Alberoni  was  compelled  to  alienate  France,  whose  sea  power, 
as  well  as  that  of  Spain,  was  concerned  in  seeing  Sicily 
in  friendly  hands,  and,  instead  of  that  natural  ally,  had  to 
conciliate  the  maritime  powers,  England  and  Holland.  This 
he  also  sought  to  do  by  commercial  concessions  ;  promising 
promptly  to  put  the  English  in  possession  of  the  privileges 
granted  at  Utrecht,  concerning  which  Spain  had  so  far 
delayed.  In  return,  he  asked  favorable  action  from  them 
in  Italy.  George  I.,  who  was  at  heart  German,  received 
coldly  advances  which  were  unfriendly  to  the  German  em¬ 
peror  in  his  Italian  dominions ;  and  Alberoni,  offended,  with¬ 
drew  them.  The  Triple  Alliance,  by  guaranteeing  the  exist¬ 
ing  arrangement  of  succession  to  the  French  throne,  gave 
further  offence  to  Philip  V.,  who  dreamed  of  asserting  his 
own  claim.  The  result  of  all  these  negotiations  was  to 
bind  England  and  France  together  against  Spain,  —  a  blind 
policy  for  the  two  Bourbon  kingdoms. 

The  gist  of  the  situation  created  by  these  different  aims 
and  feelings,  was  that  the  Emperor  of  Austria  and  the  King 
of  Spain  both  wanted  Sicily,  which  at  Utrecht  had  been 
given  to  the  Duke  of  Savoy  ;  and  that  France  and  England 
both  wished  for  peace  in  western  Europe,  because  war  would 
give  an  opportunity  to  the  malcontents  in  either  kingdom. 
The  position  of  George,  however,  being  more  secure  than 
that  of  Orleans,  the  policy  of  the  latter  tended  to  yield 
to  that  of  the  former,  and  this  tendency  was  increased  by  the 
active  ill-will  of  the  King  of  Spain.  George,  as  a  German, 


THE  SPANIARDS  INVADE  SARDINIA. 


235 


wished  the  emperor’s  success ;  and  the  English  statesmen 
naturally  preferred  to  see  Sicily^  in  the  hands  of  their  late 
ally  and  well-assured  friend  rather  than  in  Spain’s.  France, 
contrary  to  her  true  policy,  but  under  the  urgency  of  the 
regent’s  position,  entertained  the  same  views,  and  it  was 
proposed  to  modify  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht  by  transferring 
Sicily  from  Savoy  to  Austria,  giving  the  former  Sardinia 
instead.  It  was  necessary,  however,  to  consider  Spain, 
which  under  Alberoni  had  already  gained  a  degree  of  mili¬ 
tary  power  astounding  to  those  who  had  known  her  weakness 
during  the  last  war.  She  was  not  yet  ready  to  fight,  for  only 
half  of  the  five  years  asked  by  the  cardinal  had  passed ;  but 
still  less  was  she  ready  to  forego  her  ambitions.  A  trifling 
incident  precipitated  an  outbreak.  A  high  Spanish  official, 
travelling  from  Rome  to  Spain  by  land,  and  so  passing  through 
the  Italian  States  of  the  emperor,  was  arrested  as  a  rebellious 
subject  by  order  of  the  latter,  who  still  styled  himself  King 
of  Spain.  At  this  insult,  Alberoni  could  not  hold  Philip 
back.  An  expedition  of  twelve  ships  of  war  and  eighty-six 
hundred  soldiers  was  sent  against  Sardinia,  the  transfer  to 
Savoy  not  having  yet  taken  effect,  and  reduced  the  island  in  a 
few  months.  This  happened  in  1717. 

Doubtless  the  Spaniards  would  at  once  have  moved  on 
against  Sicily ;  but  France  and  England  now  intervened  more 
actively  to  prevent  the  general  war  that  seemed  threaten¬ 
ing.  England  sent  a  fleet  to  the  Mediterranean,  and  negotia¬ 
tions  began  at  Paris,  Vienna,  and  Madrid.  The  outcome 
of  these  conferences  was  an  agreement  between  England  and 
France  to  effect  the  exchange  of  Sardinia  and  Sicily  just 
mentioned,  recompensing  Spain  by  giving  her  Parma  and 
Tuscany  in  northern  Italy,  and  stipulating  that  the  emperor 
should  renounce  forever  his  absurd  but  irritating  claim  to  the 
Spanish  crown.  This  arrangement  was  to  be  enforced  by 
arms,  if  necessary.  The  emperor  at  first  refused  consent ; 
but  the  increasing  greatness  of  Alberoni’s  preparations  at 
last  decided  him  to  accept  so  advantageous  an  offer,  and  the 
accession  of  Holland  to  the  compact  gave  it  the  historical 


236  SPANISH  INVASION  OF  SICILY. 

4 

title  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance.  Spain  was  obstinate  ;  and 
it  is  significant  of  Alberoni’s  achievements  in  developing  her 
power,  and  the  eagerness,  not  to  say  anxiety,  of  George  I.,that 
the  offer  was  made  to  purchase  her  consent  by  ceding  Gib¬ 
raltar.  If  the  Regent  Orleans  knew  this,  it  would  partly 
justify  his  forwarding  the  negotiations. 

Alberoni  tried  to  back  up  his  military  power  by  diplomatic 
efforts  extending  all  over  Europe.  Russia  and  Sweden  were 
brought  together  in  a  project  for  invading  England  in  the 
interest  of  the  Stuarts ;  the  signing  of  the  Quadruple  Alli¬ 
ance  in  Holland  was  delayed  by  his  agents  ;  a  conspiracy  was 
started  in  France  against  the  regent ;  the  Turks  were  stirred 
up  against  the  emperor  ;  discontent  was  fomented  through¬ 
out  Great  Britain ;  and  an  attempt  was  made  to  gain  over  the 
Duke  of  Savoy,  outraged  by  being  deprived  of  Sicily.  On  the 
1st  of  July,  1718,  a  Spanish  army  of  thirty  thousand  troops, 
escorted  by  twenty-two  ships-of-the-linc,  appeared  at  Palermo. 
The  troops  of  Savoy  evacuated  the  city  and  pretty  nearly 
the  whole  island,  resistance  being  concentrated  in  the  citadel 
of  Messina.  Anxiety  was  felt  in  Naples  itself,  until  the  Eng¬ 
lish  admiral,  Byng,1  anchored  there  the  day  after  the  invest¬ 
ment  of  Messina.  The  King  of  Sicily  having  now  consented 
to  the  terms  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance,  Byng  received  on 
board  two  thousand  Austrian  troops  to  be  landed  at  Messina. 
When  he  appeared  before  the  place,  finding  it  besieged,  he 
wrote  to  the  Spanish  general  suggesting  a  suspension  of  arms 
for  two  months.  This  was  of  course  refused ;  so  the  Aus¬ 
trians  were  landed  again  at  Reggio,  in  Italy,  and  Byng  passed 
through  the  Straits  of  Messina  to  seek  the  Spanish  fleet, 
which  had  gone  to  the  southward. 

The  engagement  which  ensued  can  scarcely  be  called  a 
battle,  and,  as  is  apt  to  happen  in  such  affairs,  when  the  par¬ 
ties  are  on  the  verge  of  war  but  war  has  not  actually  been 
declared,  there  is  some  doubt  as  to  how  far  the  attack  was 
morally  justifiable  on  the  part  of  the  English.  It  seems 
pretty  sure  that  Byng  was  determined  beforehand  to  seize 

1  Afterward  Lord  Torrington  ;  father  of  Admiral  John  Byng,  shot  in  175/. 


ACTION  OFF  CAPE  PASSARO. 


237 


or  destroy  the  Spanish  fleet,  and  that  as  a  military  man  he 
was  justified  by  his  orders.  The  Spanish  naval  officers  had 
not  made  up  their  minds  to  any  line  of  conduct ;  they  were 
much  inferior  in  numbers,  and,  as  must  always  be  the  case, 
Alberoni’s  hastily  revived  navy  had  not  within  the  same  pe¬ 
riod  reached  nearly  the  efficiency  of  his  army.  The  English 
approached  threateningly  near,  one  or  more  Spanish  ships 
opened  fire,  whereupon  the  English,  being  to  windward,  stood 
down  and  made  an  end  of  them  ;  a  few  only  escaped  into 
Valetta  harbor.  The  Spanish  navy  was  practically  annihi¬ 
lated.  It  is  difficult  to  understand  the  importance  attached 
by  some  writers  to  Byng’s  action  at  this  time  in  attacking 
without  regard  to  the  line-of-battle.  He  had  before  him  a 
disorderly  force,  much  inferior  both  in  numbers  and  dis¬ 
cipline.  His  merit  seems  rather  to  lie  in  the  readiness  to 
assume  a  responsibility  from  which  a  more  scrupulous  man 
might  have  shrunk ;  but  in  this  and  throughout  the  cam¬ 
paign  he  rendered  good  service  to  England,  whose  sea  power 
was  again  strengthened  by  the  destruction  not  of  an  actual 
but  a  possible  rival,  and  his  services  were  rewarded  by  a  peer¬ 
age.  In  connection  with  this  day’s  work  was  written  a  de¬ 
spatch  which  has  great  favor  with  English  historians.  One 
of  the  senior  captains  was  detached  with  a  division  against 
some  escaping  ships  of  the  enemy.  His  report  to  the  ad¬ 
miral  ran  thus  :  “  Sir,  —  We  have  taken  or  destroyed  all  the 
Spanish  ships  upon  this  coast,  the  number  as  per  margin. 
Respectfully,  etc.,  G.  Walton.”  One  English  writer  makes, 
and  another  indorses,  the  uncalled-for  but  characteristic  fling 
at  the  French,  that  the  ships  thus  thrust  into  the  margin 
would  have  filled  some  pages  of  a  French  narration.1  It  may 
be  granted  that  the  so-called  “  battle  ”  of  Cape  Passaro  did  not 
merit  a  long  description,  and  Captain  Walton  possibly  felt  so  ; 
but  if  all  reports  of  naval  transactions  were  modelled  upon  his, 
the  writing  of  naval  history  would  not  depend  on  official  papers. 

Thus  the  Spanish  navy  was  struck  down  on  the  11th  of 

1  Campbell :  Lives  of  the  Admirals ;  quoted  by  Lord  Mahon  in  his  History  of 
England. 


\ 


238  DESTRUCTION  OF  SPANISH  DOCK-YARDS. 


August,  1718,  off  Cape  Passaro.  This  settled  the  fate  of 
Sicily,  if  it  had  been  doubtful  before.  The  English  fleet 
cruised  round  the  island,  supporting  the  Austrians  and  iso¬ 
lating  the  Spaniards,  none  of  whom  were  permitted  to  witli- 
draw  before  peace  was  made.  Alberoni’s  diplomatic  projects 
failed  one  after  the  other,  with  a  strange  fatality.  In  the 
following  year  the  French,  in  pursuance  of  the  terms  of  the 
alliance,  invaded  the  north  of  Spain  and  destroyed  the  dock¬ 
yards  ;  burning  nine  large  ships  on  the  stocks,  besides  the 
materials  for  seven  more,  at  the  instigation  of  an  English 
attache  accompanying  the  French  headquarters.  Thus  was 
completed  the  destruction  of  the  Spanish  navy,  which,  says  an 
English  historian,  was  ascribed  to  the  maritime  jealousy  of 
England.  “  This  was  done,”  wrote  the  French  commander, 
the  Duke  of  Berwick,  a  bastard  of  the  house  of  Stuart,  “  in 
order  that  the  English  government  may  be  able  to  show  the 
next  Parliament  that  nothing  has  been  neglected  to  diminish 
the  navy  of  Spain.”  The  acts  of  Sir  George  Byng,  as  given  by 
the  English  naval  historian,  make  yet  more  manifest  the  pur¬ 
pose  of  England  at  this  time.  While  the  city  and  citadel  of 
Messina  were  being  besieged  by  the  Austrians,  English,  and 
Sardinians,  a  dispute  arose  as  to  the  possession  of  the  Spanish 
men-of-war  within  the  mole.  Byng,  “  reflecting  within  him¬ 
self  that  possibly  the  garrison  might  capitulate  for  the  safe 
return  of  those  ships  into  Spain,  which  he  was  determined 
not  to  suffer ;  that  on  the  other  hand  the  right  of  posses¬ 
sion  might  breed  an  inconvenient  dispute  at  a  critical  junc¬ 
ture  among  the  princes  concerned,  and  if  it  should  at  length 
be  determined  that  they  did  not  belong  to  England  it  were 
better  they  belonged  to  no  one  else,  proposed  to  Count  de 
Merci,  the  Austrian  general,  to  erect  a  battery  and  destroy 
them  as  they  lay.”  1  After  some  demur  on  the  part  of  the 
other  leaders,  this  was  done.  If  constant  care  and  watch¬ 
fulness  deserve  success,  England  certainly  deserved  her  sea 
power  ;  but  what  shall  be  said  of  the  folly  of  France  at  this 
time  and  in  this  connection  ? 


1  Lives  of  the  Admirals. 


239 


ENGLAND  IN  THE  BALTIC. 

The  steady  stream  of  reverses,  and  the  hopelessness  of 
contending  for  distant  maritime  possessions  when  without  a 
navy,  broke  down  the  resistance  of  Spain.  England  and 
France  insisted  upon  the  dismissal  of  Alberoni,  and  Philip 
yielded  to  the  terms  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance.  The  Austrian 
power,  necessarily  friendly  to  England,  was  thus  firmly  settled 
in  the  central  Mediterranean,  in  Naples  and  Sicily,  as  England 
herself  was  in  Gibraltar  and  Port  Mahon.  Sir  Robert  Wal¬ 
pole,  the  minister  now  coming  into  power  in  England,  failed 
at  a  later  day  to  support  this  favorable  conjunction,  and  so 
far  betrayed  the  traditional  policy  of  his  country.  The  do¬ 
minion  of  the  House  of  Savoy  in  Sardinia,  which  then  began, 
has  lasted  ;  it  is  only  within  our  own  day  that  the  title 
King  of  Sardinia  has  merged  in  the  broader  one  of  King 
of  Italy. 

Contemporaneously  with  and  for  some  time  after  the  short 
episode  of  Alberoni’s  ministry  and  Spain’s  ambition,  a  strug¬ 
gle  was  going  on  around  the  shores  of  the  Baltic  which  must 
be  mentioned,  because  it  gave  rise  to  another  effectual  illus¬ 
tration  of  the  sea  power  of  England,  manifested  alike  in  the 
north  and  south  with  a  slightness  of  exertion  which  calls 
to  mind  the  stories  of  the  tap  of  a  tiger’s  paw.  The  long 
contest  between  Sweden  and  Russia  was  for  a  moment  in¬ 
terrupted  in  1718,  by  negotiations  looking  to  peace  and  to  an 
alliance  between  the  two  for  the  settlement  of  the  succes¬ 
sion  in  Poland  and  the  restoration  of  the  Stuarts  in  Eng¬ 
land.  This  project,  on  which  had  rested  many  of  Alberoni’s 
hopes,  was  finally  stopped  by  the  death  in  battle  of  the  Swe¬ 
dish  king.  The  war  went  on  ;  and  the  czar,  seeing  the  ex¬ 
haustion  of  Sweden,  purposed  its  entire  subjugation.  This 
destruction  of  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Baltic,  making  it 
a  Russian  lake,  suited  neither  England  nor  France ;  especially 
the  former,  whose  sea  power  both  for  peace  and  war  depended 
upon  the  naval  stores  chiefly  drawn  from  those  regions.  The 
two  western  kingdoms  interfered,  both  by  diplomacy,  while 
England  besides  sent  her  fleet.  Denmark,  which  was  also  at 
war  with  her  traditional  enemy  Sweden,  readily  yielded ;  but 


240 


THE  REGENCY  IN  FRANCE . 


Peter  the  Great  chafed  heavily  under  the  implied  coercion, 
until  at  last  orders  were  sent  to  the  English  admiral  to  join 
his  fleet  to  that  of  the  Swedes  and  repeat  in  the  Baltic  the 
history  of  Cape  Passaro.  The  czar  in  alarm  withdrew  his 
fleet.  This  happened  in  1719  ;  but  Peter,  though  baffled,  was 
not  yet  subdued.  The  following  year  the  interposition  of 
England  was  repeated  with  greater  effect,  although  not  in 
time  to  save  the  Swedish  coasts  from  serious  injury  ;  but 
the  czar,  recognizing  the  fixed  purpose  with  which  he  had 
to  deal,  and  knowing  from  personal  observation  and  prac¬ 
tical  experience  the  efficiency  of  England’s  sea  power,  con¬ 
sented  finally  to  peace.  The  French  claim  much  for  their 
own  diplomacy  in  this  happy  result,  and  say  that  England 
supported  Sweden  feebly  ;  being  willing  that  she  should  lose 
her  provinces  on  the  eastern  shore  of  the  Baltic  because  Rus¬ 
sia,  thus  brought  down  to  the  sea-shore,  could  more  easily 
open  to  English  trade  the  vast  resources  of  her  interior. 
This  may  very  possibly  be  true,  and  certainty  can  be  felt  that 
British  interests,  especially  as  to  commerce  and  sea  power, 
were  looked  after ;  but  the  character  of  Peter  the  Great  is 
the  guarantee  that  the  argument  which  weighed  most  heavily 
with  him  was  the  military  efficiency  of  the  British  fleet  and 
its  ability  to  move  up  to  his  very  doors.  By  this  Peace  of 
Nystadt,  August  30,  1721,  Sweden  abandoned  Livonia,  Estho- 
nia,  and  other  provinces  on  the  east  side  of  the  Baltic.  This 
result  was  inevitable  ;  it  was  yearly  becoming  less  possible 
for  small  States  to  hold  their  own. 

It  can  readily  be  understood  that  Spain  was  utterly  dis¬ 
contented  with  the  terms  wrung  from  her  by  the  Quadruple 
Alliance.  The  twelve  years  which  followed  are  called  years 
of  peace,  but  the  peace  was  very  uncertain,  and  fraught  with 
elements  of  future  wars.  The  three  great  grievances  rankling 
with  Spain  were  —  Sicily  and  Naples  in  the  possession  of 
Austria,  Gibraltar  and  Mahon  in  the  hands  of  England,  and 
lastly,  the  vast  contraband  trade  carried  on  by  English  mer¬ 
chants  and  ships  in  Spanish  America.  It  will  be  seen  that 
England  was  the  active  supporter  of  all  these  injuries ;  Eng- 


DEATH  OF  THE  REGENT.  241 

land  therefore  was  the  special  enemy  of  Spain,  but  Spain  was 
not  the  only  enemy  of  England. 

The  quiet,  such  as  it  was,  that  succeeded  the  fall  of  Albe- 
roni  was  due  mainly  to  the  character  and  policy  of  the  two 
ministers  of  France  and  England,  who  agreed  in  wishing  a 
general  peace.  The  policy  and  reasons  of  the  French  regent 
are  already  known.  Moved  by  the  same  reasons,  and  to  re¬ 
move  an  accidental  offence  taken  by  England,  Dubois  ob¬ 
tained  for  her  the  further  concession  from  Spain,  additional 
to  the  commercial  advantages  granted  at  Utrecht,  of  send¬ 
ing  a  ship  every  year  to  trade  in  the  West  Indies.  It  is 
said  that  this  ship,  after  being  anchored,  was  kept  continu¬ 
ally  supplied  by  others,  so  that  fresh  cargo  came  in  over  one 
side  as  fast  as  the  old  was  sent  ashore  from  the  other.  Dubois 
and  the  regent  both  died  in  the  latter  half  of  1723,  after 
an  administration  of  eight  years,  in  which  they  had  re¬ 
versed  the  policy  of  Richelieu  by  alliance  with  England  and 
Austria  and  sacrificing  to  them  the  interests  of  France. 

The  regency  and  the  nominal  government  of  France  passed 
to  another  member  of  the  royal  family ;  but  the  real  ruler  was 
Cardinal  Fleuri,  the  preceptor  of  the  young  king,  who  was 
now  thirteen  years  of  age.  Efforts  to  displace  the  preceptor 
resulted  only  in  giving  him  the  title,  as  well  as  the  power,  of 
minister  in  1726.  At  this  time  Sir  Robert  Walpole  had  become 
prime  minister  of  England,  with  an  influence  and  power  which 
gave  him  practically  the  entire  guidance  of  the  policy  of  the 
State.  The  chief  wish  of  both  Walpole  and  Fleuri  was  peace, 
above  all  in  western  Europe.  France  and  England  therefore 
continued  to  act  together  for  that  purpose,  and  though  they 
could  not  entirely  stifle  every  murmur,  they  were  for  several 
years  successful  in  preventing  outbreaks.  But  while  the  aims 
of  the  two  ministers  were  thus  agreed,  the  motives  which  in¬ 
spired  them  were  different.  Walpole  desired  peace  because 
of  the  still  unsettled  condition  of  the  English  succession ;  for 
the  peaceful  growth  of  English  commerce,  which  he  had  ever 
before  his  eyes  ;  and  probably  also  because  his  spirit,  im¬ 
patient  of  equals  in  the  government,  shrank  from  war  which 

16 


242 


ADMINISTRATION  OF  FLEURI. 


would  raise  up  stronger  men  around  him.  Fleuri,  reasonably 
secure  as  to  the  throne  and  his  own  power,  wished  like  Wal¬ 
pole  the  peaceful  development  of  his  country,  and  shrank 
from  war  with  the  love  of  repose  natural  to  old  age ;  for  he 
was  seventy -three  when  he  took  office,  and  ninety  when  he 
laid  it  down  in  death.  Under  his  mild  administration  the 
prosperity  of  France  revived ;  the  passing  traveller  could 
note  the  change  in  the  face  of  the  country  and  of  the  people ; 
yet  it  may  be  doubted  whether  this  change  was  due  to  the 
government  of  the  quiet  old  man,  or  merely  to  the  natural 
elasticity  of  the  people,  no  longer  drained  by  war  nor  isolated 
from  the  rest  of  the  world.  French  authorities  say  that  agri¬ 
culture  did  not  revive  throughout  the  country.  It  is  certain, 
however,  that  the  maritime  prosperity  of  France  advanced 
wonderfully,  owing  mainly  to  the  removal  of  commercial 
restrictions  in  the  years  immediately  following  the  death  of 
Louis  XI Y.  The  West  India  islands  in  particular  throve 
greatly,  and  their  welfare  was  naturally  shared  by  the  home 
ports  that  traded  with  them.  The  tropical  climate  of  Mar¬ 
tinique,  Guadeloupe,  and  Louisiana,  and  cultivation  by  slaves, 
lent  themselves  readily  to  the  paternal,  semi-military  gov¬ 
ernment  which  marks  all  French  colonies,  but  which  pro¬ 
duced  less  happy  results  in  the  bitter  weather  of  Canada.  In 
the  West  Indies,  France  at  this  time  obtained  a  decided  pre¬ 
ponderance  over  England  ;  the  value  of  the  French  half  of 
Hayti  was  alone  equal  to  that  of  all  the  English  West  Indies, 
and  French  coffee  and  sugar  were  driving  those  of  England 
out  of  European  markets.  A  like  advantage  over  England  in 
the  Mediterranean  and  Levant  trade  is  asserted  by  French 
historians.  At  the  same  time  the  East  India  Company  was 
revived,  and  its  French  depot,  whose  name  tells  its  association 
with  the  East,  the  Breton  town  of  L’Orient,  quickly  became 
a  splendid  city.  Pondicherry  on  the  Coromandel  coast,  and 
Chandernagore  on  the  Ganges,  the  chief  seats  of  French 
power  and  commerce  in  India,  grew  rapidly ;  the  Isle  of 
Bourbon  and  the  Isle  of  France,  now  the  Mauritius,  whose 
position  is  so  well  suited  for  the  control  of  the  Indian  Ocean, 


FRANCE  IN  INDIA. 


243 


became,  the  one  a  rich  agricultural  colony,  the  other  a  power¬ 
ful  naval  station.  The  monopoly  of  the  great  company  was 
confined  to  the  trade  between  home  and  the  chief  Indian 
stations  ;  the  traffic  throughout  the  Indian  seas  was  open  to 
private  enterprise  and  grew  more  rapidly.  This  great  move¬ 
ment,  wholly  spontaneous,  and  even  looked  on  with  distrust 
by  the  government,  was  personified  in  two  men,  Dupleix  and 
La  Bourdonnais  ;  who,  the  former  at  Chandernagore  and  the 
latter  at  the  Isle  of  France,  pointed  out  and  led  the  way  in  all 
these  undertakings,  which  were  building  up  the  power  and 
renown  of  the  French  in  the  Eastern  seas.  The  movement 
was  begun  which,  after  making  France  the  rival  of  England 
in  the  Hindustan  peninsula,  and  giving  her  for  a  moment  the 
promise  of  that  great  empire  which  has  bestowed  a  new  title 
on  the  Queen  of  Great  Britain,  was  destined  finally  to  falter 
and  perish  before  the  sea  power  of  England.  The  extent 
of  this  expansion  of  French  trade,  consequent  upon  peace 
and  the  removal  of  restrictions,  and  not  due  in  any  sense 
to  government  protection,  is  evidenced  by  the  growth  of 
French  merchant  shipping  from  only  three  hundred  vessels 
at  the  death  of  Louis  XIV.,  to  eighteen  hundred,  twenty  years 
later.  This,  a  French  historian  claims,  refutes  “  the  deplor¬ 
able  prejudices,  born  of  our  misfortunes,  that  France  is  not 
fitted  for  sea  commerce,  the  only  commerce  that  indefinitely 
extends  the  power  of  a  nation  with  its  sphere  of  activity.”  1 
This  free  and  happy  movement  of  the  people  was  far  from 
acceptable  to  Fleuri,  who  seems  to  have  seen  it  with  the 
distrust  of  a  hen  that  has  hatched  ducklings.  Walpole  and 
himself  were  agreed  to  love  peace  ;  but  Walpole  was  obliged 
to  reckon  with  the  English  people,  and  these  were  prompt  to 
resent  rivalry  upon  the  sea  and  in  trade,  however  obtained. 
Moreover,  Fleuri  had  inherited  the  unfortunate  policy  of  Louis 
XIV. ;  his  eyes  were  fixed  on  the  continent.  He  did  not  in¬ 
deed  wish  to  follow  the  course  of  the  regency  in  quarrelling 
with  Spain,  but  rather  to  draw  near  to  her ;  and  although  he 
was  not  able  for  a  time  to  do  so  without  sacrificing  his  peace 

1  Martin  :  History  of  France. 


244 


WALPOLE'S  NAVAL  DEMONSTRATIONS. 


policy,  because  of  Spain’s  restless  enmity  to  England,  yet  his 
mind  was  chiefly  bent  upon  strengthening  the  position  of 
France  on  the  land,  by  establishing  Bourbon  princes  where 
he  could,  and  drawing  them  together  by  family  alliances. 
The  navy  was  allowed  to  decay  more  and  more.  “  The 
French  government  abandoned  the  sea  at  the  very  moment 
that  the  nation,  through  the  activity  of  private  individuals, 
w^as  making  an  effort  to  regain  it.”  The  material  force  fell 
to  fifty-four  ships-of-the-line  and  frigates,  mostly  in  bad  con¬ 
dition  ;  and  even  when  war  with  England  had  been  imminent 
for  five  years,  France  had  but  forty-five  ships-of-the-line  to 
England’s  ninety.  This  difference  foreshadowed  the  results 
which  followed  a  quarter  of  a  century  of  war. 

During  the  same  period  Walpole,  relying  upon  Fleuri’s 
co-operation,  resolutely  set  his  face  against  open  war  between 
England  and  Spain.  The  difficulties  caused  by  the  threaten¬ 
ing  and  exasperating  action  of  the  latter  country,  and  of 
such  allies  as  she  from  time  to  time  could  raise,  were  met, 
and  for  a  while  successfully  met,  by  naval  demonstrations,  — 
reminders  of  that  sea  power  which  one  nation  after  another 
had  felt  and  yielded  to.  In  1725,  the  Spanish  king  and  the 
emperor  agreed  to  sink  their  long-standing  feud,  and  signed  a 
treaty  at  Vienna,  in  which  there  was  a  secret  clause  providing 
that  the  emperor  would  support  the  claim  of  Spain  to  Gibraltar 
and  Port  Mahon,  by  arms  if  necessary.  Russia  also  showed 
a  disposition  to  join  this  confederacy.  A  counter-alliance 
was  formed  between  England,  France,  and  Prussia ;  and 
English  fleets  were  sent,  one  to  the  Baltic  to  awe  the  czarina, 
another  to  the  coast  of  Spain  to  check  that  government  and 
protect  Gibraltar,  and  a  third  to  Porto  Bello,  on  the  Spanish 
Main,  to  blockade  the  fleet  of  galleons  there  assembled,  and 
by  cutting  off  the  supplies  remind  the  Spanish  king  at  once  of 
his  dependence  upon  the  specie  of  America,  and  of  England’s 
control  of  the  highway  by  which  it  reached  him.  Walpole’s 
aversion  to  war  was  marked  by  giving  the  admiral  at  Porto 
Bello  the  strictest  orders  not  to  fight,  only  to  blockade  ;  the 
consequence  of  which,  through  the  long  delay  of  the  squadron 


TRADE  IN  SPANISH  AMERICA. 


245 


upon  the  sickly  coast,  was  a  mortality  among  the  crews  that 
shocked  the  nation,  and  led,  among  other  causes,  to  the  minis¬ 
ter’s  overthrow  many  years  later.  Between  three  and  four 
thousand  officers  and  men,  including  Admiral  Hosier  himself, 
died  there.  Walpole’s  aim,  however,  was  reached;  though 
Spain  made  a  foolish  attack  by  land  upon  Gibraltar,  the 
presence  of  the  English  fleet  assured  its  supplies  and  provi¬ 
sions  and  averted  the  formal  outbreak  of  war.  The  emperor 
withdrew  from  the  alliance,  and  under  English  pressure  also 
revoked  the  charter  of  an  East  India  company  which  he  had 
authorized  in  the  Austrian  Netherlands,  and  which  took  its 
name  from  the  port  of  Ostend.  English  merchants  demanded 
the  removal  of  this  competitor,  and  also  of  a  similar  rival  es¬ 
tablished  in  Denmark  ;  both  which  concessions  the  English 
ministry,  backed  by  Holland,  obtained.  So  long  as  com¬ 
merce  was  not  seriously  disturbed,  Walpole’s  peace  policy, 
accompanied  as  it  naturally  was  by  years  of  plenty  and 
general  content,  was  easily  maintained,  even  though  Spain 
continued  threatening  and  arrogant  in  her  demands  for  Gib¬ 
raltar  ;  but  unfortunately  she  now  entered  more  deeply  upon 
a  course  of  annoyance  to  English  trade.  The  concessions  of 
the  Asiento,  or  slave-trade,  and  of  the  annual  ship  to  South 
America  have  been  mentioned ;  but  these  privileges  were  but 
a  part  of  the  English  commerce  in  those  regions.  The  sys¬ 
tem  of  Spain  with  regard  to  the  trade  of  her  colonies  was  of 
the  narrowest  and  most  exclusive  character;  but,  while  at¬ 
tempting  to  shut  them  out  from  foreign  traffic,  she  neglected 
to  provide  for  their  wants  herself.  The  consequence  was  that 
a  great  smuggling  or  contraband  trade  arose  throughout  her 
American  possessions,  carried  on  mainly  by  the  English,  who 
made  their  lawful  traffic  by  the  Asiento  and  the  yearly  ship 
subserve  also  the  unlawful,  or  at  least  unauthorized,  trade. 
This  system  was  doubtless  advantageous  to  the  great  body 
of  the  Spanish  colonists,  and  was  encouraged  by  them,  while 
colonial  governors  connived  at  it,  sometimes  for  money,  some¬ 
times  swayed  by  local  public  opinion  and  their  own  knowledge 
of  the  hardships  of  the  case  ;  but  there  were  Spanish  subjects 


246 


VIOLENT  ACTION  OF  SPAIN. 


who  saw  their  own  business  injured  by  the  use  and  abuse  of 
English  privileges,  and  the  national  government  suffered  both 
in  pocket  and  in  pride  by  these  evasions  of  the  revenue.  It 
now  began  to  pull  the  strings  tighter.  Obsolete  regulations 
were  revived  and  enforced.  Words  in  which  the  action  of 
Spain  in  this  old  controversy  have  been  described  are  curi¬ 
ously  applicable  to  certain  recent  disputes  to  which  the 
United  States  has  been  a  party.  “  The  letter  of  the  treaty 
was  now  followed,  though  the  spirit  which  dictated  it  was 
abandoned.  Although  English  ships  still  enjoyed  the  liberty 
of  putting  into  Spanish  harbors  for  the  purpose  of  refitting 
and  provisioning,  yet  they  were  far  from  enjoying  the  same 
advantages  of  carrying  on  a  friendly  and  commercial  inter¬ 
course.  They  were  now  watched  with  a  scrupulous  jealousy, 
strictly  visited  by  guarda-costas,  and  every  efficient  means 
adopted  to  prevent  any  commerce  with  the  colonies,  except 
what  was  allowed  by  the  annual  ship.”  If  Spain  could  have 
confined  herself  to  closer  watchfulness  and  to  enforcing  in 
her  own  waters  vexatious  customs  regulations,  not  essentially 
different  from  those  sanctioned  by  the  general  commercial 
ideas  of  that  day,  perhaps  no  further  harm  would  nave  re¬ 
sulted  ;  but  the  condition  of  things  and  the  temper  of  her 
government  would  not  let  her  stop  there.  It  was  not  possi¬ 
ble  to  guard  and  effectually  seal  a  sea-coast  extending  over 
hundreds  of  miles,  with  innumerable  inlets ;  nor  would 
traders  and  seamen,  in  pursuit  of  gain  which  they  had 
come  to  consider  their  right,  be  deterred  by  fears  of  penalties 
nor  consideration  for  Spanish  susceptibilities.  The  power  of 
Spain  was  not  great  enough  to  enforce  on  the  English  minis¬ 
try  any  regulation  of  their  shipping,  or  stoppage  of  the  abuse 
of  the  treaty  privileges,  in  face  of  the  feelings  of  the  mer¬ 
chants  ;  and  so  the  weaker  State,  wronged  and  harassed,  "was 
goaded  into  the  use  of  wholly  unlawful  means.  Ships-of-war 
and  guarda-costas  were  instructed,  or  at  least  permitted,  to 
stop  and  search  English  ships  on  the  high  seas,  outside  of 
Spanish  jurisdiction ;  and  the  arrogant  Spanish  temper,  un¬ 
restrained  by  the  weak  central  government,  made  many  of 


WALPOLE'S  EFFORTS  FOR  PEACE . 


247 


these  visits,  both  the  lawful  and  the  unlawful,  scenes  of  insult 
and  even  violence.  Somewhat  similar  results,  springing  from 
causes  not  entirely  different,  have  occurred  in  the  relations  of 
Spanish  officials  to  the  United  States  and  American  merchant- 
ships  in  our  own  day.  The  stories  of  these  acts  of  violence 
coming  back  to  England,  coupled  with  cases  of  loss  by  confis¬ 
cation-  and  by  the  embarrassment  of  trade,  of  course  stirred 
up  the  people.  In  1737  the  West  India  merchants  petitioned 
the  House  of  Commons,  saying,  — 

“  For  many  years  past  their  ships  have  not  only  frequently  been 
stopped  and  searched,  but  also  forcibly  and  arbitrarily  seized  upon 
the  high  seas,  by  Spanish  ships  fitted  out  to  cruise,  under  the .  plau¬ 
sible  pretext  of  guarding  their  own  coasts  ;  that  the  commanders 
thereof,  with  their  crews,  have  been  inhumanly  treated,  and  their 
ships  carried  into  some  of  the  Spanish  ports  and  there  condemned  with 
their  cargoes,  in  manifest  violation  of  the  treaties  subsisting  between 
the  two  crowns  ;  that  the  remonstrances  of  his  Majesty’s  ministers 
at  Madrid  receive  no  attention,  and  that  insults  and  plunder  must 
soon  destroy  their  trade.” 

Walpole  struggled  hard,  during  the  ten  years  following 
1729,  to  keep  off  war.  In  that  year  a  treaty  signed  at  Seville 
professed  to  regulate  matters,  restoring  the  conditions  of 
trade  to  what  they  had  been  four  years  before,  and  providing 
that  six  thousand  Spanish  troops  should  at  once  occupy  the 
territory  of  Tuscany  and  Parma.  Walpole  argued  with  his 
own  people  that  war  would  lose  them  the  commercial  privi¬ 
leges  they  already  enjoyed  in  Spanish  dominions ;  while  with 
Spain  he  carried  on  constant  negotiations,  seeking  concessions 
and  indemnities  that  might  silence  the  home  clamor.  In  the 
midst  of  this  period  a  war  broke  out  concerning  the  succes¬ 
sion  to  the  Polish  throne.  The  father-in-law  of  the  French 
king  was  one  claimant ;  Austria  supported  his  opponent.  A 
common  hostility  to  Austria  once  more  drew  France  and 
Spain  together,  and  they  were  joined  by  the  King  of  Sardinia, 
who  hoped  through  this  alliance  to  wrest  Milan  from  Austria 
and  add  it  to  his  own  territory  of  Piedmont.  The  neutrality 


248 


BOURBON  FAMILY  COMPACT. 


of  England  and  Holland  was  secured  by  a  promise  not  to 
attack  the  Austrian  Netherlands,  the  possession  of  any  part 
of  which  by  France  was  considered  to  be  dangerous  to  Eng¬ 
land’s  sea  power.  The  allied  States  declared  war  against 
Austria  in  October,  1738,  and  their  armies  entered  Italy 
together;  but  the  Spaniards,  intent  on  their  long-cherished 
projects  against  Naples  and  Sicily,  left  the  others  and  turned 
southward.  The  two  kingdoms  were  easily  and  quickly  con¬ 
quered,  the  invaders  having  command  of  the  sea  and  the 
favor  of  the  population.  The  second  son  of  the  King  of  Spain 
was  proclaimed  king  under  the  title  of  Carlos  III.,  and  the 
Bourbon  Kingdom  of  the  Two  Sicilies  thus  came  into  exist¬ 
ence.  Walpole’s  aversion  to  war,  leading  him  to  abandon 
a  long-standing  ally,  thus  resulted  in  the  transfer  of  the 
central  Mediterranean  to  a  control  necessarily  unfriendly  to 
Great  Britain. 

But  while  Walpole  thus  forsook  the  emperor,  he  was  him¬ 
self  betrayed  by  his  friend  Fleuri.  While  making  the  open 
alliance  with  Spain  against  Austria,  the  French  government 
agreed  to  a  secret  clause  directed  against  England.  This 
engagement  ran  as  follows  :  “  Whenever  it  seems  good  to 
both  nations  alike,  the  abuses  which  have  crept  into  com¬ 
merce,  especially  through  the  English,  shall  be  abolished  ; 
and  if  the  English  make  objection,  France  will  ward  off  their 
hostility  with  all  its  strength  by  land  and  sea.”  “  And  this 
compact  was  made,”  as  the  biographer  of  Lord  Hawke  points 
out,  “  during  a  period  of  intimate  and  ostentatious  alliance 
with  England  itself.” 1  “  Thus  the  policy  against  which 

William  III.  had  called  on  England  and  Europe  to  arm,  at 
last  came  into  existence.”  Had  Walpole  known  of  this 
secret  agreement,  it  might  have  seemed  to  him  an  additional 
argument  in  favor  of  peace  ;  for,  his  keen  political  sagacity 
warning  him  of  the  existence  of  a  danger  which  he  yet  could 
not  see,  he  told  the  House  of  Commons  that  “  if  the  Span¬ 
iards  had  not  private  encouragement  from  powers  more  con¬ 
siderable  than  themselves,  they  would  never  have  ventured 

- 1  Burrows  :  Life  of  Lord  Hawke. 


INCREASED  POWER  OF  HOUSE  OF  BOURBON.  249 


on  the  insults  and  injuries  which  have  been  proved  at  your 
bar ;  ”  and  he  expressed  the  opinion  that  “  England  was  not 
a  match  for  the  French  and  Spaniards  too.” 

Fleuri  had  indeed  given  his  old  friend  and  fellow-statesman 
an  ugly  fall.  The  particular  question  which  excited  the  two 
years’  War  of  the  Polish  Succession,  the  choice  of  a  ruler  for 
*  a  distracted  kingdom  fated  soon  to  disappear  from  the  list 
of  European  States,  seems  a  small  matter ;  but  the  turn 
imparted  to  European  politics  by  the  action  of  the  powers 
engaged  gives  it  a  very  different  importance.  France  and 
Austria  came  to  an  arrangement  in  October,  1735,  upon  terms 
to  which  Sardinia  and  Spain  afterward  acceded,  the  principal 
points  of  which  were  as  follows :  The  French  claimant  to  the 
Polish  throne  gave  up  his  claim  to  it,  and  received  instead 
the  duchies  of  Bar  and  Lorraine  on  the  east  of  France,  with 
the  provision  that  upon  his  death  they  were  to  go  to  his 
son-in-law,  the  King  of  France,  in  full  sovereignty  ;  the  two 
kingdoms  of  Sicily  and  Naples  were  confirmed  to  the  Spanish 
Bourbon  prince,  Don  Carlos ;  and  Austria  received  back 
Parma.  The  Sardinian  monarchy  also  got  an  increase  to  its 
Italian  territory.  France  thus,  under  the  peace-loving  Fleuri, 
obtained  in  Bar  and  Lorraine  an  accession  of  strength  which 
more  warlike  rulers  had  coveted  in  vain ;  and  at  the  same 
time  her  external  position  was  fortified  at  the  expense  of 
England,  by  the  transfer  of  controlling  positions  in  the  cen¬ 
tral  Mediterranean  to  an  ally.  Yet  the  heart  of  Fleuri  might 
well  have  failed  him  as  he  remembered  the  secret  agreement 
to  check  the  commerce  of  England,  and  thought  of  her  mighty 
sea  power  alongside  of  the  decayed  navy  of  France.  That 
compact  between  France  and  Spain,  to  which  the  Two  Sicilies 
acceded  later,  bore  within  it,  in  the  then  strained  relations 
between  England  and  Spain,  the  germ  of  the  great  wars  be¬ 
tween  England  and  the  House  of  Bourbon  which  issued  in  the 
creation  of  the  British  Empire  and  the  independence  of  the 
United  States. 

The  clamor  in  England  over  Spanish  outrages  continued, 
and  was  carefully  nursed  by  the  opposition  to  Walpole.  The 


250  WAR  BETWEEN  ENGLAND  AND  SPAIN. 

minister  was  now  over  sixty  years  of  age,  and  scarcely  able 
to  change  the  settled  convictions  and  policy  of  his  prime. 
He  was  face  to  face  with  one  of  those  irrepressible  conflicts 
between  nations  and  races  toward  which  a  policy  of  repres¬ 
sion  and  compromise  can  be  employed  but  for  a  short  time. 
The  English  were  bent  upon  opening  the  West  Indies  and 
Spanish  America,  the  Spanish  government  equally  bent  upon 
obstructing  them.  Unfortunately  for  their  policy  of  obstruc¬ 
tion,  they  strengthened  Walpole’s  enemies  by  unlawful  search 
of  English  ships  on  the  open  sea,  and  possibly  also  by  out¬ 
rages  to  English  seamen.  Some  of  the  latter  were  brought 
before  the  bar  of  the  House  of  Commons,  and  testified  that 
they  had  been  not  merely  plundered,  but  tortured,  shut  up 
in  prison,  and  compelled  to  live  and  work  under  loathsome 
conditions.  The  most  celebrated  case  was  that  of  a  certain 
Jenkins,  the  master  of  a  merchant-brig,  who  told  that  a  Span¬ 
ish  officer  had  torn  off  one  of  his  ears,  bidding  him  carry  it 
to  the  king  his  master,  and  say  that  if  he  had  been  there 
he  would  have  been  served  likewise.  Being  asked  what  were 
his  feelings  at  such  a  moment  of  danger  and  suffering,  he 
was  said  to  have  replied,  “  I  commended  my  soul  to  God 
and  my  cause  to  my  country.”  This  well-turned  dramatic 
utterance  from  the  mouth  of  a  man  of  his  class  throws  a 
suspicion  of  high  coloring  over  the  whole  story  ;  but  it  can 
be  readily  imagined  what  a  capital  campaign-cry  it  would  be 
in  the  heat  of  a  popular  movement.  The  tide  of  feeling  swept 
away  Walpole’s  patchwork  of  compromise,  and  war  was  de¬ 
clared  against  Spain  by  Great  Britain  on  the  19th  of  October, 
1739.  The  English  ultimatum  insisted  upon  a  formal  renun¬ 
ciation  of  the  right  of  search  as  claimed  and  exercised  by  the 
Spaniards,  and  upon  an  express  acknowledgment  of  the  Brit¬ 
ish  claims  in  North  America.  Among  these  claims  was  one 
relating  to  the  limits  of  Georgia,  then  a  recently  established 
colony,  touching  the  Spanish  territory  of  Florida. 

How  far  the  war  thus  urged  on  and  begun  by  England, 
against  the  judgment  of  her  able  minister,  was  morally  justi¬ 
fiable  has  been  warmly  argued  on  either  side  by  English 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  WAR. 


251 


writers.  The  laws  of  Spain  with  regard  to  the  trade  of  her 
colonies  did  not  differ  in  spirit  from  those  of  England  herself 
as  shown  by  her  Navigation  Act,  and  Spanish  naval  officers 
found  themselves  in  a  position  nearly  identical  with  that  of 
Nelson  when  captain  of  a  frigate  in  the  West  Indies  half  a 
century  later.  American  ships  and  merchants  then,  after 
the  separation  from  the  mother-country,  continued  the  trade 
which  they  had  enjoyed  as  colonists ;  Nelson,  zealous  for  the 
commercial  advantage  of  England  as  then  understood,  under¬ 
took  to  enforce  the  act,  and  in  so  doing  found  against  him 
the  feeling  of  the  West  Indians  and  of  the  colonial  authori¬ 
ties.  It  does  not  seem  that  he  or  those  supporting  him 
searched  unlawfully,  for  the  power  of  England  was  great 
enough  to  protect  her  shipping  interests  without  using  irregu¬ 
lar  means;  whereas  Spain  between  1730  and  1740,  being 
weak,  was  tempted,  as  she  has  since  been,  to  seize  those 
whom  she  knew  to  have  injured  her  wherever  she  could  find 
them,  even  outside  her  lawful  jurisdiction. 

After  reading  the  entirely  sympathetic  presentation  of  the 
case  of  Walpole’s  opponents,  urging  war,  which  is  given  by 
Professor  Burrows  in  his  Life  of  Lord  Hawke,  a  foreigner 
can  scarcely  fail  to  conclude  that  the  Spaniards  were  griev¬ 
ously  wronged,  according  to  the  rights  of  the  mother-country 
over  colonies  as  commonly  admitted  in  that  day ;  though  no 
nation  could  tolerate  the  right  of  search  as  claimed  by  them. 
It  chiefly  concerns  our  subject  to  notice  that  the  dispute  was 
radically  a  maritime  question,  that  it  grew  out  of  the  uncon¬ 
trollable  impulse  of  the  English  people  to  extend  their  trade 
and  colonial  interests.  It  is  possible  that  France  was  acting 
under  a  similar  impulse,  as  English  writers  have  asserted ; 
but  the  character  and  general  policy  of  Fleuri,  as  well  as  the 
genius  of  the  French  people,  make  this  unlikely.  There  was 
no  Parliament  and  no  opposition  to  make  known  popular 
opinion  in  the  France  of  that  day,  and  very  different  esti¬ 
mates  of  Fleuri’s  character  and  administration  have  found 
voice  since  then.  The  English  look  rather  at  the  ability  which 
obtained  Lorraine  for  France  and  the  Sicilies  for  the  House 


252 


DECAY  OF  THE  FRENCH  NAVY. 


of  Bourbon,  and  blame  Walpole  for  being  overreached.  The 
French  say  of  Fleuri  that  44  he  lived  from  day  to  day  seeking 
only  to  have  quiet  in  his  old  age.  He  had  stupefied  France 
with  opiates,  instead  of  laboring  to  cure  her.  He  could  not 
even  prolong  this  silent  sleep  until  his  own  death.”  1 2  When 
the  war  broke  out  between  England  and  Spain,  “  the  latter 
claimed  the  advantage  of  her  defensive  alliance  with  France. 
Fleuri,  grievously  against  his  will,  was  forced  to  fit  out  a 
squadron ;  he  did  so  in  niggardly  fashion.”  This  squadron, 
of  twenty-two  ships,  convoyed  to  America  the  Spanish  fleet 
assembled  at  Ferrol,  and  the  reinforcement  prevented  the 
English  from  attacking.2  44  Still,  Fleuri  made  explanations 
to  Walpole  and  hoped  for  compromise,  —  an  ilhfounded 
hope,  which  had  disastrous  results  for  our  sea  interests,  and 
prevented  measures  which  would  have  given  France,  from 
the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  superiority  in  eastern  seas.” 
But  “  upon  Walpole’s  overthrow,”  says  another  Frenchman, 
44  Fleuri  perceived  his  mistake  in  letting  the  navy  decay.  Its 
importance  had  lately  struck  him.  He  knew  that  the  kings 
of  Naples  and  Sardinia  forsook  the  French  alliance  merely 
because  an  English  squadron  threatened  to  bombard  Naples 
and  Genoa  and  to  bring  an  army  into  Italy.  For  lack  of 


1  Martin  :  History  of  France. 

2  The  peculiar  political  relation  which  France  bore  toward  England  between 
1739  and  1744,  while  the  latter  country  was  at  war  with  Spain,  needs  to  be 
explained,  as  it  depended  upon  views  of  international  duties  which  are  practi¬ 
cally  obsolete.  By  her  defensive  alliance  with  Spain,  France  had  bound  herself 
to  furnish  a  contingent  of  specified  force  to  the  Spanish  fleet  when  that  country 
was  involved  in  war  of  a  certain  kind.  She  claimed,  however,  that  her  sending 
these  succors  was  not  such  an  act  of  hostility  to  England  as  involved  a  breach 
of  the  peace  existing  between  the  two  nations.  The  French  ships-of-war,  while 
thus  serving  with  the  Spanish  fleet  under  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  were  enemies ; 
but  the  French  nation  and  all  other  armed  forces  of  France,  on  sea  and  land, 
were  neutrals,  with  all  the  privileges  of  neutrality.  Of  course  England  was  not 
bound  to  accept  this  view  of  the  matter,  and  could  make  the  action  of  France 
Si  casus  belli;  but  France  claimed  it  was  not  justly  so,  and  England  practically 
conceded  the  claim,  though  the  relation  was  likely  to  lead  to  formal  war,  as  it 
did  in  1744.  A  few  years  later  the  Dutch  will  be  found  claiming  the  same  privi¬ 
lege  of  neutrality  toward  France  while  furnishing  a  large  contingent  to  the 
Austrian  army  acting  against  her. 


DEATH  OF  WALPOLE  AND  OF  F LEU  El. 


253 


this  element  of  greatness,  France  silently  swallowed  the 
greatest  humiliations,  and  could  only  complain  of  the  violence 
of  English  cruisers,  which  pillaged  our  commerce,  in  violation 
of  the  law  of  nations,”  1  during  the  years  of  nominal  peace 
that  elapsed  between  the  time  when  the  French  fleet  was  con¬ 
fined  to  protecting  the  Spanish  against  the  English  and  the 
outbreak  of  formal  war.  The  explanation  of  these  differing 
views  seems  not  very  hard.  The  two  ministers  had  tacitly 
agreed  to  follow  lines  which  apparently  could  not  cross. 
France  was  left  free  to  expand  by  land,  provided  she  did 
not  excite  the  jealousy  of  the  English  people,  and  Walpole’s 
own  sense  of  English  interests,  by  rivalry  at  sea.  This  course 
suited  Fleuri’s  views  and  wishes.  The  one  sought  power  by 
sea,  the  other  by  land.  Which  had  been  wiser,  war  was  to 
show;  for,  with  Spain  as  an  ally  to  one  party,  war  had  to 
come,  and  that  on  the  sea.  Neither  minister  lived  to  see  the 
result  of  his  policy.  Walpole  was  driven  from  power  in 
1742,  and  died  in  March,  1745.  Fleuri  died  in  office,  Janu¬ 
ary  29,  1743. 

1  Lapejrouse-Bonfils  :  Hist,  de  la  Marine  Fran9aise. 


CHAPTER  VII. 


War  between  Great  Britain  and  Spain,  1739.  —  War  of  the 
Austrian  Succession,  1740.  —  France  joins  Spain  against 
Great  Britain,  1744.  —  Sea  Battles  of  Matthew's,  Anson, 
and  Hawke.  —  Peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  1748. 

WE  have  now  reached  the  opening  of  a  series  of  great 
wars,  destined  to  last  with  short  intervals  of  peace 
for  nearly  half  a  century,  and  having,  amid  many  misleading 
details,  one  broad  characteristic  distinguishing  them  from 
previous,  and  from  many  subsequent,  wars.  This  strife  em¬ 
braced  the  four  quarters  of  the  world,  and  that  not  only  as 
side  issues  here  and  there,  the  main  struggle  being  in  Europe ; 
for  the  great  questions  to  be  determined  by  it,  concerning 
the  world’s  history,  were  the  dominion  of  the  sea  and  the  con¬ 
trol  of  distant  countries,  the  possession  of  colonies,  and, 
dependent  upon  these,  the  increase  of  wealth.  Singularly 
enough  it  is  not  till  nearly  the  end  of  the  long  contest  that 
great  fleets  are  found  engaging,  and  the  struggle  transferred 
to  its  proper  field,  the  sea.  The  action  of  sea  power  is  evi¬ 
dent  enough,  the  issue  plainly  indicated  from  the  beginning  ; 
but  for  a  long  time  there  is  no  naval  warfare  of  any  conse¬ 
quence,  because  the  truth  is  not  recognized  by  the  French 
government.  The  movement  toward  colonial  extension  by 
France  is  wholly  popular,  though  illustrated  by  a  few  great 
names ;  the  attitude  of  the  rulers  is  cold  and  mistrustful : 
hence  came  neglect  of  the  navy,  a  foregone  conclusion  of 
defeat  on  the  main  question,  and  destruction  for  the  time 
of  her  sea  power. 

Such  being  the  character  of  the  coming  wars,  it  is  impor¬ 
tant  to  realize  the  relative  positions  of  the  three  great  powers 
in  those  quarters  of  the  world,  outside  of  Europe,  where  the 
strife  was  to  engage. 


ENGLISH  AND  FRENCH  IN  NORTH  AMERICA .  255 


In  North  America,  England  now  held  the  thirteen  colonies, 
the  original  United  States,  from  Maine  to  Georgia.  In  these 
colonies  was  to  be  found  the  highest  development  of  that 
form  of  colonization  peculiar  to  England,  bodies  of  free  men 
essentially  self-governing  and  self-dependent,  still  enthusias¬ 
tically  loyal,  and  by  occupation  at  once  agricultural,  commer¬ 
cial,  and  sea-faring.  In  the  character  of  their  country  and 
its  productions,  in  its  long  sea-coast  and  sheltered  harbors, 
and  in  their  own  selves,  they  had  all  the  elements  of  sea 
power,  which  had  already  received  large  development.  On 
such  a  country  and  such  a  people  the  royal  navy  and  army 
were  securely  based  in  the  western  hemisphere.  The  English 
colonists  were  intensely  jealous  of  the  French  and  Canadians. 

France  held  Canada  and  Louisiana,  a  name  much  more 
extensive  in  its  application  then  than  now,  and  claimed  the 
entire  valley  of  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi,  by  right  of  prior 
discovery,  and  as  a  necessary  link  between  the  St.  Lawrence 
and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  There  was  as  yet  no  adequate  occu¬ 
pation  of  this  intermediate  country,  nor  was  the  claim  ad¬ 
mitted  by  England,  whose  colonists  asserted  the  right  to 
extend  indefinitely  westward.  The  strength  of  the  French 
position  was  in  Canada ;  the  St.  Lawrence  gave  them  access 
to  the  heart  of  the  country,  and  though  Newfoundland  and 
Nova  Scotia  had  been  lost,  in  Cape  Breton  Island  they  still 
held  the  key  of  the  gulf  and  river.  Canada  had  the  char¬ 
acteristics  of  the  French  colonial  system  planted  in  a  climate 
least  suited  to  it.  A  government  paternal,  military,  and 
monkish  discouraged  the  development  of  individual  enter¬ 
prise  and  of  free  association  for  common  ends.  The  colo¬ 
nists  abandoned  commerce  and  agriculture,  raising  only  food 
enough  for  immediate  consumption,  and  were  given  to  arms 
and  hunting.  Their  chief  traffic  was  in  furs.  There  was  so 
little  mechanical  art  among  them  that  they  bought  of  the 
English  colonies  part  of  the  vessels  for  their  interior  navi¬ 
gation.  The  chief  element  of  strength  was  the  military, 
arms-bearing  character  of  the  population ;  each  man  was  a 
soldier. 


256 


SPANISH,  ENGLISH,  AND  FRENCH 


Besides  the  hostility  inherited  from  the  mother-countries, 
there  was  a  necessary  antagonism  between  two  social  and 
political  systems,  so  directly  opposed,  and  lying  one  along¬ 
side  the  other.  The  remoteness  of  Canada  from  the  West 
Indies,  and  the  inhospitable  winter  climate,  made  it,  from  the 
naval  point  of  view,  of  much  less  value  to  France  than  the 
English  colonies  to  England  ;  besides  which  the  resources 
and  population  were  greatly  inferior.  In  1750  the  population 
of  Canada  was  eighty  thousand,  that  of  the  English  colonies 
twelve  hundred  thousand.  With  such  disparity  of  strength 
and  resources,  the  only  chance  for  Canada  lay  in  the  support 
of  the  sea  power  of  France,  either  by  direct  control  of  the 
neighboring  seas,  or  by  such  powerful  diversion  elsewhere 
as  would  relieve  the  pressure  upon  her. 

On  the  continent  of  North  America,  in  addition  to  Mexico 
and  the  countries  south  of  it,  Spain  held  Florida ;  under 
which  name  were  embraced  extensive  regions  beyond  the 
peninsula,  not  accurately  defined,  and  having  little  impor¬ 
tance  at  any  period  of  these  long  wars. 

In  the  West  Indies  and  South  America,  Spain  held  mainly 
what  are  still  known  as  Spanish  American  countries,  besides 
Cuba,  Porto  Rico,  and  part  of  Hayti ;  France  had  Guadeloupe, 
Martinique,  and  the  western  half  of  Hayti ;  England,  Jamaica, 
Barbadoes,  and  some  of  the  smaller  islands.  The  fertile  char¬ 
acter  of  the  soil,  the  commercial  productions,  and  the  less 
rigorous  climate  would  seem  to  make  these  islands  objects  of 
particular  ambition  in  a  colonial  war ;  but  as  a  matter  of  fact 
no  attempt  was  made,  nor,  except  as  to  Jamaica,  which  Spain 
wished  to  recover,  was  any  intention  entertained  of  conquering 
any  of  the  larger  islands.  The  reason  probably  was  that  Eng¬ 
land,  whose  sea  power  made  her  the  principal  aggressor,  was 
influenced  in  the  direction  of  her  efforts  by  the  wishes  of  the 
great  body  of  Englishmen  on  the  North  American  continent. 
The  smaller  West  India  islands  are  singly  too  small  to  be 
strongly  held  except  by  a  power  controlling  the  sea.  They  had 
a  twofold  value  in  war  :  one  as  offering  military  positions  for 
such  a  power ;  the  other  a  commercial  value,  either  as  adding  to 


70* 


75c 


IS* 


98s 


-  V!- 

:  m  Hi  : 


Peninsula  of  Ii\  d  ia 
and  Ceylon. 


|||1» 

; .  ;  /2$b 


HtH 


til,  '  III 

■§.  111 


ntn 


"1  ~'\  /PonicWCT 

IMtipif  Cuddalor. 

torto  Yovo 
<ju  eb  ar 
fc  9»-P  otam 


Ba.to.cnlo 


70  • 


73* 


80* 


8f  • 


90* 


-  : 


* 


. 


IN  WEST  AND  EAST  INDIES. 


257 


one’s  own  resources  or  diminishing  those  of  the  enemy.  War 
directed  against  them  may  be  considered  as  a  war  upon  com' 
merce,  and  the  islands  themselves  as  ships  or  convoys  loaded 
with  enemy’s  wealth.  They  will  be  found  therefore  changing 
hands  like  counters,  and  usually  restored  when  peace  comes ; 
though  the  final  result  was  to  leave  most  of  them  in  the  hands 
of  England.  Nevertheless,  the  fact  of  each  of  the  great  powers 
having  a  share  in  this  focus  of  commerce  drew  thither  both 
large  fleets  and  small  squadrons,  a  tendency  aided  by  the  un¬ 
favorable  seasons  for  military  operations  on  the  continent ; 
and  in  the  West  Indies  took  place  the  greater  number  of  the 
fleet-actions  that  illustrated  this  long  series  of  wars. 

In  yet  another  remote  region  was  the  strife  between  Eng¬ 
land  and  France  to  be  waged,  and  there,  as  in  North  America, 
finally  decided  by  these  wars.  In  India,  the  rival  nations 
were  represented  by  their  East  India  companies,  who  di¬ 
rectly  administered  both  government  and  commerce.  Back 
of  them,  of  course,  were  the  mother-countries ;  but  in  imme¬ 
diate  contact  with  the  native  rulers  were  the  presidents  and 
officers  appointed  by  the  companies.  At  this  time  the  prin¬ 
cipal  settlements  of  the  English  were,  —  on  the  west  coast, 
Bombay ;  on  the  east,  Calcutta  upon  the  Ganges,  at  some  dis¬ 
tance  from  the  sea,  and  Madras ;  while  a  little  south  of 
Madras  another  town  and  station,  known  generally  to  the , 
English  as  Fort  St.  David,  though  sometimes  called  Cuddalore, 
had  been  established  later.  The  three  presidencies  of  Bombay, 
Calcutta,  and  Madras  were  at  this  time  mutually  independent 
and  responsible  only  to  the  Court  of  Directors  in  England. 

France  was  established  at  Chandernagore,  on  the  Ganges, 
above  Calcutta ;  at  Popdicherry,  on  the  east  coast,  eighty  miles 
south  of  Madras ;  and  on  the  west  coast,  far  to  the  south  of 
Bombay,  she  had  a  third  station  of  inferior  importance,  called 
MahA  The  French,  however,  had  a  great  advantage  in  the 
possession  of  the  intermediate  station  already  pointed  out  in 
the  Indian  Ocean,  the  neighboring  islands  of  France  and 
Bourbon.  They  were  yet  more  fortunate  in  the  personal 
character  of  the  two  men  who  were  at  this  time  at  the  head 

17 


258 


DUPLEIX  AND  LA  BOURDONNAIS 


of  their  affairs  in  the  Indian  peninsula  and  the  islands,  Du- 
plcix  and  La  Bourdonnais,  —  men  to  whom  no  rivals  in  ability 
or  force  of  character  had  as  yet  appeared  among  the  English 
Indian  officials.  Yet  in  these  two  men,  whose  cordial  fellow'- 
working  might  have  ruined  the  English  settlement  in  India, 
there  appeared  again  that  singular  conflict  of  ideas,  that  hesi¬ 
tation  between  the  land  and  the  sea  as  the  stay  of  power,  a 
prophecy  of  which  seems  to  be  contained  in  the  geographical 
position  of  France  itself.  The  mind  of  Dupleix,  though  not 
inattentive  to  commercial  interests,  was  fixed  on  building  up 
a  great  empire  in  which  France  should  rule  over  a  multitude 
of  vassal  native  princes.  In  the  pursuit  of  this  end  he  dis¬ 
played  great  tact  and  untiring  activity,  perhaps  also  a  some¬ 
what  soaring  and  fantastic  imagination  ;  but  when  he  met 
La  Bourdonnais,  whose  simpler  and  sounder  views  aimed  at 
sea  supremacy,  at  a  dominion  based  upon  free  and  certain 
communication  with  the  home  country  instead  of  the  shifting 
sands  of  Eastern  intrigues  and  alliances,  discord  at  once  arose. 
“  Naval  inferiority,”  says  a  French  historian  who  considers 
Dupleix  to  have  had  the  higher  aims,  “  was  the  principal  cause 
that  arrested  his  progress ;  ”  1  but  naval  superiority  was  pre¬ 
cisely  the  point  at  which  La  Bourdonnais,  himself  a  seaman 
and  the  governor  of  an  island,  aimed.  It  may  be  that  with 
the  weakness  of  Canada,  compared  to  the  English  colonies, 
sea  power  could  not  there  have  changed  the  actual  issue  ;  but 
in  the  condition  of  the  rival  nations  in  India  everything 
depended  upon  controlling  the  sea. 

Such  were  the  relative  situations  of  the  three  countries  in 
the  principal  foreign  theatres  of  war.  No  mention  has  been 
made  of  the  colonies  on  the  west  coast  of  Africa,  because  they 
were  mere  trading  stations  having  no  military  importance. 
The  Cape  of  Good  Hope  was  in  possession  of  the  Dutch,  who 
took  no  active  part  in  the  earlier  wars,  but  long  maintained 
toward  England  a  benevolent  neutrality,  surviving  from  the 
alliance  in  the  former  wars  of  the  century.  It  is  necessary 
to  mention  briefly  the  condition  of  the  military  navies,  which 

1  Martin  :  History  of  France. 


ENGLISH  AND  FRENCH  NAVIES  IN  17  40.  259 


were  to  have  an  importance  as  yet  unrealized.  Neither  pre¬ 
cise  numbers  nor  an  exact  account  of  condition  of  the  ships, 
can  be  given ;  but  the  relative  efficiency  can  be  fairly  esti¬ 
mated.  Campbell,  the  English  contemporary  naval  historian, 
says  that  in  1727  the  English  navy  had  eighty  four  ships-of-- 
the-line,  from  sixty  guns  up ;  forty  50-gun  ships,  and  fifty-four 
frigates  and  smaller  vessels.  In  1734  this  number  had  fallen 
to  seventy  ships-of-the-line  and  nineteen  50-gun  ships.  In 


1744,  after  four  years  of  war  with  Spain  alone,  the  number 


was  ninety  ships-of-the-line  and  eighty-four  frigates.  The 
French  navy  at  the  same  time  he  estimates  at  forty-five  ships- 
of-the-line  and  sixty-seven  frigates.  I11  1747,  near  the  end 
of  the  first  war,  he  says  that  the  royal  navy  of  Spain  was 


reduced  to  twenty-two  ships-of-the-line,  that  of  France  to 


thirty-one,  while  the  English  had  risen  to  one  hundred  and 
twenty-six.  The  French  writers  consulted  are  less  precise 
in  their  figures,  but  agree  in  representing  not  only  that  the 
navy  was  reduced  to  a  pitiful  number  of  ships,  but  that  these 


were  in  bad  condition  and  the  dockyards  destitute  of  mate 


rials.  This  neglect  of  the  navy  lasted  more  or  less  through¬ 


out  these  wars,  until  1760,  when  the  sense  of  the  nation  was 


aroused  to  the  importance  of  restoring  it ;  too  late,  however, 
to  prevent  the  most  serious  of  the  French  losses.  In  England 
as  well  as  in  France  discipline  and  administration  had  been 
sapped  by  the  long  peace;  the  inefficiency  of  the  armaments 
sent  out  was  notorious,  and  recalls  the  scandals  that  marked 
the  outbreak  of  the  Crimean  War;  while  the  very  disappear¬ 
ance  of  the  French  ships  led,  by  the  necessity  of  replacing 
them,  to  putting  afloat  vessels  superior  singly,  because  more 
modern  and  scientific,  to  the  older  ships  of  the  same  class  in 
England.  Care  must  be  had,  however,  in  accepting  too  easily 
the  complaints  of  individual  writers ;  French  authors  will 
be  found  asserting  that  English  ships  are  faster,  while  at 
the  same  period  Englishmen  complain  that  they  are  slower. 
It  may  be  accepted  as  generally  true  that  the  French  ships 
built  between  1740  and  1800  were  better  designed  and  larger, 
class  for  class,  than  the  English.  The  latter  had  the  un- 


260  ENGLISH  AND  FRENCH  NAVIES  IN  1710. 


doubted  superiority  both  in  the  number  and  quality  of  the 
seamen  and  officers.  Keeping  some  fleets  always  afloat, 
whether  better  or  worse,  the  officers  could  not  quite  lose 
touch  of  their  profession ;  whereas  in  France  it  is  said  that 
not  one  fifth  of  the  officers  were,  in  1744,  employed.  This 
superiority  was  kept  and  increased  by  the  practice,  which 
henceforth  obtained,  of  blockading  the  French  military  ports 
with  superior  force ;  the  enemy’s  squadrons  when  they  put 
to  sea  found  themselves  at  once  at  a  disadvantage  in  point  of 
,  practical  skill.  On  the  other  hand,  large  as  was  the  number 
of  English  seamen,  the  demands  of  commerce  were  so  great 
that  war  found  them  scattered  all  over  the  world,  and  part  of 
the  fleet  was  always  paralyzed  for  lack  of  crews.  This  con¬ 
stant  employment  assured  good  seamanship,  but  the  absence 
of  so  many  men  had  to  be  supplied  by  an  indiscriminate 
press,  which  dragged  in  a  class  of  miserable  and  sickly  men, 
sadly  diluting  the  quality  of  the  whole.  To  realize  the  con¬ 
dition  of  ships’  companies  of  that  day,  it  will  be  necessary 
only  to  read  the  accounts  of  those  sent  to  Anson  starting 
for  a  cruise  round  the  world,  or  to  Hawke  when  fitting  out 
for  war  service  ;  the  statements  are  now  almost  incredible, 
and  the  results  most  deplorable.  It  was  not  a  question  of 
sanitation  only  ;  the  material  sent  was  entirely  unfit  to  meet 
the  conditions  of  sea  life  under  the  most  favorable  circum¬ 
stances.  In  both  the  French  and  English  service  a  great 
deal  of  weeding  among  the  officers  was  necessary.  Those 
were  the  palmy  days  of  court  and  political  influence ;  and, 
moreover,  it  is  not  possible,  after  a  long  peace,  at  once  to  pick 
out  from  among  the  fairest-seeming  the  men  who  will  best 
stand  the  tests  of  time  and  exposure  to  the  responsibilities 
of  war.  There  was  in  both  nations  a  tendency  to  depend 
upon  officers  who  had  been  in  their  prime  a  generation  before, 
and  the  results  were  not  fortunate. 

War  having  been  declared  against  Spain  by  England  in 
October,  1739,  the  first  attempts  of  the  latter  power  were 
naturally  directed  against  the  Spanish-American  colonies, 
the  cause  of  the  dispute,  in  which  it  was  expected  to  find  an 


EXPEDITIONS  OF  VERNON  AND  ANSON. 


261 


easy  and  rich  prey.  The  first  expedition  sailed  under  Ad¬ 
miral  Vernon  in  November  of  the  same  year,  and  took  Porto 
Bello  by  a  sudden  and  audacious  stroke,  but  found  only  the 
insignificant  sum  of  ten  thousand  dollars  in  the  port  whence 
the  galleons  sailed.  Returning  to  Jamaica,  Vernon  received 
large  reinforcements  of  ships,  and  was  joined  by  a  land  force 
of  twelve  thousand  troops.  With  this  increased  force,  at. 
tempts  were  made  upon  both  Cartagena  and  Santiago  de 
Cuba,  in  the  years  1741  and  1742,  but  in  both  wretched  fail¬ 
ures  resulted ;  the  admiral  and  the  general  quarrelled,  as 
was  not  uncommon  in  days  when  neither  had  an  intelligent 
comprehension  of  the  other’s  business.  Marryatt,  when  char¬ 
acterizing  such  misunderstandings  by  a  humorous  exaggera¬ 
tion,  seems  to  have  had  in  view  this  attempt  on  Cartagena : 
“  The  army  thought  that  the  navy  might  have  beaten  down 
stone  ramparts  ten  feet  thick  ;  and  the  navy  wondered  why 
the  army  had  not  walked  up  the  same  ramparts,  which  were 
thirty  feet  perpendicular.” 

Another  expedition,  justly  celebrated  for  the  endurance  and 
perseverence  shown  by  its  leader,  and  famous  both  for  the 
hardships  borne  and  singular  final  success,  was  sent  out  in 
1740  under  Anson.  Its  mission  was  to  pass  round  Cape  Horn 
and  attack  the  Spanish  colonies  on  the  west  coast  of  South 
America.  After  many  delays,  due  apparently  to  bad  admin¬ 
istration,  the  squadron  finally  got  away  toward  the  end  of 
1740.  Passing  the  Cape  at  the  worst  season  of  the  year,  the 
ships  met  a  series  of  tempests  of  the  most  violent  kind  ;  the 
squadron  was  scattered,  never  all  to  meet  again,  and  Anson, 
after  infinite  peril,  succeeded  in  rallying  a  part  of  it  at  Juan 
Fernandez.  Two .  ships  had  put  back  to  England,  a  third 
was  lost  to  the  southward  of  Chiloe.  With  the  three  left 
to  him  he  cruised  along  the  South  American  coast,  taking 
some  prizes  and  pillaging  the  town  of  Payta,  intending  to 
touch  near  Panama  and  join  hands  with  Vernon  for  the 
capture  of  that  place  and  the  possession  of  the  isthmus,  if 
possible.  Learning  of  the  disaster  at  Cartagena,  he  then 
determined  to  cross  the  Pacific  and  waylay  the  two  galleons 


262 


WAR  OF  THE  AUSTRIAN  SUCCESSION. 


\ 


that  sailed  yearly  from  Acapulco  to  Manila.  In  the  passage 
across,  one  of  the  two  ships  now  left  to  him  was  found  in 
such  bad  condition  that  she  had  to  be  destroyed.  With  the 
other  he  succeeded  in  his  last  undertaking,  capturing  the 
great  galleon  with  a  million  and  a  half  dollars  in  specie. 
The  expedition,  from  its  many  misfortunes,  had  no  mili¬ 
tary  result  beyond  the  terror  and  consequent  embarrassment 
caused  to  the  Spanish  settlements ;  but  its  very  misfortunes, 
and  the  calm  persistency  which  worked  out  a  great  success 
from  them  all,  have  given  it  a  well-deserved  renown. 

During  the  year  1740  happened  two  events  which  led  to  a 
general  European  war  breaking  in  upon  that  in  which  Spain 
and  England  were  already  engaged.  In  May  of  that  year 
Frederick  the  Great  became  king  of  Prussia,  and  in  October 
the  emperor  Charles  TI.,  formerly  the  Austrian  claimant  of 
the  Spanish  throne,  died.  He  had  no  son,  and  left  by  will  the 
sovereignty  of  his  estates  to  his  eldest  daughter,  the  cele¬ 
brated  Maria  Theresa,  to  secure  whose  succession  the  efforts 
of  his  diplomacy  had  been  directed  for  many  years.  This  suc¬ 
cession  had  been  guaranteed  by  the  European  powers  ;  but 
the  apparent  weakness  of  her  position  excited  the  ambitions 
of  other  sovereigns.  The  Elector  of  Bavaria  -laid  claim  to 
the  whole  inheritance,  in  which  he  was  supported  by  France ; 
while  the  Prussian  king  claimed  and  seized,  the  province  of 
Silesia.  Other  powers,  large  and  small,  threw  in  their  lot 
with  one  or  the  other ;  while  the  position  of  England  was 
complicated  by  her  king  being  also  elector  of  Hanover, 
and  in  that  capacity  hurriedly  contracting  an  obligation  of 
neutrality  for  the  electorate,  although  English  feeling  was 
strongly  in  favor  of  Austria.  Meanwhile  the  failure  of  the 
Spanish-American  expeditions  and  the  severe  losses  of  Eng¬ 
lish  commerce  increased  the  general  outcry  against  Walpole, 
who  resigned  earlv  in  1742.  England  under  the  new  minis- 
try  became  the  open  ally  of  Austria ;  and  Parliament  voted 
not  only  a  subsidy  to  the  empress-queen,  but  also  a  body  of 
troops  to  be  sent  as  auxiliaries  to  the  Austrian  Netherlands. 
At  the  same  time  Holland,  under  English  influence,  and  bound 


THE  NAVIES  IN  THE  MEDITERRANEAN.  263 


like  England  by  previous  treaties  to  support  the  succession 
of  Maria  Theresa,  also  voted  a  subsidy.  Here  occurs  again 
that  curious  view  of  international  relations  before  mentioned. 
Both  of  these  powers  thus  entered  the  war  against  France, 
but  only  as  auxiliaries  to  the  empress,  not  as  principals  ;  as 
nations,  except  the  troops  actually  in  the  field,  they  were 
considered  to  be  still  at  peace.  Such  an  equivocal  situation 
could  in  the  end  have  only  one  result.  On  the  sea  France 
had  already  assumed  the  same  position  of  auxiliary  to  Spain, 
in  virtue  of  the  defensive  alliance  between  the  two  kingdoms, 
while  affecting  still  to  be  at  peace  with  England ;  and  it  is 
curious  to  see  the  gravity  with  which  French  writers  com¬ 
plain  of  assaults  upon  French  by  English  ships,  upon  the 
plea  that  there  was  no  open  war  between  the  two  States.  It 
has  already  been  mentioned  that  in  1740  a  French  squadron 
supported  a  division  of  Spanish  ships  on  their  way  to  America: 
In  1741,  Spain,  having  now  entered  the  continental  war  as  an 
enemy  of  Austria,  sent  a  body  of  fifteen  thousand  troops  from 
Barcelona  to  attack  the  Austrian  possessions  in  Italy.  The 
English  admiral  Haddock,  in  the  Mediterranean,  sought  and 
found  the  Spanish  fleet ;  but  with  it  was  a  division  of  twelve 
French  sail-of-the-line,  whose  commander  informed  Haddock 
that  he  was  engaged  in  the  same  expedition  and  had  orders 
to  fight,  if  the  Spaniards,  though  formally  at  war  with  Eng¬ 
land,  were  attacked.  As  the  allies  were  nearly  double  his 
force,  the  English  admiral  was  obliged  to  go  back  to  Port 
Mahon.  He  was  soon  after  relieved ;  and  the  new  admiral, 
Matthews,  held  at  once  the  two  positions  of  commander-in¬ 
chief  in  the  Mediterranean  and  English  minister  at  Turin, 
the  capital  of  the  King  of  Sardinia.  In  the  course  of  the  year 
1742  an  English  captain  in  his  fleet,  chasing  some  Spanish 
galleys,  drove  them  into  the  French  port  of  St.  Tropez,  and 
following  them  into  the  harbor  burned  them,  in  spite  of  the 
so-called  neutrality  of  France.  In  the  same  year  Matthews 
sent  a  division  of  ships  under  Commodore  Martin  to  Naples, 
to  compel  the  Bourbon  king  to  withdraw  his  contingent  of 
twenty  thousand  troops  serving  with  the  Spanish  army  in. 


264  THE  NA  VIES  IN  THE  MEDITERRANEAN. 


northern  Italy  against  the  Austrians.  To  the  attempts  to 
negotiate,  Martin  replied  only  by  pulling  out  his  watch  and 
giving  the  government  an  hour  to  come  to  terms.  There 
was  nothing  for  it  but  submission  ;  and  the  English  fleet 
left  the  harbor  after  a  stay  of  twenty-four  hours,  having  re¬ 
lieved  the  empress  of  a  dangerous  enemy.  Henceforward  it 
was  evident  that  the  Spanish  war  in  Italy  could  only  be 
maintained  by  sending  troops  through  France ;  England  com 
trolled  the  sea  and  the  action  of  Naples.  These  two  last 
incidents,  at  St.  Tropez  and  Naples,  deeply  impressed  the 
aged  Fleuri,  who  recognized  too  late  the  scope  and  impor¬ 
tance  of  a  well-founded  sea  power.  Causes  of  complaint  were 
multiplying  on  both  sides,  and  the  moment  was  fast  approach¬ 
ing  when  both  France  and  England  must  quit  the  pretence  of 
being  only  auxiliaries  in  the  war.  Before  it  came  to  that, 
however,  the  controlling  sea  power  and  wealth  of  England 
again  made  itself  felt  by  attaching  the  King  of  Sardinia  to 
the  Austrian  cause.  Between  the  dangers  and  advantages  of 
the  French  or  English  alliance  the  king's  action  was  deter¬ 
mined  by  a  subsidy  and  the  promise  of  a  strong  English  fleet 
in  the  Mediterranean  ;  in  return  he  engaged  to  enter  the  war 
with  an  army  of  forty-five  thousand  men.  This  compact  was 
signed  in  September,  1743.  In  October,  Fleuri  being  now 
dead,  Louis  XV.  made  with  Spain  a  treaty,  by  which  he  en¬ 
gaged  to  declare  war  against  England  and  Sardinia,  and  to 
support  the  Spanish  claims  in  Italy,  as  also  to  Gibraltar,  Ma¬ 
hon,  and  Georgia.  Open  war  was  thus  near  at  hand,  but  the 
declaration  was  still  deferred.  The  greatest  sea  fight  that 
took  place  occurred  while  nominal  peace  yet  existed. 

In  the  latter  part  of  1743  the  Infante  Philip  of  Spain  had 
sought  to  land  on  the  coast  of  the  Genoese  Republic,  which 
was  unfriendly  to  the  Austrians ;  but  the  attempt  had  been 
frustrated  by  the  English  fleet,  and  the  Spanish  ships  forced  to 
retreat  into  Toulon.  They  lay  there  for  four  months,  unable 
to  go  out  on  account  of  the  English  superiority.  In  this  di¬ 
lemma  the  court  of  Spain  applied  to  Louis  XV .  and  obtained 
an  order  for  the  French  fleet,  under  the  command  of  Admiral 


MATTHEWS. 


* 

-• 


' 


I 


BATTLE  OFF  TOULON. 


265 


de  Court,  —  an  old  man  of  eighty  years,  a  veteran  of  the  days 
of  Louis  XIV.,  —  to  escort  the  Spaniards  either  to  the  Gulf  of 
Genoa  or  to  their  own  ports,  it  does  not  clearly  appear  which. 
The  French  admiral  was  ordered  not  to  fire  unless  he  was 
attacked.  In  order  to  secure  the  best  co-operation  of  the 
Spaniards,  whose  efficiency  he  probably  distrusted,  De  Court 
proposed,  as  Ruyter  had  done  in  days  long  gone  by,  to  scat¬ 
ter  their  ships  among  his  own;  but  as  the  Spanish  admiral, 
Navarro,  refused,  the  line-of-battle  was  formed  with  nine 
French  ships  in  the  van,  in  the  centre  six  French  and  three 
Spaniards,  in  the  rear  nine  Spanish  ships  ;  in  all,  twenty-seven. 
In  this  order  the  combined  fleets  sailed  from  Toulon  Febru- 
ary  19,  1744.  The  English  fleet,  which  had  been  cruising  off 
Hyeres  in  observation,  chased,  and  on  the  22d  its  van  and 
centre  came  up  with  the  allies  ;  but  the  rear  division  was 
then  several  miles  to  windward  and  astern,  quite  out  of  sup¬ 
porting  distance  (Plate  VII.,  r).  The  wind  was  easterly, 
both  fleets  heading  to  the  southward,  and  the  English  had 
the  weather-gage.  The  numbers  were  nearly  equal,  the  Eng¬ 
lish  having  twenty-nine  to  the  allied  twenty-seven;  but  this 
advantage  was  reversed  by  the  failure  of  the  English  rear  to 
join.  The  course  of  the  rear-admiral  has  been  generally  at¬ 
tributed  to  ill-will  toward  Matthews  ;  for  although  he  proved 
that  in  his  separated  position  he  made  all  sail  to  join,  he  did 
not  attack  later  on  when  he  could,  on  the  plea  that  the  sig¬ 
nal  for  the  line-of-battle  was  flying  at  the  same  time  as  the 
signal  to  engage;  meaning  that  he  could  not  leave  the  line 
to  fight  without  disobeying  the  order  to  form  line.  This  tech¬ 
nical  excuse  was,  however,  accepted  by  the  subsequent  court- 
martial.  Under  the  actual  conditions  Matthews,  mortified  and 
harassed  by  the  inaction  of  his  lieutenant,  and  fearing  that 
the  enemy  would  escape  if  he  delayed  longer,  made  the  signal 
to  engage  when  his  own  van  was  abreast  the  enemy’s  cen¬ 
tre,  and  at  once  bore  down  himself  out  of  the  line  and  at¬ 
tacked  with  his  flag-ship  of  ninety  guns  the  largest  ship  in 
the  enemy’s  line,  the  “  Royal  Philip,”  of  one  hundred  and  ten 
guns,  carrying  the  flag  of  the  Spanish  admiral  (a).  In  doing 


2GG 


BATTLE  OFF  TOULON. 


this  he  was  bravely  supported  by  his  next  ahead  and  astern. 
The  moment  of  attack  seems  to  have  been  judiciously  chosen; 
five  Spanish  ships  had  straggled  far  to  the  rear,  leaving  their 
admiral  with  the  support  only  of  his  next  ahead  and  astern, 
while  three  other  Spaniards  continued  on  with  the  French. 
The  English  van  stood  on,  engaging  the  allied  centre,  while 
the  allied  van  was  without  antagonists.  Being  thus  disen¬ 
gaged,  the  latter  was  desirous  of  tacking  to  windward  of  the 
head  of  the  English  line,  thus  putting  it  between  two  fires, 
but  was  checked  by  the  intelligent  action  of  the  three  leading 
English  captains,  who,  disregarding  the  signal  to  bear  down, 
kept  their  commanding  position  and  stopped  the  enemy’s 
attempts  to  double.  For  this  they  were  cashiered  by  the 
court-martial,  but  afterward  restored.  This  circumspect 
but  justifiable  disregard  of  signals  was  imitated  without 
any  justification  by  all  the  English  captains  of  the  centre, 
save  the  admiral’s  seconds  already  mentioned,  as  well  as  by 
some  of  those  in  the  van,  who  kept  up  a  cannonade  at  long 
range  while  their  commander-in-chief  was  closely  and  even 
furiously  engaged.  The  one  marked  exception  was  Captain 
Hawke,  afterward  the  distinguished  admiral,  who  imitated 
the  example  of  his  chief,  and  after  driving  his  first  antago¬ 
nist  out  of  action,  quitted  his  place  in  the  van  (b),  brought 
to  close  quarters  (b')  a  fine  Spanish  ship  that  had  kept  at 
bay  five  other  English  ships,  and  took  her,  —  the  only  prize 
made  that  day.  The  commander  of  the  English  van,  with 
his  seconds,  also  behaved  with  spirit  and  came  to  close 
action.  It  is  unnecessary  to  describe  the  battle  further ;  as 
a  military  affair  it  deserves  no  attention,  and  its  most  im¬ 
portant  result  was  to  bring  out  the  merit  of  Hawke,  whom 
the  king  and  the  government  always  remembered  for  his 
share  in  it.  The  general  inefficiency  and  wide-spread  mis¬ 
behavior  of  the  English  captains,  after  five  years  of  declared 
war,  will  partly  explain  the  failure  of  England  to  obtain 
from  her  undoubted  naval  superiority  the  results  she  might 
have  expected  in  this  war  —  the  first  act  in  a  forty  years’ 
drama  —  and  they  give  military  officers  a  lesson  on  the 


CAUSES  OF  ENGLISH  FAILURE. 


267 


necessity  of  having  their  minds  prepared  and  stocked,  by 
study  of  the  conditions  of  war  in  their  own  day,  if  they 
would  not  be  found  unready  and  perhaps  disgraced  in  the 
hour  of  battle.1  It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  so  many  Eng¬ 
lish  seamen  misbehaved  through  so  vulgar  and  rare  a  defect 
as  mere  cowardice ;  it  was  unpreparedness  of  mind  and  lack  of 
military  efficiency  in  the  captains,  combined  with  bad  leader¬ 
ship  on  the  part  of  the  admiral,  with  a  possible  taint  of  ill 
will  toward  him  as  a  rude  and  domineering  superior,  that 
caused  this  fiasco.  Attention  may  here  fitly  be  drawn  to  the 
effect  of  a  certain  cordiality  and  good-will  on  the  part  of  su¬ 
periors  toward  their  subordinates.  It  is  not  perhaps  essential 
to  military  success,  but  it  undoubtedly  contributes  to  the  other 
elements  of  that  success  a  spirit,  a  breath  of  life,  which  makes 
possible  what  would  otherwise  be  impossible  ;  which  reaches 
heights  of  devotion  and  achievement  that  the  strictest  dis¬ 
cipline,  not  so  enkindled,  cannot  attain.  Doubtless  it  is  a 
natural  gift.  The  highest  example  of  it  possibly  ever  known 
among  seamen  was  Nelson.  When  he  joined  the  fleet  just 
before  Trafalgar,  the  captains  who  gathered  on  board  the 

1  There  is  not  in  modern  naval  history  a  more  striking  warning  to  the  officers 
of  every  era,  than  this  battle  of  Toulon.  Coming  as  it  did  after  a  generation  of 
comparative  naval  inactivity,  it  tried  men’s  reputation  as  by  fire.  The  lesson,  in 
the  judgment  of  the  author,  is  the  danger  of  disgraceful  failure  to  men  who 
have  neglected  to  keep  themselves  prepared,  not  only  in  knowledge  of  their  pro¬ 
fession,  but  in  the  sentiment  of  what  war  requires.  The  average  man  is  not  a 
coward ;  but  neither  is  he  endowed  by  nature  only  with  the  rare  faculty  of  seiz¬ 
ing  intuitively  the  proper  course  at  a  critical  moment.  He  gains  it,  some  more, 
some  less,  by  experience  or  by  reflection.  If  both  have  been  lacking  to  him,  in¬ 
decision  will  follow ;  either  from  not  knowing  what  to  do,  or  from  failure  to 
realize  that  utter  self-devotion  of  himself  and  his  command  are  required.  Of 
oue  of  the  captains  cashiered  it  is  said  :  “No  man  had  ever  lived  with  a  fairer 
or  more  honorable  character  previous  to  the  unfortunate  event  which  did  such 
irreparable  injury  to  his  reputation.  Many  of  his  contemporaries,  men  in  the 
highest  popular  estimation,  who  knew  him  well,  could  scarcely  credit  what  were 
indisputably  established  as  facts,  and  declared,  with  the  utmost  astonishment, 
*  they  believed  it  next  to  impossible  for  Captain  Burrish  to  behave  otherwise  than 
as  a  man  of  gallantry  and  intrepidity.’  ”  He  had  been  twenty-five  years  in  service, 
and  eleven  afloat  as  a  captain  (Charnock’s  Biographia  Navalis).  Others  of  the 
condemned  men  bore  fair  characters ;  and  even  Richard  Norris,  who  absconded 
to  avoid  trial,  had  been  of  respectable  repute. 


268 


RESULTS  OF  MATTHEWS'S  ACTION. 


flag-ship  seemed  to  forget  the  rank  of  their  admiral  in  their 
desire  to  testify  their  joy  at  meeting  him.  “This  Nelson,” 
wrote  Captain  Duff,  who  fell  in  the  battle,  “  is  so  lovable  and 
excellent  a  man,  so  kindly  a  leader,  that  we  all  wish  to  ex¬ 
ceed  his  desires  and  anticipate  his  orders.”  He  himself  was 
conscious  of  this  fascination  and  its  value,  when  writing  of 
the  battle  of  the  Nile  to  Lord  Howe,  he  said,  “  I  had  the 
happiness  to  command  a  band  of  brothers.” 

The  celebrity  attained  by  Matthews’s  action  off  Toulon,  cer¬ 
tainly  not  due  to  the  skill  with  which  it  was  managed,  nor  to 
its  results,  sprang  from  the  clamor  at  home,  and  chiefly  from 
the  number  and  findings  of  the  courts-martial  that  followed. 
Both  the  admiral  and  his  second,  and  also  eleven  captains  out 
of  the  twenty-nine,  had  charges  preferred  against  them.  The 
admiral  was  cashiered  because  he  had  broken  the  line ;  that 
is,  because  his  captains  did  not  follow  him  when  he  left  it  to 
get  at  the  enemy,  —  a  decision  that  smacks  more  of  the  Irish 
bull  than  of  the  Irish  love  of  fighting.  The  second  was  ac¬ 
quitted  on  the  technical  grounds  already  given  ;  he  avoided 
the  fault  of  breaking  the  line  by  keeping  far  enough  away. 
Of  the  eleven  captains  one  died,  one  deserted,  seven  were  dis¬ 
missed  or  suspended,  two  only  were  acquitted.  Nor  were  the 
French  and  Spaniards  better  pleased ;  mutual  recriminations 
passed.  Admiral  de  Court  was  relieved  from  his  command, 
while  the  Spanish  admiral  was  decorated  by  his  government 
with  the  title  of  Marquis  de  la  Victoria,  a  most  extraordinary 
reward  for  what  was  at  best  a  drawn  fight.  The  French,  on 
the  other  hand,  assert  that  he  left  the  deck  on  the  plea  of  a 
very  slight  wound,  and  that  the  ship  was  really  fought  by  a 
French  captain  who  happened  to  be  on  board. 

To  use  a  common  expression,  this  battle,  the  first  general 
action  since  that  off  Malaga  forty  years  before,  “  woke  up  ” 
the  English  people  and  brought  about  a  healthful  reaction. 
The  sifting  process  begun  by  the  battle  itself  was  continued, 
but  the  result  was  reached  too  late  to  have  its  proper  effect 
on  the  current  war.  It  is  rather  by  its  deficient  action,  than 
by  such  conspicuous  successes  as  were  attained  in  earlier  and 


THE  LAND  WARFARE ,  17U~17J^8. 


269 


later  times,  that  the  general  value  of  England’s  sea  power  is 
now  shown ;  like  some  precious  faculty,  scarcely  valued  when 
possessed,  but  keenly  missed  when  withdrawn.  Mistress  now 
of  the  seas  rather  by  the  weakness  of  her  enemies  than  by  her 
own  disciplined  strength,  she  drew  from  that  mastery  no  ade¬ 
quate  results  ;  the  most  solid  success,  the  capture  of  Cape  Bre¬ 
ton  Island,  in  1745,  was  achieved  by  the  colonial  forces  of  New 
England,  to  which  indeed  the  royal  navy  lent  valuable  aid,  for 
to  troops  so  situated  the  fleet  is  the  one  line  of  communication. 
The  misconduct  off  Toulon  was  repeated  by  officers  high  in 
command  in  the  West  and  East  Indies,  resulting  in  the  latter 
case  in  the  loss  of  Madras.  Other  causes  concurred  with  the 
effete  condition  of  the  naval  officers  to  hamper  the  action  of 
that  sea  power  which  launches  out  far  from  home.  The  con¬ 
dition  of  England  itself  was  insecure ;  the  cause  of  the  Stuarts 
was  still  alive,  and  though  a  formidable  invasion  by  fifteen 
thousand  troops  under  Marshal  Saxe,  in  1744,  was  foiled,  partly 
by  the  English  Channel  fleet,  and  partly  by  a  storm  which 
wrecked  several  of  the  transports  assembled  off  Dunkirk,  with 
the  loss  of  many  lives,  yet  the  reality  of  the  danger  was  shown 
in  the  following  year,  when  the  Pretender  landed  in  Scotland 
with  only  a  few  men  at  his  back  and  the  northern  kingdom 
rose  with  him.  His  successful  invasion  was  carried  well  down 
into  England  itself ;  and  sober  historians  have  thought  that  at 
one  time  the  chances  of  ultimate  success  were  rather  with  than 
against  him.  Another  serious  fetter  upon  the  full  use  of  Eng¬ 
land’s  power  was  the  direction  given  to  the  French  operations 
on  land  and  the  mistaken  means  used  to  oppose  them.  Neg¬ 
lecting  Germany,  France  turned  upon  the  Austrian  Nether¬ 
lands,  a  country  which  England,  out  of  regard  to  her  sea 
interests,  was  not  willing  to  see  conquered.  Her  commercial 
preponderance  would  be  directly  threatened  by  the  passing 
of  Antwerp,  Ostend,  and  the  Scheldt  into  the  hands  of  her 
great  rival ;  and  though  her  best  check  against  this  would 
have  been  to  seize  valuable  French  possessions  elsewhere  and 
hold  them  as  a  pledge,  the  weakness  of  her  government  and 
the  present  inefficiency  of  the  navy  prevented  her  doing  so. 


270 


THE  LAND  WARFARE ,  17W-1748. 


The  position  of  Hanover,  again,  controlled  the  action  of  Eng¬ 
land  ;  for  though  united  only  by  the  tie  of  a  common  sov¬ 
ereign,  the  love  of  that  sovereign  for  his  continental  dominion, 
his  native  country,  made  itself  strongly  felt  in  the  councils  of 
a  weak  and  time-serving  ministry.  It  was  the  disregard  of 
Hanover  by  the  first  William  Pitt,  consequent  upon  his  strong 
English  feeling,  that  incensed  the  king  and  led  him  so  long 
to  resist  the  demands  of  the  nation  that  he  should  be  put 
at  the  head  of  affairs.  These  different  causes  —  dissension 
at  home,  interest  in  the  Netherlands,  regard  for  Hanover  — 
combined  to  prevent  a  subservient  and  second-rate  ministry, 
divided  also  among  themselves,  from  giving  a  proper  direc¬ 
tion  and  infusing  a  proper  spirit  into  the  naval  war  ;  but  a 
better  condition  of  the  navy  itself,  more  satisfactory  results 
from  it,  might  have  modified  even  their  action.  As  it  was, 
the  outcome  of  the  war  was  almost  nothing  as  regards  the 
disputes  between  England  and  her  special  enemies.  On  the 
continent,  the  questions  after  1745  reduced  themselves  to 
two,  —  what  part  of  the  Austrian  possessions  should  be  given 
to  Prussia,  Spain,  and  Sardinia,  and  how  peace  was  to  be 
wrenched  by  France  from  England  and  Holland.  The  sea 
countries  still,  as  of  old,  bore  the  expenses  of  the  war, 
which  however  now  fell  chiefly  upon  England.  Marshal 
Saxe,  who  commanded  the  French  in  Flanders  throughout 
this  war,  summed  up  the  situation  in  half  a  dozen  words 
to  his  king.  “  Sire,”  said  he,  “  peace  is  within  the  walls 
of  Maestricht.”  This  strong  city  opened  the  course  of  the 
Meuse  and  the  way  for  the  French  army  into  the  United 
Provinces  from  the  rear ;  for  the  English  fleet,  in  conjunc¬ 
tion  with  that  of  Holland,  prevented  an  attack  from  the 
sea.  By  the  end  of  1746,  despite  the  efforts  of  the  allies, 
nearly  all  Belgium  was  in  the  hands  of  the  French ;  but  up 
to  this  time,  although  Dutch  subsidies  were  supporting  the 
Austrian  government,  and  Dutch  troops  in  the  Netherlands 
were  fighting  for  it,  there  was  nominal  peace  between  the 
United  Provinces  and  France.  In  April,  1747,  “  the  King  of 
France  invaded  Dutch  Flanders,  announcing  that  he  was 


WAR  IN  TIIE  NETHERLANDS. 


271 


obliged  to  send  his  army  into  the  territory  of  the  republic, 
to  arrest  the  protection  granted  by  the  States-General  to  the 
Austrian  and  English  troops ;  but  that  he  had  no  intention 
of  breaking  with  it,  and  that  the  places  and  provinces  occu¬ 
pied  would  be  restored  to  the  United  Provinces  as  soon  as 
they  gave  proof  that  they  had  ceased  to  succor  the  enemies 
of  France.”  This  was  actual,  but  not  formal,  war.  Numer¬ 
ous  places  fell  during  the  year,  and  the  successes  of  the 
French  inclined  both  Holland  and  England  to  come  to  terms. 
Negotiations  went  on  during  the  winter  ;  but  in  April,  1748, 
Saxe  invested  Maestri cht.  This  forced  a  peace. 

Meanwhile,  though  languishing,  the  sea  war  was  not  wholly 
uneventful.  Two  encounters  between  English  and  French 
squadrons  happened  during  the  y£ajiJJ47,  completing  the 
destruction  of  the  French  fighting  navy.  In  both  cases  the 
English  were  decidedly  superior ;  and  though  there  was 
given  opportunity  for  some  brilliant  fighting  by  particular 
captains,  and  for  the  display  of  heroic  endurance  on  the  part 
of  the  French,  greatly  outnumbered  but  resisting  to  the  last, 
only  one  tactical  lesson  is  afforded.  This  lesson  is,  that  when 
an  enemy,  either  as  the  result  of  battle  or  from  original  in¬ 
equality,  is  greatly  inferior  in  force,  obliged  to  fly  without 
standing  on  the  order  of  his  flying,  the  regard  otherwise  due 
to  order  must  be  in  a  measure  at  least  dismissed,  and  a 
general  chase  ordered.  The  mistake  of  Tourville  in  this 
respect  after  U£j§Lahy_JE[e&d  has  already  been  noted.  In  the 
first  of  the  cases  now  under  discussion,  the  English  Admiral 
Anson  had  fourteen  ships  against  eight  French,  weaker 
individually  as  well  as  in  total  number;  in  the  second,  Sir 
Edward  Hawke  had  fourteen  against  nine,  the  latter  being 
somewhat  larger,  ship  for  ship,  than  the  English.  In  both 
cases  the  signal  was  made  for  a  general  chase,  and  the  action 
which  resulted  was  a  melee.  There  was  no  opportunity  for 
anything  else  ;  the  one  thing  necessary  was  to  overtake  the 
running  enemy,  and  that  can  only  certainly  be  done  by 
letting  the  fleetest  or  best  situated  ships  get  ahead,  sure 
that  the  speed  of  the  fastest  pursuers  is  better  than  that  of 


272 


HAWKE  AND  L’£TENDU£RE. 


the  slowest  of  the  pursued,  and  that  therefore  either  the  lat¬ 
ter  must  be  abandoned  or  the  whole  force  brought  to  bay.  In 
the  second  case  the  French  commander,  Commodore  l’Eten¬ 
duere,  did  not  have  to  be  followed  far.  He  had  with  him  a 
convoy  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  merchant-ships  ;  detaching 
one  ship-of-tlie-line  to  continue  the  voyage  with  the  convoy,  he 
placed  himself  with  the  other  eight  between  it  and  the  enemy, 
awaiting  the  attack  under  his  topsails.  As  the  English  came 
up  one  after  another  they  divided  on  either  side  of  the  French 
column,  which  was  thus  engaged  on  both  sides.  After  an 
obstinate  resistance,  six  of  the  French  ships  were  taken,  but 
the  convoy  was  saved.  The  English  had  been  so  roughly 
handled  that  the  two  remaining  French  men-of-war  got  back 
safely  to  France.  If,  therefore,  Sir  Edward  Hawke  showed 
in  his  attack  the  judgment  and  dash  which  always  distin¬ 
guished  that  remarkable  officer,  it  may  be  claimed  for  Com¬ 
modore  l’Etenduere  that  fortune,  in  assigning  him  the  glorious 
disadvantage  of  numbers,  gave  him  also  the  leading  part  in 
the  drama,  and  that  he  filled  it  nobly.  A  French  officer 
justly  remarks  that  “  he  defended  his  convoy  as  on  shore  a 
position  is  defended,  when  the  aim  is  to  save  an  army  corps 
or  to  assure  an  evolution ;  he  gave  himself  to  be  crushed. 
After  an  action  that  lasted  from  mid-day  till  eight  P.  M.  the 
convoy  was  saved,  thanks  to  the  obstinacy  of  the  defence  ; 
two  hundred  and  fifty  ships  were  saved  to  their  owners  by 
the  devotion  of  L’Etenduere  and  of  the  captains  under  his 
orders.  ..This  devotion  cannot  be  questioned,  for  eight  ships 
had  but  few  chances  of  surviving  an  action  with  fourteen; 
and  not  only  did  the  commander  of  the  eight  accept  an  action 
which  he  might  possibly  have  avoided,  but  he  knew  how  to 
inspire  his  lieutenants  with  trust  in  him ;  for  all  supported 
the  strife  with  honor,  and  yielded  at  last,  showing  the  most 
indisputable  proofs  of  their  fine  and  energetic  defence.  Four 
ships  were  entirely  dismasted,  two  had  only  the  foremast 
standing.”  1  The  whole  affair,  as  conducted  on  both  sides, 
affords  an  admirable  study  of  how  to  follow  up  an  advantage, 

1  Troude  :  Batailles  Navales  de  la  France. 


r 

LA  BOURDONNAIS  AT  THE  ISLE  OF  FRANCE .  273 

original  or  acquired,  and  of  the  results  that  may  be  obtained 
by  a  gallant,  even  hopeless  defence,  for  the  furtherance  of 
a  particular  object.  It  may  be  added  that  Hawke,  disabled 
from  further  pursuit  himself,  sent  a  sloop  of  war  express  to 
the  West  Indies,  with  information  of  the  approach  of  the 
convoy,  —  a  step  which  led  to  the  capture  of  part  of  it,  and 
gives  a  touch  of  completeness  to  the  entire  transaction,  which 
cannot  fail  to  be  gratifying  to  a  military  student  interested 
in  seeing  the  actors  in  history  fully  alive  to  and  discharging 
to  the  utmost  their  important  tasks. 

Before  bringing  to  a  close  the  story  of  this  war  and  men¬ 
tioning  the  peace  settlement,  an  account  must  be  given  of 
the  transactions  in  India,  where  France  and  England  were 
then  on  equal  terms.  It  has  been  said  -that  affairs  there 
were  controlled  by  the  East  India  companies  of  either  na¬ 
tion  ;  and  that  the  French  were  represented  in  the  peninsula 
by  Dupleix,  in  the  islands  by  La  Bourdonnais.  The  latter 
was  appointed  to  his  post  in  1735,  and  his  untiring  genius 
had  been  felt  in  all  the  details  of  administration,  but  es¬ 
pecially  in  converting  the  Isle  of  France  into  a  great  naval 
station,  —  a  work  which  had  to  be  built  up  from  the  foun¬ 
dations.  Everything  was  wanting ;  everything  was  by  him 
in  greater  or  less  measure  supplied,  —  storehouses,  dock-yards, 
fortifications,  seamen.  In  1740,  when  war  between  France 
and  England'  became  probable,  he  obtained  from  the  East 
India  Company  a  squadron,  though  smaller  than  he  asked, 
with  which  he  proposed  to  ruin  the  English  commerce  and 
shipping ;  but  when  war  actually  began  in  1744,  he  received 
orders  not  to  attack  the  English,  the  French  company  hoping 
that  neutrality  might  exist  between  the  companies  in  that 
distant  region,  though  the  nations  were  at  war.  The  propo¬ 
sition  does  not  seem  absurd  in  view  of  the  curious  relations 
of  Holland  to  France,  nominally  at  peace  while  sending  troops 
to  the  Austrian  army  ;  but  it  was  much  to  the  advantage  of 
the  English,  who  were  inferior  in  the  Indian  seas.  Their 
company  accepted  the  proffer,  while  saying  that  it  of  course 
could  bind  neither  the  home  government  nor  the  royal  navy. 

'  18 


274 


DUPLE IX  IN  INDIA. 


The  advantage  won  by  the  forethought  of  La  Bourdonnais 
was  thus  lost ;  though  first,  and  long  alone,  on  the  field,  his 
hand  was  stayed.  Meanw7hile  the  English  admiralty  sent  out 
a  squadron  and  began  to  seize  French  ships  between  India  and 
China ;  not  till  then  did  the  company  awake  from  its  illusion. 
Having  done  this  part  of  its  work,  the  English  squadron  sailed 
to  the  coast  of  India,  and  in  July,  1745,  appeared  off  Pondi¬ 
cherry,  the  political  capital  of  French  India,  prepared  to  sus¬ 
tain  an  attack  which  the  governor  of  Madras  was  about  to 
make  by  land.  La  Bourdonnais’  time  was  now  come. 

Mean-while,  on  the  mainland  of  the  Indian  peninsula,  Du- 
pleix  had  been  forming  wide  views  and  laying  broad  founda¬ 
tions  for  the  establishment  of  French  preponderance.  Having 
entered  the  service  of  their  company  at  first  in  a  subordinate 
clerical  position,  his  ability  had  raised  him  by  rapid  steps  to 
be  head  of  the  commercial  establishments  at  Chandernagore, 
to  which  he  gave  a  very  great  enlargement,  seriously  affect¬ 
ing,  it  is  said  even  destroying,  parts  of  the  English  trade. 
In  1742  he  was  made  governor-general,  and  as  such  removed 
to  Pondicherry.  Here  he  began  to  develop  his  policy,  which 
aimed  at  bringing  India  under  the  power  of  France.  He 
saw  that  through  the  progress  and  extension  of  the  European 
races  over  the  seas  of  the  whole  world  the  time  had  come 
when  the  Eastern  peoples  must  be  brought  into  ever-increasing 
contact  with  them ;  and  he  judged  that  India,  so  often  con¬ 
quered  before,  was  now  about  to  be  conquered  by  Europeans. 
He  meant  that  France  should  win  the  prize,  and  saw  in  Eng¬ 
land  the  only  rival.  His  plan  was  to  meddle  in  Indian 
politics  :  first,  as  head  of  a  foreign  and  independent  colony, 
which  he  already  was ;  and  second,  as  a  vassal  of  the  Great 
Mogul,  -which  he  intended  to  become.  To  divide  and  con¬ 
quer,  to  advance  the  French  lines  and  influence  by  judicious 
alliances,  to  turn  wavering  scales  by  throwing  in  on  one 
side  or  the  other  the  weight  of  French  courage  and  skill, — - 
such  were  his  aims.  Pondicherry,  though  a  poor  harbor,  was 
well  adapted  for  his  political  plans ;  being  far  distant  from 
Delhi,  the  capital  of  the  Mogul,  aggressive  extension  might 


INFLUENCE  OF  SEA  POWER. 


275 


go  on  unmarked,  until  strong  enough  to  bear  the  light. 
Dupleix’s  present  aim,  therefore,  was  to  build  up  a  great 
French  principality  in  southeast  India,  around  Pondicherry, 
while  maintaining  the  present  positions  in  Bengal. 

Let  it  be  noted,  however,  —  and  the  remark  is  necessary  in 
order  to  justify  the  narration  of  these  plans  in  connection  with 
our  subject,  a  connection  perhaps  not  at  first  evident,  —  that 
the  kernel  of  the  question  now  before  Dupleix  was  not  how  to 
build  up  an  empire  out  of  the  Indian  provinces  and  races, 
but  how  to  get  rid  of  the  English,  and  that  finally.  The 
wildest  dreams  of  sovereignty  he  may  have  entertained  could 
not  have  surpassed  the  actual  performance  of  England  a  few 
years  later.  European  qualities  were  bound  to  tell,  if  not 
offset  by  the  opposition  of  other  Europeans ;  and  such  op¬ 
position  on  the  one  side  or  the  other  depended  upon  the 
control  of  the  sea.  In  a  climate  so  deadly  to  the  white  races 
the  small  numbers  whose  heroism  bore  up  the  war  against 
fearful  odds  on  many  a  field  must  be  continually-  renewed. 
As  everywhere  and  always,  the  action  of  sea  power  was  here 
quiet  and  unperceived  ;  but  it  will  not  be  necessary  to  belittle 
in  the  least  the  qualities  and  career  of  Clive  the  English  hero 
of  this  time  and  the  founder  of  their  empire,  in  order  to 
prove  the  decisive  influence  which  it  exerted,  despite  the 
inefficiency  of  the  English  naval  officers  first  engaged,  and 
the  lack  of  conclusive  results  in  such  naval  battles  as  were 
fought.1  If  during  the  twenty  years  following  1743,  French 

1  “  Notwithstanding  the  extraordinary  effort  made  by  the  French  in  sending 
out  M.  Lally  with  a  considerable  force  last  year,  I  am  confident  before  the  end 
of  this  [1759]  they  will  be  near  their  last  gasp  in  the  Carnatic  unless  some  very 
unforeseen  event  interpose  in  their  favor.  The  superiority  of  our  squadron  and 
the  plenty  of  money  and  supplies  of  all  kinds  which  our  friends  on  that  coast 
will  be  furnished  with  from  this  province  [Bengal],  while  the  enemy  are  in  ' 
total  want  of  everything,  without  any  visible  means  of  redress,  are  such  advan¬ 
tages  as,  if  properly  attended  to,  cannot  fail  of  wholly  effecting  their  ruin  in 
that  as  well  as  in  every  other  part  of  India”  (Letter  of  Clive  to  Pitt,  Calcutta, 
January  7,  1759;  Gleig’s  Life  of  Lord  Clive).  It  will  be  remembered  that  the 
control  and  use  of  Bengal,  upon  which  Clive  here  counts,  had  only  lately  been 
acquired  by  the  English  ;  in  the  days  of  Dupleix  they  did  not  possess  them.  Aa 
will  be  seen  later,  Clive’s  predictions  in  this  letter  were  wholly  fulfilled. 


27G 


AFFAIRS  IN  INDIA ,  17 46. 


fleets  instead  of  English  had  controlled  the  coasts  of  the  pe¬ 
ninsula  and  the  seas  between  it  and  Europe,  can  it  be  be¬ 
lieved  that  the  schemes  of  Dupleix  would  have  utterly  failed  ? 
“  Naval  inferiority,”  justly  says  a  French  historian,  “  was  the 
principal  cause  that  arrested  the  progress  of  Dupleix.  The 
French  royal  navy  did  not  make  its  appearance  in  the  East 
Indies  ”  in  his  day.  It  remains  to  tell  the  story  briefly. 

The  English,  in  1745,  made  preparations  to  besiege'  Pondi¬ 
cherry,  in  which  the  royal  navy  was  to  support  the  land 
forces  ;  but  the  effects  of  Dupleix’s  political  schemes  were 
at  once  seen.  The  Nabob  of  the  Carnatic  threatened  to  attack 
Madras,  and  the  English  desisted.  The  following  year  La 
Bourdonnais  appeared  on  the  scene,  and  an  action  took  place 
between  his  squadron  and  that  under  Commodore  Peyton  ; 
after  which,  although  it  had  been  a  drawn  fight,  the  English 
officer  deserted  the  coast,  taking  refuge  in  Ceylon,  and  leaving 
the  control  at  sea  with  the  French.  La  Bourdonnais  anchored 
at  Pondicherry,  where  quarrels  between  him  and  Dupleix  soon 
arose,  and  were  aggravated  by  the  conflicting  tone  of  their 
instructions  from  home.  In  September  he  went  to  Madras, 
attacked  by  land  and  sea,  and  took  the  place,  but  made  with 
the  governor  the  stipulation  that  it  might  be  ransomed ;  and 
a  ransom  of  two  million  dollars  was  accordingly  paid.  When 
Dupleix  heard  of  this  he  was  very  angry,  and  claimed  to  an¬ 
nul  the  terms  of  capitulation  on  the  ground  that,  once  taken, 
the  place  was  within  his  jurisdiction.  La  Bourdonnais  re¬ 
sented  this  attempt  as  dishonorable  to  him  after  the  promise 
given.  While  the  quarrel  was  going  on,  a  violent  cyclone 
wrecked  two  of  his  ships  and  dismasted  the  rest.  He  soon 
after  returned  to  France,  where  his  activity  and  zeal  were 
repaid  by  three  years’  imprisonment  under  charges,  from  the 
effects  of  which  Treatment  he  died.  After  his  departure 
Dupleix  broke  the  capitulation,  seized  and  kept  Madras,  drove 
out  the  English  settlers,  and  went  on  to  strengthen  the  fortifi¬ 
cations.  From  Madras  he  turned  against  Fort  St.  David,  but 
the  approach  of  an  English  squadron  compelled  him  to  raise 
the  siege  in  March,  1747. 


PEACE  OF  A IX-LA-CHA PELLE. 


277 


During  this  year  the  disasters  to  the  French  navy  in  the 
Atlantic,  already  related,  left  the  English  undisturbed  mas¬ 
ters  of  the  sea.  In  the  following  winter  they  sent  to  India 
the  greatest  European  fleet  yet  seen  in  the  East,  with  a  large 
land  force,  the  whole  under  the  command  of  Admiral  Bos- 
cawen,  who  bore  a  general’s  commission  in  addition  to  his 
naval  rank.  The  fleet  appeared  off  the  Coromandel  coast  in 
August,  1748.  Pondicherry  was  attacked  by  land  and  sea,  but 
Dupleix  made  a  successful  resistance.  The  English  fleet  in 
its  turn  suffered  from  a  hurricane,  and  the  siege  was  raised  in 
October.  Shortly  after  came  the  news  of  the  Peace  of  Aix- 
la-Chapelle,  which  ended  the  European  war.  Dupleix,  with 
his  home  communications  restored,  could  now  resume  his 
subtle  and  persevering  efforts  to  secure  a  territorial  base 
which  should,  as  far  as  possible,  shelter  him  from  the  chances 
of  sea  war.  Pity  that  so  much  genius  and  patience  should 
have  been  spent  in  an  effort  wholly  vain  ;  nothing  could  pro¬ 
tect  against  that  sea  attack  but  a  naval  aid,  which  the  home 
government  could  not  give.  One  of  the  conditions  of  the 
peace  was  that  Madras  should  be  restored  to  the  English  in 
exchange  for  Louisburg,  the  prize  won  by  the  North  Ameri¬ 
can  colonists  and  released  by  them  as  reluctantly  as  Madras 
was  by  Dupleix.  This  was  indeed  illustrating  Napoleon’s 
boast  that  he  would  reconquer  Pondicherry  on  the  bank  of 
the  Vistula ;  yet,  although  the  maritime  supremacy  of  Eng¬ 
land  made  Louisburg  in  her  hands  much  stronger  than  Ma¬ 
dras,  or  any  other  position  in  India,  when  held  by  the  French, 
the  gain  by  the  exchange  was  decidedly  on  the  side  of  Great 
Britain.  The  English  colonists  were  not  men  to  be  contented 
with  this  action ;  but  they  knew  the  naval  power  of  England, 
and  that  they  could  do  again  what  they  had  done  once,  at  a 
point  not  far  distant  from  their  own  shores.  They  under¬ 
stood  the  state  of  the  case.  Not  so  with  Madras.  Ho  w  pro¬ 
found  must  have  been  the  surprise  of  the  native  princes  at 
this  surrender,  how  injurious  to  the  personality  of  Dupleix 
and  the  influence  he  had  gained  among  them,  to  see  him,  in 
the  very  hour  of  victory,  forced,  by  a  power  they  could  not 


278 


INFLUENCE  OF  SEA  POWER  ON 


understand,  to  relinquish  his  spoil!  They  were  quite  right; 
the  mysterious  power  which  they  recognized  by  its  working, 
though  they  saw  it  not,  was  nyt  in  this  or  that  man,  king  or 
statesman,  but  in  that  control  of  the  sea  which  the  French 
government  knew  forbade  the  hope  of  maintaining  that  dis¬ 
tant  dependency  against  the  fleets  of  England.  Dupleix  him¬ 
self  saw  it  not ;  for  some  years  more  he  continued  build¬ 
ing,  on  the  sand  of  Oriental  intrigues  and  lies,  a  house  which 
he  vainly  hoped  would  stand  against  the  storms  that  must 
descend  upon  it. 

•v  The  Treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  ending  this  general  war, 
was  signed  April  80,  1748,  by  England,  France,  and  Holland, 
and  finally  by  all  the  powers  in  October  of  the  same  year. 
With  the  exception  of  certain  portions  shorn  off  the  Austrian 
Empire, —  Silesia  for  Prussia,  Parma  for  the  Infante  Philip  of 
Spain,  and  some  Italian  territory  to  the  east  of  Piedmont  for 
the  King  of  Sardinia,  —  the  general  tenor  of  the  terms  was  a 
return  to  the  status  before  the  war.  “  Never,  perhaps,  did 
any  war,  after  so  many  great  events,  and  so  large  a  loss  of 
blood  and  treasure,  end  in  replacing  the  nations  engaged  in 
it  so  nearly  in  the  same  situation  as  they  held  at  first.”  In 
truth,  as  regarded  France,  England,  and  Spain,  the  affair  of 
the  Austrian  succession,  supervening  so  soon  upon  the  out¬ 
break  of  war  between  the  two  latter,  had  wholly  turned  hostil¬ 
ities  aside  from  their  true  direction  and  postponed  for  fifteen 
years  the  settlement  of  disputes  which  concerned  them  much 
more  nearly  than  the  accession  of  Maria  Theresa.  In  the 
distress  of  her  old  enemy,  the  House  of  Austria,  France  was 
easily  led  to  renew  her  attacks  upon  it,  and  England  as  easily 
drawn  to  oppose  the  attempts  of  the  French  to  influence  or 
dictate  in  German  affairs,  —  a  course  the  more  readily  fol-  i 
lowed  from  the  German  interests  of  the  king.  It  may  be 
questioned  whether  the  true  policy  for  France  was  to  direct 
the  war  upon  the  heart  of  the  Austrian  Empire,  by  way  of  the 
Fthine  and  Germany,  or,  as  she  finally  did,  upon  the  remote 
possessions  of  the  Netherlands.  In  the  former  case  she  rested 
en  friendly  territory  in  Bavaria,  and  gave  a  hand  to  Prussia, 


THE  RESULTS  OF  THE  WAR. 


279 


whose  military  power  was  now  first  felt.  Such  was  the  first 
theatre  of  the  war.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  Netherlands, 
whither  the  chief  scene  of  hostilities  shifted  later,  France 
struck  not  only  at  Austria,  but  also  at  the  sea  powers,  always 
jealous  of  her  intrusion  there.  They  were  the  soul  of  the  war 
against  her,  by  their  subsidies  \o  her  other  enemies  and  by 
the  losses  inflicted  on  her  commerce  and  that  of  Spain.  The 
misery  of  France  was  alleged  to  the  King  of  Spain  by  Louis 
XV.,  as  forcing  him  to  conclude  peace  ;  and  it  is  evident  that 
the  suffering  must  have  been  great  to  induce  him  to  yield 
such  easy  terms  as  he  did,  when  he  already  held  the  Nether¬ 
lands  and  parts  of  Holland  itself  by  force  of  arms.  But 
while  so  successful  on  the  continent,  his  navy  was  annihilated 
and  communication  with  the  colonies  thus  cut  off ;  and  though 
it  may  be  doubted  whether  the  French  government  of  that 
day  cherished  the  colonial  ambitions  ascribed  to  it  by  some, 
it  is  certain  French  commerce  was  suffering  enormously. 

While  this  was  the  condition  of  France,  impelling  her  to 
peace,  England  in  1747  found  that,  from  disputes  about  trade 
in  Spanish  America  and  through  the  inefficient  action  of  her 
navy,  she  had  been  led  away  into  a  continental  war,  in  which 
she  had  met  with  disaster,  incurred  nearly  £  80,000,000  of 
debt,  and  now  saw  her  ally  Holland  threatened  with  inva¬ 
sion.  The  peace  itself  was  signed  under  a  threat  by  the 
French  envoy  that  the  slightest  delay  would  be  the  signal  for 
the  French  to  destroy  the  fortifications  of  the  captured  towns 
and  at  once  begin  the  invasion.  At  the  same  time  her  own 
resources  were  drained,  and  Holland,  exhausted,  was  seeking 
to  borrow  from  her.  “  Money,”  we  are  told,  “  was  never  so 
scarce  in  the  city,  and  cannot  be  had  at  twelve  per  cent.” 
Had  France,  therefore,  at  this  time  had  a  navy  able  to  make 
head  against  that  of  England,  even  though  somewhat  infe¬ 
rior  in  strength,  she  might,  with  her  grip  on  the  Netherlands 
and  Maestricht,  have  exacted  her  own  conditions.  England, 
on  the  other  hand,  though  driven  to  the  wall  on  the  conti¬ 
nent,  was  nevertheless  able  to  obtain  peace  on  equal  terms, 
through  the  control  of  the  sea  by  her  navy. 


280 


INFLUENCE  OF  SEA  POWER. 


The  commerce  of  all  three  nations  had  suffered  enor¬ 
mously,  but  the  balance  of  prizes  in  favor  of  Great  Britain, 
was  estimated  at  <£2,000,000.  Stated  in  another  way,  it  is 
said  that  the  combined  losses  of  French  and  Spanish  com¬ 
merce  amounted  during  the  war  to  8,484  ships,  the  English 
to  8,288  ;  but  in  considering  such  figures,  the  relation  they 
bear  to  the  total  merchant  shipping  of  either  nation  must 
not  be  forgotten.  A  thousand  vessels  were  a  very  much 
larger  fraction  of  French  shipping  than  of  English,  and 
meant  more  grievous  loss. 

“  After  the  disaster  to  the  squadron  of  L’Etenduere,”  says  a 
French  writer,  “the  French  flag  did  not  appear  at  sea.  Twenty- 
two  ships-of-the-line  composed  the  navy  of  France,  which  sixty 
years  before  had  one  hundred  and  twenty.  Privateers  made  few 
prizes ;  followed  everywhere,  unprotected,  they  almost  always  fell  a 
prey  to  the  English.  The  British  naval  forces,  without  any  rivals, 
passed  unmolested  over  the  seas.  In  one  year  they  are  said  to 
have  taken  from  French  commerce  £7,000,000  sterling.  Yet  this 
sea  power,  which  might  have  seized  French  and  Spanish  colonies, 
made  few  conquests  from  want  of  unity  and  persistence  in  the  direc¬ 
tion  given  them.”  1 

To  sum  up,  France  was  forced  to  give  up  her  conquests  for 
want  of  a  navy,  and  England  saved  her  position  by  her  sea 
power,  though  she  had  failed  to  use  it  to  the  best  advantage. 


1  Lapeyrouse-Bonfils  :  Hist,  de  la  Marine  Fra^aise. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


Seven  Years’  War,  1756-1763.  —  England’s  Overwhelming  Power 
and  Conquests  on  the  Seas,  in  North  America,  Europe,  and 
East  and  West  Indies.  —  Sea  Battles  :  Byng  off  Minorca  ; 
Hawke  and  Conflans  ;  Pocock  and  D’Ach^  in  East  Indies. 

THE  urgency  with  which  peace  was  desired  by  the  prin¬ 
cipal  parties  to  the  War  of  the  Austrian  Succession 
may  perhaps  be  inferred  from  the  neglect  to  settle  definitely 
and  conclusively  many  of  the  questions  outstanding  between 
them,  and  notably  the  very  disputes  about  which  the  war 
between  England  and  Spain  began.  It  seems  as  though  the 
powers  feared  to  treat  thoroughly  matters  that  contained  the 
germs  of  future  quarrels,  lest  the  discussion  should  prolong 
the  war  that  then  existed.  England  made  peace  because  the 
fall  of  Holland  was  otherwise  inevitable,  not  because  she  had 
enforced,  or  surrendered,  her  claims  of  1739  against  Spain. 
The. right of  uninterrupted  navigation  in  West  Indian  seas, 
free  from  any  search,  was  left  undetermined,  as  were  other 
kindred  matters.  Not  only  so,  but  the  boundaries  between 
the  English  and  French  colonies  in  the  valley  of  the  Ohio, 
toward  Canada,  and  on  the  land  side  of  the  Nova  Scotian 
peninsula,  remained  as  vague  as  they  had  before  been.  It 
was  plain  that  peace  could  not  last ;  and  by  it,  if  she  had 
saved  Holland,  England  surrendered  the  control  of  the  sea 
which  she  had  won.  The  true  character  of  the  strife,  shrouded 
for  a  moment  by  the  continental  war,  was  revealed  by  the  so- 
called  peace;  though  formally  allayed,  the  contention  con¬ 
tinued  in  every  part  of  the  world. 

In  India,  Dupleix,  no  longer  able  to  attack  the  English 
openly,  sought  to  undermine  their  power  by  the  line  of  policy 


282 


RECALL  OF  DUPLEIX. 


already  described.  Mingling  adroitly  in  the  quarrels  of  sur¬ 
rounding  princes,  and  advancing  his  own  power  while  so 
doing,  he  attained  by  rapid  steps  to  the  political  control,  in 
1751,  of  the  southern  extremity  of  India,  —  a  country  nearly 
as  large  as  France.  Given  the  title  of  Nabob,  he  now  had 
a  place  among  the  princes  of  the  land.  “  A  merely  commer¬ 
cial  policy  was  in  his  eyes  a  delusion ;  there  could  be  no 
middle  course  between  conquest  and  abandonment.”  In  the 
course  of  the  same  year  further  grants  extended  the  French 
power  through  extensive  regions  to  the  north  and  east,  em¬ 
bracing  all  the  coast  of  Orissa,  and  made  Dupleix  ruler  of 
a  third  of  India.  To  celebrate  his  triumphs,  perhaps  also  in 
accordance  with  his  policy  of  impressing  the  native  mind, 
he  now  founded  a  town  and  put  up  a  pillar  setting  forth  his 
successes.  But  his  doings  caused  the  directors  of  the  com¬ 
pany  only  disquietude ;  instead  of  the  reinforcements  he 
asked  for  they  sent  him  exhortations  to  peace ;  and  at  about 
this  time  Robert  Clive,  then  but  twenty-six  years  old,  began 
to  show  his  genius.  The  success  of  Dupleix  and  his  allies 
became  checkered  with  reverses ;  the  English  under  Clive’s 
leadership  supported  the  native  opponents  of  the  French. 
The  company  at  home  was  but  little  interested  in  his  political 
schemes,  and  was  annoyed  at  the  failure  of  dividends.  Nego¬ 
tiations  were  opened  at  London  for  a  settlement  of  difficulties, 
and  Dupleix  was  summoned  home  ;  the  English  government, 
it  is  said,  making  his  recall  an  absolute  condition  of  con¬ 
tinued  peace.  Two  days  after  his  departure,  in  1754,  his 
successor  signed  a  treaty  with  the  English  governor,  wholly 
abandoning  his  policy,  stipulating  that  neither  company 
should  interfere  in  the  internal  politics  of  India,  and  that  all 
possessions  acquired  during  the  war  in  the  Carnatic  should  be 
given  back  to  the  Mogul.  What  France  thus  surrendered  was 
in  extent  and  population  an  empire,  and  the  mortification  of 
French  historians  has  branded  the  concession  as  ignominious ; 
but  how  could  the  country  have  been  held,  with  the  English 
navy  cutting  off  the  eagerly  desired  reinforcements  ? 

In  North  America,  the  declaration  of  peace  was  followed  by 


AGITATION  IN  NORTH  AMERICA. 


283 


renewed  agitation,  which  sprang  from  and  betokened  the  deep 
feeling  and  keen  sense  of  the  situation  had  by  the  colonists 
and  local  authorities  on  either  side.  The  Americans  held  to 
their  points  with  the  stubbornness  of  their  race.  “  There  is 
no  repose  for  our  thirteen  colonies,”  wrote  Franklin,  “  so  long 
as  the  French  are  masters  of  Canada.”  The  rival  claims  to 
the  central  unsettled  region,  which  may  accurately  enough 
be  called  the  valley  of  the  Ohio,  involved,  if  the  English  were 
successful,  the  military  separation  of  Canada  from  Louisiana ; 
while  on  the  other  hand,  occupation  by  the  French,  linking 
the  two  extremes  of  their  acknowledged  possessions,  would 
shut  up  the  English  colonists  between  the  Alleghany  Moun¬ 
tains  and  the  sea.  The  issues  were  apparent  enough  to 
leading  Americans  of  that  day,  though  they  were  more  far- 
reaching  than  the  wisest  of  them  could  have  foreseen  ;  there 
is  room  for  curious  speculation  as  to  the  effect,  not  only  upon 
America,  but  upon  the  whole  world,  if  the  French  govern¬ 
ment  had  had  the  will,  and  the  French  people  the  genius, 
effectively  to  settle  and  hold  the  northern  and  western 
regions  which  they  then  claimed.  But  while  Frenchmen 
upon  the  spot  saw  clearly  enough  the  coming  contest  and  the 
terrible  disadvantage  of  unequal  numbers  and  inferior  navy 
under  which  Canada  must  labor,  the  home  government  was 
blind  alike  to  the  value  of  the  colony  and  to  the  fact  that  it 
must  be  fought  for ;  while  the  character  and  habits  of  the 
French  settlers,  lacking  in  political  activity  and  unused  to 
begin  and  carry  through  measures  for  the  protection  of  their 
own  interests,  did  not  remedy  the  neglect  of  the  mother- 
country.  The  paternal  centralizing  system  of  French  rule  had 
taught  the  colonists  to  look  to  the  mother-country,  and  then 
failed  to  take  care  of  them.  The  governors  of  Canada  of  that 
day  acted  as  careful  and  able  military  men,  doing  what  they 
could  to  supply  defects  and  weaknesses ;  it  is  possible  that 
their  action  was  more  consistent  and  well-planned  than  that 
of  the  English  governors ;  but  with  the  carelessness  of  both 
home  governments,  nothing  in  the  end  could  take  the  place 
of  the  capacity  of  the  English  colonists  to  look  out  for  them- 


284 


ARMED  COLLISIONS  IN  AMERICA. 


selves.  It  is  odd  and  amusing  to  read  the  conflicting  state¬ 
ments  of  English  and  French  historians  as  to  the  purposes 
and  aims  of  the  opposing  statesmen  in  these  years  when 
the  first  murmurings  of  the  storm  were  heard  ;  the  simple 
truth  seems  to  be  that  one  of  those  conflicts  familiarly  known 
to  us  as  irrepressible  was  at  hand,  and  that  both  governments 
would  gladly  have  avoided  it.  The  boundaries  might  be  un¬ 
determined  ;  the  English  colonists  were  not. 

The  French  governors  established  posts  where  they  could 
on  the  debatable  ground,  and  it  was  in  the  course  of  a  dispute 
over  one  of  these,  in  1T54,  that  the  name  of  Washington  first 
appears  in  history.  Other  troubles  occurred  in  Nova  Scotia, 
and  both  home  governments  then  began  to  awake.  In  1T55 
Braddock’s  disastrous  expedition  was  directed  against  Fort 
Duquesne,  now  Pittsburg,  where  Washington  had  surren¬ 
dered  the  year  before.  Later  in  the  year  another  collision 
between  the  English  and  French  colonists  happened  near 
Lake  George.  Although  Braddock’s  expedition  had  been 
first  to  start,  the  French  government  was  also  moving.  In 
May  of  the  same  year  a  large  squadron  of  ships-of-war,  mostly 
armed  en  fltite ,  sailed  from  Brest  with  three  thousand  troops, 
and  a  new  governor,  De  Vaudreuil,  for  Canada.  Admiral 
Boscawen  had  already  preceded  this  fleet,  and  lay  in  wait  for 
it  off  the  mouth  of  the  St.  Lawrence.  There  was  as  yet  no 
open  war,  and  the  French  were  certainly  within  their  rights 
in  sending  a  garrison  to  their  own  colonies  ;  but  Boscawen’s 
orders  were  to  stop  them.  A  fog  which  scattered  the  French 
squadron  also  covered  its  passage  ;  but  two  of  the  ships  were 
seen  by  the  English  fleet  and  captured,  June  8,  1755.  As 
soon  as  this  news  reached  Europe,  the  French  ambassador  to 
London  was  recalled,  but  still  no  declaration  of  war  followed. 
In  July,  Sir  Edward  Hawke  was  sent  to  sea  with  orders  to 
cruise  between  Ushant  and  Cape  Finisterre,  and  to  seize  any 
French  ships-of-the-line  he  might  see ;  to  which  were  added 

1  That  is,  with  the  guns  on  board,  but  for  the  most  part  not  mounted  on  their 
carriages,  in  order  to  give  increased  accommodation  for  troops.  When  the  troops 
were  landed,  the  guns  were  mounted. 


EXPEDITION  AGAINST  MINORCA. 


285 


in  August  further  orders  to  take  all  French  ships  of  every 
kind,  men-of-war,  privateers,  and  merchantmen,  and  to  send 
them  into  English  ports.  Before  the  end  of  the  year,  three 
hundred  trading  vessels,  valued  at  six  million  dollars,  had 
been  captured,  and  six  thousand  French  seamen  were  impris¬ 
oned  in  England,  —  enough  to  man  nearly  ten  ships-of-tlie-line. 
All  this  was  done  while  nominal  peace  still  existed.  War  was 
not  declared  until  six  months  later. 

France  still  seemed  to  submit,  but  she  was  biding  her  time, 
and  preparing  warily  a  severe  stroke  for  which  she  had  now 
ample  provocation.  Small  squadrons,  or  detachments  of 
ships,  continued  to  be  sent  to  the  West  Indies  and  to 
Canada,  while  noisy  preparations  were  made  in  the  dock-yard 
of  Brest,  and  troops  assembled  upon  the  shores  of  the  Channel. 
England  saw  herself  threatened  with  invasion,  —  a  menace 
to  which  her  people  have  been  peculiarly  susceptible.  The 
government  of  the  day,  weak  at  best,  was  singularly  unfit  for 
waging  war,  and  easily  misled  as  to  the  real  danger.  Besides, 
England  was  embarrassed,  as  always  at  the  beginning  of  a 
war,  not  only  by  the  numerous  points  she  had  to  protect  in 
addition  to  her  commerce,  but  also  by  the  absence  of  a  large 
number  of  her  seamen  in  trading-vessels  all  over  the  world. 
The  Mediterranean  was  therefore  neglected ;  and  the  French, 
while  making  loud  demonstrations  on  the  Channel,  quietly 
equipped  at  Toulon  twelve  ships-of-the-line,  which  sailed  on 
the  10th  of  April,  1756,  under  Admiral  la  Galissoni^re,  con¬ 
voying  one  hundred  and  fifty  transports  with  fifteen  thou¬ 
sand  troops,  commanded  by  the  Duke  of  Richelieu.  A  week 
later  the  army  was  safely  landed  in  Minorca,  and  Port 
Mahon  invested,  while  the  fleet  established  itself  in  blockade 
before  the  harbor. 

Practically  this  was  a  complete  surprise  ;  for  though  the 
suspicions  of  the  English  government  had  been  at  last 
aroused,  its  action  came  too  late.  The  garrison  had  not  been 
reinforced,  and  numbered  a  scant  three  thousand  men,  from 
which  thirty-five  officers  were  absent  on  leave,  among  them 
the  governor  and  the  colonels  of  all  the  regiments.  Admiral 


286 


BY  NGN  ACTION  OFF  MINORCA. 


Byng  sailed  from  Portsmouth  with  ten  ships-of-the-line  only 
three  days  before  the  French  left  Toulon.  Six  weeks  later, 
when  he  reached  the  neighborhood  of  Port  Mahon,  his 
fleet  had  been  increased  to  thirteen  ships-of-the-line,  and 
he  had  with  him  four  thousand  troops.  It  was  already 
late ;  a  practicable  breach  had  been  made  in  the  fortress 
a  week  before.  When  the  English  fleet  came  in  sight,  La 
Galissoniere  stood  out  to  meet  it  and  bar  the  entrance  to 
the  harbor. 

The  battle  that  followed  owes  its  historical  celebrity  wholly 
to  the  singular  and  tragic  event  which  arose  from  it.  Unlike 
Matthews’s  battle  off  Toulon,  it  does  afford  some  tactical  in¬ 
struction,  though  mainly  applicable  to  the  obsolete  conditions 
of  warfare  under  sail ;  but  it  is  especially  linked  to  the  earlier 
action  through  the  effect  produced  upon  the  mind  of  the  unfor¬ 
tunate  Byng  by  the  sentence  of  the  court-martial  upon  Mat¬ 
thews.  During  the  course  of  the  engagement  he  repeatedly 
alluded  to  the  censure  upon  that  admiral  for  leaving  the  line, 
and  seems  to  have  accepted  the  judgment  as  justifying,  if  not 
determining,  his  own  course.  Briefly,  it  may  be  said  that  the 
two  fleets,  having  sighted  each  other  on  the  morning  of  the 
20th  of  May,  were  found  after  a  series  of  manoeuvres  both  on 
the  port  tack,  with  an  easterly  wind,  heading  southerly,  the 
French  to  leeward,  between  the  English  and  the  harbor.  Byng 
ran  down  in  line  ahead  off  the  wind,  the  French  remaining  by 
it,  so  that  when  the  former  made  the  signal  to  engage,  the  fleets 
were  not  parallel,  but  formed  an  angle  of  from  thirty  to  forty 
degrees  (Plate  Vila.  A,  A).  The  attack  which  Byng  by  his 
own  account  meant  to  make,  each  ship  against  its  opposite  in 
the  enemy’s  line,  difficult  to  carry  out  under  any  circumstances, 
was  here  further  impeded  by  the  distance  between  the  two 
rears  being  much  greater  than  that  between  the  vans ;  so  that 
his  whole  line  could  not  come  into  action  at  the  same  mo¬ 
ment.  When  the  signal  was  made,  the  van  ships  kept  away 
in  obedience  to  it,  and  ran  down  for  the  French  so  nearly 
head-on  (B,B)  as  to  sacrifice  their  artillery  fire  in  great 
measure ;  they  received  three  raking  broadsides,  and  were 


BYNG’S  ACTION  OFF  MINORCA . 


287 

seriously  dismantled  aloft.  The  sixth  English  ship,  counting 
from  the  van,  had  her  foretopmast  shot  away,  flew  up  into 
the  wind,  and  came  aback,  stopping  and  doubling  up  the  rear 
of  the  line.  Then  undoubtedly  was  the  time  for  Byng,  hav¬ 
ing  committed  himself  to  the  fight,  to  have  set  the  example 
and  borne  down,  just  as  Farragut  did  at  Mobile  when  his  line 
was  confused  by  the  stopping  of  the  next  ahead ;  but  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  testimony  of  the  flag-captain,  Matthews’s  sentence 
deterred  him.  a  You  see,  Captain  Gardiner,  that  the  signal 
for  the  line  is  out,  and  that  I  am  ahead  of  the  ships  4  Louisa  ’ 
and  4  Trident  ’  [which  in  the  order  should  have  been  ahead  of 
him].  You  would  not  have  me,  as  the  admiral  of  the  fleet, 
run  down  as  if  I  were  going  to  engage  a  single  ship.  It  was 
Mr.  Matthews’s  misfortune  to  be  prejudiced  by  not  carrying 
down  his  force  together,  which  I  shall  endeavor  to  avoid.” 
The  affair  thus  became  entirely  indecisive  ;  the  English  van 
was  separated  from  the  rear  and  got  the  brunt  of  the  fight 
(C).  One  French  authority  blames  Galissoniere  for  not  tack¬ 
ing  to  windward  of  the  enemy’s  van  and  crushing  it.  Another 
says  he  ordered  the  movement,  but  that  it  could  not  be  made 
from  the  damage  to  the  rigging ;  but  this  seems  improbable, 
as  the  only  injury  the  French  squadron  underwent  aloft  was 
the  loss  of  one  topsail  yard,  whereas  the  English  suffered 
very  badly.  The  true  reason  is  probably  that  given  and 
approved  by  one  of  the  French  authorities  on  naval  warfare. 
Galissoniere  considered  the  support  of  the  land  attack  on 
Mahon  paramount  to  any  destruction  of  the  English  fleet,  if 
he  thereby  exposed  his  own.  44  The  French  navy  has  always 
preferred  the  glory  of  assuring  or  preserving  a  conquest  to 
that  more  brilliant  perhaps,  but  actually  less  real,  of  taking 
some  ships,  and  therein  has  approached  more  nearly  the 
true  end  that  has  been  proposed  in  war.”  1  The  justice  of  this 
conclusion  depends  upon  the  view  that  is  taken  of  the  true  end 
of  naval  war.  If  it  is  merely  to  assure  one  or  more  posi¬ 
tions  ashore,  the  navy  becomes  simply  a  branch  of  the  army 
for  a  particular  occasion,  and  subordinates  its  action  accord- 

1  Ramatuelle :  Tactique  Navale. 


288 


FRENCH  NAVAL  POLICY. 


ingly;  but  if  the  true  end  is  to  preponderate  over  the  enemy’s 
navy  and  so  control  the  sea,  then  the  enemy’s  ships  and  fleets 
are  the  true  objects  to  be  assailed  on  all  occasions.  A  glim¬ 
mer  of  this  view  seems  to  have  been  present  to  Morogues 
when  he  wrote  that  at  sea  there  is  no  field  of  battle  to  be 
held,  nor  places  to  be  won.  If  naval  warfare  is  a  war  of 
posts,  then  the  action  of  the  fleets  must  be  subordinate  to 
the  attack  and  defence  of  the  posts  ;  if  its  object  is  to  break 
up  the  enemy’s  power  on  the  sea,  cutting  off  his  communica¬ 
tions  with  the  rest  of  his  possessions,  drying  up  the  sources 
of  his  wealth  in  his  commerce,  and  making  possible  a  closure 
of  his  ports,  then  the  object  of  attack  must  be  his  organized 
military  forces  afloat ;  in  short,  his  navy.  It  is  to  the  latter 
course,  for  whatever  reason  adopted,  that  England  owed  a 
control  of  the  sea  that  forced  the  restitution  of  Minorca  at 
the  end  of  this  war.  It  is  to  the  former  that  France  owed 
the  lack  of  prestige  in  her  navy.  Take  this  very  case  of 
Minorca ;  had  Galissoniere  been  beaten,  Richelieu  and  his 
fifteen  thousand  troops  must  have  been  lost  to  France,  cooped 
up  in  Minorca,  as  the  Spaniards,  in  1718,  were  confined  to 
Sicily.  The  French  navy  therefore  assured  the  capture  of  the 
island ;  but  so  slight  was  the  impression  on  the  ministry  and 
the  public,  that  a  French  naval  officer  tells  us  :  “  Incredible  as 
it  may  seem,  the  minister  of  marine,  after  the  glorious  affair 
off  Mahon,  instead  of  yielding  to  the  zeal  of  an  enlightened 
patriotism  and  profiting  by  the  impulse  which  this  victory 
gave  to  France  to  build  up  the  navy,  saw  fit  to  sell  the  ships 
and  rigging  which  we  still  had  in  our  ports.  We  shall  soon 
see  the  deplorable  consequences  of  this  cowardly  conduct  on 
the  part  of  our  statesmen.”  1  Neither  the  glory  nor  the  vic¬ 
tory  is  very  apparent ;  but  it  is  quite  conceivable  that  had 
the  French  admiral  thought  less  of  Mahon  and  used  the 
great  advantage  luck  had  given  him  to  take,  or  sink,  four  or 
five  of  the  enemy,  the  French  people  would  have  anticipated 
the  outbreak  of  naval  enthusiasm  which  appeared  too  late,  in 
1760.  During  the  remainder  of  this  war  the  French  fleets, 

1  Lapeyrouse-Bonfils  :  Hist,  de  la  Marine. 


FRENCH  NAVAL  POLICY. 


289 


except  in  the  East  Indies,  appear  only  as  the  pursued  in 
a  general  chase. 

The  action  imposed  upon  the  French  fleets  was,  however, 
consistent  with  the  general  policy  of  the  French  government ; 
and  John  Clerk  was  probably  right  in  saying  that  there  is 
apparent  in  this  action  off  Minorca  a  tactics  too  well  defined 
to  be  merely  accidental,  —  a  tactics  essentially  defensive  in  its 
scope  and  aim.1  In  assuming  the  lee-gage  the  French  ad¬ 
miral  not  only  covered  Mahon,  but  took  a  good  defensive  posi¬ 
tion,  imposing  upon  his  enemy  the  necessity  of  attacking  with 
all  the  consequent  risks.  Clerk  seems  to  bring  evidence 
enough  to  prove  that  the  leading  French  ships  did,  after 
roughly  handling  their  assailants,  astutely  withdraw  (C) 
thus  forcing  the  latter  to  attack  again  with  like  results. 
The  same  policy  was  repeatedly  followed  during  the  Ameri¬ 
can  war  twenty  years  later,  and  with  pretty  uniform  success ; 
so  much  so  that,  although  formal  avowal  of  the  policy  is 
wanting,  it  may  be  concluded  that  circumspection,  economy, 
defensive  war,  remained  the  fixed  purpose  of  the  French 
authorities,  based  doubtless  upon  the  reasons  given  by  Ad¬ 
miral  Grivel,  of  that  navy  :  — 

“  If  two  maritime  powers  are  at  strife,  the  one  that  has  the  fewest 
ships  must  always  avoid  doubtful  engagements ;  it  must  run  only 
those  risks  necessary  for  carrying  out  its  missions,  avoid  action  by 
manoeuvring,  or  at  worst,  if  forced  to  engage,  assure  itself  of  favorable 
conditions.  The  attitude  to  be  taken  should  depend  radically  upon 
the  power  of  your  opponent.  Let  us  not  tire  of  repeating,  accord¬ 
ing  as  she  has  to  do  with  an  inferior  or  superior  power,  France  has 
before  her  two  distinct  strategies,  radically  opposite  both  in  means 
and  ends,  — Grand  War  and  Cruising  War.” 

Such  a  formal  utterance  by  an  officer  of  rank  must  be  re¬ 
ceived  with  respect,  and  the  more  so  when  it  expresses  a 
consistent  policy  followed  by  a  great  and  warlike  nation  ;  yet 
it  may  be  questioned  whether  a  sea  power  worthy  of  the  name 
can  thus  be  secured.  Logically,  it  follows  from  the  position 
assumed,  that  combats  between  equal  forces  are  to  be  discour- 

X 

/ 


1  Clerk :  Naval  Tactics. 
19 


290 


EXECUTION  OF  ADMIRAL  BYNG. 


aged,  because  the  loss  to  you  is  greater  than  the  loss  to  your 
opponent.  “  In  fact,”  says  Ramatuelle,  upholding  the  French 
policy,  “  of  what  consequence  to  the  English  would  be  the 
loss  of  a  few  ships  ?  ”  But  the  next  inevitable  step  in  the 
argument  is  that  it  is  better  not  to  meet  the  enemy.  As  an¬ 
other  Frenchman,1  previously  quoted,  says,  it  was  considered 
a  mishap  to  their  ships  to  fall  in  with  a  hostile  force,  and,  if 
one  was  met,  their  duty  was  to  avoid  action  if  possible  to  do 
so  honorably.  They  had  ulterior  objects  of  more  importance 
than  fighting  the  enemy’s  navy.  Such  a  course  cannot  be 
consistently  followed  for  years  without  affecting  the  spirit 
and  tone  of  the  officers  charged  with  it ;  and  it  led  directly 
to  as  brave  a  man  as  ever  commanded  a  fleet,  the  Comte  de 
Grasse,  failing  to  crush  the  English  under  Rodney  when  he 
Had  the  chance,  in  1782.  On  the  9th  of  April  of  that  year, 
being  chased  by  the  English  among  the  Windward  Islands,  it 
happened  to  him  to  have  sixteen  of  their  fleet  under  his  lee 
while  the  main  body  was  becalmed  under  Dominica.  Though 
greatly  superior  to  the  separated  ships,  during  the  three 
hours  that  this  state  of  things  lasted,  De  Grasse  left  them 
undisturbed,  except  by  a  distant  cannonade  by  his  own  van ; 
and  his  action  was  justified  by  the  court  which  tried  him, 
in  which  were  many  officers  of  high  rank  and  doubtless  of 
distinction,  as  being  “  an  act  of  prudence  on  the  part  of  the 
admiral,  dictated  to  him  by  the  ulterior  projects  of  the  cruise.” 
Three  days  later  he  was  signally  beaten  by  the  fleet  he  had 
failed  to  attack  at  disadvantage,  and  all  the  ulterior  projects 
of  the  cruise  went  down  with  him. 

To  return  to  Minorca ;  after  the  action  of  the  20th,  Byng 
called  a  council  of  war,  which  decided  that  nothing  more 
could  be  done,  and  that  the  English  fleet  should  go  to  Gib¬ 
raltar  and  cover  that  place  from  an  attack.  At  Gibraltar, 
Byng  was  relieved  by  Hawke  and  sent  home  to  be  tried.  The 
court-martial,  while  expressly  clearing  him  of  cowardice  or 
disaffection,  found  him  guilty  of  not  doing  his  utmost  either 
to  defeat  the  French  fleet  or  to  relieve  the  garrison  at  Mahon ; 

1  Jurien  de  la  Graviere :  Guerres  Maritimes. 


ENGLISH  MARITIME  PROSPERITY. 


291 


and,  as  tlie  article  of  war  prescribed  death  with  no  alterna¬ 
tive  punishment  for  this  offence,  it  felt  compelled  to  sentence 
him  to  death.  The  king  refused  to  pardon,  and  Byng  was 
accordingly  shot. 

The  expedition  against  Minorca  was  begun  while  nominal 
peace  still  lasted.  On  the  17th  of  May,  three  days  before 
Byng’s  battle,  England  declared  war,  and  France  replied  on 
the  20th  of  June.  On  the  28th,  Port  Mahon  surrendered, 
and  Minorca  passed  into  the  hands  of  France. 

The  nature  of  the  troubles  between  the  two  nations,  and 
the  scenes  where  they  occurred,  pointed  out  clearly  enough  the 
proper  theatre  of  the  strife,  and  we  should  by  rights  now  be 
at  the  opening  of  a  sea  war,  illustrated  by  great  naval  actions 
and  attended  with  great  modifications  in  the  colonial  and 
foreign  possessions  of  the  two  powers.  Of  the  two,  England 
alone  recognized  the  truth  ;  France  was  again  turned  aside 
from  the  sea  by  causes  which  will  shortly  be  given.  Her 
fleets  scarcely  appeared  ;  and  losing  the  control  of  the  sea, 
she  surrendered  one  by  one  her  colonies  and  all  her  hopes  in 
India.  Later  in  the  struggle  she  drew  in  Spain  as  her  ally, 
but  it  was  only  to  involve  that  country  in  her  own  external 
ruin.  England,  on  the  other  hand,  defended  and  nourished 
by  the  sea,  rode  it  everywhere  in  triumph.  Secure  and  pros¬ 
perous  at  home,  she  supported  with  her  money  the  enemies 
of  France.  At  the  end  of  seven  years  the  kingdom  of  Great 
Britain  had  become  the  British  Empire. 

It  is  far  from  certain  that  France  could  have  successfully 
contended  with  England  on  the  sea,  without  an  ally.  In  175G 
the  French  navy  had  sixty-three  ships-of/'1  ''-line,  of  which 
forty-five  were  in  fair  condition  ;  but  equipments  and  artillery 
were  deficient.  Spain  had  forty-six  ships-of-the-line ;  but 
from  the  previous  and  subsequent  performances  of  the  Span¬ 
ish  navy,  it  may  well  be  doubted  if  its  worth  were  equal  to  its 
numbers.  England  at  this  time  had  one  hundred  and  thirty 
ships-of-the-line  ;  four  years  later  she  had  one  hundred  and 
twenty  actually  in  commission.  Of  course  when  a  nation 
allows  its  inferiority,  whether  on  land  or  sea,  to  become 


292 


SEVEN  YEARS'  WAR  BEGINS. 


/ 

\ 


as  great  as  that  of  France  now  was,  it  cannot  hope  for 

success. 

Nevertheless,  she  obtained  advantages  at  first.  The  con¬ 
quest  of  Minorca  was  followed  in  November  of  the  same  year 
by  the  acquisition  of  Corsica.  The  republic  of  Genoa  sur¬ 
rendered  to  France  all  the  fortified  harbors  of  the  island. 
With  Toulon,  Corsica,  and  Port  Mahon,  she  now  had  a  strong 
grip  on  the  Mediterranean.  In  Canada,  the  operations  of 
1756,  under  Montcalm,  were  successful  despite  the  inferiority 
of  numbers.  At  the  same  time  an  attack  by  a  native  prince 
in  India  took  from  the  English  Calcutta,  and  gave  an  oppor¬ 
tunity  to  the  French. 

Yet  another  incident  offered  a  handle  for  French  states¬ 
manship  to  strengthen  her  position  on  the  ocean.  The  Dutch 
had  promised  France  not  to  renew  their  alliance  with  Eng¬ 
land,  but  to  remain  neutral.  England  retaliated  by  declaring 
“  all  the  ports  of  France  in  a  state  of  blockade,  and  all  vessels 
bound  to  those  ports  liable  to  seizure  as  lawful  prize.”  Such 
a  violation  of  the  rights  of  neutrals  can  only  be  undertaken 
by  a  nation  that  feels  it  has  nothing  to  fear  from  their  rising 
against  it.  The  aggressiveness,  born  of  the  sense  of  power, 
which  characterized  England  might  have  been  used  by  France 
to  draw  Spain  and  possibly  other  States  into  alliance  against 
her. 

Instead  of  concentrating  against  England,  France  began 
another  continental  war,  this  time  with  a  new  and  extraor¬ 
dinary  alliance.  The  Empress  of  Austria,  working  on  the 
religious  superstitions  of  the  king  and  upon  the  anger  of  the 
king’s  mistress,  who  was  piqued  at  sarcasms  uttered  against 
her  by  Frederick  the  Great,  drew  France  into  an  alliance  with 
Austria  against  Prussia.  This  alliance  was  further  joined 
by  Russia,  Sweden,  and  Poland.  The  empress  urged  that  the 
two  Roman  Catholic  powers  should  unite  to  take  Silesia  away 
from  a  Protestant  king,  and  expressed  her  willingness  to  give 
to  France  a  part  of  her  possessions  in  the  Netherlands,  which 
France  had  always  desired. 

Frederick  the  Great,  learning  the  combination  against  him, 


CAPTURE  OF  LOUISBURG,  1758. 


293 


instead  of  waiting  for  it  to  develop,  put  his  armies  in  motion 
and  invaded  Saxony,  whose  ruler  was  also  King  of  Poland. 
This  movement,  in  October,  1756,  began  the  Seven  Years’ 
War ;  which,  like  the  War  of  the  Austrian  Succession,  but 
not  to  the  same  extent,  drew  some  of  the  contestants  off  from 
the  original  cause  of  difference.  But  while  France,  having 
already  on  hand  one  large  quarrel  with  her  neighbor  across 
the  Channel,  was  thus  needlessly  entering  upon  another 
struggle,  with  the  avowed  end  of  building  up  that  Austrian 
empire  which  a  wiser  policy  had  long  striven  to  humble,  Eng¬ 
land  this  time  saw  clearly  where  her  true  interests  lay. 
Making  the  continental  war  wholly  subsidiary,  she  turned  her 
efforts  upon  the  sea  and  the  colonies ;  at  the  same  time  sup¬ 
porting  Frederick  both  with  money  and  cordial  sympathy  in 
the  war  for  the  defence  of  his  kingdom,  which  so  seriously 
diverted  and  divided  the  efforts  of  France.  England  thus 
had  really  but  one  war  on  hand.  In  the  same  year  the  direc¬ 
tion  of  the  struggle  was  taken  from  the  hands  of  a  weak 
ministry  and  given  into  those  of  the  bold  and  ardent  William 
Pitt,  who  retained  his  office  till  1761,  by  which  time  the  ends 
of  the  war  had  practically  been  secured. 

In  the  attack  upon  Canada  there  were  two  principal  lines 
to  be  chosen,  —  that  by  the  way  of  Lake  Champlain,  and  that 
by  the  way  of  the  St.  Lawrence.  The  former  was  entirely 
inland,  and  as  such  does  not  concern  our  subject,  beyond 
noting  that  not  till  after  the  fall  of  Quebec,  in  1759,  was  it 
fairly  opened  to  the  English.  In  1757  the  attempt  against 
Louisburg  failed ;  the  English  admiral  being  unwilling  to 
engage  sixteen  ships-of-the-line  he  found  there,  with  the  fif¬ 
teen  under  his  own  command,  which  were  also,  he  said,  of 
inferior  metal.  Whether  he  was  right  in  his  decision  or  not, 
the  indignation  felt  in  England  clearly  shows  the  difference 
of  policy  underlying  the  action  of  the  French  and  English 
governments.  The  following  year  an  admiral  of  a  higher 
spirit,  Boscawen,  was  sent  out  accompanied  with  twelve  thou¬ 
sand  troops,  and,  it  must  in  fairness  be  said,  found  only  five 
ships  in  the  port.  The  troops  were  landed,  while  the  fleet 


294 


FALL  OF  CANADA ,  1760. 


covered  the  siege  from  the  only  molestation  it  could  fear,  and 
cut  off  from  the  besieged  the  only  line  by  which  they  could 
(/look  for  supplies.  The  island  fell  in  1758,  opening  the  way 
by  the  St.  Lawrence  to  the  heart  of  Canada,  and  giving  the 
English  a  new  base  both  for  the  fleet  and  army. 

The  next  year  the  expedition  under  Wolfe  was  sent  against 
Quebec.  All  his  operations  were  based  upon  the  fleet,  which 
not  only  carried  his  army  to  the  spot,  but  moved  up  and  down 
the  river  as  the  various  feints  required.  The  landing  which 
led  to  the  decisive  action  was  made  directly  from  the  ships. 
Montcalm,  whose  skill  and  determination  had  blocked  the 
attacks  by  way  of  Lake  Champlain  the  two  previous  years, 
had  written  urgently  for  reinforcements ;  but  they  were  re¬ 
fused  by  the  minister  of  war,  who  replied  that  in  addition 
to  other  reasons  it  was  too  probable  that  the  English  would 
intercept  them  on  the  way,  and  that  the  more  France  sent, 
the  more  England  would  be  moved  to  send.  In  a  word,  the 
possession  of  Canada  depended  upon  sea  power. 

Montcalm,  therefore,  in  view  of  the  certain  attack  upon 
Quebec  by  the  river,  was  compelled  to  weaken  his  resistance 
on  the  Champlain  route ;  nevertheless,  the  English  did  not  get 
farther  than  the  foot  of  the  lake  that  year,  and  their  opera¬ 
tions,  though  creditable,  had  no  effect  upon  the  result  at 
Quebec. 

In  1760,  the  English,  holding  the  course  of  the  St.  Law¬ 
rence,  with  Louisburg  at  one  end  and  Quebec  at  the  other, 
seemed  firmly  seated.  Nevertheless,  the  French  governor, 
De  Yaudreuil,  still  held  out  at  Montreal,  and  the  colonists 
still  hoped  for  help  from  France.  The  English  garrison  at 
Quebec,  though  inferior  in  numbers  to  the  forces  of  the  Cana¬ 
dians,  was  imprudent  enough  to  leave  the  city  and  meet  them 
in  the  open  field.  Defeated  there,  and  pursued  by  the  enemy, 
the  latter  nearly  entered  Quebec  pell-mell  with  the  English 
troops,  and  trenches  were  opened  against  the  city.  A  few 
days  later  an  English  squadron  came  in  sight,  and  the  place 
was  relieved.  “  Thus,”  says  the  old  English  chronicler  of 
the  navy,  “  the  enemy  saw  what  it  was  to  be  inferior  at  sea ; 


INFLUENCE  OF  SEA  POWER. 


295 


S 

for,  had  a  French  squadron  got  the  start  of  the  English  in 
sailing  up  the  river,  Quebec  must  have  fallen.”  Wholly 
cut  off  now,  the  little  body  of  Frenchmen  that  remained  in 
Montreal  was  surrounded  by  three  English  armies,  which 
had  come,  one  by  way  of  Lake  Champlain,  the  others  from 
Oswego  and  from  Quebec.  The  surrender  of  the  city  on  the 
8th  of  September,  1760,  put  an  end  forever  to  the  French 
possession  of  Canada. 

In  all  other  quarters  of  the  world,  after  the  accession  of 
Pitt  to  power,  the  same  good  fortune  followed  the  English 
arms,  checkered  only  at  the  first  by  some  slight  reverses. 
It  was  not  so  on  the  continent,  where  the  heroism  and  skill 
of  Frederick  the  Great  maintained  with  difficulty  his  brilliant 
struggle  against  France,  Austria,  and  Russia.  The  study 
of  the  difficulties  of  his  position,  of  the  military  and  political 
combinations  attending  it,  do  not  belong  to  our  subject.  Sea 
power  does  not  appear  directly  in  its  effects  upon  the  struggle, 
but  indirectly  it  was  felt  in  two  ways,  —  first,  by  the  subsidies 
which  the  abundant  wealth  and  credit  of  England  enabled  her 
to  give  Frederick,  in  whose  thrifty  and  able  hands  they  went 
far;  and  second,  in  the  embarrassment  caused  to  France  by 
the  attacks  of  England  upon  her  colonies  and  her  own  sea- 
coast,  in  the  destruction  of  her  commerce,  and  in  the  money 
—  all  too  little,  it  is  true,  and  grudgingly  given  —  which  France 
was  forced  to  bestow  on  her  navy.  Stung  by  the  constant 
lashing  of  the  Power  of  the  sea,  France,  despite  the  blindness 
and  unwillingness  of  the  rulers,  was  driven  to  undertake 
something  against  it.  With  a  navy  much  inferior,  unable  to 
cope  in  all  quarters  of  the  world,  it  was  rightly  decided 
to  concentrate  upon  one  object ;  and  the  object  chosen  was 
Great  Britain  itself,  whose  shores  were  to  be  invaded.  This 
decision,  soon  apprehended  by  the  fears  of  the  English  nation, 
caused  the  great  naval  operations  to  centre  for  some  years 
around  the  coast  of  France  and  in  the  Channel.  Before  de¬ 
scribing  them,  it  will  be  well  to  sum  up  the  general  plan  by 
which  England  was  guided  in  the  use  of  her  overwhelming 
sea  power. 


296  ENGLISH  NAVAL  POLICY ,  1756-1763. 

Besides  the  operations  on  the  North  American  continent 
already  described,  this  plan  was  fourfold :  — 

1.  The  French  Atlantic  ports  were  watched  in  force,  espe¬ 
cially  Brest,  so  as  to  keep  the  great  fleets  or  small  squadrons 
from  getting  out  without  fighting. 

2.  Attacks  were  made  upon  the  Atlantic  and  Channel 
coasts  with  flying  squadrons,  followed  at  times  by  the  descent 
of  small  bodies  of  troops.  These  attacks,  the  direction  of 
which  could  not  be  foreseen  by  the  enemy,  were  chiefly  in¬ 
tended  to  compel  him  to  keep  on  hand  forces  at  many  points, 
and  so  to  diminish  the  army  acting  against  the  King  of  Prus¬ 
sia.  While  the  tendency  would  certainly  be  that  way,  it  may 
be  doubted  whether  the  actual  diversion  in  favor  of  Frederick 
was  of  much  consequence.  No  particular  mention  will  be 
made  of  these  operations,  which  had  but  little  visible  effect 
upon  the  general  course  of  the  war. 

3.  A  fleet  was  kept  in  the  Mediterranean  and  near  Gib¬ 
raltar  to  prevent  the  French  Toulon  fleet  from  getting  round 
to  the  Atlantic.  It  does  not  appear  that  any  attempt  was 
seriously  made  to  stop  communications  between  France  and 
Minorca.  The  action  of  the  Mediterranean  fleet,  though 
an  independent  command,  was  subsidiary  to  that  in  the 
Atlantic. 

4.  Distant  foreign  expeditions  were  sent  against  the  French 
colonies  in  the  West  India  Islands  and  on  the  coast  of  Africa, 
and  a  squadron  was  maintained  in  the  East  Indies  to  secure 
the  control  of  those  seas,  thereby  supporting  the  English 
in  the  Peninsula,  and  cutting  off  the  communications  of  the 
French.  These  operations  in  distant  waters,  never  inter¬ 
mitted,  assumed  greater  activity  and  larger  proportions  after 
the  destruction  of  the  French  navy  had  relieved  England 
from  the  fear  of  invasion,  and  when  the  ill-advised  entrance 
of  Spain  into  the  war,  in  1762,  offered  yet  richer  prizes  to 
her  enterprise. 

The  close  blockade  of  the  enemy’s  fleet  in  Brest,  which  was 
first  systematically  carried  out  during  this  war,  may  be  con¬ 
sidered  rather  a  defensive  than  an  offensive  operation ;  for 


PROJECTED  INVASION  OF  ENGLAND. 


297 


though  the  intention  certainly  was  to  fight  if  opportunity 
offered,  the  chief  object  was  to  neutralize  an  offensive  weapon 
in  the  enemy’s  hands  ;  the  destruction  of  the  weapon  was 
secondary.  The  truth  of  this  remark  is  shown  by  the  out¬ 
burst  of  fear  and  anger  which  swept  over  England  when  an 
unavoidable  absence  of  the  blockading  fleet  in  1759  allowed 
the  French  to  escape.  The  effect  of  the  blockade  in  this  and 
after  wars  was  to  keep  the  French  in  a  state  of  constant  infe¬ 
riority  in  the  practical  handling  of  their  ships,  however  fair¬ 
showing  their  outward  appearance  or  equal  their  numerical 
force.  The  position  of  the  port  of  Brest  was  such  that  a 
blockaded  fleet  could  not  get  out  during  the  heavy  westerly 
gales  that  endangered  the  blockaders ;  the  latter,  therefore, 
had  the  habit  of  running  away  from  them  to  Torbay  or 
Plymouth,  sure,  with  care,  of  getting  back  to  their  station 
with  an  east  wind  before  a  large  and  ill-handled  fleet  could 
get  much  start  of  them. 

In  the  latter  part  of  1758,  France,  depressed  by  the  sense 
of  failure  upon  the  continent,  mortified  and  harassed  by  Eng¬ 
lish  descents  upon  her  coasts,  which  had  been  particularly  an¬ 
noying  that  year,  and  seeing  that  it  was  not  possible  to  carry 
on  both  the  continental  and  sea  wars  with  her  money  re¬ 
sources,  determined  to  strike  directly  at  England.  Her  com¬ 
merce  was  annihilated  while  the  enemy’s  throve.  It  was  the 
boast  of  London  merchants  that  under  Pitt  commerce  was 
united  with  and  made  to  flourish  by  war ; 1  and  this  thriving 
commerce  was  the  soul  also  of  the  land  struggle,  by  the 
money  it  lavished  on  the  enemy  of  France. 

At  this  time  a  new  and  active-minded  minister,  Choiseul, 
was  called  into  power  by  Louis  XV.  From  the  beginning 
of  1759,  preparations  were  made  in  the  ocean  and  Channel 
ports.  Flat-boats  to  transport  troops  were  built  at  Havre, 
Dunkirk,  Brest,  and  Rochefort.  It  was  intended  to  embark 
as  many  as  fifty  thousand  men  for  the  invasion  of  England, 
while  twelve  thousand  were  to  be  directed  upon  Scotland. 
Two  squadrons  were  fitted  out,  each  of  respectable  strength. 

1  Mahon :  History  of  England. 


298 


BO  SC  A  WEN  AND  DE  LA  CLUE ,  1759. 


one  at  Toulon,  the  other  at  Brest.  The  junction  of  these 
two  squadrons  at  Brest  was  the  first  step  in  the  great 
enterprise. 

It  was  just  here  that  it  broke  down,  through  the  possession 
of  Gibraltar  by  the  English,  and  their  naval  superiority.  It 
seems  incredible  that  even  the  stern  and  confident  William 
Pitt  should,  as  late  as  175T,  have  offered  to  surrender  to 
Spain  the  watch-tower  from  which  England  overlooks  the 
road  between  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Atlantic,  as  the 
price  of  her  help  to  recover  Minorca.  Happily  for  England, 
Spain  refused.  In  1759,  Admiral  Boscawen  commanded  the 
English  Mediterranean  fleet.  In  making  an  attack  upon 
French  frigates  in  Toulon  roads,  some  of  his  ships  were  so 
damaged  that  he  sailed  with  his  whole  squadron  to  Gibraltar 
to  refit ;  taking  the  precaution,  however,  to  station  lookout 
frigates  at  intervals,  and  to  arrange  signals  by  guns  to  notify 
him  betimes  of  the  enemy’s  approach.  Taking  advantage 
of  his  absence,  and  in  obedience  to  orders,  the  French  com¬ 
modore,  De  la  Clue,  left  Toulon  with  twelve  ships-of-the-line 
on  the  5th  of  August,  and  on  the  17th  found  himself  at  the 
Straits  of  Gibraltar,  with  a  brisk  east  wind  carrying  him  out 
into  the  Atlantic.  Everything  seemed  propitious,  a  thick 
haze  and  falling  night  concealing  the  French  ships  from  the 
land,  while  not  preventing  their  sight  of  each  other,  when 
an  English  frigate  loomed  up  in  the  near  distance.  As  soon 
as  she  saw  the  fleet,  knowing  they  must  be  enemies,  she 
hauled  in  for  the  land  and  began  firing  signal-guns.  Pursuit 
was  useless ;  flight  alone  remained.  Hoping  to  elude  the 
chase  he  knew  must  follow,  the  French  commodore  steered 
west-northwest  for  the  open  sea,  putting  out  all  lights ;  but 
either  from  carelessness  or  disaffection,  —  for  the  latter  is 
hinted  by  one  French  naval  officer,  —  five  out  of  the  twelve 
ships  headed  to  the  northward  and  put  into  Cadiz  when  on 
the  following  morning  they  could  not  see  the  commodore. 
The  latter  was  dismayed  when  at  daylight  he  saw  his  forces 
thus  diminished.  At  eight  o’clock  some  sails  made  their 
appearance,  and  for  a  few  minutes  he  hoped  they  were  the 


BOSCAWEN  AND  DE  LA  CLUE ,  1759. 


299 


missing  ships.  Instead  of  that,  they  were  the  lookouts  of 
Boscawen’s  fleet,  which,  numbering  fourteen  ships-of-the- 
line,  was  in  full  pursuit.  The  French  formed  their  order 
on  one  of  the  close-hauled  lines,  and  fled  ;  but  of  course  their 
fleet-speed  was  less  than  that  of  the  fastest  English  ships. 
The  general  rule  for  all  chases  where  the  pursuer  is  decidedly 
superior,  namely,  that  order  must  be  observed  only  so  far  as 
to  keep  the  leading  ships  within  reasonable  supporting  dis¬ 
tance  of  the  slower  ones,  so  that  they  may  not  be  singly 
overpowered  before  the  latter  can  come  up,  was  by  this  time 
well  understood  in  the  English  navy,  and  that  is  certainly  the 
fitting  time  for  a  melee .  Boscawen  acted  accordingly.  The 
rear  ship  of  the  French,  on  the  other  hand,  nobly  emulated 
the  example  of  L’Etenduere  when  he  saved  his  convoy. 
Overtaken  at  two  o’clock  by  the  leading  English  ship,  and 
soon  after  surrounded  by  four  others,  her  captain  made  for 
five  hours  a  desperate  resistance,  from  which  he  could  hope, 
not  to  save  himself,  but  to  delay  the  enemies  long  enough  for 
the  better  sailers  to  escape.  He  so  far  succeeded  that  —  thanks 
to  the  injury  done  by  him  and  their  better  speed  —  they  did 
that  day  escape  action  at  close  quarters,  which  could  only 
have  ended  in  their  capture.  When  he  hauled  down  his  flag, 
his  three  topmasts  were  gone,  the  mizzen-mast  fell  immedi¬ 
ately  after,  and  the  hull  was  so  full  of  water  that  the  ship 
was  with  difficulty  kept  afloat.  M.  de  Sabran  —  his  name 
is  worthy  to  be  remembered  —  had  received  eleven  wounds  in 
this  gallant  resistance,  by  which  he  illustrated  so  signally  the 
duty  and  service  of  a  rearguard  in  retarding  pursuit.  That 
night  two  of  the  French  ships  hauled  off  to  the  westward, 
and  so  escaped.  The  other  four  continued  their  flight  as 
before ;  but  the  next  morning  the  commodore,  despairing  of 
escape,  headed  for  the  Portuguese  coast,  and  ran  them  all 
ashore  between  Lagos  and  Cape  St.  Vincent.  The  English 
admiral  followed  and  attacked  them,  taking  two  and  burning 
the  others,  without  regard  to  the  neutrality  of  Portugal.  For 
this  insult  no  amend  was  made  beyond  a  formal  apology : 
Portugal  was  too  dependent  upon  England  to  be  seriously 


300 


IIAWKE  AND  CON  FLANS,  1759. 


considered.  Pitt,  writing  to  the  English  minister  to  Portugal 
about  the  affair,  told  him  that  while  soothing  the  susceptibili¬ 
ties  of  the  Portuguese  government  he  must  not  allow  it  to 
suppose  that  either  the  ships  would  be  given  up  or  the  dis¬ 
tinguished  admiral  censured.1 

The  destruction  or  dispersal  of  the  Toulon  fleet  stopped  the 
invasion  of  England,  though  the  five  ships  that  got  into  Cadiz 
remained  a  matter  of  anxiety  to  Sir  Edward  Hawke,  who 
cruised  before  Brest.  Choiseul,  balked  of  his  main  object, 
still  clung  to  the  invasion  of  Scotland.  The  French  fleet 
at  Brest,  under  Marshal  de  Conflans,  a  sea  officer  despite  his 
title,  numbered  twenty  sail-of-the-line,  besides  frigates.  The 
troops  to  be  embarked  are  variously  stated  at  fifteen  to 
twenty  thousand.  The  original  purpose  was  to  escort  the 
transports  with  only  five  ships-of-the-line,  besides  smaller 
vessels.  Conflans  insisted  that  the  whole  fleet  ought  to  go. 
The  minister  of  the  navy  thought  that  the  admiral  was  not 
a  sufficiently  skilful  tactician  to  be  able  to  check  the  advance 
of  an  enemy,  and  so  insure  the  safe  arrival  of  the  convoy  at 
its  destination .  near  the  Clyde  without  risking  a  decisive 
encounter.  Believing  therefore  that  there  would  be  a  gen¬ 
eral  action,  he  considered  that  it  would  be  better  to  fight  it 
before  the  troops  sailed ;  for  if  disastrous,  the  convoy  would 
not  be  sacrificed,  and  if  decisively  victorious,  the  road  would 
then  be  clear.  The  transports  were  assembled,  not  at  Brest, 
but  in  the  ports  to  the  southward  as  far  as  the  mouth  of  the 
Loire.  The  French  fleet  therefore  put  to  sea  with  the  expec¬ 
tation  and  purpose  of  fighting  the  enemy ;  but  it  is  not  easy 
to  reconcile  its  subsequent  course  with  that  purpose,  nor  with 
the  elaborate  fighting  instructions 2  issued  by  the  admiral 
before  sailing. 

About  the  5th  or  6th  of  November  there  came  on  a  tremen¬ 
dous  westerly  gale.  After  buffeting  it  for  three  days,  Hawke 
bore  up  and  ran  into  Torbay,  where  he  waited  for  the  wind 
to  shift,  keeping  his  fleet  in  readiness  to  sail  at  once.  The 

1  Mahon  :  History  of  England. 

2  For  these,  see  Troude  :  Batailles  Navales. 


HAWKE  A  HD  CONFLANS,  1759. 


301 


same  gale,  while  keeping  back  the  French  already  in  Brest, 
gave  the  chance  to  a  small  squadron  under  M.  Bompart,  which 
was  expected  from  the  West  Indies,  to  slip  in  during  Hawke’s 
absence.  Conflans  made  his  preparations  with  activity,  dis¬ 
tributed  Bompart’s  crews  among  his  own  ships,  which  were 
not  very  well  manned,  and  got  to  sea  with  an  easterly  wind 
on  the  14th.  He  stood  at  once  to  tile  southward,  flattering 
himself  that  he  had  escaped  Hawke.  The  latter,  however,  had 
sailed  from  Torbay  on  the  12th ;  and  though  again  driven 
back,  sailed  a  second  time  on  the  14th,  the  same  day  that 
Conflans  left  Brest.  He  soon  reached  his  station,  learned  that 
the  enemy  had  been  seen  to  the  southward  steering  east,  and 
easily  concluding  that  they  were  bound  to  Quiberon  Bay, 
shaped  his  own  course  for  the  same  place  under  a  press  of 
sail.  At  eleven  p.  m.  of  the  19th  the  French  admiral  esti¬ 
mated  his  position  to  be  seventy  miles  southwest  by  west  from 
Belle  Isle ; 1  and  the  wind  springing  up  fresh  from  the  west¬ 
ward,  he  stood  for  it  under  short  sail,  the  wind  continuing  to 
increase  and  hauling  to  west-northwest.  At  daybreak  sev¬ 
eral  ships  were  seen  ahead,  which  proved  to  be  the  English 
squadron  of  Commodore  Duff,  blockading  Quiberon.  The 
signal  was  made  to  chase;  and  the  English,  taking  flight,  sepa¬ 
rated  into  twTo  divisions, —  one  going  off  before  the  wind,  the 
other  hauling  up  to  the  southward.  The  greater  part  of  the 
French  fleet  continued  its  course  after  the  former  division,  that 
is,  toward  the  coast ;  but  one  ship  hauled  up  for  the  second. 
Immediately  after,  the  rear  French  ships  made  signal  of  sails 
to  windward,  which  were  also  visible  from  aloft  on  board  the 
flag-ship.  It  must  have  been  about  the  same  moment  that 
the  lookout  frigate  in  advance  of  the  English  fleet  informed 
her  admiral  of  sails  to  leeward.  Hawke’s  diligence  had 
brought  him  up  with  Conflans,  who,  in  his  official  reports, 
says  he  had  considered  it  impossible  that  the  enemy  could 
have  in  that  neighborhood  forces  superior  or  even  equal  to 
his  own.  Conflans  now  ordered  his  rear  division  to  haul  its 
wind  in  support  of  the  ship  chasing  to  the  southward  and 

1  See  Plate  YHI. 


302 


HAWKE  AND  CONFLANS ,  1759. 


eastward.  In  a  few  moments  more  it  was  discovered  that 
the  fleet  to  windward  numbered  twenty-three  ships-of-the- 
line  to  the  French  twenty-one,  and  among  them  some  three- 
deckers.  Conflans  then  called  in  the  chasing  ships  and  got 
ready  for  action.  It  remained  to  settle  his  course  under 
circumstances  which  he  had  not  foreseen.  It  was  now  blow¬ 
ing  hard  from  the  west-northwest,  with  every  appearance  of 
heavy  weather,  the  fleet  not  far  from  a  lee  shore,  with  an 
enemy  considerably  superior  in  numbers  ;  for  besides  Hawke's 
twenty-three  of  the  line,  Duff  had  four  fifty-gun  ships.  Con¬ 
flans  therefore  determined  to  run  for  it  and  lead  his  squadron 
into  Quiberon  Bay,  trusting  and  believing  that  Hawke  would 
not  dare  to  follow,  under  the  conditions  of  the  weather,  into 
a  bay  which  French  authorities  describe  as  containing  banks 
and  shoals,  and  lined  with  reefs  which  the  navigator  rarely 
sees  without  fright  and  never  passes  without  emotion.  It  was 
in  the  midst  of  these  ghastly  dangers  that  forty-four  large 
ships  were  about  to  engage  pell-mell ;  for  the  space  was  too 
contracted  for  fleet  manoeuvres.  Conflans  flattered  himself 
that  he  would  get  in  first  and  be  able  to  haul  up  close  under 
the  western  shore  of  the  bay,  forcing  the  enemy,  if  he  fol¬ 
lowed,  to  take  position  between  him  and  the  beach,  six  miles 
to  leeward.  None  of  his  expectations  were  fulfilled.  In  the 
retreat  he  took  the  head  of  his  fleet ;  a  step  not  unjustifiable, 
since  only  by  leading  in  person  could  he  have  shown  just  what 
he  wanted  to  do,  but  unfortunate  for  his  reputation  with  the 
public,  as  it  placed  the  admiral  foremost  in  the  flight.  Hawke 
was  not  in  the  least,  nor  for  one  moment,  deterred  by  the 
dangers  before  him,  whose  full  extent  he,  as  a  skilful  sea¬ 
man,  entirely  realized  ;  but  his  was  a  calm  and  steadfast  as 
well  as  a  gallant  temper,  that  weighed  risks  justly,  neither 
dissembling  nor  exaggerating.  He  has  not  left  us  his  rea¬ 
soning,  but  he  doubtless  felt  that  the  French,  leading,  would 
serve  partially  as  pilots,  and  must  take  the  ground  before 
him  ;  he  believed  the  temper  and  experience  of  his  officers, 
tried  by  the  jvere  school  of  the  blockade,  to  be  superior  to 
those  of  the  French ;  and  he  knew  that  both  the  government 


/ 


V. 


THE  BREST  FLEET  DISPERSED. 


303 


and  the  country  demanded  that  the  enemy’s  fleet  should  not 
reach  another  friendly  port  in  safety.  On  the  very  day  that 
he  was  thus  following  the  French,  amid  dangers  and  under 
conditions  that  have  made  this  one  of  the  most  dramatic  of 
sea  fights,  he  was  being  burnt  in  effigy  in  England  for  allow¬ 
ing  them  to  escape.  As  Conflans,  leading  his  fleet,  was  round¬ 
ing  the  Cardinals,  —  as  the  southernmost  rocks  at  the  entrance 
of  Quiberon  Bay  are  called,  —  the  leading  English  ships  brought 
j  the  French  rear  to  action.  It  was  another  case  of  a  general 
chase  ending  in  a  melee ,  but  under  conditions  of  exceptional 
interest  and  grandeur  from  the  surrounding  circumstances  of 
the  gale  of  wind,  the  heavy  sea,  the  lee  shore,  the  headlong 
speed,  shortened  canvas,  and  the  great  number  of  ships  en¬ 
gaged.  One  French  seventy-four,  closely  pressed  and  out¬ 
numbered,  ventured  to  open  her  lower-deck  ports ;  the  sea 
sweeping  in  carried  her  down  with  all  on  board  but  twenty 
men.  Another  was  sunk  by  the  fire  of  Hawke’s  flag-ship. 
Two  others,  one  of  which  carried  a  commodore’s  pennant, 
struck  their  colors.  The  remainder  were  dispersed.  Seven 
fled  to  the  northward  and  eastward,  and  anchored  off  the 
mouth  of  the  little  river  Vilaine,  into  which  they  succeeded 
in  entering  at  the  top  of  high  water  in  two  tides,  —  a  feat 
never  before  performed.  Seven  others  took  refuge  to  the 
southward  and  eastward  in  Rochefort.  One,  after  being  very 
badly  injured,  ran  ashore  and  was  lost  near  the  mouth  of 
the  Loire.  The  flag-ship  bearing  the  same  name  as  that  of 
Tourville  burned  at  La  Hougue,  the  “  Royal  Sun,”  anchored 
at  nightfall  off  Croisic,  a  little  to  the  northward  of  the  Loire, 
where  she  rode  in  safety  during  the  night.  The  next  morn¬ 
ing  the  admiral  found  himself  alone,  and,  somewhat  precipi¬ 
tately  it  would  seem,  ran  the  ship  ashore  to  keep  her  out  of 
English  hands.  This  step  has  been  blamed  by  the  French, 
but  needlessly,  as  Hawke  would  never  have  let  her  get  away. 
The  great  French  fleet  was  annihilated  ;  for  the  fourteen 
ships  not  taken  or  destroyed  were  divided  into  two  parts, 
and  those  in  the  Vilaine  only  succeeded  in  escaping,  two 
at  a  time,  between  fifteen  months  and  two  years  later.  The 


304 


ACCESSION  OF  CHARLES  III. 

English  lost  two  ships  which  ran  upon  a  shoal  (a),  and  were 
hopelessly  wrecked  ;  their  losses  in  action  were  slight.  At 
nightfall  Hawke  anchored  his  fleet  and  prizes  in  the  position 
shown  in  the  plate  (b). 

All  possibility  of  an  invasion  of  England  passed  away  with 
the  destruction  of  the  Brest  fleet.  The  battle  of  November 
20,  1759,  was  the  Trafalgar  of  this  war  ;  and  though  a  block¬ 
ade  was  maintained  over  the  fractions  that  were  laid  up  in 
the  Vilaine  and  at  Rochefort,  the  English  fleets  were  now 
free  to  act  against  the  colonies  of  France,  and  later  of  Spain, 
on  a  grander  scale  than  ever  before.  The  same  year  that 
saw  this  great  sea  fight  and  the  fall  of  Quebec  witnessed  also 
the  capture  of  Guadeloupe  in  the  West  Indies,  of  Goree  on 
the  west  coast  of  Africa,  and  the  abandonment  of  the  East 
Indian  seas  by  the  French  flag  after  three  indecisive  actions 
between  their  commodore,  D’Ach6,  and  Admiral  Pocock,  — 
an  abandonment  which  necessarily  led  to  the  fall  of  the 
French  power  in  India,  never  again  to  rise.  In  this  year 
also  the  King  of  Spain  died,  and  his  brother  succeeded,  un¬ 
der  the  title  of  Charles  III.  This  Charles  had  been  King 
of  Naples  at  the  time  when  an  English  commodore  had  al¬ 
lowed  one  hour  for  the  court  to  determine  to  withdraw  the 
Neapolitan  troops  from  the  Spanish  army.  He  had  never  for¬ 
gotten  this  humiliation,  and  brought  to  his  new  throne  a 
heart  unfriendly  to  England.  With  such  feelings  on  his  part, 
France  and  Spain  drew  more  readily  together.  Charles’s  first 
step  was  to  propose  mediation,  but  Pitt  was  averse  to  it. 
Looking  upon  France  as  the  chief  enemy  of  England,  and  upon 
the  sea  and  the  colonies  as  the  chief  source  of  power  and 
wealth,  he  wished,  now  that  he  had  her  down,  to  weaken 
her  thoroughly  for  the  future  as  well  as  the  present,  and  to 
establish  England’s  greatness  more  firmly  upon  the  wreck. 
Later  on  he  offered  certain  conditions;  but  the  influence  of 
Louis’s  mistress,  attached  to  the  Empress  of  Austria,  prevailed 
to  except  Prussia  from  the  negotiations,  and  England  would 
not  allow  the  exception.  Pitt,  indeed,  was  not  yet  ready  for 
peace.  A  vear  later,  October  25,  1760,  George  II.  died,  and 


AFFAIRS  IN  INDIA. 


305 


Pitt’s  influence  then  began  to  wane,  the  new  king  being  less 
bent  on  war.  During  these  years,  1759  and  1760,  Frederick 
the  Great  still  continued  the  deadly  and  exhausting  strife  of 
his  small  kingdom  against  the  great  States  joined  against 
him.  At  one  moment  his  case  seemed  so  hopeless  that  he 
got  ready  to  kill  himself ;  but  the  continuance  of  the  war  di¬ 
verted  the  efforts  of  France  from  England  and  the  sea. 

The  hour  was  fast  approaching  for  the  great  colonial  ex¬ 
peditions,  which  made  the  last  year  of  the  war  illustrious  by 
the  triumph  of  the  sea  power  of  England  over  France  and 
Spain  united.  It  is  first  necessary  to  tell  the  entirely  kin¬ 
dred  story  of  the  effect  of  that  sea  power  in  the  East  Indian 
peninsula. 

The  recall  of  Dupleix  and  the  entire  abandonment  of  his 
policy,  which  resulted  in  placing  the  two  East  India  compa¬ 
nies  on  equal  terms,  have  already  been  told.  The  treaty  stipu¬ 
lations  of  1754  had  not,  however,  been  fully  carried  out.  The 
Marquis  de  Bussy,  a  brave  and  capable  soldier  who  had  been 
a  second  to  Dupleix,  and  was  wholly  in  accord  with  his  policy 
and  ambitions,  remained  in  the  Deccan,  —  a  large  region  in 
the  southern  central  part  of  the  peninsula,  over  which  Dupleix 
had  once  ruled.  In  1756,  troubles  arose  between  the  English 
and  the  native  prince  in  Bengal.  The  nabob  of  that  province 
had  died,  and  his  successor,  a  young  man  of  nineteen,  at¬ 
tacked  Calcutta.  The  place  fell,  after  a  weak  resistance,  in 
June,  and  the  surrender  was  followed  by  the  famous  tragedy 
known  as  that  of  the  Black  Hole  of  Calcutta.  The  news 
reached  Madras  in  August,  and  Clive,  whose  name  has  already 
been  mentioned,  sailed  with  the  fleet  of  Admiral  Watson,  after 
a  long  and  vexatious  delay.  The  fleet  entered  the  river  in 
December  and  appeared  before  Calcutta  in  January,  when  the 
place  fell  into  English  hands  again  as  easily  as  it  had  been  lost. 

The  nabob  was  very  angry,  and  marched  against  the 
English ;  sending  meanwhile  an  invitation  to  the  French 
at  Chandernagore  to  join  him.  Although  it  was  now  known 
that  England  and  France  were  at  war,  the  French  company, 
despite  the  experience  of  1744,  weakly  hoped  that  peace 

20 


306 


BATTLE  OF  PLASSEY. 


might  be  kept  between  it  and  the  English.  The  native 
invitation  was  therefore  refused,  and  offers  of  neutrality 
made  to  the  other  company.  Clive  marched  out,  met  the 
Indian  forces  and  defeated  them,  and  the  nabob  at  once 
asked  for  peace,  and  sought  the  English  alliance,  yielding  all 
the  claims  on  the  strength  of  which  he  had  first  attacked 
Calcutta.  After  some  demur  his  offers  were  accepted.  Clive 
and  Watson  then  turned  upon  Chandernagore  and  compelled 
the  surrender  of  the  French  settlement. 

The  nabob,  who  had  not  meant  to  allow  this,  took  umbrage, 
and  entered  into  correspondence  with  Bussy  in  the  Deccan. 
Clive  had  full  knowledge  of  his  various  intrigues,  which  were 
carried  on  with  the  vacillation  of  a  character  as  weak  as  it 
was  treacherous ;  and  seeing  no  hope  of  settled  peace  or 
trade  under  the  rule  of  this  man,  entered  into  an  extensive 
conspiracy  for  his  dethronement,  the  details  of  which  need 
not  be  given.  The  result  was  that  war  broke  out  again,  and 
that  Clive  with  three  thousand  men,  one  third  of  whom  were 
English,  met  the  nabob  at  the  head  of  fifteen  thousand  horse 
and  thirty-five  thousand  foot.  The  disproportion  in  artillery 
was  nearly  as  great.  Against  these  odds  was  fought  and 
won  the  battle  of  Plassey,  on  the  23d  of  June,  1757, — the 
date  from  which,  by  common  consent,  the  British  empire  in 
India  is  said  to  begin.  The  overthrow  of  the  nabob  was 
followed  by  placing  in  power  one  of  the  conspirators  against 
him,  a  creature  of  the  English,  and  dependent  upon  them 
for  support.  Bengal  thus  passed  under  their  control,  the 
first-fruits  of  India.  “  Clive,”  says  a  French  historian,  “  had 
understood  and  applied  the  system  of  Dupleix.” 

This  was  true  ;  yet  even  so  it  may  be  said  that  the  founda¬ 
tion  thus  laid  could  never  have  been  kept  nor  built  upon,  had 
the  English  nation  not  controlled  the  sea.  The  conditions 
of  India  were  such  that  a  few  Europeans,  headed  by  men  of 
nerve  and  shrewdness,  dividing  that  they  might  conquer,  and 
advancing  their  fortunes  by  judicious  alliances,  were  able  to 
hold  their  own,  and  more  too,  amidst  overwhelming  numerical 
odds ;  but  it  was  necessary  that  they  should  not  be  opposed  by 


NAVAL  BATTLES  IN  EAST  INDIES. 


307 


men  of  their  own  kind,  a  few  of  whom  could  turn  the  waver¬ 
ing  balance  the  other  way.  At  the  very  time  that  Clive  was 
acting  in  Bengal,  Bussy  invaded  Orissa,  seized  the  English 
factories,  and  made  himself  master  of  much  of  the  coast  re¬ 
gions  between  Madras  and  Calcutta ;  while  a  French  squadron 
of  nine  ships,  most  of  which,  however,  belonged  to  the  East 
India  Company  and  were  not  first-rate  men-of-wTar,  was  on  its 
way  to  Pondicherry  with  twelve  hundred  regular  troops,  —  an 
enormous  European  army  for  Indian  operations  of  that  day. 
The  English  naval  force  on  the  coast,  though  fewer  in  num¬ 
bers,  may  be  considered  about  equal  to  the  approaching  French 
squadron.  It  is  scarcely  too  much  to  say  that  the  future  of 
India  was  still  uncertain,  and  the  first  operations  showed  it. 

The  French  division  appeared  off  the  Coromandel  coast  to 
the  southward  of  Pondicherry  on  the  26th  of  April,  1758, 
and  anchored  on  the  28th  before  the  English  station  called 
Fort  St.  David.  Two  ships  kept  on  to  Pondicherry,  having 
on  board  the  new  governor,  Comte  de  Lally,  who  wished  to  go 
at  once  to  his  seat  of  government.  Meanwhile,  the  English 
admiral,  Pocock,  having  news  of  the  enemy’s  coming,  and 
fearing  specially  for  this  post,  was  on  his  way  to  it,  and 
appeared  on  the  29th  of  April,  before  the  two  ships  with  the 
governor  were  out  of  sight.  The  French  at  once  got  under 
way  and  stood  out  to  sea  on  the  starboard  tack  (Plate  Va.), 
heading  to  the  northward  and  eastward,  the  wind  being  south¬ 
east,  and  signals  were  made  to  recall  the  ship  and  frigate  (a) 
escorting  Lally ;  but  they  were  disregarded  by  the  latter’s 
order,  an  act  which  must  have  increased,  if  it  did  not  originate, 
the  ill-will  between  him  and  Commodore  d’Ache,  through 
which  the  French  campaign  in  India  miscarried.  The  Eng¬ 
lish,  having  formed  to  windward  on  the  same  tack  as  the 
French,  made  their  attack  in  the  then  usual  way,  and  with 
the  usual  results.  The  seven  English  ships  were  ordered  to 
keep  away  together  for  the  French  eight,  and  the  four  leading 
ships,  including  the  admiral’s,  came  into  action  handsomely  ; 
the  last  three,  whether  by  their  own  fault  or  not,  were  late 
in  doing  so,  but  it  will  be  remembered  that  this  was  almost 


308 


NAVAL  BATTLES  IN  EAST  INDIES. 


always  the  case  in  such  attacks.  The  French  commodore, 
seeing  this  interval  between  the  van  and  the  rear,  formed 
the  plan  of  separating  them,  and  made  signal  to  wear  to¬ 
gether,  but  in  his  impatience  did  not  wait  for  an  answer. 
Putting  his  own  helm  up,  he  wore  round,  and  was  followed 
in  succession  by  the  rear  ships,  while  the  van  stood  on.  The 
English  admiral,  who  had  good  reason  to  know,  gives  D’AcluS 
more  credit  than  the  French  writers,  for  he  describes  this 
movement  thus  :  — 

“At  half-past  four  p.  m.  the  rear  of  the  French  line  had  drawn 
pretty  close  up  to  their  flag-ship.  Our  three  rear  ships  were  signalled 
to  engage  closer.  Soon  after,  M.  d’Ache  broke  the  line,  and  put  be¬ 
fore  the  wind  ;  his  second  astern,  who  had  kept  on  the  ‘  Yarmouth’s  ’ 
[English  flag-ship]  quarter  most  part  of  the  action,  then  came  up 
alongside,  gave  his  fire,  and  then  bore  away  ;  and  a  few  minutes 
after,  the  enemy’s  van  bore  away  also.” 

By  this  account,  which  is  by  no  means  irreconcilable  with  the 
French,  the  latter  effected  upon  the  principal  English  ship  a 
movement  of  concentration  by  defiling  past  her.  The  French 
now  stood  down  to  their  two  separated  ships,  while  the  Eng¬ 
lish  vessels  that  had  been  engaged  were  too  much  crippled  to 
follow.  This  battle  prevented  the  English  fleet  from  reliev¬ 
ing  Fort  St.  David,  which  surrendered  on  the  2d  of  June. 

After  the  fall  of  this  place,  the  two  opposing  squadrons 
having  refitted  at  their  respective  ports  and  resumed  their 
station,  a  second  action  was  fought  in  August,  under  nearly 
the  same  conditions  and  in  much  the  same  fashion.  The 
French  flag-ship  met  with  a  series  of  untoward  accidents,  which 
determined  the  commodore  to  withdraw  from  action  ;  but  the 
statement  of  his  further  reasons  is  most  suggestive  of  the 
necessarv  final  overthrow  of  the  French  cause.  “  Prudence,” 
a  writer  of  his  own  country  says,  “  commanded  him  not  to 
prolong  a  contest  from  which  his  ships  could  not  but  come 
out  with  injuries  very  difficult  to  repair  in  a  region  where  it 
was  impossible  to  supply  the  almost  entire  lack  of  spare 
stores.”  This  want  of  so  absolute  a  requisite  for  naval 


CONDITION  OF  THE  FRENCH  ISLANDS. 


309 


efficiency  shows  in  a  strong  light  the  fatal  tendency  of  that 
economy  which  always  characterized  French  operations  at 
sea,  and  was  at  once  significant  and  ominous. 

Returning  to  Pondicherry,  D’  4ch6  found  that,  though  the 
injuries  to  the  masts  and  rigging  could  for  this  time  be 
repaired,  there  was  lack  of  provisions,  and  that  the  ships 
needed  calking.  Although  his  orders  were  to  remain  on  the 
coast  until  October  15,  he  backed  himself  with  the  opinion 
of  a  council  of  war  which  decided  that  the  ships  could  not 
remain  there  longer,  because,  in  case  of  a  third  battle,  there 
was  neither  rigging  nor  supplies  remaining  in  Pondicherry  ; 
and  disregarding  the  protests  of  the  governor,  Lally,  he 
sailed  on  the  2d  of  September  for  the  Isle  of  France.  The 
underlying  motive  of  D’Ache,  it  is  known,  was  hostility  to 
the  governor,  with  whom  he  quarrelled  continually.  Lally, 
deprived  of  the  help  of  the  squadron,  turned  his  arms  inland 
instead  of  against  Madras. 

Upon  arriving  at  the  islands,  D’Ache  found  a  state  of 
things  which  again  singularly  illustrates  the  impotence  and 
short-sightedness  characteristic  of  the  general  naval  policy 
of  the  French  at  this  time.  His  arrival  there  was  as  un¬ 
welcome  as  his  departure  from  India  had  been  to  Lally. 
The  islands  were  then  in  a  state  of  the  most  complete  desti¬ 
tution.  The  naval  division,  increased  by  the  arrival  of  three 
ships-of-the-line  from  home,  so  exhausted  them  that  its  im¬ 
mediate  departure  was  requested  of  the  commodore.  Repairs 
were  pushed  ahead  rapidly,  and  in  November  several  of  the 
ships  sailed  to  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  then  a  Dutch  colony, 
to  seek  provisions  ;  but  these  were  consumed  soon  after  being 
received,  and  the  pressure  for  the  departure  of  the  squadron 
was  renewed.  The  situation  of  the  ships  was  no  less  preca¬ 
rious  than  that  of  the  colony  ;  and  accordingly  the  commodore 
replied  by  urging  his  entire  lack  of  food  and  supplies.  The 
condition  was  such  that,  a  little  later,  it  was  necessary  to 
make  running  rigging  out  of  the  cables,  and  to  put  some  of 
the  ships  on  the  bottom,  so  as  to  give  their  materials  to 
others.  Before  returning  to  India,  D’Ache  wrote  to  the 


310 


FALL  OF  FRENCH  POWER  IN  INDIA. 


minister  of  the  navy  that  he  “  was  about  to  leave,  only  to 
save  the  crews  from  (lying  of  hunger,  and  that  nothing 
need  be  expected  from  the  squadron  if  supplies  were 
not  sent,  for  both  men  am1  things  were  in  a  deplorable 
state.  ” 

Under  these  circumstances  D’Aclie  sailed  from  the  islands 
in  July,  1759,  and  arrived  off  the  Coromandel  coast  in  Sep¬ 
tember.  During  his  year  of  absence  Lally  had  besieged  Ma¬ 
dras  for  two  months,  during  the  northeast  monsoon.  Both 
squadrons  were  absent,  that  season  being  unfit  for  naval 
operations  on  this  coast ;  but  the  English  returned  first,  and 
are  said  by  the  French  to  have  caused,  by  the  English  to 
have  hastened,  the  raising  of  the  siege.  D’Achd,  upon  his 
return,  was  much  superior  in  both  number  and  size  of  ships  ; 
but  when  the  fleets  met,  Pocock  did  not  hesitate  to  attack 
with  nine  against  eleven.  This  action,  fought  September 
10,  1759,  was  as  indecisive  as  the  two  former;  but  D’Achd 
retreated,  after  a  very  bloody  contest.  Upon  it  Campbell, 
in  his  “  Lives  of  the  Admirals,”  makes  a  droll,  but  seemingly 
serious,  comment :  “  Pocock  had  reduced  the  French  ships 
to  a  very  shattered  condition,  and  killed  a  great  many  of 
their  men ;  but  what  shows  the  singular  talents  of  both  ad¬ 
mirals,  they  had  fought  three  pitched  battles  in  eighteen 
months  without  the  loss  of  a  ship  on  either  side.”  The 
fruits  of  victory,  however,  were  with  the  weaker  fleet ;  for 
D’Ache  returned  to  Pondicherry  and  thence  sailed  on  the  1st 
of  the  next  month  for  the  islands,  leaving  India  to  its  fate. 
From  that  time  the  result  was  certain.  The  English  con¬ 
tinued  to  receive  reinforcements  from  home,  while  the  French 
did  not ;  the  men  opposed  to  Lally  were  superior  in  ability ; 
place  after  place  fell,  and  in  January,  1761,  Pondicherry  itself 
surrendered,  surrounded  by  land  and  cut  off  from  the  sea. 
This  was  the  end  of  the  French  power  in  India  ;  for  though 
Pondicherry  and  other  possessions  were  restored  at  the  peace, 
the  English  tenure  there  was  never  again  shaken,  even  under 
the  attacks  of  the  skilful  and  bold  Suffren,  who  twenty 
years  later  met  difficulties  as  great  as  D’Achd’s  with  a  vigor 


•  RUIN  OF  THE  FRENCH  NAVY.  31 1 

and  conduct  which  the  latter  at  a  more  hopeful  moment  failed 
to  show. 

France  having  thus  lost  both  Canada  and  India  by  the 
evident  failure  of  her  power  to  act  at  a  distance  by  sea,  it 
would  seem  scarcely  possible  that  Spain,  with  her  own  weak 
navy  and  widely  scattered  possessions,  would  choose  this  mo¬ 
ment  for  entering  the  war.  Yet  so  it  was.  The  maritime 
exhaustion  of  France  was  plain  to  all,  and  is  abundantly  tes¬ 
tified  to  by  her  naval  historians.  “  The  resources  of  France 
were  exhausted,”  says  one  ;  “the  year  1761  saw  only  a  few 
single  ships  leave  her  ports,  and  all  of  them  were  captured. 
The  alliance  with  Spain  came  too  late.  The  occasional  ships 
that  went  to  sea  in  1762  were  taken,  and  the  colonies  still 
remaining  to  France  could  not  be  saved.”  1  Even  as  early  as 
1758,  another  Frenchman  writes,  “  want  of  money,  the  de¬ 
pression  of  commerce  given  over  to  English  cruisers,  the  lack 
of  good  ships,  the  lack  of  supplies,  etc.,  compelled  the  French 
ministry,  unable  to  raise  large  forces,  to  resort  to  stratagems, 
to  replace  the  only  rational  system  of  war,  Grand  War,  by 
the  smallest  of  petty  wars,  —  by  a  sort  of  game  in  which  the 
great  aim  is  not  to  be  caught.  Even  then,  the  arrival  of 
four  ships-of-the-line  at  Louisburg,  by  avoiding  the  enemy, 
was  looked  on  as  a  very  fortunate  event.  ...  In  1759  the 
lucky  arrival  of  the  West  India  convoy  caused  as  much  sur¬ 
prise  as  joy  to  the  merchants.  We  see  how  rare  had  be¬ 
come  such  a  chance  in  seas  ploughed  by  the  squadrons  of 
England.”  2  This  was  before  the  disasters  of  La  Clue  and 
Conflans.  The  destruction  of  French  commerce,  beginning 
by  the  capture  of  its  merchant-ships,  was  consummated  by 
the  reduction  of  the  colonies.  It  can  hardly,  therefore,  be 
conceded  that  the  Family  Compact  now  made  between  the 
two  courts,  containing,  as  it  did,  not  only  an  agreement  to 
support  each  other  in  any  future  war,  but  also  a  secret  clause 
binding  Spain  to  declare  war  against  England  within  a  year, 
if  peace  were  not  made,  “  was  honorable  to  the  wisdom  of  the 
two  governments.”  It  is  hard  to  pardon,  not  only  the  Span- 

1  Troude :  Batailles  Navales  de  la  France.  2  Lapeyrouse-Bonfils. 


312 


THE  BOURBON  FAMILY  COMPACT. 


ish  government,  but  even  France  for  alluring  a  kindred  people 
into  such  a  bad  bargain.  It  was  hoped,  however,  to  revive 
the  French  navy  and  to  promote  an  alliance  of  neutral  pow¬ 
ers  ;  many  of  which,  besides  Spain,  had  causes  of  complaint 
against  England.  “  During  the  war  with  France,”  confesses 
an  English  historian,  “  the  Spanish  flag  had  not  always  been 
respected  by  British  cruisers.”  1  “  During  1758,”  says  another, 

“  not  less  than  one  hundred  and  seventy-six  neutral  vessels, 
laden  with  the  rich  produce  of  the  French  colonies  or  with 
military  or  naval  stores,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  English.”  2 
The  causes  were  already  at  work  which  twenty  years  later 
gave  rise  to  the  “  armed  neutrality”  of  the  Baltic  powers, 
directed  against  the  claims  of  England  on  the  sea.  The  pos¬ 
session  of  unlimited  power,  as  the  sea  power  of  England  then 
really  was,  is  seldom  accompanied  by  a  profound  respect  for 
the  rights  of  others.  Without  a  rival  upon  the  ocean,  it  suited 
England  to  maintain  that  enemy’s  property  was  liable  to  cap¬ 
ture  on  board  neutral  ships,  thus  subjecting  these  nations 
not  only  to  vexatious  detentions,  but  to  loss  of  valuable  trade  ; 
just  as  it  had  suited  her  earlier  in  the  war  to  establish  a  paper 
blockade  of  French  ports.  Neutrals  of  course  chafed  under 
these  exactions  ;  but  the  year  1761  was  ill-chosen  for  an  armed 
protest,  and  of  all  powers  Spain  risked  most  by  a  war.  Eng¬ 
land  had  then  one  hundred  and  twenty  ships-of-the-line  in 
commission,  besides  those  in  reserve,  manned  by  seventy  thou¬ 
sand  seamen  trained  and  hardened  by  five  years  of  constant 
warfare  afloat,  and  flushed  with  victory.  The  navy  of  France, 
which  numbered  seventy-seven  ships-of-the-line  in  1758,  lost 
as  prizes  to  the  English  in  1759  twenty-seven,  besides  eight 
destroyed  and  many  frigates  lost ;  indeed,  as  has  been  seen, 
their  own  writers  confess  that  the  navy  was  ruined,  root  and 
branch.  The  Spanish  navy  contained  about  fifty  ships  ;  but 
the  personnel,  unless  very  different  from  the  days  before  and 
after,  must  have  been  very  inferior.  The  weakness  of  her 
empire,  in  the  absence  of  an  efficient  navy,  has  before  been 
pointed  out.  Neutrality,  too,  though  at  times  outraged,  had 

1  Mahon :  History  of  England.  2  Campbell :  Lives  of  the  Admirals. 


ENGLAND  DECLARES  WAR  AGAINST  SPAIN.  313 

been  of  great  advantage  to  her,  permitting  her  to  restore  her 
finances  and  trade  and  to  re-establish  her  internal  resources ; 
but  she  needed  a  still  longer  period  of  it.  Nevertheless,  the 
king,  influenced  by  family  feeling  and  resentment  against  Eng¬ 
land,  allowed  himself  to  be  drawn  on  by  the  astute  Choiseul, 
and  the  Family  Compact  between  the  two  crowns  was  signed 
on  the  15th  of  August,  1761.  This  compact,  into  which  the 
King  of  Naples  was  also  to  enter,  guaranteed  their  mutual  pos¬ 
sessions  by  the  whole  power  of  both  kingdoms.  This  in  itself 
was  a  weighty  undertaking  ;  but  the  secret  clause  further 
stipulated  that  Spain  should  declare  war  against  England  on 
the  1st  of  May,  1762,  if  peace  with  France  had  not  then  been 
made.  Negotiations  of  this  character  could  not  be  kept  wholly 
secret,  and  Pitt  learned  enough  to  convince  him  that  Spain 
was  becoming  hostile  in  intention.  With  his  usual  haughty 
resolve,  he  determined  to  forestall  her  by  declaring  war  ;  but 
the  influence  against  him  in  the  councils  of  the  new  king 
was  too  strong.  Failing  to  carry  the  ministry  with  him,  he 
resigned  on  the  5th  of  October,  1761.  His  prevision  was 
quickly  justified  ;  Spain  had  been  eager  in  professing  good¬ 
will  until  the  treasure-ships  from  America  should  arrive 
laden  with  the  specie  so  needed  for  carrying  on  war.  On 
the  21st  of  September  the  Flota  of  galleons  anchored  safely 
in  Cadiz  ;  and  on  the  2d  of  November  the  British  ambassador 
announced  to  his  government  that  “  two  ships  had  safely  ar¬ 
rived  with  very  extraordinary  rich  cargoes  from  the  West 
Indies,  so  that  all  the  wealth  that  was  expected  from  Span¬ 
ish  America  is  now  safe  in  old  Spain,”  and  in  the  same  de¬ 
spatch  reports  a  surprising  change  in  the  words  of  the  Spanish 
minister,  and  the  haughty  language  now  used.1  The  griev¬ 
ances  and  claims  of  Spain  were  urged  peremptorily,  and  the 
quarrel  grew  so  fast  that  even  the  new  English  ministry, 
though  ardently  desiring  peace,  recalled  their  ambassador  be¬ 
fore  the  end  of  the  year,  and  declared  war  on  the  4th  of 
January,  1762  ;  thus  adopting  Pitt’s  policy,  but  too  late  to 
reap  the  advantages  at  which  he  had  aimed. 

1  Mahon :  History  of  England. 


314 


CAPTURE  OF  HAVANA. 


However,  no  such  delay  on  the  part  of  England  could  alter 
the  essential  inequality,  in  strength  and  preparation,  between 
the  two  nations.  The  plans  formed  by  Pitt  were  in  the  main 
adopted  by  his  successor,  and  carried  out  with  a  speed  which 
the  readiness  of  the  English  navy  permitted.  On  the  5th 
of  March,  Pocock,  who  had  returned  from  the  East  Indies, 
sailed  from  Portsmouth,  convoying  a  fleet  of  transports  to 
act  against  Havana;  in  the  West  Indies  he  was  reinforced 
from  the  forces  in  that  quarter,  so  that  his  command  con¬ 
tained  nineteen  ships-of-the-line  besides  smaller  vessels,  and 
ten  thousand  soldiers. 

In  the  previous  January,  the  West  India  fleet,  under  the 
well-known  Rodney,  had  acted  with  the  land  forces  in  the 
reduction  of  Martinique,  the  gem  and  tower  of  the  French 
islands  and  the  harbor  of  an  extensive  privateering  system. 
It  is  said  that  fourteen  hundred  English  merchantmen  were 
taken  during  this  war  in  the  West  Indian  seas  by  cruisers 
whose  principal  port  was  Fort  Royal  in  Martinique.  With 
this  necessary  base  fell  also  the  privateering  system  resting 
upon  it.  Martinique  was  surrendered  February  12,  and  the 
loss  of  this  chief  commercial  and  military  centre  was  im¬ 
mediately  followed  by  that  of  the  smaller  islands,  Grenada, 
Sta.  Lucia,  St.  Vincent.  By  these  acquisitions  the  English 
colonies  at  Antigua,  St.  Kitts,  and  Nevis,  as  well  as  the 
ships  trading  to  those  islands,  were  secured  against  the  en¬ 
emy,  the  commerce  of  England  received  large  additions,  and 
all  the  Lesser  Antilles,  or  Windward  Islands,  became  British 
possessions. 

Admiral  Pocock  was  joined  off  Cape  St.  Nicholas  by  the 
West  Indian  reinforcement  on  the  27th  of  May,  and  as  the 
season  was  so  far  advanced,  he  took  his  great  fleet  through 
the  old  Bahama  channel  instead  of  the  usual  route  around 
the  south  side  of  Cuba.  This  was  justly  considered  a  great 
feat  in  those  days  of  poor  surveys,  and  was  accomplished 
without  an  accident.  Lookout  and  sounding  vessels  went 
first,  frigates  followed,  and  boats  or  sloops  were  anchored 
on  shoals  with  carefully  arranged  signals  for  day  or  night 


THE  ALLIES  INVADE  PORTUGAL. 


315 


Having  good  weather,  the  fleet  got  through  in  a  week  and 
appeared  before  Havana.  The  operations  will  not  be  given 
in  detail.  After  a  forty  days’  siege  the  Moro  Castle  was 
taken  on  the  30th  of  July,  and  the  city  surrendered  on  the 
10th  of  August.  The  Spaniards  lost  not  only  the  city  and 
port,  but  twelve  ships-of-the-line,  besides  £3,000,000  in  money 
and  merchandise  belonging  to  the  Spanish  king.  The  impor¬ 
tance  of  Havana  was  not  to  be  measured  only  by  its  own  size, 
or  its  position  as  centre  of  a  large  and  richly  cultivated  dis¬ 
trict  ;  it  was  also  the  port  commanding  the  only  passage  by 
which  the  treasure  and  other  ships  could  sail  from  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico  to  Europe  in  those  days.  With  Havana  in  an 
enemy’s  hands  it  would  be  necessary  to  assemble  them  at 
Cartagena  and  from  there  beat  up  against  the  trade-winds, 
—  an  operation  always  difficult,  und  which  would  keep  ships 
long  in  waters  where  they  were  exposed  to  capture  by  Eng¬ 
lish  cruisers.  Not  even  an  attack  upon  the  isthmus  would 
have  been  so  serious  a  blow  to  Spain.  This  important  result 
could  only  be  achieved  by  a  nation  confident  of  controlling 
the  communications  by  its  sea  power,  to  which  the  happy 
issue  must  wholly  be  ascribed,  and  which  had  another  signal 
illustration  in  the  timely  conveying  of  four  thousand  Amer¬ 
ican  troops  to  reinforce  the  English  ranks,  terribly  wasted 
by  battle  and  fever.  It  is  said  that  only  twenty-five  hundred 
serviceable  fighting  men  remained  on  foot  when  the  city  fell. 

While  the  long  reach  and  vigor  of  England’s  sea  power  was 
thus  felt  in  the  West  Indies,  it  was  receiving  further  illus¬ 
tration  in  Portugal  and  in  the  far  East.  The  allied  crowns 
in  the  beginning  had  invited  Portugal  to  join  their  alliance 
against  those  whom  they  had  taken  to  calling  the  “tyrants 
of  the  seas,”  reminding  her  how  the  English  monopoly  of  her 
trade  was  draining  the  country  of  gold,  and  recalling  the 
deliberate  violation  of  her  neutrality  by  the  fleet  under  Bos- 
cawen.  The  Portuguese  minister  of  the  day  well  knew  all 
this,  and  keenly  felt  it ;  but  though  the  invitation  was  accom¬ 
panied  by  the  plain  statement  that  Portugal  would  not  be 
allowed  to  continue  a  neutrality  she  could  not  enforce,  he 


316 


CAPTURE  OF  MANILA. 


judged  rightly  that  the  country  had  more  to  fear  from  Eng¬ 
land  and  her  fleet  than  from  the  Spanish  army.  The  allies 
declared  war  and  invaded  Portugal.  They  were  for  a  time 
successful ;  but  the  “  tyrants  of  the  seas  ”  answered  Por¬ 
tugal’s  call,  sent  a  fleet  and  landed  at  Lisbon  eight  thousand 
soldiers,  who  drove  the  Spaniards  over  the  frontiers,  and 
even  carried  the  war  into  Spain  itself. 

Simultaneous  with  these  significant  events,  Manila  was 
attacked.  With  so  much  already  on  hand,  it  was  found  im¬ 
possible  to  spare  troops  or  ships  from  England.  The  suc¬ 
cesses  in  India  and  the  absolute  security  of  the  establishments 
there,  with  the  control  of  the  sea,  allowed  the  Indian  officials 
themselves  to  undertake  this  colonial  expedition.  It  sailed 
in  August,  1762,  and  reaching  Malacca  on  the  19th,  was  sup¬ 
plied  at  that  neutral  port  with  all  that  was  needed  for  the 
siege  about  to  be  undertaken  ;  the  Dutch,  though  jealous  of 
the  English  advance,  not  venturing  to  refuse  their  demands. 
The  expedition,  which  depended  entirely  upon  the  fleet,  re¬ 
sulted  in  the  whole  group  of  Philippine  Islands  surrendering 
in  October  and  paying  a  ransom  of  four  million  dollars.  At 
about  the  same  time  the  fleet  captured  the  Acapulco  galleon 
having  three  million  dollars  on  board,  and  an  English 
squadron  in  the  Atlantic  took  a  treasure-ship  from  Lima  with 
four  million  dollars  in  silver  for  the  Spanish  government. 

“  Never  had  the  colonial  empire  of  Spain  received  such  blows. 
Spain,  whose  opportune  intervention  might  have  modified  the  fate 
of  the  war,  entered  it  too  late  to  help  France,  but  in  time  to  share 
her  misfortunes.  There  was  reason  to  fear  yet  more.  Panama  and 
San  Domingo  were  threatened,  and  the  Anglo-Americans  were  pre¬ 
paring  for  the  invasion  of  Florida  and  Louisiana.  .  .  .  The  conquest 
of  Havana  had  in  great  measure  interrupted  the  communications  be¬ 
tween  the  wealthy  American  colonies  of  Spain  and  Europe.  The 
reduction  of  the  Philippine  Islands  now  excluded  her  from  Asia. 
The  two  together  severed  all  the  avenues  of  Spanish  trade  and  cut 
off  all  intercourse  between  the  parts  of  their  vast  but  disconnected 
empire.”  1 


1  Martin :  History  of  France. 


SPAIN  SUES  FOR  PEACE. 


317 


The  selection  of  the  points  of  attack,  due  to  the  ministry 
of  Pitt,  was  strategically  good,  cutting  effectually  the  sinews 
of  the  enemy’s  strength ;  and  if  his  plans  had  been  fully  car¬ 
ried  out  and  Panama  also  seized,  the  success  would  have  been 
yet  more  decisive.  England  had  lost  also  the  advantage  of 
the  surprise  he  would  have  effected  by  anticipating  Spain’s 
declaration  of  war ;  but  her  arms  were  triumphant  during 
this  short  contest,  through  the  rapidity  with  which  her  pro¬ 
jects  were  carried  into  execution,  due  to  the  state  of  efficiency 
to  which  her  naval  forces  and  administration  had  been 
brought. 

With  the  conquest  of  Manila  ended  the  military  operations 
of  the  war.  Nine  months,  counting  from  the  formal  declara¬ 
tion  by  England  in  January,  had  been  sufficient  to  shatter  the 
last  hope  of  France,  and  to  bring  Spain  to  a  peace  in  which 
was  conceded  every  point  on  which  she  had  based  her  hostile 
attitude  and  demands.  It  seems  scarcely  necessary,  after 
even  the  brief  summary  of  events  that  has  been  given,  to 
point  out  that  the  speed  and  thoroughness  with  which  Eng¬ 
land’s  work  was  done  was  due  wholly  to  her  sea  power,  which 
allowed  her  forces  to  act  on  distant  points,  widely  apart  as 
Cuba,  Portugal,  India,  and  the  Philippines,  without  a  fear  of 
serious  break  in  their  communications. 

Before  giving  the  terms  of  peace  which  ought  to  summarize 
the  results  of  the  war,  but  do  so  imperfectly,  owing  to  the 
weak  eagerness  of  the  'English  ministry  to  conclude  it,  it  is 
necessary  to  trace  in  outline  the  effect  of  the  war  upon  com¬ 
merce,  upon  the  foundations  of  sea  power  and  national 
prosperity. 

One  prominent  feature  of  this  war  may  be  more  strongly 
'impressed  upon  the  mind  by  a  startling,  because  paradoxical, 
statement  that  the  prosperity  of  the  English  is  shown  by  the 
magnitude  of  their  losses. 

“  From  1756  to  1760,”  states  a  French  historian,  “  French  privateers 
captured  from  the  English  more  than  twenty-five  hundred  merchant¬ 
men.  In  1761,  though  France  had  not,  so  to  speak,  a  single  ship-of- 
the-line  at  sea,  and  though  the  English  had  taken  two  hundred  and 


318 


PROSPERITY  OF  BRITISH  COMMERCE. 


forty  of  our  privateers,  their  comrades  still  took  eight  hundred  and 
twelve  English  vessels.  The  explanation  of  the  number  of  these 
prizes  lies  in  the  prodigious  growth  of  the  English  shipping.  In  1760 
it  is  claimed  that  the  English  had  at  sea  eight  thousand  sail  ;  of  these 
the  French  captured  nearly  one  tenth,  despite  escorts  and  cruisers. 
In  the  four  years  from  1756  to  1760  the  French  lost  only  nine 
hundred  and  fifty  vessels.”  1 

But  this  discrepancy  is  justly  attributed  by  an  English 
writer  “  to  the  diminution  of  the  French  commerce  and  the 
dread  of  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  English,  which  kept 
many  of  their  trading- vessels  from  going  to  sea ;  ”  and  he 
goes  on  to  point  out  that  the  capture  of  vessels  was  not  the 
principal  benefit  resulting  from  the  efficiency  of  England’s 
fleets.  “  Captures  like  Duquesne,  Louisburg,  Prince  Edward’s 
Island,  the  reduction  of  Senegal,  and  later  on  of  Guadeloupe 
and  Martinique,  were  events  np  less  destructive  to  French 
commerce  and  colonies  than  advantageous  to  those  of  Eng¬ 
land.”  2  The  multiplication  of  French  privateers  was  indeed 
a  sad  token  to  an  instructed  eye,  showing  behind  them  mer¬ 
chant  shipping  in  enforced  idleness,  whose  crews  and  whose 
owners  were  driven  to  speculative  pillage  in  order  to  live. 
Nor  was  this  risk  wholly  in  vain.  The  same  Englishman 
confesses  that  in  1759  the  losses  of  merchantmen  showed  a 
worse  balance  than  the  ships-of-war.  While  the  French  were 
striving  in  vain  to  regain  equality  upon  the  sea  and  repair 
their  losses,  but  to  no  purpose,  for  44  in  building  and  arming 
vessels  they  labored  only  for  the  English  fleet,”  yet,  “  not¬ 
withstanding  the  courage  and  vigilance  of  English  cruisers, 
French  privateers  so  swarmed  that  in  this  year  they  took  two 
hundred  and  forty  British  vessels,  chiefly  coasters  and  small 
craft.”  In  1760  the  same  authority  gives  the  British  loss  in 
trading- vessels  at  over  three  hundred,  and  in  1761  at  over  eight 
hundred,  three  times  that  of  the  French ;  but  he  adds :  “  It 
would  not  have  been  wonderful  had  they  taken  more  and  richer 
ships.  While  their  commerce  was  nearly  destroyed,  and  they 

1  Martin :  History  of  France. 

2  Campbell :  Lives  of  the  Admirals. 


TRIUMPHANT  POSITION  OF  ENGLAND. 


319 


had  few  merchant-ships  at  sea,  the  trading-fleets  of  England 
covered  the  seas.  Every  year  her  commerce  was  increasing ; 
the  money  which  the  war  carried  out  was  returned  by  the 
produce  of  her  industry.  Eight  thousand  vessels  were  em¬ 
ployed  by  the  traders  of  Great  Britain.”  The  extent  of  her 
losses  is  attributed  to  three  causes,  of  which  the  first  only 
was  preventable :  (1)  The  inattention  of  merchant-ships 
to  the  orders  of  the  convoying  vessels ;  (2)  The  immense 
number  of  English  ships  in  all  seas ;  (3)  The  enemy’s  ven¬ 
turing  the  whole  remains  of  his  strength  in  privateering. 
During  the  same  year,  1761,  the  navy  lost  one  ship-of-the-line, 
which  was  retaken,  and  one  cutter.  At  the  same  time,  not¬ 
withstanding  the  various  exchanges,  the  English  still  held 
twenty-five  thousand  French  prisoners,  while  the  English 
prisoners  in  France  were  but  twelve  hundred.  These  were 
the  results  of  the  sea  war. 

Finally,  in  summing  up  the  commercial  condition  of  the 
kingdom  at  the  end  of  the  war,  after  mentioning  the  enormous 
sums  of  specie  taken  from  Spain,  the  writer  says :  — • 

“  These  strengthened  trade  and  fostered  industry.  The  remit¬ 
tances  for  foreign  subsidies  were  in  great  part  paid  by  bills  on  mer¬ 
chants  settled  abroad,  who  had  the  value  of  the  drafts  in  British 
manufactures.  The  trade  of  England  increased  gradually  every  year, 
and  such  a  scene  of  national  prosperity  while  waging  a  long,  costly, 
and  bloody  war,  was  never  before  shown  by  any  people  in  the  world.” 

No  wonder,  with  such  results  to  her  commerce  and  such 
unvarying  success  attending  her  arms,  and  seeing  the  practi¬ 
cal  annihilation  of  the  French  navy,  that  the  union  of  France 
and  Spain,  which  was  then  lowering  on  her  future  and 
had  once  excited  the  fears  of  all  Europe,  was  now  beheld  by 
Great  Britain  alone  without  the  smallest  fear  or  despondency. 
Spain  was  by  her  constitution  and  the  distribution  of  her  em¬ 
pire  peculiarly  open  to  the  attack  of  a  great  sea  people ;  and 
whatever  the  views  of  the  government  of  the  day,  Pitt  and  the 
nation  saw  that  the  hour  had  come,  which  had  been  hoped 
for  in  vain  in  1739,  because  then  years  of  peace  and  the  obsti- 


320 


ENGLAND  AND  PORTUGAL. 


nate  bias  of  a  great  minister  had  relaxed  the  muscles  of  her 
fleet.  Now  she  but  reached  forth  her  hand  and  seized  what 
she  wished  ;  nor  could  there  have  been  any  limit  to  her  prey, 
had  not  the  ministry  again  been  untrue  to  the  interests  of 
the  country. 

The  position  of  Portugal  with  reference  to  Great  Britain 
has  been  alluded  to,  but  merits  some  special  attention  as  in¬ 
stancing  an  element  of  sea  power  obtained  not  by  colonies, 
but  by  alliance,  whether  necessary  or  prudential.  The  com¬ 
mercial  connection  before  spoken  of  “  was  strengthened  by 
the  strongest  political  ties.  The  two  kingdoms  were  so  situ¬ 
ated  as  to  have  little  to  fear  from  each  other,  while  they  might 
impart  many  mutual  advantages.  The  harbors  of  Portugal 
gave  shelter  as  well  as  supplies  to  the  English  fleet,  while 
the  latter  defended  the  rich  trade  of  Portugal  with  Brazil. 
The  antipathy  between  Portugal  and  Spain  made  it  neces¬ 
sary  for  the  former  to  have  an  ally,  strong  yet  distant. 
None  is  so  advantageous  in  that  way  as  England,  which 
in  her  turn  might,  and  always  has,  derived  great  advan¬ 
tages  from  Portugal  in  a  war  with  any  of  the  southern 
powers  of  Europe.” 

This  is  an  English  view  of  a  matter  which  to  others  looks 
somewhat  like  an  alliance  between  a  lion  and  a  lamb.  To 
call  a  country  with  a  fleet  like  England’s  “  distant  ”  from  a 
small  maritime  nation  like  Portugal  is  an  absurdity.  Eng¬ 
land  is,  and  yet  more  in  those  days  was,  wherever  her  fleet 
could  go.  The  opposite  view  of  the  matter,  showing  equally 
the  value  of  the  alliance,  was  well  set  forth  in  the  memorial 
by  which,  under  the  civil  name  of  an  invitation,  the  crowns 
of  France  and  Spain  ordered  Portugal  to  declare  against 
England. 

The  grounds  of  that  memorial  —  namely,  the  unequal  bene¬ 
fit  to  Portugal  from  the  connection  and  the  disregard  of 
Portuguese  neutrality  —  have  already  been  given.  The  King 
of  Portugal  refused  to  abandon  the  alliance,  for  the  professed 
reason  that  it  was  ancient  and  wholly  defensive.  To  this  the 
two  crowns  replied  :  — 


PEACE  OF  PARIS ,  1763. 


321 


“  The  defensive  alliance  is  actually  an  offensive  one  by  the  situ¬ 
ation  of  the  Portuguese  dominions  and  the  nature  of  the  English 
power.  The  English  squadrons  cannot  in  all  seasons  keep  the  sea, 
nor  cruise  on  the  principal  coasts  of  France  and  Spain  for  cutting  off 
the  navigation  of  the  two  countries,  without  the  ports  and  assistance 
of  Portugal  ;  and  these  islanders  could  not  insult  all  maritime 
Europe,  if  the  whole  riches  of  Portugal  did  not  pass  through  their 
hands,  which  furnishes  them  with  the  means  to  make  war  and  renders 
the  alliance  truly  and  properly  offensive.” 

Between  the  two  arguments  the  logic  of  situation  and 
power  prevailed.  Portugal  found  England  nearer  and  more 
dangerous  than  Spain,  and  remained  for  generations  of  trial 
true  to  the  alliance.  This  relationship  was  as  useful  to  Eng¬ 
land  as  any  of  her  colonial  possessions,  depending  of  course 
upon  the  scene  of  the  principal  operations  at  any  particular 
time. 

The  preliminaries  of  peace  were  signed  at  Fontainebleau,  v 
November  3, 1762 ;  the  definitive  treaty  on  the  10th  of  the  fol¬ 
lowing  February,  at  Paris,  whence  the  peace  takes  its  name. 

By  its  terms  France  renounced  all  claims  to  Canada,  Nova 
Scotia,  and  all  the  islands  of  the  St.  Lawrence ;  along  with 
Canada  she  ceded  the  valley  of  the  Ohio  and  all  her  territory 
on  the  east  side  of  the  Mississippi,  except  the  city  of  New 
Orleans.  At  the  same  time  Spain,  as  an  equivalent  for 
Havana,  which  England  restored,  yielded  Florida,  under  which 
name  were  comprised  all  her  continental  possessions  east  of 
the  Mississippi.  Thus  England  obtained  a  colonial  empire  v 
embracing  Canada,  from  Hudson’s  Bay,  and  all  of  the  present 
United  States  east  of  the  Mississippi.  The  possibilities  of  this 
vast  region  were  then  only  partially  foreseen,  and  as  yet  there 
was  no  foreshadowing  of  the  revolt  of  the  thirteen  colonies. 

In  the  West  Indies,  England  gave  back  to  France  the 
important  islands  of  Guadeloupe  and  Martinique.  The  four 
so-called  neutral  islands  of  the  Lesser  Antilles  were  divided 
between  the  two  powers  ;  Sta.  Lucia  going  to  France,  St.  Vin¬ 
cent,  Tobago,  and  Dominica  to  England,  which  also  retained 
Grenada. 


21 


322 


OPPOSITION  TO  THE  TREATY . 


Minorca  was  given  back  to  England  ;  and  as  the  restora¬ 
tion  of  the  island  to  Spain  had  been  one  of  the  conditions 
of  the  alliance  with  the  latter,  France,  unable  to  fulfil  her 
stipulation,  ceded  to  Spain  Louisiana  west  of  the  Mississippi. 

In  India,  France  recovered  the  possessions  she  had  held 
before  Dupleix  began  his  schemes  of  aggrandizement;  but 
she  gave  up  the  right  of  erecting  fortifications  or  keeping 
troops  in  Bengal,  and  so  left  the  station  at  Cliandernagore 
defenceless.  In  a  word,  France  resumed  her  facilities  for 
trading,  but  practically  abandoned  her  pretensions  to  polit¬ 
ical  influence.  It  was  tacitly  understood  that  the  English 
company  would  keep  all  its  conquests. 

The  right  of  fishing  upon  the  coasts  of  Newfoundland  and 
in  parts  of  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence,  which  France  had  pre¬ 
viously  enjoyed,  was  conceded  to  her  by  this  treaty;  but  it 
was  denied  to  Spain,  who  had  claimed  it  for  her  fishermen. 
This  concession  was  among  those  most  attacked  by  the  Eng¬ 
lish  opposition. 

The  nation  at  large  and  Pitt,  the  favorite  of  the  nation, 
were  bitterly  opposed  to  the  terms  of  the  treaty.  “  France,” 
said  Pitt,  “  is  chiefly  formidable  to  us  as  a  maritime  and  com¬ 
mercial  power.  What  we  gain  in  this  respect  is  valuable  to 
us  above  all  through  the  injury  to  her  which  results  from  it. 
You  leave  to  France  the  possibility  of  reviving  her  navy.” 
In  truth,  from  the  point  of  view  of  sea  power  and  of  the 
national  jealousies  which  the  spirit  of  that  age  sanctioned, 
these  ^vords,  though  illiberal,  were  strictly  justifiable.  The 
restoration  to  France  of  her  colonies  in  the  West  Indies  and 
her  stations  in  India,  together  with  the  valuable  right  of 
fishery  in  her  former  American  possessions,  put  before  her 
the  possibility  and  the  inducement  to  restore  her  shipping, 
her  commerce,  and  her  navy,  and  thus  tended  to  recall  her 
from  the  path  of  continental  ambition  which  had  been  so  fatal 
to  her  interests,  and  in  the  same  proportion  favorable  to  the 
unprecedented  growth  of  England’s  power  upon  the  ocean. 
The  opposition,  and  indeed  some  of  the  ministry,  also  thought 
that  so  commanding  and  important  a  position  as  Havana 


RESULTS  OF  THE  CONTINENTAL  WAR. 


323 


was  poorly  paid  for  by  the  cession  of  the  yet  desolate  and 
unproductive  region  called  Florida.  Porto  Rico  was  sug¬ 
gested,  Florida  accepted.  There  were  other  minor  points 
of  difference,  into  which  it  is  unnecessary  to  enter.  It  could 
scarcely  be  denied  that  with  the  commanding  military  control 
of  the  sea  held  by  England,  grasping  as  she  now  did  so  many 
important  positions,  with  her  navy  overwhelmingly  supe¬ 
rior  in  numbers,  and  her  commerce  and  internal  condition 
very  thriving,  more  rigorous  terms  might  easily  have  been 
exacted  and  would  have  been  prudent.  The  ministry  de¬ 
fended  their  eagerness  and  spirit  of  concession  on  the  ground 
of  the  enormous  growth  of  the  debt,  which  then  amounted 
to  £122,000,000,  a  sum  in  every  point  of  view  much  greater 
then  than  now  ;  but  while  this  draft  upon  the  future  was 
fully  justified  by  the  success  of  the  war,  it  also  imperatively 
demanded  that  the  utmost  advantages  which  the  military 
situation  made  attainable  should  be  exacted.  This  the  min¬ 
istry  failed  to  do.  As  regards  the  debt,  it  is  well  observed  by 
a  French  writer  that  “  in  this  war,  and  for  years  afterward, 
England  had  in  view  nothing  less  than  the  conquest  of  Amer¬ 
ica  and  the  progress  of  her  East  India  Company.  By  these 
two  countries  her  manufactures  and  commerce  acquired  more 
than  sufficient  outlets,  and  repaid  her  for  the  numerous  sacri¬ 
fices  she  had  made.  Seeing  the  maritime  decay  of  Europe, 
—  its  commerce  annihilated,  its  manufactures  so  little  ad¬ 
vanced,  —  how  could  the  English  nation  feel  afraid  of  a  future 
which  offered  so  vast  a  perspective  ?  ”  Unfortunately  the  na¬ 
tion  needed  an  exponent  in  the  government ;  and  its  chosen 
mouthpiece,  the  only  man,  perhaps,  able  to  rise  to  the  level 
of  the  great  opportunity,  was  out  of  favor  at  court. 

Nevertheless,  the  gains  of  England  were  very  great,  not 
only  in  territorial  increase,  nor  yet  in  maritime  preponder¬ 
ance,  but  in  the  prestige  and  position  achieved  in  the  eyes 
of  the  nations,  now  fully  opened  to  her  great  resources  and 
mighty  power.  To  these  results,  won  by  the  sea,  the  issue 
of  the  continental  war  offered  a  singular  and  suggestive  con¬ 
trast.  France  had  already  withdrawn,  along  with  England, 


324 


INFLUENCE  OF  SEA  POWER  IN 


from  all  share  in  that  strife,  and  peace  between  the  other 

<  parties  to  it  was  signed  five  days  after  the  Peace  of  Paris. 
The  terms  of  the  peace  were  simply  the  status  quo  ante  helium. 
By  the  estimate  of  the  King  of  Prussia,  one  hundred  and  eighty 
thousand  of  his  soldiers  had  fallen  or  died  in  this  war,  out 
of  a  kingdom  of  five  million  souls ;  while  the  losses  of  Russia, 
Austria,  and  France  aggregated  four  hundred  and  sixty  thou¬ 
sand  men.  The  result  was  simply  that  things  remained  as 
they  were.1  To  attribute  this  only  to  a  difference  between 
the  possibilities  of  land  and  sea  war  is  of  course  absurd.  The 
genius  of  Frederick,  backed  by  the  money  of  England,  had 
proved  an  equal  match  for  the  mismanaged  and  not  al¬ 
ways  hearty  efforts  of  a  coalition  numerically  overwhelming. 
What  does  seem  a  fair  conclusion  is,  that  States  having  a 
.  good  seaboard,  or  even  ready  access  to  the  ocean  by  one  or 
two  outlets,  will  find  it  to  their  advantage  to  seek  prosperity 
and  extension  by  the  way  of  the  sea  and  of  commerce,  rather 
than  in  attempts  to  unsettle  and  modify  existing  political 
arrangements  in  countries  where  a  more  or  less  long  posses¬ 
sion  of  power  has  conferred  acknowledged  rights,  and  created 
national  allegiance  or  political  ties.  Since  the  Treaty  of  Paris 
in  1763,  the  waste  places  of  the  world  have  been  rapidly 
filled ;  witness  our  own  continent,  Australia,  and  even  South 
America.  A  nominal  and  more  or  less  clearly  defined  po¬ 
litical  possession  now  generally  exists  in  the  most  forsaken 
regions,  though  to  this  statement  there  are  some  marked  ex¬ 
ceptions  ;  but  in  many  places  this  political  possession  is  little 
more  than  nominal,  and  in  others  of  a  character  so  feeble 
that  it  cannot  rely  upon  itself  alone  for  support  or  protection. 
s'  The  familiar  and  notorious  example  of  the  Turkish  Empire, 
kept  erect  only  by  the  forces  pressing  upon  it  from  opposing 
sides,  by  the  mutual  jealousies  of  powers  that  have  no  sym¬ 
pathy  with  it,  is  an  instance  of  such  weak  political  tenure ; 
and  though  the  question  is  wholly  European,  all  know  enough 
<of  it  to  be  aware  that  the  interest  and  control  of  the  sea  powers 
la  among  the  chief,  if  not  the  first,  of  the  elements  that  now  fix 

1  See  Annual  Register,  1762,  p.  63. 


REMOTE  AND  DISORDERED  COUNTRIES.  325 


the  situation ;  and  that  they,  if  intelligently  used,  will  direct 
the  future  inevitable  changes.  Upon  the  western  continents  the 
political  condition  of  the  Central  American  and  tropical  South 
American  States  is  so  unstable  as  to  cause  constant  anxiety 
about  the  maintenance  of  internal  order,  and  seriously  to 
interfere  with  commerce  and  with  the  peaceful  development 
of  their  resources.  So  long  as  —  to  use  a  familiar  expres¬ 
sion  —  they  hurt  no  one  but  themselves,  this  may  go  on  ;  but 
for  a  long  time  the  citizens  of  more  stable  governments  have 
been  seeking  to  exploit  their  resources,  and  have  borne  the 
losses  arising  from  their  distracted  condition.  North  America 
and  Australia  still  offer  large  openings  to  immigration  and 
enterprise  ;  but  they  are  filling  up  rapidly,  and  as  the  oppor¬ 
tunities  there  diminish,  the  demand  must  arise  for  a  more 
settled  government  in  those  disordered  States,  for  security 
to  life  and  for  reasonable  stability  of  institutions  enabling 
merchants  and  others  to  count  upon  the  future.  There  is 
certainly  no  present  hope  that  such  a  demand  can  be  fulfilled 
from  the  existing  native  materials  ;  if  the  same  be  true  when 
the  demand  arises,  no  theoretical  positions,  like  the  Monroe 
doctrine,  will  prevent  interested  nations  from  attempting  to 
remedy  the  evil  by  some  measure,  which,  whatever  it  may 
be  called,  will  be  a  political  interference.  Such  interferences 
must  produce  collisions,  which  may  be  at  times  settled  by 
arbitration,  but  can  scarcely  fail  at  other  times  to  cause 
war.  Even  for  a  peaceful  solution,  that  nation  will  have  the 
strongest  arguments  which  has  the  strongest  organized  force. 
It  need  scarcely  be  said  that  the  successful  piercing  of  the 
Central  American  Isthmus  at  any  point  may  precipitate  the 
moment  that  is  sure  to  come  sooner  or  later.  The  profound 
modification  of  commercial  routes  expected  from  this  enter¬ 
prise,  the  political  importance  to  the  United  States  of  such  a 
channel  of  communication  between  her  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
seaboards,  are  not,  however,  the  whole  nor  even  the  principal 
part  of  the  question.  As  far  as  can  be  seen,  the  time  will 
come  when  stable  governments  for  the  American  tropical 
States  must  be  assured  by  the  now  existing  powerful  and 


326  EFFECTS  OF  THE  SEVEN  YEARS ’  WAR 


stable  States  of  America  or  Europe.  The  geographical  position 
of  those  States,  the  climatic  conditions,  make  it  plain  at  once 
that  sea  power  will  there,  even  more  than  in  the  case  of 
Turkey,  determine  what  foreign  State  shall  predominate, — 
if  not  by  actual  possession,  by  its  influence  over  the  native 
governments.  The  geographical  position  of  the  United  States 
and  her  intrinsic  power  give  her  an  undeniable  advantage  ; 
but  that  advantage  will  not  avail  if  there  is  a  great  infe¬ 
riority  of  organized  brute-force,  which  still  remains  the  last 
argument  of  republics  as  of  kings.  Herein  lies  to  us  the 
great  and  still  living  interest  of  the  Seven  Years’  War.  In 
it  we  have  seen  and  followed  England,  with  an  army  small 
as  compared  with  other  States,  as  is  still  her  case  to-day, 
first  successfully  defending  her  own  shores,  then  carrying 
her  arms  in  every  direction,  spreading  her  rule  and  influence 
over  remote  regions,  and  not  only  binding  them  to  her  obedi¬ 
ence,  but  making  them  tributary  to  her  wealth,  her  strength, 
and  her  reputation.  As  she  loosens  the  grasp  and  neutralizes 
the  influence  of  France  and  Spain  in  regions  beyond  the  sea, 
there  is  perhaps  seen  the  prophecy  of  some  other  great  nation 
in  days  yet  to  come,  that  will  incline  the  balance  of  power  in 
some  future  sea  war,  whose  scope  will  be  recognized  after¬ 
ward,  if  not  by  contemporaries,  to  have  been  the  political 
future  and  the  economical  development  of  regions  before  lost 
to  civilization;  but  that  nation  will  not  be  the  United  States 
if  the  moment  find  her  indifferent,  as  now,  to  the  empire 
of  the  seas. 

The  direction  then  given  to  England’s  efforts,  by  the 
instinct  of  the  nation  and  the  fiery  genius  of  Pitt,  continued 
after  the  war,  and  has  profoundly  influenced  her  subsequent 
policy.  Mistress  now  of  North  America,  lording  it  in  India, 
through  the  company  whose  territorial  conquests  had  been 
ratified  by  native  princes,  over  twenty  millions  of  inhabitants, 
—  a  population  larger  than  that  of  Great  Britian  and  having 
a  revenue  respectable  alongside  of  that  of  the  home  govern¬ 
ment,  —  England,  with  yet  other  rich  possessions  scattered 
far  and  wide  over  the  globe,  had  ever  before  her  eyes,  as  a 


UPON  THE  AFTER  POLICY  OF  ENGLAND.  327 


salutary  lesson,  the  severe  chastisement  which  the  weakness 
of  Spain  had  allowed  her  to  inflict  upon  that  huge  disjointed 
empire.  The  words  of  the  English  naval  historian  of  that 
war,  speaking  about  Spain,  apply  with  slight  modifications 
to  England  in  our  own  day. 

“  Spain  is  precisely  that  power  against  which  England  can  always 
contend  with  the  fairest  prospect  of  advantage  and  honor.  That 
extensive  monarchy  is  exhausted  at  heart,  her  resources  lie  at  a 
great  distance,  and  whatever  power  commands  the  sea,  may  com¬ 
mand  the  wealth  and  commerce  of  Spain.  The  dominions  from 
which  she  draws  her  resources,  lying  at  an  immense  distance  from 
the  capital  and  from  one  another,  make  it  more  necessary  for  her 
than  for  any  other  State  to-  temporize,  until  she  can  inspire  with 
activity  all  parts  of  her  enormous  but  disjointed  empire.”1 

It  would  be  untrue  to  say  that  England  is  exhausted  at 
heart ;  but  her  dependence  upon  the  outside  world  is  such  as 
to  give  a  certain  suggestiveness  to  the  phrase. 

This  analogy  of  positions  was  not  overlooked  by  England. 
From  that  time  forward  up  to  our  own  day,  the  possessions 
won  for  her  by  her  sea  power  have  combined  with  that  sea 
power  itself  to  control  her  policy.  The  road  to  India — in 
the  days  of  Clive  a  distant  and  perilous  voyage  on  which  she 
had  not  a  stopping-place  of  her  own  —  was  reinforced  as  op¬ 
portunity  offered  by  the  acquisition  of  St.  Helena,  of  the  Cape 
of  Good  Hope,  of  the  Mauritius.  When  steam  made  the  Red 
Sea  and  Mediterranean  route  practicable,  she  acquired  Aden, 
and  yet  later  has  established  herself  at  Socotra.  Malta  had 
already  fallen  into  her  hands  during  the  wars  of  the  French 
Revolution  ;  and  her  commanding  position,  as  the  corner-stone 
upon  which  the  coalitions  against  Napoleon  rested,  enabled 
her  to  claim  it  at  the  Peace  of  1815.  Being  but  a  short  thou¬ 
sand  miles  from  Gibraltar,  the  circles  of  military  command 
exercised  by  these  two  places  intersect.  The  present  day  has 
seen  the  stretch  from  Malta  to  the  Isthmus  of  Suez,  formerly 
without  a  station,  guarded  by  the  cession  to  her  of  Cyprus. 

1  Campbell :  Lives  of  the  Admirals. 


323  NAVAL  POWER  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN. 

Egypt,  despite  the  jealousy  of  France,  has  passed  under  Eng¬ 
lish  control.  The  importance  of  that  position  to  India,  under¬ 
stood  by  Napoleon  and  Nelson,  led  the  latter  at  once  to  send 
an  officer  overland  to  Bombay  with  the  news  of  the  battle 
of  the  Nile  and  the  downfall  of  Bonaparte’s  hopes.  Even 
now,  the  jealousy  with  which  England  views  the  advance  of 
Russia  in  Central  Asia  is  the  result  of  those  days  in  which 
her  sea  power  and  resources  triumphed  over  the  weakness 
of  D’Actffi  and  the  genius  of  Suffren,  and  wrenched  the 
peninsula  of  India  from  the  ambition  of  the  French. 

“  For  the  first  time  since  the  Middle  Ages,”  says  M.  Martin, 
speaking  of  the  Seven  Years’  War,  “  England  had  conquered 
France  single-handed  almost  without  allies,  France  having  powerful 
auxiliaries.  She  had  conquered  solely  by  the  superiority  of  her 
government.” 

Yes  !  but  by  the  superiority  of  her  government  using  the 
tremendous  weapon  of  her  sea  power.  This  made  her  rich, 
and  in  turn  protected  the  trade  by  which  she  had  her 
wealth.  With  her  money  she  upheld  her  few  auxiliaries, 
mainly  Prussia  and  Hanover,  in  their  desperate  strife.  Her 
power  was  everywhere  that  her  ships  could  reach,  and  there 
was  none  to  dispute  the  sea  to  her.  Where  she  would  she 
went,  and  with  her.  went  her  guns  and  her  troops.  By  this 
mobility  her  forces  were  multiplied,  those  of  her  enemies 
distracted.  Ruler  of  the  seas,  she  everywhere  obstructed  its 
highways.  The  enemies’  fleets  could  not  join  ;  no  great  fleet 
could  get  out,  or  if  it  did,  it  was  only  to  meet  at  once,  with 
uninured  officers  and  crews,  those  who  were  veterans  in  gales 
and  warfare.  Save  in  the  case  of  Minorca,  she  carefully  held 
her  own  sea-bases  and  eagerly  seized  those  of  the  enemy.  What 
a  lion  in  the  path  was  Gibraltar  to  the  French  squadrons  of 
Toulon  and  Brest !  What  hope  for  French  succor  to  Canada, 
when  the  English  fleet  had  Louisburg  under  its  lee  ? 

The  one  nation  that  gained  in  this  war  was  that  which 
used  the  sea  in  peace  to  earn  its  wealth,  and  ruled  it  in  war 


NAVAL  POWER  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN.  ,  329 

jj*/ 

by  the  extent  of  its  navy,  by  the  number  of  its  subjects  who 
lived  on  the  sea  or  by  the  sea,  and  by  its  numerous  bases  of 
operations  scattered  over  the  globe.  Yet  it  must  be  observed 
that  these  bases  themselves  would  have  lost  their  value  if 
their  communications  remained  obstructed.  Therefore  the 
French  lost  Louisburg,  Martinique,  Pondicherry ;  so  England 
herself  lost  Minorca.  The  service  between  the  bases  and  the 
mobile  force  between  the  ports  and  the  fleets  is  mutual.1  In 
this  respect  the  navy  is  essentially  a  light  corps ;  it  keeps 
open  the  communications  between  its  own  ports,  it  obstructs 
those  of  the  enemy ;  but  it  sweeps  the  sea  for  the  service 
of  the  land,  it  controls  the  desert  that  man  may  live  and 
thrive  on  the  habitable  globe. 

1  These  remarks,  always  true,  are  doubly  so  now  since  the  introduction  of 
steam.  The  renewal  of  coal  is  a  want  more  frequent,  more  urgent,  more  per¬ 
emptory,  than  any  known  to  the  sailing-ship.  It  is  vain  to  look  for  energetic 
naval  operations  distant  from  coal  stations.  It  is  equally  vain  to  acquire  dis¬ 
tant  coaling  stations  without  maintaining  a  powerful  navy ;  they  will  but  fall 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  But  the  vainest  of  all  delusions  is  the  expectation 
of  bringing  down  an  enemy  by  commerce-destroying  alone,  with  no  coaling 
stations  outside  the  national  boundaries. 


) 


CHAPTER  IX. 

Course  of  Events  from  the  Peace  of  Paris  to  1778.  —  Mari¬ 
time  War  consequent  upon  the  American  Revolution.  —  Sea 
Battle  off  Ushant. 

TF  England  had  reason  to  complain  that  she  had  not  reaped 
-*■  from  the  Treaty  of  Paris  all  the  advantages  that  her 
military  achievements  and  position  entitled  her  to  expect, 
France  had  every  cause  for  discontent  at  the  position  in 
which  the  war  left  her.  The  gain  of  England  was  nearly 
measured  by  her  losses;  even  the  cession  of  Florida,  made 
to  the  conqueror  by  Spain,  had  been  bought  by  France 
at  the  price  of  Louisiana.  Naturally  the  thoughts  of  her 
statesmen  and  of  her  people,  as  they  bent  under  the  present 
necessity  to  bear  the  burden  of  the  vanquished,  turned  to 
the  future  with  its  possibilities  of  revenge  and  compensation. 
The  Due  de  Choiseul,  able  though  imperious,  remained  for 
many  years  more  at  the  head  of  affairs,  and  worked  persist¬ 
ently  to  restore  the  power  of  France  from  the  effects  of  the 
treaty.  The  Austrian  alliance  had  been  none  of  his  seeking  ; 
it  was  already  made  and  working  when  he  came  to  office  in 
1758  ;  but  he  had  even  at  the  first  recognized  that  the  chief 
enemy  was  England,  and  tried  as  far  as  could  be  to  direct 
the  forces  of  the  nation  against  her.  The  defeat  of  Conflans 
having  thwarted  his  projects  of  invasion,  he  next  sought,  in 
entire  consistency  with  his  main  purpose,  to  stir  up  Spain  and 
gain  her  alliance.  The  united  efforts  of  the  two  kingdoms 
with  their  fine  seaboards  could,  under  good  administration  and 
with  time  for  preparation,  put  afloat  a  navy  that  would  be  a 
fair  counterpoise  to  that  of  England.  It  was  also  doubtless 
true  that  weaker  maritime  States,  if  they  saw  such  a  combi- 


REVIVAL  OF  THE  FRENCH  NAVY. 


331 


nation  successfully  made  and  working  efficiently,  would  pluck 
up  heart  to  declare  against  a  government  whose  greatness 
excited  envy  and  fear,  and  which  acted  with  the  disregard  to 
the  rights  and  welfare  of  others  common  to  all  uncontrolled 
power.  Unhappily  for  both  France  and  Spain,  the  alliance 
came  too  late.  The  virtual  annihilation  of  the  French  fleet 
in  1759  was  indeed  followed  by  an  outburst  of  national  en¬ 
thusiasm  for  the  navy,  skilfully  fostered  and  guided  by 
Choiseul.  44  Popular  feeling  took  up  the  cry,  from  one  end 
of  France  to  the  other, 6  The  navy  must  be  restored.’  Gifts 
of  cities,  corporations,  and  private  individuals  raised  funds. 
A  prodigious  activity  sprang  up  in  the  lately  silent  ports ; 
everywhere  ships  were  building  and  repairing.”  The  min¬ 
ister  also  recognized  the  need  of  restoring  the  discipline  and 
tone,  as  well  as  the  material  of  the  navy.  The  hour,  how¬ 
ever,  was  too  late ;  the  middle  of  a  great  and  unsuccessful 
war  is  no  time  to  begin  preparations.  44  Better  late  than 
never  ”  is  not  so  safe  a  proverb  as  44  In  time  of  peace  pre¬ 
pare  for  war.”  The  condition  of  Spain  was  better.  When 
war  broke  out,  the  English  naval  historian  estimates  that  she 
had  one  hundred  ships  of  all  sizes ;  of  these,  probably  sixty 
were  of  the  line.  Nevertheless,  although  the  addition  of 
Spain  to  her  numerous  enemies  might  make  the  position  of 
England  seem  critical,  the  combination  in  her  favor  of  num¬ 
bers,  skill,  experience,  and  prestige,  was  irresistible.  With 
seventy  thousand  veteran  seamen,  she  had  only  to  maintain 
a  position  already  won.  The  results  we  know. 

After  the  peace,  Choiseul  wisely  remained  faithful  to  his 
own  first  ideas.  The  restoration  of  the  navy  continued,  and 
was  accompanied  and  furthered  by  a  spirit  of  professional 
ambition  and  of  desire  to  excel,  among  the  officers  of  the 
navy,  which  has  been  before  mentioned,  and  which,  in  the 
peculiar  condition  of  the  United  States  navy  at  the  present 
day,  may  be  commended  as  a  model.  The  building  of  ships- 
of-war  continued  with  great  activity  and  on  a  large  scale.  At 
the  end  of  the  war,  thanks  to  the  movement  begun  in  1761, 
there  were  forty  ships-of-the-line  in  good  condition.  In  1770, 


332 


TONE  OF  THE  FRENCH  OFFICERS. 


when  Choiseul  was  dismissed,  the  royal  navy  numbered  sixty- 
four  of  the  line  and  fifty  frigates  afloat.  The  arsenals  and 
storehouses  were  filled,  and  a  stock  of  ship-timber  laid  up. 
At  the  same  time  the  minister  tried  to  improve  the  efficiency 
of  the  officers  by  repressing  the  arrogant  spirit  of  those  of 
noble  birth,  which  showed  itself  both  toward  superiors  and 
toward  another  order  of  officers,  not  of  the  nobility,  whose 
abilities  made  them  desired  on  board  the  fleet.  This  class¬ 
feeling  carried  with  it  a  curious  sentiment  of  equality 
among  officers  of  very  different  grades,  which  injuriously  af¬ 
fected  the  spirit  of  subordination.  Members,  all,  of  a  privi¬ 
leged  social  order,  their  equality  as  such  was  more  clearly 
recognized  than  their  inequality  as  junior  and  senior.  The 
droll  story  told  by  Marryatt  of  the  midshipman,  who  repre¬ 
sented  to  his  captain  that  a  certain  statement  had  been 
made  in  confidence,  seems  to  have  had  a  realization  on  the 
French  quarter-deck  of  that  day.  “  Confidence  !  ”  cried  the 
captain ;  “  who  ever  heard  of  confidence  between  a  post- 
captain  and  a  midshipman  !  ”  “  No  sir,”  replied  the  young¬ 

ster,  “  not  between  a  captain  and  a  midshipman,  but  between 
two  gentlemen.”  Disputes,  arguments,  suggestions,  between 
two  gentlemen,  forgetful  of  their  relative  rank,  would  break 
out  at  critical  moments,  and  the  feeling  of  equality,  which 
wild  democratic  notions  spread  throughout  the  fleets  of  the 
republic,  was  curiously  forestalled  by  that  existing  among  the 
members  of  a  most  haughty  aristocracy.  “  I  saw  by  his 
face,”  says  one  of  Marryatt’s  heroes,  “that  the  first  lieu¬ 
tenant  did  not  agree  with  the  captain ;  but  he  was  too  good 
an  officer  to  say  so  at  such  a  moment.”  The  phrase  ex¬ 
presses  one  of  the  deepest-rooted  merits  of  the  English  sys¬ 
tem,  the  want  of  which  is  owned  by  French  writers :  — 

“  Under  Louis  XVI.  the  intimacy  and  fellowship  existing  be¬ 
tween  the  chief  and  the  subordinate  led  the  latter  to  discuss  the 
orders  which  were  given  him.  .  .  .  The  relaxation  of  discipline  and 
the  spirit  of  independence  were  due  also  to  another  cause  than  that 
pointed  out ;  they  can  be  partly  attributed  to  the  regulation  of  the 
officers’  messes.  Admiral,  captain,  officers,  midshipmen,  ate  together  ; 


FOREIGN  POLICY  OF  CHOISEUL. 


333 


everything  was  in  common.  They  thee-and-thou’d  each  other  like 
chums.  In  handling  the  ship,  the  inferior  gave  his  opinion,  argued, 
and  the  chief,  irritated,  often  preferred  to  yield  rather  than  make 
enemies.  Facts  of  this  kind  are  asserted  by  witnesses  whose  truth¬ 
fulness  is  above  suspicion.”  1 

Insubordination  of  this  character,  to  which  weaker  men 
gave  way,  dashed  in  vain  against  the  resolute  and  fiery  tem¬ 
per  of  Suffren ;  but  the  spirit  of  discontent  rose  almost  to 
the  height  of  mutiny,  causing  him  to  say  in  his  despatches 
to  the  minister  of  the  navy,  after  his  fourth  battle :  “  My 
heart  is  pierced  by  the  most  general  defection.  It  is  frightful 
to  think  that  I  might  four  times  have  destroyed  the  English 
fleet,  and  that  it  still  exists.”  Choiseul’s  reforms  broke 
against  this  rock,  which  only  the  uprising  of  the  whole  na¬ 
tion  finally  removed;  but  in  the  personnel  of  the  crews  a 
great  improvement  was  made.  In  1767  he  reorganized  the 
artillery  of  the  fleet,  forming  a  body  of  ten  thousand  gunners, 
who  were  systematically  drilled  once  a  week  during  the  ten 
years  still  to  intervene  before  the  next  war  with  England. 

Losing  sight  of  no  part  of  his  plans,  Choiseul,  while  pro¬ 
moting  the  naval  and  military  power  of  France,  paid  special 
attention  to  the  alliance  with  Spain  and  judiciously  encouraged 
and  furthered  the  efforts  of  that  country  in  the  path  of  pro¬ 
gress  under  Charles  III.,  the  best  of  her  kings  of  the  Bourbon 
line.  The  Austrian  alliance  still  existing  was  maintained, 
but  his  hopes  were  chiefly  fixed  upon  Spain.  The  wisdom 
and  insight  which  had  at  once  fastened  upon  England  as  the 
centre  of  enmity  to  France  had  been  justified  and  further 
enlightened  by  the  whole  course  of  the  Seven  Years’  War. 
In  Spain  was  the  surest,  and,  with  good  administration,  the 
most  powerful  ally.  The  close  proximity  of  the  two  coun¬ 
tries,  the  relative  positions  of  their  ports,  made  the  naval 
situation  particularly  strong :  and  the  alliance  which  was 
dictated  by  sound  policy,  by  family  ties,  and  by  just  fear  of 
England’s  sea  power,  was  further  assured  to  France  by  recent 
and  still  existing  injuries  that  must  continue  to  rankle  with 

1  Troude  :  Batailles  Navales. 


334 


FRANCE  ACQUIRES  CORSICA. 


Spain.  Gibraltar,  Minorca,  and  Florida  were  still  in  the 
hands  of  England  ;  no  Spaniard  could  be  easy  till  this  re¬ 
proach  was  wiped  out. 

It  may  be  readily  believed,  as  is  asserted  by  French  his¬ 
torians,  that  England  viewed  with  disquietude  the  growth  of 
the  French  navy,  and  would  gladly  have  nipped  it  betimes ; 
but  it  is  more  doubtful  whether  she  would  have  been  willing 
to  force  a  war  for  that  purpose.  During  the  years  succeeding 
the  Peace  of  Paris  a  succession  of  short  ministries,  turning 
mainly  upon  questions  of  internal  policy  or  unimportant 
party  arrangement,  caused  her  foreign  policy  to  present  a 
marked  contrast  to  the  vigorous,  overbearing,  but  straight¬ 
forward  path  followed  by  Pitt.  Internal  commotions,  such 
as  are  apt  to  follow  great  wars,  and  above  all  the  contro¬ 
versy  with  the  North  American  colonies,  which  began  as 
early  as  1765  with  the  well-known  Stamp  Act,  conspired 
with  other  causes  to  stay  the  hand  of  England.  Twice  at 
least  during  the  years  of  Choiseul’s  ministry  there  occurred 
opportunities  which  a  resolute,  ready,  and  not  too  scrupulous 
government  might  easily  have  converted  into  a  cause  of  war ; 
the  more  so  as  they  involved  that  sea  power  which  is  to  Eng¬ 
land  above  all  other  nations  the  object  of  just  and  jealous 
concern.  In  1764  the  Genoese,  weary  of  their  unsuccessful 
attempts  to  control  Corsica,  again  asked  France  to  renew  the 
occupation  of  the  ports  which  had  been  garrisoned  by  her  in 
1756.  The  Corsicans  also  sent  an  ambassador  to  France  in 
order  to  solicit  recognition  of  the  independence  of  the  island, 
in  consideration  of  a  tribute  equivalent  to  that  which  they 
had  formerly  paid  to  Genoa.  The  latter,  feeling  its  inability 
to  reconquer  the  island,  at  length  decided  practically  to  cede 
it.  The  transaction  took  the  shape  of  a  formal  permission 
for  the  King  of  France  to  exercise  all  the  rights  of  sover¬ 
eignty  over  all  the  places  and  harbors  of  Corsica,  as  security 
for  debts  owing  to  him  by  the  republic.  This  cession,  dis¬ 
guised  under  the  form  of  a  security  in  order  to  palliate  the 
aggrandizement  of  France  in  the  eyes  of  Austria  and  Eng¬ 
land,  recalls  the  conditional  and  thinly  veiled  surrender  of 


DISPUTE  ABOUT  FALKLAND  ISLANDS.  335 

Cyprus  to  England  nine  years  ago,  —  a  transfer  likely  to  be 
as  final  and  far-reaching  as  that  of  Corsica.  England  then 
remonstrated  and  talked  angrily  ;  but  though  Burke  said, 
“  Corsica  as  a  province  of  France  is  terrible  to  me,”  only 
one  member  of  the  House  of  Commons,  the  veteran  admiral 
Sir  Charles  Saunders,  was  found  to  say  “  that  it  would  be 
better  to  go  to  war  with  France  than  consent  to  her  taking 
possession  of  Corsica.”1  Having  in  view  the  then  well- 
recognized  interests  of  England  in  the  Mediterranean,  it  is 
evident  that  an  island  so  well  situated  as  Corsica  for  influ¬ 
encing  the  shores  of  Italy  and  checking  the  naval  station  at 
Minorca,  would  not  have  been  allowed  to  go  into  the  hands 
of  a  strong  master,  if  the  nation  had  felt  ready  and  willing 
for  war. 

Again,  in  1770,  a  dispute  arose  between  England  and  Spain 
relative  to  the  possession  of  the  Falkland  Islands.  It  is  not 
material  to  state  the  nature  of  either  claim  to  what  was  then 
but  a  collection  of  barren  islands,  destitute  of  military  as 
well  as  of  natural  advantages.  Both  England  and  Spain 
had  had  a  settlement,  on  which  the  national  colors  were 
flying ;  and  at  the  English  station  a  captain  in  the  navy  com¬ 
manded.  Before  this  settlement,  called  Port  Egmont,  there 
suddenly  appeared,  in  June,  1770,  a  Spanish  expedition,  fitted 
out  in  Buenos  Ayres,  of  five  frigates  and  sixteen  hundred 
soldiers.  To  such  a  force  the  handful  of  Englishmen  could 
make  no  serious  resistance ;  so  after  a  few  shots,  exchanged 
for  the  honor  of  the  flag,  they  capitulated. 

The  news  of  this  transaction,  which  reached  England  in 
the  following  October,  showed  by  its  reception  how  much 
more  serious  is  an  insult  than  an  injury,  and  how  much  more 
bitterly  resented.  The  transfer  of  Corsica  had  scarcely  oc¬ 
casioned  a  stir  outside  the  offices  of  statesmen ;  the  attack 
on  Port  Egmont  roused  the  people  and  Parliament.  The 
minister  to  Madrid  was  ordered  to  demand  the  immediate 
restoration  of  the  islands,  with  a  disavowal  of  the  action  of 
the  officer  who  had  ordered  the  attack.  Without  waiting 

1  Mahon :  History  of  England. 


336 


DEATH  OF  LOUIS  XV. 


for  a  reply,  ships  were  ordered  into  commission,  press-gangs 
swept  the  streets,  and  in  a  short  time  a  powerful  fleet  was 
ready  at  Spithead  to  revenge  the  insult.  Spain,  relying  upon 
the  Bourbon  family  compact  and  the  support  of  France, 
was  disposed  to  stand  firm ;  but  the  old  king,  Louis  XV., 
was  averse  to  war,  and  Choiseul,  among  whose  enemies  at 
court  was  the  last  mistress,  was  dismissed.  With  his  fall 
disappeared  the  hopes  of  Spain,  which  at  once  complied  with 
the  demands  of  England,  reserving,  however,  the  question 
as  to  the  rights  of  sovereignty.  This  conclusion  shows 
clearly  that  England,  though  still  wielding  an  effective  sea 
power  able  to  control  Spain,  was  not  eager  for  a  war  merely 
in  order  to  break  down  the  rival  navies. 

It  is  not  wholly  alien  to  the  question  of  sea  power  to  note, 
without  dwelling  upon  it,  a  great  event  which  now  happened, 
seemingly  utterly  removed  from  all  relation  to  the  sea.  The 
first  partition  of  Poland  between  Prussia,  Russia,  and  Austria, 
carried  out  in  1772,  was  made  easier  by  the  preoccupation 
of  Choiseul  with  his  naval  policy  and  the  Spanish  alliance. 
The  friendship  and  support  of  Poland  and  Turkey,  as  checks 
upon  the  House  of  Austria,  were  part  of  the  tradition  received 
from  Henry  IV.  and  Richelieu  ;  the  destruction  of  the  for¬ 
mer  was  a  direct  blow  to  the  pride  and  interest  of  France. 
What  Choiseul  would  have  done  had  he  been  in  office, 
cannot  be  known ;  but  if  the  result  of  the  Seven  Years’ 
War  had  been  different,  France  might  have  interfered  to 
some  purpose. 

On  the  10th  of  May,  1774,  Louis  XV.  died,  at  the  time  when 
the  troubles  in  the  North  American  colonies  were  fast  com¬ 
ing  to  a  head.  Under  his  youthful  successor,  Louis  XVI., 
the  policy  of  peace  on  the  continent,  of  friendly  alliance  with 
Spain,  and  of  building  up  the  navy  in  numbers  and  efficiency, 
was  continued.  This  was  the  foreign  policy  of  Choiseul, 
directed  against  the  sea  power  of  England  as  the  chief 
enemy,  and  toward  the  sea  power  of  France  as  the  chief 
support,  of  the  nation.  The  instructions  which,  according 
to  a  French  naval  author,  the  new  king  gave  to  his  ministers 


FOREIGN  POLICY  OF  LOUIS  XVI. 


33T 


show  the  spirit  with  which  his  reign  up  to  the  Revolution 
was  inspired,  whether  or  not  they  originated  with  the  king 
himself :  — 

“  To  watch  all  indications  of  approaching  danger ;  to  observe  by 
cruisers  the  approaches  to  our  islands  and  the  entrance  to  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico ;  to  keep  track  of  what  was  passing  on  the  banks  of 
Newfoundland,  and  to  follow  the  tendencies  of  English  commerce ; 
to  observe  in  England  the  state  of  the  troops  and  armaments,  the 
public  credit  and  the  ministry ;  to  meddle  adroitly  in  the  affairs  of 
the  British  colonies ;  to  give  the  insurgent  colonists  the  means  of 
obtaining  supplies  of  war,  while  maintaining  the  strictest  neutrality  ; 
to  develop  actively,  but  noiselessly,  the  navy;  to  repair  our  ships 
of  war ;  to  fill  our  storehouses  and  to  keep  on  hand  the  means  for 
rapidly  equipping  a  fleet  at  Brest  and  at  Toulon,  while  Spain  should 
be  fitting  one  at  Ferrol ;  finally,  at  the  first  serious  fear  of  rupture, 
to  assemble  numerous  troops  upon  the  shores  of  Brittany  and 
Normandy,  and  get  everything  ready  for  an  invasion  of  England, 
so  as  to  force  her  to  concentrate  her  forces,  and  thus  restrict  her 
means  of  resistance  at  the  extremities  of  the  empire.”1 

Such  instructions,  whether  given  all  at  once  as  a  sym¬ 
metrical,  well-thought-out  plan,  or  from  time  to  time,  as 
occasion  arose,  showed  that  an  accurate  forecast  of  the 
situation  had  been  made,  and  breathed  a  conviction  which, 
if  earlier  felt,  would  have  greatly  modified  the  history  of  the 
two  countries.  The  execution  was  less  thorough  than  the 
conception. 

In  the  matter  of  developing  the  navy,  however,  fifteen  years 
of  peace  and  steady  work  showed  good  results.  When  war 
openly  broke  out  in  1778,  France  had  eighty  ships-of-the-linc 
in  good  condition,  and  sixty-seven  thousand  seamen  were 
borne  on  the  rolls  of  the  maritime  conscription.  Spain,  when 
she  entered  the  war  in  1779  as  the  ally  of  France,  had  in 
her  ports  nearly  sixty  ships-of-the-line.  To  this  combination 
England  opposed  a  total  number  of  two  hundred  and  twenty- 
eight  ships  of  all  classes,  of  which  about  one  hundred  and 
fifty  were  of  the  line.  The  apparent  equality  in  material 

1  Lapeyrouse-Bonfils,  vol.  iii.  p.  5. 

22 


338  CHARACTER  OF  THE  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1778. 


which  would  result  from  these  numbers  was  affected,  to  the 
disadvantage  of  England,  by  the  superior  size  and  artillery 
of  the  French  and  Spaniards;  but  on  the  other  hand  her 
strength  was  increased  by  the  unity  of  aim  imparted  by  be¬ 
longing  to  one  nation.  The  allies  were  destined  to  feel  the 
proverbial  weakness  of  naval  coalitions,  as  well  as  the  de¬ 
generate  administration  of  Spain,  and  the  lack  of  habit  —  may 
it  not  even  be  said  without  injustice,  of  aptitude  for  the  sea 
—  of  both  nations.  The  naval  policy  with  which  Louis  XVI. 
began  his  reign  was  kept  up  to  the  end;  in  1791,  two  years 
after  the  assembly  of  the  States-General,  the  French  navy 
numbered  eighty-six  ships-of-the-line,  generally  superior,  both 
in  dimensions  and  model,  to  English  ships  of  the  same  class. 

We  have  come,  therefore,  to  the  beginning  of  a  truly 
maritime  war ;  which,  as  will  be  granted  by  those  who  have 
followed  this  narrative,  had  not  been  seen  since  the  days 
of  De  Ruyter  and  Tourville.  The  magnificence  of  sea  power 
and  its  value  had  perhaps  been  more  clearly  shown  by  the 
uncontrolled  sway,  and  consequent  exaltation,  of  one  bellig¬ 
erent  ;  but  the  lesson  thus  given,  if  more  striking,  is  less 
vividly  interesting  than  the  spectacle  of  that  sea  power 
meeting  a  foe  worthy  of  its  steel,  and  excited  to  exertion 
by  a  strife  which  endangered,  not  only  its  most  valuable 
colonies,  but  even  its  own  shores.  Waged,  from  the  ex¬ 
tended  character  of  the  British  Empire,  in  all  quarters  of  the 
world  at  once,  the  attention  of  the  student  is  called  now  to 
the  East  Indies  and  now  to  the  West;  now  to  the  shores  of 
the  United  States  and  thence  to  those  of  England  ;  from  New 
York  and  Chesapeake  Bay  to  Gibraltar  and  Minorca,  to  the 
Cape  Verde  Islands,  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  and  Ceylon. 
Fleets  now  meet  fleets  of  equal  size,  and  the  general  chase 
and  the  melee ,  which  marked  the  actions  of  Hawke,  Boscawen, 
and  Anson,  though  they  still  occur  at  times,  are  for  the 
most  part  succeeded  by  wary  and  complicated  manoeuvres, 
too  often  barren  of  decisive  results  as  naval  battles,  which 
are  the  prevailing  characteristic  of  this  coming  war.  The 
superior  tactical  science  of  the  French  succeeded  in  impart- 


ORDERS  TO  FRENCH  ADMIRALS. 


339 


ing  to  this  conflict  that  peculiar  feature  of  their  naval  pol¬ 
icy,  which  subordinated  the  control  of  the  sea  by  the 
destruction  of  the  enemy’s  fleets, ^  of  his  organized  naval 
forces,  to  the  success  of  particular  operations,  the  retention 
of  particular  points,  the  carrying  out  of  particular  ulterior 
strategic  ends.  It  is  not  necessary  to  endeavor  to  force  upon 
others  the  conviction  of  the  present  writer  that  such  a  policy, 
however  applicable  as  an  exception,  is  faulty  as  a  rule  ;  but 
it  is  most  desirable  that  all  persons  responsible  for  the  con¬ 
duct  of  naval  affairs  should  recognize  that  the  two  lines  of 
policy,  in  direct  contradiction  to  each  other,  do  exist.  In 
the  one  there  is  a  strict  analogy  to  a  war  of  posts ;  while  in 
the  other  the  objective  is  that  force  whose  destruction  leaves 
the  posts  unsupported  and  therefore  sure  to  fall  in  due  time. 
These  opposing  policies  being  recognized,  consideration  should 
also  be  had  of  the  results  of  the  two  as  exemplified  in  the 
history  of  England  and  France. 

It  was  not,  however,  with  such  cautious  views  that  the 
new  king  at  first  sought  to  impress  his  admirals.  In  the 
instructions  addressed  to  the  Count  d’Orvilliers,  commanding 
the  first  fleet  sent  out  from  Brest,  the  minister,  speaking  in 
the  name  of  the  king,  says  :  — 

“Your  duty  now  is  to  restore  to  the  French  flag  the  lustre  with 
which  it  once  shone ;  past  misfortunes  and  faults  must  be  buried  out 
of  sight ;  only  by  the  most  illustrious  actions  can  the  navy  hope  to 
succeed  in  doing  this.  His  Majesty  has  the  right  to  expect  the 
greatest  efforts  from  his  officers.  .  .  .  Under  whatever  circumstances 
the  king’s  fleet  may  be  placed,  his  Majesty’s  orders,  which  he  ex¬ 
pressly  charges  me  to  impress  upon  you,  as  well  as  upon  all  officers 
in  command,  are  that  his  ships  attack  with  the  greatest  vigor,  and 
defend  themselves,  on  all  occasions,  to  the  last  extremity.” 

More  follows  to  the  same  effect;  upon  which  a  French 
officer,  who  has  not  before  been  quoted  in  connection  with 
this  phase  of  French  naval  policy,  says :  — 

“  How  different  this  language  from  that  held  to  our  admirals 
during  the  last  war ;  fo»*  it  would  be  an  error  to  believe  that  they 


340 


ORDERS  TO  FRENCH  ADMIRALS. 


followed  by  choice  and  temper  the  timid  and  defensive  system  which 
predominated  in  the  tactics  of  the  navy.  The  government,  always 
finding  the  expenses  exacted  by  the  employment  of  the  navy  ex¬ 
cessive,  too  often  prescribed  to  its  admirals  to  keep  the  sea  as  long 
as  possible  without  coming  to  pitched  battles,  or  even  to  brushes, 
generally  very  expensive,  and  from  which  might  follow  the  loss  of 
ships  difficult  to  replace.  Often  they  were  enjoined,  if  driven  to 
accept  action,  carefully  to  avoid  compromising  the  fate  of  their 
squadron  by  too  decisive  encounters.  They  thought  themselves, 
therefore,  obliged  to  retreat  as  soon  as  an  engagement  took  too 
serious  a  turn.  Thus  they  acquired  the  unhappy  habit  of  voluntarily 
yielding  the  field  of  battle  as  soon  as  an  enemy,  even  inferior, 
boldly  disputed  it  with  them.  Thus  to  send  a  fleet  to  meet  the 
enemy,  only  to  retire  shamefully  from  his  presence;  to  receive 
action  instead  of  offering  it ;  to  begin  battles  only  to  end  them  with 
the  semblance  of  defeat ;  to  ruin  moral  force  in  order  to  save  physi¬ 
cal  force,  —  that  was  the  spirit  which,  as  has  been  very  judiciously 
said  by  M.  Charles  Dupin,  guided  the  French  ministry  of  that  epoch. 
The  results  are  known.” 1 

The  brave  words  of  Louis  XYI.  were  followed  almost  im¬ 
mediately  by  others,  of  different  and  qualifying  tenor,  to 
Admiral  d’Orvilliers  before  he  sailed.  He  was  informed  that 
the  king,  having  learned  the  strength  of  the  English  fleet, 
relied  upon  his  prudence  as  to  the  conduct  to  be  followed  at 
a  moment  when  he  had  under  his  orders  all  the  naval  force 
of  which  France  could  dispose.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  two 
fleets  were  nearly  equal ;  it  would  be  impossible  to  decide 
which  was  the  stronger,  without  detailed  information  as  to  the 
armament  of  every  ship.  D’Orvilliers  found  himself,  as  many 
a  responsible  man  has  before,  with  two  sets  of  orders,  on  one 
or  the  other  of  which  he  was  sure  to  be  impaled,  if  unlucky ; 
while  the  government,  in  the  same  event,  was  sure  of  a 
scape-goat. 

The  consideration  of  the  relative  force  of  the  two  navies, 
material  and  moral,  has  necessarily  carried  us  beyond  the  date 
of  the  opening  of  the  American  Revolutionary  War.  Before 

1  Troude,  vol.  ii.  pp.  3-5.  For  other  quotations  from  French  authors  to  th© 
same  effect,  see  ante,  pages  77,  SO,  81. 


MILITARY  SITUATION  IN  AMERICA. 


341 


beginning  with  that  struggle,  it  may  be  well  to  supplement  the 
rough  estimate  of  England’s  total  naval  force,  given,  in  lack 
of  more  precise  information,  by  the  statement  of  the  First 
Lord  of  the  Admiralty  made  in  the  House  of  Lords  in  Novem¬ 
ber,  1777,  a  very  few  months  before  the  war  with  France 
began.  Replying  to  a  complaint  of  the  opposition  as  to  the 
smallness  of  the  Channel  fleet,  he  said  :  — 

“We  have  now  forty-two  ships-of-the-line  in  commission  in  Great 
Britain  (without  counting  those  on  foreign  service),  thirty-five  of 
which  are  completely  manned,  and  ready  for  sea  at  a  moment’s  warn¬ 
ing.  ...  I  do  not  believe  that  either  France  or  Spain  entertains  any 
hostile  disposition  toward  us ;  but  from  what  I  have  now  submitted 
to  you,  I  am  authorized  to  affirm  that  our  navy  is  more  than  a  match 
for  that  of  the  whole  House  of  Bourbon.”  1 

It  must,  however,  be  said  that  this  pleasing  prospect  was 
not  realized  by  Admiral  Keppel  when  appointed  to  command 
in  the  following  March,  and  looking  at  his  fleet  with  (to  use 
his  own  apt  expression)  “  a  seaman’s  eye  ;  ”  2  and  in  June  he 
went  to  sea  with  only  twenty  ships. 

It  is  plainly  undesirable  to  insert  in  a  narrative  of  this 
character  any  account  of  the  political  questions  which  led  to 
the  separation  of  the  United  States  from  the  British  Empire. 
It  has  already  been  remarked  that  the  separation  followed 
upon  a  succession  of  blunders  by  the  English  ministry, — 
not  unnatural  in  view  of  the  ideas  generally  prevalent  at  that 
day  as  to  the  relations  of  colonies  to  the  mother-country.  It 
needed  a  man  of  commanding  genius  to  recognize,  not  only  the 
substantial  justice  of  the  American  claims,  —  many  did  that, 
—  but  also  the  military  strength  of  their  situation,  as  before 
indicated.  This  lay  in  the  distance  of  the  colonies  from  home, 
their  nearness  to  each  other  independently  of  the  command 
of  the  sea,  the  character  of  the  colonists,  —  mainly  of  English 
and  Dutch  stock,  —  and  the  probable  hostility  of  France  and 
Spain.  Unfortunately  for  England,  the  men  most  able  to  cope 
with  the  situation  were  in  the  minority  and  out  of  office. 

1  Mahon  :  History  of  England;  Gentleman’s  Magazine,  1777,  p.  553. 

3  Keppel’s  Defence. 


342 


THE  LINE  OF  THE  HUDSON. 


It  has  been  said  before  that,  bad  the  thirteen  colonies  been 
islands,  the  sea  power  of  Great  Britain  would  have  so  com¬ 
pletely  isolated  them  that  their  fall,  one  after  the  other, 
must  have  ensued.  To  this  it  may  be  added  that  the  narrow¬ 
ness  of  the  strip  then  occupied  by  civilized  man,  and  the  man¬ 
ner  in  which  it  was  intersected  by  estuaries  of  the  sea  and 
navigable  rivers,  practically  reduced  to  the  condition  of  islands, 
so  far  as  mutual  support  went,  great  sections  of  the  insurgent 
country,  which  were  not  large  enough  to  stand  alone,  yet  too 
large  for  their  fall  not  to  have  been  a  fatal  blow  to  the  com¬ 
mon  cause.  The  most  familiar  case  is  that  of  the  line  of  the 
Hudson,  where  the  Bay  of  New  York  was  held  from  the  first 
by  the  British,  who  also  took  the  city  in  September,  1776,  two 
months  after  the  Declaration  of  Independence.  The  difficul¬ 
ties  in  the  way  of  moving  up  and  down  such  a  stream  were 
doubtless  much  greater  to  sailing  vessels  than  they  now  are 
to  steamers  ;  yet  it  seems  impossible  to  doubt  that  active  and 
capable  men  wielding  the  great  sea  power  of  England  could  so 
have  held  that  river  and  Lake  Champlain  with  ships-of-war  at 
intervals  and  accompanying  galleys  as  to  have  supported  a 
sufficient  army  moving  between  the  head-waters  of  the  Hudson 
and  the  lake,  while  themselves  preventing  any  intercourse  by 
water  between  New  England  and  the  States  west  of  the  river. 
This  operation  would  have  closely  resembled  that  by  which  in 
the  Civil  War  the  United  States  fleets  and  armies  gradually  cut 
in  twain  the  Southern  Confederacy  by  mastering  the  course  of 
the  Mississippi,  and  the  political  results  would  have  been  even 
more  important  than  the  military  ;  for  at  that  early  stage  of 
the  war  the  spirit  of  independence  was  far  more  general  and 
Hitter  in  the  section  that  would  have  been  cut  off,  —  in  New 
England,  — than  in  New  York  and  New  Jersey,  perhaps  than 
anywhere  except  in  South  Carolina.1 

1  “  A  candid  view  of  our  affairs,  which  I  am  going  to  exhibit,  will  make  von 
a  judge  of  the  difficulties  under  which  we  labor.  Almost  all  our  supplies  of  flour 
and  no  inconsiderable  part  of  our  meat  are  drawn  from  the  States  westward  of 
Hudson’s  River.  This  renders  a  secure  communication  across  that  river  indis¬ 
pensably  necessary,  both  to  the  support  of  your  squadron  and  the  army.  The 
anemy,  being  masters  of  that  navigation,  would  interrupt  this  essential  intercourse 


HOWE’S  EXPEDITION  TO  PHILADELPHIA.  343 


In  1T7T  the  British  attempted  to  accomplish  this  object 
by  sending  General  Burgoyne  from  Canada  to  force  his  way 
by  Lake  Champlain  to  the  Hudson.  At  the  same  time  Sir 
Henry  Clinton  moved  north  from  New  York  with  three  thou¬ 
sand  men,  and  reached  West  Point,  whence  he  sent  by  ship¬ 
ping  a  part  of  his  force  up  the  river  to  within  forty  miles 
of  Albany.  Here  the  officer  in  command  learned  of  the 
surrender  of  Burgoyne  at  Saratoga,  and  returned  ;  but  what 
he  did  at  the  head  of  a  detachment  from  a  main  body  of 
only  three  thousand,  shows  what  might  have  been  done  under 
a  better  system.  While  this  was  happening  on  the  Hudson, 
the  English  commander-in-chief  of  the  troops  acting  in 
America  had  curiously  enough  made  use  of  the  sea  power 
of  his  nation  to  transport  the  bulk  of  his  army  —  fourteen 
thousand  men  —  from  New  York  to  the  head  of  Chesa¬ 
peake  Bay,  so  as  to  take  Philadelphia  in  the  rear.  This  eccen¬ 
tric  movement  was  successful  as  regarded  its  objective,  Phila¬ 
delphia  ;  but  it  was  determined  by  political  considerations, 
because  Philadelphia  was  the  seat  of  Congress,  and  was  con¬ 
trary  to  sound  military  policy.  The  conquest  therefore  was 
early  lost ;  but  it  was  yet  more  dearly  won,  for  by  this  diver¬ 
sion  of  the  British  forces  the  different  corps  were  placed  out 
of  mutual  support,  and  the  control  of  the  water-line  of  the 
Hudson  was  abandoned.  While  Burgoyne,  with  seven  thou¬ 
sand  regular  troops,  besides  auxiliaries,  was  moving  down  to 
seize  the  head-waters  of  the  river,  fourteen  thousand  men  were 
removed  from  its  mouth  to  the  Chesapeake.  The  eight  thou¬ 
sand  left  in  or  near  New  York  were  consequently  tied  to  the 
city  by  the  presence  of  the  American  army  in  New  Jersey. 
This  disastrous  step  was  taken  in  August ;  in  October  Burgoyne, 
isolated  and  hemmed  in,  surrendered.  In  the  following  May 

between  the  States.  They  have  been  sensible  of  these  advantages.  .  .  .  If  they 
could  by  any  demonstration  in  another  part  draw  our  attention  and  strength  from 
this  important  point,  and  by  anticipating  our  return  possess  themselves  of  it,  the 
consequences  would  be  fatal.  Our  dispositions  must  therefore  have  equal  regard 
to  co-operating  with  you  [at  Boston]  in  a  defensive  plan,  and  securing  the 
North  River,  which  the  remoteness  of  the  two  objects  from  each  other  render* 
peculiarly  difficult.”  —  Washington  to  D’Estaing,  Sept.  11,  1778. 


344 


AMERICAN  PRIVATEERING. 


the  English  evacuated  Philadelphia,  and  after  a  painful  and 
perilous  march  through  New  Jersey,  with  Washington’s  army 
in  close  pursuit,  regained  New  York. 

This  taking  of  the  British  fleet  to  the  head  of  the  Chesa¬ 
peake,  coupled  with  the  ascent  of  the  Potomac  in  1814  by 
English  sailing-frigates,  shows  another  weak  line  in  the  chain 
of  the  American  colonies  ;  but  it  was  not,  like  that  of  the 
Hudson  and  Champlain,  a  line  both  ends  of  which  rested  in 
the  enemy’s  power,  — in  Canada  on  the  one  hand,  on  the  sea 
on  the  other. 

As  to  the  sea  warfare  in  general,  it  is  needless  to  enlarge 
upon  the  fact  that  the  colonists  could  make  no  head  against 
the  fleets  of  Great  Britain,  and  were  consequently  forced  to 
abandon  the  sea  to  them,  resorting  only  to  a  cruising  warfare, 
mainly  by  privateers,  for  which  their  seamanship  and  enter¬ 
prise  well  fitted  them,  and  by  which  they  did  much  injury  to 
English  commerce.  By  the  end  of  1778  the  English  naval 
historian  estimates  that  American  privateers  had  taken  nearly 
a  thousand  merchant-ships,  valued  at  nearly  £2,000,000  ;  he 
claims,  however,  that  the  losses  of  the  Americans  were 
heavier.  They  should  have  been ;  for  the  English  cruisers 
were  both  better  supported  and  individually  more  powerful, 
while  the  extension  of  American  commerce  had  come  to  be 
the  wonder  of  the  statesmen  of  the  mother-country.  When 
the  war  broke  out,  it  was  as  great  as  that  of  England  herself 
at  the  beginning  of  the  century. 

An  interesting  indication  of  the  number  of  the  seafaring 
population  of  North  America  at  that  time  is  given  by  the 
statement  in  Parliament  by  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty, 
“  that  the  navy  had  lost  eighteen  thousand  of  the  seamen  em¬ 
ployed  in  the  last  war  by  not  having  America,”  1  —  no  incon¬ 
siderable  loss  to  a  sea  power,  particularly  if  carried  over  to 
the  ranks  of  the  enemy. 

The  course  of  warfare  on  the  sea  gave  rise,  as  always,  to 
grievances  of  neutrals  against  the  English  for  the  seizures  of 
their  ships  in  the  American  trade.  Such  provocation,  however, 

1  Annual  Register,  1778,  p.  201. 


FRENCH  SUPPORT  OF  THE  AMERICANS.  345 


was  not  necessary  to  excite  the  enmity  and  the  hopes  of  France 
in  the  harassed  state  of  the  British  government.  The  hour  of 
reckoning,  of  vengeance,  at  which  the  policy  of  Choiseul  had 
aimed,  seemed  now  at  hand.  The  question  was  early  enter¬ 
tained  at  Paris  what  attitude  should  be  assumed,  what  advan¬ 
tage  drawn  from  the  revolt  of  the  colonies.  It  was  decided 
that  the  latter  should  receive  all  possible  support  short  of  an 
actual  break  with  England  ;  and  to  this  end  a  Frenchman 
named  Beaumarchais  was  furnished  with  money  to  establish  a 
business  house  which  should  supply  the  colonists  with  warlike 
stores.  France  gave  a  million  francs,  to  which  Spain  added 
an  equal  sum,  and  Beaumarchais  was  allowed  to  buy  from  gov¬ 
ernment  arsenals.  Meanwhile  agents  were  received  from  the 
United  States,  and  French  officers  passed  into  its  service  with 
little  real  hindrance  from  their  government.  Beaumarchais* 
house  was  started  in  17T6;  in  December  of  that  year  Ben¬ 
jamin  Franklin  landed  in  France,  and  in  May,  1777,  Lafayette 
came  to  America.  Meanwhile  the  preparations  for  war,  espe¬ 
cially  for  a  sea  war,  were  pushed  on  ;  the  navy  was  steadily 
increased,  and  arrangements  were  made  for  threatening  an  in 
vasion  from  the  Channel,  while  the  real  scene  of  the  war  was  to 
be  in  the  colonies.  There  France  was  in  the  position  of  a  man 
who  has  little  to  lose.  Already  despoiled  of  Canada,  she  had 
every  reason  to  believe  that  a  renewal  of  war,  with  Europe 
neutral  and  the  Americans  friends  instead  of  enemies,  would 
not  rob  her  of  her  islands.  Recognizing  that  the  Americans, 
who  less  than  twenty  years  before  had  insisted  upon  the  con¬ 
quest  of  Canada,  would  not  consent  to  her  regaining  it,  she 
expressly  stipulated  that  she  would  have  no  such  hopes,  but 
exacted  that  in  the  coming  war  she  should  retain  any  Eng¬ 
lish  West  Indian  possessions  which  she  could  seize.  Spain 
was  differently  situated.  Hating  England,  wanting  to  regain 
Gibraltar,  Minorca,  and  Jamaica,  —  no  mere  jewels  in  her 
crown,  but  foundation-stones  of  her  sea  power,  —  she  never¬ 
theless  saw  that  the  successful  rebellion  of  the  English  colo¬ 
nists  against  the  hitherto  unrivalled  sea  power  of  the  mother- 
country  would  be  a  dangerous  example  to  her  own  enormous 


346  TREATY  BETWEEN  FRANCE  AND  AMERICA. 


colonial  system,  from  which  she  yearly  drew  so  great  sub¬ 
sidies.  If  England  with  her  navy  should  fail,  what  could 
Spain  achieve  ?  In  the  introductory  chapter  it  was  pointed 
out  that  the  income  of  the  Spanish  government  was  drawn, 
not  as  a  light  tax  upon  a  wealthy  sea  power,  built  upon  the 
industry  and  commerce  of  the  kingdom,  but  from  a  narrow 
stream  of  gold  and  silver  trickling  through  a  few  treasure- 
ships  loaded  with  the  spoils  of  colonies  administered  upon  the 
narrowest  system.  Spain  had  much  to  lose,  as  well  as  to 
gain.  It  was  true  still,  as  in  1760,  that  she  was  the  power 
with  which  England  could  war  to  the  greatest  advantage. 
Nevertheless,  existing  injuries  and  dynastic  sympathy  carried 
the  day.  Spain  entered  upon  the  secretly  hostile  course 
pursued  by  France. 

To  this  explosive  condition  of  things  the  news  of  Burgoyne’s 
surrender  acted  as  a  spark.  The  experience  of  former  wars 
had  taught  France  the  worth  of  the  Americans  as  enemies, 
and  she  was  expecting  to  find  in  them  valuable  helpers  in 
her  schemes  of  revenge  ;  now  it  seemed  that  even  alone  they 
might  be  able  to  take  care  of  themselves,  and  reject  any 
alliance.  The  tidings  reached  Europe  on  the  2d  of  December,- 
1777  ;  on  the  16th  the  French  foreign  minister  informed  the 
commissioners  of  Congress  that  the  king  was  ready  to  recog¬ 
nize  the  independence  of  the  United  States,  and  to  make  with 
them  a  commercial  treaty  and  contingent  defensive  alliance. 
The  speed  with  which  the  business  was  done  shows  that 
France  had  made  up  her  mind ;  and  the  treaty,  so  momentous 
in  its  necessary  consequences,  was  signed  on  the  6th  of  Feb¬ 
ruary,  1778. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  give  the  detailed  terms  of  the  treaty ; 
but  it  is  important  to  observe,  first,  that  the  express  renuncia¬ 
tion  of  Canada  and  Nova  Scotia  by  France  foreshadowed  that 
political  theory  which  is  now  known  as  the  Monroe  doctrine, 
the  claims  of  which  can  scarcely  be  made  good  without  an 
adequate  sea-force  ;  and  next,  that  the  alliance  with  France, 
and  subsequently  with  Spain,  brought  to  the  Americans  that 
which  they  above  all  needed,  —  a  sea  power  to  counterbalance 


THE  MILITARY  SITUATION  IN  1778. 


347 


that  of  England.  Will  it  be  too  much  for  American  pride  to 
admit  that,  had  France  refused  to  contest  the  control  of 
the  sea  with  England,  the  latter  would  have  been  able  to 
reduce  the  Atlantic  seaboard  ?  Let  us  not  kick  down  the 
ladder  by  which  we  mounted,  nor  refuse  to  acknowledge  what 
our  fathers  felt  in  their  hour  of  trial. 

Before  going  on  with  the  story  of  this  maritime  war,  the 
military  situation  as  it  existed  in  the  different  parts  of  the 
world  should  be  stated. 

The  three  features  which  cause  it  to  differ  markedly  from 
that  at  the  opening  of  the  Seven  Years’  War,  in  1756,  are  — 
(1)  the  hostile  relation  of  America  to  England ;  (2)  the  early 
appearance  of  Spain  as  the  ally  of  France ;  and  (3)  the  neu¬ 
trality  of  the  other  continental  States,  which  left  France 
without  preoccupation  on  the  land  side. 

On  the  North  American  continent  the  Americans  had  held 
Boston  for  two  years.  Narragansett  Bay  and  Rhode  Island 
were  occupied  by  the  English,  who  also  held  New  York  and 
Philadelphia.  Chesapeake  Bay  and  its  entrance,  being  with¬ 
out  strong  posts,  were  in  the  power  of  any  fleet  that  appeared 
against  them.  In  the  South,  since  the  unsuccessful  attack 
upon  Charlestown  in  1776,  no  movement  of  importance  had 
been  made  by  the  English  ;  up  to  the  declaration  of  war  by 
France  the  chief  events  of  the  war  had  been  north  of  the 
Chesapeake  (of  Baltimore).  In  Canada,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  Americans  had  failed,  and  it  remained  to  the  end  a  firm 
base  to  the  English  power. 

In  Europe  the  most  significant  element  to  be  noted  is  the 
state  of  preparedness  of  the  French  navy,  and  to  some  extent 
of  the  Spanish,  as  compared  with  previous  wars.  England 
stood  wholly  on  the  defensive,  and  without  allies ;  while  the 
Bourbon  kings  aimed  at  the  conquest  of  Gibraltar  and  Port 
Mahon,  and  the  invasion  of  England.  The  first  two,  however, 
were  the  dear  objects  of  Spain,  the  last  of  France  ;  and  this 
divergence  of  aims  was  fatal  to  the  success  of  this  maritime 
coalition.  In  the  introductory  chapter  allusion  was  made  to 
the  strategic  question  raised  by  these  two  policies. 


348  MILITARY  SITUATION  IN  THE  WEST  INDIES. 


In  the  West  Indies  the  grip  of  the  two  combatants  on 
the  land  was  in  fact  about  equal,  though  it  should  not 
have  been  so.  Both  France  and  England  were  strongly 
posted  in  the  Windward  Islands,  —  the  one  at  Martinique,, 
the  other  at  Barbadoes.  It  must  be  noted  that  the  posi¬ 
tion  of  the  latter,  to  windward  of  all  others  of  the  group, 
was  a  decided  strategic  advantage  in  the  days  of  sail.  As  it 
happened,  the  fighting  was  pretty  nearly  confined  to  the 
neighborhood  of  the  Lesser  Antilles.  Here,  at  the  opening 
of  the  struggle,  the  English  island  of  Dominica  lay  between 
the  French  Martinique  and  Guadeloupe ;  it  was  therefore 
coveted  and  seized.  Next  south  of  Martinique  lay  Sta. 
Lucia,  a  French  colony.  Its  strong  harbor  on  the  lee 
side,  known  as  Gros  Ilot  Bay,  was  a  capital  place  from 
which  to  watch  the  proceedings  of  the  French  navy  in  Fort 
Royal,  Martinique.  The  English  captured  the  island,  and 
from  that  safe  anchorage  Rodney  watched  and  pursued  the 
French  fleet  before  his  famous  action  in  1782.  The  islands 
to  the  southward  were  of  inferior  military  consequence.  In 
the  greater  islands,  Spain  should  have  outweighed  England, 
holding  as  she  did  Cuba,  Porto  Rico,  and,  with  France,  Hayti, 
as  against  Jamaica  alone.  Spain,  however,  counted  here  for 
nothing  but  a  dead- weight ;  and  England  had  elsewhere  too 
much  on  her  hands  to  attack  her.  The  only  point  in  America 
where  the  Spanish  arms  made  themselves  felt  was  in  the 
great  region  east  of  the  Mississippi,  then  known  as  Florida, 
which,  though  at  that  time  an  English  possession,  did  not 
join  the  revolt  of  the  colonies. 

In  the  East  Indies  it  will  be  remembered  that  France  had 
received  back  her  stations  at  the  peace  of  1768 ;  but  the  politi¬ 
cal  predominance  of  the  English  in  Bengal  was  not  offset  by 
similar  control  of  the  French  in  any  part  of  the  peninsula. 
During  the  ensuing  years  the  English  had  extended  and 
strengthened  their  power,  favored  in  so  doing  by  the  charac¬ 
ter  of  their  chief  representatives,  Clive  and  Warren  Hastings. 
Powerful  native  enemies  had,  however,  risen  against  them  in 
the  south  of  the  peninsula,  both  on  the  east  and  west,  afford* 


EVENTS  IN  INDIA. 


349 


ing  an  excellent  opportunity  for  France  to  regain  her  influence 
when  the  war  broke  out ;  but  her  government  and  people 
remained  blind  to  the  possibilities  of  that  vast  region.  Not 
so  England.  The  very  day  the  news  of  the  outbreak  of  war 
reached  Calcutta,  July  7, 1778,  Hastings  sent  orders  to  the 
governor  of  Madras  to  attack  Pondicherry,  and  set  the  example 
by  seizing  Chandernagore.  The  naval  force  of  each  nation 
was  insignificant ;  but  the  French  commodore,  after  a  brief 
action,  forsook  Pondicherry,  which  surrendered  after  a  siege 
by  land  and  sea  of  seventy  days.  The  following  March,  1779, 
Mah£,  the  last  French  settlement,  fell,  and  the  French  flag 
again  disappeared  ;  while  at  the  same  time  there  arrived  a 
strong  English  squadron  of  six  ships-of-th e-line  under  Admiral 
Hughes.  The  absence  of  any  similar  French  force  gave  the 
entire  control  of  the  sea  to  the  English  until  the  arrival  of 
Suffren,  nearly  three  years  later.  In  the  mean  while  Holland 
had  been  drawn  into  the  war,  and  her  stations,  Negapatam  on 
the  Coromandel  coast,  and  the  very  important  harbor  of  Trin- 
comalee  in  Ceylon,  were  both  captured,  the  latter  in  January, 
1782,  by  the  joint  forces  of  the  army  and  navy.  The  success¬ 
ful  accomplishment  of  these  two  enterprises  completed  the 
military  situation  in  Hindostan  at  the  time  when  the  arrival 
of  Suffren,  just  one  month  later,  turned  the  nominal  war  into 
a  desperate  and  bloody  contest.  Suffren  found  himself  with 
a  decidedly  stronger  squadron,  but  without  a  port,  either 
French  or  allied,  on  which  to  base  his  operations  against 
the  English. 

Of  these  four  chief  theatres  of  the  war,  two,  North  America 
and  the  West  Indies,  as  might  be  expected  from  their  near¬ 
ness,  blend  and  directly  affect  each  other.  This  is  not  so 
obviously  the  case  with  the  struggles  in  Europe  and  India. 
The  narrative  therefore-  naturally  falls  into  three  principal 
divisions,  which  may  to  some  extent  be  treated  separately. 
After  such  separate  consideration  their  mutual  influence  will 
be  pointed  out,  together  with  any  useful  lessons  to  be  gathered 
from  the  goodness  or  badness,  the  success  or  failure,  of  the 
grand  combinations,  and  from  the  part  played  by  sea  power. 


350 


OUTBREAK  OF  WAR ,  1778. 


On  the  13th  of  March,  1778,  the  French  ambassador  at 
London  notified  the  English  government  that  France  had 
acknowledged  the  independence  of  the  United  States,  and 
made  with  them  a  treaty  of  commerce  and  defensive  alliance. 
England  at  once  recalled  her  ambassador ;  but  though  war 
was  imminent  and  England  at  disadvantage,  the  Spanish  king 
offered  mediation,  and  France  wrongly  delayed  to  strike.  In 
June,  Admiral  Keppel  sailed  from  Portsmouth,  with  twenty 
ships,  on  a  cruise.  Falling  in  with  two  French  frigates,  his 
guns,  to  bring  them  to,  opened  the  war.  Finding  from  their 
papers  that  thirty-two  French  ships  lay  in  Brest,  he  at  once 
returned  for  reinforcements.  Sailing  again  with  thirty  ships, 
he  fell  in  with  the  French  fleet  under  D’Orvilliers  to  the  west¬ 
ward  of  Ushant,  and  to  windward,  with  a  westerly  wind.  On 
the  27th  of  July  was  fought  the  first  fleet  action  of  the  war, 
generally  known  as  the  battle  of  Ushant.  v 

This  battle,  in  which  thirty  ships-of-the-line  fought  on  either 
side,  was  wholly  indecisive  in  its  results.  No  ship  was  taken 
or  sunk ;  both  fleets,  after  separating,  returned  to  their  re¬ 
spective  ports.  The  action  nevertheless  obtained  great  celeb¬ 
rity  in  England  from  the  public  indignation  at  its  lack  of 
result,  and  from  the  storm  of  naval  and  political  controversy 
which  followed.  The  admiral  and  the  officer  third  in  command 
belonged  to  different  political  parties  ;  they  made  charges, 
one  against  the  other,  and  in  the  following  courts-martial 
all  England  divided,  chiefly  on  party  lines.  Public  and  naval 
sentiment  generally  favored  the  commander-in-chief,  Keppel. 

Tactically,  the  battle  presents  some  interesting  features,  and 
involves  one  issue  which  is  still  living  to-day.  Keppel  was 
to  leeward  and  wished  to  force  an  action  ;  in  order  to  do  this 
he  signalled  a  general  chase  to  windward,  so  that  his  fastest 
ships  might  overtake  the  slower  ones  of  the  enemy.  Granting 
equal  original  fleet-speed,  this  was  quite  correct.  D’Orvilliers, 
to  windward,  had  no  intention  of  fighting  except  on  his  own 
terms.  As  will  generally  be  the  case,  the  fleet  acting  on  the 
offensive  obtained  its  wish.  At  daybreak  of  the  27th  both 
fleets  were  on  the  port  tack,  heading  west-northwest,  with  a 


' 


BATTLE  OF  USHANT. 


351 


steady  breeze  at  southwest  (Plate  IX.,  A,  A,  A).1  The  Engl¬ 
ish  rear  (R)  had  fallen  to  leeward,2  and  Keppel  consequently 
made  signal  to  six  of  its  ships  to  chase  to  windward,  so  as  to 
place  them  in  a  better  position  to  support  the  main  body  if 
it  could  get  into  action.  D’Orvilliers  observed  this  movement, 
and  construed  it  to  show  an  intention  to  attack  his  rear  with 
a  superior  force.  The  two  fleets  being  then  from  six  to  eight 
miles  apart,  he  wore  his  fleet  in  succession  (French  A  to  B), 
by  which  he  lost  ground  to  leeward,  but  approached  the  enemy, 
and  was  able  to  see  them  better  (Positions  B,  B,  B).  At 
the  completion  of  this  evolution  the  wind  hauled  to  the  south¬ 
ward,  favoring  the  English ;  so  Keppel,  instead  of  going 
about,  stood  on  for  half  an  hour  more  (English  B  to  C),  and 
then  tacked  together  in  wake  of  the  French.  This  con¬ 
firmed  D’Orvilliers’  suspicions,  and  as  the  wind,  which  cer¬ 
tainly  favored  the  English  that  morning,  now  hauled  back 
again  to  the  westward,  permitting  them  to  lay  up  for  the 
French  rear,  he  wore  his  fleet  together  (B  to  C),  thus  bring¬ 
ing  the  rest  to  aid  the  rear,  now  become  the  van,  and  pre¬ 
senting  Keppel  from  concentrating  on  or  penetrating  it. 
The  two  fleets  thus  passed  on  opposite  tacks  (C),3  exchanging 
ineffective  broadsides,  the  French  running  free  to  windward 
and  having  the  power  to  attack,  but  not  using  it.  D’Orvilliers 
then  made  the  signal  for  his  van,  formerly  the  rear,  to  wear 
to  leeward  of  the  English  rear,  which  was  to  leeward  of  its 


1  In  this  plate  the  plan  followed  in  every  other  instance,  of  showing  only  the 
characteristic  phases  of  a  battle,  in  succession,  but  disconnected,  has  been  aban¬ 
doned,  and  the  attempt  is  to  indicate  continuously  the  series  of  manoeuvres  and 
the  tracks  by  which  the  fleets  at  last  came  into  contact  (from  A  to  C).  As  the 
battle  consisted  merely  in  the  passage  by  each  other  of  two  fleets,  moving  in 
opposite  parallel  directions,  an  encounter  always  indecisive  and  futile,  the 
previous  manoeuvres  constitute  the  chief  interest  in  an  affair  whose  historical 
importance  is  due  to  other  than  tactical  reasons. 

2  The  line  drawn  through  the  centre  of  the  English  fleet  at  A  shows  the 
close-hauled  line  (south-southeast)  on  which,  by  strict  tactical  requirement,  the 
English  ships  should  have  borne  from  each  other. 

3  The  leading  ships  of  the  two  fleets  diverged  from  each  other  (C),  which  is, 
by  the  French,  attributed  to  the  English  van  keeping  away  ;  by  the  English  it  is 
said  that  the  French  van  luffed.  The  latter  account  is  followed  in  the  diagrams. 


352 


BATTLE  OF  USHANT. 


own  main  body,  intending  himself  to  remain  to  windward  and 
so  attack  it  on  both  sides  ;  but  the  commander  of  that  division, 
a  prince  of  the  blood  royal,  did  not  obey,  and  the  possible  ad¬ 
vantage  was  lost.  On  the  English  side  the  same  manoeuvre 
was  attempted.  The  admiral  of  the  van  and  some  of  his  ships 
tacked,  as  soon  as  out  of  fire  (D),1  and  stood  after  the  French 
rear ;  but  for  the  most  part  the  damage  to  rigging  prevented 
tacking,  and  wearing  was  impossible  on  account  of  the  ships 
coming  up  behind.  The  French  now  stood  to  leeward  and 
formed  line  again,  but  the  English  were  not  in  condition  to 
attack.  This  was  the  end  of  the  battle. 

It  has  been  said  that  there  are  some  interesting  points  about 
this  resultless  engagement.  One  is,  that  Keppel’s  conduct 
was  approved  throughout,  on  oath  before  the  court-martial,  by 
one  of  the  most  distinguished  admirals  England  has  brought 
forth,  Sir  John  Jervis,  who  commanded  a  ship  in  the  fleet. 
It  does  not  indeed  appear  what  he  could  have  done  more  ;  but 
his  lack  of  tactical  understanding  is  shown  by  a  curious  re¬ 
mark  in  his  defence.  “  If  the  French  admiral  really  meant 
to  come  to  action,”  says  he,  “  I  apprehend  he  would  never 
have  put  his  fleet  on  the  contrary  tack  to  that  on  which 
the  British  fleet  was  approaching.”  This  remark  can  only 
proceed  from  ignorance  or  thoughtlessness  of  the  danger  to 
which  the  rear  of  the  French  fleet  would  have  been  exposed, 
and  is  the  more  curious  as  he  himself  had  said  the  English 
were  lying  up  for  it.  Keppel’s  idea  seems  to  have  been  that 
the  French  should  have  waited  for  him  to  come  up  abreast, 
and  then  go  at  it,  ship  for  ship,  in  what  was  to  him  the  good 
old  style  ;  D’Orvilliers  was  too  highly  trained  to  be  capable 
of  such  action. 

The  failure  of  the  Due  de  Chartres,2  commanding  the 
French  van  during  the  firing,  to  wear  in  obedience  to  orders, 

1  The  position  D,  separated  from  the  rest  of  the  plan,  shows  the  end  of  the 
passage  by,  which  began  at  C.  It  could  not  be  shown  in  connection  with  the 
other  tracks  without  producing  confusion. 

2  Afterward  Due  d’Orleans ;  the  Philippe  ifegalite  of  the  French  Revolution, 
and  father  of  Louis  Philippe. 


POSITION  OF  AN  ADMIRAL  IN  BATTLE . 


353 


whether  due  to  misunderstanding  or  misconduct,  raises  the 
question,  which  is  still  debated,  as  to  the  proper  position  for 
a  naval  commander-in-chief  in  action.  Had  D’Orvilliers  been 
in  the  van,  he  could  have  insured  the  evolution  he  wished. 
From  the  centre  the  admiral  has  the  extremities  of  his  fleet 
equally  visible,  or  invisible,  as  it  may  be.  At  the  head  he 
enforces  his  orders  by  his  example.  The  French  toward  the 
end  of  this  war  solved  the  question  by  taking  him  out  of 
the  line  altogether  and  putting  him  on  board  a  frigate,  for 
the  avowed  reasons  that  he  could  thus  better  see  the  move¬ 
ments  of  his  fleet  and  of  the  enemy  without  being  blinded 
by  smoke  or  distracted  by  the  occurrences  on  board  his  own 
ship,  and  that  his  signals  could  be  better  seen.1  This  posi¬ 
tion,  resembling  somewhat  that  of  a  general  on  shore,  being 
remote  from  personal  risk,  was  also  assumed  by  Lord  Howe 
in  1778  ;  but  both  that  officer  and  the  French  abandoned 
the  practice  later.  Nelson  at  Trafalgar,  the  end  of  his 
career,  led  his  column  ;  but-  it  may  be  doubted  whether  he 
had  any  other  motive  than  his  ardor  for  battle.  The  two 
other  great  attacks  in  which  he  commanded  in  chief  were 
directed  against  ships  at  anchor,  and  in  neither  did  he  take 
the  head  of  the  column  ;  for  the  good  reason  that,  his  knowl¬ 
edge  of  the  ground  being  imperfect,  the  leading  ship  was  in 
most  danger  of  grounding.  The  common  practice  in  the  days 
of  broadside  sailing-ships,  except  when  a  general  chase  was 
ordered,  was  for  the  admiral  to  be  in  the  line,  and  in  the 
centre  of  it.  The  departure  from  this  custom  on  the  part  of 
both  Nelson  and  Collingwood,  each  of  whom  led  his  own 
columns  at  Trafalgar,  may  have  had  some  reason,  and  an 
ordinary  man  rather  shrinks  from  criticising  the  action  of 
officers  of  their  eminence.  The  danger  to  which  were  exposed 
the  two  senior  officers  of  the  fleet,  upon  whom  so  much  de¬ 
pended,  is  obvious ;  and  had  any  serious  injury  befallen  their 
persons,  or  the  head  of  their  columns,  the  lack  of  their  influ¬ 
ence  would  have  been  seriously  felt.  As  it  was,  they  were 

1  The  capture  of  the  French  commander-in-chief  on  board  his  flag-ship,  in  the 
battle  of  April  12,  1782,  was  also  a  motive  for  this  new  order. 

23 


354 


POSITION  OF  A  NAVAL 


speedily  obliterated,  as  admirals,  in  the  smoke  of  the  battle, 
leaving  to  those  who  came  after  them  no  guidance  or  control 
except  the  brilliancy  of  their  courage  and  example.  A  French 
admiral  has  pointed  out  that  the  practical  effect  of  the  mode 
of  attack  at  Trafalgar,  two  columns  bearing  down  upon  a 
line  at  right  angles  to  them,  was  to  sacrifice  the  head  of  the 
columns  in  making  two  breaches  in  the  enemy’s  line.  So  far, 
very  well ;  the  sacrifice  was  well  worth  while  ;  and  into  these 
breaches  came  up  the  rear  ships  of  each  column,  nearly  fresh, 
forming  in  fact  a  reserve  which  fell  upon  the  shattered  ships 
of  the  enemy  on  either  side  of  the  breaks.  Now  this  idea  of 
a  reserve  prompts  a  thought  as  to  the  commander-in-chief. 
The  size  of  his  ship  was  such  as  precluded  its  being  out  of 
the  order  ;  but  would  it  not  have  been  well  had  the  admiral  of 
each  column  been  with  this  reserve,  keeping  in  his  hands  the 
power  of  directing  it  according  to  the  chances  of  the  action, 
making  him  a  reality  as  well  as  a  name  for  some  time  longer, 
and  to  a  very  useful  purpose  ?  The  difficulty  of  arranging  any 
system  of  signals  or  light  despatch-boats  which  could  take 
the  place  of  the  aids  or  messengers  of  a  general,  coupled  with 
the  fact  that  ships  cannot  stand  still,  as  divisions  of  men  do, 
waiting  orders,  but  that  they  must  have  steerage-way,  precludes 
the  idea  of  putting  an  admiral  of  a  fleet  under  way  in  a  light 
vessel.  By  so  doing  he  becomes  simply  a  spectator ;  whereas 
by  being  in  the  most  powerful  ship  of  the  fleet  he  retains  the 
utmost  weight  possible  after  action  is  once  engaged,  and,  if 
this  ship  be  in  the  reserve,  the  admiral  keeps  to  the  latest 
possible  moment  the  power  of  commander-in-chief  in  his  own 
hands.  “  Half  a  loaf  is  better  than  no  bread  ;  ”  if  the  admiral 
cannot,  from  the  conditions  of  sea  warfare,  occupy  the  calmly 
watchful  position  of  his  brother  on  shore,  let  there  be  secured 
for  him  as  much  as  may  be.  The  practice  of  Farragut  after 
New  Orleans  and  Vicksburg,  that  is  to  say,  in  the  latter  part 
of  his  career,  when  it  may  be  believed  experience  had  deter¬ 
mined  his  views,  was  to  lead  in  person.  It  is  known  that  he 
very  reluctantly,  at  the  solicitation  of  various  officers,  yielded 
his  convictions  in  this  matter  at  Mobile  so  far  as  to  take  the 


COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  IN  BATTLE. 


355 


second  place,  and  afterward  freely  expressed  his  regrets  for 
having  done  so.  It  may,  however,  be  argued  that  the  char¬ 
acter  of  all  the  actions  in  which  Farragut  commanded  had 
a  peculiarity,  differentiating  them  from  battles  in  the  strict 
sense  of  the  word.  At  New  Orleans,  at  Vicksburg,  at  Port 
Hudson,  and  at  Mobile,  the  task  was  not  to  engage,  but  to 
pass  fortifications  which  the  fleet  confessedly  could  not  stand 
up  to  ;  and  the  passage  was  to  be  made  under  conditions 
mainly  of  pilotage  upon  ground  as  to  which,  unlike  Nelson, 
he  had  good  knowledge.  There  was  thus  imposed  upon 
the  commander-in-chief  the  duty  of  leadership  in  the  literal, 
as  well  as  the  military,  sense  of  the  term.  So  leading,  he 
not  only  pointed  out  to  the  fleet  the  safe  road,  but,  drawing 
continually  ahead  of  the  smoke,  was  better  able  to  see  and 
judge  the  path  ahead,  and  to  assume  the  responsibility  of  a 
course  which  he  may  have  prescribed  and  intended  through¬ 
out,  but  from  which  a  subordinate  might  shrink.  It  has 
not  perhaps  been  commonly  noted,  that  at  Mobile  the  lead¬ 
ers,  not  only  of  one  but  of  both  columns,  at  the  critical 
point  of  the  road  hesitated  and  doubted  as  to  the  admiral’s 
purpose  ;  not  that  they  had  not  received  it  clearly,  but  because 
circumstances  seemed  to  them  to  be  different  from  what  he 
had  supposed.  Not  only  Alden  in  the  “  Brooklyn,”  but  Craven 
also  in  the  “  Tecumseh,”  departed  from  the  admiral’s  orders 
and  left  the  course  dictated  to  them,  with  disastrous  results. 
There  is  no  necessity  to  condemn  either  captain  ;  but  the 
irresistible  inference  is  that  Farragut  was  unqualifiedly  right 
in  his  opinion  that  the  man  who  alone  has  the  highest  re¬ 
sponsibility  should,  under  the  conditions  of  his  battles,  be 
in  the  front.  And  here  it  must  be  remarked  that  at  such 
critical  moments  of  doubt  any  but  the  highest  order  of  mind 
tends  to  throw  off  the  responsibility  of  decision  upon  the 
superior,  though  from  the  instancy  of  the  case  hesitation 
or  delay  may  be  fatal.  A  man  who  as  the  commissioned 
chief  would  act  intelligently,  as  the  mere  subordinate  will 
balk.  Nelson’s  action  at  St.  Vincent  will  rarely  be  emulated, 
a  truth  which  is  strongly  shown  by  the  fact  that  Collingwood 


356 


POSITION  OF  A  NAVAL 


was  immediately  in  his  rear  that  day,  and  did  not  imitate 
his  action  till  signalled  by  the  commander-in-chief ;  yet  after 
receiving  the  authority  of  the  signal,  he  particularly  distin¬ 
guished  himself  by  his  judgment  and  daring.1  It  will  be 
recalled,  also,  in  connection  with  this  question  of  pilot-ground 
battles,  that  a  central  position  nearly  lost  the  flag-ship  at  New 
Orleans,  owing  to  the  darkness  and  to  the  smoke  from  the  pre¬ 
ceding  ships  ;  the  United  States  fleet  came  near  finding  itself 
without  its  leader  after  the  passage  of  the  forts.  Now  as  the 
mention  of  a  reserve  prompted  one  set  of  considerations, 
so  the  name  of  pilotage  suggests  certain  ideas,  broader  than 
itself,  which  modify  what  lias  been  said  of  keeping  the  ad¬ 
miral  with  the  reserve.  The  ease  and  quickness  with  which 
a  steam  fleet  can  change  its  formation  make  it  very  probable 
that  a  fleet  bearing  down  to  attack  may  find  itself,  almost 
at  the  very  moment  of  collision,  threatened  with  some  un¬ 
looked-for  combination  ;  then  where  would  be  the  happiest 
position  for  an  admiral  ?  Doubtless  in  that  part  of  his  own 

1  The  following  incident,  occurring  during  Rodney’s  chase  of  De  Grasse,  in 
April,  1782,  shows  how  far  subordination  may  be  carried.  Hood  was  one  of  the 
finest  of  the  British  officers ;  nor  does  the  author  undertake  to  criticise  his 
action.  He  was  some  miles  from  Rodney  at  the  time.  “  The  separated  French 
ship  in  the  N.W.,  having  got  the  breeze  at  the  same  time  as  our  van  division> 
boldly  stood  for  and  endeavored  to  weather  the  British  advanced  ships ;  that 
being  the  only  way  to  regain  her  own  fleet,  then  to  windward.  To  such  a 
length  did  she  carry  her  audacity  that  she  compelled  the  Alfred,  the  head¬ 
most  ship  of  Sir  Samuel  Hood’s  division,  to  bear  up  in  order  to  allow  her  to 
pass.  Every  eye  was  fixed  upon  the  bold  Frenchman,  excepting  those  who 
were  anxiously  looking  out  on  the  commander-in-chief  to  make  the  signal  to 
engage,  but  who,  most  likely  from  not  supposing  it  could  be  an  enemy,  did  not 
throw  out  the  ardently  looked-for  signal,  and  therefore  not  a  gun  was  fired. 
This  is  mentioned  to  show  the  state  of  discipline  on  board  the  ships  composing 
Sir  Samuel  Hood’s  division,  and  that  he,  though  second  in  command,  would 
not  fire  a  single  shot  until  directed  to  do  so  by  his  commander-in-chief.  ‘  It 
is  more  than  probable  that  Sir  S.  Hood’s  reason  for  having  waited  for  the 
signal  to  engage  from  his  commander-in-chief,  ere  he  would  fire,  arose  from 
the  supposition  that  had  he  been  the  occasion  of  prematurely  bringing  on  an 
action  under  the  above  circumstances,  he  would  have  been  responsible  for  the 
results.’  ”  (White’s  Naval  Researches,  p.  97.) 

Hood  may  have  been  influenced  by  Rodney’s  bearing  toward  inferiors  whose 
initiative  displeased  him.  The  relations  of  the  two  seem  to  have  been  strained. 


COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  IN  BATTLE. 


357 


order  where  he  could  most  readily  pilot  his  ships  into  the 
new  disposition,  or  direction,  by  which  he  would  meet  the 
changed  conditions  ;  that  isr  in  the  position  of  leading.  It 
would  seem  that  there  are  always  two  moments  of  greatest 
importance  in  a  sea-fight ;  one  which  determines  the  method 
of  the  main  attack,  the  other  the  bringing  up  and  directing 
the  effort  of  the  reserve.  If  the  first  is  more  important,  the 
second  perhaps  requires  the  higher  order  of  ability ;  for  the 
former  may  and  should  proceed  on  a  before-determined  plan, 
while  the  latter  may,  and  often  must,  be  shaped  to  meet  unfore¬ 
seen  exigencies.  The  conditions  of  sea-battles  of  the  future 
contain  one  element  that  land  battles  cannot  have,  —  the  ex¬ 
treme  rapidity  with  which  encounters  and  changes  of  order 
can  take  place.  However  troops  may  be  moved  by  steam 
to  the  field  of  battle,  they  will  there  fight  on  foot  or  on  horse¬ 
back,  and  with  a  gradual  development  of  their  plan,  which 
will  allow  the  commander-in-chief  time  to  make  his  wishes 
known  (as  a  rule,  of  course),  in  case  of  a  change  in  the 
enemy’s  attack.  On  the  other  hand,  a  fleet,  comparatively 
small  in  numbers  and  with  its  component  units  clearly  de¬ 
fined,  may  be  meditating  an  important  change  of  which  no 
sign  can  appear  until  it  begins,  and  which  will  occupy  but 
a  few  minutes.  So  far  as  these  remarks  are  sound,  they 
show  the  need  of  a  second  in  command  thoroughly  conver¬ 
sant  with  not  only  the  plans,  but  with  the  leading  principles  of 
action  of  his  chief,  —  a  need  plain  enough  from  the  fact  that 
the  two  extremities  of  the  order-of-battle  may  be  necessarily 
remote,  and  that  you  want  the  spirit  of  the  leader  at  both  ex¬ 
tremities.  As  he  cannot  be  there  in  person,  the  best  thing  is 
to  have  an  efficient  second  at  one  end.  As  regards  Nelson’s 
position  at  Trafalgar,  mentioned  at  the  beginning  of  this  dis¬ 
cussion,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the  u  Victory  ”  did  nothing  that 
another  ship  could  not  have  done  as  well,  and  that  the  light¬ 
ness  of  the  wind  forbade  the  expectation  of  any  sudden  change 
in  the  enemy’s  order.  The  enormous  risk  run  by  the  person 
of  the  admiral,  on  whose  ship  was  concentrated  the  fire  of 
the  enemy’s  line,  and  which  led  several  captains  to  implore 


358 


NELSON  AND  COLLINGWOOD. 


a  change,  was  condemned  long  before  by  Nelson  himself  in 
one  of  his  letters  after  the  battle  of  the  Nile :  — 

“  I  think,  if  it  had  pleased  God  I  had  not  been  wounded,  not  a  boat 
would  have  escaped  to  have  told  the  tale ;  but  do  not  believe  that  any 
individual  in  the  fleet  is  to  blame.  ...  I  only  mean  to  say  that  if  my 
experience  could  in  person  have  directed  those  individuals,  there  was 
every  appearance  that  Almighty  God  would  have  continued  to  bless 
my  endeavors,”  etc.1 

Yet,  notwithstanding  such  an  expression  of  opinion  based 
upon  experience,  he  took  the  most  exposed  position  at  Trafal¬ 
gar,  and  upon  the  loss  of  the  leader  there  followed  a  curious 
exemplification  of  its  effects.  Collingwood  at  once,  rightly  or 
wrongly,  avoidably  or  unavoidably,  reversed  Nelson’s  plans, 
urged  with  his  last  breath.  u  Anchor. !  Hardy,  do  you 
anchor !  ”  said  the  dying  chief.  “  Anchor  !  ”  said  Colling¬ 
wood.  “  It  is  the  last  thing  I  should  have  thought  of.” 

1  Sir  N.  H.  Nicholas :  Despatches  and  Letters  of  Lord  Nelson. 


CHAPTER  X. 


Maritime  War  in  North  America  and  West  Indies,  1778-1781. 
—  Its  Influence  upon  the  course  of  the  American  Revo¬ 
lution.  —  Fleet  Actions  off  Grenada,  Dominica,  and  Chesa¬ 
peake  Bay. 

ON  the  15th  of  April,  1778,  Admiral  Comte  d’Estaing 
sailed  from  Toulon  for  the  American  continent,  having 
under  his  command  twelve  ships-of-the-line  and  five  frigates. 
With  him  went  as  a  passenger  a  minister  accredited  to  Con¬ 
gress,  who  was  instructed  to  decline  all  requests  for  subsidies, 
and  to  avoid  explicit  engagements  relative  to  the  conquest  of 
Canada  and  other  British  possessions.  “  The  Cabinet  of  Ver¬ 
sailles, ”  says  a  French  historian,  “  was  not  sorry  for  the 
United  States  to  have  near  them  a  cause  of  anxiety,  which 
would  make  them  feel  the  value  of  the  French  alliance.”  1 
While  acknowledging  the  generous  sympathy  of  many  French¬ 
men  for  their  struggle,  Americans  need  not  blind  themselves 
to  the  self-interestedness  of  the  French  government.  Neither 
should  they  find  fault ;  for  its  duty  was  to  consider  French 
interests,  first. 

TVEatfling’fl  progress  was  very  slow.  It  is  said  that  he 
wasted  much  i|ime  in  drills,  and  even  uselessly.  However 
that  may  be,  he  did  not  reach  his  destination the  Capes  of 
the^Dgiaiyare,  until  the  8th  of  July,  —  making  a  passage  of 
twelve  weeks,  four  of  which  were  spent  in  reaching  the  At¬ 
lantic.  The  English  government  had  news  of  his  intended 
sailing ;  and  in  fact,  as  soon  as  they  recalled  their  ambas¬ 
sador  at  Paris,  orders  were  sent  to  America  to  evacuate  Phila¬ 
delphia,  and  concentrate  upon  New  York.  Fortunately  for 

1  Martin  :  History  of  France. 


360 


D’ESTAING  AT  NEW  YORK. 


them,  Lord  Howe’s  movements  were  marked  by  a  vigor  and 
system  other  than  D’Estaing’s.  First  assembling  his  fleet  and 
transports  in  Delaware  Bay,  and  then  hastening  the  embarka¬ 
tion  of  stores  and  supplies,  he  left  Philadelphia  as  soon  as  the 
army  had  marched  from  there  for  New  York.  Ten  days  were 
taken  up  in  reaching  the  mouth  of  the  bay ; 1  but  he  sailed 
from  it  the  28th  of  June,  ten  days  before  D’Estaing  arrived, 
though  more  than  ten  weeks  after  he  had  sailed.  Once  out¬ 
side,  a  favoring  wind  took  the  whole  fleet  to  Sandy  Hook  in 
two  days.  War  is  unforgiving  ;  the  prey  that  D’Estaing  had 
missed  by  delays  foiled  him  in  his  attempts  upon  both  New 
York  and  Rhode  Island. 

The  day  after  Howe’s  arrival  at  Sandy  Hook  the  English 
army  reached  the  heights  of  Navesink,  after  an  harassing 
march  through  New  Jersey,  with  Washington’s  troops  hang¬ 
ing  upon  its  rear.  By  the  active  co-operation  of  the  navy  it 
was  carried  up  to  New  York  by  the  5th  of  July  ;  and  Howe 
then  went  back  to  bar  the  entrance  to  the  port  against  the 
French  fleet.  As  no  battle  followed,  the  details  of  his  ar¬ 
rangements  will  not  be  given  ;  but  a  very  full  and  interesting 
account  by  an  officer  of  the  fleet  can  be  found  in  Ekins’s 
“  Naval  Battles.”  Attention,  however,  may  well  be  called  to 
the  combination  of  energy,  thought,  skill,  and  determination 
shown  by  the  admiral.  The  problem  before  him  was  to 
defend  a  practicable  pass  with  six  sixty-four-gun  ships  and 
three  of  fifty,  against  eight  of  seventy-four  guns  or  over, 
three  sixty-fours,  and  one  fifty,  —  it  may  be  said  against 
nearly  double  his  own  force. 

D’Estaing  anchored  outside,  south  of  the  Hook,  on  the  11th 
of  July,  and  there  remained  until  the  22d,  engaged  in  sound¬ 
ing  the  bar,  and  with  every  apparent  determination  to  enter. 
On  the  22d  a  high  northeast  wind,  coinciding  with  a  spring 
tide,  raised  the  water  on  the  bar  to  thirty  feet.  The  French 
fleet  got  under  way,  and  worked  up  to  windward  to  a  point 
fair  for  crossing  the  bar.  Then  D’Estaing’s  heart  failed  him 

1  This  delay  was  due  to  calms.  Howe’s  Despatch,  Gentleman’s  Magazine, 
1778. 


D’ESTAING  AT  NEWPORT. 


361 


under  the  discouragement  of  the  pilots  ;  he  gave  up  the  attack 
and  stood  away  to  the  southward. 

Naval  officers  cannot  but  sympathize  with  the  hesitation 
of  a  seaman  to  disregard  the  advice  of  pilots,  especially  on  a 
coast  foreign  to  him;  but  such  sympathy  should  not  close 
their  eyes  to  the  highest  type  of  character.  Let  any  one  com¬ 
pare  the  action  of  D’Estaing  at  New  York  with  that  of  Nelson 
at  Copenhagen  and  the  Nile,  or  that  of  Farragut  at  Mobile  and 
Port  Hudson,  and  the  inferiority  of  the  Frenchman  as  a  mili¬ 
tary  leader,  guided  only  by  military  considerations,  is  painfully 
apparent.  New  York  was  the  very  centre  of  the  British 
power ;  its  fall  could  not  but  have  shortened  the  war.  In 
fairness  to  D’Estaing,  however,  it  must  be  remembered  that 
other  than  military  considerations  had  to  weigh  with  him. 
The  French  admiral  doubtless  had  instructions  similar  to 
those  of  the  French  minister,  and  he  probably  reasoned  that 
France  had  nothing  to  gain  by  the  fall  of  New  York,  which 
might  have  led  to  peace  between  America  and  England,  and 
left  the  latter  free  to  turn  all  her  power  against  his  own  coun¬ 
try.  Less  than  that  would  have  been  enough  to  decide  his 
wavering  mind  as  to  risking  his  fleet  over  the  bar. 

Howe  was  more  fortunate  than  D’Estaing.  in  having  no 
divided  purposes.  Having  escaped  from  Philadelphia  and 
saved  New  York  by  his  diligence,  he  had  in  store  the  further 
honor  of  saving  Rhode  Island  by  the  like  rapid  movements. 
Scattered  ships-of-war  from  a  fleet  despatched  from  England 
now  began  to  arrive.  On  the  28th  of  July  Howe  was  informed 
that  the  French  fleet,  which  had  disappeared  to  the  southward, 
had  been  seen  heading  for  Rhode  Island.  In  four  days  his 
fleet  was  ready  for  sea,  but  owing  to  contrary  winds  did  not 
reach  Point  Judith  till  the  9th  of  August.  There  he  anchored, 
and  learned  that  D’Estaing  had  run  the  batteries  the  day  be¬ 
fore  and  anchored  between  Gould  and  Canonicut  Islands  ; 1 

1  Most  accounts  say  between  Goat  Island  and  Canonicut;  but  the  position 
given  seems  more  probable.  The  names  “  Goat  ”  and  “  Gould  ”  (often  written 
“  Gold  ”)  are  easily  confused.  Since  writing  the  above,  the  author  has  been 
favored  with  the  sight  of  a  contemporary  manuscript  map  obtained  in  Paris, 
which  shows  the  anchorage  as  near  Canonicut  and  abreast  Coaster’s  Harbor 


362 


HOWE  AND  D’ESTAING. 


the  Seakonnet  and  Western  passages  had  also  been  occupied 
by  French  ships,  and  the  fleet  was  prepared  to  sustain  the 
American  army  in  an  attack  upon  the  British  works. 

The  arrival  of  Howe,  although  his  reinforcements  did  not 
raise  the  English  fleet  to  over  two  thirds  the  strength  of  the 
French,  upset  D’Estaing’s  plans.  With  the  prevailing  sum¬ 
mer  southwest  breezes  blowing  straight  into  the  bay,  he  was 
exposed  to  any  attempts  his  adversary  might  make.  That 
same  night  the  wind  shifted  unexpectedly  to  the  northward, 
and  D’Estaing  at  once  got  under  way  and  stood  out  to  sea. 
Howe,  though  surprised  by  this  unlooked-for  act, — for  he 
had  not  felt  himself  strong  enough  to  attack, —  also  made 
sail  to  keep  the  weather-gage.  The  next  twenty-four  hours 
passed  in  manoeuvring  for  the  advantage ;  but  on  the  night 
of  the  11th  of  August  a  violent  gale  of  wind  dispersed  the 
fleets.  Great  injury  was  done  to  the  vessels  of  both,  and 
among  others  the  French  flag-ship  “  Languedoc,”  of  ninety 
guns,  lost  all  her  masts  and  her  rudder.  Immediately  after 
the  gale  two  different  English  fifty-gun  ships,  in  fighting 
order,  fell  in,  the  one  with  the  “  Languedoc,”  the  other  with 
the  “  Tonnant,”  of  eighty  guns,  having  only  one  mast  stand¬ 
ing.  Under  such  conditions  both  English  ships  attacked ; 
but  night  coming  on,  they  ceased  action,  intending  to  begin 
again  in  the  morning.  When  morning  came,  other  French 
ships  also  came,  and  the  opportunity  was  lost.  It  is  sug¬ 
gestive  to  note  that  one  of  the  captains  was  Hotliam,  who  as 
admiral  of  the  Mediterranean  fleet,  seventeen  years  later,  so 
annoyed  Nelson  by  his  cool  satisfaction  in  having  taken  only 
two  ships:  “We  must  be  contented;  we  have  done  very 
well.”  This  was  the  immediate  occasion  of  Nelson’s  char¬ 
acteristic  saying,  “  Had  we  taken  ten  sail,  and  allowed  the 
eleventh  to  escape,  being  able  to  get  at  her,  I  could  never 
have  called  it  well  done.” 

Island ;  the  latter  being  marked  “  L’Isle  d’Or  on  Golde  Isle.”  The  sketch, 
while  accurate  in  its  main  details,  seems  the  more  authentic  from  its  mistakes 
being  such  as  a  foreigner,  during  a  hurried  and  exciting  stay  of  twenty-four 
hours,  might  readily  make. 


ACTIVITY  SHOWN  BY  HOWE. 


363 


The  English  fell  back  on  New  York.  The  French  rallied 
again  off  the  entrance  of  Narragansett  Bay  ;  but  D’Estaing 
decided  that  he  could  not  remain  on  account  of  the  damage  to 
the  squadron,  and  accordingly  sailed  for  Boston  on  the  21st 
of  August.  Rhode  Island  was  thus  left  to  the  English^  who 
retained  it  for  a  year  longer,  evacuating  then  for  strategic 
reasons.  Howe  on  his  part  diligently  repaired  his  ships,  and 
sailed  again  for  Rhode  Island  when  he  heard  of  the  French 
being  there ;  but  meeting  on  the  way  a  vessel  with  word  of 
their  going  to  Boston,  he  followed  them  to  that  harbor,  in 
which  they  were  too  strongly  placed  to  be  attacked.  Taking 
into  consideration  his  enforced  return  to  New  York,  the  neces¬ 
sary  repairs,  and  the  fact  that  he  was  only  four  days  behind 
the  French  at  Boston,  it  may  be  believed  that  Howe  showed 
to  the  end  the  activity  which  characterized  the  beginning 
of  his  operations. 

Scarcely  a  shot  had  been  exchanged  between  the  two  fleets, 
yet  the  weaker  had  thoroughly  outgeneralled  the  stronger. 
With  the  exception  of  the  manoeuvres  for  the  weather-gage 
after  D’Estaing  left  Newport,  which  have  not  been  preserved, 
and  of  Howe’s  dispositions  to  receive  the  expected  attack  in 
New  York  Bay,  the  lessons  are  not  tactical,  but  strategic,  and 
of  present  application.  Chief  among  them  undoubtedly  stands 
the  value  of  celerity  and  watchfulness,  combined  with  knowl¬ 
edge  of  one’s  profession.  Howe  learned  of  his  danger  by 
advices  from  home  three  weeks  after  D’Estaing  sailed  from 
Toulon.  He  had  to  gather  in  his  cruisers  from  the  Chesa¬ 
peake  and  outside,  get  his  ships-of-the-line  from  New  York 
and  Rhode  Island,  embark  the  supplies  of  an  army  of  ten 
thousand  men,  move  down  the  Delaware,  —  which  unavoidably 
took  ten  days,  —  and  round  to  New  York  again.  D’Estaing 
was  ten  days  behind  him  at  the  Delaware,  twelve  days  at 
Sandy  Hook,  and  only  one  day  ahead  of  him  in  entering 
Newport,  outside  which  harbor  he  had  lain  ten  days  before 
sailing  in.  An  English  narrator  in  the  fleet,  speaking  of 
the  untiring  labor  between  June  30,  when  the  English  army 
reached  Navesink,  and  the  arrival  of  the  French  fleet  on  the 


364 


SUCCESS  OF  HOWE'S  MOVEMENTS. 


11th  of  July,  says :  “  Lord  Howe  attended  in  person  as 
usual,  and  by  his  presence  animated  the  zeal  and  quickened 
the  industry  of  officers  and  men.”  In  this  quality  he  was 
a  marked  contrast  to  his  amiable  but  indolent  brother,  Gen¬ 
eral  Howe. 

The  same  industry  and  watchfulness  marked  his  remaining 
operations.  As  soon  as  the  French  ships  hauled  off  to  the 
southward,  lookout  vessels  followed  them,  and  preparations 
continued  (notably  of  fireships)  for  pursuit.  The  last  ship 
that  joined  from  England  crossed  the  bar  at  New  York  on 
the  80th  of  July.  On  the  1st  of  August  the  fleet  was 
ready  for  sea,  with  four  fire-ships.  The  accident  of  the 
wind  delayed  his  next  movements ;  but,  as  has  been  seen, 
he  came  up  only  one  day  after  the  entrance  of  the  enemy 
into  Newport,  which  his  inferior  force  could  not  have  pre¬ 
vented.  But  the  object  of  the  enemy,  which  he  could  not 
oppose,  was  frustrated  by  his  presence.  D’Estaing  was  no 
sooner  in  Newport  than  he  wi&had — himself  out.  Howe’s 
position  was  strategically  excellent.  With  his  weatherly 
position  in  reference  to  the  prevailing  winds,  the  difficulty 
of  beating  a  fleet  out  through  the  narrow  entrance  to  the 
harbor  would  expose  the  French  ships  trying  it  to  be  at¬ 
tacked  in  detail ;  while  if  the  wind  unluckily  came  fair,  the 
admiral  relied  upon  his  own  skill  to  save  his  squadron. 

Cooper,  in  one  of  his  novels,  “  The  Two  Admirals,”  makes 
his  hero  say  to  a  cavilling  friend  that  if  he  had  not  been  in 
the  way  of  good  luck,  he  could  not  have  profited  by  it.  The 
sortie  of  the  French,  the  subsequent  gale,  and  the  resulting 
damage  were  all  what  is  commonly  called  luck  ;  but  if  it  had 
not  been  for  Howe’s  presence  off  Point  Judith  threatening 
them,  they  would  have  ridden  out  the  gale  at  their  anchors 
inside.  Howe’s  energy  and  his  confidence  in  himself  as  a  sea¬ 
man  had  put  him  in  the  way  of  good  luck,  and  it  is  not  fair  to 
deny  his  active  share  in  bringing  it  about.  But  for  him  the 
gale  would  not  have  saved  the  British  force  in  Newport.1 

1  “  The  arrival  of  the  French  fleet  upon  the  coast  of  America  is  a  great  and 
striking  event;  but  the  operations  of  it  have  been  injured  by  a  number 


D’ESTAING  IN  THE  WEST  INDIES. 


365 


HEgiaing,  having  repaired  his  ships,  sailed  with  his  whole 
force  for  Martinique  on  the  4th  of  November ;  on  the  same  day 
Commodore  Hotham  left  New  York  for  Barbadoes,  with  five 
sixty-four  and  fifty-gun  ships  and  a  convoy  of  five  thousand 
troops,  destined  for  the  conquest  of  Sta.  Lucia  Tslnnd-  On  the 
way  a  heavy  gale  of  wind  injured  the  French  fleet  more  than 
the  English,  the  French  flag-ship  losing  her  main  and  mizzen 
topmasts.  The  loss  of  these  spars,  and  the  fact  that  twelve 
unencumbered  ships-of-war  reached  Martinique  only  one  day 
before  the  convoy  of  fifty-nine  English  transports  reached 
Barbadoes,  a  hundred  miles  farther  on,  tells  badly  for  the 
professional  skill  which  then  and  now  is  a  determining 
feature  in  naval  war. 

Admiral  Barrington,  commanding  at  Barbadoes,  showed  the 
same  energy  as  Howe.  The  transports  arrived  on  the  10th ; 
the  troops  were  kept  on  board  ;  sailed  on  the  morning  of  the 
12th  for  Sta.  Lucia,  and  anchored  there  at  three  p.  m.  the  13th. 
The  same  afternoon  half  the  troops  were  landed,  and  the 
rest  the  next  morning.  They  seized  at  once  a  better  port, 
to  which  the  admiral  was  about  to  move  the  transports  when 
the  appearance  of  D’Estaing  prevented  him.  All  that  night 

of  unforeseen  and  unfavorable  circumstances,  which,  though  they  ought  not  to 
detract  from  the  merit  and  good  intention  of  our  great  ally,  have  nevertheless 
lessened  the  importance  of  its  services  in  a  great  degree.  The  length  of  the  pas¬ 
sage,  in  the  first  instance,  was  a  capital  misfortune ;  for  had  even  one  of  common 
length  taken  place,  Lord  Howe,  with  the  British  ships-of-war  and  all  the  trans¬ 
ports  in  the  river  Delaware,  must  inevitably  have  fallen ;  and  Sir  Henry  Clin¬ 
ton  must  have  had  better  luck  than  is  commonly  dispensed  to  men  of  his  profes¬ 
sion  under  such  circumstances,  if  he  and  his  troops  had  not  shared  at  least  the  fate 
of  Burgoyne.  The  long  passage  of  Count  d’Estaing  was  succeeded  by  an  un¬ 
favorable  discovery  at  the  Hook,  which  hurt  us  in  two  respects,  —  first,  in  a  de¬ 
feat  of  the  enterprise  upon  New  York  and  the  shipping  and  troops  at  that  place, 
and  next  in  the  delay  occasioned  in  ascertaining  the  depth  of  water  over  the  bar 
which  wras  essential  to  their  entrance  into  the  harbor  of  New  York.  And,  more 
over,  after  the  enterprise  upon  Rhode  Island  had  been  planned  and  was  in  th6 
moment  of  execution,  that  Lord  Howe  with  the  British  ships  should  interpose 
merely  to  create  a  diversion  and  draw  the  French  fleet  from  the  island  was  again 
unlucky,  as  the  Count  had  not  returned  on  the  17th  to  the  island,  though  drawn 
off  from  it  on  the  1  Oth ;  by  which  means  the  land  operations  were  retarded,  and 
the  whole  subjected  to  a  miscarriage  in  case  of  the  arrival  of  Byron’s  squadron/ 
—  Washington’s  Letter,  Aug.  20, 1778. 


3  bfl 


THE  ENGLISH  SEIZE  SANTA  LUCIA. 


the  transports  were  being  warped  inside  the  ships-of-war, 
and  the  latter  anchored  across  the  entrance  to  the  bay,  espe¬ 
cial  care  being  taken  to  strengthen  the  two  extremities  of  the 
line,  and  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  passing  inside  the  weather 
end,  as  the  English  ships  in  after  years  did  at  the  battle  of  the 
Nile.  The  French  was  much  more  than  double  the  English 
fleet ;  and  if  the  latter  were  destroyed,  the  transports  and 
troops  would  be  trapped. 

D’Estaing  stood  down  along  the  English  order  twice  from 
north  to  south,  cannonading  at  long  range,  but  did  not  anchor. 
Abandoning  then  his  intentions  against  the  fleet,  he  moved  to 
another  bay,  landed  some  French  soldiers,  and  assaulted  the 
position  of  the  English  troops.  Failing  here  also,  he  retired 
to  Martinique  ;  and  the  French  garrison,  which  had  been 
driven  into  the  interior  of  the  island,  surrendered. 

It  seems  scarcely  necessary  to  point  out  the  admirable  dili¬ 
gence  of  Admiral  Barrington,  to  which  and  to  the  skill  of  his 
dispositions  he  owed  this  valuable  strategic  success ;  for  such 
it  was.  Sta.  Lucia  was  the  island  next  south  of  Martinique, 
and  the  harbor  of  Gros  Ilot  at  its  northern  end  was  especially 
adapted  to  the  work  of  watching  the  French  depot  at  Fort 
Royal,  their  principal  station  in  the  West  Indies.  Thence 
Rodney  pursued  them  before  his  great  action  in  1782. 

The  absence  of  precise  information  causes  hesitation  in  con¬ 
demning  D’Estaing  for  this  mortifying  failure.  His  respon¬ 
sibility  depends  upon  the  wind,  which  may  have  been  light 
under  the  land,  and  upon  his  power  to  anchor.  The  fact, 
however,  remains  that  he  passed  twice  along  the  enemy’s 
line  within  cannon-shot,  yet  did  not  force  a  decisive  action. 
His  course  was  unfavorably  criticised  by  the  great  Suffren, 
then  one  of  his  captains.1 

The  English  had  thus  retrieved  the  capture  of  Dominica, 
which  had  been  taken  on  the  8tli  of  September  by  the  French 
governor  of  the  West  India  Islands.  There  being  no  English 
squadron  there,  no  difficulty  had  been  met.  The  value  of 
Dominica  to  the  French  has  been  pointed  out ;  and  it  is 

1  See  page  426. 


D’ESTAING  AT  GRENADA. 


367 


necessary  here  to  use  the  example  of  both  Dominica  and  Sta. 
Lucia  to  enforce  what  has  before  been  said,  that  the  posses¬ 
sion  of  these  smaller  islands  depended  solely  upon  the  naval 
preponderance.  Upon  the  grasp  of  this  principle  held  by 
any  one  will  depend  his  criticism  upon  the  next  action  of 
D’Estaing,  to  be  immediately  related. 

Six  months  of  almost  entire  quiet  followed  the  affair  of  Sta. 
Lucia.  The  English  were  reinforced  by  the  fleet  of  Byron, 
who  took  chief  command  ;  but  the  French,  being  joined  by  ten 
more  ships-of-the-line,  remained  superior  in  numbers.  About 
the  middle  of  June,  Byron  sailed  with  his  fleet  to  protect  a  large 
convoy  of  merchant-ships,  bound  for  England,  till  they  were 
clear  of  the  islands.  D’Estaing  then  sent  a  very  small  expe¬ 
dition  which  seized  St.  Vincent,  June  16,  1779,  without  diffi¬ 
culty  ;  and  on  the  80th  of  June  he  sailed  with  his  whole  fleet  to 
attack  Grenada.  Anchoring  off  Georgetown  on  the  2d  of  July, 
he  landed  his  soldiers,  and  on  the  4th  the  garrison  of  seven 
hundred  men  surrendered  the  island.  Meanwhile  Byron, 
hearing  of  the  loss  of  St.  Vincent  and  probable  attack  on 
Grenada,  sailed  with  a  large  convoy  of  vessels  carrying 
troops,  and  with  twenty-one  ships-of-the-line,  to  regain  the 
one  and  relieve  the  other.  Receiving  on  the  way  definite  in¬ 
formation  that  the  French  were  before  Grenada,  he  kept  on 
for  it,  rounding  the  northwest  point  of  the  island  at  day¬ 
break  of  July  6.  His  approach  had  been  reported  the  day 
before  to  D’Estaing,  who  remained  at  anchor,1  fearing  lest 
with  the  currents  and  light  winds  he  might  drop  too  far 
to  leeward  if  he  let  go  the  bottom.  When  the  English  came 
in  sight,  the  French  got  under  way ;  but  the  confused  mass¬ 
ing  of  their  ships  prevented  Byron  from  recognizing  at  once 
the  disparity  of  numbers,  they  having  twenty-five  ships-of- 
the-line.  He  made  signal  for  a  general  chase,  and  as  the 
disorder  of  the  French  fleet  forced  it  to  form  on  the  lee- 
wardmost  ships,  the  English  easily  retained  the  advantage  of 
the  wind  with  which  they  approached.  As  the  action  began, 
therefore,  the  French  were  to  the  westward  with  a  partly 
formed  line,  on  the  starboard  tack,  heading  north,  the  rear  in 

1  D’Estaing’s  position  at  anchor  is  marked  by  the  anchor  in  Plate  X. 


368 


NAVAL  BATTLE  OFF  GRENADA. 


disorder,  and  to  windward  of  the  van  and  centre  (Plate  X.,  A). 
The  English  stood  down  with  a  fair  wind,  steering  south  by 
west  on  the  port  tack  (A),  between  the  island  and  the  enemy, 
their  leading  ships  approaching  at  a  slight  angle,  but  heading 
more  directly  for  his  yet  unformed  rear ;  while  the  English 
convoy  was  between  its  own  fleet  and  the  island,  under  special 
charge  of  three  ships  (A,  a),  which  were  now  called  in.  As 
the  signal  so  far  commanded  a  general  chase,  the  three  fastest 
of  the  English,  among  which  was  the  flag  of  the  second  in 
command,  Admiral  Barrington,  came  under  fire  of  the  French 
centre  and  rear,  apparently  unsupported  £b),  and  suffered 
much  from  the  consequent  concentration  of  fire  upon  them. 
When  they  reached  the  sternmost  ships  they  wore  upon  the 
same  tack  with  them  and  stood  north,  after  and  to  windward 
of  them ;  and  at  about  the  same  time  Byron,  who  had  not  be¬ 
fore  known  of  the  surrender,  saw  the  French  flag  flying  over 
the  forts.  Signals  followed  to  wear  in  succession,  and  for  the 
advanced  ships  to  form  line  for  mutual  support,  ceasing  the 
general  chase  under  which  the  engagement  had  hitherto  been 
fought.  While  the  main  body  was  still  standing  south  on  the 
port  tack,  three  ships,  —  “  Cornwall,”  “  Grafton,”  and  “  Lion  ” 
(c),  —  obeying  literally  the  signal  for  close  action,  had  passed 
much  to  leeward  of  the  others,  drawing  upon  themselves  most 
of  the  fire  of  -the  enemy’s  line.  They  thus  suffered  very 
severely  in  men  and  spars  ;  and  though  finally  relieved  by  the 
advanced  ships,  as  these  approached  from  the  southward  on 
the  opposite  tack,  they  were  unable,  after  wearing  (B,  c',  c"), 
to  keep  up  with  the  fleet,  and  so  dropped  astern  and  toward  the 
French.  The  bulk  of  the  injury  sustained  by  the  English  fell 
upon  these  three,  upon  the  three  advanced  ships  under  Bar¬ 
rington,  and  upon  two  others  in  the  rear  (A,  a),  which,  seeing 
the  van  so  heavily  engaged,  did  not  follow  the  successive 
movement,  but  bore  down  straight  out  of  the  order,  and  took 
their  places  at  the  head  of  the  column  (B,  a,  a'),  —  an  act 
strongly  resembling  that  which  won  Nelson  such  high  renown 
at  Cape  St.  Vincent,  but  involving  less  responsibility.1 

1  Of  one  of  these,  the  “  Monmouth/’  sixty-four  (a'),  it  is  said  that  the  officers 
of  the  French  flag-ship  drank  to  the  health  of  the  captain  of  the  “little  black 


D’ESTAING  AND  BYRON 

JULY  6,1779 
FRENCH  «=»  25  SHIPS 
ENGLISH  «•-  21  >> 

WIND  N.E.byE. 


* 


D’ESTAING’S  FAVORABLE  OPPORTUNITY. 


369 


So  far  Byron  had  conducted  his  attack,  using  the  initiative 
permitted  him  by  the  advantage  of  the  wind  and  the  disorder 
of  the  French  rear.  It  will  be  observed  that,  though  it  was 
desirable  to  lose  no  time  in  assailing  the  latter  while  in  con¬ 
fusion,  it  is  questionable  whether  Barrington’s  three  ships 
should  have  been  allowed  to  separate  as  far  as  they  seem  to 
have  done  from  the  rest  of  the  fleet.  A  general  chase  is  per¬ 
missible  and  proper  when,  from  superiority  of  numbers,  origi¬ 
nal  or  acquired,  or  from  the  general  situation,  the  ships  first 
in  action  will  not  be  greatly  outnumbered,  or  subjected  to 
overpowering  concentration  before  support  comes  up,  or  when 
there  is  probability  that  the  enemy  may  escape  unless  promptly 
struck.  This  was  not  so  here.  Nor  should  the  “  Cornwall,” 
“  Grafton,”  and  u  Lion  ”  have  been  permitted  to  take  a  course 
which  allowed,  almost  compelled,  the  enemy  to  concentrate 
rather  than  diffuse  his  fire.  The  details  of  the  affair  are  not 
precise  enough  to  warrant  more  comment  than  naming  these 
mistakes,  without  necessarily  attributing  them  to  fault  on  the 
part  of  the  admiral. 

The  French  had  up  to  this  time  remained  strictly  on  the 
defensive,  in  accordance  with  their  usual  policy.  There  was 
now  offered  an  opportunity  for  offensive  action  which  tested 
D’Estaing’s  professional  qualities,  and  to  appreciate  which 
the  situation  at  the  moment  must  be  understood.  Both  fleets 
were  by  this  on  the  starboard  tack,  heading  north  (B,  B,  B), 
the  French  to  leeward.  The  latter  had  received  little  injury 
in  their  motive  power,  though  their  line  was  not  in  perfect 
order;  but  the  English,  owing  to  the  faulty  attack,  had  seven 
ships  seriously  crippled,  four  of  which  —  the  “  Monmouth  ”  (a') 
“  Grafton,”  “Cornwall”  (V),  and  “Lion”  (c") —  were  dis¬ 
abled.  The  last  three,  by  three  P.  M.,  were  a  league  astern  and 

ship.”  Ships’  names,  like  those  of  families,  often  have  a  marked  career.  A  for¬ 
mer  “  Monmouth,”  twenty  years  before,  had  attacked  and  taken,  practically  sin¬ 
gle-handed,  the  “Foudroyant,”  eighty-four,  one  of  the  finest  ships  in  the  French 
navy.  She  was  then  commanded  by  a  Captain  Gardiner,  who,  having  com¬ 
manded  Byng’s  ship  in  the  battle  which  led  to  his  execution,  was  moved  by  his 
mortification  at  the  result  of  that  affair  to  dare  such  desperate  odds,  and  thereby 
lost  his  life.  The  same  ship,  here  punished  so  severely  off  Grenada,  will  be  found 
in  like  sturdy  fight,  under  another  captain,  three  years  later  in  India. 

24 


370 


INDECISIVE  ACTION  OF  D’ESTAING. 


much  to  leeward  of  their  line,  being  in  fact  nearer  the  French 
than  the  English ;  while  the  speed  of  the  English  fleet  was 
necessarily  reduced  to  that  of  the  crippled  ships  remaining  in 
line.  These  conditions  bring  out  strongly  the  embarrassments 
of  a  fleet  whose  injuries  are  concentrated  upon  a  few  ships, 
instead  of  being  distributed  among  all ;  the  ten  or  twelve 
which  were  practically  untouched  had  to  conform  to  the 
capabilities  of  the  others.  D’Estaing,  with  twenty-five  ships, 
now  had  Byron  to  windward  of  him  with  seventeen  or  eighteen 
capable  of  holding  together,  but  slower  and  less  handy  than 
their  enemies,  and  saw  him  tactically  embarrassed  by  the  care 
of  a  convoy  to  windward  and  three  disabled  ships  to  leeward. 
Under  these  circumstances  three  courses  were  open  to  the 
French  admiral:  (1)  He  might  stretch  ahead,  and,  tacking 
in  succession,  place  himself  between  Byron  and  the  convoy, 
throwing  his  frigates  among  the  latter  ;  (2)  He  might  tack 
his  fleet  together  and  stand  up  to  the  English  line  to  bring 
on  a  general  action ;  or  (3)  he  could,  after  going  about,  cut 
off  the  three  disabled  ships,  which  might  bring  on  a  general 
action  with  less  exposure. 

None  of  these  did  he  do.  As  regards  the  first,  he,  knowing 
the  criticisms  of  the  fleet,  wrote  home  that  his  line  was  too 
much  disordered  to  allow  it.  Whatever  the  technical  irregu¬ 
larity,  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that,  with  the  relative  power  of 
motion  in  the  two  fleets,  the  attempt  was  hopeless.  The  third 
alternative  probably  presented  the  greatest  advantage,  for  it 
insured  the  separation  between  the  enemy’s  main  body  and 
the  crippled  ships,  and  might  very  probably  exasperate  the 
British  admiral  into  an  attack  under  most  hazardous  condi¬ 
tions.  It  is  stated  by  English  authorities  that  Byron  said  he 
would  have  borne  down  again,  had  any  attack  been  made 
on  them.  At  three  p.  m.  D’Estaing  tacked  all  together,  form¬ 
ing  line  on  the  lee  ship,1  and  stood  to  the  southward  again. 

1  The  line  BC  shows  the  final  direction  of  the  French  line-of -battle ;  the  lee 
ship  (o)  having  tacked  and  standing  to  o',  while  the  other  ships  took  position  in 
her  wake.  Though  not  expressly  stated,  Byron  doubtless  formed  in  the  same 
way  on  a  parallel  line.  Into  this  new  line  the  disabled  ships  (c'),  which  could 
scarcely  have  made  good  the  course  they  were  heading,  would  be  easily  received 


D'ESTAING’S  PROFESSIONAL  REPUTATION.  371 

The  English  imitated  this  movement,  except  the  van  ship 
“Monmouth”  (a'),  which  being  too  badly  hurt  to  manoeuvre 
kept  on  to  the  northward,  and  the  three  separated  ships.  Two 
of  these  ( c ')  kept  on  north  and  passed  once  more  under  the 
French  broadsides  ;  but  the  “  Lion  ”  (c"),  unable  to  keep  to  the 
wind,  kept  broad  off  before  it  across  the  bows  of  the  enemy, 
for  Jamaica,  a  thousand  miles  away.  She  was  not  pursued  ; 
a  single  transport  was  the  sole  maritime  trophy  of  the  French. 
“Had  the  admiral’s  seamanship  equalled  his  courage,”  wrote 
the  celebrated  Suffren,  who  commanded  the  French  van  ship, 
“we  would  not  have  suffered  four  dismasted  vessels  to  escape.” 
“  D’Estaing,  at  the  age  of  thirty,  had  been  transferred  from 
the  army  to  the  navy  with  the  premature  rank  of  rear-admiral. 
The  navy  did  not  credit  him  with  nautical  ability  when  the 
war  broke  out,  and  it  is  safe  to  say  that  its  opinion  was  jus¬ 
tified  by  his  conduct  during  it.” 1  “  Brave  as  his  sword, 

D’Estaing  was  always  the  idol  of  the  soldier,  the  idol  of  the 
seaman ;  but  moral  authority  over  his  officers  failed  him 
on  several  occasions,  notwithstanding  the  marked  protection 
extended  to  him  by  the  king.”2 

Another  cause  than  incapacity  as  a  seaman  has  usually 
been  assigned  by  French  historians  for  the  impotent  action 
of  D’Estaing  on  this  occasion.  He  looked  upon  Grenada, 
they  say,  as  the  real  objective  of  his  efforts,  and  considered 
the  English  fleet  a  very  secondary  concern.  Ramatuelle,  a 
naval  tactician  who  served  actively  in  this  war  and  wrote 
under  the  Empire,  cites  this  case,  which  he  couples  with 
that  of  Yorktown  and  others,  as  exemplifying  the  true 
policy  of  naval  war.  His  words,  which  probably  reflect  the 
current  opinion  of  his  service  in  that  day,  as  they  certainly 
do  the  policy  of  French  governments,  call  for  more  than 
passing  mention,  as  they  involve  principles  worthy  of  most 
serious  discussion :  — 

“  The  French  navy  has  always  preferred  the  glory  of  assuring  or 
preserving  a  conquest  to  that,  more  brilliant  perhaps,  but  actually 


1  Chevalier :  Hist,  de  la  Marine  Franjaise. 


2  Guerin :  Hist.  Maritime. 


372 


FRENCH  NAVAL  POLICY . 


less  real,  of  taking  a  few  ships ;  and  in  that  it  has  approached  more 
nearly  the  true  end  to  be  proposed  in  war.  What  in  fact  would  the 
loss  of  a  few  ships  matter  to  the  English  ?  The  essential  point  is  to 
attack  them  in  their  possessions,  the  immediate  source  of  their  com¬ 
mercial  wealth  and  of  their  maritime  power.  The  war  of  1778  fur¬ 
nishes  examples  which  prove  the  devotion  of  the  French  admirals  to 
the  true  interests  of  the  country.  The  preservation  of  the  island  of 
Grenada,  the  reduction  of  Yorktown  where  the  English  army  surren¬ 
dered,  the  conquest  of  the  island  of  St.  Christopher,  were  the  re¬ 
sult  of  great  battles  in  which  the  enemy  was  allowed  to  retreat  un¬ 
disturbed,  rather  than  risk  giving  him  a  chance  to  succor  the  points 
attacked.” 

The  issue  could  not  be  more  squarely  raised  than  in  the 
case  of  Grenada.  No  one  will  deny  that  there  are  moments 
when  a  probable  military  success  is  to  be  foregone,  or  post¬ 
poned,  in  favor  of  one  greater  or  more  decisive.  The  posi¬ 
tion  of  De  Grasse  at  the  Chesapeake,  in  1781,  with  the  fate  of 
Yorktown  hanging  in  the  balance,  is  in  point ;  and  it  is  here 
coupled  with  that  of  D’Estaing  at  Grenada,  as  though  both 
stood  on  the  same  grounds.  Both  are  justified  alike ;  not  on 
their  respective  merits  as  fitting  the  particular  cases,  but  upon 
a  general  principle.  Is  that  principle  sound  ?  The  bias  of 
the  writer  quoted  betrays  itself  unconsciously,  in  saying  “  a 
few  ships.”  A  whole  navy  is  not  usually  to  be  crushed  at 
a  blow ;  a  few  ships  mean  an  ordinary  naval  victory.  In 
Rodney’s  famous  battle  only  five  ships  were  taken,  though 
Jamaica  was  saved  thereby. 

In  order  to  determine  the  soundness  of  the  principle,  which 
is  claimed  as  being  illustrated  by  these  two  cases  (St.  Chris¬ 
topher  will  be  discussed  later  on),  it  is  necessary  to  examine 
what  was  the  advantage  sought,  and  what  the  determining 
factor  of  success  in  either  case.  At  lrorktown  the  advantage 
sought  was  the  capture  of  Cornwallis’s  army ;  the  objective 
was  the  destruction  of  the  enemy’s  organized  military  force 
on  shore.  At  Grenada  the  chosen  objective  was  the  posses¬ 
sion  of  a  piece  of  territory  of  no  great  military  value ;  for  it 
must  be  remarked  that  all  these  smaller  Antilles,  if  held  in 


FRENCH  NAVAL  POLICY. 


373 


force  at  all,  multiplied  large  detachments,  whose  mutual  sup 
port  depended  wholly  upon  the  navy.  These  large  detach¬ 
ments  were  liable  to  be  crushed  separately,  if  not  supported 
by  the  navy  ;  and  if  naval  superiority  is  to  be  maintained,  the 
enemy’s  navy  must  be  crushed.  Grenada,  near  and  to  lee¬ 
ward  of  Barbadoes  and  Sta.  Lucia,  both  held  strongly  by  the 
English,  was  peculiarly  weak  to  the  French ;  but  sound  mili¬ 
tary  policy  for  all  these  islands  demanded  one  or  two  strongly 
fortified  and  garrisoned  naval  bases,  and  dependence  for  the 
rest  upon  the  fleet.  Beyond  this,  security  against  attacks  by 
single  cruisers  and  privateers  alone  was  needed. 

Such  were  the  objectives  in  dispute.  What  was  the  deter¬ 
mining  factor  in  this  strife  ?  Surely  the  navy,  the  organized 
military  force  afloat.  Cornwallis’s  fate  depended  absolutely 
upon  the  sea.  It  is  useless  to  speculate  upon  the  result,  had 
the  odds  on  the  5th  of  September,  1781,  in  favor  of  De  Grasse, 
been  reversed ;  if  the  French,  instead  of  five  ships  more,  had 
had  five  ships  less  than  the  English.  As  it  was,  De  Grasse, 
when  that  fight  began,  had  a  superiority  over  the  English 
equal  to  the  result  of  a  hard-won  fight.  The  question  then 
was,  should  he  risk  the  almost  certain  decisive  victory  over 
the  organized  enemy’s  force  ashore,  for  the  sake  of  a  much 
more  doubtful  advantage  over  the  organized  force  afloat? 
This  was  not  a  question  of  Yorktown,  but  of  Cornwallis  and 
his  army ;  there  is  a  great  deal  in  the  way  things  are  put. 

So  stated,  —  and  the  statement  needs  no  modifications, — * 
there  can  be  but  one  answer.  Let  it  be  remarked  clearly, 
however,  that  both  De  Grasse’s  alternatives  brought  before 
him  the  organized  forces  as  the  objective. 

Not  so  with  D’Estaing  at  Grenada.  His  superiority  in 
numbers  over  the  English  was  nearly  as  great  as  that  of  De 
Grasse ;  his  alternative  objectives  were  the  organized  force 
afloat  and  a  small  island,  fertile,  but  militarily  unimportant. 
Grenada  is  said  to  have  been  a  strong  position  for  defence ; 
but  intrinsic  strength  does  not  give  importance,  if  the  position 
has  not  strategic  value.  To  save  the  island,  he  refused  to 
use  an  enormous  advantage  fortune  had  given  him  over  the 


874 


FRENCH  NAVAL  POLICY. 


fleet.  Yet  upon  the  strife  between  the  two  navies  depended 
the  tenure  of  the  islands.  Seriously  to  hold  the  West  India 
Islands  required,  first,  a  powerful  seaport,  which  the  French 
had ;  second,  the  control  of  the  sea.  For  the  latter  it  was 
necessary,  not  to  multiply  detachments  in  the  islands,  but  to 
destroy  the  enemy’s  navy,  which  may  be  accurately  called 
the  army  in  the  field.  The  islands  were  but  rich  towns  ; 
and  not  more  than  one  or  two  fortified  towns,  or  posts,  were 
needed. 

It  may  safely  be  said  that  the  principle  which  led  to  D’Es- 
taing’s  action  was  not,  to  say  the  least,  unqualifiedly  correct; 
for  it  led  him  wrong.  In  the  case  of  Yorktown,  the  principle 
as  stated  by  Ramatuelle  is  not  the  justifying  reason  of  De 
Grasse’s  conduct,  though  it  likely  enough  was  the  real  rea¬ 
son.  What  justified  De  Grasse  was  that,  the  event  depending 
upon  the  unshaken  control  of  the  sea,  for  a  short  time  only, 
he  already  had  it  by  his  greater  numbers.  Had  the  numbers 
been  equal,  loyalty  to  the  military  duty  of  the  hour  must 
have  forced  him  to  fight,  to  stop  the  attempt  which  the  Eng¬ 
lish  admiral  would  certainly  have  made.  The  destruction  of 
a  few  ships,  as  Ramatuelle  slightingly  puts  it,  gives  just  that 
superiority  to  which  the  happy  result  at  Yorktown  was  due. 
As  a  general  principle,  this  is  undoubtedly  a  better  objective 
than  that  pursued  by  the  French.  Of  course,  exceptions  will 
be  found ;  but  those  exceptions  will  probably  be  where,  as  at 
Yorktown,  the  military  force  is  struck  at  directly  elsewhere, 
or,  as  at  Port  Mahon,  a  desirable  and  powerful  base  of  that 
force  is  at  stake ;  though  even  at  Mahon  it  is  doubtful 
whether  the  prudence  was  not  misplaced.  Had  Hawke  or 
Boscawen  met  with  Byng’s  disaster,  they  would  not  have 
gone  to  Gibraltar  to  repair  it,  unless  the  French  admiral 
had  followed  up  his  first  blow  with  others,  increasing  their 
disability. 

Grenada  was  no  doubt  very  dear  in  the  eyes  of  D’Estaing, 
because  it  was  his  only  success.  After  making  the  failures 
at  the  Delaware,  at  New  York,  and  at  Rhode  Island,  with  the 
mortifying  affair  at  Sta.  Lucia,  it  is  difficult  to  understand 


D'ESTAING  AT  SAVANNAH. 


375 


the  confidence  in  him  expressed  by  some  French  writers. 
Gifted  with  a  brilliant  and  contagious  personal  daring,  he 
distinguished  himself  most  highly,  when  an  admiral,  by  lead¬ 
ing  in  person  assaults  upon  intrenchments  at  Sta.  Lucia  and 
Grenada,  and  a  few  months  later  in  the  unsuccessful  attack 
upon  Savannah. 

During  the  absence  of  the  French  navy  in  the  winter  of 
1778-79,  the  English,  controlling  now  the  sea  with  a  few 
of  their  ships  that  had  not  gone  to  the  West  Indies,  deter¬ 
mined  to  shift  the  scene  of  the  continental  war  to  the  South¬ 
ern  States,  where  there  was  believed  to  be  a  large  number  of 
loyalists.  The  expedition  was  directed  upon  Georgia,  and 
was  so  far  successful  that  Savannah  fell  into  their  hands  in 
the  last  days  of  1778.  The  whole  State  speedily  submitted. 
Operations  were  thence  extended  into  South  Carolina,  but 
failed  to  bring  about  the  capture  of  Charleston. 

Word  of  these  events  was  sent  to  D’Estaing  in  the  West 
Indies,  accompanied  by  urgent  representations  of  the  danger 
to  the  Carolinas,  and  the  murmurings  of  the  people  against 
the  French,  who  were  accused  of  forsaking  their  allies,  hav¬ 
ing  rendered  them  no  service,  but  on  the  contrary  having 
profited  by  the  cordial  help  of  the  Bostonians  to  refit  their 
crippled  fleet.  There  was  a  sting  of  truth  in  the  alleged 
failure  to  help,  which  impelled  D’Estaing  to  disregard  the 
orders  actually  in  his  hands  to  return  at  once  to  Europe 
with  certain  ships.  Instead  of  obeying  them  he  sailed  for 
the  American  coast  with  twenty-two  ships-of-the-line,  having 
in  view  two  objects,  —  the  relief  of  the  Southern  States  and 
an  attack  upon  New  York  in  conjunction  with  Washington’s 
army. 

Arriving  off  the  coast  of  Georgia  on  the  1st  of  September, 
D’Estaing  took  the  English  wholly  at  unawares  ;  but  the  fatal 
lack  of  promptness,  which  had  previously  marked  the  com¬ 
mand  of  this  very  daring  man,  again  betrayed  his  good 
fortune.  Dallying  at  first  before  Savannah,  the  fleeting  of 
precious  days  again  brought  on  a  change  of  conditions,  and 
the  approach  of  the  bad-weather  season  impelled  him,  too 


376 


DE  G  U I  CHEN  SUCCEEDS  D’ESTAING. 


slow  at  first,  into  a  premature  assault.  In  it  he  displayed 
his  accustomed  gallantry,  fighting  at  the  head  of  his  column, 
as  did  the  American  general ;  but  the  result  was  a  bloody 
repulse.  The  siege  was  raised,  and  D’Estaing  sailed  at  once 
for  France,  not  only  giving  up  his  project  upon  New  York, 
but  abandoning  the  Southern  States  to  the  enemy.  The 
value  of  this  help  from  the  great  sea  power  of  France,  thus 
cruelly  dangled  before  the  eyes  of  the  Americans  only  to  be 
withdrawn,  was  shown  by  the  action  of  the  English,  who 
abandoned  Newport  in  the  utmost  haste  when  they  learned 
the  presence  of  the  French  fleet.  Withdrawal  had  been 
before  decided  upon,  but  D’Estaing’s  coming  converted  it 
into  flight. 

After  the  departure  of  D’Estaing,  which  involved  that  of 
the  whole  French  fleet,  —  for  the  ships  which  did  not  go 
back  to  France  returned  to  the  West  Indies,  —  the  Eng¬ 
lish  resumed  the  attack  upon  the  Southern  States,  which 
had  for  a  moment  been  suspended.  The  fleet  and  army 
left  New  York  for  Georgia  in  the  last  weeks  of  1779,  and 
after  assembling  at  Tybee,  moved  upon  Charleston  by  way 
of  Edisto.  The  powerlessness  of  the  Americans  upon  the 
sea  left  this  movement  unembarrassed  save  by  single  cruis¬ 
ers,  which  picked  up  some  stragglers,  —  affording  another 
lesson  of  the  petty  results  of  a  merely  cruising  warfare. 
The  siege  of  Charleston  began  at  the  end  of  March, —  the 
English  ships  soon  after  passing  the  bar  and  Fort  Moul¬ 
trie  without  serious  damage,  and  anchoring  within  gunshot 
of  the  place.  Fort  Moultrie  was  soon  and  easily  reduced 
by  land  approaches,  and  the  city  itself  was  surrendered 
on  the  12th  of  May,  after  a  siege  of  forty  days.  The  whole 
State  was  then  quickly  overrun  and  brought  into  military 
subjection. 

The  fragments  of  D’Estaing’s  late  fleet  were  joined  by  a 
reinforcement  from  France  under  tlie^  Comte  de  Guichen, 
who  assumed  chief  command  in  the  West  Indian  seas  March 
22,  1780.  The  next  day  he  sailed  for  Sta.  Lucia,  which  he 
hoped  to  find  unprepared ;  but  a  crusty,  hard-fighting  old 


RODNEY’S  ARRIVAL  IN  WEST  INDIES.  377 

admiral  of  the  traditional  English  type,  Sir  Hyde  Parker, 
had  so  settled  himself  at  the  anchorage,  with  sixteen  ships, 
that  Guichen  with  his  twenty-two  would  not  attack.  The 
opportunity,  if  it  were  one,  did  not  recur.  De  Guichen,  re¬ 
turning  to  Martinique,  anchored  there  on  the  27th;  and  the 
same  day  Parker  at  Sta.  Lucia  was  joined  by  the  new  Eng¬ 
lish  commander-in-chief,  Rodney. 

This  since  celebrated,  but  then  only  distinguished,  admiral 
was  sixty-two  years  old  at  the  time  of  assuming  a  command 
where  he  was  to  win  an  undying  fame.  Of  distinguished 
courage  and  professional  skill,  but  with  extravagant  if  not 
irregular  habits,  money  embarrassments  had  detained  him 
in  exile  in  France  at  the  time  the  war  began.  A  boast  of 
his  ability  to  deal  with  the  French  fleet,  if  circumstances 
enabled  him  to  go  back  to  England,  led  a  French  nobleman 
who  heard  it  to  assume  his  debts,  moved  by  feelings  in 
which  chivalry  and  national  pique  probably  bore  equal  shares. 
Upon  his  return  he  was  given  a  command,  and  sailed,  in  Janu¬ 
ary,  1780,  with  a  fleet  of  twenty  ships-of-the-line,  to  relieve 
Gibraltar,  then  closely  invested.  Off  Cadiz,  with  a  good  luck 
for  which  he  was  proverbial,  he  fell  in  with  a  Spanish  fleet 
of  eleven  ships-of-the-line,  which  awkwardly  held  their  ground 
until  too  late  to  fly.1  Throwing  out  the  signal  for  a  general 
chase,  and  cutting  in  to  leeward  of  the  enemy,  between  them 
and  their  port,  Rodney,  despite  a  dark  and  stormy  night, 
succeeded  in  blowing  up  one  ship  and  taking  six.  Hasten¬ 
ing  on,  he  relieved  Gibraltar,  placing  it  out  of  all  danger 
from  want;  and  then,  leaving  the  prizes  and  the  bulk  of  his 
fleet,  sailed  with  the  rest  for  his  station. 

Despite  his  brilliant  personal  courage  and  professional 
skill,  which  in  the  matter  of  tactics  was  far  in  advance  of 
his  contemporaries  in  England,  Rodney,  as  a  commander-in- 
chief,  belongs  rather  to  the  wary,  cautious  school  of  the 
French  tacticians  than  to  the  impetuous,  unbounded  eager* 

1  Drinkwater,  in  his  history  of  the  siege  of  Gibraltar,  explains  that  the  Span¬ 
ish  admiral  believed  that  Rodney  would  not  accompany  the  convoy  to  the  Straits, 
but  had  separated  from  it.  He  did  not  detect  his  mistake  until  too  late. 


378 


RODNEY’S  MILITARY  CHARACTER. 


ness  of  Nelson.  As  in  Tourville  we  have  seen  the  desperate 
fighting  of  the  seventeenth  century,  unwilling  to  leave  its 
enemy,  merging  into  the  formal,  artificial  —  we  may  almost 
say  trifling  —  parade  tactics  of  the  eighteenth,  so  in  Rodney 
we  shall  see  the  transition  from  those  ceremonious  duels  to 
an  action  which,  while  skilful  in  conception,  aimed  at  serious 
results.  For  it  would  be  unjust  to  Rodney  to  press  the  com¬ 
parison  to  the  French  admirals  of  his  day.  With  a  skill 
that  De  Guichen  recognized  as  soon  as  they  crossed  swords, 
Rodney  meant  mischief,  not  idle  flourishes.  Whatever  inci¬ 
dental  favors  fortune  might  bestow  by  the  way,  the  objective 
from  which  his  eye  never  wandered  was  the  French  fleet, — 
the  organized  military  force  of  the  enemy  on  the  sea.  And 
on  the  day  when  Fortune  forsook  the  opponent  who  had  neg¬ 
lected  her  offers,  when  the  conqueror  of  Cornwallis  failed 
to  strike  while  he  had  Rodney  at  a  disadvantage,  the  latter 
won  a  victory  which  redeemed  England  from  the  depths  of 
anxiety,  and  restored  to  her  by  one  blow  all  those  islands 
which  the  cautious  tactics  of  the  allies  had  for  a  moment 
gained,  save  only  Tobago. 

De  Guichen  and  Rodney  met  for  the  first  time  on  the  17th 
of  April,  1780,  three  weeks  after  the  arrival  of  the  latter. 
The  French  fleet  was  beating  to  windward  in  the  Channel 
between  Martinique  and  Dominica,  when  the  enemy  was 
made  in  the  southeast.  A  day  was  spent  in  manoeuvring 
for  the  weather-gage,  which  Rodney  got.  The  two  fleets 
being  now  well  to  leeward  of  the  islands1  (Plate  XI.),  both 
on  the  starboard  tack  heading  to  the  northward  and  the 
French  on  the  lee  bow  of  the  English,  Rodney,  who  was  carry¬ 
ing  a  press  of  sail,  signalled  to  his  fleet  that  he  meant  to 
attack  the  enemy’s  rear  and  centre  with  his  whole  force  ;  and 
when  he  had  reached  the  position  he  thought  suitable,  ordered 
them  to  keep  away  eight  points  (90°)  together  (A,  A,  A). 
De  Guichen,  seeing  the  danger  of  the  rear,  wore  his  fleet  all 
together  and  stood  down  to  succor  it.  Rodney,  finding  him¬ 
self  foiled,  hauled  up  again  on  the  same  tack  as  the  enemy, 

1  The  place  where  the  battle  was  fought  is  shown  by  the  crossed  flags. 


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3T9 


both  fleets  now  heading  to  the  southward  and  eastward.1 
Later,  he  again  made  signal  for  battle,  followed  an  hour 
after,  just  at  noon,  by  the  order  (quoting  his  own  despatch), 
“  for  every  ship  to  bear  down  and  steer  for  her  opposite  in 
the  enemy’s  line.”  This,  which  sounds  like  the  old  story  of 
ship  to  ship,  Rodney  explains  to  have  meant  her  opposite  at 
the  moment,  not  her  opposite  in  numerical  order.  His  own 
words  are  :  “  In  a  slanting  position,  that  my  leading  ships 
might  attack  the  van  ships  of  the  enemy’s  centre  division, 
and  the  whole  British  fleet  be  opposed  to  onl}r  two  thirds 
of  the  enemy  ”  (B,  B).  The  difficulty  and  misunderstand¬ 
ing  which  followed  seem  to  have  sprung  mainly  from  the 
defective  character  of  the  signal  book.  Instead  of  doing  as 
the  admiral  wished,  the  leading  ships  (a)  carried  sail  so  as 
to  reach  their  supposed  station  abreast  their  numerical  oppo¬ 
site  in  the  order.  Rodney  stated  afterward  that  when  he 
bore  down  the  second  time,  the  French  fleet  was  in  a  very 
extended  line  of  battle ;  and  that,  had  his  orders  been  obeyed, 
the  centre  and  rear  must  have  been  disabled  before  the  van 
could  have  joined. 

There  seems  every  reason  to  believe  that  Rodney’s  inten¬ 
tions  throughout  were  to  double  on  the  French,  as  asserted. 
The  failure  sprang  from  the  signal-book  and  tactical  ineffL 
ciency  of  the  fleet ;  for  which  he,  having  lately  joined,  was  not 
answerable.  But  the  ugliness  of  his  fence  was  so  apparent  to 
De  Guichen,  that  he  exclaimed,  when  the  English  fleet  kept 
away  the  first  time,  that  six  or  seven  of  his  ships  were 
gone  ;  and  sent  word  to  Rodney  that  if  his  signals  had  been 
obeyed  he  would  have  had  him  for  his  prisoner.2  A  more 


1  The  black  ships,  in  position  A,  represent  the  English  ships  bearing  down 
upon  the  Erench  centre  and  rear.  The  line  v  r  is  the  line-of-battle  from  van  to 
rear  before  bearing  down.  The  positions  v',  r',  are  those  of  the  van  and  rear 
ships  after  hanling  up  on  the  port  tack,  when  the  French  wore. 

2  In  a  severe  reprimand  addressed  to  Captain  Carkett,  commanding  the  lead¬ 
ing  ship  of  the  English  line,  by  Rodney,  he  says  :  “  Your  leading  in  the  manner 
you  did,  induced  others  to  follow  so  bad  an  example ;  and  thereby,  forgetting 
that  the  signal  for  the  line  was  at  only  two  cables’  length  distance  from  each 
other,  the  van  division  was  led  by  you  to  more  than  two  leagues  distance  from  the 
centre  division,  which  was  thereby  exposed  to  the  greatest  strength  of  the  enemy 


380 


BREAKING  THE  LINE . 


convincing  proof  that  he  recognized  the  dangerousness  of  his 
enemy  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  he  took  care  not  to  have 
the  lee-gage  in  their  subsequent  encounters.  Rodney’s  care¬ 
ful  plans  being  upset,  he  showed  that  with  them  he  carried  all 
the  stubborn  courage  of  the  most  downright  fighter ;  taking 
his  own  ship  close  to  the  enemy  and  ceasing  only  when  the 
latter  hauled  off,  her  foremast  and  mainyard  gone,  and  her 
hull  so  damaged  that  she  could  hardly  be  kept  afloat. 

An  incident  of  this  battle  mentioned  by  French  writers 
and  by  Botta,1  who  probably  drew  upon  French  authorities, 
but  not  found  in  the  English  accounts,  shows  the  critical 
nature  of  the  attack  in  the  apprehension  of  the  French. 
According  to  them,  Rodney,  marking  a  gap  in  their  order 
due  to  a  ship  in  rear  of  the  French  admiral  being  out  of 
station,  tried  to  break  through  (b)  ;  but  the  captain  of  the 
“  Destin,”  seventy-four,  pressed  up  under  more  sail  and  threw 
himself  across  the  path  of  the  English  ninety-gun  ship. 

“  The  action  of  the  ‘  Destin  ’  was  justly  praised,”  says  Lapeyrouse- 
Bonfils.  “  The  fleet  ran  the  danger  of  almost  certain  defeat,  but  for 
the  bravery  of  M.  de  Goimpv.  Such,  after  the  affair,  was  the  opinion  of 
the  whole  French  squadron.  Yet,  admitting  that  our  line  was  broken, 
what  disasters  then  would  necessarily  threaten  the  fleet?  Would  it 
not  always  have  been  easy  for  our  rear  to  remedy  the  accident  by 
promptly  standing  on  to  fill  the  place  of  the  vessels  cut  off?  That 
movement  would  necessarily  have  brought  about  a  melee,  which  would 
have  turned  to  the  advantage  of  the  fleet  having  the  bravest  and  most 
devoted  captains.  But  then,  as  under  the  empire,  it  was  an  acknowl¬ 
edged  principle  that  ships  cut  off  were  ships  taken,  and  the  belief 
wrought  its  own  fulfilment.” 

The  effect  of  breaking  an  enemy’s  line,  or  order-of-battle, 
depends  upon  several  conditions.  The  essential  idea  is  to 

and  not  properly  supported”  (Life,  vol.  i.  p.  351).  By  all  rules  of  tactical 
common-sense  it  would  seem  that  the  other  ships  should  have  taken  their  distance 
from  their  next  astern,  that  is,  should  have  closed  toward  the  centre.  In  conver¬ 
sation  with  Sir  Gilbert  Blane,  who  was  not  in  this  action,  Rodney  stated  that  the 
French  line  extended  four  leagues  in  length,  “as  if  Pe  Guichen  thought  we 
meant  to  run  away  from  him”  (Naval  Chronicle,  vol.  xxv.  p.  402). 

1  History  of  the  American  Revolution. 


RODNEY  IN  NEW  YORK. 


381 


divide  the  opposing  force  by  penetrating  through  an  interval 
found,  or  made,  in  it,  and  then  to  concentrate  upon  that  one 
of  the  fractions  which  can  be  least  easily  helped  by  the 
other.  In  a  column  of  ships  this  will  usually  be  the  rear. 
The  compactness  of  the  order  attacked,  the  number  of  the 
ships  cut  off,  the  length  of  time  during  which  they  can  be 
isolated  and  outnumbered,  will  all  affect  the  results.  A 
very  great  factor  in  the  issue  will  be  the  moral  effect,  the 
confusion  introduced  into  a  line  thus  broken.  Ships  coming 
up  toward  the  break  are  stopped,  the  rear  doubles  up,  while 
the  ships  ahead  continue  their  course.  Such  a  moment 
is  critical,  and  calls  for  instant  action ;  but  the  men  are 
rare  who  in  an  unforeseen  emergency  can  see,  and  at  once 
take  the  right  course,  especially  if,  being  subordinates, 
they  incur  responsibility.  In  such  a  scene  of  confusion  the 
English,  without  presumption,  hoped  to  profit  by  their  bet¬ 
ter  seamanship ;  for  it  is  not  only  “  courage  and  devotion,” 
but  skill,  which  then  tells.  All  these  effects  of  “  break¬ 
ing  the  line”  received  illustration  in  Rodney’s  great  battle 
in  1782. 

De  Guichen  and  Rodney  met  twice  again  in  the  following 
month,  but  on  neither  occasion  did  the  French  admiral  take 
the  favorite  lee-gage  of  his  nation.  Meanwhile  a  Spanish 
fleet  of  twelve  ships-of-the-line  was  on  its  way  to  join  the 
French.  Rodney  cruised  to  windward  of  Martinique  to  inter¬ 
cept  them  ;  but  the  Spanish  admiral  kept  a  northerly  course, 
sighted  Guadeloupe,  and  thence  sent  a  despatch  to  De  Guichen, 
who  joined  his  allies  and  escorted  them  into  port.  The  great 
preponderance  of  the  coalition,  in  numbers,  raised  the  fears  of 
the  English  islands ;  but  lack  of  harmony  led  to  delays  and 
hesitations,  a  terrible  epidemic  raged  in  the  Spanish  squad¬ 
ron,  and  the  intended  operations  came  to  nothing.  In  August 
De  Guichen  sailed  for  France  with  fifteen  ships.  Rodney, 
ignorant  of  his  destination,  and  anxious  about  both  North 
America  and  Jamaica,  divided  his  fleet,  leaving  one  half  in 
the  islands,  and  with  the  remainder  sailing  for  New  York, 
where  he  arrived  on  the  12th  of  September.  The  risk  thus 


382  RODNEY  RETURNS  TO  THE  WEST  INDIES. 


run  was  very  great,  and  scarcely  justifiable  ;  but  no  ill  effect 
followed  the  dispersal  of  forces.1  Had  De  Guichen  intended 
to  turn  upon  Jamaica,  or,  as  was  expected  by  Washington, 
upon  New  York,  neither  part  of  Rodney’s  fleet  could  well  have 
withstood  him.  Two  chances  of  disaster,  instead  of  one,  were 
run,  by  being  in  small  force  on  two  fields  instead  of  in  full 
force  on  one. 

Rodney’s  anxiety  about  North  America  was  well  grounded. 
On  the  12th  of  July  of  this  year  the  long  expected  French 
succor  arrived,  —  five  thousand  French  troops  under  Rocham- 
beau  and  seven  ships-of-the-line  under  De  Ternay.  Hence 
the  English,  though  still  superior  at  sea,  felt  forced  to  con¬ 
centrate  at  New  York,  and  were  unable  to  strengthen  their 
operations  in  Carolina.  The  difficulty  and  distance  of  move¬ 
ments  by  land  gave  such  an  advantage  to  sea  power  that 
Lafayette  urged  the  French  government  further  to  increase 
the  fleet ;  but  it  was  still  naturally  and  properly  attentive  to 
its  own  immediate  interests  in  the  Antilles.  It  was  not  yet 
time  to  deliver  America. 

Rodney,  having  escaped  the  great  hurricane  of  October, 
1T80,  by  his  absence,  returned  to  the  West  Indies  later  in 
the  year,  and  soon  after  heard  of  the  war  between  England 
and  Holland  ;  which,  proceeding  from  causes  which  will  be 
mentioned  later,  was  declared  December  20,  1780.  The  ad¬ 
miral  at  once  seized  the  Dutch  islands  of  St.  Eustatius  and 
St.  Martin,  besides  numerous  merchant-ships,  with  property 
amounting  in  all  to  fifteen  million  dollars.  These  islands, 
while  still  neutral,  had  played  a  role  similar  to  that  of  Nas¬ 
sau  during  the  American  Civil  War,  and  had  become  a  great 
depot  of  contraband  goods,  immense  quantities  of  which  now 
fell  into  the  English  hands. 

The  year  1780  had  been  gloomy  for  the  cause  of  the  United 
States.  The  battle  of  Camden  had  seemed  to  settle  the  Eng¬ 
lish  yoke  on  South  Carolina,  and  the  enemy  formed  high  hopes 
of  controlling  both  North  Carolina  and  Virginia.  The  treason 
of  Arnold  following  had  increased  the  depression,  which  was 

1  For  Rodney’s  reasons,  see  his  Life,  vol.  i.  pp.  365,  376. 


DE  GRASSE  SAILS  FROM  BREST. 


383 


but  partially  relieved  by  the  victory  at  King’s  Mountain.  The 
substantial  aid  of  French  troops  was  the  most  cheerful  spot 
in  the  situation.  Yet  even  that  had  a  checkered  light,  the 
second  division  of  the  intended  help  being  blocked  in  Brest 
by  the  English  fleet ;  while  the  final  failure  of  De  Guichen  to 
appear^and  Rodney  coming  in  his  stead,  made  the  hopes  of 
the  campaign  fruitless. 

A  period  of  vehement  and  decisive  action  was,  however,  at 
hand.  At  the  end  of  March,  1781,  the  Comte  de  Grasse  sailed 
from  Brest  with  twenty-six  ships-of-the-line  and  a  large  con¬ 
voy.  When  off  the  Azores,  five  ships  parted  company  for 
the  East  Indies,  under  Suffren,  of  whom  more  will  be  heard 
later  on.  De  Grasse  came  in  sight  of  Martinique  on  the  28th 
of  April.  Admiral  Hood  (Rodney  having  remained  behind  at 
St.  Eustatius)  was  blockading  before  Fort  Royal,  the  French 
port  and  arsenal  on  the  lee  side  of  the  island,  in  which  were 
four  ships-of-the-line,  when  his  lookouts  reported  the  enemy’s 
fleet.  Hood  had  two  objects  before  him,  —  one  to  prevent  the 
junction  of  the  four  blockaded  ships  with  the  approaching 
fleet,  the  other  to  keep  the  latter  from  getting  between  him 
and  Gros  Ilot  Bay  in  Sta.  Lucia.  Instead  of  effecting  this 
in  the  next  twenty-four  hours,  by  beating  to  windward  of 
the  Diamond  Rock,  his  fleet  got  so  far  to  leeward  that  De 
Grasse,  passing  through  the  channel  on  the  29th,  headed  up 
for  Fort  Royal,  keeping  his  convoy  between  the  fleet  and  the 
island.  For  this  false  position  Hood  was  severely  blamed  by 
Rodney,  but  it  may  have  been  due  to  light  winds  and  the  lee 
current.  However  that  be,  the  four  ships  in  Fort  Royal  got 
under  way  and  joined  the  main  body.  The  English  had  now 
only  eighteen  ships  to  the  French  twenty-four,  and  the  latter 
were  to  windward ;  but  though  thus  in  the  proportion  of  four 
to  three,  and  having  the  power  to  attack,  De  Grasse  would  not 
do  it.  The  fear  of  exposing  his  convoy  prevented  him  from 
running  the  chance  of  a  serious  engagement.  Great  must 
have  been  his  distrust  of  his  forces,  one  would  say.  When 
is  a  navy  to  fight,  if  this  was  not  a  time  ?  He  carried  on 
a  distant  cannonade,  with  results  so  far  against  the  English 


384  CORNWALLIS  IN  THE  SOUTHERN  STATES. 


as  to  make  liis  backwardness  yet  more  extraordinary.  Can 
a  policy  or  a  tradition  which  justifies  such  a  line  of  conduct 
be  good  ? 

The  following  day,  April  80,  De  Grasse,  having  thrown  away 
his  chance,  attempted  to  follow  Hood  ;  but  the  latter  had  no 
longer  any  reason  for  fighting,  and  his  original  inferiority  was 
increased  by  the  severe  injuries  of  some  ships  on  the  29th. 
De  Grasse  could  not  overtake  him,  owing  to  the  inferior  speed 
of  his  fleet,  many  of  the  ships  not  being  coppered,  —  a  fact 
worthy  of  note,  as  French  vessels  by  model  and  size  were  gen¬ 
erally  faster  than  English ;  but  this  superiority  was  sacrificed 
through  the  delay  of  the  government  in  adopting  the  new 
improvement. 

Hood  rejoined  Rodney  at  Antigua ;  and  De  Grasse,  after  re¬ 
maining  a  short  time  at  Fort  Royal,  made  an  attempt  upon 
Gros  Ilot  Bay,  the  possession  of  which  by  the  English  kept 
all  the  movements  of  his  fleet  under  surveillance.  Foiled 
here,  he  moved  against  Tobago,  which  surrendered  June  2, 
1781.  Sailing  thence,  after  some  minor  operations,  he  an¬ 
chored  on  the  26th  of  July  at  Cap  Frangais  (now  Cape  Hay- 
tien),  in  the  island  of  Hayti.  Here  he  found  awaiting  him  a 
French  frigate  from  the  United  States,  bearing  despatches 
from  Washington  and  Rochambeau,  upon  which  he  was  to 
take  the  most  momentous  action  that  fell  to  any  French 
admiral  during  the  war. 

The  invasion  of  the  Southern  States  by  the  English,  be¬ 
ginning  in  Georgia  and  followed  by  the  taking  of  Charles¬ 
ton  and  the  military  control  of  the  two  extreme  States,  had 
been  pressed  on  to  the  northward  by  way  of  Camden  into 
North  Carolina.  On  the  16th  of  August,  1780,  General  Gates 
was  totally  defeated  at  Camden  ;  and  during  the  following 
nine  months  the  English  under  Cornwallis  persisted  in  their 
attempts  to  overrun  North  Carolina.  These  operations,  the 
narration  of  which  is  foreign  to  our  immediate  subject,  had 
ended  by  forcing  Cornwallis,  despite  many  successes  in  actual 
encounter,  to  fall  back  exhausted  toward  the  seaboard,  and 
finally  upon  Wilmington,  in  which  place  depots  for  such  a 


ARNOLD  ON  THE  JAMES  RIVER . 


385 


contingency  had  been  established.  His  opponent,  General 
Greene,  then  turned  the  American  troops  toward  South  Caro¬ 
lina.  Cornwallis,  too  weak  to  dream  of  controlling,  or  even 
penetrating,  into  the  interior  of  an  unfriendly  country,  had 
now  to  choose  between  returning  to  Charleston,  to  assure  there 
and  in  South  Carolina  the  shaken  British  power,  and  moving 
northward  again  into  Virginia,  there  to  join  hands  with  a 
small  expeditionary  force  operating  on  the  James  River  under 
Generals  Phillips  and  Arnold.  To  fall  back  would  be  a  con¬ 
fession  that  the  weary  marching  and  fighting  of  months  past 
had  been  without  results,  and  the  general  readily  convinced 
himself  that  the  Chesapeake  was  the  proper  seat  of  war,  even 
if  New  York  itself  had  to  be  abandoned.  The  commander-in 
chief,  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  by  no  means  shared  this  opinion, 
upon  which  was  justified  a  step  taken  without  asking  him. 
“  Operations  in  the  Chesapeake,”  he  wrote,  “  are  attended 
with  great  risk  unless  we  are  sure  of  a  permanent  superiority 
at  sea.  I  tremble  for  the  fatal  consequences  that  may  ensue.” 
For  Cornwallis,  taking  the  matter  into  his  own  hands,  had 
marched  from  Wilmington  on  the  25th  of  April,  1781,  joining 
the  British  already  at  Petersburg  on  the  20th  of  May.  The 
forces  thus  united  numbered  seven  thousand  men.  Driven 
back  from  the  open  country  of  South  Carolina  into  Charles¬ 
ton,  there  now  remained  two  centres  of  British  power,  —  at 
New  York  and  in  the  Chesapeake.  With  New  Jersey  and 
Pennsylvania  in  the  hands  of  the  Americans,  communication 
between  the  two  depended  wholly  upon  the  sea. 

Despite  his  unfavorable  criticism  of  Cornwallis’s  action, 
Clinton  had  himself  already  risked  a  large  detachment  in 
the  Chesapeake.  A  body  of  sixteen  hundred  men  under  Bene¬ 
dict  Arnold  had  ravaged  the  country  of  the  James  and 
burned  Richmond  in  January  of  this  same  year.  In  the 
hopes  of  capturing  Arnold,  Lafayette  had  been  sent  to  Vir¬ 
ginia  with  a  nucleus  of  twelve  hundred  troops,  and  on  the 
evening  of  the  8th  of  March  the  French  squadron  at  Newport 
sailed,  in  concerted  movement,  to  control  the  waters  of  the 
bay.  Admiral  Arbuthnot,  commanding  the  English  fleet  lying 

25 


386  NAVAL  BATTLE  OFF  THE  CHESAPEAKE. 


in  Gardiner’s  Bay,1  learned  the  departure  by  his  lookouts,  and 
started  in  pursuit  on  the  morning  of  the  10th,  thirty-six  hours 
later.  Favored  either  by  diligence  or  luck,  he  made  such  good 
time  that  when  the  two  fleets  came  in  sight  of  each  other, 
a  little  outside  of  the  capes  of  the  Chesapeake,  the  English, 
were  leading2  (Plate  XII.,  A,  A).  They  at  once  went  about 
to  meet  their  enemy,  who,  on  his  part,  formed  a  line-of-battle. 
The  wind  at  this  time  was  west,  so  that  neither  could  head 
directly  into  the  bay. 

The  two  fleets  were  nearly  equal  in  strength,  there  being 
eight  ships  on  each  side  ;  but  the  English  had  one  ninety- 
gun  ship,  while  of  the  French  one  was  only  a  heavy  frigate, 
which  was  put  into  the  line.  Nevertheless,  the  case  was  emi¬ 
nently  one  for  the  general  French  policy  to  have  determined 
the  action  of  a  vigorous  chief,  and  the  failure  to  see  the  mat¬ 
ter  through  must  fall  upon  the  good-will  of  Commodore,  Des- 
touches,  or  upon  some  other  cause  than  that  preference  for 
the  ulterior  objects  of  the  operations,  of  which  the  reader  of 
French  naval  history  hears  so  much.  The  weather  was  bois¬ 
terous  and  threatening,  and  the  wind,  after  hauling  once  or 
twice,  settled  down  to  northeast,  with  a  big  sea,  but  was  then 
fair  for  entering  the  bay.  The  two  fleets  were  by  this  time 
both  on  the  port  tack  standing  out  to  sea,  the  French  leading, 
and  about  a  point  on  the  weather  bow  of  the  English  (B,  B). 
From  this  position  they  wore  in  succession  (c)  ahead  of  the 
latter,  taking  the  lee-gage,  and  thus  gaining  the  use  of  their 
lower  batteries,  which  the  heavy  sea  forbade  to  the  weather- 
gage.  The  English  stood  on  till  abreast  the  enemy’s  line 
(a,  b),  when  they  wore  together,  and  soon  after  attacked  in 
the  usual  manner,  and  with  the  usual  results  (C).  The  three 
van  ships  were  very  badly  injured  aloft,  but  in  their  turn, 
throwing  their  force  mainly  on  the  two  leaders  of  the  enemy, 
crippled  them  seriously  in  hulls  and  rigging.  The  French  van 
then  kept  away,  and  Arbuthnot,  in  perplexity,  ordered  his 

1  At  the  eastern  end  of  Long  Island. 

2  The  French  ascribe  this  disadvantage  to  the  fact  that  some  of  their  ship# 
were  not  coppered. 


CORNWALLIS  OCCUPIES  YORKTOWN. 


387 


van  to  haul  the  wind  again.  M.  Destouches  now  executed  a 
very  neat  movement  by  defiling.  Signalling  his  van  to  haul 
up  on  the  other  tack  (e),  he  led  the  rest  of  his  squadron  by 
the  disabled  English  ships,  and  after  giving  them  the  suc¬ 
cessive  broadsides  of  his  comparatively  fresh  ships,  wore  (d), 
and  out  to  sea  (D).  This  was  the  end  of  the  battle,  in  which 
the  English  certainly  got  the  worst  ;  but  with  their  usual 
tenacity  of  purpose,  being  unable  to  pursue  their  enemy  afloat, 
they  steered  for  the  bay  (D),  made  the  junction  with  Arnold, 
and  thus  broke  up  the  plans  of  the  French  and  Americans, 
from  which  so  much  had  been  hoped  by  Washington.  There 
can  be  no  doubt,  after  careful  reading  of  the  accounts,  that 
after  the  fighting  the  French  were  in  better  force  than  the 
English,  and  they  in  fact  claimed  the  victory ;  yet  the  ulte¬ 
rior  objects  of  the  expedition  did  not  tempt  them  again  to  try 
the  issue  with  a  fleet  of  about  their  own  size.1 

The  way  of  the  sea  being  thus  open  and  held  in  force,  two 
thousand  more  English  troops  sailing  from  New  York  reached 
Virginia  on  the  26th  of  March,  and  the  subsequent  arrival  of 
Cornwallis  in  May  raised  the  number  to  seven  thousand.  The 
operations  of  the  contending  forces  during  the  spring  and 
summer  months,  in  which  Lafayette  commanded  the  Ameri¬ 
cans,  do  not  concern  our  subject.  Early  in  August,  Corn¬ 
wallis,  acting  under  orders  from  Clinton,  withdrew  his  troops 
into  the  peninsula  between  the  York  and  James  rivers,  and 
occupied  Yorktown. 

Washington  and  Rochambeau  had  met  on  the  21st  of  May, 
and  decided  that  the  situation  demanded  that  the  effort  of  the 
French  West  Indian  fleet,  when  it  came,  should  be  directed 
against  either  New  York  or  the  Chesapeake.  This  was  the 
tenor  of  the  despatch  found  by  De  Grasse  at  Cap  Frangais, 

1  That  the  French  government  was  not  satisfied  with  M.  Destouches’s  action 
can  be  safely  inferred  from  its  delay  to  reward  the  officers  of  the  squadron, 
which  called  forth  much  feeling  and  very  lively  remonstrances.  The  French 
asserted  that  Arbuthnot  was  hooted  in  the  streets  of  New  York  and  recalled  by 
his  government.  The  latter  is  a  mistake,  as  he  went  home  by  his  own  request ; 
but  the  former  is  likely  enough.  Both  commanders  reversed  in  this  case  tho 
usual  naval  policy  of  their  nations. 


388 


DE  GRASSE  IN  THE  CHESAPEAKE. 


and  meantime  the  allied  generals  drew  their  troops  toward 
New  York,  where  they  would  be  on  hand  for  the  furtherance 
of  one  object,  and  nearer  the  second  if  they  had  to  make  for  it. 

Jn  either  case  the  result,  in  the  opinion  both  of  Washington 
and  of  the  French  government,  depended  upon  superior  sea 
power ;  but  Rpchambeau  had  privately  notified  the  admiral 
that  his  own  preference  was  for  the  Chesapeake  as  the  scene 
of  the  intended  operations,  and  moreover  the  French  gov¬ 
ernment  had  declined  to  furnish  the  means  for  a  formal  siege 
of  New  York.1  The  enterprise  therefore  assumed  the  form 
of  an  extensive  military  combination,  dependent  upon  ease 
sand  rapidity  of  movement,  and  upon  blinding  the  eyes  of  the 
enemy  to  the  real  objective,  —  purposes  to  which  the  peculiar 
qualities  of  a  navy  admirably  lent  themselves.  The  shorter 
distance  to  be  traversed,  the  greater  depth  of  water  and 
easier  pilotage  of  the  Chesapeake,  were  further  reasons  which 
would  commend  the  scheme  to  the  judgment  of  a  seaman ; 
and  De  Grasse  readily  accepted  it,  without  making  difficulties 
■or  demanding  modifications  which  would  have  involved  dis¬ 
cussion  and  delay. 

Having  made  his  decision,  the  French  admiral  acted  with 
great  good  judgment,  promptitude,  and  vigor.  The  same 
frigate  that  brought  despatches  from  Washington  was  sent 
hack,  so  that  by  August  15th  the  allied  generals  knew  of  the 
intended  coming  of  the  fleet.  Thirty-five  hundred  soldiers 
were  spared  by  the  governor  of  Cap  Frangais,  upon  the 
condition  of  a  Spanish  squadron  anchoring  at  the  place,  which 
De  Grasse  procured.  He  also  raised  from  the  governor  of 
Havana  the  money  urgently  needed  hy  the  Americans ;  and 
finally,  instead  of  weakening  his  force  by  sending  convoys 
to  France,  as  the  court  had  wished,  he  took  every  available 
:ship  to  the  Chesapeake.  To  conceal  his  coming  as  long  as 
possible,  he  passed  through  the  Bahama  Channel,  as  a  less 
frequented  route,  and  on  the  30th  of  August  anchored  in 
iLynnhaven  Bay,  just  within  the  capes  of  the  Chesapeake,  with 
twenty-eight  ships-of-th e-line.  Three  days  before,  August  27, 

1  Bancroft :  History  of  the  United  States. 


CORNWALLIS  SHUT  UP  IN  YORK  TOWN 


389 


the  French  squadron  at  Newport,  eight  ships-of-the-line  with 
four  frigates  and  eighteen  transports  under  M.  de  Barra s, 
sailed  for  the  rendezvous ;  making,  however,  a  wide  circuit 
out  to  sea  to  avoid  the  English.  This  course  was  the  more 
necessary  as  the  French  siege-artillery  was  with  it.  The 
troops  under  Washington  and  Rochambeau  had  crossed  the 
Hudson  on  the  24th  of  August,  moving  toward  the  head  of 
Chesapeake  Bay.  Thus  the  different  armed  forces,  both  land 
and  sea,  were  converging  toward  their  objective,  Cornwallis. 

The  English  were  unfortunate  in  all  directions.  Rodney* 
learning  of  De  Grasse’s  departure,  sent  fourteen  ships-of-the- 
line  under  Admiral  Hood  to  North  America,  and  himself 
sailed  for  England  in  August,  on  account  of  ill  health.  Hood, 
going  by  the  direct  route,  reached  the  Chesapeake  three  days 
before  De  Grasse,  looked  into  the  bay,  and  finding  it  empty 
went  on  to  New  York.  There  he  met  five  ships-of-the-line 
under  Admiral  Graves,  who,  being  senior  officer,  took  com¬ 
mand  of  the  whole  force  and  sailed  on  the  31st  of  August 
for  the  Chesapeake,  hoping  to  intercept  De  Barras  before 
he  could  join  De  Grasse.  It  was  not  till  two  days  later 
that  Sir  Henry  Clinton  was  persuaded  that  the  allied  armies 
had  gone  against  Cornwallis,  and  had  too  far  the  start  to 
be  overtaken. 

Admiral  Graves  was  painfully  surprised,  on  making  the 
Chesapeake,  to  find  anchored  there  a  fleet  which  from  its 
numbers  could  only  be  an  enemy’s.  Nevertheless,  he  stood  in 
to  meet  it,  and  as  De  Grasse  got  under  way,  allowing  his 
ships  to  be  counted,  the  sense  of  numerical  inferiority  — 
nineteen  to  twenty-four  —  did  not  deter  the  English  admiral 
from  attacking.  The  clumsiness  of  his  method,  however* 
betrayed  his  gallantry ;  many  of  his  ships  were  roughly 
handled,  without  any  advantage  being  gained.  De  Grasse* 
expecting  De  Barras,  remained  outside  five  days,  keeping  the 
English  fleet  in  play  without  coming  to  action ;  then  return¬ 
ing  to  port  he  found  De  Barras  safely  at  anchor.  Graves  went 
back  to  New  York,  and  with  him  disappeared  the  last  hope  of 
succor  that  was  to  gladden  Cornwallis’s  eyes.  The  siege  was 


390  MISMANAGEMENT  OF  THE  ENGLISH  NAVY. 


steadily  endured,  but  the  control  of  the  sea  made  only  one 
issue  possible,  and  the  English  forces  were  surrendered  Octo¬ 
ber  19,  1781.  With  this  disaster  the  hope  of  subduing  the 
colonies  died  in  England.  The  conflict  flickered  through  a 
year  longer,  but  no  serious  operations  were  undertaken. 

In  the  conduct  of  the  English  operations,  which  ended  thus 
unfortunately,  there  was  both  bad  management  and  ill  fortune. 
Hood’s  detachment  might  have  been  strengthened  by  several 
ships  from  Jamaica,  had  Rodney’s  orders  been  carried  out.1 
The  despatch-ship,  also,  sent  by  him  to  Admiral  Graves 
commanding  in  New  York,  found  that  officer  absent  on  a 
cruise  to  the  eastward,  with  a  view  to  intercept  certain  very 
important  supplies  which  had  been  forwarded  by  the  American 
agent  in  France.  The  English  Court  had  laid  great  stress 
upon  cutting  off  this  convoy  ;  but,  with  the  knowledge  that 
he  had  of  the  force  accompanying  it,  the  admiral  was  probably 
ill-advised  in  leaving  his  headquarters  himself,  with  all  his 
fleet,  at  the  time  when  the  approach  of  the  hurricane  season 
in  the  West  Indies  directed  the  active  operations  of  the  navies 
toward  the  continent.  In  consequence  of  his  absence,  al¬ 
though  Rodney’s  despatches  were  at  once  sent  on  by  the 
senior  officer  in  New  York,  the  vessel  carrying  them  being 
driven  ashore  by  enemy’s  cruisers,  Graves  did  not  learn  their 
contents  until  his  return  to  port,  August  16.  The  informa¬ 
tion  sent  by  Hood  of  his  coming  was  also  intercepted.  After 
Hood’s  arrival,  it  does  not  appear  that  there  was  avoidable 
delay  in  going  to  sea ;  but  there  does  seem  to  have  been  mis- 
judgment  in  the  direction  given  to  the  fleet.  It  was  known 
that  De  Barras  had  sailed  from  Newport  with  eight  ships, 
bound  probably  for  the  Chesapeake,  certainly  to  effect  a 
junction  with  De  Grasse  ;  and  it  has  been  judiciously  pointed 
out  that  if  Graves  had  taken  up  his  cruising-ground  near  the 
Capes,  but  out  of  sight  of  land,  he  could  hardly  have  failed 
to  fall  in  with  him  in  overwhelming  force.  Knowing  what 
is  now  known,  this  would  undoubtedly  have  been  the  proper 
thing  to  do ;  but  the  English  admiral  had  imperfect  informa- 

1  Life  of  Rodne}r,  vol.  ii.  p.  152;  Clerk:  Naval  Tactics,  p.  84. 


CONDUCT  OF  ADMIRAL  GRAVES. 


391 


tion.  It  was  nowhere  expected  that  the  French  would  bring 
nearly  the  force  they  did  ;  and  Graves  lost  information,  which 
he  ought  to  have  received,  as  to  their  numbers,  by  the  care¬ 
lessness  of  his  cruisers  stationed  off  the  Chesapeake.  These 
had  been  ordered  to  keep  under  way,  but  were  both  at  anchor 
under  Cape  Henry  when  De  Grasse’s  appearance  cut  off  their 
escape.  One  was  captured,  the  other  driven  up  York  River. 
No  single  circumstance  contributed  more  to  the  general  result 
than  the  neglect  of  these  two  subordinate  officers,  by  which 
Graves  lost  that  all-important  information.  It  can  readily 
be  conceived  how  his  movements  might  have  been  affected, 
had  he  known  two  days  earlier  that  De  Grasse  had  brought 
twenty-seven  or  twenty-eight  sail  of  the  line  ;  how  natural 
would  have  been  the  conclusion,  first,  to  waylay  De  Barras, 
with  whom  his  own  nineteen  could  more  than  cope.  “  Had 
Admiral  Graves  succeeded  in  capturing  that  squadron,  it 
would  have  greatly  paralyzed  the  besieging  army  [it  had 
the  siege  train  on  board],  if  it  would  not  have  prevented 
its  operations  altogether ;  it  would  have  put  the  two  fleets 
nearly  on  an  equality  in  point  of  numbers,  would  have  ar¬ 
rested  the  progress  of  the  French  arms  for  the  ensuing 
year  in  the  West  Indies,  and  might  possibly  have  created 
such  a  spirit  of  discord  between  the  French  and  Ameri¬ 
cans  1  as  would  have  sunk  the  latter  into  the  lowest  depths 
of  despair,  from  which  they  were  only  extricated  by  the 
arrival  of  the  forces  under  De  Grasse.”  2  These  are  true 
and  sober  comments  upon  the  naval  strategy. 

In  regard  to  the  admiral’s  tactics,  it  will  be  enough  to  say 
that  the  fleet  was  taken  into  battle  nearly  as  Byng  took  his  ; 
that  very  similar  mishaps  resulted ;  and  that,  when  attack¬ 
ing  twenty-four  ships  with  nineteen,  seven,  under  that  capable 
officer  Hood,  were  not  able  to  get  into  action,  owing  to  the 
dispositions  made. 

1  De  Barras  had  been  unwilling  to  go  to  the  Chesapeake,  fearing  to  be  inter¬ 
cepted  by  a  superior  force,  and  had  only  yielded  to  the  solicitation  of  Washington 
and  Rochambeau. 

2  Naval  Researches :  Capt.  Thomas  White,  R.  N. 


392  MILITARY  SITUATION  OF  ENGLAND 

On  the  French  side  De  Grasse  must  be  credited  with  a 
degree  of  energy,  foresight,  and  determination  surprising  in 
view  of  his  failures  at  other  times.  The  decision  to  take 
every  ship  with  him,  which  made  him  independent  of  any 
failure  on  the  part  of  De  Barras  ;  the  passage  through  the 
Bahama  Channel  to  conceal  his  movements ;  the  address 
with  which  he  obtained  the  money  and  troops  required,  from 
the  Spanish  and  the  French  military  authorities  ;  the  pre¬ 
vision  which  led  him,  as  early  as  March  29,  shortly  after 
leaving  Brest,  to  write  to  Rochambeau  that  American  coast 
pilots  should  be  sent  to  Cap  Francais ;  the  coolness  with 
which  he  kept  Graves  amused  until  De  Barras’s  squadron 
had  slipped  in,  are  all  points  worthy  of  admiration.  The 
French  were  also  helped  by  the  admiral’s  power  to  detain  the 
two  hundred  merchant-ships,  the  “  West  India  trade,”  await¬ 
ing  convoy  at  Cap  Francais,  where  they  remained  from  July 
till  November,  when  the  close  of  operations  left  him  at 
liberty  to  convoy  them  with  ships-of-war.  The  incident 
illustrates  one  weakness  of  a  mercantile  country  with  repre¬ 
sentative  government,  compared  with  a  purely  military  nation. 
“  If  the  British  government,”  wrote  an  officer  of  that  day, 
“  had  sanctioned,  or  a  British  admiral  had  adopted,  such  a 
measure,  the  one  would  have  been  turned  out  and  the  other 
hanged.”  1  Rodney  at  the  same  time  had  felt  it  necessary  to 
detach  five  ships-of-the-line  with  convoys,  while  half  a  dozen 
more  went  home  with  the  trade  from  Jamaica. 

It  is  easier  to  criticise  the  division  of  the  English  fleet  be¬ 
tween  the  West  Indies  and  North  America  in  the  successive 
years  1780  and  1781,  than  to  realize  the  embarrassment  of 
the  situation.  This  embarrassment  was  but  the  reflection  of 
the  military  difficulty  of  England’s  position,  all  over  the 
world,  in  this  great  and  unequal  war.  England  was  every¬ 
where  outmatched  and  embarrassed,  as  she  has  alwavs  been 
as  an  empire,  by  the  number  of  her  exposed  points.  In 
Europe  the  Channel  fleet  was  more  than  once  driven  into  its 
ports  by  overwhelming  forces.  Gibraltar,  closely  blockaded 

1  White :  Naval  Researches. 


IN  THE  WAR  OF  1778. 


393 


by  land  and  sea,  was  only  kept  alive  in  its  desperate  resist¬ 
ance  by  the  skill  of  English  seamen  triumphing  over  the  in¬ 
aptness  and  discords  of  their  combined  enemies.  In  the  East 
Indies,  Sir  Edw,ard  Hughes  met  in  Suffren  an  opponent  as 
superior  to  him  in  numbers  as  was  De  Grasse  to  Hood,  and  of 
far  greater  ability.  Minorca,  abandoned  by  the  home  gov¬ 
ernment,  fell  before  superior  strength,  as  has  been  seen  to 
fall,  one  by  one,  the  less  important  of  the  English  Antilles. 
The  position  of  England  from  the  time  that  France  and  Spain 
opened  their  maritime  war  was  everywhere  defensive,  except 
in  North  America;  and  was  therefore, from  the  military  point 
of  view,  essentially  false.  She  everywhere  awaited  attacks 
which  the  enemies,  superior  in  every  case,  could  make  at 
their  own  choice  and  their  own  time.  North  America  was 
really  no  exception  to  this  rule,  despite  some  offensive  opera¬ 
tions  which  in  no  way  injured  her  real,  that  is  her  naval,  foes. 

Thus  situated,  and  putting  aside  questions  of  national  pride 
or  sensitiveness,  what  did  military  wisdom  prescribe  to  Eng¬ 
land  ?  The  question  would  afford  an  admirable  study  to  a 
military  inquirer,  and  is  not  to  be  answered  off-hand,  but 
certain  evident  truths  may  be  pointed  out.  In  the  first  place, 
it  should  have  been  determined  what  part  of  the  assailed  em¬ 
pire  was  most  necessary  to  be  preserved.  After  the  British 
islands  themselves,  the  North  American  colonies  were  the 
most  valuable  possessions  in  the  eyes  of  the  England  of  that 
day.  Next  should  have  been  decided  what  others  by  their 
natural  importance  were  best  worth  preserving,  and  by  their 
own  inherent  strength,  or  that  of  the  empire,  which  was  mainly 
naval  strength,  could  most  surely  be  held.  In  the  Mediterra¬ 
nean,  for  instance,  Gibraltar  and  Mahon  were  both  very  valu¬ 
able  positions.  Could  both  be  held  ?  Which  was  more  easily 
to  be  reached  and  supported  by  the  fleet  ?  If  both  could  not 
probably  be  held,  one  should  have  been  frankly  abandoned, 
and  the  force  and  efforts  necessary  to  its  defence  carried 
elsewhere.  So  in  the  West  Indies  the  evident  strategic  ad¬ 
vantages  of  Barbadoes  and  Sta.  Lucia  prescribed  the  aban¬ 
donment  of  the  other  small  islands  by  garrisons  as  soon  as 


394 


NECESSITY  FOR  A  VIGOROUS 


the  fleet  was  fairly  outnumbered,  if  not  before.  The  case  of 
so  large  an  island  as  Jamaica  must  be  studied  separately, 
as  well  as  with  reference  to  the  general  question.  Such  an 
island  may  be  so  far  self-supporting  as  to  defy  any  attack 
but  one  in  great  force  and  numbers,  and  that  would  rightly 
draw  to  it  the  whole  English  force  from  the  windward  stations 
at  Barbadoes  and  Sta.  Lucia. 

With  the  defence  thus  concentrated,  England’s  great  weapon, 
the  navy,  should  have  been  vigorously  used  on  the  offensive. 
Experience  has  taught  that  free  nations,  popular  governments, 
will  seldom  dare  wholly  to  remove  the  force  that  lies  be¬ 
tween  an  invader  and  its  shores  or  capital.  Whatever  the 
military  wisdom,  therefore,  of  sending  the  Channel  fleet  to 
seek  the  enemy  before  it  united,  the  step  may  not  have  been 
possible.  But  at  points  less  vital  the  attack  of  the  English 
should  have  anticipated  that  of  the  allies.  This  was  most  es¬ 
pecially  true  of  that  theatre  of  the  war  which  has  so  far  been 
considered.  If  North  America  was  the  first  object,  Jamaica 
and  the  other  islands  should  have  been  boldly  risked.  It  is 
due  to  Rodney  to  say  that  he  claims  that  his  orders  to  the 
admirals  at  Jamaica  and  New  York  were  disobeyed  in  1781, 
and  that  to  this  was  owing  the  inferiority  in  number  of  Graves’s 
fleet. 

But  why,  in  1780,  when  the  departure  of  De  Guichen  for 
Europe  left  Rodney  markedly  superior  in  numbers  during  his 
short  visit  to  North  America,  from  September  14  to  Novem¬ 
ber  14,  should  no  attempt  have  been  made  to  destroy  the 
French  detachment  of  seven  ships-of-the-line  in  Newport  ? 
These  ships  had  arrived  there  in  July  ;  but  although  they 
had  at  once  strengthened  their  position  by  earthworks,  great 
alarm  was  excited  by  the  news  of  Rodney's  appearance  off 
the  coast.  A  fortnight  passed  <by  Rodney  in  New  York  and 
by  the  French  in  busy  work,  placed  the  latter,  in  their  own 
opinion,  in  a  position  to  brave  all  the  naval  force  of  England. 
44  We  twice  feared,  and  above  all  at  the  time  of  Rodney’s  arri¬ 
val,”  wrote  the  chief  of  staff  of  the  French  squadron,  44  that 
the  English  might  attack  us  in  the  road  itself ;  and  there  was 


INITIATIVE  BY  GREAT  BRITAIN. 


395 


a  space  of  time  during  which  such  an  undertaking  would  not 
have  been  an  act  of  rashness.  Now  [October  20],  the  an¬ 
chorage  is  fortified  so  that  we  can  there  brave  all  the  naval 
force  of  England.”  1 

The  position  /thus  taken  by  the  French  was  undoubtedly 
very  strong.^  It  formed  a  re-entrant  angle  of  a  little  over 
ninety  degrees,  contained  by  lines  drawn  from  Goat  Island  to 
what  was  then  called  Brenton’s  Point,  the  site  of  the  present 
Fort  Adams  on  the  one  side,  and  to  Rose  Island  on  the  other. 
On  the  right  flank  of  the  position  Rose  Island  received  a 
battery  of  thirty-six  24-pounders  ;  while  twelve  guns  of  the 
same  size  were  placed  on  the  left  flank  at  Brenton’s  Point. 
Between  Rose  and  Goat  islands  four  ships,  drawn  up  on  a 
west-northwest  line,  bore  upon  the  entrance  and  raked  an 
approaching  fleet ;  while  three  others,  between  Goat  Island 
and  Brenton’s  Point,  crossed  their  fire  at  right  angles  with 
the  former  four. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  summer  winds  blow  directly  up  the 
entrance,  often  with  great  force.  There  could  be  no  question 
even  of  a  considerably  crippled  attacking  ship  reaching  her 
destined  position,  and  when  once  confused  with  the  enemy’s 
line,  the  shore  batteries  would  be  neutralized.  The  work  on 
Rose  Island  certainly,  that  on  Brenton’s  Point  probably,  had 
less  height  than  the  two  upper  batteries  of  a  ship-of-tlie-line, 
and  could  be  vastly  outnumbered.  They  could  not  have  been 
casemated,  and  might  indisputably  have  been  silenced  by  the 
grapeshot  of  the  ships  that  could  have  been  brought  against 
them.  Rose  Island  could  be  approached  on  the  front  and  on 
the  west  flank  within  two  hundred  yards,  and  on  the  north 
within  half  a  mile.  There  was  nothing  to  prevent  this  right 
flank  of  the  French,  including  the  line  of  ships,  being  en- 

1  Bouclon:  La  Marine  de  Louis  XVI.,  p.  281.  Under  a  rather  misleading 
title  this  work  is  really  a  lengthy  biography  of  Liberge  de  Granchain,  chief  of 
staff  to  the  French  squadron  under  Ternay. 

2  Diary  of  a  French  officer,  1781  ;  Magazine  of  American  History  for  March, 
1880.  The  works  at  the  time  of  Rodney’s  visit  to  New  York  were  doubtless  less 
complete  than  in  1781.  This  authority,  a  year  later,  gives  the  work  on  Rose 
Island  twenty  36-pounders. 


396 


NECESSITY  FOR  A  VIGOROUS 


filaded  and  crushed  by  the  English  ships  taking  position  west 
of  Rose  Island.  The  essential  points  of  close  range  and  su¬ 
perior  height  were  thus  possible  to  the  English  fleet,  which 
numbered  twenty  to  the  enemy’s  seven.  If  successful  in  de¬ 
stroying  the  shipping  and  reducing  Rose  Island,  it  could  find 
anchorage  farther  up  the  bay  and  await  a  favorable  wind  to 
retire.  In  the  opinion  of  a  distinguished  English  naval  offi¬ 
cer  of  the  day,1  closely  familiar  with  the  ground,  there  was 
no  doubt  of  the  success  of  an  attack  ;  and  he  urged  it  fre¬ 
quently  upon  Rodney,  offering  himself  to  pilot  the  leading 
ship.  The  security  felt  by  the  French  in  this  position,  and 
the  acquiescence  of  the  English  in  that  security,  mark  clearly 
the  difference  in  spirit  between  this  war  and  the  wars  of 
Nelson  and  Napoleon. 

It  is  not,  however,  merely  as  an  isolated  operation,  but  in 
relation  to  the  universal  war,  that  such  an  attempt  is  here 
considered.  England  stood  everywhere  on  the  defensive,  with 
inferior  numbers.  From  such  a  position  there  is  no  salvation 
except  by  action  vigorous  almost  to  desperation.  “  It  is  im¬ 
possible  for  us,”  wrote  with  great  truth  the  First  Lord  of  the 
Admiralty  to  Rodney,  “  to  have  a  superior  fleet  in  every  part ; 
and  unless  our  commanders-in-chief  will  take  the  great  line, 
as  you  do,  and  consider  the  king’s  whole  dominions  under 
their  care,  our  enemies  must  find  us  unprepared  somewhere, 
and  carry  their  point  against  us.”  2  Attacks  which  consid¬ 
ered  in  themselves  alone  might  be  thought  unjustifiable, 
were  imposed  upon  English  commanders.  The  allied  navy 
was  the  key  of  the  situation,  and  its  large  detachments,  as 
at  Newport,  should  have  been  crushed  at  any  risk.  The 
effect  of  such  a  line  of  action  upon  the  policy  of  the  French 
government  is  a  matter  of  speculation,  as  to  which  the  pres¬ 
ent  writer  has  no  doubts  ;  but  no  English  officer  in  chief  com- 

1  Sir  Thomas  Graves,  afterward  second  in  command  to  Nelson  in  the  attack 
at  Copenhagen  in  1801,  —  an  enterprise  fully  as  desperate  and  encompassed  with 
greater  difficulties  of  pilotage  than  the  one  here  advocated.  See  biographical 
memoir,  Naval  Chronicle,  vol.  viii. 

•  Rodney’s  Life,  vol.  i.  p.  402. 


INITIATIVE  BY  GREAT  BRITAIN. 


397 


mand  rose  to  the  level  of  the  situation,  with  the  exception 
of  Hood,  and  possibly  of  Howe.  Rodney  was  now  old,  infirm, 
and  though  of  great  ability,  a  careful  tactician  rather  than  a 
great  admiral. 

The  defeat  of  Graves  and  subsequent  surrender  of  Corn¬ 
wallis  did  not  end  the  naval  operations  in  the  western  hemi¬ 
sphere.  On  the  contrary,  one  of  the  most  interesting  tactical 
feats  and  the  most  brilliant  victory  of  the  whole  war  were 
-  yet  to  grace  the  English  flag  in  the  West  Indies;  but  with 
the  events  at  Yorktown  the  patriotic  interest  for  Americans 
closes.  Before  quitting  that  struggle  for  independence,  it 
must  again  be  affirmed  that  its  successful  ending,  at  least 
at  so  early  a  date,  was  due  to  the  control  of  the  sea,  —  to  sea 
power  in  the  hands  of  the  French,  and  its  improper  distribu¬ 
tion  by  the  English  authorities.  This  assertion  may  be  safely 
rested  on  the  authority  of  the  one  man  who,  above  all  others, 
thoroughly  knew  the  resources  of  the  country,  the  temper  of 
the  people,  the  difficulties  of  the  struggle,  and  whose  name 
is  still  the  highest  warrant  for  sound,  quiet,  unfluttered  good- 
sense  and  patriotism. 

The  keynote  to  all  Washington’s  utterances  is  set  in  the 
“  Memorandum  for  concerting  a  plan  of  operations  with  the 
French  army,”  dated  July  15,  1780,  and  sent  by  the  hands 
of  Lafayette :  — 

“  The  Marquis  de  Lafayette  will  be  pleased  to  communicate  the 
following  general  ideas  to  Count  de  Rochambeau  and  the  Chevalier 
de  Ternay,  as  the  sentiments  of  the  underwritten : 

“  I.  In  any  operation ,  and  under  all  circumstances,  a  decisive  naval 
superiority  is  to  be  considered  as  a  fundamental  principle ,  and  the  basis 
upon  which  every  hope  of  success  must  ultimately  depend.” 

This,  however,  though  the  most  formal  and  decisive  ex¬ 
pression  of  Washington’s  views,  is  but  one  among  many 
others  equally  distinct.  Thus,  writing  to  Franklin,  Decem¬ 
ber  20, 1780,  he  says:  — 

“  Disappointed  of  the  second  division  of  French  troops  [blockaded 
in  Brest],  but  more  especially  in  the  expected  naval  superiority,  which 


398 


WASHINGTON'S  OPINIONS  AS  TO 


was  the  pivot  upon  which  everything  turned,  we  have  been  compelled 
to  spend  an  inactive  campaign  after  a  flattering  prospect  at  the  open¬ 
ing  of  it.  .  .  .  Latterly  we  have  been  obliged  to  become  spectators  of 
a  succession  of  detachments  from  the  army  at  New  York  in  aid  of 
Lord  Cornwallis ;  while  our  naval  weakness,  and  the  political  dissolu¬ 
tion  of  a  large  part  of  our  army,  put  it  out  of  our  power  to  counteract 
them  at  the  southward,  or  to  take  advantage  of  them  here.” 

A  month  later,  January  15,  1781,  in  a  memorandum  letter 
to  Colonel  Laurens,  sent  on  a  special  mission  to  France,  he 
says  :  — 

“  Next  to  a  loan  of  money,  a  constant  naval  superiority  upon  these 
coasts  is  the  object  most  interesting.  This  would  instantly  reduce 
the  enemy  to  a  difficult  defensive.  .  .  .  Indeed,  it  is  not  to  be  con¬ 
ceived  how  they  could  subsist  a  large  force  in  this  country,  if  we  had 
the  command  of  the  seas  to  interrupt  the  regular  transmission  of  sup¬ 
plies  from  Europe.  This  superiority,  with  an  aid  in  money,  would 
enable  us  to  convert  the  war  into  a  vigorous  offensive.  With  re¬ 
spect  to  us  it  seems  to  be  one  of  two  deciding  points.” 

In  another  letter  to  the  same  person,  then  in  Paris,  dated 
April  9,  he  writes  :  — 

“  If  France  delays  a  timely  and  powerful  aid  in  the  critical  posture 
of  our  affairs,  it  will  avail  us  nothing,  should  she  attempt  it  here¬ 
after.  .  .  .  Why  need  I  run  into  detail,  when  it  may  be  declared  in 
a  word  that  we  are  at  the  end  of  our  tether,  and  that  now  or  never 
our  deliverance  must  come  ?  How  easy  would  it  be  to  retort  the 
enemy’s  own  game  upon  them,  if  it  could  be  made  to  comport  with 
the  general  plan  of  the  war  to  keep  a  superior  fleet  always  in  these 
seas,  and  France  would  put  us  in  condition  to  be  active  by  advancing 
us  money.” 

Ships  and  money  are  the  burden  of  his  cry.  May  23, 1781, 
he  writes  to  the  Chevalier  de  la  Luzerne :  “  I  do  not  see  how 
it  is  possible  to  give  effectual  support  to  the  Southern  States, 
and  avert  the  evils  which  threaten,  while  we  are  inferior  in 
naval  force  in  these  seas.”  As  the  season  for  active  opera¬ 
tions  advances,  his  utterances  are  more  frequent  and  urgent. 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  SEA  POWER. 


399 


To  Major  General  Greene,  struggling  with  his  difficulties  in 
South  Carolina,  he  writes,  June  1,  1781 :  “  Our  affairs  have 
been  attentively  considered  in  every  point  of  view,  and  it  was 
finally  determined  to  make  an  attempt  upon  New  York,  in 
preference  to  a  Southern  operation,  as  we  had  not  decided 
command  of  the  water.”  To  Jefferson,  June  8  :  “  Should  I 
be  supported  in  the  manner  I  expect,  by  the  neighboring 
States,  the  enemy  will,  I  hope,  be  reduced  to  the  necessity  of 
recalling  part  of  their  force  from  the  southward  to  support 
New  York,  or  they  will  run  the  most  imminent  risk  of  being 
expelled  from  that  post,  which  is  to  them  invaluable ;  and 
should  we,  by  a  lucky  coincidence  of  circumstances,  gain  a 
naval  superiority,  their  ruin  would  be  inevitable.  .  .  .  While 
we  remain  inferior  at  sea  .  .  .  policy  dictates  that  relief 
should  be  attempted  by  diversion  rather  than  by  sending  re¬ 
inforcements  immediately  to  the  point  in  distress,”  that  is,  to 
the  South.  To  Rochambeau,  June  13:  “Your  Excellency 
will  recollect  that  New  York  was  looked  upon  by  us  as  the 
only  practicable  object  under  present  circumstances ;  but 
should  we  be  able  to  secure  a  naval  superiority,  wt;  may 
perhaps  find  others  more  practicable  and  equally  advisable.” 
By  the  15th  of  August  the  letters  of  Be  Grasse  announcing 
his  sailing  for  the  Chesapeake  were  received,  and  the  corre¬ 
spondence  of  Washington  is  thenceforth  filled  with  busy 
preparations  for  the  campaign  in  Virginia,  based  upon  the 
long-delayed  fleet.  The  discouragement  of  Be  Grasse,  and 
his  purpose  to  go  to  sea,  upon  learning  that  the  English  fleet 
in  New  York  had  been  reinforced,  drew  forth  an  appealing  let¬ 
ter  dated  September  25,  which  is  too  long  for  quotation  ;  but 
the  danger  passed,  Washington’s  confidence  returns.  The 
day  after  the  capitulation  he  writes  to  Be  Grasse :  “  The 
surrender  of  York  .  .  .  the  honor  of  which  belongs  to  your 
Excellency ,  has  greatly  anticipated  [in  time]  our  most  san¬ 
guine  anticipations.”  He  then  goes  on  to  urge  further  opera¬ 
tions  in  the  South,  seeing  so  much  of  the  good  season  was 
still  left :  “  The  general  naval  superiority  of  the  British, 
previous  to  your  arrival,  gave  them  decisive  advantages  in 


OPINIONS  OF  WASHINGTON . 

the  South,  in  the  rapid  transport  of  their  troops  and  sup¬ 
plies  ;  while  the  immense  land  marches  of  our  succors,  too 
tardy  and  expensive  in  every  point  of  view,  subjected  us  to 
be  beaten  in  detail.  It  will  depend  upon  your  Excellency, 
therefore,  to  terminate  the  war.”  De  Grasse  refusing  this  re¬ 
quest,  but  intimating  an  intention  to  co-operate  in  the  next 
year’s  campaign,  Washington  instantly  accepts:  “  With  your 
Excellency  I  need  not  insist  upon  the  indispensable  necessity 
of  a  maritime  force  capable  of  giving  you  an  absolute  ascen¬ 
dency  in  these  seas.  ,  .  .  You  will  have  observed  that,  what¬ 
ever  efforts  are  made  by  the  land  armies,  the  navy  must  have 
the  casting  vote  in  the  present  contest.”  A  fortnight  later, 
November  15,  he  writes  to  Lafayette,  who  is  on  the  point  of 
sailing  for  France  :  — 

“  As  you  expressed  a  desire  to  know  my  sentiments  respecting  the 
operations  of  the  next  campaign,  I  will,  without  a  tedious  display  of 
reasoning,  declare  in  one  word  that  it  must  depend  absolutely  upon 
the  naval  force  which  is  employed  in  these  seas,  and  the  time  of  its 
appearance  next  year.  No  land  force  can  act  decisively  unless  ac¬ 
companied  by  a  maritime  superiority.  ...  A  doubt  did  not  exist, 
nor  does  it  at  this  moment,  in  any  man’s  mind,  of  the  total  extirpation 
of  the  British  force  in  the  Carolinas  and  Georgia,  if  Count  de  Grasse 
could  have  extended  his  co-operation  two  months  longer.” 

Such,  in  the  opinion  of  the  revered  commander-in-chief  of 
the  American  armies,  was  the  influence  of  sea  power  upon  the 
contest  which  he  directed  with  so  much  skill  and  such  infinite 
patience,  and  which,  amidst  countless  trials  and  discourage¬ 
ments,  he  brought  to  a  glorious  close. 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  American  cause  was  reduced  to 
these  straits,  notwithstanding  the  great  and  admitted  losses 
of  British  commerce  by  the  cruisers  of  the  allies  and  by 
American  privateers.  This  fact,  and  the  small  results  from 
the  general  war,  dominated  as  it  was  by  the  idea  of  commerce- 
destroying,  show  strongly  the  secondary  and  indecisive  effect 
of  such  a  policy  upon  the  great  issues  of  war. 


CHAPTER  XI. 


Maritime  War  in  Europe,  1779-1782. 


HE  last  chapter  closed  with  the  opinions  of  Washington, 


expressed  in  many  ways  and  at  many  times,  as  to  the 
effect  of  sea  power  upon  the  struggle  for  American  inde¬ 
pendence.  If  space  allowed,  these  opinions  could  be  amply 
strengthened  by  similar  statements  of  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  the 
English  commander-in-chief.1  In  Europe  the  results  turned 
yet  more  entirely  upon  the  same  factor.  There  the  allies  had 
three  several  objectives,  at  each  of  which  England  stood  strictly 
upon  the  defensive.  The  first  of  these  was  England  herself, 
involving,  as  a  preliminary  to  an  invasion,  the  destruction  of 
the  Channel  fleet,  —  a  project  which,  if  seriously  entertained, 
can  scarcely  be  said  to  have  been  seriously  attempted  ;  the 
second  was  the  reduction  of  Gibraltar ;  the  third,  the  capture 
of  Minorca.  The  last  alone  met  with  success.  Thrice  was 
England  threatened  by  a  largely  superior  fleet,  thrice  the 
threat  fell  harmless.  Thrice  was  Gibraltar  reduced  to  straits  ; 
thrice  was  it  relieved  by  the  address  and  fortune  of  English 
seamen,  despite  overpowering  odds. 

After  Keppel’s  action  off  Ushant,  no  general  encounter 
took  place  between  fleets  in  European  seas  during  the  year 
1778  and  the  first  half  of  1779.  Meantime  Spain  was  draw¬ 
ing  toward  a  rupture  with  England  and  an  active  alliance 
with  France.  War  was  declared  by  her  on  the  16th  of  June, 
1779;  but  as  early  as  April  12,  a  treaty  between  the  two 
Bourbon  kingdoms,  involving  active  war  upon  England,  had 
been  signed.  By  its  terms  the  invasion  of  Great  Britain  or 
Ireland  was  to  be  undertaken,  every  effort  made  to  recover 

1  The  curious  reader  can  consult  Clinton’s  letters  and  notes,  in  the  “  Clinton 
Cornwallis  Controversy,”  by  B.  F.  Stevens.  London,  1888. 


26 


402  ALLIED  FLEETS  IN  THE  CHANNEL ,  1779. 


fur  Spain,  Minorca,  Pensacola,  and  Mobile,  and  the  two  courts 
bound  themselves  to  grant  neither  peace,  nor  truce,  nor  sus¬ 
pension  of  hostilities,  until  Gibraltar  should  be  restored.1 

The  declaration  of  war  was  withheld  until  ready  to  strike ; 
but  the  English  government,  doubtless,  should  have  been  upon 
its  guard  in  the  strained  relations  of  the  two  countries,  and 
prepared  to  prevent  a  junction  of  the  two  fleets.  As  it  was, 
no  efficient  blockade  of  Brest  was  established,  and  twenty-eight 
French  sail-of-the-line  went  out  unopposed2  June  3,  1779, 
under  D’Orvilliers,  Keppel’s  opponent  of  the  year  before.  The 
fleet  steered  for  the  coasts  of  Spain,  where  it  was  to  find  the 
Spanish  ships ;  but  it  was  not  till  the  22d  of  July  that  the  full 
contingent  joined.  Seven  precious  summer  weeks  thus  slipped 
by  unimproved,  but  that  was  not  all  the  loss  ;  the  French  had 
been  provisioned  for  only  thirteen  weeks,  and  this  truly  great 
armada  of  sixty-six  ships-of-the-line  and  fourteen  frigates 
had  not  more  than  forty  working-days  before  it.  Sickness, 
moreover,  ravaged  the  fleet ;  and  although  it  was  fortunate 
enough  to  enter  the  Channel  while  the  English  were  at  sea, 
the  latter,  numbering  little  more  than  half  their  enemies, 
succeeded  in  passing  within  them.  The  flabbiness  of  coali¬ 
tions  increased  the  weakness  due  to  inefficient  preparation  ; 
a  great  and  not  unnatural  panic  on  the  English  Channel 
coast,  and  the  capture  of  one  ship-of-the-line,  were  the  sole 
results  of  a  cruise  extending,  for  the  French,  over  fifteen 
weeks.3  The  disappointment,  due  to  bad  preparation,  mainly 

1  Bancroft :  History  of  the  United  States,  vol.  x.  p.  191. 

2  Although  the  English  thus  culpably  failed  to  use  their  superiority  to  the 
Erench  alone,  the  Channel  fleet  numbering  over  forty  of  the  line,  the  fear  that 
it  might  prevent  the  junction  caused  the  Brest  fleet  to  sail  in  haste  and  under¬ 
manned,  —  a  fact  which  had  an  important  effect  upon  the  issue  of  the  cruise. 
(Chevalier,  p.  159.) 

3  The  details  of  the  mismanagement  of  this  huge  mob  of  ships  are  so  numerous 
as  to  confuse  a  narrative,  and  are  therefore  thrown  into  a  foot-note.  The  French 
fleet  was  hurried  to  sea  four  thousand  men  short.  The  Spaniards  were  seven 
weeks  in  joining.  When  they  met,  no  common  system  of  signals  had  been 
arranged  ;  five  fair  summer  days  were  spent  in  remedying  this  defect.  Not  till 
a  week  after  the  junction  could  the  fleet  sail  for  England.  No  steps  were  taken 
to  supply  the  provisions  consumed  by  the  French  during  the  seven  weeks.  The 


RODNEY  RELIEVES  GIBRALTAR . 


403 


on  the  part  of  Spain,  though  the  French  ministry  utterly 
failed  to  meet  the  pressing  wants  of  its  fleet,  fell,  of  course, 
upon  the  innocent  Admiral  d’Orvilliers.  That  brave  and 
accomplished  but  unfortunate  officer,  whose  only  son,  a 
lieutenant,  had  died  of  the  pestilence  which  scourged  the 
allies,  could  not  support  the  odium.  Being  of  a  deeply  re¬ 
ligious  character,  the  refuge  which  Villeneuve  after  Tra¬ 
falgar  found  in  suicide  was  denied  him  ;  but  he  threw  up 
his  command  and  retired  into  a  religious  house. 

The  scanty  maritime  interest  of  the  year  1780,  in  Europe, 
centres  round  Cadiz  and  Gibraltar.  This  fortress  was  in¬ 
vested  by  Spain  immediately  upon  the  outbreak  of  war,  and, 
while  successfully  resisting  direct  attack,  the  supply  of  pro¬ 
visions  and  ammunition  was  a  matter  of  serious  concern  to 
England,  and  involved  both  difficulty  and  danger.  For  this 
purpose,  Rodney  sailed  on  the  29th  of  December,  1779,  having 
under  his  command  twenty  ships-of-tlie-line  with  a  large  con¬ 
voy  and  reinforcements  for  Gibraltar  and  Minorca,  as  well  as 
the  West  India  trade.  The  latter  parted  company  on  the  7th 
of  January,  under  the  care  of  four  frigates,  and  the  following 
morning  the  fleet  fell  in  with  and  captured  a  Spanish  squad¬ 
ron  of  seven  ships-of-war  and  sixteen  supply-ships.  Twelve 
of  the  latter  being  laden  with  provisions  were  carried  on  to 
Gibraltar.  A  week  later,  at  one  p.  m.  of  the  16th,  a  Spanish 

original  orders  to  D’Orvilliers  contemplated  a  landing  at  Portsmouth,  or  the 
seizure  of  the  Isle  of  Wight,  for  which  a  large  army  was  assembled  on  the  coast 
of  Normandy.  Upon  reaching  the  Channel,  these  orders  were  suddenly  changed, 
and  Falmouth  indicated  as  the  point  of  landing.  By  this  time,  August  16, 
summer  was  nearly  over ;  and  Falmouth,  if  taken,  would  offer  no  shelter  to  a 
great  fleet.  Then  an  easterly  gale  drove  the  fleet  out  of  the  Channel.  By  this 
time  the  sickness  which  raged  had  so  reduced  the  crews  that  many  ships  could 
be  neither  handled  nor  fought.  Ships  companies  of  eight  hundred  or  a  thousand 
men  could  muster  only  from  three  to  five  hundred.  Thus  bad  administration 
crippled  the  fighting  powers  of  the  fleet ;  while  the  unaccountable  military 
blunder  of  changing  the  objective  from  a  safe  and  accessible  roadstead  to  a 
fourth-rate  and  exposed  harbor  completed  the  disaster  by  taking  away  the  only 
hope  of  a  secure  base  of  operations  during  the  fall  and  winter  months.  France 
then  had  no  first-class  port  on  the  Channel ;  hence  the  violent  westerly  gales 
which  prevail  in  the  autumn  and  winter  would  have  driven  the  allies  into  the 
North  Sea. 


404 


DEFEAT  OF  LANGARA'S  FLEET. 


fleet  of  eleven  sail-of-the-line  was  seen  in  the  southeast.  They 
held  their  ground,  supposing  the  approaching  vessels  to  be  only 
supply-ships  for  Gibraltar,  without  a  strong  force  of  men-of- 
war,  —  an  unfortunate  error  from  which  they  did  not  awake 
until  too  late  to  escape,  owing  to  the  yet  more  unfortunate 
oversight  of  having  no  lookout  frigates  thrown  out.  When 
the  Spanish  admiral,  Don  Juan  de  Langara,  recognized  his 
mistake,  he  attempted  to  escape  ;  but  the  English  ships  were 
copper-bottomed,  and  Rodney  making  the  signal  for  a  gen¬ 
eral  chase  overtook  the  enemy,  cut  in  between  him  and  his 
port,  regardless  of  a  blowy  night,  lee  shore,  and  dangerous 
shoals,  and  succeeded  in  capturing  the  commander-in-chief 
with  six  ships-of-the-line.  A  seventh  was  blown  up.  The 
weather  continuing  very  tempestuous,  one  of  the  prizes  was 
wrecked,  and  one  forced  into  Cadiz ;  several  of  the  English 
ships  were  also  in  great  danger,  but  happily  escaped,  and 
within  a  few  days  the  entire  force  entered  Gibraltar  Bay. 
The  convoy  for  Minorca  was  at  once  despatched,  and  imme¬ 
diately  after  the  return  of  the  ships-of-war  guarding  it,  on 
the  13th  of  February,  Rodney  sailed  for  the  West  Indies 
with  four  ships-of-the-line,  sending  the  rest  of  his  force, 
with  the  prizes,  to  England  under  Admiral  Digby. 

The  state  of  politics  and  parties  in  England  at  this  time 
was  such  that,  combined  with  the  unavoidable  inferiority  ot 
the  Channel  fleet,  it  was  difficult  to  find  an  admiral  willing 
to  accept  the  chief  command.  An  admirable  officer,  Bar¬ 
rington,  the  captor  of  Sta.  Lucia,  refused  the  first  place, 
though  willing  to  serve  as  second,  even  to  a  junior.1  The 
allied  fleet,  to  the  number  of  thirty-six  sail-of-the-line,  assem¬ 
bled  at  Cadiz.  Their  cruises,  however,  were  confined  to  the 
Portuguese  coast ;  and  their  only  service,  a  most  important 
one,  was  the  capture  of  an  entire  convoy,  largely  laden  with 
military  stores,  for  the  East  and  West  Indies.  The  entrance 
of  sixty  English  prizes,  with  nearly  three  thousand  prisoners, 
into  Cadiz,  was  a  source  of  great  rejoicing  to  Spain.  On  the 

1  Life  of  Admiral  Keppel,  vol.  ii.  pp.  72,  346,  403.  See  also  Barrow  :  Life  of 
Lord  Howe,  pp.  123-126. 


THE  ARMED  NEUTRALITY. 


405 


24th  of  October,  De  Guichen,  returning  from  his  contest  with 
Rodney,  came  into  the  same  port  with  his  West  Indian  squad¬ 
ron,  of  nineteen  ships-of-the-line  ;  but  the  immense  armament 
thus  assembled  did  nothing.  The  French  ships  returned  to 
Brest  in  January,  1781. 

While  thus  unproductive  of  military  results  in  Europe,  the 
war  in  1780  gave  rise  to  an  event  which  cannot  wholly  be 
passed  over  by  any  history  of  sea  power.  This  was  the 
Armed  Neutrality,  at  the  head  of  which  stood  Russia,  joined  by 
Sweden  and  Denmark.  The  claim  of  England  to  seize  enemy’s 
goods  in  neutral  ships  bore  hard  upon  neutral  powers,  and 
especially  upon  those  of  the  Baltic  and  upon  Holland,  into 
whose  hands,  and  those  of  the  Austrian  Netherlands,  the  war 
had  thrown  much  of  the  European  carrying-trade  ;  while  the 
products  of  the  Baltic,  naval  stores  and  grain,  were  those 
which  England  was  particularly  interested  in  forbidding  to  her 
enemies.  The  declarations  finally  put  forth  by  Russia,  and 
signed  by  Sweden  and  Denmark,  were  four  in  number : 

1.  That  neutral  vessels  had  a  right,  not  only  to  sail  to 
unblockaded  ports,  but  also  from  port  to  port  of  a  belligerent 
nation  ;  in  other  words,  to  maintain  the  coasting  trade  of  a 
belligerent. 

2.  That  property  belonging  to  the  subjects  of  a  power  at 
war  should  be  safe  on  board  neutral  vessels.  This  was  the 
principle  involved  in  the  now  familiar  maxim,  “  Free  ships 
make  free  goods.” 

8.  That  no  articles  are  contraband,  except  arms,  equip¬ 
ments,  and  munitions  of  war.  This  ruled  out  naval  stores 
and  provisions  unless  belonging  to  the  government  of  a 
belligerent. 

4.  That  blockades,  to  be  binding,  must  have  an  adequate 
naval  force  stationed  in  close  proximity  to  the  blockaded  port. 

The  contracting  parties  being  neutral  in  the  present  war, 
but  binding  themselves  to  support  these  principles  by  a  com¬ 
bined  armed  fleet  of  a  fixed  minimum  number,  the  agreement 
received  the  name  of  the  Armed  Neutrality.  The  discussion 
of  the  propriety  of  the  various  declarations  belongs  to  Inter- 


406  WAR  BETWEEN  ENGLAND  AND  HOLLAND. 


national  law  ;  but  it  is  evident  that  no  great  maritime  State, 
situated  as  England  then  was,  would  submit  to  the  first  and 
third  as  a  matter  of  right.  Policy  only  could  induce  her  to 
do  so.  Without  meeting  the  declarations  by  a  direct  contra¬ 
diction,  the  ministry  and  the  king  determined  to  disregard 
them, — a  course  which  was  sustained  in  principle  even  by 
prominent  members  of  the  bitter  opposition  of  that  day.  The 
undecided  attitude  of  the  United  Provinces,  divided  as  in  the 
days  of  Louis  XI Y.  between  the  partisans  of  England  and 
France,  despite  a  century  of  alliance  with  the  former,  drew 
the  especial  attention  of  Great  Britain.  They  had  been  asked 
to  join  the  Armed  Neutrality  ;  they  hesitated,  but  the  majority 
of  the  provinces  favored  it.  A  British  officer  had  already 
gone  so  far  as  to  fire  upon  a  Dutch  man-of-war  which  had 
resisted  the  search  of  merchant-ships  under  its  convoy  ;  an 
act  which,  whether  right  or  wrong,  tended  to  incense  the 
Dutch  generally  against  England.  It  was  determined  by  the 
latter  that  if  the  United  Provinces  acceded  to  the  coalition  of 
neutrals,  war  should  be  declared.  On  the  16th  of  December, 
1780,  the  English  ministry  was  informed  that  the  States- 
General  had  resolved  to  sign  the  declarations  of  the  Armed 
Neutrality  without  delay.  Orders  were  at  once  sent-  out  to 
Rodney  to  seize  the  Dutch  West  India  and  South  American 
possessions  ;  similar  orders  to  the  East  Indies  ;  and  the  am¬ 
bassador  at  the  Hague  was  recalled.  England  declared  war 
four  days  later.  The  principal  effect,  therefore,  of  the  Armed 
Neutrality  upon  the  war  was  to  add  the  colonies  and  com¬ 
merce  of  Holland  to  the  prey  of  English  cruisers.  The  ad¬ 
ditional  enemy  was  of  small  account  to  Great  Britain, 
whose  geographical  position  effectually  blocked  the  junction 
of  the  Dutch  fleet  with  those  of  her  other  enemies.  The 
possessions  of  Holland  fell  everywhere,  except  when  saved  by 
the  French  ;  while  a  bloody  but  wholly  uninstructive  battle 
between  English  and  Dutch  squadrons  in  the  North  Sea,  in 
August,  1781,  was  the  only  feat  of  arms  illustrative  of  the 
old  Dutch  courage  and  obstinacy. 

The  year  1781,  decisive  of  the  question  of  the  independence 


DERBY  RELIEVES  GIBRALTAR . 


407 


of  the  United  States,  was  marked  in  the  European  seas  by  im- 
posing  movements  of  great  fleets  followed  by  puny  results.  At 
the  end  of  March  De  Grasse  sailed  from  Brest  with  twenty- 
six  ships-of-the-line.  On  the  29th  he  detached  five  under 
Suffren  to  the  East  Indies,  and  himself  continued  on  to  meet 
success  at  York  town  and  disaster  in  the  West  Indies.  On 
the  23d  of  June  De  Guichen  sailed  from  Brest  with  eighteen 
ships-of-the-line  for  Cadiz,  where  he  joined  thirty  Spanish 
ships.  This  immense  armament  sailed  on  the  22d  of  July 
for  the  Mediterranean,  landed  fourteen  thousand  troops  at 
Minorca,  and  then  moved  upon  the  English  Channel. 

The  English  had  this  year  first  to  provide  against  the  danger 
to  Gibraltar.  That  beset  fortress  had  had  no  supplies  since 
Rodney’s  visit,  in  January  of  the  year  before,  and  was  now  in 
sore  want,  the  provisions  being  scanty  and  bad,  the  biscuits 
weevilly,  and  the  meat  tainted.  Amid  the  horrors  and  uproar 
of  one  of  the  longest  and  most  exciting  sieges  of  history, 
the  suffering^  of  the  combatants  were  intensified  by  the 
presence  of  many  peaceful  inhabitants,  including  the  wives 
and  families  of  soldiers  as  well  as  of  officers.  A  great  fleet 
of  twenty-eight  ships-of-the-line  sailed  from  Portsmouth  on 
the  13th  of  March,  convoying  three  hundred  merchant-ships 
for  the  East  and  West  Indies,  besides  ninety-seven  transports 
and  supply-ships  for  the  Rock.  A  delay  on  the  Irish  coast 
prevented  its  falling  in  with  De  Grasse,  who  had  sailed  nine 
days  after  it.  Arriving  off  Cape  St.  Vincent,  it  met  no 
enemy,  and  looking  into  Cadiz  saw  the  great  Spanish  fleet 
at  anchor.  The  latter  made  no  move,  and  the  English  ad¬ 
miral,  Derby,  threw  his  supplies  into  Gibraltar  on  the  12th 
of  April,  undisturbed.  At  the  same  time  he,  like  De  Grasse, 
detached  to  the  East  Indies  a  small  squadron,  which  was 
destined  before  long  to  fall  in  with  Suffren.  The  inaction 
of  the  Spanish  fleet,  considering  the  eagerness  of  its  gov¬ 
ernment  about  Gibraltar  and  its  equal  if  not  superior  num¬ 
bers,  shows  scanty  reliance  of  the  Spanish  admiral  upon 
himself  or  his  command.  Derby,  having  relieved  Gibraltar 
and  Minorca,  returned  to  the  Channel  in  May. 


408  the  ALLIES  IN  ENGLISH  CHANNEL ,  1781. 


Upon  the  approach  of  the  combined  fleet  of  nearly  fifty 
sail  in  August  following,  Derby  fell  back  upon  Torbay  and 
there  anchored  his  fleet,  numbering  thirty  ships.  De  Guichen, 
who  held  chief  command,  and  whose  caution  when  engaged 
with  Rodney  has  been  before  remarked,  was  in  favor  of 
fighting ;  but  the  almost  unanimous  opposition  of  the  Span¬ 
iards,  backed  by  some  of  his  own  officers,  overruled  him 
in  a  council  of  war,1  and  again  the  great  Bourbon  coalition 
fell  back,  foiled  by  their  own  discord  and  the  unity  of  their 
enemy.  Gibraltar  relieved,  England  untouched,  were  the 
results  of  these  gigantic  gatherings  ;  they  can  scarcely  be 
called  efforts.  A  mortifying  disaster  closed  the  year  for 
the  allies.  De  Guichen  sailed  from  Brest  with  seventeen 
sail,  protecting  a  large  convoy  of  merchantmen  and  ships 
with  military  supplies.  The  fleet  was  pursued  by  twelve 
English  ships  under  Admiral  Kempenfeldt,  an  officer  whose 
high  professional  abilities  have  not  earned  the  immortality 
with  which  poetry  has  graced  his  tragical  death.  Falling  in 
with  the  French  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles  west  of  Ushant, 
he  cut  off  a  part  of  the  convoy,  despite  his  inferior  num¬ 
bers.2  A  few  days  later  a  tempest  dispersed  the  French 

1  Beatson  gives  quite  at  length  (vol.  v.  p.  395)  the  debate  in  the  allied  council 
of  war.  The  customary  hesitation  of  such  councils,  in  face  of  the  difficulties  of 
the  situation,  was  increased  by  an  appeal  to  the  delusion  of  commerce-destroying 
as  a  decisive  mode  of  warfare.  M.  de  Beausset  urged  that  “  the  allied  fleets 
should  direct  their  whole  attention  to  that  great  and  attainable  object,  the  inter¬ 
cepting  of  the  British  homeward-bound  West  India  fleets.  This  was  a  measure 
which,  as  they  were  now  masters  of  the  sea,  could  scarcely  fail  of  success ;  and  it 
would  prove  a  blow  so  fatal  to  that  nation,  that  she  could  not  recover  it  during 
the  whole  course  of  the  war.”  The  French  account  of  Lapevrouse-Bonfils  is 
essentially  the  same.  Chevalier,  who  is  silent  as  to  details,  justly  remarks : 
“  The  cruise  just  made  by  the  allied  fleet  was  such  as  to  injure  the  reputation  of 
France  and  Spain.  These  two  powers  had  made  a  great  display  of  force  which 
had  produced  no  result.”  The  English  trade  also  received  little  injury.  Guichen 
wrote  home  :  “  I  have  returned  from  a  cruise  fatiguing  but  not  glorious.” 

2  This  mishap  of  the  French  was  largely  due  to  mismanagement  by  De  Guichen, 
a  skilful  and  usually  a  careful  admiral.  When  Kempenfeldt  fell  in  with  him,  all 
the  French  ships-of-wTar  were  to  leeward  of  their  convoy,  while  the  English  were 
to  windward  of  it.  The  former,  therefore,  were  unable  to  interpose  in  time  ;  and 
the  alternative  remedy,  of  the  convoy  running  down  to  leeward  of  their  escort, 
could  not  be  applied  by  all  the  merchant-ships  in  so  large  a  body. 


SURRENDER  OF  PORT  MAHON. 


409 


fleet.  Only  two  ships-of-the-line  and  five  merchantmen  out 
of  one  hundred  and  fifty  reached  the  West  Indies. 

The  year  1782  opened  with  the  loss  to  the  English  of 
Port  Mahon,  which  surrendered  on  the  5th  of  February, 
after  a  siege  of  six  months.  —  a  surrender  induced  by  the 
ravages  of  scurvy,  consequent  upon  the  lack  of  vegetables, 
and  confinement  in  the  foul  air  of  bombproofs  and  casemates, 
under  the  heavy  fire  of  an  enemy.  On  the  last  night  of 
the  defence  the  call  for  necessary  guards  was  four  hundred 
and  fifteen,  while  only  six  hundred  and  sixty  men  were 
fit  for  duty,  thus  leaving  no  reliefs. 

The  allied  fleets  assembled  this  year  in  Cadiz,  to  the 
number  of  forty  ships-of-the-line.  It  was  expected  that  this 
force  would  be  increased  by  Dutch  ships,  but  a  squadron 
under  Lord  Howe  drove  the  latter  back  to  their  ports.  It 
does  not  certainly  appear  that  any  active  enterprise  was 
intended  against  the  English  coast ;  but  the  allies  cruised 
off  the  mouth  of  the  Channel  and  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay 
during  the  summer  months.  Their  presence  insured  the 
safe  arrival  and  departure  of  the  homeward  and  outward 
bound  merchantmen,  and  likewise  threatened  English  com¬ 
merce  ;  notwithstanding  which,  Howe,  with  twenty-two  ships, 
not  only  kept  the  sea  and  avoided  an  engagement,  but  also 
succeeded  in  bringing  the  Jamaica  fleet  safe  into  port.  The 
injury  to  trade  and  to  military  transportation  by  sea  may  be 
said  to  have  been  about  equal  on  either  side  ;  and  the  credit 
for  successful  use  of  sea  power  for  these  most  important 
ends  must  therefore  be  given  to  the  weaker  party. 

Having  carried  out  their  orders  for  the  summer  cruise, 
the  combined  fleets  returned  to  Cadiz.  On  the  10th  of 
September  they  sailed  thence  for  Algesiras,  on  the  opposite 
side  of  the  bay  from  Gibraltar,  to  support  a  grand  com¬ 
bined  attack  by  land  and  sea,  which,  it  was  hoped,  would 
reduce  to  submission  the  key  to  the  Mediterranean.  With 
the  ships  already  there,  the  total  rose  to  nearly  fifty  ships- 
of-the-line.  The  details  of  the  mighty  onslaught  scarcely 
belong  to  our  subject,  yet  cannot  be  wholly  passed  by, 


410 


ATTACK  ON  GIBRALTAR. 


without  at  least  such  mention  as  may  recognize  and  draw 
attention  to  their  interest. 

The  three  years’  siege  which  was  now  drawing  to  its  end 
had  been  productive  of  many  brilliant  feats  of  arms,  as 
well  as  of  less  striking  but  more  trying  proofs  of  steadfast 
endurance,  on  the  part  of  the  garrison.  How  long  the  latter 
might  have  held  out  cannot  be  said,  seeing  the  success  with 
which  the  English  sea  power  defied  the  efforts  of  the  allies 
to  cut  off  the  communications  of  the  fortress ;  but  it  was 
seemingly  certain  that  the  place  must  be  subdued  by  main 
force  or  not  at  all,  while  the  growing  exhaustion  of  the 
belligerents  foretold  the  near  end  of  the  war.  Accordingly 
Spain  multiplied  her  efforts  of  preparation  and  military  in¬ 
genuity  ;  while  the  report  of  them  and  of  the  approaching 
decisive  contest  drew  to  the  scene  volunteers  and  men  of  emi¬ 
nence  from  other  countries  of  Europe.  Two  French  Bour¬ 
bon  princes  added,  by  their  coming,  to  the  theatrical  interest 
with  which  the  approaching  drama  was  invested.  The  pres¬ 
ence  of  royalty  was  needed  adequately  to  grace  the  sublime 
catastrophe  ;  for  the  sanguine  confidence  of  the  besiegers  had 
determined  a  satisfactory  denouement  with  all  the  security  of 
a  playwright. 

Besides  the  works  on  the  isthmus  which  joins  the  Rock 
to  the  mainland,  where  three  hundred  pieces  of  artillery  were 
now  mounted,  the  chief  reliance  of  the  assailants  was  upon 
ten  floating  batteries  elaborately  contrived  to  be  shot  and 
fire  proof,  and  carrying  one  hundred  and  fifty-four  heavy 
guns.  These  were  to  anchor  in  a  close  north-and-south  line 
along  the  west  face  of  the  works,  at  about  nine  hundred  yards 
distance.  They  were  to  be  supported  by  forty  gunboats  and 
as  many  bomb  vessels,  besides  the  efforts  of  the  ships-of-the- 
line  to  cover  the  attack  and  distract  the  garrison.  Twelve 
thousand  French  troops  were  brought  to  reinforce  the  Span¬ 
iards  in  the  grand  assault,  which  was  to  be  made  when  the 
bombardment  had  sufficiently  injured  and  demoralized  the 
defenders.  At  this  time  the  latter  numbered  seven  thousand, 
their  land  opponents  thirty-three  thousand  men. 


ATTACK  ON  GIBRALTAR. 


411 


The  final  act  was  opened  by  the  English.  At  seven  o’clock 
on  the  morning  of  September  8,  1782,  the  commanding  gen¬ 
eral,  Elliott,  began  a  severe  and  most  injurious  fire  upon 
the  works  on  the  isthmus.  Having  effected  his  purpose,  he 
stopped ;  but  the  enemy  took  up  the  glove  the  next  morning, 
and  for  four  days  successively  poured  in  a  fire  from  the  isth¬ 
mus  alone  of  six  thousand  five  hundred  cannon-balls  and  one 
thousand  one  hundred  bombs  every  twenty-four  hours.  So 
approached  the  great  closing  scene  of  September  18.  At 
seven  a.  m.  of  that  day  the  ten  battering-ships  unmoored  from 
the  head  of  the  bay  and  stood  down  to  their  station.  Be¬ 
tween  nine  and  ten  they  anchored,  and  the  general  fire  at 
once  began.  The  besieged  replied  with  equal  fury.  The  bat¬ 
tering-ships  seem  in  the  main,  and  for  some  hours,  to  have 
justified  the  hopes  formed  of  them ;  cold  shot  glanced  or 
failed  to  get  through  their  sides,  while  the  self-acting  appara¬ 
tus  for  extinguishing  fires  balked  the  hot  shot. 

About  two  o’clock,  however,  smoke  was  seen  to  issue  from 
the  ship  of  the  commander-in-chief,  and  though  controlled 
for  some  time,  the  fire  continued  to  gain.  The  same  misfor¬ 
tune  befell  others ;  by  evening,  the  fire  of  the  besieged  gained 
a  marked  superiority,  and  by  one  o’clock  in  the  morning  the 
greater  part  of  the  battering-ships  were  in  flames.  Their 
distress  was  increased  by  the  action  of  the  naval  officer  com¬ 
manding  the  English  gunboats,  who  now  took  post  upon  the 
flank  of  the  line  and  raked  it  effectually,  —  a  service  which 
the  Spanish  gunboats  should  have  prevented.  In  the  end, 
nine  of  the  ten  blew  up  at  their  anchors,  with  a  loss  esti¬ 
mated  at  fifteen  hundred  men,  four  hundred  being  saved 
from  the  midst  of  the  fire  by  the  English  seamen.  The  tenth 
ship  was  boarded  and  burned  by  the  English  boats.  The 
hopes  of  the  assailants  perished  with  the  failure  of  the 
battering-ships. 

There  remained  only  the  hope  of  starving  out  the  garrison. 
To  this  end  the  allied  fleets  now  gave  themselves.  It  was 
known  that  Lord  Howe  was  on  his  way  out  with  a  great  fleet, 
numbering  thirty-four  ships-of-the-line,  besides  supply  vessels. 


412 


LORD  HOWE  RELIEVES  GIBRALTAR . 


On  the  10th  of  October  a  violent  westerly  gale  injured  the  com¬ 
bined  ships,  driving  one  ashore  under  the  batteries  of  Gibral¬ 
tar,  where  she  was  surrendered.  The  next  day  Howe’s  force 
came  in  sight,  and  the  transports  had  a  fine  chance  to  make 
the  anchorage,  which,  through  carelessness,  was  missed  by 
all  but  four.  The  rest,  with  the  men-of-war,  drove  eastward 
into  the  Mediterranean.  The  allies  followed  on  the  13th ; 
but  though  thus  placed  between  the  port  and  the  relieving 
force,  and  not  encumbered,  like  the  latter,  with  supply-ships, 
they  yet  contrived  to  let  the  transports,  with  scarcely  an  ex¬ 
ception,  slip  in  and  anchor  safely.  Not  only  provisions  and 
ammunition,  but  also  bodies  of  troops  carried  by  the  ships- 
of-war,  were  landed  without  molestation.  On  the  19th  the 
English  fleet  repassed  the  straits  with  an  easterly  wind, 
having  within  a  week’s  time  fulfilled  its  mission,  and  made 
Gibraltar  safe  for  another  year.  The  allied  fleet  followed, 
and  on  the  20th  an  action  took  place  at  long  range,  the  allies 
to  windward,  but  not  pressing  their  attack  close.  The  num¬ 
ber  of  ships  engaged  in  this  magnificent  spectacle,  the  closing 
scene  of  the  great  drama  in  Europe,  the  after-piece  to  the 
successful  defence  of  Gibraltar,  was  eighty-three  of  the  line, 
—  forty-nine  allies  and  thirty -four  English.  Of  the  former, 
thirty-three  only  got  into  action ;  but  as  the  duller  sailers 
would  have  come  up  to  a  general  engagement,  Lord  Howe 
was  probably  right  in  declining,  so  far  as  in  him  lay,  a  trial 
which  the  allies  did  not  too  eagerly  court. 

Such  were  the  results  of  this  great  contest  in  the  European 
seas,  marked  on  the  part  of  the  allies  by  efforts  gigantic  in 
size,  but  loose-jointed  and  flabby  in  execution.  By  England, 
so  heavily  overmatched  in  mere  numbers,  were  shown  firm¬ 
ness  of  purpose,  high  courage,  and  seamanship ;  but  it  can 
scarcely  be  said  that  the  military  conceptions  of  her  councils, 
or  the  cabinet  management  of  her  sea  forces,  were  worthy  of 
the  skill  and  devotion  of  her  seamen.  The  odds  against  her 
were  not  so  great  —  not  nearty  so  great  —  as  the  formidable 
lists  of  guns  and  ships  seemed  to  show ;  and  while  allowance 
must  justly  be  made  for  early  hesitations,  the  passing  years 


NAVAL  POLICY  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN. 


413 


of  indecision  and  inefficiency  on  the  part  of  the  allies  should 
have  betrayed  to  her  their  weakness.  The  reluctance  of  the 
French  to  risk  their  ships,  so  plainly  shown  by  D’Estaing, 
De  Grasse,  and  De  Guichen,  the  sluggishness  and  inefficiency 
of  the  Spaniards,  should  have  encouraged  England  to  pursue 
her  old  policy,  to  strike  at  the  organized  forces  of  the  enemy 
afloat.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  and  probably  from  the  neces¬ 
sities  of  the  case,  the  opening  of  every  campaign  found  the 
enemies  separated,  —  the  Spaniards  in  Cadiz,  the  French  in 
Brest.1  To  blockade  the  latter  in  full  force  before  they  could 
get  out,  England  should  have  strained  every  effort ;  thus  she 
would  have  stopped  at  its  head  the  main  stream  of  the  allied 
strength,  and,  by  knowing  exactly  where  this  great  body  was, 
would  have  removed  that  uncertainty  as  to  its  action  which 
fettered  her  own  movements  as  soon  as  it  had  gained  the 
freedom  of  the  open  sea.  Before  Brest  she  was  interposed 
between  the  allies  ;  by  her  lookouts  she  would  have  known 
the  approach  of  the  Spaniards  long  before  the  French  could 
know  it ;  she  would  have  kept  in  her  hands  the  power  of 
bringing  against  each,  singly,  ships  more  numerous  and  indi¬ 
vidually  more  effective.  A  wind  that  was  fair  to  bring  on  the 
Spaniards  would  have  locked  their  allies  in  the  port.  The 
most  glaring  instances  of  failure  on  the  part  of  England  to  do 
this  were  when  De  Grasse  was  permitted  to  get  out  unopposed 
in  March,  1781;  for  an  English  fleet  of  superior  force  had 
sailed  from  Portsmouth  nine  days  before  him,  but  was  delayed 

1  “In  the  spring  of  1780  the  British  admiralty  had  assembled  in  the  Channel 
ports  forty-five  ships-of-the-line.  The  squadron  at  Brest  was  reduced  to  twelve 
or  fifteen.  ...  To  please  Spain,  twenty  French  ships-of-the-line  had  joined  the 
flag  of  Admiral  Cordova  in  Cadiz.  In  consequence  of  these  dispositions,  the 
English  with  their  Channel  fleet  held  in  check  the  forces  which  we  had  in  Brest 
and  in  Cadiz.  Enemy’s  cruisers  traversed  freely  the  space  between  the  Lizard 
and  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar.”  (Chevalier,  p.  202.) 

In  1781  “the  Cabinet  of  Versailles  called  the  attention  of  Holland  and  Spain 
to  the  necessity  of  assembling  at  Brest  a  fleet  strong  enough  to  impose  upon  the 
ships  which  Great  Britain  kept  in  the  Channel.  The  Dutch  remained  in  the 
Texel,  and  the  Spaniards  did  not  leave  Cadiz.  From  this  state  of  things  it 
resulted  that  the  English,  with  forty  ships-of-the-line,  blocked  seventy  belonging 
to  the  allied  powers.”  (p.  265.) 


414 


PROPER  DISPOSAL  OF  THE  BRITISH 


by  the  admiralty  on  the  Irish  coast ; 1  and  again  at  the  end  of 
that  year,  when  Kempenfeldt  was  sent  to  intercept  De  Guichen 
with  an  inferior  force,  while  ships  enough  to  change  the  odds 
were  kept  at  home.  Several  of  the  ships  which  were  to  ac¬ 
company  Rodney  to  the  West  Indies  were  ready  when  Kem¬ 
penfeldt  sailed,  yet  they  were  not  associated  with  an  enterprise 
so  nearly  affecting  the  objects  of  Rodney’s  campaign.  The 
two  forces  united  would  have  made  an  end  of  De  Guichen’s 
seventeen  ships  and  his  invaluable  convoy. 

Gibraltar  was  indeed  a  heavy  weight  upon  the  English 
operations,  but  the  national  instinct  which  clung  to  it  was 
correct.  The  fault  of  the  English  policy  was  in  attempting 
to  hold  so  many  other  points  of  land,  while  neglecting,  by 
rapidity  of  concentration,  to  fall  upon  any  of  the  detach¬ 
ments  of  the  allied  fleets.  The  key  of  the  situation  was 
upon  the  ocean ;  a  great  victory  there  would  have  solved 
all  the  other  points  in  dispute.  But  it  was  not  possible  to 
win  a  great  victory  while  trying  to  maintain  a  show  of  force 
everywhere. 2 

North  America  was  a  yet  heavier  clog,  and  there  undoubt¬ 
edly  the  feeling  of  the  nation  was  mistaken ;  pride,  not  wis¬ 
dom,  maintained  that  struggle.  Whatever  the  sympathies 
of  individuals  and  classes  in  the  allied  nations,  by  their  gov¬ 
ernments  American  rebellion  was  valued  only  as  a  weakening 
of  England’s  arm.  The  operations  there  depended,  as  has 

1  “  A  question  was  very  much  agitated  both  in  and  out  of  Parliament ;  namely. 
Whether  the  intercepting  of  the  French  fleet  under  the  Count  de  Grasse  should 
not  have  been  the  first  object  of  the  British  fleet  under  Vice-Admiral  Darby, 
instead  of  losing  time  in  going  to  Ireland,  by  which  that  opportunity  was  missed. 
The  defeat  of  the  French  fleet  would  certainly  totally  have  disconcerted  the  great 
plans  which  the  enemies  had  formed  in  the  East  and  West  Indies.  It  would 
have  insured  the  safety  of  the  British  West  India  islands;  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope  must  have  fallen  into  the  hands  of  Britain ;  and  the  campaign  in  North 
America  might  have  had  a  very  different  termination.”  (Beatson’s  Memoirs, 
vol.  v.  p.  341,  where  the  contrary  arguments  are  also  stated.) 

2  This  is  one  of  the  most  common  and  flagrant  violations  of  the  principles  of 
war,  —  stretching  a  thin  line,  everywhere  inadequate,  over  an  immense  frontier. 
The  clamors  of  trade  and  local  interests  make  popular  governments  especially 
liable  to  it. 


NAVY  IN  THE  WAR  OF  1778. 


415 


been  shown,  upon  the  control  of  the  sea;  and  to  maintain 
that,  large  detachments  of  English  ships  were  absorbed  from 
the  contest  with  France  and  Spain.  Could  a  successful  war 
have  made  America  again  what  it  once  was,  a  warmly  at¬ 
tached  dependency  of  Great  Britain,  a  firm  base  for  her  sea 
power,  it  would  have  been  worth  much  greater  sacrifices ;  but 
that  had  become  impossible.  But  although  she  had  lost,  by 
her  own  mistakes,  the  affection  of  the  colonists,  which  would 
have  supported  and  secured  her  hold  upon  their  ports  and  sea- 
coast,  there  nevertheless  remained  to  the  mother-country,  in 
Halifax,  Bermuda,  and  the  West  Indies,  enough  strong  mili¬ 
tary  stations,  inferior,  as  naval  bases,  only  to  those  strong 
ports  which  are  surrounded  by  a  friendly  country,  great  in 
its  resources  and  population.  The  abandonment  of  the  con¬ 
test  in  North  America  would  have  strengthened  England  very 
much  more  than  the  allies.  As  it  was,  her  large  naval  de¬ 
tachments  there  were  always  liable  to  be  overpowered  by  a 
sudden  move  of  the  enemy  from  the  sea,  as  happened  in  1TT8 
and  1781. 

To  the  abandonment  of  America  as  hopelessly  lost,  be¬ 
cause  no  military  subjection  could  have  brought  back  the  old 
loyalty,  should  have  been  added  the  giving  up,  for  the  time, 
all  military  occupancy  which  fettered  concentration,  while 
not  adding  to  military  strength.  Most  of  the  Antilles  fell 
under  this  head,  and  the  ultimate  possession  of  them  would 
depend  upon  the  naval  campaign.  Garrisons  could  have  been 
spared  for  Barbadoes  and  Sta.  Lucia*  for  Gibraltar  and  per¬ 
haps  for  Mahon,  that  could  have  effectually  maintained  them 
until  the  empire  of  the  seas  was  decided ;  and  to  them  could 
have  been  added  one  or  two  vital  positions  in  America,  like 
New  York  and  Charleston,  to  be  held  only  till  guarantees 
were  given  for  such  treatment  of  the  loyalists  among  the  in¬ 
habitants  as  good  faith  required  England  to  exact. 

Having  thus  stripped  herself  of  every  weight,  rapid  con¬ 
centration  with  offensive  purpose  should  have  followed.  Sixty 
ships-of-the-line  on  the  coast  of  Europe,  half  before  Cadiz 
and  half  before  Brest,  with  a  reserve  at  home  to  replace  in- 


416 


PROPER  DISPOSAL  OF  THE  BRITISH 


jured  ships,  would  not  have  exhausted  by  a  great  deal  the 
roll  of  the  English  navy ;  and  that  such  fleets  would  not  have 
had  to  fight,  may  not  only  be  said  by  us,  who  have  the  whole 
history  before  us,  but  might  have  been  inferred  by  those  who 
had  watched  the  tactics  of  D’Estaing  and  De  Guichen,  and 
later  on  of  De  Grasse.  Or,  had  even  so  much  dispersal  been 
thought  unadvisable,  forty  ships  before  Brest  would  have  left 
the  sea  open  to  the  Spanish  fleet  to  try  conclusions  with  the 
rest  of  the  English  navy  when  the  question  of  controlling  Gib¬ 
raltar  and  Mahon  came  up  for  decision.  Knowing  what  we 
do  of  the  efficiency  of  the  two  services,  there  can  be  little 
question  of  the  result ;  and  Gibraltar,  instead  of  a  weight, 
would,  as  often  before  and  since  those  days,  have  been  an 
element  of  strength  to  Great  Britain. 

The  conclusion  continually  recurs.  Whatever  may  be  the 
determining  factors  in  strifes  between  neighboring  continental 
States,  when  a  question  arises  of  control  over  distant  regions, 
politically  weak,  —  whether  they  be  crumbling  empires,  an¬ 
archical  republics,  colonies,  isolated  military  posts,  or  islands 
below  a  certain  size,  —  it  must  ultimately  be  decided  by  naval 
power,  by  the  organized  military  force  afloat,  which  repre¬ 
sents  the  communications  that  form  so  prominent  a  feature 
in  all  strategy.  The  magnificent  defence  of  Gibraltar  hinged 
upon  this ;  upon  this  depended  the  military  results  of  the  war 
in  America;  upon  this  the  final  fate  of  the  West  India  Islands; 
upon  this  certainly  the  possession  of  India.  Upon  this  will 
depend  the  control  of  the  Central  American  Isthmus,  if  that 
question  take  a  military  coloring;  and  though  modified  by 
the  continental  position  and  surroundings  of  Turkey,  the  same 
sea  power  must  be  a  weighty  factor  in  shaping  the  outcome 
of  the  Eastern  Question  in  Europe. 

If  this  be  true,  military  wisdom  and  economy,  both  of  time 
and  money,  dictate  bringing  matters  to  an  issue  as  soon  as 
possible  upon  the  broad  sea,  with  the  certainty  that  the 
power  which  achieves  military  preponderance  there  will  win 
in  the  end.  In  the  war  of  the  American  Revolution  the  nu¬ 
merical  preponderance  was  very  great  against  England ;  the 


NA  VY  IN  THE  WAR  OF  1778. 


417 


actual  odds  were  less,  though  still  against  her.  Military  con¬ 
siderations  would  have  ordered  the  abandonment  of  the  colo¬ 
nies  ;  but  if  the  national  pride  could  not  stoop  to  this,  the 
right  course  was  to  blockade  the  hostile  arsenals.  If  not 
strong  enough  to  be  in  superior  force  before  both,  that  of  the 
more  powerful  nation  should  have  been  closed.  Here  was  the 
first  fault  of  the  English  admiralty ;  the  statement  of  the  First 
Lord  as  to  the  available  force  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  was 
not  borne  out  by  facts.  The  first  fleet,  under  Keppel,  barely 
equalled  the  French  ;  and  at  the  same  time  Howe’s  force  in 
America  was  inferior  to  the  fleet  under  D’Estaing.  In  1779 
and  1781,  on  the  contrary,  the  English  fleet  was  superior  to 
that  of  the  French  alone ;  yet  the  allies  joined  unopposed, 
while  in  the  latter  year  De  Grasse  got  away  to  the  West 
Indies,  and  Suffren  to  the  East.  In  Kempenfeldt’s  affair 
with  De  Guiclien,  the  admiralty  knew  that  the  French  convoy 
was  of  the  utmost  importance  to  the  campaign  in  the  West 
Indies,  yet  they  sent  out  their  admiral  with  only  twelve  ships ; 
while  at  that  time,  besides  the  reinforcement  destined  for  the 
West  Indies,  a  number  of  others  were  stationed  in  the  Downs, 
for  what  Fox  justly  called  “  the  paltry  purpose  ”  of  distress¬ 
ing  the  Dutch  trade.  The  various  charges  made  by  Fox  in 
the  speech  quoted  from,  and  which,  as  regarded  the  Franco- 
Spanish  War,  were  founded  mainly  on  the  expediency  of 
attacking  the  allies  before  they  got  away  into  the  ocean  wil¬ 
derness,  were  supported  by  the  high  professional  opinion  of 
Lord  Howe,  who  of  the  Kempenfeldt  affair  said :  “  Not  only 
the  fate  of  the  West  India  Islands,  but  perhaps  the  whole 
future  fortune  of  the  war,  might  have  been  decided,  almost 
without  a  risk,  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay.”  1  Not  without  a  risk, 
but  with  strong  probabilities  of  success,  the  whole  fortune 
of  the  war  should  at  the  first  have  been  staked  on  a  concen¬ 
tration  of  the  English  fleet  between  Brest  and  Cadiz.  No 
relief  for  Gibraltar  would  have  been  more  efficacious  ;  no 
diversion  surer  for  the  West  India  Islands  ;  and  the  Ameri¬ 
cans  would  have  appealed  in  vain  for  the  help,  scantily  given 

1  Annual  Register,  1782. 

27 


418  DE  GRASSE'S  SHORT  STAY  IN  AMERICA. 


as  it  was,  of  the  French  fleet.  For  the  great  results  that 
flowed  from  the  coming  of  De  Grasse  must  not  obscure  the 
fact  that  he  came  on  the  31st  of  August,  and  announced 
from  the  beginning  that  he  must  be  in  the  West  Indies 
again  by  the  middle  of  October.  Only  a  providential  com¬ 
bination  of  circumstances  prevented  a  repetition  to  Washing¬ 
ton,  in  1781,  of  the  painful  disappointments  by  D’Estaing  and 
De  Guichen  in  1778  and  1780. 


CHAPTER  XII. 


Events  in  the  East  Indies,  1778-1781.  —  Suffren  sails  from 
Brest,  1781.  —  His  Brilliant  Naval  Campaign  in  the  Indian 
Seas,  1782,  1783. 

HTHE  very  interesting  and  instructive  campaign  of  Suffren 
^  in  the  East  Indies,  although  in  itself  by  far  the  most 
noteworthy  and  meritorious  naval  performance  of  the  war 
of  1778,  failed,  through  no  fault  of  his,  to  affect  the  gen¬ 
eral  issue.  It  was  not  till  1781  that  the  French  Court  felt 
able  to  direct  upon  the  East  naval  forces  adequate  to  the  im¬ 
portance  of  the  issue.  Yet  the  conditions  of  the  peninsula 
at  that  time  were  such  as  to  give  an  unusual  opportunity 
for  shaking  the  English  power.  Hyder  Ali,  the  most  skilful 
and  daring  of  all  the  enemies  against  whom  the  English  had 
yet  fought  in  India,  was  then  ruling  over  the  kingdom  of 
Mysore,  which,  from  its  position  in  the  southern  part  of  the 
peninsula,  threatened  both  the  Carnatic  and  the  Malabar 
coast.  Hyder,  ten  years  before,  had  maintained  alone  a  most 
successful  war  against  the  intruding  foreigners,  concluding 
with  a  peace  upon  the  terms  of  a  mutual  restoration  of  con¬ 
quests  ;  and  he  was  now  angered  by  the  capture  of  MahA 
On  the  other  hand,  a  number  of  warlike  tribes,  known  by  the 
name  of  the  Mahrattas,  of  the  same  race  and  loosely  knit 
together  in  a  kind  of  feudal  system,  had  become  involved  in 
war  with  the  English.  The  territory  occupied  by  these  tribes, 
whose  chief  capital  was  at  Poonah,  near  Bombay,  extended 
northward  from  Mysore  to  the  Ganges.  With  boundaries 
thus  conterminous,  and  placed  centrally  with  reference  to 
the  three  English  presidencies  of  Bombay,  Calcutta,  and  Ma¬ 
dras,  Hyder  and  the  Mahrattas  were  in  a  position  of  advan¬ 
tage  for  mutual  support  and  for  offensive  operations  against 


420 


ENGLISH  DISASTERS  IN  INDIA. 


the  common  enemy.  At  the  beginning  of  the  war  between 
England  and  France,  a  French  agent  appeared  at  Poonah.  It 
was  reported  to  Warren  Hastings,  the  Governor-General,  that 
the  tribes  had  agreed  to  terms  and  ceded  to  the  French  a 
seaport  on  the  Malabar  coast.  With  his  usual  promptness, 
Hastings  at  once  determined  on  war,  and  sent  a  division 
of  the  Bengal  army  across  the  Jumna  and  into  Berar.  An¬ 
other  body  of  four  thousand  English  troops  also  marched 
from  Bombay ;  but  being  badly  led,  was  surrounded  and 
forced  to  surrender  in  January,  17T9.  This  unusual  reverse 
quickened  the  hopes  and  increased  the  strength  of  the  ene¬ 
mies  of  the  English  ;  and  although  the  material  injury  was 
soon  remedied  by  substantial  successes  under  able  leaders, 
the  loss  of  prestige  remained.  The  anger  of  Hyder  Ali, 
roused  by  the  capture  -of  Mah£,  was  increased  by  imprudent 
thwarting  on  the  part  of  the  governor  of  Madras.  Seeing 
the  English  entangled  with  the  Mahrattas,  and  hearing  that 
a  French  armament  was  expected  on  the  Coromandel  coast, 
he  quietly  prepared  for  war.  In  the  summer  of  1780  swarms 
of  his  horsemen  descended  without  warning  from  the  hills, 
and  appeared  near  the  gates  of  Madras.  In  September  one 
body  of  English  troops,  three  thousand  strong,  was  cut  to 
pieces,  and  another  of  five  thousand  was  only  saved  by  a 
rapid  retreat  upon  Madras,  losing  its  artillery  and  trains. 
Unable  to  attack  Madras,  Hyder  turned  upon  the  scattered 
posts  separated  from  each  other  and  the  capital  by  the  open 
country,  which  was  now  wholly  in  his  control. 

Such  was  the  state  of  affairs  when,  in  January,  1781,  a 
French  squadron  of  six  ships-of-the-line  and  three  frigates 
appeared  on  the  coast.  The  English  fleet  under  Sir  Edward 
Hughes  had  gone  to  Bombay.  To  the  French  commodore, 
Count  d’Orves,  Hyder  appealed  for  aid  in  an  attack  upon  Cud- 
dalore.  Deprived  of  support  by  sea,  and  surrounded  by  the 
myriads  of  natives,  the  place  must  have  fallen.  D’Orves,  how¬ 
ever,  refused,  and  returned  to  the  Isle  of  France.  At  the  same 
time  one  of  the  most  skilful  of  the  English  Indian  soldiers, 
Sir  Eyre  Coote,  took  the  field  against  Hyder.  The  latter  at 


SUFFREN  SAILS  FROM  BREST  FOR  INDIA.  421 


once  raised  the  siege  of  the  beleaguered  posts,  and  after  a 
series  of  operations  extending  through  the  spring  months,  was 
brought  to  battle  on  the  1st  of  July,  1781.  His  total  defeat 
restored  to  the  English  the  open  country,  saved  the  Carnatic, 
and  put  an  end  to  the  hopes  of  the  partisans  of  the  French  in 
their  late  possession  of  Pondicherry.  A  great  opportunity 
had  been  lost. 

Meanwhile  a  French  officer  of  very  different  temper  from 
his  predecessors  was  on  his  way  to  the  East  Indies.  It  will 
be  remembered  that  when  De  Grasse  sailed  from  Brest, 
March  22,  1781,  for  the  West  Indies,  there  went  with  his 
fleet  a  division  of  five  ships-of-the-line  under  Suffren.  The 
latter  separated  from  the  main  body  on  the  29th  of  the  month, 
taking  with  him  a  few  transports  destined  for  the  Cape  of 
Good  Hope,  then  a  Dutch  colony.  The  French  government 
had  learned  that  an  expedition  from  England  was  destined 
to  seize  this  important  halting-place  on  the  road  to  India, 
and  Suffren’s  first  mission  was  to  secure  it.  In  fact,  the 
squadron  under  Commodore  Johnstone1  had  got  away  first, 
and  had  anchored  at  Porto  Praya,  in  the  Cape  Yerde  Islands, 
a  Portuguese  colony,  on  the  11th  of  April.  It  numbered  two 
ships-of-the-line,  and  three  of  fifty  guns,  with  frigates  and 
smaller  vessels,  besides  thirty-five  transports,  mostly  armed. 
Without  apprehension  of  attack,  not  because  he  trusted  to 
the  neutrality  of  the  port  but  because  he  thought  his  destina¬ 
tion  secret,  the  English  commodore  had  not  anchored  with  a 
view  to  battle. 

It  so  happened  that  at  the  moment  of  sailing  from  Brest 
one  of  the  ships  intended  for  the  West  Indies  was  transferred 
to  Suffren’s  squadron.  She  consequently  had  not  water 
enough  for  the  longer  voyage,  and  this  with  other  reasons 

1  This  Commodore  Johnstone,  more  commonly  known  as  Governor  John¬ 
stone,  was  one  of  the  three  commissioners  sent  by  Lord  North  in  1778  to  promote 
a  reconciliation  with  America.  Owing  to  certain  suspicious  proceedings  on  his 
part,  Congress  declared  it  was  incompatible  with  their  honor  to  hold  any  manner 
of  correspondence  or  intercourse  with  him.  His  title  of  Governor  arose  from  his 
being  at  one  time  governor  of  Pensacola.  He  had  a  most  unenviable  reputation 
in  the  English  navy.  (See  Charnock’s  Biog.  Navalis.) 


422 


ACTION  AT  PORTO  PRAYA. 


determined  Suffren  also  to  anchor  at  Porto  Praya.  On  the 
16th  of  April,  five  days  after  Johnstone,  he  made  the  island 
early  in  the  morning  and  stood  for  the  anchorage,  sending 
a  coppered  ship  ahead  to  reconnoitre.  Approaching  from 
the  eastward,  the  land  for  some  time  hid  the  English  squad¬ 
ron  ;  but  at  quarter  before  nine  the  advance  ship,  the  64  Ar- 
tesien,”  signalled  that  enemy’s  ships  were  anchored  in  the 
bay.  The  latter  is  open  to  the  southward,  and  extends 
from  east  to  west  about  a  mile  and  a  half ;  the  conditions 
are  such  that  ships  usually  lie  in  the  northeast  part,  near 
the  shore  (Plate  XIII).1  The  English  were  there,  stretch¬ 
ing  irregularly  in  a  west-northwest  line.  Both  Suffren  and 
Johnstone  were  surprised,  but  the  latter  more  so ;  and  the 
initiative  remained  with  the  French  officer.  Few  men  were 
fitter,  by  natural  temper  and  the  teaching  of  experience,  for 
the  prompt  decision  required.  Of  ardent  disposition  and 
inborn  military  genius,  Suffren  had  learned,  in  the  conduct 
of  Boscawen  toward  the  squadron  of  De  la  Clue,2  in  which 
he  had  served,  not  to  lay  weight  upon  the  power  of  Portugal 
to  enforce  respect  for  her  neutrality.  He  knew  that  this 
must  be  the  squadron  meant  for  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope. 
The  only  question  for  him  was  whether  to  press  on  to  the 
Cape  with  the  chance  of  getting  there  first,  or  to  attack  the 
English  at  their  anchors,  in  the  hope  of  so  crippling  them  as 
to  prevent  their  further  progress.  He  decided  for  the  latter  ; 
and  although  the  ships  of  his  squadron,  not  sailing  equally  well, 
were  scattered,  he  also  determined  to  stand  in  at  once,  rather 
than  lose  the  advantage  of  a  surprise.  Making  signal  to  pre¬ 
pare  for  action  at  anchor,  he  took  the  lead  in  his  flag-ship, 
the  44  Heros,”  of  seventy-four  guns,  hauled  close  round  the 
southeast  point  of  the  bay,  and  stood  for  the  English  flag¬ 
ship  (f).  He  was  closely  followed  by  the  44  Hannibal,”  sev¬ 
enty-four  (line  a  b)  ;  the  advance  ship  “Arffisien”  (c),  a 
sixty-four,  also  stood  on  with  him ;  but  the  two  rear  ships 
were  still  far  astern. 

1  This  plate  is  taken  almost  wholly  from  Cunat’s  “  Vie  de  Suffren.” 

2  Page  299. 


I 


ACTION  AT  PORTO  PRAY  A. 


423 


The  English  commodore  got  ready  for  battle  as  soon  as  he 
made  out  the  enemy,  but  had  no  time  to  rectify  his  order. 
Suffren  anchored  five  hundred  feet  from  the  flag-ship’s  star¬ 
board  beam  (by  a  singular  coincidence  the  English  flag-ship 
was  also  called  “  Hero  ”),  thus  having  enemy’s  ships  on  both 
sides,  and  opened  fire.  The  “  Hannibal  ”  anchored  ahead 
of  her  commodore  (b),  and  so  close  that  the  latter  had  to 
veer  cable  and  drop  astern  (a)  ;  but  her  captain,  ignorant  of 
Suffren’s  intention  to  disregard  the  neutrality  of  the  port, 
had  not  obeyed  the  order  to  clear  for  action,  and  was  wholly 
unprepared,  —  his  decks  lumbered  with  water-casks  which  had 
been  got  up  to  expedite  watering,  and  the  guns  not  cast  loose. 
He  did  not  add  to  this  fault  by  any  hesitation,  but  followed 
the  flag-ship  boldly,  receiving  passively  the  fire,  to  which  for 
a  time  he  was  unable  to  reply.  Luffing  to  the  wind,  he  passed 
to  windward  of  his  chief,  chose  his  position  with  skill,  and 
atoned  by  his  death  for  his  first  fault.  These  two  ships  were 
so  placed  as  to  use  both  broadsides.  The  “  Art4sien,”  in  the 
smoke,  mistook  an  East  India  ship  for  a  man-of-war.  Run¬ 
ning  alongside  (c'),  her  captain  was  struck  dead  at  the  mo¬ 
ment  he  was  about  to  anchor,  and  the  critical  moment  being 
lost  by  the  absence  of  a  head,  the  ship  drifted  out  of  close  ac¬ 
tion,  carrying  the  East-Indiaman  along  with  her  (c").  The 
remaining  two  vessels,  coming  up  late,  failed  to  keep  close 
enough  to  the  wind,  and  they  too  were  thrown  out  of  action 
(d,  e).  Then  Suffren,  finding  himself  with  only  two  ships  to 
bear  the  brunt  of  the  fight,  cut  his  cable  and  made  sail.  The 
“  Hannibal  ”  followed  his  movement ;  but  so  much  injured 
was  she  that  her  fore  and  main  masts  went  over  the  side, — 
fortunately  not  till  she  was  pointed  out  from  the  bay,  which 
she  left  shorn  to  a  hulk. 

Putting  entirely  aside  questions  of  international  law,  the 
wisdom  and  conduct  of  Suffren’s  attack,  from  the  military 
point  of  view,  invite  attention.  To  judge  them  properly,  we 
must  consider  what  was  the  object  of  the  mission  with  which 
he  was  charged,  and  what  were  the  chief  factors  in  thwarting 
or  forwarding  it.  His  first  object  was  to  protect  the  Cape 


424 


MERITS  OF  SUFFREN'S  ACTION. 


of  Good  Hope  against  an  English  expedition ;  the  chief  reli¬ 
ance  for  effecting  his  purpose  was  to  get  there  first ;  the 
obstacle  to  his  success  was  the  English  fleet.  To  anticipate 
the  arrival  of  the  latter,  two  courses  were  open  to  him,  —  to 
run  for  it  in  the  hope  of  winning  the  race,  or  to  beat  the 
enemy  and  so  put  him  out  of  the  running  altogether.  So 
long  as  his  whereabouts  was  unknown,  a  search,  unless  with 
very  probable  information,  would  be  a  waste  of  time  ;  but 
when  fortune  had  thrown  his  enemy  across  his  path,  the 
genius  of  Suffren  at  once  jumped  to  the  conclusion  that 
the  control  of  the  sea  in  southern  waters  would  determine 
the  question,  and  should  be  settled  at  once.  To  use  his  own 
strong  expression,  “  The  destruction  of  the  English  squad¬ 
ron  would  cut  off  the  root  of  all  the  plans  and  projects  of  that 
expedition,  gain  us  for  a  long  time  the  superiority  in  India, 
a  superiority  whence  might  result  a  glorious  peace,  and  hin¬ 
der  the  English  from  reaching  the  Cape  before  me,  —  an  ob¬ 
ject  which  has  been  fulfilled  and  was  the  principal  aim  of 
my  mission.”  He  was  ill-informed  as  to  the  English  force, 
believing  it  greater  than  it  was  ;  but  he  had  it  at  disadvantage 
and  surprised.  The  prompt  decision  to  fight,  therefore,  was 
right,  and  it  is  the  most  pronounced  merit  of  Suffren  in  this 
affair,  that  he  postponed  for  the  moment  —  dismissed,  so  to 
speak,  from  his  mind  —  the  ulterior  projects  of  the  cruise  ; 
but  in  so  doing  he  departed  from  the  traditions  of  the  French 
navy  and  the  usual  policy  of  his  government.  It  cannot  be 
imputed  to  him  as  a  fault  that  he  did  not  receive  from  his 
captains  the  support  he  was  fairly  entitled  to  expect.  The 
accidents  and  negligence  which  led  to  their  failure  have  been 
mentioned ;  but  having  his  three  best  ships  in  hand,  there 
can  be  little  doubt  he  was  right  in  profiting  by  the  surprise, 
and  trusting  that  the  two  in  reserve  would  come  up  in  time. 

The  position  taken  by  his  own  ship  and  by  the  “  Hannibal,” 
enabling  them  to  use  both  broadsides,  —  in  other  words,  to 
develop  their  utmost  force,  —  was  excellently  judged.  He 
thus  availed  himself  to  the  full  of  the  advantage  given  by  the 
surprise  and  by  the  lack  of  order  in  the  enemy’s  squadron. 


SUFFREN’S  DISTINCTIVE  MERITS. 


425 


This  lack  of  order,  according  to  English  accounts,  threw  out 
of  action  two  of  their  fifty-gun  ships,  —  a  circumstance  which, 
while  discreditable  to  Johnstone,  confirmed  Suffren’s  judg¬ 
ment  in  precipitating  his  attack.  Had  he  received  the  aid 
upon  which,  after  all  deductions,  he  was  justified  in  counting, 
he  would  have  destroyed  the  English  squadron  ;  as  it  was,  he 
saved  the  Cape  Colony  at  Porto  Praya.  It  is  not  surprising, 
therefore,  that  the  French  Court,  notwithstanding  its  tradi¬ 
tional  sea  policy  and  the  diplomatic  embarrassment  caused 
by  the  violation  of  Portuguese  neutrality,  should  have  heartily 
and  generously  acknowledged  a  vigor  of  action  to  which  it  was 
unused  in  its  admirals. 

It  has  been  said  that  Suffren,  who  had  watched  the  cautious 
movements  of  D’Estaing  in  America,  and  had  served  in  the 
Seven  Years’  War,  attributed  in  part  the  reverses  suffered 
by  the  French  at  sea  to  the  introduction  of  Tactics,  which  he 
stigmatized  as  the  veil  of  timidity  ;  but  that  the  results  of  the 
fight  at  Porto  Praya,  necessarily  engaged  without  previous 
arrangement,  convinced  him  that  system  and  method  had 
their  use.1  Certainly  his  tactical  combinations  afterward 
were  of  a  high  order,  especially  in  his  earlier  actions  in  the 
East  (for  he  seems  again  to  have  abandoned  them  in  the 
later  fights  under  the  disappointment  caused  by  his  captains* 
disaffection  or  blundering).  But  his  great  and  transcendent 
merit  lay  in  the  clearness  with  which  he  recognized  in  the 
English  fleets,  the  exponent  of  the  British  sea  power,  the 
proper  enemy  of  the  French  fleet,  to  be  attacked  first  and 
always  when  with  any  show  of  equality.  Far  from  blind  to 
the  importance  of  those  ulterior  objects  to  which  the  action  of 
the  French  navy  was  so  constantly  subordinated,  he  yet  saw 
plainly  that  the  way  to  assure  those  objects  was  not  by  econo¬ 
mizing  his  own  ships,  but  by  destroying  those  of  the  enemy. 
Attack,  not  defence,  was  the  road  to  sea  power  in  his  eyes ; 
and  sea  power  meant  control  of  the  issues  upon  the  land,  at 
least  in  regions  distant  from  Europe.  This  view  out  of  the 
English  policy  he  had  the  courage  to  take,  after  forty  years 

1  La  Serre :  Essais  Hist,  et  Critiques  sur  la  Marine  Frangaise. 


426 


CLEARNESS  OF  SUFFRENS  VIEWS. 


of  service  in  a  navy  sacrificed  to  the  opposite  system  ;  but 
he  brought  to  its  practical  application  a  method  not  to  be 
found  in  any  English  admiral  of  the  day,  except  perhaps 
Rodney,  and  a  fire  superior  to  the  latter.  Yet  the  course 
thus  followed  was  no  mere  inspiration  of  the  moment ;  it  was 
the  result  of  clear  views  previously  held  and  expressed.  How¬ 
ever  informed  by  natural  ardor,  it  had  the  tenacity  of  an 
intellectual  conviction.  Thus  he  wrote  to  D’Estaing,  after 
the  failure  to  destroy  Barrington’s  squadron  at  Sta.  Lucia, 
remonstrating  upon  the  half-manned  condition  of  his  own 
and  other  ships,  from  which  men  had  been  landed  to  attack 
the  English  troops  :  — 

m 

u  Notwithstanding  the  small  results  of  the  two  cannonades  of  the 
15th  of  December  [directed  against  Barrington’s  squadron],  and  the 
unhappy  check  our  land  forces  have  undergone,  we  may  yet  hope  for 
success.  But  the  only  means  to  have  it  is  to  attack  vigorously  the 
squadron,  which,  with  our  superiority,  cannot  resist,  notwithstanding 
its  land  batteries,  whose  effects  will  be  neutralized  if  we  run  them 
aboard,  or  anchor  upon  their  buoys.  If  we  delay,  they  may  escape. 
.  .  .  Besides,  our  fleet  being  unmanned,  it  is  in  condition  neither  to 
sail  nor  to  fight.  What  would  happen  if  Admiral  Byron’s  fleet 
should  arrive  ?  What  would  become  of  ships  having  neither  crews 
nor  admiral  ?  Their  defeat  would  cause  the  loss  of  the  army  and  the 
colony.  Let  us  destroy  that  squadron ;  their  army,  lacking  every¬ 
thing  and  in  a  bad  country,  would  soon  be  obliged  to  surrender. 
Then  let  Byron  come,  we  shall  be  pleased  to  see  him.  I  think  it  is 
not  necessary  to  point  out  that  for  this  attack  we  need  men  and  plans 
well  concerted  with  those  who  are  to  execute  them.” 

Equally  did  lie  condemn  the  failure  of  D’Estaing  to  cap¬ 
ture  the  four  crippled  ships  of  Byron’s  squadron,  after  the 
action  off  Grenada. 

Owing  to  a  combination  of  misfortunes,  the  attack  at  Porto 
Praya  had  not  the  decisive  result  it  deserved.  Commodore 
Johnstone  got  under  way  and  followed  Suffren ;  but  he  thought 
his  force  was  not  adequate  to  attack  in  face  of  the  resolute 
bearing  of  the  French,  and  feared  the  loss  of  time  conse¬ 
quent  upon  chasing  to  leeward  of  his  port.  He  succeeded, 


SUFFREN  ARRIVES  IN  INDIA. 


427 


however,  in  retaking  the  East  India  ship  which  the  “  Artdsien” 
had  carried  out.  Suffren  continued  his  course  and  anchored 
at  the  Cape,  in  Simon’s  Bay,  on  the  21st  of  June.  John- 
stone  followed  him  a  fortnight  later ;  but  learning  by  an 
advance  ship  that  the  French  troops  had  been  landed,  he  gave 
up  the  enterprise  against  the  colony,  made  a  successful  com¬ 
merce-destroying  attack  upon  five  Dutch  India  ships  in  Sal- 
danha  Bay,  which  poorly  repaid  the  failure  of  the  military 
undertaking,  and  then  went  back  himself  to  England,  after 
sending  the  ships-of-the-line  on  to  join  Sir  Edward  Hughes 
in  the  East  Indies. 

Having  seen  the  Cape  secured,  Suffren  sailed  for  the  Isle 
of  France,  arriving  there  on  the  25th  of  October,  1781. 
Count  d’Orves,  being  senior,  took  command  of  the  united 
squadron.  The  necessary  repairs  were  made,  and  the  fleet 
sailed  for  India,  December  17.  On  the  22d  of  January,  1782, 
an  English  fifty-gun  ship,  the  “  Hannibal,”  was  taken.  On 
the  9th  of  February  Count  d’Orves  died,  and  Suffren  became 
commander-in-chief,  with  the  rank  of  commodore.  A  few 
days  later  the  land  was  seen  to  the  northward  of  Madras  ; 
but  owing  to  head-winds  the  city  was  not  sighted  until  Feb¬ 
ruary  15.  Nine  large  ships-of-war  were  found  anchored  in 
order  under  the  guns  of  the  forts.  They  were  the  fleet  of  Sir 
Edward  Hughes,  not  in  confusion  like  that  of  Johnstone.1 

Here,  at  the  meeting  point  between  these  two  redoubtable 
champions,  each  curiously  representative  of  the  characteris¬ 
tics  of  his  own  race,  —  the  one  of  the  stubborn  tenacity  and 
seamanship  of  the  English,  the  other  of  the  ardor  and  tac¬ 
tical  science  of  the  French,  too  long  checked  and  betrayed 
by  a  false  system,  —  is  the  place  to  give  an  accurate  state- 

*  The  question  of  attacking  the  English  squadron  at  its  anchors  was  debated 
ill  a  council  of  war.  Its  opinion  confirmed  Suffren’s  decision  not  to  do  so.  In 
contrasting  this  with  the  failure  of  the  English  to  attack  the  French  detachment 
in  Newport  (p.  394),  it  must  he  borne  in  mind  that  in  the  latter  case  there  was  no 
means  of  forcing  the  ships  to  leave  their  strong  position  ;  whereas  by  threatening 
Trincomalee,  or  other  less  important  points,  Suffren  could  rely  upon  drawing 
Hughes  out.  He  was  therefore  right  in  not  attacking,  while  the  English  before 
Newport  were  probably  wrong. 


428  IMPORTANCE  OF  CONTROLLING  THE  SEA. 


ment  of  the  material  forces.  The  French  fleet  had  three 
seventy-fours,  seven  sixty-fours,  and  two  fifty-gun  ships,  one 
of  which  was  the  lately  captured  English  “  Hannibal.”  To 
these  Sir  Edward  Hughes  opposed  two  seventy-fours,  one 
seventy,  one  sixty-eight,  four  sixty-fours,  and  one  fifty-gun 
ship.  The  odds,  therefore,  twelve  to  nine,  were  decidedly 
against  the  English  ;  and  it  is  likely  that  the  advantage  in 
single-ship  power,  class  for  class,  was  also  against  them. 

It  must  be  recalled  that  at  the  time  of  his  arrival  Suffren 
found  no  friendly  port  or  roadstead,  no  base  of  supplies  or 
repair.  The  French  posts  had  all  fallen  by  1779;  and  his 
rapid  movement,  which  saved  the  Cape,  did  not  bring  him 
up  in  time  to  prevent  the  capture  of  the  Dutch  Indian  posses¬ 
sions.  The  invaluable  harbor  of  Trincomalee,  in  Ceylon,  was 
taken  just  one  month  before  Suffren  saw  the  English  fleet  at 
Madras.  But  if  he  thus  had  everything  to  gain,  Hughes  had 
as  much  to  lose.  To  Suffren,  at  the  moment  of  first  meeting, 
belonged  superiority  of  numbers  and  the  power  of  taking  the 
offensive,  with  all  its  advantages  in  choice  of  initiative.  Upon 
Hughes  fell  the  anxiety  of  the  defensive,  with  inferior  num¬ 
bers,  many  assailable  points,  and  uncertainty  as  to  the  place 
where  the  blow  would  fall. 

It  was  still  true,  though  not  so  absolutely  as  thirty  years 
before,  that  control  in  India  depended  upon  control  of  the 
sea.  The  passing  years  had  greatly  strengthened  the  grip  of 
England,  and  proportionately  loosened  that  of  France.  Rela¬ 
tively,  therefore,  the  need  of  Suffren  to  destroy  his  enemy  was 
greater  than  that  of  his  predecessors,  D’Ach6  and  others ; 
whereas  Hughes  could  count  upon  a  greater  strength  in  the 
English  possessions,  and  so  bore  a  somewhat  less  responsi¬ 
bility  than  the  admirals  who  went  before  him. 

Nevertheless,  the  sea  was  still  by  far  the  most  important 
factor  in  the  coming  strife,  and  for  its  proper  control  it  was 
necessary  to  disable  more  or  less  completely  the  enemy’s 
fleet,  and  to  have  some  reasonably  secure  base.  For  the  latter 
purpose,  Trincomalee,  though  unhealthy,  was  by  far  the  best 
harbor  on  the  east  coast ;  but  it  had  not  been  long  enough 


CONDITIONS  INFLUENCING  HUGHES. 


429 


in  the  hands  of  England  to  be  well  supplied.  Hughes,  there¬ 
fore,  inevitably  fell  back  on  Madras  for  repairs  after  an  action, 
and  was  forced  to  leave  Trincomalee  to  its  own  resources 
until  ready  to  take  the  sea  again.  Suffren,  on  the  other 
hand,  found  all  ports  alike  destitute  of  naval  supplies,  while 
the  natural  advantages  of  Trincomalee  made  its  possession 
an  evident  object  of  importance  to  him ;  and  Hughes  so 
understood  it. 

Independently,  therefore,  of  the  tradition  of  the  English 
navy  impelling  Hughes  to  attack,  the  influence  of  which  ap¬ 
pears  plainly  between  the  lines  of  his  letters,  Suffren  had,  in 
moving  toward  Trincomalee,  a  threat  which  was  bound  to 
draw  his  adversary  out  of  his  port.  Nor  did  Trincomalee 
stand  alone  ;  the  existing  war  between  Hyder  Ali  and  the 
English  made  it  imperative  for  Suffren  to  seize  a  port  upon 
the  mainland,  at  which  to  land  the  three  thousand  troops  car¬ 
ried  by  the  squadron  to  co-operate  on  shore  against  the  common 
enemy,  and  from  which  supplies,  at  least  of  food,  might  be 
had.  Everything,  therefore,  concurred  to  draw  Hughes  out, 
and  make  him  seek  to  cripple  or  hinder  the  French  fleet. 

The  method  of  his  action  would  depend  upon  his  own  and 
his  adversary’s  skill,  and  upon  the  uncertain  element  of  the 
weather.  It  was  plainly  desirable  for  him  not  to  be  brought 
to  battle  except  on  his  own  terms  ;  in  other  words,  without 
some  advantage  of  situation  to  make  up  for  his  weaker  force. 
As  a  fleet  upon  the  open  sea  cannot  secure  any  advantages  of 
ground,  the  position  favoring  the  weaker  was  that  to  wind¬ 
ward,  giving  choice  of  time  and  some  choice  as  to  method 
of  attack,  the  offensive  position  used  defensively,  with  the 
intention  to  make  an  offensive  movement  if  circumstances 
warrant.  The  leeward  position  left  the  weaker  no  choice  but 
to  run,  or  to  accept  action  on  its  adversary’s  terms. 

Whatever  may  be  thought  of  Hughes’s  skill,  it  must  be 
conceded  that  his  task  was  difficult.  Still,  it  can  be  clearly 
thought  down  to  two  requisites.  The  first  was  to  get  in  a 
blow  at  the  French  fleet,  so  as  to  reduce  the  present  in¬ 
equality  ;  the  Second,  to  keep  Suffren  from  getting  Trin* 


430 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  BETWEEN 


comalee,  wnich  depended  wholly  on  the  fleet.1  Suffren,  on 
the  other  hand,  if  he  could  do  Hughes,  in  an  action,  more 
injury  than  he  himself  received,  would  be  free  to  turn  in  any 
direction  he  chose. 

Suffren  having  sighted  Hughes’s  fleet  at  Madras,  February 
15,  anchored  his  own  four  miles  to  the  northward.  Con¬ 
sidering  the  enemy’s  line,  supported  by  the  batteries,  to  be 
too  strong  for  attack,  he  again  got  under  way  at  four  p.  m., 
and  stood  south.  Hughes  also  weighed,  standing  to  the  south¬ 
ward  all  that  night  under  easy  sail,  and  at  daylight  found 
that  the  enemy’s  squadron  had  separated  from  the  convoy, 
the  ships  of  war  being  about  twelve  miles  east,  while  the 
transports  were  nine  miles  southwest,  from  him  (Plate  XIY. 
A,  A).  This  dispersal  is  said  to  have  been  due  to  the  care¬ 
lessness  of  the  French  frigates,  which  did  not  keep  touch 
of  the  English.  Hughes  at  once  profited  by  it,  chasing  the 
convoy  (c),  knowing  that  the  line-of-battle  ships  must  follow. 
His  copper-bottomed  ships  came  up  with  and  captured  six 
of  the  enemy,  five  of  which  were  English  prizes.  The  sixth 
carried  three  hundred  troops  with  military  stores.  Hughes 
had  scored  a  point. 

Suffren  of  course  followed  in  a  general  chase,  and  by  three 
p.  M.  four  of  his  best  sailers  were  two  or  three  miles  from 
the  sternmost  English  ships.  Hughes’s  ships  were  now  much 
scattered,  but  not  injudiciously  so,  for  they  joined  by  signal 
at  seven  p.  m.  Both  squadrons  stood  to  the  southeast  during 
the  night,  under  easy  sail. 

At  daylight  of  the  17th — the  date  of  the  first  of  four  actions 
fought  between  these  two  chiefs  within  seven  months  —  the 

fleets  were  six  or  eight  miles  apart,  the  French  bearing  north- 

/ 

1  The  dependence  of  Trincomalee  upon  the  English  fleet  in  this  campaign 
affords  an  excellent  illustration  of  the  embarrassment  and  false  position  in  which 
a  navy  finds  itself  when  the  defence  of  its  seaports  rests  upon  it.  This  bears 
upon  a  much  debated  point  of  the  present  day,  and  is  worthy  the  study  of  those 
who  maintain,  too  unqualifiedly,  that  the  best  coast  defence  is  a  navy.  In  one 
sense  this  is  doubtless  true,  —  to  attack  the  enemy  abroad  is  the  best  of  defences ; 
but  in  the  narrow  sense  of  the  word  “  defence  ”  it  is  not  true.  Trincomalee  unfor¬ 
tified  was  simply  a  centre  round  which  Hughes  had  to  revolve  like  a  tethered 
animal ;  and  the  same  will  always  happen  under  like  conditions. 


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HUGHES  AND  SUFFREN. 


431 


northeast  from  the  English  (B,  B).  The  latter  formed  line- 
ahead  on  the  port  tack  (a),  with  difficulty,  owing  to  the  light 
winds  and  frequent  calms.  Admiral  Hughes  explains  that  he 
hoped  to  weather  the  enemy  by  this  course  so  as  to  engage 
closely,  counting  probably  on  finding  himself  to  windward 
when  the  sea-breeze  made.  The  wind  continuing  light,  but 
with  frequent  squalls,  from  north-northeast,  the  French,  run¬ 
ning  before  it,  kept  the  puffs  longer  and  neared  the  English 
rapidly,  Suffren’s  intention  to  attack  the  rear  being  aided  by 
Hughes’s  course.  The  latter  finding  his  rear  straggling,  bore 
up  to  line  abreast  (b),  retreating  to  gain  time  for  the  ships 
to  close  on  the  centre.  These  movements  in  line  abreast  con¬ 
tinued  till  twenty  minutes  before  four  p.  M.,  when,  finding  he 
could  not  escape  attack  on  the  enemy’s  terms,  Hughes  hauled 
his  wind  on  the  port  tack  and  awaited  it  (C).  Whether  by 
his  own  fault  or  not,  he  was  now  in  the  worst  possible  posi¬ 
tion,  waiting  for  an  attack  by  a  superior  force  at  its  pleasure. 
The  rear  ship  of  his  line,  the  44  Exeter,”  was  not  closed  up  ; 
and  there  appears  no  reason  why  she  should  not  have  been 
made  the  van,  by  forming  on  the  starboard  tack,  and  thus 
bringing  the  other  ships  up  to  her. 

The  method  of  Suffren’s  attack  (C)  is  differently  stated 
by  him  and  by  Hughes,  but  the  difference  is  in  detail  only ; 
the  main  facts  are  certain.  Hughes  says  the  enemy  44  steered 
down  on  the  rear  of  our  line  in  an  irregular  double  line- 
abreast,”  in  which  formation  they  continued  till  the  moment 
of  collision,  when  44  three  of  the  enemy’s  ships  in  the  first 
line  bore  right  down  upon  the  4  Exeter,’  while  four  more  of 
their  second  line,  headed  by  the  ‘  Hdros,’  in  which  M.  de  Suffren 
had  his  flag,  hauled  along  the  outside  of  the  first  line  toward 
our  centre.  At  five  minutes  past  four  the  enemy’s  three  ships 
began  their  fire  upon  the  4  Exeter,’  which  was  returned  by  her 
and  her  second  ahead;  the  action  became  general  from  our 
rear  to  our  centre,  the  commanding  ship  of  the  enemy,  with 
three  others  of  their  second  line,  leading  down  on  our  centre, 
yet  never  advancing  farther  than  opposite  to  the  4  Superbe,’ 
Our  centre  ship,  with  little  or  no  wind  and  some  heavy  rain 


432 


SUFFREN’S  TACTICS. 


during  the  engagement.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  en¬ 
emy  brought  eight  of  their  best  ships  to  the  attack  of  five 
of  ours,  as  the  van  of  our  line,  consisting  of  the  4  Monmouth,’ 

4  Eagle,’  4  Burford,’  and  4  Worcester,’  could  not  be  brought  into 
action  without  tacking  on  the  enemy,”  for  which  there  was 
not  enough  wind. 

Here  we  will  leave  them,  and  give  Suffren’s  account  of 
how  he  took  up  his  position.  In  his  report  to  the  Minister 
of  Marine  he  says  :  — 

“  I  should  have  destroyed  the  English  squadron,  less  by  superior 
numbers  than  by  the  advantageous  disposition  in  which  I  attacked  it. 
I  attacked  the  rear  ship  and  stood  along  the  English  line  as  far  as  the 
sixth.  I  thus  made  three  of  them  useless,  so  that  we  were  twelve 
against  six.  I  began  the  fight  at  half-past  three  in  the  afternoon, 
taking  the  lead  and  making  signal  to  form  line  as  best  could  be  done ; 
without  that  I  would  not  have  engaged.  At  four  I  made  signal  to 
three  ships  to  double  on  the  enemy’s  rear,  and  to  the  squadron  to 
approach  within  pistol-shot.  This  signal,  though  repeated,  was  not 
executed.  I  did  not  myself  give  the  example,  in  order  that  I  might 
hold  in  check  the  three  van  ships,  which  by  tacking  would  have 
doubled  on  me.  However,  except  the  ‘  Brilliant,’  which  doubled  on 
the  rear,  no  ship  was  as  close  as  mine,  nor  received  as  many  shots.” 

The  principal  point  of  difference  in  the  two  accounts  is, 
that  Suffren  asserts  that  his  flag-ship  passed  along  the  whole 
English  line,  from  the  rear  to  the  sixth  ship  ;  while  Hughes 
says  the  French  divided  into  two  lines,  which,  upon  coming 
near,  steered,  one  on  the  rear,  the  other  on  the  centre,  of  his 
squadron.  The  latter  would  be  the  better  manoeuvre  ;  for  if 
the  leading  ship  of  the  attack  passed,  as  Suffren  asserts,  along 
the  enemv’s  line  from  the  rear  to  the  sixth,  she  should  receive 
in  succession  the  first  fire  of  six  ships,  which  ought  to  cripple 
her  and  confuse  her  line.  Suffren  also  notes  the  intention 
to  double  on  the  rear  by  placing  three  ships  to  leeward  of 
it.  Two  of  the  French  did  take  this  position.  Suffren  further 
gives  his  reason  for  not  closing  with  his  own  ship,  which  led ; 
but  as  those  which  followed  him  went  no  nearer,  Hughes’s 
attention  was  not  drawn  to  his  action. 


-  SUFFREN’S  STRATEGIC  IDEAS. 


433 


The  French  commodore  was  seriously,  and  it  would  seem 
justly,  angered  by  the  inaction  of  several  of  his  captains. 
Of  the  second  in  command  he  complained  to  the  minister : 
“  Being  at  the  head,  I  could  not  well  see  what  was  going 
on  in  the  rear.  I  had  directed  M.  de  Tromelin  to  make  sig¬ 
nals  to  ships  which  might  be  near  him  ;  he  only  repeated  my 
own  without  having  them  carried  out.”  This  complaint  was 
wholly  justified.  On  the  6th  of  February,  ten  days  before  the 
fight,  he  had  written  to  his  second  as  follows  :  — 

“  If  we  are  so  fortunate  as  to  be  to  windward,  as  the  English  are 
not  more  than  eight,  or  at  most  nine,  my  intention  is  to  double  on 
their  rear.  Supposing  your  division  to  be  in  the  rear,  you  will  see 
by  your  position  what  number  of  ships  will  overlap  the  enemy’s  line, 
and  you  will  make  signal  to  them  to  double  1  [that  is,  to  engage  on 
the  lee  side].  ...  In  any  case,  I  beg  you  to  order  to  your  division 
the  manoeuvres  which  you  shall  think  best  fitted  to  assure  the  success 
of  the  action.  The  capture  of  Trincomalee  and  that  of  Negapatam, 
and  perhaps  of  all  Ceylon,  should  make  us  wish  for  a  general  action.” 

The  last  two  sentences  reveal  Suffren’s  own  appreciation 
of  the  military  situation  in  the  Indian  seas,  which  demanded, 
first,  the  disabling  of  the  hostile  fleet,  next,  the  capture  of 
certain  strategic  ports.  That  this  diagnosis  was  correct  is 
as  certain  as  that  it  reversed  the  common  French  maxims, 
which  would  have  put  the  port  first  and  the  fleet  second 
as  objectives.  A  general  action  was  the  first  desideratum  of 
Suffren,  and  it  is  therefore  safe  to  say  that  to  avoid  such 
action  should  have  been  the  first  object  of  Hughes.  The 
attempt  of  the  latter  to  gain  the  windward  position  was  con¬ 
sequently  correct ;  and  as  in  the  month  of  February  the  sea- 
breeze  at  Madras  sets  in  from  the  eastward  and  southward 
about  eleven  a.  M.,he  probably  did  well  to  steer  in  that  general 
direction,  though  the  result  disappointed  him.  De  Guichen  in 

1  Plate  XIV.,  Fig.  D,  shows  the  order  of  battle  Suffren  intended  in  this  action. 
The  five  rear  ships  of  the  enemy  would  each  have  two  opponents  close  aboard. 
The  leading  F rench  ship  on  the  weather  side  was  to  be  kept  farther  off,  so  that 
while  attacking  the  sixth  Englishman  she  could  “contain”  the  van  ship?  if  they 
attempted  to  reinforce  the  rear  by  tacking. 

28 


434  DUTIES  OF  THE  SECOND  IN  COMMAND. 


one  of  his  engagements  with  Rodney  shaped  the  course  of  his 
fleet  with  reference  to  being  to  windward  when  the  afternoon 
breeze  made,  and  was  successful.  What  use  Hughes  would 
have  made  of  the  advantage  of  the  wind  can  only  be  inferred 
from  his  own  words,  —  that  he  sought  it  in  order  to  engage 
more  closely.  There  is  not  in  this  the  certain  promise  of 
any  skilful  use  of  a  tactical  advantage. 

Suffren  also  illustrates,  in  his  words  to  Tromelin,  his  com 
ception  of  the  duties  of  a  second  in  command,  which  may 
fairly  be  paralleled  with  that  of  Nelson  in  his  celebrated  order 
before  Trafalgar.  In  this  first  action  he  led  the  main  attack 
himself,  leaving  the  direction  of  what  may  be  called  the  re¬ 
serve  —  at  any  rate,  of  the  second  half  of  the  assault  —  to 
his  lieutenant,  who,  unluckily  for  him,  was  not  a  Collingwood, 
and  utterly  failed  to  support  him.  It  is  probable  that  Suf- 
fren’s  leading  was  due  not  to  any  particular  theory,  but  to 
the  fact  that  his  ship  was  the  best  sailer  in  the  fleet,  and  that 
the  lateness  of  the  hour  and  lightness  of  the  wind  made  it 
necessary  to  bring  the  enemy  to  action  speedily.  But  here 
appears  a  fault  on  the  part  of  Suffren.  Leading  as  he  did 
involves,  not  necessarily  but  very  naturally,  the  idea  of  ex¬ 
ample  ;  and  holding  his  own  ship  outside  of  close  range,  for 
excellent  tactical  reasons,  led  the  captains  in  his  wake  natu¬ 
rally,  almost  excusably,  to  keep  at  the  same  distance,  not¬ 
withstanding  his  signals.  The  conflict  between  orders  and 
example,  which  cropped  out  so  singularly  at  Vicksburg  in  our 
civil  war,  causing  the  misunderstanding  and  estrangement 
of  two  gallant  officers,  should  not  be  permitted  to  occur.  It 
is  the  business  of  a  chief  to  provide  against  such  misappre¬ 
hensions  by  most  careful  previous  explanation  of  both  the  letter 
and  spirit  of  his  plans.  Especially  is  this  so  at  sea,  where 
smoke,  slack  wind,  and  intervening  rigging  make  signals 
hard  to  read,  though  they  are  almost  the  only  means  of  com¬ 
munication.  This  was  Nelson’s  practice ;  nor  was  Suffren  a 
stranger  to  the  idea.  “  Dispositions  well  concerted  with  those 
who  are  to  carry  them  out  are  needed,”  he  wrote  to  D’Estaing, 
three  years  before.  The  excuse  which  may  be  pleaded  for 


SUFFREN’S  COMPLAINTS  OF  HIS  OFFICERS.  435 


those  who  followed  him,  and  engaged,  cannot  avail  for  the 
rear  ships,  and  especially  not  for  the  second  in  command, 
who  knew  Suffren’s  plans.  He  should  have  compelled  the 
rear  ships  to  take  position  to  leeward,  leading  himself,  if  ne¬ 
cessary.  There  was  wind  enough  ;  for  two  captains  actually 
engaged  to  leeward,  one  of  them  without  orders,  acting, 
through  the  impulse  of  his  own  good  will  and  courage,  on 
Nelson’s  saying,  “No  captain  can  do  very  wrong  who  places 
his  ship  alongside  that  of  an  enemy.”  He  received  the 
special  commendation  of  Suffren,  in  itself  an  honor  and  a 
reward.  Whether  the  failure  of  so  many  of  his  fellows  was 
due  to  inefficiency,  or  to  a  spirit  of  faction  and  disloyalty, 
is  unimportant  to  the  general  military  writer,  however  in¬ 
teresting  to  French  officers  jealous  for  the  honor  of  their 
service.  Suffren’s  complaints,  after  several  disappointments, 
became  vehement. 

“My  heart,”  wrote  he,  “is  wruDg  by  the  most  general  defection. 
I  have  just  lost  the  opportunity  of  destroying  the  English  squadron. 
.  .  .  All  —  yes,  all  —  might  have  got  near,  since  we  were  to  wind¬ 
ward  and  ahead,  and  none  did  so.  Several  among  them  had  behaved 
bravely  in  other  combats.  I  can  only  attribute  this  horror  to  the 
wish  to  bring  the  cruise  to  an  end,  to  ill-will,  and  to  ignorance  ;  for 
I  dare  not  suspect  anything  worse.  The  result  has  been  terrible.  I 
must  tell  you,  Monseigneur,  that  officers  who  have  been  long  at  the 
Isle  of  France  are  neither  seamen  nor  military  men.  Not  seamen, 
for  they  have  not  been  at  sea ;  and  the  trading  temper,  independent 
and  insubordinate,  is  absolutely  opposed  to  the  military  spirit.” 

This  letter,  written  after  his  fourth  battle  with  Hughes, 
must  be  taken  with  allowance.  Not  only  does  it  appear  that 
Suffren  himself,  hurried  away  on  this  last  occasion  by  his 
eagerness,  was  partly  responsible  for  the  disorder  of  his  fleet, 
but  there  were  other  circumstances,  and  above  all  the  char¬ 
acter  of  some  of  the  officers  blamed,  which  made  the  charge 
of  a  general  disaffection  excessive.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
remains  true  that  after  four  general  actions,  with  superior 
numbers  on  the  part  of  the  French,  under  a  chief  of  the  skill 
and  ardor  of  Suffren,  the  English  squadron,  to  use  his  own 


436 


MOVEMENTS  OF  THE  TWO  FLEETS. 


plaintive  expression,  “  still  existed  ;  ”  not  only  so,  but  had  not 
lost  a  single  ship.  The  only  conclusion  that  can  be  drawn 
is  that  of  a  French  naval  writer :  “  Quantity  disappeared  be¬ 
fore  quality.”  1  It  is  immaterial  whether  the  defect  was  due 

to  inefficiency  or  disaffection. 

•/ 

The  inefficiency  which  showed  itself  on  the  field  of  battle 
disappeared  in  the  general  conduct  of  the  campaign  where  the 
qualities  of  the  chief  alone  told.  The  battle  of  February  17th 
ended  with  a  shift  of  wind  to  the  southeast  at  six  P.  M.,  after 
two  hours  action.  The  English  were  thus  brought  to  wind¬ 
ward,  and  their  van  ships  enabled  to  share  in  the  fight.  Night 
falling,  Suffren,  at  half-past  six,  hauled  his  squadron  by  the 
wind  on  the  starboard  tack,  heading  northeast,  while  Hughes 
steered  south  under  easy  sail.  It  is  said  by  Captain  Che¬ 
valier,  of  the  French  navy,  that  Suffren  intended  to  renew  the 
fight  next  day.  In  that  case  he  should  have  taken  measures 
to  keep  within  reach.  It  was  too  plainly  Hughes’s  policy  not 
to  fight  without  some  advantage,  —  to  allow  the  supposition 
that  with  one  ship,  the  “  Exeter,”  lost  to  him  through  the 
concentration  of  so  many  enemies  upon  her,  he  would  quietly 
await  an  attack.  This  is  so  plain  as  to  make  it  probable  that 
Suffren  saw  sufficient  reason,  in  the  results  to  his  fleet  and 
the  misconduct  of  his  officers,  not  to  wish  to  renew  action  at 
once.  The  next  morning  the  two  fleets  were  out  of  sight 
of  each  other.  The  continuance  of  the  north  wind,  and  the 
crippled  state  of  two  of  his  ships,  forced  Hughes  to  go  to  Trin- 
comalee,  where  the  sheltered  harbor  allowed  them  to  repair. 
Suffren,  anxious  about  his  transports,  went  to  Pondicherry, 
where  he  anchored  in  their  company.  It  was  his  wish  then 
to  proceed  against  Negapatam  ;  but  the  commander  of  the 
troops  chose  to  act  against  Cuddalore.  After  negotiations  and 
arrangements  with  Hyder  Ali  the  army  landed  south  of  Porto 
Novo,  and  marched  against  Cuddalore,  which  surrendered  on 
the  4th  of  April. 

Meanwhile  Suffren,  anxious  to  act  against  his  principal 
objective,  had  sailed  again  on  the  23d  of  March.  It  was  his 

1  Troude :  Batailles  Navales. 


MOVEMENTS  OF  THE  TWO  FLEETS. 


437 


hope  to  cut  off  two  ships-of-tlie-line  which  were  expected 
from  England.  For  this  he  was  too  late  ;  the  two  seventy- 
fours  joined  the  main  body  at  Madras,  March  80th.  Hughes 
had  refitted  at  Trincomalee  in  a  fortnight,  and  reached  Madras 
again  on  the  12th  of  March.  Soon  after  the  reinforcement 
had  joined  him,  he  sailed  again  for  Trincomalee  with  troops 
and  military  stores  for  the  garrison.  On  the  8th  of  April 
Suffren’s  squadron  was  seen  to  the  northeast,  also  standing 
to  the  southward.  Hughes  kept  on,  through  that  and  the  two 
following  days,  with  light  northerly  winds.  On  the  11th  he 
made  the  coast  of  Ceylon,  fifty  miles  north  of  Trincomalee, 
and  bore  away  for  the  port.  On  the  morning  of  the  12th  the 
French  squadron  in  the  northeast  was  seen  crowding  sail  in 
pursuit.  It  was  the  day  on  which  Rodney  and  De  Grasse  met 
in  the  West  Indies,  but  the  parts  were  reversed  ;  here  the 
French,  not  the  English,  sought  action. 

The  speed  of  the  ships  in  both  squadrons  was  very  un¬ 
equal  ;  each  had  some  coppered  ships  and  some  not  cop¬ 
pered.  Hughes  found  that  his  slow  sailers  could  not  escape 
the  fastest  of  his  enemy,  —  a  condition  which  will  always 
compel  a  retreating  force  to  hazard  an  action,  unless  it  can 
resolve  to  give  up  the  rear  ships,  and  which  makes  it  im¬ 
perative  for  the  safety,  as  well  as  the  efficiency,  of  a  squad¬ 
ron  that  vessels  of  the  same  class  should  all  have  a  certain 
minimum  speed.  The  same  cause  —  the  danger  of  a  sepa¬ 
rated  ship  —  led  the  unwilling  De  Grasse,  the  same  day,  in 
another  scene,  to  a  risky  manoeuvre  and  a  great  mishap. 
Hughes,  with  better  reason,  resolved  to  fight ;  and  at  nine 
A.  M.  formed  his  line  on  the  starboard  tack,  standing  in-shore 
(Plate  XV.,  A),  the  squadron  in  good  order,  with  intervals  of 
two  cables  between  the  ships.1  His  account,  which  again  varies 
from  that  of  Suffren,  giving  a  radically  different  idea  of  the 
tactics  used  by  the  French  commodore,  and  more  to  the  credit 
of  the  latter’s  skill,  will  first  be  followed.  He  says  :  — 

“  The  enemy,  bearing  north  by  east,  distant  six  miles,  with  wind 
At  north  by  east,  continued  manoeuvring  their  ships  and  changing 

1  Between  four  and  five  hundred  yards. 


438 


•  THE  SECOND  BATTLE  BETWEEN 


their  positions  in  line,  till  fifteen  minutes  past  noon,  when  they  bore 
away  (a)  to  engage  us,  five  sail  of  their  van  stretching  along  (b)  to 
engage  the  ships  of  our  van,  and  the  other  seven  sail  (b')  steering 
directly  on  our  three  centre  ships,  the  ‘  Superbe,’  the  ‘  Monmouth,’  her 
second  ahead,  and  the  ‘  Monarca,’  her  second  astern.  At  half-past  one 
the  engagement  began  in  the  van  of  both  squadrons  ;  three  minutes 
after,  I  made  the  signal  for  battle.  The  French  admiral  in  the  ‘  Heros  ’ 
and  his  second  astern  in  ‘L’Orient’  (both  seventy -fours)  bore  down  on 
the  ‘  Superbe  ’ 1  within  pistol-shot.  The  ‘  Heros  ’  continued  in  her  posi¬ 
tion,  giving  and  receiving  a  severe  fire  for  nine  minutes,  and  then 
stood  on,  greatly  damaged,  to  attack  the  ‘  Monmouth,’  at  that  time  en¬ 
gaged  with  another  of  the  enemy’s  ships,  making  room  for  the  ships 
in  his  rear  to  come  up  to  the  attack  of  our  centre,  where  the  engage¬ 
ment  was  hottest.  At  three  the  ‘  Monmouth  ’  had  her  mizzen-mast 
shot  away,  and  in  a  few  minutes  her  mainmast,  and  bore  out  of  the 
line  to  leeward  (C,  c)  ;  and  at  forty  minutes  past  three  the  wind  un¬ 
expectedly  continuing  far  northerly  without  any  sea-breeze,  and  being 
careful  not  to  entangle  our  ships  with  the  land,  I  made  signal  to  wear 
and  haul  by  the  wind  in  a  line-of-battle  on  the  larboard  tack,  still 
engaging  the  enemy.” 

Now  here,  practically,  was  concentration  with  a  vengeance. 
In  this,  the  hardest  fight  between  these  two  hard  fighters,  the 
English  loss  was  137  killed  and  430  wounded  in  eleven  ships. 
Of  this  total,  the  two  centre  ships,  the  flag-ship  and  her  next 
ahead,  lost  104  killed  and  198  wounded,  —  fifty-three  per 
cent  of  the  entire  loss  of  the  squadron,  of  which  they  formed 
eighteen  per  cent.  The  casualties  were  very  much  heavier, 
in  proportion  to  the  size  of  the  ships,  than  those  of  the  lead¬ 
ers  of  the  two  columns  at  Trafalgar.2  The  material  injury  to 
hulls,  spars,  etc.,  was  yet  more  serious.  The  English  squad¬ 
ron,  by  this  concentration  of  the  enemy  upon  a  small  fraction 
of  it,  was  entirely  crippled.  Inferior  when  the  action  began, 

1  The  English  and  French  flag-ships  are  denoted  in  the  plan  by  their  excep¬ 
tional  size. 

2  The  “  Victory,”  Nelson’s  ship  at  Trafalgar,  a  100-gun  ship,  lost  57  killed  and 
102  wounded;  Hughes’s  ship,  a  74,  lost  59  killed  and  96  wounded.  Collingwood’s 
ship,  the  “  Royal  Sovereign,”  also  of  100  guns,  lost  47  killed  and  94  wounded;  the 
“  Monmouth,”  a  64,  in  Hughes’s  action  lost  45  killed  and  102  wounded. 


SUFFREN  AND  HUGHES. 


439 


its  inferiority  was  yet  more  decisive  by  the  subtraction  of  two 
ships,  and  Suffren’s  freedom  to  move  was  increased. 

But  how  far  was  this  concentration  intended  by  Suffren  ? 
For  this  we  must  go  to  the  pages  of  two  French  writers,1  who 
base  their  narratives  upon  his  own  despatches  on  record  in 
the  French  Marine  Office.  The  practical  advantage  gained 
by  the  French  must  also  be  tested  by  comparing  the  lists 
of  casualties,  and  the  injuries  received  by  their  individual 
ships  ;  for  it  is  evident  that  if  both  the  squadrons  received 
the  same  total  amount  of  injury,  but  that  with  the  English 
it  fell  on  two  ships,  so  that  they  could  not  be  ready  for  action 
for  a  month  or  more,  while  with  the  French  the  damage  was 
divided  among  the  twelve,  allowing  them  to  be  ready  again  in 
a  few  days,  the  victory  tactically  and  strategically  would  rest 
with  the  latter.2 

As  regards  Suffren’s  purpose,  there  is  nothing  to  indicate 
that  he  meant  to  make  such  an  attack  as  Hughes  describes. 
Having  twelve  ships  to  the  English  eleven,  his  intention  seems 
to  have  been  to  pursue  the  usual  English  practice,  —  form  line 
parallel  to  the  enemy,  bear  down  together,  and  engage  ship  to 
ship.  To  this  he  added  one  simple  combination ;  the  twelfth 
French  ship,  being  unprovided  with  an  opponent,  was  to 
engage  the  rear  English  ship  on  her  lee  side,  placing  her 
thus  between  two  fires.  In  truth,  a  concentration  upon  the 
van  and  centre,  such  as  Hughes  describes,  is  tactically  in¬ 
ferior  to  a  like  effort  upon  the  centre  and  rear  of  a  column. 
This  is  true  of  steamers  even,  which,  though  less  liable  to 
loss  of  motive  power,  must  still  turn  round  to  get  from  van 
to  rear,  losing  many  valuable  seconds  ;  but  it  is  specially 
true  of  sailing  vessels,  and  above  all  in  the  light,  baffling 
airs  which  are  apt  to  mark  the  change  of  monsoon  at  the 
season  when  this  fight  was  fought.  Nelson  emphasized  his 
contempt  of  the  Russians  of  his  day  by  saying  he  would 
not  hesitate  to  attack  their  van,  counting  upon  throwing  the 

1  Troude  :  Batailles  Navales  ;  Chevalier :  Hist,  de  la  Marine  Francaise. 

2  This  remark  seems  too  self-evident  to  need  emphasis ;  yet  it  may  be  ques 
tioned  whether  naval  men  generally  carry  it  in  their  stock  of  axioms. 


440 


SUFFREN’S  TACTICS ,  APRIL  12,  1782. 


whole  line  in  confusion  from  their  want  of  seamanship ;  but 
though  entertaining  a  not  much  better  opinion  of  the  Span¬ 
iards,  he  threw  the  weight  of  attack  on  the  rear  of  the  allied 
fleets  at  Trafalgar.  In  dealing  with  such  seamen  as  the  cap¬ 
tains  of  Hughes’s  fleet,  it  would  have  been  an  error  to  assail 
the  van  instead  of  the  rear.  Only  a  dead  calm  could  have 
kept  the  latter  out  of  action. 

Suffren’s  attack  is  thus  described  by  Captain  Chevalier. 
After  mentioning  Hughes’s  forming  line  on  the  starboard 
tack,  he  says  :  — 

“This  manoeuvre  was  imitated  by  the  French,  and  the  two  squad¬ 
rons  ran  on  parallel  lines,  heading  about  west-northwest  (A,  A).  At 
eleven,  our  line  being  well  formed,  Suffren  made  signal  to  keep 
away  to  west-southwest,  by  a  movement  all  together.  Our  ships  did 
not  keep  their  bearing  upon  the  prescribed  line,  and  the  van,  com¬ 
posed  of  the  best  sailers,  came  first  within  range  of  the  enemy.1  At 
one,  the  leading  ships  of  the  English  fleet  opened  fire  upon  the  ‘  Ven- 
geur  ’  and  ‘  Artesien  ’  [French  van].  These  two  ships,  having  luffed  2 
to  return  the  fire,  were  at  once  ordered  to  keep  away  again.  Suffren, 
who  wished  for  a  decisive  action,  kept  his  course,  receiving  without 
reply  the  shots  directed  upon  his  ship  by  the  enemy.  When  at  pistol- 
range  of  the  ‘  Superbe/  he  hauled  to  the  wind  (B),  and  the  signal  to 
open  fire  appeared  at  his  mainmast  head.  Admiral  Hughes  having 
only  eleven  ships,  the  4  Bizarre,’  according  to  the  dispositions  taken 
by  the  commander-in-chief,  was  to  attack  on  the  quarter  the  rear  ship 
of  the  English  fleet  and  double  on  it  to  leeward.  At  the  moment  when 
the  first  cannon-shots  were  heard,  our  worst  sailers  were  not  up  with 
their  stations.  Breathing  the  letter,  and  not  the  spirit,  of  the  com¬ 
modore’s  orders,  the  captains  of  these  ships  luffed  at  the  same  time  as 
those  which  preceded  them.  Hence  it  resulted  that  the  French  line 
formed  a  curve  (B),  whose  extremities  were  represented  in  the  van 
by  the  ‘Artesien’  and  ‘Vengeur/  and  in  the  rear  by  the  ‘Bizarre,' 
‘  Ajax/  and  ‘  Severe/  In  consequence,  these  ships  were  very  far  from 
those  which  corresponded  to  them  in  the  enemy’s  line.” 

It  is  evident  from  all  this,  written  by  a  warm  admirer  of 
Suffren,  who  has  had  full  access  to  the  official  papers,  that 

1  As  always. 

'  2  That  is,  turned  their  side  to  the  enemy  instead  of  approaching  him. 


INJURIES  OF  THE  TWO  FLEETS. 


441 


tlie  French  chief  intended  an  attack  elementary  in  conception 
and  difficult  of  execution.  To  keep  a  fleet  on  a  line  of  bearing, 
sailing  free,  requires  much  drill,  especially  when  the  ships  have 
different  rates  of  speed,  as  had  Suffren’s.  The  extreme  injury 
suffered  by  the  “  Superbe  ”  and  “  Monmouth,”  undeniably  due 
to  a  concentration,  cannot  be  attributed  to  Suffren’s  disposi¬ 
tions.  “  The  injuries  which  the  ‘  Heros’  received  at  the  begin¬ 
ning  of  the  action  did  not  allow  her  to  remain  by  the  1  Superbe.’ 
Not  being  able  to  back  her  topsails  in  time,  the  braces  having 
been  cut,  she  passed  ahead,  and  was  only  stopped  on  the  beam 
of  the  6  Monmouth.’  ”  1  This  accounts  for  the  suffering  of  the 
latter  ship,  already  injured,  and  now  contending  with  a  much 
larger  opponent.  The  “  Superbe  ”  was  freed  from  Suffren  only 
to  be  engaged  by  the  next  Frenchman,  an  equally  heavy  ship ; 
and  when  the  “  Monmouth  ”  drifted  or  bore  up,  to  leeward,  the 
French  flag-ship  also  drifted  so  that  for  a  few  moments  she 
fired  her  stern  guns  into  the  “  Superbe’s  ”  bow  (C,  d).  The 
latter  at  the  same  time  was  engaged  on  the  beam  and  quar¬ 
ter  by  two  French  ships,  who,  either  with  or  without  signal, 
came  up  to  shield  their  commodore. 

An  examination  of  the  list  of  casualties  shows  that  the  loss 
of  the  French  was  much  more  distributed  among  their  ships 
than  was  the  case  with  the  English.  No  less  than  three  of 
the  latter  escaped  without  a  man  killed,  while  of  the  French 
only  one.  The  kernel  of  the  action  seems  to  have  been  in  the 
somewhat  fortuitous  concentration  of  two  French  seventy- 
fours  and  one  sixty-four  on  an  English  seventy -four  and  sixty- 
four.  Assuming  the  ships  to  have  been  actually  of  the  same 
force  as  their  rates,  the  French  brought,  counting  broadside 
only,  one  hundred  and  six  guns  against  sixty-nine. 

Some  unfavorable  criticism  was  excited  by  the  management 
of  Admiral  Hughes  during  the  three  days  preceding  the  fight, 
because  he  refrained  from  attacking  the  French,  although, 
they  were  for  much  of  the  time  to  leeward  with  only  one  ship 
more  than  the  English,  and  much  separated  at  that.  It  was 
thought  that  he  had  the  opportunity  of  beating  them  in  detail.* 

1  Chevalier.  2  Annual  Register,  1782. 


442 


CRITICISMS  UPON  HUGHES’S  CONDUCT. 


The  accounts  accessible  are  too  meagre  to  permit  an  accu- 
rate  judgment  upon  this  opinion,  which  probably  reflected 
the  mess-table  and  quarter-deck  talk  of  the  subordinate  offi¬ 
cers  of  the  fleet.  Hughes’s  own  report  of  the  position  of  the 
two  fleets  is  vague,  and  in  one  important  particular  directly 
contradictory  to  the  French.  If  the  alleged  opportunity 
offered,  the  English  admiral  in  declining  to  use  it  adhered  to 
the  resolve,  with  which  he  sailed,  neither  to  seek  nor  shun  the 
enemy,  but  to  go  directly  to  Trincomalee  and  land  the  troops 
and  supplies  he  had  on  board.  In  other  words,  he  was  gov¬ 
erned  in  his  action  by  the  French  rather  than  the  English 
naval  policy,  of  subordinating  the  attack  of  the  enemy’s  fleet 
to  the  particular  mission  in  hand.  If  for  this  reason  he  did 
allow  a  favorable  chance  of  fighting  to  slip,  he  certainly  had 
reason  bitterly  to  regret  his  neglect,  in  the  results  of  the  battle 
which  followed ;  but  in  the  lack  of  precise  information  the 
most  interesting  point  to  be  noted  is  the  impression  made 
upon  public  and  professional  opinion,  indicating  how  strongly 
the  English  held  that  the  attack  of  the  enemy’s  fleet  was  the 
first  duty  of  an  English  admiral.  It  may  also  be  said  that  he 
could  hardly  have  fared  worse  by  attacking  than  he  did  by 
allowing  the  enemy  to  become  the  assailant ;  and  certainly 
not  worse  than  he  would  have  fared  had  Suffren’s  captains 
been  as  good  as  his  own. 

After  the  action,  towards  sunset,  both  squadrons  anchored 
in  fifteen  fathoms  of  water,  irregular  soundings,  three  of  the 
French  ships  taking  the  bottom  on  coral  patches.  Here  they 
lay  for  a  week  two  miles  apart,  refitting.  Hughes,  from  the 
ruined  condition  of  the  “  Monmouth,”  expected  an  attack  ;  but 
when  Suffren  had  finished  his  repairs  on  the  19th,  he  got 
under  way  and  remained  outside  for  twenty-four  hours,  in¬ 
viting  a  battle  which  he  would  not  begin.  He  realized  the 
condition  of  the  enemy  so  keenly  as  to  feel  the  necessity  of 
justifying  his  action  to  the  Minister  of  Marine,  which  he  did 
for  eight  reasons  unnecessary  to  particularize  here.  The  last 
was  the  lack  of  efficiency  and  hearty  support  on  the  part  of 
his  captains. 


ENFORCED  INACTIVITY  OF  THE  ENGLISH.  443 


It  is  not  likely  that  Suffren  erred  on  the  side  of  excessive 
caution.  On  the  contrary,  his  most  marked  defect  as  a  com¬ 
mander-in-chief  was  an  ardor  which,  when  in  sight  of  the 
enemy,  became  impatience,  and  carried  him  at  times  into  ac¬ 
tion  hastily  and  in  disorder.  But  if,  in  the  details  and  exe¬ 
cution  of  his  battles,  in  his  tactical  combinations,  Suffren  was 
at  times  foiled  by  his  own  impetuosity  and  the  short-comings 
of  most  of  his  captains,  in  the  general  conduct  of  the  cam¬ 
paign,  in  strategy,  where  the  personal  qualities  of  the  com- 
mander-in-chief  mainly  told,  his  superiority  was  manifest, 
and  achieved  brilliant  success.  Then  ardor  showed  itself  in 
energy,  untiring  and  infectious.  The  eagerness  of  his  hot 
Provencal  blood  overrode  difficulty,  created  resources  out  of 
destitution,  and  made  itself  felt  through  every  vessel  under  his 

orders.  No  militarv  lesson  is  more  instructive  nor  of  more 

•/ 

enduring  value  than  the  rapidity  and  ingenuity  with  which  he, 
without  a  port  or  supplies,  continually  refitted  his  fleet  and 
took  the  field,  while  his  slower  enemy  was  dawdling  over  his 
repairs. 

The  battle  forced  the  English  to  remain  inactive  for  six 
weeks,  till  the  u  Monmouth  ”  was  repaired.  Unfortunately, 
Suffren’s  situation  did  not  allow  him  to  assume  the  offensive 
at  once.  He  was  short  of  men,  provisions,  and  especially  of 
spare  spars  and  rigging.  In  an  official  letter  after  the  action 
he  wrote :  “  I  have  no  spare  stores  to  repair  rigging ;  the 
squadron  lacks  at  least  twelve  spare  topmasts.”  A  convoy  of 
supply-ships  was  expected  at  Point  de  Galles,  which,  with  the 
rest  of  Ceylon,  except  Trincomalee,  was  still  Dutch.  He  there¬ 
fore  anchored  at  Batacalo,  south  of  Trincomalee,  a  position  in 
which  he  was  between  Hughes  and  outward-bound  English 
ships,  and  was  favorably  placed  to  protect  his  own  convoys, 
which  joined  him  there.  On  the  3d  of  June  he  sailed  for 
Tranquebar,  a  Danish  possession,  where  he  remained  two  or 
three  weeks,  harassing  the  English  communications  between 
Madras  and  the  fleet  at  Trincomalee.  Leaving  there,  he  sailed 
for  Cuddalore,  to  communicate  with  the  commander  of  the 
land  forces  and  Hyder  Ali.  The  latter  was  found  to  be  much 


444 


ENERGY  SHOWN  BY  SUFFREN. 


discontented  with  the  scanty  co-operation  of  the  French  general. 
Suffren,  however,  had  won  his  favor,  and  he  expressed  a  wish 
to  see  him  on  his  return  from  the  expedition  then  in  contem¬ 
plation  ;  for,  true  to  his  accurate  instinct,  the  commodore  was 
bent  upon  again  seeking  out  the  English  fleet,  after  beating 
which  he  intended  to  attack  Negapatam.  There  was  not  in 
him  any  narrowness  of  professional  prejudice  ;  he  kept  always 
in  view  the  necessity,  both  political  and  strategic,  of  nursing 
the  alliance  with  the  Sultan  and  establishing  control  upon  the 
seaboard  and  in  the  interior ;  but  he  clearly  recognized  that 
the  first  step  thereto  was  the  control  of  the  sea,  by  disabling 
the  English  fleet.  The  tenacity  and  vigor  with  which  he 
followed  this  aim,  amid  great  obstacles,  joined  to  the  clear¬ 
sightedness  with  which  he  saw  it,  are  the  distinguishing 
merits  of  Suffren  amid  the  crowd  of  French  fleet-commanders, 
—  his  equals  in  courage,  but  trammelled  by  the  bonds  of  a 
false  tradition  and  the  perception  of  a  false  objective. 

Hughes  meantime,  having  rigged  jury-masts  to  the  “  Mon¬ 
mouth,”  had  gone  to  Trincomalee,  where  his  squadron  re¬ 
fitted  and  the  sick  were  landed  for  treatment ;  but  it  is  evident, 
as  has  before  been  mentioned,  that  the  English  had  not  held 
the  port  long  enough  to  make  an  arsenal  or  supply  port,  for 
he  says,  “  I  will  be  able  to  re  mast  the  4  Monmouth  ’  from  the 
spare  stores  on  board  the  several  ships.”  His  resources  were 
nevertheless  superior  to  those  of  his  adversary.  During  the 
time  that  Suffren  was  at  Tranquebar,  worrying  the  English 
communications  between  Madras  and  Trincomalee,  Hughes 
still  stayed  quietly  in  the  latter  port,  sailing  for  Negapatam 
on  the  23d  of  June,  the  day  after  Suffren  reached  Cuddalore. 
The  two  squadrons  had  thus  again  approached  each  other, 
and  Suffren  hastened  his  preparations  for  attack  as  soon, 
as  he  heard  that  his  enemy  was  where  he  could  get  at  him. 
Hughes  awaited  his  movement. 

Before  sailing,  however,  Suffren  took  occasion  to  say  in 
.  writing  home :  “  Since  my  arrival  in  Ceylon,  partly  by  the 
help  of  the  Dutch,  partly  through  the  prizes  we  have  taken, 
the  squadron  has  been  equipped  for  six  months’  service,  and  I 


SUFFREN’S  MILITARY  CHARACTER. 


445 


have  rations  of  wheat  and  rice  assured  for  more  than  a  year.” 
This  achievement  was  indeed  a  just  source  of  pride  and  self* 
congratulation.  Without  a  port,  and  destitute  of  resources, 
the  French  commodore  had  lived  oft  the  enemy ;  the  store 
ships  and  commerce  of  the  latter  had  supplied  his  wants. 
To  his  fertility  of  resource  and  the  activity  of  his  cruisers, 
inspired  by  himself,  this  result  was  due.  Yet  he  had  but  two 
frigates,  the  class  of  vessel  upon  which  an  admiral  must 
mainly  depend  for  this  predatory  warfare.  On  the  23d  of 
March,  both  provisions  and  stores  had  been  nearly  exhausted. 
Six  thousand  dollars  in  money,  and  the  provisions  in  the  con¬ 
voy,  were  then  his  sole  resources.  Since  then  he  had  fought  a 
severe  action,  most  expensive  in  rigging  and  men,  as  well  as 
in  ammunition.  After  that  fight  of  April  12  he  had  left  only 
powder  and  shot  enough  for  one  other  battle  of  equal  severity. 
Three  months  later  he  was  able  to  report  as  above,  that  he 
could  keep  the  sea  on  his  station  for  six  months  without  fur¬ 
ther  supplies.  This  result  was  due  wholly  to  himself,  —  to  his 
self-reliance,  and  what  may  without  exaggeration  be  called  his 
greatness  of  soul.  It  was  not  expected  at  Paris  ;  on  the  con¬ 
trary,  it  was  expected  there  that  the  squadron  would  return 
to  the  Isle  of  France  to  refit.  It  was  not  thought  possible  that 
it  could  remain  on  a  hostile  coast,  so  far  from  its  nearest  base, 
and  be  kept  in  efficient  condition.  Suffren  thought  otherwise  ; 
he  considered,  with  true  military  insight  and  a  proper  sense 
of  the  value  of  his  own  profession,  that  the  success  of  the 
operations  in  India  depended  upon  the  control  of  the  sea,  and 
therefore  upon  the  uninterrupted  presence  of  his  squadron. 
He  did  not  shrink  from  attempting  that  which  had  always 
been  thought  impossible.  This  firmness  of  spirit,  bearing  the 
stamp  of  genius,  must,  to  be  justly  appreciated,  be  considered 
with  reference  to  the  circumstances  of  his  own  time,  and  of 
the  preceding  generations  in  which  he  grew  up. 

Suffren  was  born  July  17,  1729,  and  served  during  the  wars 
of  1739  and  1756.  He  was  first  under  fire  at  Matthews’s 
action  off  Toulon,  February  22,  1744.  He  was  the  contempo¬ 
rary  of  D’Estaing,  De  Guichen,  and  De  Grasse,  before  the 


446 


THE  THIRD  BATTLE  BETWEEN 


days  of  the  French  Revolution,  when  the  uprising  of  a  people 
had  taught  men  how  often  impossibilities  are  not  impossible  ; 
before  Napoleon  and  Nelson  had  made  a  mock  of  the  word. 
His  attitude  and  action  had  therefore  at  the  time  the  addi¬ 
tional  merit  of  originality,  but  his  lofty  temper  was  capable 
of  yet  higher  proof.  Convinced  of  the  necessity  of  keeping 
the  squadron  on  its  station,  he  ventured  to  disregard  not  only 
the  murmurs  of  his  officers  but  the  express  orders  of  the 
Court.  When  he  reached  Batacalo,  he  found  despatches 
directing  him  to  return  to  the  Isle  of  France.  Instead  of 
taking  them  as  a  release  from  the  great  burden  of  responsi¬ 
bility,  he  disobeyed,  giving  his  reasons,  and  asserting  that  he 
on  the  spot  could  judge  better  than  a  minister  in  Europe 
what  the  circumstances  demanded.  Such  a  leader  deserved 
better  subordinates,  and  a  better  colleague  than  he  had  in  the 
commander  of  the  forces  on  shore.  Whether  or  no  the  con¬ 
ditions  of  the  general  maritime  struggle  would  have  permitted 
the  overthrow  of  the  English  East  Indian  power  may  be  doubt¬ 
ful  ;  but  it  is  certain  that  among  all  the  admirals  of  the  three 
nations  there  was  none  so  fitted  to  accomplish  that  result  as 
Suffren.  We  shall  find  him  enduring  severer  tests,  and  always 
equal  to  them. 

In  the  afternoon  of  the  5th  of  July  Suffren’ s  squadron  came  in 
sight  of  the  English,  anchored  off  Cuddalore.  An  hour  later, 
a  sudden  squall  carried  away  the  main  and  mizzen  topmasts  of 
one  of  the  French  ships.  Admiral  Hughes  got  under  way,  and 
the  two  fleets  manoeuvred  during  the  night.  The  following 
day  the  wind  favored  the  English,  and  the  opponents  found 
themselves  in  line  of  battle  on  the  starboard  tack,  heading 
south-southeast,  with  the  wind  at  southwest.  The  disabled 
French  ship  having  by  unpardonable  inactivity  failed  to  re¬ 
pair  her  injuries,  the  numbers  about  to  engage  were  equal,  — 
eleven  on  each  side.  At  eleven  a.  m.  the  English  bore  down  to¬ 
gether  and  engaged  ship  against  ship  ;  but  as  was  usual  under 
those  conditions,  the  rear  ships  did  not  come  to  as  close  ac¬ 
tion  as  those  ahead  of  them  (Plate  XVI.,  Position  I.).  Cap¬ 
tain  Chevalier  carefully  points  out  that  their  failure  was  a  fair 


SUFFREN  &.  HUGHES.  JULY  6,1782. 


' 


. 


SUFFREN  AND  HUGHES. 


447 


offset  to  the  failure  of  the  French  rear  on  the  12th  of  April,1 
but  fails  to  note  in  this  connection  that  the  French  van,  both 
on  that  occasion  and  again  on  the  3d  of  September,  bungled 
as  well  as  the  rear.  There  can  remain  little  doubt,  in  the 
mind  of  the  careful  reader,  that  most  of  the  French  captains 
were  inferior,  as  seamen,  to  their  opponents.  During  this  part 
of  the  engagement  the  fourth  ship  in  the  French  order,  the 
“Brilliant”  (a),  lost  her  mainmast,  bore  up  out  of  the  line  (a'), 
and  dropped  gradually  astern  and  to  leeward  (a"). 

At  one  p.  M.,  when  the  action  was  hottest,  the  wind  sud¬ 
denly  shifted  to  south-southeast,  taking  the  ships  on  the  port 
bow  (Position  II.).  Four  English  ships,  the  “  Burford,” 
“Sultan”  (s),  “Worcester,”  and  “Eagle,”  seeing  the  breeze 
coming,  kept  off  to  port,  toward  the  French  line ;  the  others 
were  taken  aback  and  paid  off  to  starboard.  The  French 
ships,  on  the  other  hand,  with  two  exceptions,  the  “  Brilliant  ” 
(a)  and  “  Severe”  (b),  paid  off  from  the  English.  The  effect 
of  the  change  of  wind  was  therefore  to  separate  the  main  parts 
of  the  two  squadrons,  but  to  bring  together  between  the  lines 
four  English  and  two  French  ships.  Technical  order  was 
destroyed.  The  “  Brilliant,”  having  dropped  far  astern  of  her 
position,  came  under  the  fire  of  two  of  the  English  rear,  the 
“  Worcester  ”  and  the  “  Eagle,”  who  had  kept  off  in  time  and 
so  neared  the  French.  Suffren  in  person  came  to  her  assist¬ 
ance  (Position  III.,  a)  and  drove  off  the  English,  who  were 
also  threatened  by  the  approach  of  two  other  French  ships  that 
had  worn  to  the  westward  in  obedience  to  signal.  While  this 
partial  action  was  taking  place,  the  other  endangered  French 
ship,  the  “  S£v£re  ”  (b),  was  engaged  by  the  English  “  Sultan  ” 
(s),  and,  if  the  French  captain  M.  de  Cillart  can  be  believed, 

1  The  British  account  differs  materially  as  to  the  cause  of  the  distance  sepa¬ 
rating  the  two  rears.  “  In  this  action  it  did  not  fall  to  the  ‘  Monmouth’s  ’  lot 
to  sustain  a  very  considerable  share,  the  enemy’s  rear  being  so  far  to  leeward 
that  the  ships  of  the  British  rear  could  not,  even  whilst  the  wind  was  favorable, 
close  with  them  without  considerably  breaking  the  order  of  their  own  line  ” 
(Memoir  of  Captain  Alms,  Naval  Chronicle,  vol.  ii  ).  Such  contradictions  are 
common,  and,  except  for  a  particular  purpose,  need  not  to  be  reconciled.  Alms 
seems  to  have  been  not  only  a  first-rate  seaman,  but  an  officer  capable  of  resolute 
and  independent  action ;  his  account  is  probably  correct. 


448 


THE  “StiVtiRE”  STRIKES  HER  FLAG. 


by  two  other  English  ships.  It  is  probable,  from  her  place 
in  the  line,  that  the  “  Burford  ”  also  assailed  her.  However 
this  may  be,  the  “  Severe  ”  hauled  down  her  flag  ;  but  while  the 
“  Sultan  ”  was  wearing  away  from  her,  she  resumed  her  fire, 
raking  the  English  ship.  The  order  to  surrender,  given  by 
the  French  captain  and  carried  into  execution  by  the  formal 
well-established  token  of  submission,  was  disregarded  by  his 
subordinates,  who  fired  upon  their  enemy  while  the  flag  was 
down.  In  effect,  the  action  of  the  French  ship  amounted  to 
using  an  infamous  ruse  de  guerre  ;  but  it  would  be  unjust  to 
say  that  this  was  intended.  The  positions  of  the  different 
vessels  were  such  that  the  “  Sultan  ”  could  not  have  secured 
her  prize ;  other  French  ships  were  approaching  and  must 
have  retaken  it.  The  indignation  of  the  French  juniors  at  the 
weakness  of  their  captain  was  therefore  justified  ;  their  refusal 
to  be  bound  by  it  may  be  excused  to  men  face  to  face  with  an 
unexpected  question  of  propriety,  in  the  heat  of  battle  and 
under  the  sting  of  shame.  Nevertheless,  scrupulous  good  faith 
would  seem  to  demand  that  their  deliverance  should  be  awaited 
from  other  hands,  not  bound  by  the  action  of  their  commander  ; 
or  at  least  that  the  forbearing  assailant  should  not  have  suf¬ 
fered  from  them.  The  captain,  suspended  and  sent  home  by 
Suffren,  and  cashiered  by  the  king,  utterly  condemned  him¬ 
self  by  his  attempted  defence :  “  When  Captain  de  Cillart  saw 
the  French  squadron  drawing  off,  —  for  all  the  ships  except  the 
4  Brilliant’  had  fallen  off  on  the  other  tack,  —  he  thought  it 
useless  to  prolong  his  defence,  and  had  the  flag  hauled  down. 
The  ships  engaged  with  him  immediately  ceased  their  fire ,  and 
the  one  on  the  starboard  side  moved  away.  At  this  moment 
the  4  Severe  ’  fell  off  to  starboard  and  her  sails  filled ;  Cap¬ 
tain  de  Cillart  then  ordered  the  fire  to  be  resumed  by  his 
lower-deck  guns,  the  only  ones  still  manned,  and  he  rejoined 
his  squadron.”  1 

1  Troude :  Batailles  Navales.  It  was  seen  from  Suffren’s  ship  that  the 
Severe’s  ”  flag  was  down ;  but  it  was  supposed  that  the  ensign  halliards  had 
been  shot  away.  The  next  day  Hughes  sent  the  captain  of  the  “  Sultan  ”  to  de¬ 
mand  the  delivery  to  him  of  the  ship  which  had  struck.  The  demand,  of  course. 


HUGHES'S  MILITARY  CHARACTER. 


449 


This  action  was  the  only  one  of  the  five  fought  by  Suffren 
on  the  coast  of  India,  in  which  the  English  admiral  was  the 
assailant.  There  can  be  found  in  it  no  indication  of  military 
conceptions,  of  tactical  combinations ;  but  on  the  other  hand 
Hughes  is  continually  showing  the  aptitudes,  habits  of  thought, 
and  foresight  of  the  skilful  seaman,  as  well  as  a  courage  be¬ 
yond  all  proof.  He  was  in  truth  an  admirable  representative 
of  the  average  English  naval  officer  of  the  middle  of  the  eigh¬ 
teenth  century  ;  and  while  it  is  impossible  not  to  condemn  the 
general  ignorance  of  the  most  important  part  of  the  profession, 
it  is  yet  useful  to  remark  how  far  thorough  mastery  of  its 
other  details,  and  dogged  determination  not  to  yield,  made  up 
for  so  signal  a  defect.  As  the  Roman  legions  often  redeemed 
the  blunders  of  their  generals,  so  did  English  captains  and 
seamen  often  save  that  which  had  been  lost  by  the  errors  of 
their  admirals,  —  errors  which  neither  captain  nor  seamen  rec¬ 
ognized,  nor  would  probably  have  admitted.  Nowhere  were 
these  solid  qualities  so  clearly  shown  as  in  Suffren’s  battles, 
because  nowhere  else  were  such  demands  made  upon  them. 
No  more  magnificent  instances  of  desperate  yet  useful  resist¬ 
ance  to  overwhelming  odds  are  to  be  found  in  naval  annals, 
than  that  of  the  44  Monmouth  ”  on  April  12,  and  of  the  “  Exe¬ 
ter  ”  on  February  17.  An  incident  told  of  the  latter  ship  is 
worth  quoting.  44  At  the  heel  of  the  action,  when  the  4  Exe¬ 
ter  ’  was  already  in  the  state  of  a  wreck,  the  master  came  to 
Commodore  King  to  ask  him  what  he  should  do  with  the  ship, 
as  two  of  the  enemy  were  again  bearing  down  upon  her.  He 
laconically  answered,  4  there  is  nothing  to  be  done  but  to  fight 
her  till  she  sinks.’  ”  1  She  was  saved. 

Suffren,  on  the  contrary,  was  by  this  time  incensed  beyond 
endurance  by  the  misbehavior  of  his  captains.  Cillart  was 
sent  home ;  but  besides  him  two  others,  both  of  them  men  of 
influential  connections,  and  one  a  relative  of  Suffren  himself, 

could  not  be  complied  with.  “  The  *  Sultan/  "  Troude  says,  u  which  had  hove-to 
to  take  possession  of  the  *  Severe/  was  the  victim  of  this  action ;  she  received 
during  some  time,  without  replying,  the  whole  fire  of  the  French  ship." 

1  Annual  Register,  1782. 


29 


450 


SUFFREN  TAKES  TRINCOMALEE. 


were  dispossessed  of  their  commands.  However  necessary 
and  proper  this  step,  few  but  Suffren  would  have  had  the  reso¬ 
lution  to  take  it ;  for,  so  far  as  he  then  knew,  he  was  only  a 
captain  in  rank,  and  it  was  not  permitted  even  to  admirals  to 
deal  thus  with  their  juniors.  “You  may  perhaps  be  angry, 
Monseigneur,”  he  wrote,  “  that  I  have  not  used  rigor  sooner ; 
but  I  beg  you  to  remember  that  the  regulations  do  not  give 
this  power  even  to  a  general  officer,  which  I  am  not.” 

It  is  immediately  after  the  action  of  the  6th  of  July  that 
Suffren’s  superior  energy  and  military  capacity  begin  mark¬ 
edly  to  influence  the  issue  between  himself  and  Hughes. 
The  tussle  had  been  severe ;  but  military  qualities  began  to 
tell,  as  they  surely  must.  The  losses  of  the  two  squadrons 
in  men,  in  the  last  action,  had  been  as  one  to  three  in  favor 
of  the  English ;  on  the  other  hand,  the  latter  had  apparently 
suffered  more  in  sails  and  spars,  —  in  motive  power.  Both 
fleets  anchored  in  the  evening,  the  English  off  Negapatam, 
the  French  to  leeward,  off  Cuddalore.  On  the  18th  of  July 
Suffren  was  again  ready  for  sea ;  whereas  on  the  same  day 
Hughes  had  but  just  decided  to  go  to  Madras  to  finish  his 
repairs.  Suffren  was  further  delayed  by  the  political  neces¬ 
sity  of  an  official  visit  to  Hyder  Ali,  after  which  he  sailed 
to  Batacalo,  arriving  there  on  the  9th  of  August,  to  await 
reinforcements  and  supplies  from  France.  On  the  21st,  these 
joined  him ;  and  two  days  later  he  sailed,  now  with  fourteen 
ships-of-the-line,  for  Trincomalee,  anchoring  off  the  town  on 
the  25th.  The  following  night  the  troops  were  landed,  bat¬ 
teries  thrown  up,  and  the  attack  pressed  with  vigor.  On 
the  30th  and  31st  the  two  forts  which  made  the  defensive 
strength  of  the  place  surrendered,  and  this  all-important 
port  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  French.  Convinced  that 
Hughes  would  soon  appear,  Suffren  granted  readily  all  the 
honors  of  war  demanded  by  the  governor  of  the  place,  con¬ 
tenting  himself  with  the  substantial  gain.  Two  days  later, 
on  the  evening  of  September  2d,  the  English  fleet  was  sighted 
by  the  French  lookout  frigates. 

During  the  six  weeks  in  which  Suffren  had  been  so  actively 


SUFFREN’S  UNTIRING  ACTIVITY. 


451 


and  profitably  employed,  the  English  admiral  had  remained 
quietly  at  anchor,  repairing  and  refitting.  No  precise  informa¬ 
tion  is  available  for  deciding  how  far  this  delay  was  unavoid¬ 
able  ;  but  having  in  view  the  well-known  aptitude  of  English 
seamen  of  that  age,  it  can  scarcely  be  doubted  that,  had 
Hughes  possessed  the  untiring  energy  of  his  great  rival,  he 
could  have  gained  the  few  days  which  decided  the  fate  of 
Trincomalee,  and  fought  a  battle  to  save  the  place.  In  fact, 
this  conclusion  is  supported  by  his  own  reports,  which  state 
that  on  the  12th  of  August  the  ships  were  nearly  fitted ; 
and  yet,  though  apprehending  an  attack  on  Trincomalee,  he 
did  not  sail  until  the  20th.  The  loss  of  this  harbor  forced 
him  to  abandon  the  east  coast,  which  was  made  unsafe  by 
the  approach  of  the  northeast  monsoon,  and  conferred  an 
important  strategic  advantage  upon  Suffren,  not  to  speak  of 
the  political  effect  upon  the  native  rulers  in  India. 

To  appreciate  thoroughly  this  contrast  between  the  two 
admirals,  it  is  necessary  also  to  note  how  differently  they 
were  situated  with  regard  to  material  for  repairs.  After  the 
action  of  the  6th,  Hughes  found  at  Madras  spars,  cordage, 
stores,  provisions,  and  material.  Suffren  at  Cuddalore  found 
nothing.  To  put  his  squadron  in  good  fighting  condition, 
nineteen  new  topmasts  were  needed,  besides  lower  masts, 
yards,  rigging,  sails,  and  so  on.  To  take  the  sea  at  all,  the 
masts  were  removed  from  the  frigates  and  smaller  vessels, 
and  given  to  the  ships-of-the-line,  while  English  prizes  were 
stripped  to  equip  the  frigates.  Ships  were  sent  off  to  the 
Straits  of  Malacca  to  procure  other  spars  and  timber.  Houses 
were  torn  down  on  shore  to  find  lumber  for  repairing  the 
hulls.  The  difficulties  were  increased  by  the  character  of  the 
anchorage,  an  open  roadstead  with  frequent  heavy  sea,  and 
by  the  near  presence  of  the  English  fleet ;  but  the  work  was 
driven  on  under  the  eyes  of  the  commander-in-chief,  who,  like 
Lord  Howe  at  New  York,  inspired  the  working  parties  by  his 
constant  appearance  among  them.  “  Notwithstanding  his  pro¬ 
digious  obesity,  Suffren  displayed  the  fiery  ardor  of  youth ; 
he  was  everywhere  where  work  was  going  on.  Under  his 


452  REINFORCEMENTS  SENT  FROM  ENGLAND. 


powerful  impulse,  the  most  difficult  tasks  were  done  with  in¬ 
credible  rapidity.  Nevertheless,  his  officers  represented  to 
him  the  bad  state  of  the  fleet,  and  the  need  of  a  port  for  the 
ships-of-tlie-line.  4  Until  we  have  taken  Trincomalee,’  he  re¬ 
plied,  4  the  open  roadsteads  of  the  Coromandel  coast  will  an¬ 
swer.’  ” 1  It  was  indeed  to  this  activity  on  the  Coromandel 
coast  that  the  success  at  Trincomalee  was  due.  The  weapons 
with  which  Suffren  fought  are  obsolete ;  but  the  results 
wrought  by  his  tenacity  and  fertility  in  resources  are  among 
the  undying  lessons  of  history. 

While  the  characters  of  the  two  chiefs  were  thus  telling 
upon  the  strife  in  India,  other  no  less  lasting  lessons  were 
being  afforded  by  the  respective  governments  at  home,  who 
did  much  to  restore  the  balance  between  them.  While  the 
English  ministry,  after  the  news  of  the  battle  of  Porto  Pray  a, 
fitted  out  in  November,  1781,  a  large  and  compact  expedition, 
convoyed  by  a  powerful  squadron  of  six  ships-of-the-line, 
under  the  command  of  an  active  officer,  to  reinforce  Hughes, 
the  French  despatched  comparatively  scanty  succors  in  small 
detached  bodies,  relying  apparently  upon  secrecy  rather  than 
upon  force  to  assure  their  safety.  Thus  Suffren,  while  strug¬ 
gling  with  his  innumerable  embarrassments,  had  the  morti¬ 
fication  of  learning  that  now  one  and  now  another  of  the 
small  detachments  sent  to  his  relief  were  captured,  or  driven 
back  to  France,  before  they  were  clear  of  European  waters. 
There  was  in  truth  little  safety  for  small  divisions  north  of 
the  Straits  of  Gibraltar.  Thus  the  advantages  gained  by  his 
activity  were  in  the  end  sacrificed.  Up  to  the  fall  of  Trin¬ 
comalee  the  French  were  superior  at  sea ;  but  in  the  six 
months  which  followed,  the  balance  turned  the  other  way,  by 
the  arrival  of  the  English  reinforcements  under  Sir  Richard 
Bickerton. 

With  his  usual  promptness  the  French  commodore  had  pre¬ 
pared  for  further  immediate  action  as  soon  as  Trincomalee 
surrendered.  The  cannon  and  men  landed  from  the  ships 
were  at  once  re-embarked,  and  the  port  secured  by  a  garrison 


1  Cunat ;  Vie  de  Suffren. 


HUGHES  APPEARS  OFF  TRINCOMALEE. 


453 


strong  enough  to  relieve  him  of  any  anxiety  about  holding  it. 
This  great  seaman,  who  had  done  as  much  in  proportion  to  the 
means  intrusted  to  him  as  any  known  to  history,  and  had  so 
signally  illustrated  the  sphere  and  influence  of  naval  power, 
had  no  intention  of  fettering  the  movements  of  his  fleet,  or 
risking  his  important  conquest,  by  needlessly  taking  upon  the 
shoulders  of  the  ships  the  burden  of  defending  a  seaport. 
When  Hughes  appeared,  it  was  past  the  power  of  the  English 
fleet  by  a  single  battle  to  reduce  the  now  properly  garrisoned 
post.  Doubtless  a  successful  campaign,  by  destroying  or 
driving  away  the  French  sea  power,  would  achieve  this  re¬ 
sult  ;  but  Suffren  might  well  believe  that,  whatever  mishaps 
might  arise  on  a  single  day,  he  could  in  the  long  run  more 
than  hold  his  own  with  his  opponent. 

Seaports  should  defend  themselves  ;  the  sphere  of  the  fleet 
is  on  the  open  sea,  its  object  offence  rather  than  defence,  its 
objective  the  enemy’s  shipping  wherever  it  can  be  found. 
Suffren  now  saw  again  before  him  the  squadron  on  which 
depended  the  English  control  of  the  sea ;  he  knew  that  power¬ 
ful  reinforcements  to  it  must  arrive  before  the  next  season, 
and  he  hastened  to  attack.  Hughes,  mortified  by  his  failure 
to  arrive  in  time,  —  for  a  drawn  battle  beforehand  would  have 
saved  what  a  successful  battle  afterward  could  not  regain,  — 
was  in  no  humor  to  balk  him.  Still,  with  sound  judgment, 
he  retreated  to  the  southeast,  flying  in  good  order,  to  use 
Suffren’s  expression ;  regulating  speed  by  the  slowest  ships, 
and  steering  many  different  courses,  so  that  the  chase  which 
began  at  daybreak  overtook  the  enemy  only  at  two  in  the 
afternoon.  The  object  of  the  English  was  to  draw  Suffren 
so  far  to  leeward  of  the  port  that,  if  his  ships  were  disabled, 
he  could  not  easily  regain  it. 

The  French  numbered  fourteen  ships-of-the-line  to  twelve 
English.  This  superiority,  together  with  his  sound  apprecia¬ 
tion  of  the  military  situation  in  India,  increased  Suffren’s 
natural  eagerness  for  action ;  but  his  ships  sailed  badly,  and 
were  poorly  handled  by  indifferent  and  dissatisfied  men. 
These  circumstances,  during  the  long  and  vexatious  pursuit, 


454 


THE  FOURTH  BATTLE  BETWEEN 


chafed  and  fretted  the  hot  temper  of  the  commodore,  which 
still  felt  the  spur  of  urgency  that  for  two  months  had  quick¬ 
ened  the  operations  of  the  squadron.  Signal  followed  sig¬ 
nal,  manoeuvre  succeeded  manoeuvre,  to  bring  his  disordered 
vessels  into  position.  “  Sometimes  they  edged  down,  some¬ 
times  they  brought  to,”  says  the  English  admiral,  who  was 
carefully  watching  their  approach,  “  in  no  regular  order,  as 
if  undetermined  what  to  do.”  Still,  Suffren  continued  on, 
and  at  two  p.  m.,  having  been  carried  twenty-five  miles  away 
from  his  port,  his  line  being  then  partly  formed  and  within 
striking  distance  of  the  enemy,  the  signal  was  made  to  come 
to  the  wind  to  correct  the  order  before  finally  bearing  down. 
A  number  of  blunders  in  executing  this  made  matters  worse 
rather  than  better;  and  the  commodore,  at  last  losing  pa¬ 
tience,  made  signal  thirty  minutes  later  to  attack  (Plate 
XVII.,  A),  following  it  with  another  for  close  action  at  pis¬ 
tol  range.  This  being  slowly  and  clumsily  obeyed,  he  ordered 
a  gun  fired,  as  is  customary  at  sea  to  emphasize  a  signal ; 
unluckily  this  was  understood  by  his  own  crew  to  be  the 
opening  of  the  action,  and  the  flag-ship  discharged  all  her 
battery.  This  example  was  followed  by  the  other  ships, 
though  yet  at  the  distance  of  half  cannon-shot,  which,  under 
the  gunnery  conditions  of  that  day,  meant  indecisive  action. 
Thus  at  the  end  and  as  the  result  of  a  mortifying  series  of 
blunders  and  bad  seamanship,  the  battle  began  greatly  to  the 
disadvantage  of  the  French,  despite  their  superior  numbers. 
The  English,  who  had  been  retreating  under  short  and  handy 
sail,  were  in  good  order  and  quietly  ready ;  whereas  their 
enemies  were  in  no  order  (B).  Seven  ships  had  forereached 
in  rounding  to,1  and  now  formed  an  irregular  group  ahead 
of  the  English  van,  as  wrell  as  far  from  it,  where  they  were 
of  little  service  ;  while  in  the  centre  a  second  confused  group 
was  formed,  the  ships  overlapping  and  masking  each  other’s 
fire.  Under  the  circumstances  the  entire  brunt  of  the  action 

1  The  curves  in  (B)  represent  the  movements  of  the  ships  after  the  shift  of 
wind,  which  practically  ended  the  battle.  The  ships  themselves  show  the  order 
in  fighting. 


Pl.XvTL 

SUFFREN  and  HUGHES 

SEPT.  3,1782. 


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SUFFREN  AND  HUGHES. 


455 


fell  upon  Suffren’s  flag-ship  (a)  and  two  others  which  sup¬ 
ported  him ;  while  at  the  extreme  rear  a  small  ship-of-the- 
line,  backed  by  a  large  frigate,  alone  engaged  the  English 
rear ;  but  these,  being  wholly  overmatched,  were  soon  forced 
to  retire. 

A  military  operation  could  scarcely  be  worse  carried  out. 
The  French  ships  in  the  battle  did  not  support  each  other ; 
they  were  so  grouped  as  to  hamper  their  own  fire  and  need¬ 
lessly  increase  the  target  offered  to  the  enemy  ;  so  far  from 
concentrating  their  own  effort,  three  ships  were  left,  almost 
unsupported,  to  a  concentrated  fire  from  the  English  line.1 
“  Time  passed  on,  and  our  three  ships  [B,  a],  engaged  on  the 
beam  by  the  centre  of  the  English  fleet  and  raked  [enfiladed] 
by  van  and  rear,  suffered  greatly.  After  two  hours  the 
4  Haros’ 9  sails  were  in  rags,  all  her  running  rigging  cut,  and 
she  could  no  longer  steer.  The  4  Illustre  ’  had  lost  her 
mizzen-mast  and  inaintopmast.”  In  this  disorder  such  gaps 
existed  as  to  offer  a  great  opportunity  to  a  more  active  oppo¬ 
nent.  44  Had  the  enemv  tacked  now,”  wrote  the  chief-of-staff 
in  his  journal,  44  we  would  have  been  cut  off  and  probably 
destroyed.”  '  The  faults  of  an  action  in  which  every  proper 
distribution  was  wanting  are  summed  up  in  the  results.  The 
French  had  fourteen  ships  engaged.  They  lost  eiglity-two 
killed  and  two  hundred  and  fifty-five  wounded.  Of  this  total, 
sixty-four  killed  and  one  hundred  and  seventy-eight  wounded, 
or  three  fourths,  fell  to  three  ships.  Two  of  these  three  lost 
their  main  and  mizzen  masts  and  foretopmast ;  in  other  words, 
were  helpless. 

This  was  a  repetition  on  a  larger  scale  of  the  disaster  to 
two  of  Hughes’s  ships  on  the  12th  of  April ;  but  on  that  day 
the  English  admiral,  being  to  leeward  and  in  smaller  force, 
had  to  accept  action  on  the  adversary’s  terms,  while  here 
the  loss  fell  on  the  assailant,  who,  to  the  advantage  of  the 
wind  and  choice  of  his  mode  of  attack,  added  superiority  in 

1  The  enemy  formed  a  semicircle  around  us  and  raked  us  ahead  and  astern, 
as  the  ship  came  up  and  fell  off,  with  the  helm  to  leeward.  —  Journal  de  Bord 
du  Bailli  de  Suffren. 


4o6  contrast  between  hughes  and  suffren. 


numbers.  Full  credit  must  in  this  action  be  allowed  to 
Hughes,  who,  though  lacking  in  enterprise  and  giving  no 
token  of  tactical  skill  or  coup  d’oeil,  showed  both  judgment 
and  good  management  in  the  direction  of  his  retreat  and  in 
keeping  his  ships  so  well  in  hand.  It  is  not  easy  to  ap¬ 
portion  the  blame  which  rests  upon  his  enemies.  Suffren 
laid  it  freely  upon  his  captains.1  It  has  been  rightly  pointed 
out,  however,  that  many  of  the  officers  thus  condemned  in 
mass  had  conducted  themselves  well  before,  both  under  Suf¬ 
fren  and  other  admirals ;  that  the  order  of  pursuit  was 
irregular,  and  Suffren’s  signals  followed  each  other  with 
confusing  rapidity ;  and  finally  that  chance,  for  which  some¬ 
thing  must  always  be  allowed,  was  against  the  French,  as 
was  also  the  inexperience  of  several  captains.  It  is  pretty 
certain  that  some  of  the  mishap  must  be  laid  to  the  fiery 
and  inconsiderate  haste  of  Suffren,  who  had  the  defects  of 
his  great  qualities,  upon  which  his  coy  and  wary  antagonist 
unwittingly  played. 

It  is  noteworthy  that  no  complaints  of  his  captains  are  to 
be  found  in  Hughes’s  reports.  Six  fell  in  action,  and  of  each 
he  speaks  in  terms  of  simple  but  evidently  sincere  apprecia¬ 
tion,  while  on  the  survivors  he  often  bestows  particular  as 
well  as  general  commendation.  The  marked  contrast  be¬ 
tween  the  two  leaders,  and  between  the  individual  ship-com¬ 
manders,  on  either  side,  makes  this  singularly  instructive 
among  naval  campaigns ;  and  the  ultimate  lesson  taught  is 
in  entire  accordance  with  the  experience  of  all  military  his¬ 
tory  from  the  beginning.  Suffren  had  genius,  energy,  great 
tenacity,  sound  military  ideas,  and  was  also  an  accomplished 
seaman.  Hughes  had  apparently  all  the  technical  acquire¬ 
ments  of  the  latter  profession,  would  probably  have  com¬ 
manded  a  ship  equally  well  with  any  of  his  captains,  but 
shows  no  trace  of  the  qualities  needed  by  a  general  officer. 
On  the  other  hand,  without  insisting  again  upon  the  skill 
and  fidelity  of  the  English  subordinates,  it  is  evident  that, 

1  See  page  435.  He  added  :  “  It  is  frightful  to  have  had  four  times  in  oui 
power  to  destroy  the  English  squadron,  and  that  it  still  exists.* 


FRENCH  SHIPS  WRECKED. 


457 


to  whatever  it  be  attributed,  the  French  single  ships  were  as 
a  rule  incomparably  worse-handled  than  those  of  their  oppo¬ 
nents.  Four  times,  Suffren  claims,  certainly  thrice,  the  Eng¬ 
lish  squadron  was  saved  from  overwhelming  disaster  by  the 
difference  in  quality  of  the  under  officers.  Good  troops  have 
often  made  amends  for  bad  generalship  ;  but  in  the  end  the 
better  leader  will  prevail.  This ^ was  conspicuously  the  case 
in  the  Indian  seas  in  1782  and  1783.  War  cut  short  the 
strife,  but  not  before  the  issue  was  clearly  indicated. 

The  action  of  September  3,  like  that  of  July  6,  was  brought 
to  a  close  by  a  shift  of  wind  to  the  southeast.  When  it  came, 
the  English  line  wore,  and  formed  again  on  the  other  tack. 
The  French  also  wore  ;  and  their  van  ships,  being  now  to 
windward,  stood  down  between  their  crippled  ships  and  the 
enemy’s  line  (C).  Toward  sundown  Hughes  hauled  off  to 
the  northward,  abandoning  the  hope  of  regaining  Trincoma- 
lee,  but  with  the  satisfaction  of  having  inflicted  this  severe 
retaliation  upon  his  successful  opponent. 

That  firmness  of  mind  which  was  not  the  least  of  Suffren’s 
qualities  was  severely  tried  soon  after  the  action  off  Trin- 
comalee.  In  returning  to  port,  a  seventy-four,  the  “  Orient,” 
was  run  ashore  and  lost  by  mismanagement,  the  only  con¬ 
solation  being  that  her  spars  were  saved  for  the  two  dismasted 
ships.  Other  crippled  masts  were  replaced  as  before  by  rob¬ 
bing  the  frigates,  whose  crews  also  were  needed  to  replace 
the  losses  in  battle.  Repairs  were  pushed  on  with  the  usual 
energy,  the  defence  of  the  port  was  fully  provided  for,  and  on 
the  30th  of  September  the  squadron  sailed  for  the  Coromandel 
coast,  where  the  state  of  French  interests  urgently  called  for 
it.  Cuddalore  was  reached  in  four  days  ;  and  here  another 
incapable  officer  wrecked  the  “  Bizarre,”  of  sixty-four  guns, 
in  picking  up  his  anchorage.  In  consequence  of  the  loss  of 
these  two  ships,  Suffren,  when  he  next  met  the  enemy,  could 
oppose  only  fifteen  to  eighteen  ships-of-the-line ;  so  much 
do  general  results  depend  upon  individual  ability  and  care. 
Hughes  was  at  Madras,  ninety  miles  north,  whither  he  had 
gone  at  once  after  the  late  action.  He  reports  his  ships  badly 


458 


APPROACH  OF  THE  BAD  SEASQN. 


damaged  ;  but  the  loss  was  so  evenly  distributed  among  them 
that  it  is  difficult  to  justify  his  failure  to  follow  up  the  in¬ 
juries  done  to  the  French. 

At  this  season  the  monsoon  wind,  which  has  come  for  four 
or  five  months  from  southwest,  changes  to  northeast,  blow¬ 
ing  upon  the  east  coast  of  the  peninsula,  where  are  no  good 
harbors.  The  consequent  swell  made  the  shore  often  unap- 
proachable,  and  so  forbade  support  from  fleet  to  army.  The 
change  of  the  monsoon  is  also  frequently  marked  by  violent 
hurricanes.  The  two  commanders,  therefore,  had  to  quit 
a  region  where  their  stay  might  be  dangerous  as  well  as 
useless.  Had  Trincomalee  not  been  lost,  Hughes,  in  the 
condition  of  his  squadron,  might  have  awaited  there  the 
reinforcements  and  supplies  expected  soon  from  England ; 
for  although  the  port  is  not  healthy,  it  is  secure  and  well 
situated.  Bickerton  had  already  reached  Bombay,  and  was 
on  his  way  now  to  Madras  with  five  ships-of-the-line.  As 
things  were,  Hughes  thought  necessary  to  go  to  Bombay 
for  the  season,  sailing  or  rather  being  driven  to  sea  by  a 
hurricane,  on  the  17th  of  October.  Four  days  later  Bicker- 
ton  reached  Madras,  not  having  fallen  in  with  the  admiral. 
With  an  activity  which  characterized  him  he  sailed  at  once, 
and  was  again  in  Bombay  on  the  28th  of  November.  Hughes’s 
ships,  scattered  and  crippled  by  tempest,  dropped  in  one  by 
one,  a  few  days  later. 

Suffren  held  Trincomalee,  yet  his  decision  was  not  easy. 
The  port  was  safe,  he  had  not  to  fear  an  attack  by  the  Eng¬ 
lish  fleet ;  and  on  the  other  hand,  besides  being  sickly  during 
the  approaching  monsoon,  it  was  doubtful  whether  the  pro¬ 
visions  needed  for  the  health  of  the  crews  could  be  had  there. 
In  short,  though  of  strategic  value  from  its  strength  and  posi¬ 
tion,  the  port  was  deficient  in  resources.  Opposed  to  Trin¬ 
comalee  there  was  an  alternative  in  Achem,  a  harbor  on  the 
other  side  of  the  Bay  of  Bengal,  at  the  west  end  of  the  island 
of  Sumatra.  This  was  healthy,  could  supply  provisions,  and, 
from  its  position  with  reference  to  the  northeast  monsoon, 
would  permit  ships  to  regain  the  Coromandel  coast  sooner 


MILITARY  SITUATION  IN  INDIA . 


459 


than  those  in  Bombay,  when  the  milder  ending  of  the  season 
made  landing  more  practicable. 

These  simple  considerations  were  not,  however,  the  only 
elements  in  the  really  difficult  problem  before  Suffren.  The 
small  results  that  followed  this  campaign  must  not  hide  the 
fact  that  great  issues  were  possible,  and  that  much  might 
depend  upon  his  decision.  Owing  to  the  French  policy  of 
sending  out  reinforcements  in  several  small  bodies,  not  only 
was  there  much  loss,  but  great  uncertainty  prevailed  among 
the  scattered  commands  as  to  conditions  elsewhere.  This 
uncertainty,  loss,  and  delay  profoundly  affected  the  political 
situation  in  India.  When  Suffren  first  reached  the  coast,  the 
English  had  on  their  hands  not  only  Hyder  Ali,  but  the  Mah- 
rattas  as  well.  Peace  with  the  latter  was  signed  on  the  17th  of 
May,  1782  ;  but,  owing  probably  to  an  opposition  party  among 
them,  the  ratifications  were  not  exchanged  until  December. 
Both  there  and  in  the  court  of  Hyder  Ali  there  was  division 
of  interest ;  and  representations  were  made  from  both  to  the 
French,  who,  though  suspicious,  could  obtain  no  certain  in¬ 
formation  of  the  treaty,  that  everything  depended  upon  the 
relative  military  strength  of  themselves  and  the  English. 
The  presence  and  the  actions  of  Suffren  were  all  that  France 
had  to  show,  —  the  prestige  of  his  genius,  the  capture  of  Trin- 
comalee,  his  success  in  battle.  The  French  army,  cooped  up 
in  Cuddalore,  was  dependent  upon  the  sultan  for  money,  for 
food,  and  for  reinforcements  ;  even  the  fleet  called  on  him 
for  money,  for  masts,  for  ammunition,  for  grain.  The  Eng¬ 
lish,  on  the  other  hand,  maintained  their  ground  ;  though  on 
the  whole  worsted,  they  lost  no  ships  ;  and  Bickerton’s  power¬ 
ful  squadron  was  known  to  have  reached  Bombay.  Above  all, 
while  the  French  asked  for  money,  the  English  lavished  it. 

It  was  impossible  for  the  French  to  make  head  against 
their  enemy  without  native  allies ;  it  was  essential  to  keep 
Hyder  from  also  making  peace.  Here  the  inadequate  sup¬ 
port  and  faulty  dispositions  of  the  home  government  made 
themselves  felt.  The  command  in  India,  both  by  land  and 
sea,  was  intrusted  to  General  de  Bussy,  once  the  brilliant 


460 


SUFFREN  GOES  TO  AC  HEM. 


fellow-worker  with  Dupleix,  now  a  gouty  invalid  of  sixty* 
four.  With  a  view  to  secrecy,  Bussy  sailed  from  Cadiz  in 
November,  1781,  with  two  ships-of-the-line,  for  Teneriffe, 
where  he  was  to  be  joined  by  a  convoy  leaving  Brest  in  De¬ 
cember.  This  convoy  was  captured  by  the  English,  only 
two  of  the  vessels  escaping  to  Bussy.  The  latter  pursued 
his  journey,  and  learning  at  the  Cape  of  Good  Dope  that 
Bickerton’s  strong  force  was  on  the  way,  felt  compelled  to 
land  there  a  great  part  of  his  troops.  He  reached  the  Isle  of 
France  on  the  81st  of  May.  The  next  convoy  of  eighteen 
transports,  sailing  in  April  for  India,  was  also  intercepted. 
Two  of  the  four  ships-of-war  were  taken,  as  also  ten  of  the 
transports  ;  the  remainder  returned  to  Brest.  A  third  detach¬ 
ment  was  more  fortunate,  reaching  the  Cape  in  May ;  but  it 
was  delayed  there  two  months  by  the  wretched  condition  of 
the  ships  and  crews.  These  disappointments  decided  Bussy 
to  remain  at  the  Island  until  joined  by  the  expected  ships 
from  the  Cape,  and  Suffren  at  this  critical  moment  did  not 
know  what  the  state  of  things  there  was.  The  general  had 
only  written  him  that,  as  he  could  not  reach  the  coast  before 
the  bad  season,  he  should  rendezvous  at  Achem.  These 
uncertainties  made  a  painful  impression  upon  Hyder  Ali, 
who  had  been  led  to  expect  Bussy  in  September,  and  had 
instead  received  news  of  Bickerton’s  arrival  and  the  defec¬ 
tion  of  his  old  allies,  the  Mahrattas.  Suffren  was  forced 
to  pretend  a  confidence  which  he  did  not  feel,  but  which, 
with  the  influence  of  his  own  character  and  achievements, 
determined  the  sultan  to  continue  the  war.  This  settled, 
the  squadron  sailed  for  Achem  on  the  15th  of  October, 
anchoring  there  the  2d  of  November. 

Three  weeks  afterward  a  vessel  arrived  from  Bussy,  with 
word  that  his  departure  was  indefinitely  delayed  by  an  epi¬ 
demic  raging  among  the  troops.  Suffren  therefore  deter¬ 
mined  to  hasten  his  own  return  to  the  coast,  and  sailed  on 
the  20th  of  December.  January  8,  1788,  he  anchored  off 
Ganjam,  five  hundred  miles  northeast  of  Cuddalore,  whence 
he  would  have  a  fair  wind  to  proceed  when  he  wished.  It 


SUFFREN  RETURNS  TO  TRINCOMALEE. 


461 


was  his  purpose  to  attack  not  only  the  coasting  vessels  but 
the  English  factories  on  shore  as  well,  the  surf  being  now 
often  moderate ;  but  learning  on  the  12th,  from  an  English 
prize,  the  important  and  discouraging  news  of  Hyder  Ali’s 
death,  he  gave  up  all  minor  operations,  and  sailed  at  once  for 
Cuddalore,  hoping  to  secure  by  his  presence  the  continuance 
of  the  alliance  as  well  as  the  safety  of  the  garrison.  He 
reached  the  place  on  the  6th  of  February. 

During  his  four  months  absence  the  failure  of  Bussy  to 
appear  with  his  troops,  and  the  arrival  of  Bickerton,  who 
had  shown  himself  on  both  coasts,  had  seriously  injured  the 
French  cause.  The  treaty  of  peace  between  the  English  and 
the  Mahrattas  had  been  ratified ;  and  the  former,  released 
from  this  war  and  reinforced,  had  attacked  the  sultan  on  the 
west,  or  Malabar,  coast.  The  effect  of  this  diversion  was  of 
course  felt  on  the  east  coast,  despite  the  efforts  of  the  French 
to  keep  the  new  sultan  there.  The  sickness  among  the  troops 
at  the  Isle  of  France  had,  however,  ceased  early  in  Novem¬ 
ber  ;  and  had  Bussy  then  started  without  delay,  he  and  Suf- 
fren  would  now  have  met  in  the  Carnatic,  with  full  command 
of  the  sea  and  large  odds  in  their  favor  ashore.  Hughes  did 
not  arrive  till  two  months  later. 

Being  thus  alone,  Suffren,  after  communicating  with  Tippoo- 
Saib,  the  new  sultan  of  Mysore,  went  to  Trincomalee ;  and 
there  he  was  at  last  joined,  on  the  10th  of  March,  by  Bussy, 
accompanied  by  three  ships-of-the-line  and  numerous  trans¬ 
ports.  Eager  to  bring  the  troops  into  the  field,  Suffren  sailed 
on  the  15th  with  his  fastest  ships,  and  landed  them  the  next 
day  at  Porto  Novo.  He  returned  to  Trincomalee  on  the  lltli 
of  April,  and  fell  in  with  Hughes’s  fleet  of  seventeen  ships-of- 
the-line  off  the  harbor’s  mouth.  Having  only  part  of  his 
force  with  him,  no  fight  ensued,  and  the  English  went  on  to 
Madras.  The  southwest  monsoon  was  now  blowing. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  follow  the  trivial  operations  of  the 
next  two  months.  Tippoo  being  engaged  on  the  other  side 
of  the  peninsula  and  Bussy  displaying  little  vigor,  while 
Hughes  was  in  superior  force  off  the  coast,  the  affairs  of  the 


462 


ENGLISH  SIEGE  OF  CUDDALORE. 


French  on  shore  went  from  bad  to  worse.  Suffren,  having 
but  fifteen  ships  to  eighteen  English,  was  unwilling  to  go  to 
leeward  of  Trincomalee,  lest  it  should  fall  before  he  could 
return  to  it.  Under  these  conditions  the  English  troops  ad¬ 
vanced  from  Madras,  passing  near  but  around  Cuddalore,  and 
encamped  to  the  southward  of  it,  by  the  sea.  The  supply- 
ships  and  light  cruisers  were  stationed  off  the  shore  near 
the  army ;  while  Admiral  Hughes,  with  the  heavy  ships,  an¬ 
chored  some  twenty  miles  south,  where,  being  to  windward, 
he  covered  the  others. 

In  order  to  assure  to  Suffren  the  full  credit  of  his  subse¬ 
quent  course,  it  is  necessary  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  Bussy, 
though  commander-in-chief  both  by  land  and  sea,  did  not 
venture  to  order  him  to  leave  Trincomalee  and  come  to  his 
support.  Allowing  him  to  feel  the  extremity  of  the  danger, 
he  told  him  not  to  leave  port  unless  he  heard  that  the  army 
was  shut  up  in  Cuddalore,  and  blockaded  by  the  English 
squadron.  This  letter  was  received  on  the  10th  of  June. 
Suffren  waited  for  no  more.  The  next  day  he  sailed,  and 
forty-eight  hours  later  his  frigates  saw  the  English  fleet.  The 
same  day,  the  13th,  after  a  sharp  action,  the  French  army  was 
shut  up  in  the  town,  behind  very  weak  walls.  Everything 
now  depended  on  the  action  of  the  fleets. 

Upon  Suffren’ s  appearance,  Hughes  moved  away  and  an¬ 
chored  four  or  five  miles  from  the  town.  Baffling  winds 
prevailed  for  three  days ;  but  the  monsoon  resuming  on  the 
16th,  Suffren  approached.  The  English  admiral  not  liking 
to  accept  action  at  anchor,  and  to  leeward,  in  which  he  was 
right,  got  under  way  ;  but  attaching  more  importance  to  the 
weather-gage  than  to  preventing  a  junction  between  the  ene¬ 
my’s  land  and  sea  forces,  he  stood  out  into  the  offing  with 
a  southerly,  or  south-southeast  wind,  notwithstanding  his  su¬ 
perior  numbers.  Suffren  formed  on  the  same  tack,  and  some 
manoeuvring  ensued  during  that  night  and  the  next  day. 
At  eight  P.  M.  of  the  17th  the  French  squadron,  which  had 
refused  to  be  drawn  to  sea,  anchored  off  Cuddalore  and  com¬ 
municated  with  the  commander-in-chief.  Twelve  hundred 


NEWS  OF  THE  PEACE  REACHES  INDIA.  463 


of  the  garrison  were  hastily  embarked  to  fill  the  numerous 
vacancies  at  the  guns  of  the  fleet. 

Until  the  20th  the  wind,  holding  unexpectedly  at  west,  de¬ 
nied  Hughes  the  advantage  which  he  sought ;  and  finally  on 
that  day  he  decided  to  accept  action  and  await  the  attack. 
It  was  made  by  Suffren  with  fifteen  ships  to  eighteen,  the 
fire  opening  at  quarter-past  four  p.  m.  and  lasting  until  half¬ 
past  six.  The  loss  on  both  sides  was  nearly  equal;  but 
the  English  ships,  abandoning  both  the  field  of  battle  and 
their  army,  returned  to  Madras.  Suffren  anchored  before 
Cuddalore. 

The  embarrassment  of  the  British  army  was  now  very 
great.  The  supply-ships  on  which  it  had  depended  fled  be¬ 
fore  the  action  of  the  20th,  and  the  result  of  course  made 
it  impossible  for  them  to  return.  The  sultan’s  light  cavalry 
harassed  their  communications  by  land.  On  the  25tli,  the 
general  commanding  wrote  that  his  “  mind  was  on  the  rack 
without  a  moment’s  rest  since  the  departure  of  the  fleet, 
considering  the  character  of  M.  de  Suffren,  and  the  infinite 
superiority  on  the  part  of  the  French  now  that  we  are  left  to 
ourselves.”  From  this  anxiety  he  was  relieved  by  the  news 
of  the  conclusion  of  peace,  which  reached  Cuddalore  on  the 
29th  by  flag-of-truce  from  Madras. 

If  any  doubt  had  remained  as  to  the  relative  merits  of  the 
two  sea-commanders,  the  last  few  days  of  their  campaign 
would  have  removed  them.  Hughes  alleges  the  number  of 
his  sick  and  shortness  of  water  as  his  reasons  for  abandon¬ 
ing  the  contest.  Suffren’s  difficulties,  however,  were  as  great 
as  his  own ; 1  and  if  he  had  an  advantage  at  Trincomalee, 
that  only  shifts  the  dispute  a  step  back,  for  he  owed  its  pos¬ 
session  to  superior  generalship  and  activity.  The  simple 
facts  that  with  fifteen  ships  he  forced  eighteen  to  abandon  a 
blockade,  relieved  the  invested  army,  strengthened  his  own 
crews,  and  fought  a  decisive  action,  make  an  impression  which 

1  There  was  not  a  single  ship  of  Suffren’s  which  had  more  than  three- 
fourths  of  her  regular  complement  of  men.  It  must  be  added  that  soldiers  and 
sepoys  made  up  half  of  these  reduced  crews.  —  Chevalier,  p.  463. 


464 


SUFFREN  RETURNS  TO  FRANCE . 


does  not  need  to  be  diminished  in  the  interests  of  truth.1  It 
is  probable  that  Hughes’s  self-reliance  had  been  badly  shaken 
by  his  various  meetings  with  Suffren. 

Although  the  tidings  of  peace  sent  by  Hughes  to  Bussy 
rested  only  upon  unofficial  letters,  they  were  too  positive 
to  justify  a  continuance  of  bloodshed.  An  arrangement  was 
entered  into  by  the  authorities  of  the  two  nations  in  India, 
and  hostilities  ceased  on  the  8th  of  July.  Two  months  later, 
at  Pondicherry,  the  official  despatches  reached  Suffren.  His 
own  words  upon  them  are  worth  quoting,  for  they  show  the 
depressing  convictions  under  which  he  had  acted  so  noble  a 
part :  “  God  be  praised  for  the  peace  !  for  it  was  clear  that  in 
India,  though  we  had  the  means  to  impose  the  law,  all  would 
have  been  lost.  I  await  your  orders  with  impatience,  and 
heartily  pray  they  may  permit  me  to  leave.  War  alone  can 
make  bearable  the  weariness  of  certain  things.” 

On  the  6th  of  October,  1T88,  Suffren  finally  sailed  from 
Trincomalee  for  France,  stopping  at  the  Isle  of  France  and 
the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  The  homeward  voyage  was  a  con¬ 
tinued  and  spontaneous  ovation.  In  each  port  visited  the 
most  flattering  attentions  were  paid  by  men  of  every  degree 
and  of  every  nation.  What  especially  gratified  him  was  the 
homage  of  the  English  captains.  It  might  well  be  so ;  none 
had  so  clearly  established  a  right  to  his  esteem  as  a  warrior. 
On  no  occasion  when  Hughes  and  Suffren  met,  save  the  last, 
did  the  English  number  over  twelve  ships ;  but  six  English 
captains  had  laid  down  their  lives,  obstinately  opposing  his 
efforts.  While  he  was  at  the  Cape,  a  division  of  nine  of 
Hughes’s  ships,  returning  from  the  war,  anchored  in  the 


1  You  will  have  learned  my  promotion  to  commodore  and  rear-admiral. 
Now,  I  tell  you  in  the  sincerity  of  my  heart  and  for  your  own  ear  alone,  that 
what  I  have  done  since  then  is  worth  infinitely  more  than  what  I  had  done  be¬ 
fore.  You  know  the  capture  and  battle  of  Trincomalee ;  but  the  end  of  the  cam¬ 
paign,  and  that  which  took  place  between  the  month  of  March  and  the  end  of 
June,  is  far  above  anything  that  has  been  done  in  the  navy  since  I  entered  it. 
The  result  has  been  very  advantageous  to  the  State,  for  the  squadron  was  endan¬ 
gered  and  the  army  lost.  —  Private  Letter  of  Suffren ,  Sept.  13,  1783;  quoted  in 
the  “  Journal  de  Bord  du  Bailli  de  Suffren.' * 


MILITARY  QUALITIES  OF  SUFFREN. 


465 


harbor.  Their  captains  called  eagerly  upon  the  admiral,  the 
stout  Commodore  King  of  the  “  Exeter  ”  at  their  head. 
“The  good  Dutchmen  have  received  me  as  their  savior,” 
wrote  Suffren  ;  “  but  among  the  tributes  which  have  most 
flattered  me,  none  has  given  me  more  pleasure  than  the 
esteem  and  consideration  testified  by  the  English  who  are 
here.”  On  reaching  home,  rewards  were  heaped  upon  him. 
Having  left  France  as  a  captain,  he  came  back  a  rear- 
admiral  ;  and  immediately  after  his  return  the  king  created 
a  fourth  vice-admiralship,  a  special  post  to  be  filled  by 
Suffren,  and  to  lapse  at  his  death.  These  honors  were  won 
by  himself  alone ;  they  were  the  tribute  paid  to  his  un¬ 
yielding  energy  and  genius,  shown  not  only  in  actual  fight 
but  in  the  steadfastness  which  held  to  his  station  through 
every  discouragement,  and  rose  equal  to  every  demand  made 
by  recurring  want  and  misfortune. 

Alike  in  the  general  conduct  of  his  operations  and  on  the 
battlefield  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy,  this  lofty  resolve 
was  the  distinguishing  merit  of  Suffren ;  and  when  there  is 
coupled  with  it  the  clear  and  absolute  conviction  which  he 
held  of  the  necessity  to  seek  and  crush  the  enemy’s  fleet,  we 
have  probably  the  leading  traits  of  his  military  character. 
The  latter  was  the  light  that  led  him,  the  former  the  spirit 
that  sustained  him.  As  a  tactician,  in  the  sense  of  a  driller 
of  ships,  imparting  to  them  uniformity  of  action  and  manoeu¬ 
vring,  he  seems  to  have  been  deficient,  and  would  probably 
himself  have  admitted,  with  some  contempt,  the  justice  of 
the  criticism  made  upon  him  in  these  respects.  Whether  or 
no  he  ever  actually  characterized  tactics  —  meaning  thereby 
elementary  or  evolutionary  tactics  —  as  the  veil  of  timidity, 
there  was  that  in  his  actions  which  makes  the  mot  probable. 
Such  a  contempt,  however,  is  unsafe  even  in  the  case  of 
genius.  The  faculty  of  moving  together  with  uniformity 
and  precision  is  too  necessary  to  the  development  of  the  full 
power  of  a  body  of  ships  to  be  lightly  esteemed  ;  it  is  essen¬ 
tial  to  that  concentration  of  effort  at  which  Suffren  rightly 
aimed,  but  which  he  was  not  always  careful  to  secure  by  pr$ 


466 


LATER  CAREER  OF  SUFFREN. 


vious  dispositions.  Paradoxical  though  it  sounds,  it  is  true 
that  only  fleets  which  are  able  to  perform  regular  movements 
can  afford  at  times  to  cast  them  aside ;  only  captains  wTiom 
the  habit  of  the  drill-ground  has  familiarized  with  the  shift¬ 
ing  phases  it  presents,  can  be  expected  to  seize  readily  the 
opportunities  for  independent  action  presented  by  the  field  of 
battle.  Howe  and  Jervis  must  make  ready  the  way  for  the 
successes  of  Nelson.  Suffren  expected  too  much  of  his  cap¬ 
tains.  He  had  the  right  to  expect  more  than  he  got,  but  not 
that  ready  perception  of  the  situation  and  that  firmness  of 
nerve  which,  except  to  a  few  favorites  of  Nature,  are  the  re¬ 
sult  only  of  practice  and  experience. 

Still,  he  was  a  very  great  man.  When  every  deduction  has 
been  made,  there  must  still  remain  his  heroic  constancy,  his 
fearlessness  of  responsibility  as  of  danger,  the  rapidity  of  his 
action,  and  the  genius  whose  unerring  intuition  led  him  to 
break  through  the  traditions  of  his  service  and  assert  for 
the  navy  that  principal  part  which  befits  it,  that  offensive 
action  which  secures  the  control  of  the  sea  by  the  destruc¬ 
tion  of  the  enemy’s  fleet.  Had  he  met  in  his  lieutenants 
such  ready  instruments  as  Nelson  found  prepared  for  him, 
there  can  be  little  doubt  that  Hughes’s  squadron  would 
have  been  destroyed  while  inferior  to  Suffren’s,  before  re¬ 
inforcements  could  have  arrived ;  and  with  the  English 
fleet  it  could  scarcely  have  failed  that  the  Coromandel 
coast  also  would  have  fallen.  What  effect  this  would  have 
had  upon  the  fate  of  the  peninsula,  or  upon  the  terms  of 
the  peace,  can  only  be  surmised.  His  own  hope  was  that, 
by  acquiring  the  superiority  in  India,  a  glorious  peace  might 
result. 

No  further  opportunities  of  distinction  in  war  were  given 
to  Suffren.  The  remaining  years  of  his  life  were  spent 
in  honored  positions  ashore.  In  1788,  upon  an  appearance 
of  trouble  with  England,  he  was  appointed  to  the  command 
of  a  great  fleet  arming  at  Brest ;  but  before  he  could  leave 
Paris  he  died  suddenly  on  the  8th  of  December,  in  the  six¬ 
tieth  year  of  his  age.  There  seems  to  have  been  no  suspicion 


LATER  CAREER  OF  SUFFREiV. 


467 


at  the  time  of  other  than  natural  causes  of  death,  he  being 
exceedingly  stout  and  of  apoplectic  temperament ;  but  many 
years  after  a  story,  apparently  well-founded,  became  current 
that  he  was  killed  in  a  duel  arising  out  of  his  official  action 
in  India.  His  old  antagonist  on  the  battlefield,  Sir  Edward 
Hughes,  died  at  a  great  age  in  1794. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 


Events  in  the  West  Indies  after  the  Surrender  of  Yorktown. 
—  Encounters  of  De  Grasse  with  Hood.  —  The  Sea  Battle 
of  the  Saints.  —  1781,  1782. 

HE  surrender  of  Cornwallis  marked  the  end  of  the  active 


X  war  upon  the  American  continent.  The  issue  of  the 
struggle  was  indeed  assured  upon  the  day  when  France  de¬ 
voted  her  sea  power  to  the  support  of  the  colonists  ;  but, 
as  not  uncommonly  happens,  the  determining  characteristics 
of  a  period  were  summed  up  in  one  striking  event.  From 
the  beginning,  the  military  question,  owing  to  the  physical 
characteristics  of  the  country,  a  long  seaboard  with  estuaries 
penetrating  deep  into  the  interior,  and  the  consequent  greater 
case  of  movement  by  water  than  by  land,  had  hinged  upon 
the  control  of  the  sea  and  the  use  made  of  that  control. 
Its  misdirection  by  Sir  William  Howe  in  1777,  when  he 
moved  his  army  to  the  Chesapeake  instead  of  supporting 
Burgoyne’s  advance,  opened  the  way  to  the  startling  success 
at  Saratoga,  when  amazed  Europe  saw  six  thousand  regular 
troops  surrendering  to  a  body  of  provincials.  During  the 
four  years  that  followed,  until  the  surrender  of  Y^orktown, 
the  scales  rose  and  fell  according  as  the  one  navy  or  the 
other  appeared  on  the  scene,  or  as  English  commanders 
kept  touch  with  the  sea  or  pushed  their  operations  far  from 
its  support.  Finally,  at  the  great  crisis,  all  is  found  depend¬ 
ing  upon  the  question  whether  the  French  or  the  English 
fleet  should  first  appear,  and  upon  their  relative  force. 

The  maritime  struggle  was  at  once  transferred  to  the 
West  Indies.  The  events  which  followed  there  were  ante¬ 
cedent  in  time  both  to  Suffren’s  battles  and  to  the  final 
relief  of  Gibraltar  ;  but  they  stand  so  much  by  themselves  as 


ATTACK  ON  ISLAND  OF  ST.  CHRISTOPHER.  469 

to  call  for  separate  treatment,  and  have  such  close  relation 
to  the  conclusion  of  the  war  and  the  conditions  of  peace* 
as  to  form  the  dramatic  finale  of  the  one  and  the  stepping- 
stone  of  transition  to  the  other.  It  is  fitting  indeed  that 
a  brilliant  though  indecisive  naval  victory  should  close  the 
story  of  an  essentially  naval  war. 

The  capitulation  of  Yorktown  was  completed  on  the  19th 
of  October,  1781,  and  on  the  5th  of  November,  De  Grasse* 
resisting  the  suggestions  of  Lafayette  and  Washington  that 
the  fleet  should  aid  in  carrying  the  war  farther  south,  sailed 
from  the  Chesapeake.  He  reached  Martinique  on  the  26th, 
the  day  after  the  Marquis  de  Bouill6,  commanding  the  French 
troops  in  the  West  Indies,  had  regained  by  a  bold  surprise 
the  Dutch  island  of  St.  Eustatius.  The  two  commanders 
now  concerted  a  joint  expedition  against  Barbadoes,  which 
was  frustrated  by  the  violence  of  the  trade  winds. 

Foiled  here,  the  French  proceeded  against  the  island  of 
St.  Christopher,  or  St.  Kitt’s  (Plate  XVIII.).  On  the  11th 
of  January,  1782,  the  fleet,  carrying  six  thousand  troops, 
anchored  on  the  west  coast  off  Basse  Terre,  the  chief  town. 
No  opposition  was  met,  the  small  garrison  of*  six  hundred 
men  retiring  to  a  fortified  post  ten  miles  to  the  northwest, 
on  Brimstone  Hill,  a  solitary  precipitous  height  overlooking 
the  lee  shore  of  the  island.  The  French  troops  landed  and 
pursued,  but  the  position  being  found  too  strong  for  assault, 
siege  operations  were  begun. 

The  French  fleet  remained  at  anchor  in  Basse  Terre  road. 
Meanwhile,  news  of  the  attack  was  carried  to  Sir  Samuel 
Hood,  who  had  followed  De  Grasse  from  the  continent,  and, 
in  the  continued  absence  of  Rodney,  was  naval  commander- 
in-chief  on  the  station.  He  sailed  from  Barbadoes  on  the 
14th,  anchored  at  Antigua  on  the  21st,  and  there  embarked 
all  the  troops  that  could  be  spared,  —  about  seven  hundred 
men.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  23d  the  fleet  started  for 
St.  Kitt’s,  carrying  such  sail  as  would  bring  it  within  striking 
distance  of  the  enemy  at  daylight  next  morning. 

The  English  having  but  twenty-two  ships  to  the  French 


I 


470 


HOOD  AND  DE  GRASSE 


twenty-nine,  and  the  latter  being  generally  superior  in  force, 
class  for  class,  it  is  necessary  to  mark  closely  the  lay  of 
the  land  in  order  to  understand  Hood’s  original  plans  and 
their  subsequent  modifications ;  for,  resultless  as  his  attempt 
proved,  his  conduct  during  the  next  three  weeks  forms  the 
most  brilliant  military  effort  of  the  whole  war.  The  islands 
of  St.  Kitt’s  and  Nevis  (Plates  XVIII.  and  XIX.)  being  sep¬ 
arated  only  by  a  narrow  channel,  impracticable  for  ships-of- 
the-line,  are  in  effect  one,  and  their  common  axis  lying 
northwest  and  southeast,  it  is  necessary  for  sailing-ships,  with 
the  trade  wind,  to  round  the  southern  extremity  of  Nevis, 
from  which  position  the  wind  is  fair  to  reach  all  anchorages 
on  the  lee  side  of  the  islands.  Basse  Terre  is  about  twelve 
miles  distant  from  the  western  point  of  Nevis  (Fort  Charles), 
and  its  roadstead  lies  east  and  west.  The  French  fleet  were 
anchored  there  in  disorder  (Plate  XVIII.,  A),  three  or  four 
deep,  not  expecting  attack,  and  the  ships  at  the  west  end 
of  the  road  could  not  reach  those  at  the  east  without  beating 
to  windward,  —  a  tedious,  and  under  fire  a  perilous  process. 
A  further  most  important  point  to  note  is  that  all  the  east¬ 
ern  ships  were  so  placed  that  vessels  approaching  from  the 
southward  could  reach  them  with  the  usual  wind. 

Hood,  therefore,  we  are  told,  intended  to  appear  at  early 
daylight,  in  order  of  and  ready  for  battle,  and  fall  upon 
the  eastern  ships,  filing  by  them  with  his  whole  fleet  (a,  a'), 
thus  concentrating  the  fire  of  all  upon  a  few  of  the  enemy  ; 
then  turning  away,  so  as  to  escape  the  guns  of  the  others, 
he  proposed,  first  wearing  and  then  tacking,  to  keep  his 
fleet  circling  in  long  procession  (ar,  a")  past  that  part  of  the 
enemy’s  ships  chosen  for  attack.  The  plan  was  audacious, 
but  undeniably  sound  in  principle  ;  some  good  could  hardly 
fail  to  follow,  and  unless  De  Grasse  showed  more  readiness 
than  he  had  hitherto  done,  even  decisive  results  might  be 
hoped  for.1 

1  The  curve,  a,  a',  a",  represents  the  line  which  Hood  proposed  to  follow  with 
his  fleet,  the  wind  being  supposed  east-southeast.  The  positions  B,  B,  B,  refer 
to  the  proceedings  of  a  subsequent  day  and  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  diagram 
at  A. 


NEVIS 


AT  ST.  CHRISTOPHER. 


471 


The  best-laid  plans,  however,  may  fail,  and  Hood’s  was 
balked  by  the  awkwardness  of  a  lieutenant  of  the  watch, 
who  hove-to  (stopped)  a  frigate  at  night  ahead  of  the  fleet, 
and  was  consequently  run  down  by  a  ship-of-the-line.  The 
latter  also  received  such  injury  as  delayed  the  movement, 
several  hours  being  lost  in  repairing  damages.  The  French 
were  thus  warned  of  the  enemy’s  approach,  and  although 
not  suspecting  his  intention  to  attack,  De  Grasse  feared 
that  Hood  would  pass  down  to  leeward  of  him  and  disturb 
the  siege  of  Brimstone  Hill,  —  an  undertaking  so  rash  for 
an  inferior  force  that  it  is  as  difficult  to  conceive  how  he 
could  have  supposed  it,  as  to  account  for  his  overlooking 
the  weakness  of  his  own  position  at  anchor. 

At  one  p.  M.  of  the  24th  the  English  fleet  was  seen  rounding 
the  south  end  of  Nevis  ;  at  three  De  Grasse  got  under  way  and 
stood  to  the  southward.  Toward  sundown  Hood  also  went 
about  and  stood  south,  as  though  retreating ;  but  he  was 
well  to  windward  of  his  opponent,  and  maintained  this  ad¬ 
vantage  through  the  night.  At  daybreak  both  fleets  were 
to  leeward  of  Nevis,  —  the  English  near  the  island,  the  French 
about  nine  miles  distant  (Plate  XIX.).  Some  time  was 
spent  in  manoeuvring,  with  the  object  on  Hood’s  part  of  get¬ 
ting  the  French  admiral  yet  more  to  leeward  ;  for,  having 
failed  in  his  first  attempt,  he  had  formed  the  yet  bolder 
intention  of  seizing  the  anchorage  his  unskilful  opponent 
had  left,  and  establishing  himself  there  in  an  impregnable 
manner.  In  this  he  succeeded,  as  will  be  shown  ;  but  to 
understand  the  justification  for  a  movement  confessedly  haz¬ 
ardous,  it  must  be  pointed  out  that  he  thus  would  place 
himself  between  the  besiegers  of  Brimstone  Hill  and  their 
fleet ;  or,  if  the  latter  anchored  near  the  hill,  the  Eng¬ 
lish  fleet  would  be  between  it  and  its  base  in  Martinique, 
ready  to  intercept  supplies  or  detachments  approaching  from 
the  southward.  In  short,  the  position  in  which  Hood  hoped 
to  establish  himself  was  on  the  flank  of  the  enemy’s  com¬ 
munications,  a  position  the  more  advantageous  because  the 
island  alone  could  not  long  support  the  large  body  of  troops 


472 


HOOD  AND  DE  GRASSE 


so  suddenly  thrown  upon  it.  Moreover,  both  fleets  were 
expecting  reinforcements  ;  Rodney  was  on  his  way  and  might 
arrive  first,  which  he  did,  and  in  time  to  save  St.  Kitt’s, 
which  he  did  not.  It  was  also  but  four  months  since  York- 
town ;  the  affairs  of  England  were  going  badly  ;  something 
must  be  done,  something  left  to  chance,  and  Hood  knew 
himself  and  his  officers.  It  may  be  added  that  he  knew 
his  opponent. 

At  noon,  when  the  hillsides  of  Nevis  were  covered  with 
expectant  and  interested  sightseers,  the  English  fleet  rapidly 
formed  its  line  on  the  starboard  tack  and  headed  north 
for  Basse  Terre  (Plate  XIX.,  A,  A').  The  French,  at  the 
moment,  were  in  column  steering  south,  but  went  about 
at  once  and  stood  for  the  enemy  in  a  bow-and-quarter  line  1 
(A,  A).  At  two  the  British  had  got  far  enough  for  Hood 
to  make  signal  to  anchor.  At  twenty  minutes  past  two  the 
van  of  the  French  came  within  gunshot  of  the  English 
centre  (B,  B,  B),  and  shortly  afterward  the  firing  began, 
the  assailants  very  properly  directing  their  main  effort  upon 
the  English  rear  ships,  which,  as  happens  with  most  long 
columns,  had  opened  out,  a  tendency  increased  in  this  case 
by  the  slowness  of  the  fourth  ship  from  the  rear,  the  “  Pru¬ 
dent.”  The  French  flag-ship,  “  Ville  de  Paris,”  of  one  hun¬ 
dred  and  twenty  guns,  bearing  De  Grasse’s  flag,  pushed  for 
the  gap  thus  made,  but  was  foiled  by  the  “  Canada,”  seventy- 
four,  whose  captain,  Cornwallis,  the  brother  of  Lord  Corn¬ 
wallis,  threw  all  his  sails  aback,  and  dropped  down  in  front 
of  the  huge  enemy  to  the  support  of  the  rear,  —  an  example 
nobly  followed  by  the  “  Resolution  ”  and  the  “  Bedford  ”  im¬ 
mediately  ahead  of  him  (a).  The  scene  was  now  varied  and 
animated  in  the  extreme.  The  English  van,  which  had 
escaped  attack,  was  rapidly  anchoring  (b)  in  its  appointed 
position.  The  commander-in-chief  in  the  centre,  proudly 
reliant  upon  the  skill  and  conduct  of  his  captains,  made 

1  When  a  fleet  is  in  line  ahead,  close  to  the  wind,  on  one  tack,  and  the  ships 
go  about  together,  they  will,  on  the  other  tack,  be  on  the  same  line,  but  not  one 
ahead  of  the  other.  This  formation  was  called  bow-and-quarter  line. 


Pi. XIX. 

HOOD  &  DE  GRASSE. 

JAN.  25,  1782. 


FRENCH 

ENGLISH 


WIND,  E.S.E. 


AT  ST.  CHRISTOPHER. 


473 


signal  for  the  ships  ahead  to  carry  a  press  of  sail,  and 
gain  their  positions  regardless  of  the  danger  to  the  threat¬ 
ened  rear.  The  latter,  closely  pressed  and  outnumbered, 
stood  on  unswervingly,  shortened  sail,  and  came  to  anchor, 
one  by  one,  in  a  line  ahead  (B,  B'),  under  the  roar  of  the 
guns  of  their  baffled  enemies.  The  latter  filed  by,  delivered 
their  fire,  and  bore  off  again  to  the  southward,  leaving  their 
former  berths  to  their  weaker  but  clever  antagonists. 

The  anchorage  thus  brilliantly  taken  by  Hood  was  not 
exactly  the  same  as  that  held  by  De  Grasse  the  day  before  ; 
but  as  it  covered  and  controlled  it,  his  claim  that  he  took 
up  the  place  the  other  had  left  is  substantially  correct.  The 
following  night  and  morning  were  spent  in  changing  and 
strengthening  the  order,  which  was  finally  established  as 
follows  (Plate  XVIII.,  B,  B').  The  van  ship  was  anchored 
about  four  miles  southeast  from  Basse  Terre,  so  close  to 
the  shore  that  a  ship  could  not  pass  inside  her,  nor,  with 
the  prevailing  wind,  even  reach  her,  because  of  a  point  and 
shoal  just  outside,  covering  her  position.  From  this  point 
the  line  extended  in  a  west-northwest  direction  to  the  twelfth 
or  thirteenth  ship  (from  a  mile  and  a  quarter  to  a  mile 
and  a  half),  where  it  turned  gradually  but  rapidly  to  north, 
the  last  six  ships  being  on  a  north  and  south  line.  Hood’s 
flag-ship,  the  44  Barfleur,”  of  ninety  guns,  was  at  the  apex  of 
the  salient  angle  thus  formed. 

It  would  not  have  been  impossible  for  the  French  fleet 
to  take  the  anchorage  they  formerly  held  ;  but  it  and  all 
others  to  leeward  were  forbidden  by  the  considerations  al¬ 
ready  stated,  so  long  as  Hood  remained  where  he  was.  It 
became  necessary  therefore  to  dislodge  him,  but  this  was 
rendered  exceedingly  difficult  by  the  careful  tactical  dis¬ 
positions  that  have  been  described.  His  left  flank  was 
covered  by  the  shore.  Any  attempt  to  enfilade  his  front 
by  passing  along  the  other  flank  was  met  by  the  broadsides 
of  the  six  or  eight  ships  drawn  up  en  potence  to  the  rear. 
The  front  commanded  the  approaches  to  Basse  Terre.  To 
attack  him  in  the  rear,  from  the  northwest,  was  forbidden 


474 


HOOD  AND  DE  GRASSE 


by  the  trade-wind.  To  these  difficulties  was  to  be  added 
that  the  attack  must  be  made  under  sail  against  ships  at 
anchor,  to  whom  loss  of  spars  would  be  of  no  immediate 
concern  ;  and  which,  having  springs  1  out,  could  train  their 
broadsides  over  a  large  area  with  great  ease. 

Nevertheless,  both  sound  policy  and  mortification  impelled 
De  Grasse  to  fight,  which  he  did  the  next  day,  January  26. 
The  method  of  attack,  in  single  column  of  twenty-nine  ships 
against  a  line  so  carefully  arranged,  was  faulty  in  the  ex¬ 
treme  ;  but  it  may  be  doubted  whether  any  commander  of 
that  day  would  have  broken  through  the  traditional  fighting 
order.2  Hood  had  intended  the  same,  but  he  hoped  a  sur¬ 
prise  on  an  ill-ordered  enemy,  and  at  the  original  French 
anchorage  it  was  possible  to  reach  their  eastern  ships,  with 
but  slight  exposure  to  concentrated  fire.  Not  so  now.  The 
French  formed  to  the  southward  and  steered  for  the  eastern 
flank  of  Hood’s  line.  As  their  van  ship  drew  up  with  the 
point  already  mentioned,  the  wind  headed  her,  so  that  she 
could  only  reach  the  third  in  the  English  order,  the  first 
four  ships  of  which,  using  their  springs,  concentrated  their 
guns  upon  her.  This  vessel  was  supposed  by  the  English 
to  be  the  “  Pluton,”  and  if  so,  her  captain  was  D’Albert  de 
Rions,  in  Suffren’s  opinion  the  foremost  officer  of  the  French 
navy.  “  The  crash  occasioned  by  their  destructive  broad¬ 
sides,”  wrote  an  English  officer  who  was  present,  “  was  so 
tremendous  that  whole  pieces  of  plank  were  seen  flying  from 
her  off  side  ere  she  could  escape  the  cool,  concentrated  fire 
of  her  determined  adversaries.  As  she  proceeded  along  the 
British  line,  she  received  the  first  fire  of  every  ship  in 

1  A  spring  is  a  rope  taken  from  the  stern  or  quarter  of  a  ship  at  anchor,  to 
an  anchor  properly  placed,  by  which  means  the  ship  can  be  turned  in  a  desired 
direction. 

2  In  the  council  of  war  of  the  allied  fleets  on  the  expediency  of  attacking  the 
English  squadron  anchored  at  Torbay  (p.  408)  an  opponent  of  the  measure  urged 
“  that  the  whole  of  the  combined  fleets  could  not  bear  down  upon  the  English  in 
a  line-of-battle  abreast,  that  of  course  they  must  form  the  line-of- battle  ahead, 
and  go  down  upon  the  enemy  singly,  by  which  they  would  run  the  greatest  risk 
of  being  shattered  and  torn  to  pieces,”  etc.  (Beatson,  vol.  v.  p.  396). 


AT  ST.  CHRISTOPHER. 


475 


passing.  She  was  indeed  in  so  shattered  a  state  as  to  be 
compelled  to  bear  away  for  St.  Eustatius.”  And  so  ship 
after  ship  passed  by,  running  the  length  of  the  line  (Plate 
XVIII.,  B,  B),  distributing  their  successive  fires  in  gallant 
but  dreary,  ineffectual  monotony  over  the  whole  extent.  A 
second  time  that  day  De  Grasse  attacked  in  the  same  order, 
but  neglecting  the  English  van,  directed  his  effort  upon 
the  rear  and  centre.  This  was  equally  fruitless,  and  seems 
to  have  been  done  with  little  spirit. 

From  that  time  until  the  14th  of  February,  Hood  maintained 
his  position  in  sight  of  the  French  fleet,  which  remained 
cruising  in  the  offing  and  to  the  southward.  On  the  1st  a 
despatch  vessel  arrived  from  Kempenfeldt,  informing  him 
of  the  dispersal  of  the  French  reinforcements  for  the  West 
Indies,  which  must  have  renewed  his  hopes  that  his  bold 
attempt  would  be  successful  through  Rodney’s  arrival.  It 
was  not,  however,  to  be  so.  Brimstone  Hill  surrendered  on 
the  12th,  after  a  creditable  defence.  On  the  13th  De  Grasse 
took  his  fleet,  now  amounting  to  thirty -three  ships-of-the-line, 
to  Nevis,  and  anchored  there.  On  the  night  of  the  14th 
Hood  summoned  all  his  captains  on  board,  had  them  set 
their  watches  by  his,  and  at  eleven  P.  M.,  one  after  another, 
without  noise  or  signal,  cut  their  cables  and  made  sail  to 
the  northward,  passing  round  that  end  of  the  island  un¬ 
noticed,  or  at  least  unmolested,  by  the  French. 

Both  strategically  and  tactically  Hood’s  conceptions  and 
dispositions  were  excellent,  and  their  execution  was  most 
honorable  to  the  skill  and  steadiness  of  himself  and  his  cap¬ 
tains.  Regarded  as  a  single  military  operation,  this  was 
brilliant  throughout ;  but  when  considered  with  reference  to 
the  general  situation  of  England  at  the  time,  a  much  higher 
estimate  must  be  formed  of  the  admiral’s  qualities.1  St.  Kitt’s 

1  In  war,  as  in  cards,  the  state  of  the  score  must  at  times  dictate  the  play ;  and 
the  chief  who  never  takes  into  consideration  the  effect  which  his  particular  action 
will  have  on  the  general  result,  nor  what  is  demanded  of  him  by  the  condition 
of  things  elsewhere,  both  political  and  military,  lacks  an  essential  quality  of  a 
great  general.  “The  audacious  manner  in  which  Wellington  stormed  the  re¬ 
doubt  of  Francisco  [at  Ciudad  Rodrigo],  and  broke  ground  on  the  first  night  of 


476 


CRITICISM  OF  DE  GRASSE’S  ACTION . 


in  itself  might  not  be  worth  a  great  risk  ;  but  it  was  of  the 
first  importance  that  energy  and  audacity  should  be  carried 
into  the  conduct  of  England’s  naval  war,  that  some  great 
success  should  light  upon  her  flag.  Material  success  was 
not  obtained.  The  chances,  though  fair  enough,  turned  against 
Hood ;  but  every  man  in  that  fleet  must  have  felt  the  glow 
of  daring  achievement,  the  assured  confidence  which  follows 
a  great  deed  nobly  done.  Had  this  man  been  in  chief  com¬ 
mand  when  greater  issues  were  at  stake,  had  he  been  first 
instead  of  second  at  the  Chesapeake,  Cornwallis  might  have 
been  saved.  The  operation  —  seizing  an  anchorage  left  by  the 
enemy  —  would  have  been  nearly  the  same  ;  and  both  situa¬ 
tions  may  be  instructively  compared  with  Suffren’s  relief  of 
Cuddalore. 

The  action  of  De  Grasse,  also,  should  be  considered  not  only 
with  reference  to  the  particular  occasion,  but  to  the  general 
condition  of  the  war  as  well,  and  when  thus  weighed,  and 
further  compared  with  other  very  similar  opportunities  ne¬ 
glected  by  this  general  officer,  a  fair  estimate  of  his  military 
capacity  can  be  reached.  This  comparison,  however,  is  better 
deferred  to  the  now  not  very  distant  close  of  the  campaign. 
The  most  useful  comment  to  be  made  here  is,  that  his  action 
in  failing  to  crush  Hood  at  his  anchors,  with  a  force  at  least 
fifty  per  cent  greater,  was  in  strict  accordance  with  the  gen¬ 
eral  French  principle  of  subordinating  the  action  of  the  fleet 
to  so-called  particular  operations ;  for  nothing  is  more  in¬ 
structive  than  to  note  how  an  unsound  principle  results  in 
disastrous  action.  Hood’s  inferiority  was  such  as  to  weaken* 
for  offensive  purposes,  his  commanding  position.  So  long 

the  investment,  the  more  audacious  manner  in  which  he  assaulted  the  place 
before  the  fire  of  the  defence  had  in  any  way  lessened,  and  before  the  counter¬ 
scarp  had  been  blown  in,  were  the  true  causes  of  the  sudden  fall  of  the  place. 
Both  the  military  and  political  state  of  affairs  warranted  this  neglect  of  rules. 
When  the  general  terminated  his  order  for  the  assault  with  this  sentence, 
*  Ciudad  Rodrigo  must  be  stormed  this  evening/  he  knew  well  that  it  would  bo 
nobly  understood”  (Napier’s  Peninsular  War).  “Judging  that  the  honour  of 
his  Majesty’s  arms,  and  the  circumstances  of  the  war  in  these  seas,  required  a 
considerable  degree  of  enterprise,  I  felt  myself  justified  in  departing  from  the 
regular  system”  (Sir  John  Jervis’s  Report  of  the  Battle  of  Cape  St.  Vincent). 


CRITICISM  OF  DE  GRASSE'S  ACTION . 


477 


as  De  Grasse  kept  to  windward,  he  maintained  his  commu¬ 
nications  with  Martinique,  and  he  was  strong  enough,  too, 
to  force  communication  when  necessary  with  the  troops  be¬ 
fore  Brimstone  Hill.  It  was  probable,  as  the  event  showed, 
that  the  particular  operation,  the  reduction  of  St.  Kitt’s, 
would  succeed  despite  the  presence  of  the  English  fleet ;  and 
u  the  French  navy  has  always  preferred  the  glory  of  assuring 
a  conquest  to  that,  more  brilliant  perhaps  but  less  real,  of 
taking  a  few  ships.” 

So  far  De  Grasse  may  be  acquitted  of  any  error  beyond 
that  of  not  rising  above  the  traditions  of  his  service.  Some 
days,  however,  before  the  surrender  of  the  island  and  the 
departure  of  the  English  fleet,  he  was  joined  by  two  ships- 
of-the-line  which  brought  him  word  of  the  dispersal  of  the 
expected  convoy  and  reinforcements  from  Europe.1  He  then 
knew  that  he  himself  could  not  be  strengthened  before  Rod¬ 
ney’s  arrival,  and  that  by  that  event  the  English  would  be 
superior  to  him.  He  had  actually  thirty-three  ships-of-the- 
line  in  hand,  and  a  few  miles  off  lay  twenty-two  English  in 
a  position  where  he  knew  they  would  await  his  attack  ;  yet 
he  let  them  escape.  His  own  explanation  implies  clearly  that 
he  had  no  intention  of  attacking  them  at  anchor :  — 

“  The  day  after  the  capitulation  of  Brimstone  Hill  was  the  mo¬ 
ment  to  watch  Hood  closely,  and  to  fight  him  as  soon  as  he  got  under 
way  from  the  conquered  island.  But  our  provisions  were  exhausted  ; 
we  had  only  enough  for  thirty-six  hours.  Some  supply-ships  had  ar¬ 
rived  at  Nevis,  and  you  will  admit  one  must  live  before  fighting.  I 
went  to  Nevis,  always  to  windward  and  in  sight  of  the  enemy,  a  league 
and  a  half  from  him,  in  order  to  take  on  board  the  necessary  supplies 
as  rapidly  as  possible.  Hood  decamped  at  night  without  signals,  and 
the  next  morning  I  found  only  the  sick  whom  he  left  behind.”  2 

In  other  words,  Hood  having  held  his  ground  with  con¬ 
summate  audacity  and  skill,  when  he  had  some  chance  of 

1  By  Kempenfeldt’s  attack  upon  De  Guichen’s  convoy,  and  the  following  gale 
in  December,  1781.  See  p.  408. 

2  Kerguelen  :  Guerre  Maritime  de  1778.  Letter  of  De  Grasse  to  Kerguelen* 
dated  Paris,  January  8,  1783.  p.  263. 


478 


CRITICISM  OF  DE  GRASSE'S  ACTIOR. 


successful  resistance,  declined  to  await  his  adversary’s  attack 
under  conditions  overwhelmingly  unfavorable.  What  shall 
be  said  of  this  talk  about  provisions?  Did  not  the  Comte  de 
Grasse  know  a  month  before  how  long,  to  a  day,  the  supplies 
on  board  would  last  ?  Did  he  not  know,  four  davs  before 
Hood  sailed,  that  he  had  with  him  every  ship  he  could  proba¬ 
bly  count  on  for  the  approaching  campaign,  while  the  Eng¬ 
lish  would  surely  be  reinforced?  And  if  the  English  position 
was  as  strong  as  good  judgment,  professional  skill,  and  bold 
hearts  could  make  it,  had  it  not  weak  points?  Were  not 
the  lee  ships  to  leeward  ?  If  they  did  attempt  to  beat  to 
windward,  had  he  not  ships  to  “  contain  ”  them  ?  If  the 
van  ship  could  not  be  reached,  had  he  not  force  enough  to 
double  and  treble  on  the  third  and  following  ships,  as  far 
down  the  line  as  he  chose  ?  A  letter  of  Suffren’s,  referring 
to  a  similar  condition  of  things  at  Santa  Lucia,1  but  written 
three  years  before  these  events,  seems  almost  a  prophetic 
description  of  them  :  — 

“  Notwithstanding  the  slight  results  of  the  two  cannonades  of 
December  15  [1778],  we  can  yet  expect  success;  but  the  only  way 
to  attain  it  is  to  attack  vigorously  the  squadron,  which  in  consequence 
of  our  superiority  cannot  hold  out,  despite  their  land  works,  which 
will  become  of  no  effect  if  we  lay  them  on  board ,  or  anchor  upon  their 
buoys.  If  we  delay,  a  thousand  circumstances  may  save  them.  They 
may  profit  by  the  night  to  depart .” 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  English  would  have  sold 
their  defeat  dearly ;  but  results  in  war  must  be  paid  for,  and 
the  best  are  in  the  long  run  the  cheapest.  A  tight  grip  of  a 
few  simple  principles  —  that  the  enemy’s  fleet  was  the  con¬ 
trolling  factor  in  the  coming  campaign,  that  it  was  therefore 
his  true  objective,  that  one  fraction  of  it  must  be  crushed 
without  delay  when  caught  thus  separated  —  would  have 
saved  De  Grasse  a  great  blunder  ;  but  it  is  only  fair  to  note 
that  it  would  have  made  him  an  exception  to  the  practice 
of  the  French  navy. 

The  hour  was  now  close  at  hand  when  the  French  admiral 

1  See  pp.  366,  426. 


JUNCTION  OF  RODNEY  AND  HOOD. 


479 


should  feel,  even  if  he  did  not  admit,  the  consequences  of  this 
mistake,  by  which  he  had  won  a  paltry  island  and  lost  an 
English  fleet.  Rodney  had  sailed  from  Europe  on  the  15th 
of  January,  with  twelve  sliips-of-the-line.  On  the  19th  of 
February  he  anchored  at  Barbadoes,  and  the  same  day  Hood 
reached  Antigua  from  St.  Kitt’s.  On  the  25th  the  squad¬ 
rons  of  Rodney  and  Hood  met  to  windward  of  Antigua, 
forming  a  united  fleet  of  thirty-four  ships-of-the-line.  The 
next  day  De  Grasse  anchored  in  Fort  Royal,  thus  escaping 
the  pursuit  which  Rodney  at  once  began.  The  English  ad¬ 
miral  then  returned  to  Sta.  Lucia,  where  he  was  joined  by 
three  more  ships-of-the-line  from  England,  raising  his  force 
to  thirty-seven.  Knowing  that  a  large  convoy  was  expected 
from  France,  before  the  arrival  of  which  nothing  could  be 
attempted,  Rodney  sent  a  part  of  his  fleet  to  cruise  to  wind¬ 
ward  and  as  far  north  as  Guadeloupe  ;  but  the  officer  in 
charge  of  the  French  convoy,  suspecting  this  action,  kept 
well  north  of  that  island,  and  reached  Fort  Royal,  Marti¬ 
nique,  on  the  20th  of  March.  The  ships-of-war  with  him 
raised  De  Grasse’s  fleet  to  thirty-three  effective  sail-of-the-line 
and  two  fifty-gun  ships. 

The  object  of  the  united  efforts  of  France  and  Spain  this 
year  was  the  conquest  of  Jamaica.  It  was  expected  to  unite 
at  Cap  Fran^ais  (now  Cap  Haltien),  in  Hayti,  fifty  ships-of- 
the-line  and  twenty  thousand  troops.  Part  of  the  latter  were 
already  at  the  rendezvous  ;  and  De  Grasse,  appointed  to  com¬ 
mand  the  combined  fleets,  was  to  collect  in  Martinique  all 
the  available  troops  and  supplies  in  the  French  islands,  and 
convoy  them  to  the  rendezvous.  It  was  this  junction  that 
Rodney  was  charged  to  prevent. 

The  region  within  which  occurred  the  important  operations 
of  the  next  few  days  covers  a  distance  of  one  hundred  and 
fifty  miles,  from  south  to  north,  including  the  islands  of  Sta. 
Lucia,  Martinique,  Dominica,  and  Guadeloupe,  in  the  order 
named.  (See  Plate  XI.  p.  378.)  At  this  time  the  first  was  in 
English,  the  others  in  French,  hands.  The  final,  and  for  the 
moment  decisive,  encounter  took  place  between,  and  a  little 


480  POSITIONS  OF  RODNEY  AND  DE  GRASSE. 


to  westward  of,  Dominica  and  Guadeloupe.  These  are  twenty- 
three  miles  apart ;  but  the  channel  is  narrowed  to  thirteen 
by  three  islets  called  the  Saints,  lying  ten  miles  south  of 
Guadeloupe.  It  is  said  to  have  been  De  Grasse’s  intention, 
instead  of  sailing  direct  for  Cap  Fran^ais,1  to  take  a  circui¬ 
tous  course  near  the  islands,  which,  being  friendly  or  neutral, 
would  give  refuge  to  the  convoy  if  pressed.  The  close  pur¬ 
suit  of  the  English,  who  came  up  with  him  off  Dominica,  led 
him  to  forsake  this  plan,  sending  the  convoy  into  Basse  Terre 
at  the  south  end  of  Guadeloupe,  while  with  the  fleet  he  tried 
to  beat  through  the  channel  and  pass  east  of  the  island,  thus 
drawing  the  English  away  from  the  transports  and  ridding 
himself  of  the  tactical  embarrassment  due  to  the  latter’s 
presence.  Accidents  to  various  ships  thwarted  this  attempt, 
and  brought  about  a  battle  disastrous  to  him  and  fatal  to  the 
joint  enterprise. 

The  anchorages  of  the  two  fleets,  in  Martinique  and  Sta. 
Lucia,  were  thirty  miles  apart.  The  prevailing  east  wind  is 
generally  fair  to  pass  from  one  to  the  other  ;  but  a  strong 
westerly  current,  and  the  frequency  of  calms  and  light  airs, 
tend  to  throw  to  leeward  sailing-ships  leaving  Sta.  Lucia  for 
the  northern  island.  A  chain  of  frigates  connected  the  Eng¬ 
lish  lookout  ships  off  Martinique,  by  signal,  with  Rodney’s 
flag-ship  in  Gros  Ilot  Bay.  Everything  was  astir  at  the  two 
stations,  the  French  busy  with  the  multitudinous  arrange¬ 
ments  necessitated  by  a  great  military  undertaking,  the  Eng¬ 
lish  with  less  to  do,  yet  maintaining  themselves  in  a  state  of 
expectancy  and  preparation  for  instant  action,  that  entails 
constant  alertness  and  mental  activity. 

On  the  5tli  of  April  Rodney  was  informed  that  the  soldiers 
were  being  embarked,  and  on  the  8th,  soon  after  daylight, 
the  lookout  frigates  were  seen  making  signal  that  the  enemy 
was  leaving  port.  The  English  fleet  at  once  began  to  get 
under  way,  and  by  noon  was  clear  of  the  harbor  to  the  num¬ 
ber  of  thirty-six  of  the  line.  At  half-past  two  P.  M.  the  ad¬ 
vanced  frigates  were  in  sight  of  the  French  fleet,  which  was 

1  See  Map  IV..  of  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  p.  532. 


SAILING  OF  THE  FRENCH  FLEET. 


481 


seen  from  the  mastheads  of  the  main  body  just  before  sun¬ 
down.  The  English  stood  to  the  northward  all  night,  and 
at  daybreak  of  the  9th  were  abreast  Dominica,  but  for  the 
most  part  becalmed.  In-shore  of  them,  to  the  northward 
and  eastward,  were  seen  the  French  fleet  and  convoy : 
the  men-of-war  numbering  thirty-three  of  the  line,  besides 
smaller  vessels ;  the  convoy  a  hundred  and  fifty  sail,  under 
special  charge  of  the  two  fifty-gun  ships.  The  irregular  and 
uncertain  winds,  common  to  the  night  and  early  hours  of 
the  day  near  the  land,  had  scattered  these  unwieldy  num¬ 
bers.  Fifteen  sail-of-the-line  were  in  the  channel  between 
Dominica  and  the  Saints,  with  a  fresh  trade-wind,  appar¬ 
ently  beating  to  windward ;  the  remainder  of  the  ships-of- 
war  and  most  of  the  convoy  were  still  becalmed  close 
under  Dominica  (Plate  XX.,  Position  I,  b).  Gradually, 
however,  one  by  one,  the  French  ships  were  catching  light 
airs  off  the  land ;  and  by  favor  of  these,  which  did  not 
reach  so  far  as  the  English  in  the  offing,  drew  out  from  the 
island  and  entered  the  more  steady  breeze  of  the  channel, 
reinforcing  the  group  which  was  thus  possessed  of  that  prime 
element  of  naval  power,  mobility.  At  the  same  time  light- 
airs  from  the  southeast  crept  out  to  the  English  van  under 
Hood,  fanning  it  gently  north  from  the  main  body  of  the 
fleet  toward  two  isolated  French  ships  (i),  which,  having 
fallen  to  leeward  during  the  night,  had  shared  the  calms  that 
left  the  English  motionless,  with  their  heads  all  round  the 
compass.  They  had  come  nearly  within  gunshot,  when  a 
light  puff  from  the  northwest  enabled  the  Frenchmen  to  draw 
away  and  approach  their  own  ships  in  the  channel. 

The  farther  the  English  van  advanced,  the  fresher  grew 
their  wind,  until  they  fairly  opened  the  channel  of  the  Saints 
and  felt  the  trade-wind.  De  Grasse  signalled  to  the  convoy 
to  put  into  Guadeloupe,  which  order  was  so  well  carried  out 
that  they  were  all  out  of  sight  to  the  northward  by  two  in  the 
afternoon,  and  will  appear  no  more  in  the  sequel.  The  two 
French  ships,  already  spoken  of  as  fallen  to  leeward,  not 
being  yet  out  of  danger  from  the  English  van,  which  had  now 

31 


482 


ACTION  OF  APRIL  9 ,  1782 . 


a  commanding  breeze,  and  the  latter  being  much  separated 
from  their  rear  and  centre,  De  Grasse  ordered  his  van  to  bear 
down  and  engage.  This  was  obeyed  by  the  ships  signalled 
and  by  three  others,  in  all  by  fourteen  or  fifteen,  the  ac¬ 
tion  beginning  at  half-past  nine  a.  m.,  and  lasting  with  in¬ 
termissions  until  quarter-past  one  p.  m.  Hood  was  soon 
forced  to  heave-to,  in  order  not  to  increase  too  much  his 
separation  from  the  main  fleet ;  the  French  kept  under  way, 
approaching  from  the  rear  and  passing  in  succession  at  half 
cannon-shot  to  windward  (Plate  XX.,  Position  I.).  As  each 
ship  drew  ahead  of  the  English  division,  she  tacked,  stand¬ 
ing  back  to  the  southward  until  in  position  to  resume  her 
place  in  the  order  of  attack,  thus  describing  a  continuous 
irregular  curve  of  elliptical  form,  to  windward  of  their 
opponents.  The  brunt  of  the  attack  fell  upon  eight  or 
nine  of  the  English,  this  number  being  successively  in¬ 
creased  as  one  ship  after  another,  as  the  baffling  airs  served, 
drew  out  from  the  calm  space  under  Dominica ;  but  the 
French  received  similar  accessions.  While  this  engagement 
was  going  on,  part  of  the  English  centre,  eight  ships  with 
Rodney’s  flag  among  them  (Position  I.,  a),  by  carefully 
watching  the  puffs  and  cat’s-paws,  had  worked  in  with  the 
land  and  caught  the  sea  breeze,  which  was  felt  there  sooner 
than  in  the  offing.  As  soon  as  they  had  it,  about  eleven 
A.  M.,  they  stood  to  the  north,  being  now  on  the  weather 
quarter 1  both  of  the  English  van  and  its  assailants  (Posi¬ 
tion  II.,  a).  The  latter,  seeing  this,  tacked,  and  abandon¬ 
ing  the  contest  for  the  moment,  steered  south  to  join  their 
centre,  lest  Rodney’s  eight  ships  should  get  between  them. 
At  half-past  eleven  the  French  again  formed  line  on  the 
starboard  tack,  most  of  their  ships  being  now  clear  of  the 
land,  while  the  English  rear  was  still  becalmed.  The  greater 
numbers  of  the  French  enabled  them  to  extend  from  north 
to  south  along  the  length  of  the  English  line,  whereas  the 
latter  was  still  broken  by  a  great  gap  between  the  van 
and  centre  (Position  II.).  The  attack  upon  Hood  was 

1  Weather  quarter  is  behind,  but  on  the  windward  side. 


CRITICISM  UPON  DE  GRASSES  CONDUCT.  483 


therefore  hotly  renewed ;  but  the  French  centre  and  rear 
(b),  having  the  wind,  kept  their  distance,  and  held  Rodney’s 
division  at  long  range.  At  quarter-past  one  the  French, 
finding  that  the  whole  British  line  was  coming  up  with  the 
wind,  ceased  firing,  and  at  two  Rodney  hauled  down  the 
signal  for  battle,  the  enemy  having  withdrawn. 

This  action  of  the  9th  of  April  amounted  actually  to  no  more 
than  an  artillery  duel.  One  French  ship,  the  “  Caton,”  a  sixty- 
four  (d),  received  injuries  which  sent  her  into  Guadeloupe; 
two  English  were  disabled,  but  repaired  their  injuries  without 
leaving  the  fleet.  The  material  advantage,  therefore,  lay  with 
the  latter.  Opinions  differ  as  to  the  generalship  of  the  Comte 
de  Grasse  on  this  day,  but  they  divide  on  the  same  basis  of 
principle  as  to  whether  ulterior  operations,  or  the  chances  of 
beating  the  enemy’s  fleet,  are  to  determine  an  admiral’s  action. 
The  facts  of  the  case  are  these :  Sixteen  of  the  English  fleet, 
all  the  rear  and  four  of  the  centre  (Position  II.,  c),  were  not 
able  at  any  time  to  fire  a  shot.  Apparently  every  French 
ship,  first  and  last,  might  have  been  brought  into  actiom  At 
the  beginning,  eight  or  nine  English  were  opposed  to  fifteen 
French.  At  the  end  there  were  twenty  English  to  thirty- 
three  French,  and  these  general  proportions  doubtless  obtained 
throughout  the  four  hours.  De  Grasse  therefore  found  himself 
in  the  presence  of  a  fleet  superior  to  his  own,  in  numbers  at 
least,  and  by  the  favor  of  Providence  that  fleet  so  divided  that 
nearly  half  of  it  was  powerless  to  act.  He  had  the  wind,  he 
had  a  fine  body  of  captains ;  what  was  to  prevent  him  from 
attacking  Hood’s  nine  ships  with  fifteen,  putting  one  on  each 
side  of  the  six  in  the  rear.  Had  those  nine  been  thoroughly 
beaten,  Rodney’s  further  movements  must  have  been  hope¬ 
lessly  crippled.  The  French  lost  only  five  in  their  defeat 
three  days  later.  The  subsequent  court-martial,  however,  laid 
down  the  French  doctrine  thus :  “  The  decision  to  persist  in 
engaging  with  only  a  part  of  our  fleet  may  be  considered  as  an 
act  of  prudence  on  the  part  of  the  admiral,  which  might  be  dic¬ 
tated  by  the  ulterior  projects  of  the  campaign.”  On  this  a 
French  professional  writer  naturally  remarks,  that  if  an  attack 


484 


ACCIDENTS  IN  THE  FRENCH  FLEET. 


were  made  at  all,  it  would  be  more  prudent  to  make  it  in 
force ;  less  injury  would  fall  on  individual  ships,  while  in  the 
end  the  whole  fleet  would  inevitably  be  drawn  in  to  support 
any  which,  by  losing  spars,  could  not  return  to  windward. 

Three  times  in  one  year  had  Fortune  thrown  before  De 
Grasse  the  opportunity  of  attacking  English  fleets  with  de¬ 
cisive  odds  on  his  side.1  Her  favors  were  now  exhausted. 
Three  days  more  were  to  show  how  decidedly  the  ulterior 
projects  of  a  campaign  may  be  affected  by  a  battle  and  the  loss 
of  a  few  ships.  From  the  9th  to  the  morning  of  the  12th  the 
French  fleet  continued  beating  to  windward  between  Dominica 
and  the  Saints,  in  no  regular  order.  On  the  night  of  the  9th 
the  English  liove-to  to  repair  damages.  The  next  day  the 
chase  to  windward  was  resumed,  but  the  French  gained  very 
decidedly  upon  their  pursuers.  On  the  night  of  the  10th  two 
ships,  the  “  Jason”  and  “  Zele,”  collided.  The  “  Zel6  ”  was 
the  bane  of  the  French  fleet  during  these  days.  She  was  one 
of  those  that  were  nearly  caught  by  the  enemy  on  the  9th,  and 
was  also  the  cause  of  the  final  disaster.  The  injuries  to  the 
“Jason”  forced  her  to  put  into  Guadeloupe.  On  the  11th 
the  main  body  was  to  windward  of  the  Saints,  but  the  “  Zel6  ” 
and  another  had  fallen  so  far  to  leeward  that  De  Grasse  bore 
down  to  cover  them,  thus  losing  much  of  the  ground  gained. 
On  the  night  following,  the  “  Zdle  ”  was  again  in  collision, 
this  time  with  De  Grasse’s  flag-ship  ;  the  latter  lost  some  sails, 
but  the  other,  which  had  not  the  right  of  way  and  was  wholly 
at  fault,  carried  away  both  foremast  and  bowsprit.  The 
admiral  sent  word  to  the  frigate  “  Astrde  ”  to  take  the  “  Z£le  ” 
in  tow ;  and  here  flits  across  the  page  of  our  story  a  celebrated 
and  tragical  figure,  for  the  captain  of  the  “  Astr^e  ”  was  the 
ill-fated  explorer  Lapeyrouse,  the  mystery  of  whose  disappear¬ 
ance  with  two  ships  and  their  entire  crews  remained  so  long 
unsolved.  Two  hours  were  consumed  in  getting  the  ship 
under  way  in  tow  of  the  frigate,  —  not  very  smart  work  under 
the  conditions  of  weather  and  urgency ;  but  by  five  a.  m.  the 

1  April  29, 1781,  off  Martinique,  twenty-four  ships  to  eighteen;  January,  1782, 
thirty  to  twenty-two;  April  9.  1782,  thirty  to  twenty. 


THE  NAVAL  BATTLE  OF  THE  SAINTS. 


485 


two  were  standing  away  for  Basse  Terre,  where  the  “  Caton  ” 
and  “  Jason,”  as  well  as  the  convoy,  had  already  arrived.  The 
French  fleet  had  thus  lost  three  from  its  line-of-battle  since 
leaving  Martinique. 

The  disabled  ship  had  not  long  been  headed  for  Basse  Terre, 
when  the  faint  streaks  of  dawn  announced  the  approach  of 
the  12th  of  April,  a  day  doubly  celebrated  in  naval  annals. 
The  sun  had  not  quite  set  upon  the  exhausted  squadrons  of 
Suffren  and  Hughes,  anchoring  after  their  fiercest  battle  off 
Ceylon,  when  his  early  rays  shone  upon  the  opening  strife 
between  Rodney  and  De  Grasse.1  The  latter  was  at  the  time 
the  greatest  naval  battle  in  its  results  that  had  been  fought  in 
a  century  ;  its  influence  on  the  course  of  events  was  very  great, 
though  far  from  as  decisive  as  it  might  have  been ;  it  was 
attended  with  circumstances  of  unusual  though  somewhat 
factitious  brilliancy,  and  particularly  was  marked  by  a  ma¬ 
noeuvre  that  was  then  looked  upon  as  exceptionally  daring  and 
decisive,  —  “  breaking  the  line.”  It  must  be  added  that  it  has 
given  rise  to  a  storm  of  controversy ;  and  the  mass  of  details, 
as  given  by  witnesses  who  should  be  reliable,  are  so  confused 
and  contradictory,  owing  mainly  to  the  uncertainties  of  the 
wind,  that  it  is  impossible  now  to  do  more  than  attempt  to 
reconcile  them  in  a  full  account.  Nevertheless,  the  leading 
features  can  be  presented  with  sufficient  accuracy,  and  this 
will  first  be  done  briefly  and  barely  ;  the  outline  thus  pre¬ 
sented  can  afterward  be  clothed  with  the  details  which  give 
color,  life,  and  interest  to  the  great  scene. 

At  daylight2  (about  half-past  five)  the  English  fleet,  which 
had  gone  about  at  two  a.  m.,  was  standing  on  the  starboard 

1  The  difference  of  time  from  Trincomalee  to  the  Saints  is  nine  hours  and 
a  half. 

2  The  account  of  the  transactions  from  April  9  to  April  12  is  based  mainly 
upon  the  contemporary  plates  and  descriptions  of  Lieutenant  Matthews,  R.  N., 
and  the  much  later  “Naval  Researches”  of  Capt.  Thomas  White,  also  of  the 
British  Navy,  who  were  eye-witnesses,  both  being  checked  by  French  and  other 
English  narratives.  Matthews  and  White  are  at  variance  with  Rodney’s  official 
report  as  to  the  tack  on  which  the  English  were  at  daybreak ;  but  the  latter  is 
explicitly  confirmed  by  private  letters  of  Sir  Charles  Douglas,  sent  immediately 
after  the  battle  to  prominent  persons,  and  is  followed  in  the  text. 


486 


THE  NAVAL  BATTLE  OF  THE  SAINTS , 


tack,  with  the  wind  at  southeast,1  an  unusual  amount  of  south¬ 
ing  for  that  hour  (Plate  XXI.,  A).  It  was  then  about  fifteen 
miles  from  the  Saints,  which  bore  north-northeast,  and  ten  from 
the  French  fleet,  which  bore  northeast.  The  latter,  owing  to 
the  events  of  the  night,  was  greatly  scattered,  as  much  as  eight 
or  ten  miles  separating  the  weather,  or  easternmost,  ships 
from  the  lee,2  the  flag-ship  “  Ville  de  Paris  ”  being  among  the 
latter.  Anxiety  for  the  “  Z61e”  kept  the  French  admiral,  with 
the  ships  in  his  company,  under  short  canvas,  standing  to  the 
southward  on  the  port  tack  (A).  The  English  on  the  star¬ 
board  tack,  with  the  wind  as  they  had  it,3  headed  east-north¬ 
east,  and  thus,  as  soon  as  there  was  light  to  see,  found  the 
French  “  broad  on  the  lee  bow,  and  one  of  M.  de  Grasse’s 
ships  (the  “  Zele  ”)  towed  by  a  frigate,  square  under  our  lee 
(a),  with  his  bowsprit  and  foremast  prostrate  across  his  fore¬ 
castle.”  1  To  draw  the  French  farther  to  leeward,  Rodney  de¬ 
tached  four  ships  (b)  to  chase  the  “  Zele.”  As  soon  as  De 
Grasse  saw  this  he  signalled  his  fleet  to  keep  away  (c),  as 
Rodney  wished,  and  at  the  same  time  to  form  the  line-of-battle, 
thus  calling  down  to  him  the  ships  to  windward.  The  English 
1  ne  was  also  formed  rapidly,  and  the  chasing  ships  recalled 
at  seven  a.  m.  De  Grasse,  seeing  that  if  he  stood  on  he  would 
lose  the  weather-gage  altogether,  hauled  up  again  on  the  port 
tack  (c')  ;  and  the  breeze  changing  to  east-southeast  and  east 
in  his  favor  and  knocking  the  English  off,  the  race  of  the  two 
fleets  on  opposite  tacks,  for  the  advantage  of  the  wind,  be¬ 
came  nearly  equal.  The  French,  however,  won,  thanks  to  a 
superiority  in  sailing  which  had  enabled  them  to  draw  so  far 
to  windward  of  the  English  on  the  previous  days,  and,  but  for 
the  awkwardness  of  the  “  Z£le,”  might  have  cleared  them 
altogether  (Plate  XXI.,  B).  Their  leading  ships  first  reached 
and  passed  the  point  where  the  rapidly  converging  tracks 
intersected,  while  the  English  leader,  the  “  Marlborough,” 

1  Letter  of  Sir  Charles  Douglas,  Rodney’s  chief-of-staff :  “  United  Sendee 
Journal,”  1833,  Part  I.  p.  515. 

2  De  Grasse  calls  this  distance  three  leagues,  while  some  of  his  captains  esti* 
mated  it  to  be  as  great  as  five. 

3  The  French,  in  mid-channel,  had  the  wind  more  to  the  eastward. 


APRIL  12,  1782. 


487 


struck  the  French  line  between  the  sixth  and  tenth  ships 
(variously  stated).  The  battle,  of  course,  had  by  this  time 
begun,  the  ninth  ship  in  the  French  line,  the  “  Brave,”  open¬ 
ing  fire  at  twenty  minutes  before  eight  a.  m.  upon  the  “  Marl¬ 
borough.”  As  there  was  no  previous  intention  of  breaking 
the  line,  the  English  leader  kept  away,  in  obedience  to  a  sig¬ 
nal  from  Rodney,  and  ran  close  along  under  the  enemy’s  lee, 
followed  in  succession  by  all  the  ships  as  they  reached  her 
wake.  The  battle  thus  assumed  the  common  and  indecisive 
phase  of  two  fleets  passing  on  opposite  tacks,  the  wind  very 
light,  however,  and  so  allowing  a  more  heavy  engagement 
than  common  under  these  circumstances,  the  ships  “  sliding 
by  ”  at  the  rate  of  three  to  four  knots.  Since  the  hostile 
lines  diverged  again  south  of  their  point  of  meeting,  De 
Grasse  made  signal  to  keep  away  four  points  to  south-south¬ 
west,  thus  bringing  his  van  (B,  a)  to  action  with  the  Eng¬ 
lish  rear,  and  not  permitting  the  latter  to  reach  his  rear 
unscathed.  There  were,  however,  two  dangers  threatening 
the  French  if  they  continued  their  course.  Its  direction, 
south  or  south-southwest,  carried  them  into  the  calms  that 
hung  round  the  north  end  of  Dominica  ;  and  the  uncertainty 
of  the  wind  made  it  possible  that  by  its  hauling  to  the  south¬ 
ward  the  enemy  could  pass  through  their  line  and  gain  the 
wind,  and  with  it  the  possibility  of  forcing  the  decisive  battle 
which  the  French  policy  had  shunned ;  and  this  was  in  fact 
what  happened.  De  Grasse  therefore  made  signal  at  half¬ 
past  eight  to  wear  together  and  take  the  same  tack  as  the  Eng¬ 
lish.  This,  however,  was  impossible  ;  the  two  fleets  were  too 
close  together  to  admit  the  evolution.  He  then  signalled  to 
haul  close  to  the  wind  and  wear  in  succession ,  which  also  failed 
to  be  done,  and  at  five  minutes  past  nine  the  dreaded  contin¬ 
gency  arose ;  the  wind  hauled  to  the  southward,  knocking  off 
nil  the  French  ships  that  had  not  yet  kept  away ;  that  is,  all 
who  had  English  ships  close  under  their  lee  (Plate  XXI.  C). 
Rodney,  in  the  “  Formidable,”  was  at  this  time  just  drawing 
up  with  the  fourth  ship  astern  of  De  Grasse’s  flag.  Luffing  to 
the  new  wind,  he  passed  through  the  French  line,  followed  by 


488 


THE  NAVAL  BATTLE  OF  THE  SAINTS. 


the  five  ships  next  astern  of  him  (C,  a),  while  nearly  at  the 
same  moment,  and  from  the  same  causes,  his  sixth  astern 
(C,  b)  led  through  the  interval  abreast  him,  followed  by  the 
whole  English  rear.  The  French  line-of-battle  was  thus  broken 
in  two  places  by  columns  of  enemies’  ships  in  such  close  order 
as  to  force  its  vessels  aside,  even  if  the  wind  had  not  conspired 
to  embarrass  their  action.  Every  principle  upon  which  a  line- 
of-battle  was  constituted,  for  mutual  support  and  for  the  clear 
field  of  fire  of  each  ship,  was  thus  overthrown  for  the  French, 
and  preserved  for  the  English  divisions  which  filed  through  ; 
and  the  French  were  forced  off  to  leeward  by  the  interposition 
of  the  enemy’s  columns,  besides  being  broken  up.  Compelled 
thus  to  forsake  the  line  upon  which  they  had  been  ranged,  it 
was  necessary  to  re-form  upon  another,  and  unite  the  three 
groups  into  which  they  were  divided,  —  a  difficult  piece  of 
tactics  under  any  circumstances,  but  doubly  so  under  the 
moral  impression  of  disaster,  and  in  presence  of  a  superior 
enemy,  who,  though  himself  disordered,  was  in  better  shape, 
and  already  felt  the  glow  of  victory. 

It  does  not  appear  that  any  substantial  attempt  to  re-form 
was  made  by  the  French.  To  reunite,  yes ;  but  only  as  a 
flying,  disordered  mass.  The  various  shifts  of  wind  and  move¬ 
ments  of  the  divisions  left  their  fleet,  at  midday  (Plate  XXI. 

with  the  centre  (c)  two  miles  northwest  of  and  to  leeward 
of  the  van  (v),  the  rear  (r)  yet  farther  from  the  centre  and  to 
leeward  of  it.  Calms  and  short  puffs  of  wind  prevailed  now 
through  both  fleets.  At  half-past  one  p.  m.  a  light  breeze  from 
the  east  sprang  up,  and  De  Grasse  made  signal  to  form  the  line 
again  on  the  port  tack ;  between  three  and  four,  not  having  suc¬ 
ceeded  in  this,  he  made  signal  to  form  on  the  starboard  tack. 
The  two  signals  and  the  general  tenor  of  the  accounts  show 
that  at  no  time  were  the  French  re-formed  after  their  line  was 
broken  ;  and  all  the  manoeuvres  tended  toward,  even  if  they 
did  not  necessitate,  taking  the  whole  fleet  as  far  down  as  the 
most  leewardly  of  its  parts  (D).  In  such  a  movement,  it 
followed  of  course  that  the  most  crippled  ships  were  left  be¬ 
hind,  and  these  were  picked  up,  one  by  one,  by  the  English, 


DETAILS  OF  THE  BATTLE  OF  APRIL  12.  489 


who  pursued  without  any  regular  order,  for  which  there  was 
no  need,  as  mutual  support  was  assured  without  it.  Shortly 
after  six  p.  m.  De  Grasse’s  flag-ship,  the  “  Ville  de  Paris,” 
struck  her  colors  to  the  “  Barfleur,”  carrying  the  flag  of  Sir 
Samuel  Hood.  The  French  accounts  state  that  nine  of  the 
enemy’s  ships  then  surrounded  her,  and  there  is  no  doubt 
that  she  had  been  fought  to  the  bitter  end.  Her  name, 
commemorating  the  great  city  whose  gift  she  had  been  to 
the  king,  her  unusual  size,  and  the  fact  that  no  French  naval 
commander-in-chief  had  before  been  taken  prisoner  in  bat¬ 
tle,  conspired  to  bestow  a  peculiar  brilliancy  upon  Rod¬ 
ney’s  victory.  Four  other  ships-of-the-line  were  taken,1  and, 
singularly  enough,  upon  these  particular  ships  was  found 
the  whole  train  of  artillery  intended  for  the  reduction  of 
Jamaica. 

Such  were  the  leading  features  of  the  Battle  of  the  Saints, 
or,  as  it  is  sometimes  styled,  of  the  12th  of  April,  known  to 
the  French  as  the  Battle  of  Dominica.  Certain  points  which 
have  so  far  been  omitted  for  the  sake  of  clearness,  but  which 
affect  the  issue,  must  now  be  given.  When  the  day  opened, 
the  French  fleet  was  greatly  scattered  and  without  order.2 
De  Grasse,  under  the  influence  of  his  fears  for  the  “  Zcle,”  so 
precipitated  his  movements  that  his  line  was  not  properly 
formed  at  the  moment  of  engaging.  The  van  ships  had  not 
yet  come  into  position  (B,  a),  and  the  remainder  were  so  far 
from  having  reached  their  places  that  De  Vaudreuil,  com¬ 
manding  the  rear  division  and  last  engaged,  states  that  the 
line  was  formed  under  the  fire  of  musketry.  The  English,  on 
the  contrary,  were  in  good  order,  the  only  change  made  being 
to  shorten  the  interval  between  ships  from  two  to  one  cable’s 
length  (seven  hundred  feet).  The  celebrated  stroke  of  break¬ 
ing  through  the  French  line  was  due,  not  to  previous  intention, 
but  to  a  shift  of  wind  throwing  their  ships  out  of  order  and  so 

1  The  positions  of  the  French  ships  captured  are  shown  by  a  cross  in  each  of 
the  three  successive  stages  of  the  battle,  B,  C,  D. 

2  The  distance  of  the  weathermost  French  ships  from  the  “  Ville  de  Paris,” 
when  the  signal  to  form  line-of-battle  was  made,  is  variously  stated  at  from  six 
to  nine  miles. 


490 


BREAKING  THE  LINE. 


increasing  the  spaces  between  them ;  while  the  gap  through 
which  Rodney’s  group  penetrated  was  widened  by  the  “Dia- 
deme  ”  on  its  north  side  being  taken  aback  and  paying  round 
on  the  other  tack  (C,  c.)  Sir  Charles  Douglas  says  the  imme¬ 
diate  effect,  where  the  flag-ship  broke  through,  was  “  the  bring¬ 
ing  together,  almost  if  not  quite  in  contact  with  each  other, 
the  four  ships  of  the  enemy  which  were  nearest,”  on  the  north, 
44  to  the  point  alluded  to  (c),  and  coming  up  in  succession. 
This  unfortunate  group,  composing  now  only  one  large  single 
object  at  which  to  fire,  was  attacked  by  the  4  Duke,’  4  Namur,’ 
and  4  Formidable  ’  (ninety -gun  ships)  all  at  once,  receiving 
several  broadsides  from  each,  not  a  single  shot  missing;  and 
great  must  have  been  the  slaughter.”  The  44  Duke  ”  (C,  d), 
being  next  ahead  of  the  flag-ship,  had  followed  her  leader 
under  the  French  lee ;  but  as  soon  as  her  captain  saw  that 
the  44  Formidable  ”  had  traversed  the  enemy’s  order,  he  did 
the  same,  passing  north  of  this  confused  group  and  so  bring¬ 
ing  it  under  a  fire  from  both  sides.  The  log  of  the  44  Magna- 
nime,”  one  of  the  group,  mentions  passing  under  the  fire  of  two 
three-deckers,  one  on  either  side. 

As  soon  as  the  order  was  thus  broken,  Rodney  hauled  down 
the  signal  for  the  line,  keeping  flying  that  for  close  action, 
and  at  the  same  time  ordered  his  van,  which  had  now  passed 
beyond  and  north  of  the  enemy’s  rear,  to  go  about  and  rejoin 
the  English  centre.  This  was  greatly  delayed  through  the  in¬ 
juries  to  spars  and  sails  received  in  passing  under  the  ene¬ 
my’s  fire.  His  own  flag-ship  and  the  ships  with  her  went 
about.  The  rear,  under  Hood,  instead  of  keeping  north  again 
to  join  the  centre,  stood  to  windward  for  a  time,  and  were 
then  becalmed  at  a  considerable  distance  from  the  rest  of  the 
fleet. 

Much  discussion  took  place  at  a  later  day  as  to  the  wisdom 
of  Rodney’s  action  in  breaking  through  his  enemy’s  order, 
and  to  whom  the  credit,  if  any,  should  be  ascribed.  The  lat¬ 
ter  point  is  of  little  concern  ;  but  it  may  be  said  that  the  son 
of  Sir  Charles  Douglas,  Rodney’s  chief-of-staff,  brought  for¬ 
ward  an  amount  of  positive  evidence,  the  only  kind  that  could 


EFFECTS  OF  RODNETS  MANOEUVRE. 


491 


be  accepted  to  diminish  the  credit  of  the  person  wholly  re* 
sponsible  for  the  results,  which  proves  that  the  suggestion 
came  from  Douglas,  and  Rodney’s  consent  was  with  difficulty 
obtained.  The  value  of  the  manoeuvre  itself  is  of  more  conse¬ 
quence  than  any  question  of  personal  reputation.  It  lias  been 
argued  by  some  that,  so  far  from  being  a  meritorious  act,  it  was 
unfortunate,  and  for  Rodney’s  credit  should  rather  be  attrib¬ 
uted  to  the  force  of  circumstances  than  to  choice.  It  had 
been  better,  these  say,  to  have  continued  along  under  the  lee 
of  the  French  rear,  thus  inflicting  upon  it  the  fire  of  the 
whole  English  line,  and  that  the  latter  should  have  tacked 
and  doubled  on  the  French  rear.  This  argument  conven¬ 
iently  forgets  that  tacking,  or  turning  round  in  any  way, 
after  a  brush  of  this  kind,  was  possible  to  only  a  part  of  the 
ships  engaged ;  and  that  these  would  have  much  difficulty 
in  overtaking  the  enemies  who  had  passed  on,  unless  the 
latter  were  very  seriously  crippled.  Therefore  this  suggested 
attack,  the  precise  reproduction  of  the  battle  of  Ushant,  really 
reduces  itself  to  the  fleets  passing  on  opposite  tacks,  each  dis¬ 
tributing  its  fire  over  the  whole  of  the  enemy’s  line  without 
attempting  any  concentration  on  a  part  of  it.  It  may,  and 
must,  be  conceded  at  once,  that  Rodney’s  change  of  course 
permitted  the  eleven  rear  ships  of  the  French  (D,  r)  to  run 
off  to  leeward,  having  received  the  fire  of  only  part  of  their 
enemy,  while  the  English  van  had  undergone  that  of  nearly 
the  whole  French  fleet.  These  ships,  however,  were  thus 
thrown  entirely  out  of  action  for  a  measurable  and  impor¬ 
tant  time  by  being  driven  to  leeward,  and  would  have  been 
still  more  out  of  position  to  help  any  of  their  fleet,  had  not 
De  Grasse  himself  been  sent  to  leeward  by  Hood’s  divi¬ 
sion  cutting  the  line  three  ships  ahead  of  him.  The  thirteen 
leading  French  ships,  obeying  the  last  signal  they  had  seen, 
were  hugging  the  wind  ;  the  group  of  six  with  De  Grasse 
(C,  e)  would  have  done  the  same  had  they  not  been  headed 
off  by  Hood’s  division.  The  result  of  Rodney’s  own  action 
alone,  therefore,  would  have  been  to  divide  the  French  fleet  into 
two  parts,  separated  by  a  space  of  six  miles,  and  one  of  them 


492 


EFFECTS  OF  RODNEY’S  MANCEUVRE. 


hopelessly  to  leeward.  The  English,  having  gained  the  wind, 
would  have  been  in  position  easily  to  “  contain  ”  the  eleven 
lee  ships,  and  to  surround  the  nineteen  weather  ones  in  over¬ 
whelming  force.  The  actual  condition,  owing  to  the  two 
breaches  in  the  line,  was  slightly  different ;  the  group  of  six 
with  De  Grasse  being  placed  between  his  weather  and  lee  di¬ 
visions,  two  miles  from  the  former,  four  from  the  latter  (D). 
It  seems  scarcely  necessary  to  insist  upon  the  tactical  advan¬ 
tages  of  such  a  situation  for  the  English,  even  disregarding 
the  moral  effect  of  the  confusion  through  which  the  French 
had  passed.  In  addition  to  this,  a  very  striking  lesson  is  de- 
ducible  from  the  immediate  effects  of  the  English  guns  in 
passing  through.  Of  the  five  ships  taken,  three  were  those 
under  whose  sterns  the  English  divisions  pierced.1  Instead 
of  giving  and  taking,  as  the  parallel  lines  ran  by,  on  equal 
terms,  each  ship  having  the  support  of  those  ahead  and 
astern,  the  French  ships  near  which  the  penetrating  columns 
passed  received  each  the  successive  fire  of  all  the  enemy’s 
division.  Thus  Hood’s  thirteen  ships  filed  by  the  two  rear 
ones  of  the  French  van,  the  “  C6sar  ”  and  “  Hector,”  fairly 
crushing  them  under  this  concentration  of  fire  ;  while  in  like 
manner,  and  with  like  results,  Rodney’s  six  passed  by  the 
“  Glorieux.”  This  “  concentration  by  defiling  ”  past  the  ex¬ 
tremity  of  a  column  corresponds  quite  accurately  to  the  con¬ 
centration  upon  the  flank  of  a  line,  and  has  a  special  interest, 
because  if  successfully  carried  out  it  would  be  as  powerful  an 
attack  now  as  it  ever  has  been.  If  quick  to  seize  their  ad¬ 
vantage,  the  English  might  have  fired  upon  the  ships  on  both 
sides  of  the  gaps  through  which  they  passed,  as  the  “  For¬ 
midable  ”  actually  did  ;  but  they  were  using  the  starboard 
broadsides,  and  many  doubtless  did  not  realize  their  oppor- 

1  The  other  two  French  ships  taken  were  the  “  Ville  de  Paris,”  which,  in  her 
isolated  condition,  and  bearing  the  flag  of  the  commander-in-chief,  became  the 
quarry  around  which  the  enemy’s  ships  naturally  gathered,  and  the  “  Ardent,”  of 
sixty-four  guns,  which  appears  to  have  been  intercepted  in  a  gallant  attempt  to 
pass  from  the  van  to  the  side  of  her  admiral  in  his  extremity.  The  latter  was 
the  solitary  prize  taken  by  the  allied  Great  Armada  in  the  English  Channel, 
in  1779. 


ARMAMENTS  OF  THE  TWO  FLEETS. 


493 


tunity  until  too  late.  The  natural  results  of  Rodney’s  act, 
therefore,  were:  (1)  The  gain  of  the  wind,  with  the  power 
of  offensive  action ;  (2)  Concentration  of  fire  upon  a  part  of 
the  enemy’s  order ;  and  (3)  The  introduction  into  the  latter 
of  confusion  and  division,  which  might,  and  did,  become  very 
great,  offering  the  opportunity  of  further  tactical  advantage. 
It  is  not  a  valid  reply  to  say  that,  had  the  French  been  more 
apt,  they  could  have  united  sooner.  A  manoeuvre  that  pre¬ 
sents  a  good  chance  of  advantage  does  not  lose  its  merit  be¬ 
cause  it  can  be  met  by  a  prompt  movement  of  the  enemy,  any 
more  than  a  particular  lunge  of  the  sword  becomes  worthless 
because  it  has  its  appropriate  parry.  The  chances  were  that 
by  heading  off  the  rear  ships,  while  the  van  stood  on,  the 
French  fleet  would  be  badly  divided  ;  and  the  move  was  none 
the  less  sagacious  because  the  two  fragments  could  have 
united  sooner  than  they  did,  had  they  been  well  handled. 
With  the  alternative  action  suggested,  of  tacking  after  pass¬ 
ing  the  enemy’s  rear,  the  pursuit  became  a  stern  chase,  in 
which  both  parties  having  been  equally  engaged  would  pre¬ 
sumably  be  equally  crippled.  Signals  of  disability,  in  fact, 
were  numerous  in  both  fleets. 

Independently  of  the  tactical  handling  of  the  two  fleets, 
there  were  certain  differences  of  equipment  which  conferred 
tactical  advantage,  and  are  therefore  worth  noting.  The 
French  appear  to  have  had  finer  ships,  and,  class  for  class, 
heavier  armaments.  Sir  Charles  Douglas,  an  eminent  offi¬ 
cer  of  active  and  ingenious  turn  of  mind,  who  paid  particular 
attention  to  gunnery  details,  estimated  that  in  weight  of  bat¬ 
tery  the  thirty-three  French  were  superior  to  the  thirty-six 
English  by  the  force  of  four  84-gun  ships  ;  and  that  after 
the  loss  of  the  “  Zeffi,”  “  Jason,”  and  “  Caton  ”  there  still 
remained  an  advantage  equal  to  two  seventy-fours.  The 
French  admiral  La  Gravi£re  admits  the  generally  heavier 
calibre  of  French  cannon  at  this  era.  The  better  construc¬ 
tion  of  the  French  ships  and  their  greater  draught  caused 
them  to  sail  and  beat  better,  and  accounts  in  part  for  the 
success  of  De  Grasse  in  gaining  to  windward  ;  for  in  the  after- 


494 


ARMAMENTS  OF  THE  TWO  FLEETS. 


noon  of  the  lltli  only  three  or  four  of  the  body  of  his  fleet 
were  visible  from  the  mast-head  of  the  English  flag-ship,  which 
had  been  within  gunshot  of  them  on  the  9th.  It  was  the 
awkwardness  of  the  unlucky  “  Z616  ”  and  of  the  “  Magnanime,” 
which  drew  down  De  Grasse  from  his  position  of  vantage,  and 
justified  Rodney’s  perseverance  in  relying  upon  the  chapter 
of  accidents  to  effect  his  purpose.  The  greater  speed  of  the 
French  as  a  body  is  somewhat  hard  to  account  for,  because, 
though  undoubtedly  with  far  better  lines,  the  practice  of  cop¬ 
pering  the  bottom  had  not  become  so  general  in  France  as 
in  England,  and  among  the  French  there  were  several  un¬ 
coppered  and  worm-eaten  ships.1  The  better  sailing  of  the 
French  was,  however,  remarked  by  the  English  officers,  though 
the  great  gain  mentioned  must  have  been  in  part  owing  to 
Rodney’s  lying-by,  after  the  action  of  the  9th,  to  refit,  due 
probably  to  the  greater  injury  received  by  the  small  body  of 
his  vessels,  which  had  been  warmly  engaged,  with  greatly  su¬ 
perior  numbers.  It  was  stated,  in  narrating  that  action,  that 
the  French  kept  at  half  cannon-range  ;  this  was  to  neutralize 
a  tactical  advantage  the  English  had  in  the  large  number  of 
carronades  and  other  guns  of  light  weight  but  large  calibre, 
which  in  close  action  told  heavily,  but  were  useless  at  greater 
distances.  The  second  in  command,  De  Vaudreuil,  to  whom 
was  intrusted  the  conduct  of  that  attack,  expressly  states 
that  if  he  had  come  within  reach  of  the  carronades  his 
ships  would  have  been  quickly  unrigged.  Whatever  judg¬ 
ment  is  passed  upon  the  military  policy  of  refusing  to  crush 
an  enemy  situated  as  the  English  division  was,  there  can  be 
no  question  that,  if  the  object  was  to  prevent  pursuit,  the 
tactics  of  De  Vaudreuil  on  the  9th  was  in  all  respects  excel¬ 
lent.  He  inflicted  the  utmost  injury  with  the  least  exposure 
of  his  own  force.  On  the  12th,  De  Grasse,  by  allowing  him¬ 
self  to  be  lured  within  reach  of  carronades,  yielded  this  ad¬ 
vantage,  besides  sacrificing  to  an  impulse  his  whole  previous 
strategic  policy.  Rapidly  handled  from  their  lightness,  firing 

1  Official  letter  of  the  Marquis  de  Vaudreuil.  Guerin  :  Histoire  de  la  Marine 
Fran9aise,  vol.  v.  p.  513. 


LESSONS  DEDUCED  FROM  THE  BATTLE. 


495 


grape  and  shot  of  large  diameter,  these  guns  were  peculiarly 
harmful  in  close  action  and  useless  at  long  range.  In  a  later 
despatch  De  Vaudreuil  says  :  “  The  effect  of  these  new  arms 
is  most  deadly  within  musket  range  ;  it  is  they  which  so  badly 
crippled  us  on  the  12th  of  April.”  There  were  other  gunnery 
innovations,  in  some  at  least  of  the  English  ships,  which  by 
increasing  the  accuracy,  the  rapidity,  and  the  field  of  fire, 
greatly  augmented  the  power  of  their  batteries.  These  were 
the  introduction  of  locks,  by  which  the  man  who  aimed  also 
fired ;  and  the  fitting  to  the  gun-carriages  of  breast-pieces 
and  sweeps,  so  that  the  guns  could  be  pointed  farther  ahead 
or  astern, — that  is,  over  a  larger  field  than  had  been  usual. 
In  fights  between  single  ships,  not  controlled  in  their  move¬ 
ments  by  their  relations  to  a  fleet,  this  improvement  would  at 
times  allow  the  possessor  to  take  a  position  whence  he  could 
train  upon  his  enemy  without  the  latter  being  able  to  reply, 
and  some  striking  instances  of  such  tactical  advantage  are 
given.  In  a  fleet  fight,  such  as  is  now  being  considered,  the 
gain  was  that  the  guns  could  be  brought  to  bear  farther  for¬ 
ward,  and  could  follow  the  opponent  longer  as  he  passed 
astern,  thus  doubling,  or  more,  the  number  of  shots  he  might 
receive,  and  lessening  for  him  the  interval  of  immunity  en¬ 
joyed  between  two  successive  antagonists.1  These  matters  of 
antiquated  and  now  obsolete  detail  carry  with  them  lessons 
that  are  never  obsolete ;  they  differ  in  no  respect  from  the 
more  modern  experiences  with  the  needle-gun  and  the  torpedo. 

And  indeed  this  whole  action  of  April  12,1782,  is  fraught 
with  sound  military  teaching.  Perseverance  in  pursuit,  gain¬ 
ing  advantage  of  position,  concentration  of  one’s  own  effort, 
dispersal  of  the  enemy’s  force,  the  efficient  tactical  bearing  of 
small  but  important  improvements  in  the  material  of  war, 
have  been  dwelt  on.  To  insist  further  upon  the  necessity  of 
not  letting  slip  a  chance  to  beat  the  enemy  in  detail,  would 
be  thrown  away  on  any  one  not  already  convinced  by  the 
bearing  of  April  9  on  April  12.  The  abandonment  of  the 
attack  upon  Jamaica,  after  the  defeat  of  the  French  fleet, 

1  See  United  Service  Journal,  1834,  Part  II.  pp.  109  and  following. 


496  RODNEY'S  FAILURE  TO  PURSUE  THE  ENEMY. 


shows  conclusively  that  the  true  way  to  secure  ulterior  ob¬ 
jects  is  to  defeat  the  force  which  threatens  them.  There 
remains  at  least  one  criticism,  delicate  in  its  character,  but 
essential  to  draw  out  the  full  teachings  of  these  events ;  that 
is,  upon  the  manner  in  which  the  victory  was  followed  up,  and 
the  consequent  effects  upon  the  war  in  general. 

The  liability  of  sailing-ships  to  injury  in  spars  and  sails, 
in  other  wrords,  in  that  mobility  which  is  the  prime  charac¬ 
teristic  of  naval  strength,  makes  it  difficult  to  say,  after  a 
lapse  of  time,  what  might  or  might  not  have  been  done.  It 
is  not  only  a  question  of  actual  damage  received,  which  log¬ 
books  may  record,  but  also  of  the  means  for  repair,  the 
energy  and  aptitude  of  the  officers  and  seamen,  which  differ 
from  ship  to  ship.  As  to  the  ability  of  the  English  fleet, 
however,  to  follow  up  its  advantages  by  a  more  vigorous  pur¬ 
suit  on  the  12th  of  April,  we  have  the  authority  of  two  most 
distinguished  officers,  —  Sir  Samuel  Hood,  the  second  in  com¬ 
mand,  and  Sir  Charles  Douglas,  the  captain  of  the  fleet,  or  chief- 
of-staff  to  the  admiral.  The  former  expressed  the  opinion  that 
twenty  ships  might  have  been  taken,  and  said  so  to  Rodney 
the  next  day  ;  while  the  chief- of- staff  was  so  much  mortified 
by  the  failure,  and  by  the  manner  in  which  the  admiral  re¬ 
ceived  his  suggestions,  as  seriously  to  contemplate  resigning 
his  position.1 

Advice  and  criticism  are  easy,  nor  can  the  full  weight  of 
a  responsibility  be  felt,  except  by  the  man  on  whom  it  is  laid ; 
but  great  results  cannot  often  be  reached  in  war  without  risk 
and  effort.  The  accuracy  of  the  judgment  of  these  two  offi¬ 
cers,  however,  is  confirmed  by  inference  from  the  French 
reports.  Rodney  justifies  his  failure  to  pursue  by  alleging 
the  crippled  condition  of  many  ships,  and  other  matters  in¬ 
cident  to  the  conclusion  of  a  hard-fought  battle,  and  then 
goes  on  to  suggest  what  might  have  been  done  that  night, 
had  he  pursued,  by  the  French  fleet,  which  “  went  off  in  a 

1  See  letter  of  Sir  Howard  Douglas  in  United  Service  Journal,  1834,  Part  II. 
p.  97  ;  also  “Naval  Evolutions,”  by  same  author.  The  letters  of  Sir  Samuel 
Hood  have  not  come  under  the  author’s  eye. 


RODNEY'S  FAILURE  TO  PURSUE  THE  ENEMY.  497 


body  of  twenty-six  ships-of-the-line.” 1  These  possibilities  are 
rather  creditable  to  his  imagination,  considering  what  the 
French  fleet  had  done  by  day ;  but  as  regards  the  body  of 
twenty-six2  ships,  De  Vaudreuil,  who,  after  De  Grasse’s  sur¬ 
render,  made  the  signal  for  the  ships  to  rally  round  his  flag, 
found  only  ten  with  him  next  morning,  and  was  not  joined 
by  any  more  before  the  14th.  During  the  following  days  five 
more  joined  him  at  intervals.3  With  these  he  went  to  the 
rendezvous  at  Cap  Frangais,  where  he  found  others,  bringing 
the  whole  number  who  repaired  thither  to  twenty.  The  five 
remaining,  of  those  that  had  been  in  the  action,  fled  to  Cura- 
90a,  six  hundred  miles  distant,  and  did  not  rejoin  until  May. 
The  “  body  of  twenty-six  ships,”  therefore,  had  no  existence 
in  fact ;  on  the  contrary,  the  French  fleet  was  very  badly 
broken  up,  and  several  of  its  ships  isolated.  As  regards  the 
crippled  condition,  there  seems  no  reason  to  think  the  English 
had  suffered  more,  but  rather  less,  than  their  enemy  ;  and  a 
curious  statement,  bearing  upon  this,  appears  in  a  letter  from 
Sir  Gilbert  Blane  :  — 

“  It  was  with  difficulty  we  could  make  the  French  officers  believe 
that  the  returns  of  killed  and  wounded,  made  by  our  ships  to  the  ad¬ 
miral,  were  true ;  and  one  of  them  flatly  contradicted  me,  saying  we 
always  gave  the  world  a  false  account  of  our  loss.  I  then  walked 
with  him  over  the  decks  of  the  ‘  Formidable/  and  bid  him  remark 
what  number  of  shot-holes  there  were,  and  also  how  little  her  rigging 
had  suffered,  and  asked  if  that  degree  of  damage  was  likely  to  be 
connected  with  the  loss  of  more  than  fourteen  men,  which  was  our 
number  killed,  and  the  greatest  of  any  in  the  fleet ,  except  the  4  Royal 
Oak  ’  and  ‘  Monarch.’  He  .  .  .  owned  our  fire  must  have  been 
much  better  kept  up  and  directed  than  theirs.”  4 

There  can  remain  little  doubt,  therefore,  that  the  advan¬ 
tage  was  not  followed  up  with  all  possible  vigor.  Not  till  five 
days  after  the  battle  was  Hood’s  division  sent  toward  San 

1  Rodney’s  Life,  vol.  ii.  p.  248. 

2  There  were  only  twenty-five  in  all. 

8  Guerin,  vol.  v.  p.  511. 

4  Rodney’s  Life,  vol.  ii.  p.  246. 

32 


498  EFFECT  OF  THE  VICTORY  ON  THE  PEACE. 


Domingo,  where  they  picked  up  in  the  Mona  Passage  the 
“Jason”  and  the  “  Caton,”  which  had  separated  before  the 
battle  and  were  on  their  way  to  Cap  Frangais.  These,  and  two 
small  vessels  with  them,  were  the  sole  after-fruits  of  the  vic¬ 
tory.  Under  the  conditions  of  England’s  war  this  cautious 
failure  is  a  serious  blot  on  Rodney’s  military  reputation,  and 
goes  far  to  fix  his  place  among  successful  admirals.  He  had 
saved  J amaica  for  the  time  ;  but  he  had  not,  having  the  oppor¬ 
tunity,  crushed  the  French  fleet.  He  too,  like  De  Grasse,  had 
allowed  the  immediate  objective  to  blind  him  to  the  general 
military  situation,  and  to  the  factor  which  controlled  it. 

To  appreciate  the  consequences  of  this  neglect,  and  the 
real  indecisiveness  of  this  celebrated  battle,  we  must  go  for¬ 
ward  a  year  and  listen  to  the  debates  in  Parliament  on  the 
conditions  of  peace,  in  February,  1783.  The  approval  or 
censure  of  the  terms  negotiated  by  the  existing  ministry  in¬ 
volved  the  discussion  of  many  considerations  ;  but  the  gist 
of  the  dispute  was,  whether  the  conditions  were  such  as  the 
comparative  financial  and  military  situations  of  the  belliger¬ 
ents  justified,  or  whether  it  would  have  been  better  for  Eng¬ 
land  to  continue  the  war  rather  than  submit  to  the  sacrifices 

•mr 

she  had  made.  As  regards  the  financial  condition,  despite 
the  gloomy  picture  drawn  by  the  advocates  of  the  peace,  there 
was  probably  no  more  doubt  then  than  there  is  now  about 
the  comparative  resources  of  the  different  countries.  The 
question  of  military  strength  was  really  that  of  naval  power. 
The  ministry  argued  that  the  whole  British  force  hardly 
numbered  one  hundred  sail-of-the-line,  while  the  navies  of 
France  and  Spain  amounted  to  one  hundred  and  forty,  not 
to  speak  of  that  of  Holland. 

“With  so  glaring  an  inferiority,  what  hopes  of  success  could  we 
derive,  either  from  the  experience  of  the  last  campaign,  or  from  any 
new  distribution  of  our  force  in  that  which  would  have  followed  ?  In 
the  West  Indies  we  could  not  have  had  more  than  forty-six  sail  to 
oppose  to  forty,  which  on  the  day  that  peace  was  signed  lay  in  Cadiz 
Bay,  with  sixteen  thousand  troops  on  board,  ready  to  sail  for  that 
quarter  of  the  world,  where  they  would  have  been  joined  by  twelve 


RODNEY’S  MERITS  AS  AN  ADMIRAL. 


499 


of  the  line  from  Havana  and  ten  from  San  Domingo.  .  .  .  Might  we 
not  too  reasonably  apprehend  that  the  campaign  in  the  West  Indies 
would  have  closed  with  the  loss  of  Jamaica  itself,  the  avowed  object 
of  this  immense  armament  ?  ”  1 

These  are  certainly  the  reasonings  of  an  avowed  partisan, 
for  which  large  allowances  must  be  made.  The  accuracy  of 
the  statement  of  comparative  numbers  was  denied  by  Lord 
Keppel,  a  member  of  the  same  party,  and  but  lately  at  the 
head  of  the  admiralty,  a  post  which  he  had  resigned  because 
he  disapproved  the  treaty.2  English  statesmen,  too,  as  well 
as  English  seamen,  must  by  this  time  have  learned  to  dis¬ 
count  largely  the  apparent,  when  estimating  the  real,  power 
of  the  other  navies.  Nevertheless,  how  different  would  have 
been  the  appreciation  of  the  situation,  both  moral  and  ma¬ 
terial,  had  Rodney  reaped  the  full  fruits  of  the  victory  which 
he  owed  rather  to  chance  than  to  his  own  merit,  great  as  that 
undeniably  was. 

A  letter  published  in  1809,  anonymous,  but  bearing  strong 
internal  evidence  of  being  written  by  Sir  Gilbert  Blane,  the 
physician  of  the  fleet  and  long  on  intimate  terms  with  Rod¬ 
ney,  who  was  a  constant  sufferer  during  his  last  cruise,  states 
that  the  admiral  “  thought  little  of  his  victory  on  the  12th  of 
April,  1782.”  He  would  have  preferred  to  rest  his  reputation 
upon  his  combinations  against  De  Guichen,  April  17, 1780, 
and  “  looked  upon  that  opportunity  of  beating,  with  an  infe¬ 
rior  fleet,  such  an  officer,  whom  he  considered  the  best  in  the 
French  service,  as  one  by  which,  but  for  the  disobedience  of 
his  captains,  he  might  have  gained  immortal  renown.”  3  Few 
students  will  be  inclined  to  question  this  estimate  of  Rodney’s 
merit  on  the  two  occasions.  Fortune,  however,  decreed  that 
his  glory  should  depend  upon  a  battle,  brilliant  in  itself, 
to  which  his  own  qualities  least  contributed,  and  denied  him 
success  when  he  most  deserved  it.  The  chief  action  of  his 
life  in  which  merit  and  success  met,  the  destruction  of  Lan- 

1  Annual  Register,  1783,  p.  151. 

2  Annual  Register,  1783,  p.  157 ;  Life  of  Admiral  Keppel,  vol.  ii.  p.  403. 

3  Naval  Chronicle,  vol.  xxv.  p.  404. 


500 


RODNEY  RELIEVED  OF  HIS  COMMAND. 


gara’s  fleet  off  Cape  St.  Vincent,  has  almost  passed  into 
oblivion  ;  yet  it  called  for  the  highest  qualities  of  a  seaman, 
and  is  not  unworthy  of  comparison  with  Hawke’s  pursuit 
of  Conflans.1 

Within  the  two  years  and  a  half  which  had  elapsed  since 
Rodney  was  appointed  to  his  command  he  had  gained  sev¬ 
eral  important  successes,  and,  as  was  remarked,  had  taken 
a  French,  a  Spanish,  and  a  Dutch  admiral.  “  In  that  time 
he  had  added  twelve  line-of-battle  ships,  all  taken  from  the 
enemy,  to  the  British  navy,  and  destroyed  five  more ;  and 
to  render  the  whole  still  more  singularly  remarkable,  the 
4  Yille  de  Paris  ’  was  said  to  be  the  only  first-rate  man-of- 
war  that  ever  was  taken  and  carried  into  port  by  any  com¬ 
mander  of  any  nation.”  Notwithstanding  his  services,  the 
party  spirit  that  was  then  so  strong  in  England,  penetrating 
even  the  army  and  navy,  obtained  his  recall 2  upon  the  fall  of 
Lord  North’s  ministry,  and  his  successor,  a  man  unknown  to 
fame,  had  already  sailed  when  news  arrived  of  the  victory. 
In  the  fallen  and  discouraging  state  of  English  affairs  at  the 
time,  it  excited  the  utmost  exultation,  and  silenced  the 
strictures  which  certain  parts  of  the  admiral’s  previous  con¬ 
duct  had  drawn  forth.  The  people  were  not  in  a  humor  to 
be  critical,  and  amid  the  exaggerated  notions  that  prevailed 
of  the  results  achieved,  no  one  thought  of  the  failure  to  obtain 
greater.  This  impression  long  prevailed.  As  late  as  1880, 
when  Rodney’s  Life  was  first  published,  it  was  asserted  “  that 
the  French  navy  had  been  so  effectually  crippled  and  re¬ 
duced  by  the  decisive  victory  of  the  12th  of  April,  as  to  be 

1  Page  404.  Yet  here  also  the  gossip  of  the  day,  as  reflected  in  the  Naval 
Atalantis,  imputed  the  chief  credit  to  Young,  the  captain  of  the  flag-ship.  Sir 
Gilbert  Blane  stated,  many  years  later,  “  When  it  was  close  upon  sunset,  it 
became  a  question  whether  the  chase  should  he  continued.  After  some  dis¬ 
cussion  between  the  admiral  and  captain,  at  which  I  was  present,  the  admiral 
being  confined  with  the  gout,  it  was  decided  to  persist  in  the  same  course  with 
the  signal  to  engage  to  leeward.”  (United  Service  Journal,  1830,  Part  II. 
p.  479.) 

2  Podney  was  a  strong  Tory.  Almost  all  the  other  distinguished  admirals  of 
the  day,  notably  Keppel,  Howe,  and  Barrington,  were  Whigs,  —  a  fact  unfortunate 
for  the  naval  power  of  England. 


SUBSEQUENT  CAREER  OF  BE  GRASSE. 


501 fc 


no  longer  in  a  condition  to  contest  with  Great  Britain  the 
empire  of  the  seas.”  This  is  nonsense,  excusable  in  1782, 
but  not  to  the  calm  thought  of  after  days.  The  favorable 
terms  obtained  were  due  to  the  financial  embarrassment  of 
France,  not  to  her  naval  humiliation  ;  and  if  there  was 
exaggeration  in  the  contention  of  the  advocates  of  peace 
that  England  could  not  save  Jamaica,  it  is  probable  that 
she  could  not  have  recovered  by  arms  the  other  islands 
restored  to  her  by  the  treaty. 

The  memory  of  Be  Grasse  will  always  be  associated  with 
great  services  done  to  America.  His  name,  rather  than 
that  of  Rochambeau,  represents  the  material  succor  which 
France  gave  to  the  struggling  life  of  the  young  Republic, 
as  Lafayette’s  recalls  the  moral  sympathy  so  opportunely 
extended.  The  incidents  of  his  life,  subsequent  to  the  great 
disaster  which  closed  his  active  career,  cannot  be  without 
interest  to  American  readers. 

After  the  surrender  of  the  “  Ville  de  Paris,”  De  Grasse 
accompanied  the  English  fleet  and  its  prizes  to  Jamaica, 
whither  Rodney  repaired  to  refit  his  ships,  thus  appear¬ 
ing  as  a  captive  upon  the  scene  of  his  intended  conquest. 
On  the  19tli  of  May  he  left  the  island,  still  a  prisoner, 
for  England.  Both  by  naval  officers  and  by  the  English 
people  he  was  treated  with  that  flattering  and  benevolent 
attention  which  comes  easily  from  the  victor  to  the  van¬ 
quished,  and  of  which  his  personal  valor  at  least  was  not 
unworthy.  It  is  said  that  he  did  not  refuse  to  show  himself 
on  several  occasions  upon  the  balcony  of  his  rooms  in  Lon¬ 
don,  to  the  populace  shouting  for  the  valiant  Frenchman. 
This  undignified  failure  to  appreciate  his  true  position 
naturally  excited  the  indignation  of  his  countrymen ;  the 
more  so  as  he  had  been  unsparing  and  excessive  in  de¬ 
nouncing  the  conduct  of  his  subordinates  on  the  unlucky 
12th  of  April. 

“  He  bears  his  misfortune,”  wrote  Sir  Gilbert  Blane,  “  with  equa¬ 
nimity  ;  conscious,  as  he  says,  that  he  has  done  his  duty.  .  .  .  He 
attributes  his  misfortune,  not  to  the  inferiority  of  his  force,  but  to  the 


502 


FINDINGS  OF  THE  COURT-MARTIAL 


base  desertion  of  his  officers  in  the  other  ships,  to  whom  he  made 
the  signal  to  rally,  and  even  hailed  them  to  abide  by  him,  but  was 
abandoned.”  1 

This  was  the  key-note  to  all  his  utterances.  Writing  from 
the  English  flag-ship,  the  day  after  the  battle,  he  “  threw 
upon  the  greater  part  of  his  captains  the  misfortunes  of  the 
day.  Some  had  disobeyed  his  signals  ;  others,  and  notably 
the  captains  of  the  4  Languedoc  ’  and  4  Couronne,’  that  is  to 
say  his  next  ahead  and  astern,  had  abandoned  him.”  2  He 
did  not,  however,  confine  himself  to  official  reports,  but 
while  a  prisoner  in  London  published  several  pamphlets 
to  the  same  effect,  which  he  sent  broadcast  over  Europe. 
The  government,  naturally  thinking  that  an  officer  could 
not  thus  sully  the  honor  of  his  corps  without  good  reason, 
resolved  to  search  out  and  relentlessly  punish  all  the  guilty. 
The  captains  of  the  “  Languedoc  ”  and  “  Couronne  ”  were 
imprisoned  as  soon  as  they  reached  France,  and  all  papers, 
logs,  etc.,  bearing  upon  the  case  were  gathered  together. 
Under  all  the  circumstances  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at 
that  on  his  return  to  France,  De  Grasse,  to  use  his  own 
words,  “  found  no  one  to  hold  out  a  hand  to  him.” 3  It 
was  not  till  the  beginning  of  1784  that  all  the  accused  and 
witnesses  were  ready  to  appear  before  the  court-martial ;  but 
the  result  of  the  trial  was  to  clear  entirely  and  in  the  most 
ample  manner  almost  every  one  whom  he  had  attacked, 
while  the  faults  found  were  considered  of  a  character  entitled 
to  indulgence,  and  were  awarded  but  slight  punishment. 
“  Nevertheless,”  cautiously  observes  a  French  writer,  “  one 
cannot  but  say,  with  the  Court,  that  the  capture  of  an  ad¬ 
miral  commanding  thirty  ships-of-the-line  is  an  historical 
incident  which  causes  the  regret  of  the  whole  nation.”  4  As 

1  Rodney’s  Life,  vol.  ii.  p.  242.  2  Chevalier,  p.  311. 

3  Kerguelen:  Guerre  Maritime  de  1778.  Letter  of  De  Grasse  to  Kerguelen, 
p.  263. 

4  Troude  :  Batailles  Navales.  It  is  interesting  to  note  in  this  connection  that 
one  of  the  ships  near  the  French  admiral,  when  he  surrendered,  was  the  “  Pluton,” 
which,  though  the  extreme  rear  ship,  had  nevertheless  thus  reached  a  position 
worthy  of  the  high  reputation  of  her  captain,  D’Albert  de  Rions. 


UPON  DE  GRASSE  AND  HIS  OFFICERS . 


503 


to  the  conduct  of  the  battle  by  the  admiral,  the  Court  found 
that  the  danger  of  the  “  Zele  ”  on  the  morning  of  the  12tli 
was  not  such  as  to  justify  bearing  down  for  so  long  a  time 
as  was  done ;  that  the  crippled  ship  had  a  breeze  which 
was  not  then  shared  by  the  English,  five  miles  away  to 
the  southward,  and  which  carried  her  into  Basse  Terre  at 
ten  a.  m.  ;  that  the  engagement  should  not  have  been  begun 
before  all  the  ships  had  come  into  line  ;  and  finally,  that  the 
fleet  should  have  been  formed  on  the  same  tack  as  the 
English,  because,  by  continuing  to  stand  south,  it  entered 
the  zone  of  calms  and  light  airs  at  the  north  end  of 
Dominica.1 

De  Grasse  was  much  dissatisfied  with  the  finding  of  the 
Court,  and  was  indiscreet  enough  to  write  to  the  minister 
of  marine,  protesting  against  it  and  demanding  a  new  trial. 
The  minister,  acknowledging  his  protest,  replied  in  the  name 
of  the  king.  After  commenting  upon  the  pamphlets  that  had 
been  so  widely  issued,  and  the  entire  contradiction  of  their 
statements  by  the  testimony  before  the  Court,  he  concluded 
with  these  weighty  words  :  — 

“  The  loss  of  the  battle  cannot  be  attributed  to  the  fault  of  private 
officers.2  It  results,  from  the  findings,  that  you  have  allowed  yourself 
to  injure,  by  ill-founded  accusations,  the  reputation  of  several  officers, 
in  order  to  clear  yourself  in  public  opinion  of  an  unhappy  result,  the 
excuse  for  which  you  might  perhaps  have  found  in  the  inferiority  of 
your  force,  in  the  uncertain  fortune  of  war,  and  in  circumstances  over 
which  you  had  no  control.  His  Majesty  is  willing  to  believe  that 
you  did  what  you  could  to  prevent  the  misfortunes  of  the  day  ;  but 
he  cannot  be  equally  indulgent  to  your  unjust  imputations  upon  those 
officers  of  his  navy  who  have  been  cleared  of  the  charges  against  them. 
His  Majesty,  dissatisfied  with  your  conduct  in  this  respect,  forbids 
you  to  present  yourself  before  him.  I  transmit  his  orders  with  re¬ 
gret,  and  add  my  own  advice  to  retire,  under  the  circumstances,  to 
your  province.” 

De  Grasse  died  in  January,  1T88.  His  fortunate  opponent, 
rewarded  with  peerage  and  pension,  lived  until  1792.  Hood 

1  Troude,  vol.  ii.  p.  147.  2  That  is,  commanders  of  single  ships. 


504 


HOOD'S  SUBSEQUENT  CAREER. 


was  also  created  a  peer,  and  commanded  with  distinction 
in  the  early  part  of  the  wars  of  the  French  Revolution, 
winning  the  enthusiastic  admiration  of  Nelson,  who  served 
under  him ;  but  a  sharp  difference  with  the  admiralty  caused 
him  to  be  retired  before  achieving  any  brilliant  addition 
to  his  reputation.  He  died  in  1816,  at  the  great  age  of 
ninety-two. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

Critical  Discussion  of  the  Maritime  War  of  1778. 


'T'HE  war  of  1778,  between  Great  Britain  and  the  House  of 
Bourbon,  which  is  so  inextricably  associated  with  the 
American  Revolution,  stands  by  itself  in  one  respect.  It  was 
purely  a  maritime  war,.  Not  only  did  the  allied  kingdoms 
carefully  refrain  from  continental  entanglements,  which  Eng¬ 
land  in  accordance  with  her  former  policy  strove  to  excite, 
but  there  was  between  the  two  contestants  an  approach  to 
equality  on  the  sea  which  had  not  been  realized  since  the  days 
of  Tourville.  The  points  in  dispute,  the  objects  for  which  the 
war  was  undertaken  or  at  which  it  aimed,  were  for  the  most 
part  remote  from  Europe ;  and  none  of  them  was  on  the  con¬ 
tinent  with  the  single  exception  of  Gibraltar,  the  strife  over 
which,  being  at  the  extreme  point  of  a  rugged  and  difficult 
salient,  and  separated  from  neutral  nations  by  the  whole  of 
France  and  Spain,  never  threatened  to  drag  in  other  parties 
than  those  immediately  interested. 

No  such  conditions  existed  in  any  war  between  the  acces¬ 
sion  of  Louis  XIY.  and  the  downfall  of  Napoleon.  There 
was  a  period  during  the  reign  of  the  former  in  which  the 
French  navy  was  superior  in  number  and  equipment  to  the 
English  and  Dutch ;  but  the  policy  and  ambition  of  the  sover¬ 
eign  was  always  directed  to  continental  extension,  and  his 
naval  power,  resting  on  inadequate  foundations,  was  epheme¬ 
ral.  During  the  first  three-quarters  of  the  eighteenth  century 
there  was  practically  no  check  to  the  sea  power  of  England  ; 
great  as  were  its  effects  upon  the  issues  of  the  day,  the  ab¬ 
sence  of  a  capable  rival  made  its  operations  barren  of  military 
lessons.  In  the  later  wars  of  the  French  Republic  and  Em' 


506  SPECIAL  INTEREST  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1778. 


pire,  the  apparent  equality  in  numbers  of  ships  and  weight  of 
batteries  was  illusive,  owing  to  the  demoralization  of  the 
French  officers  and  seamen  by  causes  upon  which  it  is  not 
necessary  here  to  enlarge.  After  some  years  of  courageous 
but  impotent  effort,  the  tremendous  disaster  of  Trafalgar 
proclaimed  to  the  world  the  professional  inefficiency  of  the 
French  and  Spanish  navies,  already  detected  by  the  keen  eyes 
of  Nelson  and  his  brother  officers,  and  upon  which  rested  the 
contemptuous  confidence  that  characterized  his  attitude,  and 
to  some  extent  his  tactics,  toward  them.  Thenceforward  the 
emperor  “  turned  his  eyes  from  the  only  field  of  battle  where 
fortune  had  been  unfaithful  to  him,  and  deciding  to  pursue 
England  elsewhere  than  upon  the  seas,  undertook  to  restore  his 
navy,  but  without  reserving  to  it  any  share  in  a  strife  become 
more  than  ever  furious.  .  .  .  Up  to  the  last  day  of  the  Empire 
he  refused  to  offer  to  this  restored  navy,  full  of  ardor  and 
confidence,  the  opportunity  to  measure  itself  with  the  enemy.”  1 
Great  Britain  resumed  her  old  position  as  unquestioned  mis¬ 
tress  of  the  seas. 

The  student  of  naval  war  will  therefore  expect  to  find  a 
particular  interest  in  the  plans  and  methods  of  the  parties  to 
this  great  contest,  and  especially  where  they  concern  the  gen¬ 
eral  conduct  of  the  whole  war,  or  of  certain  large  and  clearly 
defined  portions  of  it ;  in  the  strategic  purpose  which  gave, 
or  should  have  given,  continuity  to  their  actions  from  first  to 
last,  and  in  the  strategic  movements  which  affected  for  good 
or  ill  the  fortunes  of  the  more  limited  periods,  which  may  be 
called  naval  campaigns.  For  while  it  cannot  be  conceded  that 
the  particular  battles  are,  even  at  this  day,  wholly  devoid  of 
tactical  instruction,  which  it  has  been  one  of  the  aims  of  the 
preceding  pages  to  elicit,  it  is  undoubtedly  true  that,  like  all 
the  tactical  systems  of  history,  they  have  had  their  day,  and 
their  present  usefulness  to  the  student  is  rather  in  the  mental 
training,  in  the  forming  of  correct  tactical  habits  of  thought, 
than  in  supplying  models  for  close  imitation.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  movements  which  precede  and  prepare  for  great 

1  Jurien  de  la  Gravifcre  :  Guerres  Maritimes,  vol.  ii.  p.  255. 


OBJECT  AND  OBJECTIVE. 


507 


battles,  or  which,  by  their  skilful  and  energetic  combinations, 
attain  great  ends  without  the  actual  contact  of  arms,  depend 
upon  factors  more  permanent  than  the  weapons  of  the  age, 
and  therefore  furnish  principles  of  more  enduring  value. 

In  a  war  undertaken  for  any  object,  even  if  that  object  be 
the  possession  of  a  particular  territory  or  position,  an  attack 
directly  upon  the  place  coveted  may  not  be,  from  the  military 
point  of  view,  the  best  means  of  obtaining  it.  The  end  upon 
which  the  military  operations  are  directed  may  therefore  be 
other  than  the  object  which  the  belligerent  government  wishes 
to  obtain,  and  it  has  received  a  name  of  its  own,  —  the  objec¬ 
tive.  In  the  critical  consideration  of  any  war  it  is  necessary, 
first,  to  put  clearly  before  the  student’s  eye  the  objects  desired 
by  each  belligerent ;  then,  to  consider  whether  the  objective 
chosen  is  the  most  likely,  in  case  of  success,  to  compass  those 
objects  ;  and  finally,  to  study  the  merits  or  faults  of  the  vari¬ 
ous  movements  by  which  the  objective  is  approached.  The 
minuteness  with  which  such  an  examination  is  conducted  will 
depend  upon  the  extent  of  the  work  which  the  inquirer  pro 
poses  to  himself ;  but  it  will  generally  conduce  to  clearness  if 
an  outline,  giving  only  the  main  features  unencumbered  by 
detail,  should  precede  a  more  exhaustive  discussion.  When 
such  principal  lines  are  thoroughly  grasped,  details  are  easily 
referred  to  them,  and  fall  into  place.  The  effort  here  will  be 
confined  to  presenting  such  an  outline,  as  being  alone  fitted 
to  the  scope  of  this  work. 

The  principal  parties  to  the  War  of  1778  were,  on  the  one 
hand,  Great  Britain  ;  on  the  other,  the  House  of  Bourbon, 
controlling  the  two  great  kingdoms  of  France  and  Spain. 
The  American  colonies,  being  already  engaged  in  an  unequal 
struggle  with  the  mother-country,  gladly  welcomed  an  event 
so  important  to  them  ;  while  in  1780  Holland  was  deliberately 
forced  by  England  into  a  war  from  which  she  had  nothing  to 
gain  and  all  to  lose.  The  object  of  the  Americans  was  per¬ 
fectly  simple,  —  to  rid  their  country  out  of  the  hands  of  the 
English.  Their  poverty  and  their  lack  of  military  sea  power, 
with  the  exception  of  a  few  cruisers  that  preyed  upon  the 


508 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1778. 


enemy’s  commerce,  necessarily  confined  their  efforts  to  land 
warfare,  which  constituted  indeed  a  powerful  diversion  in 
favor  of  the  allies  and  an  exhausting  drain  upon  the  resources 
of  Great  Britain,  but  which  it  was  in  the  power  of  the  latter 
to  stop  at  once  by  abandoning  the  contest.  Holland,  on  the 
other  hand,  being  safe  from  invasion  by  land,  showed  little 
desire  for  anything  more  than  to  escape  with  as  little  external 
loss  as  possible,  through  the  assistance  of  the  allied  navies. 
The  object  of  these  two  minor  parties  may  therefore  be 
said  to  have  been  the  cessation  of  the  war ;  whereas  the 
principals  hoped  from  its  continuance  certain  changed  con¬ 
ditions,  which  constituted  their  objects. 

With  Great  Britain  also  the  object  of  the  war  was  very 
simple.  Having  been  led  into  a  lamentable  altercation  with 
her  most  promising  colonies,  the  quarrel  had  gone  on  step 
by  step  till  she  was  threatened  with  their  loss.  To  main¬ 
tain  forcible  control  when  willing  adhesion  had  departed, 
she  had  taken  up  arms  against  them,  and  her  object  in  so 
doing  was  to  prevent  a  break  in  those  foreign  possessions 
with  which,  in  the  eyes  of  that  generation,  her  greatness 
was  indissolubly  connected.  The  appearance  of  France  and 
Spain  as  active  supporters  of  the  colonists’  cause  made  no 
change  in  England’s  objects,  whatever  change  of  objective  her 
military  plans  may,  or  should,  have  undergone.  The  danger 
of  losing  the  continental  colonies  was  vastly  increased  by 
these  accessions  to  the  ranks  of  her  enemies,  which  brought 
with  them  also  a  threat  of  loss,  soon  to  be  realized  in  part, 
of  other  valuable  foreign  possessions.  England,  in  short,  as 
regards  the  objects  of  the  war,  was  strictly  on  the  defensive  ; 
she  feared  losing  much,  and  at  best  only  hoped  to  keep  what 
she  had.  By  forcing  Holland  into  war,  however,  she  obtained 
a  military  advantage  ;  for,  without  increasing  the  strength  of 
her  opponents,  several  important  but  ill-defended  military  and 
commercial  positions  were  thereby  laid  open  to  her  arms. 

The  views  and  objects  of  France  and  Spain  were  more  com¬ 
plex.  The  moral  incentives  of  hereditary  enmity  and  desire 
of  revenge  for  the  recent  past  doubtless  weighed  strongly,  as 


OBJECTS  OF  THE  BELLIGERENTS. 


509 


in  France  did  also  the  sympathy  of  the  salons  and  philosophers 
with  the  colonists’  struggle  for  freedom ;  but  powerfully  as 
sentimental  considerations  affect  the  action  of  nations,  only 
the  tangible  means  by  which  it  is  expected  to  gratify  them 
admit  of  statement  and  measurement.  France  might  wish  to 
regain  her  North  American  possessions  ;  but  the  then  living 
generation  of  colonists  had  too  keen  personal  recollection  of 
the  old  contests  to  acquiesce  in  any  such  wishes  as  to  Canada. 
The  strong  inherited  distrust  of  the  French,  which  charac¬ 
terized  the  Americans  of  the  revolutionary  era,  has  been  too 
much  overlooked  in  the  glow  of  gratitude  which  followed  the 
effectual  sympathy  and  assistance  then  given ;  but  it  was 
understood  at  the  time,  and  France  felt,  that  to  renew  those 
pretensions  might  promote,  between  people  of  the  same  race 
only  recently  alienated,  a  reconciliation  by  just  concessions, 
which  a  strong  and  high-minded  party  of  Englishmen  had 
never  ceased  to  advocate.  She  therefore  did  not  avow,  per¬ 
haps  did  not  entertain,  this  object.  On  the  contrary,  she 
formally  renounced  all  claim  to  any  part  of  the  continent 
which  was  then,  or  had  recently  been,  under  the  power  of  the 
British  crown,  but  stipulated  for  freedom  of  action  in  con¬ 
quering  and  retaining  any  of  the  West  India  Islands,  while 
all  the  other  colonies  of  Great  Britain  were,  of  course,  open 
to  her  attack.  The  principal  objects  at  which  France  aimed 
wrere  therefore  the  English  West  Indies  and  that  control  of 
India  which  had  passed  into  English  hands,  and  also  to  secure 
in  due  time  the  independence  of  the  United  States,  after  they 
had  wrought  a  sufficient  diversion  in  her  favor.  With  the 
policy  of  exclusive  trade  which  characterized  that  generation, 
the  loss  of  these  important  possessions  was  expected  to  lessen 
that  commercial  greatness  upon  which  the  prosperity  of  Eng¬ 
land  depended,  —  to  weaken  her  and  to  strengthen  France. 
In  fact,  the  strife  which  should  be  greater  may  be  said  to 
have  been  the  animating  motive  of  France  ;  all  objects  were 
summed  up  in  the  one  supreme  end  to  which  they  contrib¬ 
uted,  —  maritime  and  political  superiority  over  England. 

Preponderance  over  England,  in  combination  with  France, 


hio  DISCUSSION  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1778. 

was  also  the  aim  of  the  equally  humbled  but  less  vigorous 
kingdom  of  Spain ;  but  there  was  a  definiteness  in  the  injuries 
suffered  and  the  objects  specially  sought  by  her  which  is  less 
easily  found  in  the  broader  views  of  her  ally.  Although  no 
Spaniard  then  living  could  remember  the  Spanish  flag  flying 
over  Minorca,  Gibraltar,  or  Jamaica,  the  lapse  of  time  had 
not  reconciled  the  proud  and  tenacious  nation  to  their  loss ; 
nor  was  there  on  the  part  of  the  Americans  the  same  tradi¬ 
tional  objection  to  the  renewal  of  Spanish  sovereignty  over  the 
two  Floridas  that  was  felt  with  reference  to  Canada. 

Such,  then,  were  the  objects  sought  by  the  two  nations,  whose 
interposition  changed  the  whole  character  of  the  American 
Revolutionary  War.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  they  did  not 
all  appear  among  the  causes,  or  pretexts,  avowed  for  engaging 
in  hostility  ;  but  sagacious  English  opinion  of  the  day  rightly 
noted,  as  embodying  in  a  few  words  the  real  ground  of  action 
of  the  united  Bourbon  Courts,  the  following  phrase  in  the 
French  manifesto  :  “  To  avenge  their  respective  injuries,  and 
to  put  an  end  to  that  tyrannical  empire  which  England  has 
usurped,  and  claims  to  maintain  upon  the  ocean.”  In  short, 
as  regards  the  objects  of  the  war  the  allies  were  on  the  offen¬ 
sive,  as  England  was  thrown  upon  the  defensive. 

The  tyrannical  empire  which  England  was  thus  accused, 
and  not  unjustly,  of  exercising  over  the  seas,  rested  upon  her 
great  sea  power,  actual  or  latent  ;  upon  her  commerce  and 
armed  shipping,  her  commercial  establishments,  colonies,  and 
naval  stations  in  all  parts  of  the  world.  Up  to  this  time  her 
scattered  colonies  had  been  bound  to  her  by  ties  of  affectionate 
sentiment,  and  by  the  still  stronger  motive  of  self-interest 
through  the  close  commercial  connection  with  the  mother- 
country  and  the  protection  afforded  by  the  constant  presence 
of  her  superior  navy.  Now  a  break  was  made  in  the  girdle  of 
strong  ports  upon  which  her  naval  power  was  based,  by  the 
revolt  of  the  continental  colonies  ;  while  the  numerous  trade 
interests  between  them  and  the  West  Indies,  which  were  in¬ 
jured  by  the  consequent  hostilities,  tended  to  divide  the  sym¬ 
pathies  of  the  islands  also.  The  struggle  was  not  only  for 


THE  CHOICE  OF  OBJECTIVES. 


511 


political  possession  and  commercial  use.  It  involved  a  mili¬ 
tary  question  of  the  first  importance,  —  whether  a  chain  of 
naval  stations  covering  one  of  the  shores  of  the  Atlantic,  link¬ 
ing  Canada  and  Halifax  with  the  West  Indies,  and  backed  by 
a  thriving  seafaring  population,  should  remain  in  the  hands 
of  a  nation  which  had  so  far  used  its  unprecedented  sea  power 
with  consistent,  resolute  aggressiveness,  and  with  almost  un¬ 
broken  success. 

While  Great  Britain  was  thus  embarrassed  by  the  difficulty 
of  maintaining  her  hold  upon  her  naval  bases,  which  were  the 
defensive  element  of  her  naval  strength,  her  offensive  naval 
power,  her  fleet,  was  threatened  by  the  growth  of  the  armed 
shipping  of  France  and  Spain,  which  now  confronted  her  upon 
the  field  which  she  had  claimed  as  her  own,  with  an  organized 
military  force  of  equal  or  superior  material  strength.  The 
moment  was  therefore  favorable  for  attacking  the  great  Power 
whose  wealth,  reaped  from  the  sea,  had  been  a  decisive  factor 
in  the  European  wars  of  the  past  century.  The  next  question 
was  the  selection  of  the  points  of  attack  —  of  the  principal  ob¬ 
jectives  upon  which  the  main  effort  of  the  assailants  should 
be  steadily  directed,  and  of  the  secondary  objectives  by  which 
the  defence  should  be  distracted  and  its  strength  dissipated. 

One  of  the  wisest  French  statesmen  of  that  day,  Turgot,  held 
that  it  was  to  the  interest  of  France  that  the  colonies  should 
not  achieve  their  independence.  If  subdued  by  exhaustion,  their 
strength  was  lost  to  England  ;  if  reduced  by  a  military  tenure 
of  controlling  points,  but  not  exhausted,  the  necessity  of  con¬ 
stant  repression  would  be  a  continual  weakness  to  the  mother- 
country.  Though  this  opinion  did  not  prevail  in  the  councils 
of  the  French  government,  which  wished  the  ultimate  inde¬ 
pendence  of  America,  it  contained  elements  of  truth  which 
effectually  moulded  the  policy  of  the  war.  If  benefit  to  the 
United  States,  by  effecting  their  deliverance,  were  the  princi¬ 
pal  object,  the  continent  became  the  natural  scene,  and  its 
decisive  military  points  the  chief  objectives,  of  operations;  but 
as  the  first  object  of  France  was  not  to  benefit  America,  but 
to  injure  England,  sound  military  judgment  dictated  that  the 


512 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1778. 


continental  strife,  so  far  from  being  helped  to  a  conclusion, 
should  be  kept  in  vigorous  life.  It  was  a  diversion  ready  made 
to  the  hand  of  France  and  exhausting  to  Great  Britain,  requir¬ 
ing  only  so  much  support  as  would  sustain  a  resistance  to 
which  the  insurgents  were  bound  by  the  most  desperate  alter¬ 
natives.  The  territory  of  the  thirteen  colonies  therefore 
should  not  be  the  principal  objective  of  France  ;  much  less 
that  of  Spain. 

The  commercial  value  of  the  English  West  Indies  made 
them  tempting  objects  to  the  French,  who  adapted  themselves 
with  peculiar  readiness  to  the  social  conditions  of  that  region, 
in  which  their  colonial  possessions  were  already  extensive. 
Besides  the  two  finest  of  the  Lesser  Antilles,  Guadeloupe  and 
Martinique,  which  she  still  retains,  France  then  held  Sta. 
Lucia  and  the  western  half  of  Hayti.  She  might  well  hope  by 

*  _  t 

successful  war  to  add  most  of  the  English  Antilles,  and  thus 
to  round  off  a  truly  imperial  tropical  dependency ;  while, 
though  debarred  from  Jamaica  by  the  susceptibilities  of  Spain, 
it  might  be  possible  to  win  back  that  magnificent  island  for 
an  allied  and  weaker  nation.  But  however  desirable  as  pos¬ 
sessions,  and  therefore  as  objects,  the  smaller  Antilles  might 
be,  their  military  tenure  depended  too  entirely  upon  control 
of  the  sea  for  them  to  be  in  themselves  proper  objectives.  The 
French  government,  therefore,  forbade  its  naval  commanders 
to  occupy  such  as  they  might  seize.  They  were  to  make  the 
garrisons  prisoners,  destroy  the  defences,  and  so  retire.  In 
the  excellent  military  port  of  Fort  Royal,  Martinique,  in  Cap 
Frangais,  and  in  the  strong  allied  harbor  of  Havana,  a  fleet 
of  adequate  size  found  good,  secure,  and  well-distributed  bases ; 
while  the  early  and  serious  loss  of  Sta.  Lucia  must  be  attrib¬ 
uted  to  the  mismanagement  of  the  French  fleet  and  the  pro¬ 
fessional  ability  of  the  English  admiral.  On  shore,  in  the 
West  Indies,  the  rival  powers  therefore  found  themselves  about 
equally  provided  with  the  necessary  points  of  support ;  mere 
occupation  of  others  could  not  add  to  their  military  strength, 
thenceforth  dependent  upon  the  numbers  and  quality  of  the 
fleets.  To  extend  occupation  further  with  safety,  the  first  need 


OBJECTIVES  OF  THE  OPERATIONS. 


513 


was  to  obtain  maritime  supremacy,  not  only  locally,  but  over 
the  general  field  of  war.  Otherwise  occupation  was  precarious, 
unless  enforced  by  a  body  of  troops  so  large  as  to  entail  ex¬ 
pense  beyond  the  worth  of  the  object.  The  key  of  the  situa¬ 
tion  in  the  West  Indies  being  thus  in  the  fleets,  these  became 
the  true  objectives  of  the  military  effort ;  and  all  the  more  so 
because  the  real  military  usefulness  of  the  West  Indian  ports 
in  this  war  was  as  an  intermediate  base,  between  Europe  and 
the  American  continent,  to  which  the  fleets  retired  when  the 
armies  went  into  winter  quarters.  No  sound  strategic  opera¬ 
tion  on  shore  was  undertaken  in  the  West  Indies  except  the 
seizure  of  Sta.  Lucia  by  the  English,  and  the  abortive  plan 
against  Jamaica  in  1782  ;  nor  was  any  serious  attempt  against 
a  military  port,  as  Barbadoes  or  Fort  Royal,  possible,  until 
naval  preponderance  was  assured  either  by  battle  or  by  happy 
concentration  of  force.  The  key  of  the  situation,  it  must  be 
repeated,  was  in  the  fleet. 

The  influence  of  naval  power,  of  an  armed  fleet,  upon  the 
war  on  the  American  continent  has  also  been  indicated  in  the 
opinions  of  Washington  and  Sir  Henry  Clinton;  while  the 
situation  in  the  East  Indies,  regarded  as  a  field  by  itself,  has 
been  so  largely  discussed  under  the  head  of  Suffren’s  cam¬ 
paign,  that  it  needs  here  only  to  repeat  that  everything  there 
depended  upon  control  of  the  sea  by  a  superior  naval  force. 
The  capture  of  Trincomalee,  essential  as  it  was  to  the  French 
squadron  which  had  no  other  base,  was,  like  that  of  Sta.  Lucia, 
a  surprise,  and  could  only  have  been  effected  by  the  defeat, 
or,  as  happened,  by  the  absence  of  the  enemy’s  fleet.  In  North 
America  and  India  sound  military  policy  pointed  out,  as  the 
true  objective,  the  enemy’s  fleet,  upon  which  also  depended  the 
communications  with  the  mother-countries.  There  remains 
Europe,  which  it  is  scarcely  profitable  to  examine  at  length  as 
a  separate  field  of  action,  because  its  relations  to  the  universal 
war  are  so  much  more  important.  It  may  simply  be  pointed 
out  that  the  only  two  points  in  Europe  whose  political  trans¬ 
fer  was  an  object  of  the  war  were  Gibraltar  and  Minorca  ;  the 
former  of  which  was  throughout,  by  the  urgency  of  Spain, 

33 


514 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1778. 


made  a  principal  objective  of  the  allies.  The  tenure  of  both 
these  depended,  obviously,  upon  control  of  the  sea. 

In  a  sea  war,  as  in  all  others,  two  things  are  from  the  first 
essential,  —  a  suitable  base  upon  the  frontier,  in  this  case  the 
seaboard,  from  which  the  operations  start,  and  an  organized 
military  force,  in  this  case  a  fleet,  of  size  and  quality  adequate 
to  the  proposed  operations.  If  the  war,  as  in  the  present  in¬ 
stance,  extends  to  distant  parts  of  the  globe,  there  will  be 
needed  in  each  of  those  distant  regions  secure  ports  for  the 
shipping,  to  serve  as  secondary,  or  contingent,  bases  of  the  local 
war.  Between  these  secondary  and  the  principal,  or  home, 
bases  there  must  be  reasonably  secure  communication,  which 
will  depend  upon  military  control  of  the  intervening  sea. 
This  control  must  be  exercised  by  the  navy,  which  will  enforce 
it  either  by  clearing  the  sea  in  all  directions  of  hostile  cruisers, 
thus  allowing  the  ships  of  its  own  nation  to  pass  with  reason¬ 
able  security,  or  by  accompanying  in  force  (convoying)  each 
train  of  supply-ships  necessary  for  the  support  of  the  distant 
operations.  The  former  method  aims  at  a  widely  diffused  effort 
of  the  national  power,  the  other  at  a  concentration  of  it  upon 
that  part  of  the  sea  where  the  convoy  is  at  a  given  moment. 
Whichever  be  adopted,  the  communications  will  doubtless  be 
strengthened  by  the  military  holding  of  good  harbors,  properly 
spaced  yet  not  too  numerous,  along  the  routes,  —  as,  for  in¬ 
stance,  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  and  the  Mauritius.  Stations  of 
this  kind  have  always  been  necessary,  but  are  doubly  so  now, 
as  fuel  needs  renewing  more  frequently  than  did  the  provisions 
and  supplies  in  former  days.  These  combinations  of  strong 
points  at  home  and  abroad,  and  the  condition  of  the  commu¬ 
nications  between  them,  may  be  called  the  strategic  features 
of  the  general  military  situation,  by  which,  and  by  the  rela¬ 
tive  strength  of  the  opposing  fleets,  the  nature  of  the  opera¬ 
tions  must  be  determined.  In  each  of  the  three  divisions  of 
the  field,  Europe,  America,  and  India,  under  which  for  sake  of 
clearness  the  narrative  has  been  given,  the  control  of  the  sea 
has  been  insisted  upon  as  the  determining  factor,  and  the 
hostile  fleet  therefore  indicated  as  the  true  objective.  Let  the 


THE  BASES  OF  OPERATIONS. 


515 


foregoing  considerations  now  be  applied  to  the  whole  field  of 
war,  and  see  how  far  the  same  conclusion  holds  good  of  it, 
and  if  so,  what  should  have  been  the  nature  of  the  operations 
on  either  side.1 

In  Europe  the  home  base  of  Great  Britain  was  on  the  Eng¬ 
lish  Channel,  with  the  two  principal  arsenals  of  Plymouth 
and  Portsmouth.  The  base  of  the  allied  powers  was  on  the 
Atlantic,  the  principal  military  ports  being  Brest,  Ferrol,  and 
Cadiz.  Behind  these,  within  the  Mediterranean,  were  the 
dock-yards  of  Toulon  and  Cartagena,  over  against  which  stood 
the  English  station  Port  Mahon,  in  Minorca.  The  latter, 
however,  may  be  left  wholly  out  of  account,  being  confined  to 
a  defensive  part  during  the  war,  as  the  British  fleet  was  not 
able  to  spare  any  squadron  to  the  Mediterranean.  Gibraltar, 
on  the  contrary,  by  its  position,  effectually  watched  over  de¬ 
tachments  or  reinforcements  from  within  the  Straits,  provided 
it  were  utilized  as  the  station  of  a  body  of  ships  adequate  to 
the  duty.  This  was  not  done  ;  the  British  European  fleet 
being  kept  tied  to  the  Channel,  that  is,  to  home  defence,  and 
making  infrequent  visits  to  the  Rock  to  convoy  supplies  essen¬ 
tial  to  the  endurance  of  the  garrison.  There  was,  however,  a 
difference  in  the  parts  played  by  Port  Mahon  and  Gibraltar. 
The  former,  being  at  the  time  wholly  unimportant,  received 
no  attention  from  the  allies  until  late  in  the  war,  when  it  fell 
after  a  six  months’  siege  ;  whereas  the  latter,  being  considered 
of  the  first  importance,  absorbed  from  the  beginning  a  very 
large  part  of  the  allied  attack,  and  so  made  a  valuable  diver¬ 
sion  in  favor  of  Great  Britain.  To  this  view  of  the  principal 
features  of  the  natural  strategic  situation  in  Europe  may 
properly  be  added  the  remark,  that  such  aid  as  Holland  might 
be  inclined  to  send  to  the  allied  fleets  had  a  very  insecure 
line  of  communication,  being  forced  to  pass  along  the  English 
base  on  the  Channel.  Such  aid  in  fact  was  never  given. 

In  North  America  the  local  bases  of  the  war  at  its  outbreak 
were  New  York,  Narragansett  Bay,  and  Boston.  The  two 
former  were  then  held  by  the  English,  and  were  the  most  im« 

1  See  map  of  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  p.  532. 


516 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1778. 


portant  stations  on  the  continent,  from  their  position,  suscep¬ 
tibility  of  defence,  and  resources.  Boston  had  passed  into  the 
hands  of  the  Americans,  and  was  therefore  at  the  service  of 
the  allies.  From  the  direction  actually  given  to  the  war,  by 
diverting  the  active  English  operations  to  the  Southern  States 
in  1779,  Boston  was  thrown  outside  the  principal  theatre  of 
operations,  and  became  from  its  position  militarily  unimpor¬ 
tant  ;  but  had  the  plan  been  adopted  of  isolating  New  Eng¬ 
land  by  holding  the  line  of  the  Hudson  and  Lake  Champlain, 
and  concentrating  military  effort  to  the  eastward,  it  will  be 
Been  that  these  three  ports  would  all  have  been  of  decisive 
importance  to  the  issue.  South  of  New  York,  the  Delaware 
and  Chesapeake  Bays  undoubtedly  offered  tempting  fields 
for  maritime  enterprise  ;  but  the  width  of  the  entrances,  the 
want  of  suitable  and  easily  defended  points  for  naval  sta¬ 
tions  near  the  sea,  the  wide  dispersal  of  the  land  forces 
entailed  by  an  attempt  to  hold  so  many  points,  and  the  sick¬ 
liness  of  the  locality  during  a  great  part  of  the  year,  should 
have  excepted  them  from  a  principal  part  in  the  plan  of 
the  first  campaigns.  It  is  not  necessary  to  include  them 
among  the  local  bases  of  the  war.  To  the  extreme  south 
the  English  were  drawn  by  the  ignis  fatuus  of  expected  sup¬ 
port  among  the  people.  They  failed  to  consider  that  even  if 
a  majority  there  preferred  quiet  to  freedom,  that  very  quality 
would  prevent  them  from  rising  against  the  revolutionary 
government  by  which,  on  the  English  theory,  they  were  op¬ 
pressed  ;  yet  upon  such  a  rising  the  whole  success  of  this 
distant  and  in  its  end  most  unfortunate  enterprise  was  staked. 
The  local  base  of  this  war  apart  was  Charleston,  which  passed 
into  the  hands  of  the  British  in  May,  1780,  eighteen  months 
after  the  first  expedition  had  landed  in  Georgia. 

The  principal  local  bases  of  the  war  in  the  West  Indies  are 
already  known  through  the  previous  narrative.  They  were 
for  the  English,  Barbadoes,  Sta.  Lucia,  and  to  a  less  degree 
Antigua.  A  thousand  miles  to  leeward  was  the  large  island 
of  Jamaica,  with  a  dock-yard  of  great  natural  capabilities  at 
Kingston.  The  allies  held,  in  the  first  order  of  importance> 


THE  BASES  OF  OPERATIONS. 


517 


Fort  Royal  in  Martinique,  and  Havana ;  in  the  second  order, 
Guadeloupe  and  Cap  Fran^ais.  A  controlling  feature  of  the 
strategic  situation  in  that  day,  and  one  which  will  not  be 
wholly  without  weight  in  our  own,  was  the  trade-wind,  with 
its  accompanying  current.  A  passage  to  windward  against 
these  obstacles  was  a  long  and  serious  undertaking  even  for 
single  ships,  much  more  for  larger  bodies.  It  followed  that 
fleets  would  go  to  the  western  islands  only  reluctantly,  or 
when  assured  that  the  enemy  had  taken  the  same  direction, 
as  Rodney  went  to  Jamaica  after  the  Battle  of  the  Saints, 
knowing  the  French  fleet  to  have  gone  to  Cap  Fran^ais.  This 
condition  of  the  wind  made  the  windward,  or  eastern,  islands 
points  on  the  natural  lines  of  communication  between  Europe 
and  America,  as  well  as  local  bases  of  the  naval  war,  and 
tied  the  fleets  to  them.  Hence  also  it  followed  that  between 
the  two  scenes  of  operations,  between  the  continent  and  the 
Lesser  Antilles,  was  interposed  a  wide  central  region  into 
which  the  larger  operations  of  war  could  not  safely  be  carried 
except  by  a  belligerent  possessed  of  great  naval  superiority, 
or  unless  a  decisive  advantage  had  been  gained  upon  one 
flank.  In  1762,  when  England  held  all  the  Windward  Islands, 
with  undisputed  superiority  at  sea,  she  safely  attacked  and 
subdued  Havana;  but  in  the  years  1779-1782  the  French  sea 
power  in  America  and  the  French  tenure  of  the  Windward 
Islands  practically  balanced  her  own,  leaving  the  Spaniards 
at  Havana  free  to  prosecute  their  designs  against  Pensacola 
and  the  Bahamas,  in  the  central  region  mentioned.1 

1  It  may  be  said  here  in  passing,  that  the  key  to  the  English  possessions  in  what 
was  then  called  West  Florida  was  at  Pensacola  and  Mobile,  which  depended  upon 
Jamaica  for  support;  the  conditions  of  the  country,  of  navigation,  and  of  the 
general  continental  war  forbidding  assistance  from  the  Atlantic.  The  English 
force,  military  and  naval,  at  Jamaica  was  only  adequate  to  the  defence  of  the 
island  and  of  trade,  and  could  not  afford  sufficient  relief  to  Florida.  The  cap¬ 
ture  of  the  latter  and  of  the  Bahamas  was  effected  with  little  difficulty  by  over¬ 
whelming  Spanish  forces,  as  many  as  fifteen  ships-of-the-line  and  seven  thousand 
troops  having  been  employed  against  Pensacola.  These  events  will  receive  no 
other  mention.  Their  only  bearing  upon  the  general  war  was  the  diversion  of 
this  imposing  force  from  joint  operations  with  the  French,  Spain  here,  as  at 
Gibraltar,  pursuing  her  own  aims  instead  of  concentrating  upon  the  common 
enemy,  —  a  policy  as  shortsighted  as  it  was  selfish. 


518 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1778. 


Posts  like  Martinique  and  Sta.  Lucia  had  therefore  for  the 
present  war  great  strategic  advantage  over  Jamaica,  Havana, 
or  others  to  leeward.  They  commanded  the  latter  in  virtue 
of  their  position,  by  which  the  passage  westward  could  be 
made  so  much  more  quickly  than  the  return  ;  while  the  de¬ 
cisive  points  of  the  continental  struggle  were  practically  little 
farther  from  the  one  than  from  the  other.  This  advantage 
was  shared  equally  by  most  of  those  known  as  the  Lesser 
Antilles  ;  but  the  small  island  of  Barbadoes,  being  well  to 
windward  of  all,  possessed  peculiar  advantages,  not  only  for 
offensive  action,  but  because  it  was  defended  by  the  difficulty 
with  which  a  large  fleet  could  approach  it,  even  from  so  near 
a  port  as  Fort  Royal.  It  will  be  remembered  that  the  expe¬ 
dition  which  finally  sat  down  before  St.  Kitt’s  had  been  in¬ 
tended  for  Barbadoes,  but  could  not  reach  it  through  the 
violence  of  the  trade-wind.  Thus  Barbadoes,  under  the  con¬ 
ditions  of  the  time,  was  peculiarly  fitted  to  be  the  local  base 
and  depot  of  the  English  war,  as  well  as  a  wayside  port  of 
refuge  on  the  line  of  communications  to  Jamaica,  Florida, 
and  even  to  North  America ;  while  Sta.  Lucia,  a  hundred 
miles  to  leeward,  was  held  in  force  as  an  advanced  post  for 
the  fleet,  watching  closely  the  enemy  at  Fort  Royal. 

In  India  the  political  conditions  of  the  peninsula  neces¬ 
sarily  indicated  the  eastern,  or  Coromandel,  coast  as  the 
scene  of  operations.  Trincomalee,  in  the  adjacent  island  of 
Ceylon,  though  unhealthy,  offered  an  excellent  and  defensible 
harbor,  and  thus  acquired  first-rate  strategic  importance,  all 
the  other  anchorages  on  the  coast  being  mere  open  roadsteads. 
From  this  circumstance  the  trade-winds,  or  monsoons,  in  this 
region  also  had  strategic  bearing.  From  the  autumnal  to 
the  spring  equinox  the  wind  blows  regularly  from  the  north¬ 
east,  at  times  with  much  violence,  throwing  a  heavy  surf  upon 
the  beach  and  making  landing  difficult ;  but  during  the  sum¬ 
mer  months  the  prevailing  wind  is  southwest,  giving  com¬ 
paratively  smooth  seas  and  good  weather.  The  “  change  of 
the  monsoon,”  in  September  and  October,  is  often  marked 
by  violent  hurricanes.  Active  operations,  or  even  remaining 


THE  BASES  OF  OPERATIONS . 


519 


on  the  coast,  were  therefore  unadvisable  from  this  time  until 
the  close  of  the  northeast  monsoon.  The  question  of  a  port 
to  which  to  retire  during  this  season  was  pressing.  Trin- 
comalee  was  the  only  one,  and  its  unique  strategic  value  was 
heightened  by  being  to  windward,  during  the  fine  season,  of 
the  principal  scene  of  war.  The  English  harbor  of  Bombay 
on  the  west  coast  was  too  distant  to  be  considered  a  local  base, 
and  rather  falls,  like  the  French  islands  Mauritius  and  Bour¬ 
bon,  under  the  head  of  stations  on  the  line  of  communica¬ 
tions  with  the  mother-country. 

Such  were  the  principal  points  of  support,  or  bases,  of  the 
belligerent  nations,  at  home  and  abroad.  Of  those  abroad 
it  must  be  said,  speaking  generally,  that  they  were  deficient 
in  resources, —  an  important  element  of  strategic  value.  Na¬ 
val  and  military  stores  and  equipments,  and  to  a  great  extent 
provisions  for  sea  use,  had  to  be  sent  them  from  the  mother- 
countries.  Boston,  surrounded  by  a  thriving,  friendly  popu¬ 
lation,  was  perhaps  an  exception  to  this  statement,  as  was 
also  Havana,  at  that  time  an  important  naval  arsenal,  where 
much  ship-building  was  done  ;  but  these  were  distant  from 
the  principal  theatres  of  war.  Upon  New  York  and  Narra- 
gansett  Bay  the  Americans  pressed  too  closely  for  the  re¬ 
sources  of  the  neighboring  country  to  be  largely  available, 
while  the  distant  ports  of  the  East  and  West  Indies  depended 
wholly  upon  home.  Hence  the  strategic  question  of  commu¬ 
nications  assumed  additional  importance.  To  intercept  a 
large  convoy  of  supply-ships  was  an  operation  only  secondary 
to  the  destruction  of  a  body  of  ships-of-war ;  while  to  protect 
such  by  main  strength,  or  by  evading  the  enemy’s  search, 
taxed  the  skill  of  the  governments  and  naval  commanders 
in  distributing  the  ships-of-war  and  squadrons  at  their  dis¬ 
posal,  among  the  many  objects  which  demanded  attention. 
The  address  of  Kempenfeldt  and  the  bad  management  of 
Guichen  in  the  North  Atlantic,  seconded  by  a  heavy  gale 
of  wind,  seriously  embarrassed  De  Grasse  in  the  West  Indies. 
Similar  injury,  by  cutting  off  small  convoys  in  the  Atlantic, 
was  done  to  Suffren  in  the  Indian  seas ;  while  the  latter  at 


520 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1778. 

A 

once  made  good  part  of  these  losses,  and  worried  his  oppo¬ 
nents  by  the  success  of  his  cruisers  preying  on  the  English 
supply-ships. 

Thus  the  navies,  by  which  alone  these  vital  streams  could 
be  secured  or  endangered,  bore  the  same  relation  to  the  main¬ 
tenance  of  the  general  war  that  has  already  been  observed 
of  the  separate  parts.  They  were  the  links  that  bound  the 
whole  together,  and  were  therefore  indicated  as  the  proper 
objective  of  both  belligerents. 

The  distance  from  Europe  to  America  was  not  such  as 
to  make  intermediate  ports  of  supply  absolutely  necessary; 
while  if  difficulty  did  arise  from  an  unforeseen  cause,  it  was 
always  possible,  barring  meeting  an  enemy,  either  to  return 
to  Europe  or  to  make  a  friendly  port  in  the  West  Indies. 
The  case  was  different  with  the  long  voyage  to  India  by  the 
Gape  of  Good  Hope.  Bickerton,  leaving  England  with  a  con¬ 
voy  in  February,  was  thought  to  have  done  well  in  reaching 
Bombay  the  following  September  ;  while  the  ardent  Suffren, 
sailing  in  March,  took  an  equal  time  to  reach  Mauritius, 
whence  the  passage  to  Madras  consumed  two  months  more. 
A  voyage  of  such  duration  could  rarely  be  made  without  a 
stop  for  water,  for  fresh  provisions,  often  for  such  refitting 
as  called  for  the  quiet  of  a  harbor,  even  when  the  stores  on 
board  furnished  the  necessary  material.  A  perfect  line  of 
communications  required,  as  has  been  said,  several  such  har¬ 
bors,  properly  spaced,  adequately  defended,  and  with  abun¬ 
dant  supplies,  such  as  England  in  the  present  day  holds  on 
some  of  her  main  commercial  routes,  acquisitions  of  her  past 
wars.  In  the  war  of  1778  none  of  the  belligerents  had  such 
ports  on  this  route,  until,  by  the  accession  of  Holland,  the 
Cape  of  Good  Hope  was  put  at  the  disposal  of  the  French 
and  suitably  strengthened  by  Suffren.  With  this  and  the 
Mauritius  on  the  way,  and  Trincomalee  at  the  far  end  of  the 
road,  the  communications  of  the  allies  with  France  were  rea¬ 
sonably  guarded.  England,  though  then  holding  St.  Helena, 
depended,  for  the  refreshment  and  refitting  of  her  India- 
bound  squadrons  and  convoys  in  the  Atlantic,  upon  the 


THE  LINES  OF  COMMUNICATION. 


521 


benevolent  neutrality  of  Portugal,  extended  in  the  islands  of 
Madeira  and  Cape  Verde  and  in  the  Brazilian  ports.  This 
neutrality  was  indeed  a  frail  reliance  for  defence,  as  was 
shown  by  the  encounter  between  Johnstone  and  Suffren  at 
the  Cape  Verde  ;  but  there  being  several  possible  stopping- 
places,  and  the  enemy  unable  to  know  which,  if  any,  would 
be  used,  this  ignorance  itself  conferred  no  small  security,  if 
the  naval  commander  did  not  trust  it  to  the  neglect  of  proper 
disposition  of  his  own  force,  as  did  Johnstone  at  Porto  Praya. 
Indeed,  with  the  delay  and  uncertainty  which  then  character¬ 
ized  the  transmission  of  intelligence  from  one  point  to  another, 
doubt  where  to  find  the  enemy  was  a  greater  bar  to  offensive 
enterprises  than  the  often  slight  defences  of  a  colonial  port. 

This  combination  of  useful  harbors  and  the  conditions  of 
the  communications  between  them  constitute,  as  has  been 
said,  the  main  strategic  outlines  of  the  situation.  The  navy, 
as  the  organized  force  linking  the  whole  together,  has  been 
indicated  as  the  principal  objective  of  military  effort.  The 
method  employed  to  reach  the  objective,  the  conduct  of  the 
war,  is  still  to  be  considered.1 

Before  doing  this  a  condition  peculiar  to  the  sea,  and  af¬ 
fecting  the  following  discussion,  must  be  briefly  mentioned ; 
that  is,  the  difficulty  of  obtaining  information.  Armies  pass 
through  countries  more  or  less  inhabited  by  a  stationary  pop¬ 
ulation,  and  they  leave  behind  them  traces  of  their  march. 
Fleets  move  through  a  desert  over  which  wanderers  flit,  but 
where  they  do  not  remain;  and  as  the  waters  close  behind 
them,  an  occasional  waif  from  the  decks  may  indicate  their 
passage,  but  tells  nothing  of  their  course.  The  sail  spoken 
by  the  pursuer  may  know  nothing  of  the  pursued,  which  yet 
passed  the  point  of  parley  but  a  few  days  or  hours  before. 
Of  late,  careful  study  of  the  winds  and  currents  of  the  ocean 

1  In  other  words,  having  considered  the  objects  for  which  the  belligerents 
were  at  war  and  the  proper  objectives  upon  which  their  military  efforts  should 
have  been  directed  to  compass  the  objects,  the  discussion  now  considers  how  the 
military  forces  should  have  been  handled ;  by  what  means  and  at  what  point  the 
objective,  being  mobile,  should  have  been  assailed. 


522 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1778. 


has  laid  down  certain  advantageous  routes,  which  will  he  ha¬ 
bitually  followed  by  a  careful  seaman,  and  afford  some  pre¬ 
sumption  as  to  his  movements  ;  but  in  1778  the  data  for  such 
precision  were  not  collected,  and  even  had  they  been,  the 
quickest  route  must  often  have  been  abandoned  for  one  of  the 
many  possible  ones,  in  order  to  elude  pursuit  or  lying-in-wait. 
In  such  a  game  of  hide-and-seek  the  advantage  is  with  the 
sought,  and  the  great  importance  of  watching  the  outlets  of 
an  enemy’s  country,  of  stopping  the  chase  before  it  has  got 
away  into  the  silent  desert,  is  at  once  evident.  If  for  any 
reason  such  a  watch  there  is  impossible,  the  next  best  thing 
is,  not  attempting  to  watch  routes  which  may  not  be  taken,  to 
get  first  to  the  enemy’s  destination  and  await  him  there ;  but 
this  implies  a  knowledge  of  his  intentions  which  may  not 
always  be  obtainable.  The  action  of  Suffren,  when  pitted 
against  Johnstone,  was  throughout  strategically  sound,  both 
in  his  attack  at  Porto  Praya  and  in  the  haste  with  which 
he  made  for  their  common  destination ;  while  the  two  fail¬ 
ures  of  Rodney  to  intercept  the  convoys  to  Martinique  in 
1780  and  1782,  though  informed  that  they  were  coming, 
show  the  difficulty  which  attended  lying-in-wait  even  when 
the  point  of  arrival  was  known. 

Of  any  maritime  expedition  two  points  only  are  fixed, — 
the  point  of  departure  and  that  of  arrival.  The  latter  may 
be  unknown  to  the  enemy ;  but  up  to  the  time  of  sailing, 
the  presence  of  a  certain  force  in  a  port,  and  the  indications 
of  a  purpose  soon  to  move,  may  be  assumed  as  known. 
It  may  be  of  moment  to  either  belligerent  to  intercept  such 
a  movement ;  but  it  is  more  especially  and  universally  neces¬ 
sary  to  the  defence,  because,  of  the  many  points  at  which  he 
is  open  to  attack,  it  may  be  impossible  for  him  to  know  which 
is  threatened  ;  whereas  the  offence  proceeds  with  full  knowl¬ 
edge  direct  to  his  aim,  if  he  can  deceive  his  opponent.  The 
importance  of  blocking  such  an  expedition  becomes  yet  more 
evident  should  it  at  any  time  be  divided  between  two  or  more 
ports,  —  a  condition  which  may  easily  arise  when  the  facili¬ 
ties  of  a  single  dock-yard  are  insufficient  to  fit  out  so  many 


STRATEGIC  POSITIONS  TO  BE  TAKEN. 


523 


ships  in  the  time  allowed,  or  when,  as  in  the  present  war, 
allied  powers  furnish  separate  contingents.  To  prevent  the 
junction  of  these  contingents  is  a  matter  of  prime  necessity, 
and  nowhere  can  this  be  done  so  certainly  as  off  the  ports 
whence  one  or  both  is  to  sail.  The  defence,  from  its  very 
name,  is  presumably  the  less  strong,  and  is  therefore  the 
more  bound  to  take  advantage  of  such  a  source  of  weakness 
as  the  division  of  the  enemy’s  force.  Rodney  in  1T82  at  Sta. 
Lucia,  watching  the  French  contingent  at  Martinique  to  pre¬ 
vent  its  union  with  the  Spaniards  at  Cap  Frangais,  is  an  in¬ 
stance  of  correct  strategic  position ;  and  had  the  islands  been 
so  placed  as  to  put  him  between  the  French  and  their  desti¬ 
nation,  instead  of  in  their  rear,  nothing  better  could  have 
been  devised.  As  it  was,  he  did  the  best  thing  possible 
under  the  circumstances. 

The  defence,  being  the  weaker,  cannot  attempt  to  block  all 
the  ports  where  divisions  of  the  enemy  lie,  without  defeating 
his  aim  by  being  in  inferior  force  before  each.  This  would 
be  to  neglect  the  fundamental  principles  of  war.  If  he  cor¬ 
rectly  decide  not  to  do  this,  but  to  collect  a  superior  force 
before  one  or  two  points,  it  becomes  necessary  to  decide 
which  shall  be  thus  guarded  and  which  neglected,  —  a  ques¬ 
tion  involving  the  whole  policy  of  the  war  after  a  full  un¬ 
derstanding  of  the  main  conditions,  military,  moral,  and 
economic,  in  every  quarter. 

The  defensive  was  necessarily  accepted  by  England  in  1778. 
It  had  been  a  maxim  with  the  best  English  naval  authorities 
of  the  preceding  era,  with  Hawke  and  his  contemporaries,  that 
the  British  navy  should  be  kept  equal  in  numbers  to  the  com¬ 
bined  fleets  of  the  Bourbon  kingdoms,  —  a  condition  which, 
with  the  better  quality  of  the  personnel  and  the  larger  mari¬ 
time  population  upon  which  it  could  draw,  would  have  given 
a  real  superiority  of  force.  This  precaution,  however,  had  not 
been  observed  during  recent  years.  It  is  of  no  consequence 
to  this  discussion  whether  the  failure  was  due  to  the  ineffi¬ 
ciency  of  the  ministry,  as  was  charged  by  their  opponents,  or 
to  the  misplaced  economy  often  practised  by  representative 


524 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1778 . 


governments  in  time  of  peace.  The  fact  remains  that,  not* 
withstanding  the  notorious  probability  of  France  and  Spain 
joining  in  the  war,  the  English  navy  was  inferior  in  number 
to  that  of  the  allies.  In  what  have  been  called  the  strategic 
features  of  the  situation,  the  home  bases,  and  the  secondary 
bases  abroad,  the  advantage  upon  the  whole  lay  with  her. 
Her  positions,  if  not  stronger  in  themselves,  were  at  least 
better  situated,  geographically,  for  strategic  effect ;  but  in  the 
second  essential  for  war,  the  organized  military  force,  or  fleet, 
adequate  to  offensive  operations,  she  had  been  allowed  to 
become  inferior.  It  only  remained,  therefore,  to  use  this  in¬ 
ferior  force  with  such  science  and  vigor  as  would  frustrate  the 
designs  of  the  enemy,  by  getting  first  to  sea,  taking  positions 
skilfully,  anticipating  their  combinations  by  greater  quick¬ 
ness  of  movement,  harassing  their  communications  with 
their  objectives,  and  meeting  the  principal  divisions  of  the 
enemy  with  superior  forces. 

It  is  sufficiently  clear  that  the  maintenance  of  this  war, 
everywhere  except  on  the  American  continent,  depended  upon 
the  mother-countries  in  Europe  and  upon  open  communica¬ 
tion  with  them.  The  ultimate  crushing  of  the  Americans,  too, 
not  by  direct  military  effort  but  by  exhaustion,  was  proba¬ 
ble,  if  England  were  left  unmolested  to  strangle  their  com¬ 
merce  and  industries  with  her  overwhelming  naval  strength. 
This  strength  she  could  put  forth  against  them,  if  relieved 
from  the  pressure  of  the  allied  navies ;  and  relief  would  be 
obtained  if  she  could  gain  over  them  a  decided  preponder¬ 
ance,  not  merely  material  but  moral,  such  as  she  had  twenty 
years  later.  In  that  case  the  allied  courts,  whose  financial 
weakness  was  well  known,  must  retire  from  a  contest  in 
which  their  main  purpose  of  reducing  England  to  an  inferior 
position  was  already  defeated.  Such  preponderance,  how¬ 
ever,  could  only  be  had  by  fighting ;  by  showing  that,  despite 
inferiority  in  numbers,  the  skill  of  her  seamen  and  the  re¬ 
sources  of  her  wealth  enabled  her  government,  by  a  wise  use 
of  these  powers,  to  be  actually  superior  at  the  decisive  points 
of  the  war.  It  could  never  be  had  by  distributing  the  ships- 


ENGLAND  UPON  THE  DEFENSIVE. 


525 


of-the-line  all  over  the  world,  exposing  them  to  be  beaten  in 
detail  while  endeavoring  to  protect  all  the  exposed  points  of 
the  scattered  empire. 

The  key  of  the  situation  was  in  Europe,  and  in  Europe  in 
the  hostile  dock-yards.  If  England  were  unable,  as  she  proved 
to  be,  to  raise  up  a  continental  war  against  France,  then 
her  one  hope  was  to  find  and  strike  down  the  enemy’s  navy. 
Nowhere  was  it  so  certainly  to  be  found  as  in  its  home  ports  ; 
nowhere  so  easily  met  as  immediately  after  leaving  them. 
This  dictated  her  policy  in  the  Napoleonic  wars,  when  the 
moral  superiority  of  her  navy  was  so  established  that  she 
dared  to  oppose  inferior  forces  to  the  combined  dangers  of  the 
sea  and  of  the  more  numerous  and  well-equipped  ships  lying 
quietly  at  anchor  inside.  By  facing  this  double  risk  she  ob¬ 
tained  the  double  advantage  of  keeping  the  enemy  under  her 
eyes,  and  of  sapping  his  efficiency  by  the  easy  life  of  port, 
while  her  own  officers  and  seamen  were  hardened  by  the 
rigorous  cruising  into  a  perfect  readiness  for  every  call  upon 
their  energies.  “We  have  no  reason,”  proclaimed  Admiral 
Villeneuve  in  1805,  echoing  the  words  of  the  emperor,  “  to 
fear  the  sight  of  an  English  squadron.  Their  seventy-fours 
have  not  five  hundred  men  on  board ;  they  are  worn  out  by  a 
two  years’  cruise.”  1  A  month  later  he  wrote  :  “  The  Toulon 
squadron  appeared  very  fine  in  the  harbor,  the  crews  well 
clothed  and  drilling  well ;  but  as  soon  as  a  storm  came,  all 
was  changed.  They  were  not  drilled  in  storms.”  2  “  The  em¬ 
peror,”  said  Nelson,  “  now  finds,  if  emperors  hear  truth,  that 
his  fleet  suffers  more  in  a  night  than  ours  in  one  year.  .  .  . 
These  gentlemen  are  not  used  to  the  hurricanes,  which  we 
have  braved  for  twenty-one  months  without  losing  mast  or 
yard.” 3  It  must  be  admitted,  however,  that  the  strain  was 
tremendous  both  on  men  and  ships,  and  that  many  English 
officers  found  in  the  wear  and  tear  an  argument  against 
keeping  their  fleets  at  sea  off  the  enemy’s  coast.  “  Every 

1  Orders  of  Admiral  Villeneuve  to  the  captains  of  his  fleet,  Dec.  20,  1804. 

2  Letter  of  Villeneuve,  January,  1805. 

3  Letters  and  Despatches  of  Lord  Nelson. 


526 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1778. 


one  of  the  blasts  we  endure,”  wrote  Collingwood,  “lessens 
the  security  of  the  country.  The  last  cruise  disabled  five 
large  ships  and  two  more  lately ;  several  of  them  must  be 
docked.”  “  I  have  hardly  known  what  a  night  of  rest  is  these 
two  months,”  wrote  he  again  ;  “  this  incessant  cruising  seems 
to  me  beyond  the  powers  of  human  nature.  Calder  is  worn 
to  a  shadow,  quite  broken  down,  and  I  am  told  Graves  is  not 
much  better.”  1  The  high  professional  opinion  of  Lord  Howe 
was  also  adverse  to  the  practice. 

Besides  the  exhaustion  of  men  and  ships,  it  must  also 
be  admitted  that  no  blockade  could  be  relied  on  certainly  to 
check  the  exit  of  an  enemy’s  fleet.  Villeneuve  escaped  from 
Toulon,  Missiessy  from  Rochefort.  “  I  am  here  watching  the 
French  squadron  in  Rochefort,”  wrote  Collingwood,  “  but 
feel  that  it  is  not  practicable  to  prevent  their  sailing ;  and 
yet,  if  they  should  get  by  me,  I  should  be  exceedingly  mor¬ 
tified.  .  .  .  The  only  thing  that  can  prevent  their  sailing  is 
the  apprehension  that  they  may  get  among  us,  as  they  can¬ 
not  know  exactly  where  we  are.”  1 

Nevertheless,  the  strain  then  was  endured.  The  English 
fleets  girdled  the  shores  of  France  and  Spain  ;  losses  were 
made  good ;  ships  were  repaired  ;  as  one  officer  fell,  or  was 
worn  out  at  his  post,  another  took  his  place.  The  strict 
guard  over  Brest  broke  up  the  emperor’s  combinations ;  the 
watchfulness  of  Nelson,  despite  an  unusual  concurrence  of 
difficulties,  followed  the  Toulon  fleet,  from  the  moment  of  its 
starting,  across  the  Atlantic  and  back  to  the  shores  of  Eu¬ 
rope.  It  was  long  before  they  came  to  blows,  before  strategy 
stepped  aside  and  tactics  completed  the  work  at  Trafalgar  ; 
but  step  by  step  and  point  by  point  the  rugged  but  disci¬ 
plined  seamen,  the  rusty  and  battered  but  well-handled  ships, 
blocked  each  move  of  their  unpractised  opponents.  Disposed 
in  force  before  each  arsenal  of  the  enemy,  and  linked  together 
by  chains  of  smaller  vessels,  they  might  fail  now  and  again 
to  check  a  raid,  but  they  effectually  stopped  all  grand  com¬ 
binations  of  the  enemy’s  squadrons. 

1  Life  and  Letters  of  Lord  Collingwood. 


ENGLISH  POLICY  IN  OTHER  WARS. 


527 


The  ships  of  1805  were  essentially  the  same  as  those  of 
1780.  There  had  doubtless  been  progress  and  improvement ; 
but  the  changes  were  in  degree,  not  in  kind.  Not  only  so, 
but  the  fleets  of  twenty  years  earlier,  under  Hawke  and  his 
fellows,  had  dared  the  winters  of  the  Bay  of  Biscay.  “  There 
is  not  in  Hawke’s  correspondence,”  says  his  biographer,  “  the 
slightest  indication  that  he  himself  doubted  for  a  moment 
that  it  was  not  only  possible,  but  his  duty,  to  keep  the  sea, 
even  through  the  storms  of  winter,  and  that  he  should  soon 
be  able  to  4  make  downright  work  of  it.’  ” 1  If  it  be  urged  that 
the  condition  of  the  French  navy  was  better,  the  character 
and  training  of  its  officers  higher,  than  in  the  days  of  Hawke 
and  Nelson,  the  fact  must  be  admitted  ;  nevertheless,  the  ad¬ 
miralty  could  not  long  have  been  ignorant  that  the  number 
of  such  officers  was  still  so  deficient  as  seriously  to  affect  the 
quality  of  the  deck  service,  and  the  lack  of  seamen  so  great 
as  to  necessitate  filling  up  the  complements  with  soldiers. 
As  for  the  personnel  of  the  Spanish  navy,  there  is  no  reason 
to  believe  it  better  than  fifteen  years  later,  when  Nelson, 
speaking  of  Spain  giving  certain  ships  to  France,  said,  44 1  take 
it  for  granted  not  manned  [by  Spaniards],  as  that  would  be 
the  readiest  way  to  lose  them  again.” 

In  truth,  however,  it  is  too  evident  to  need  much  arguing, 
that  the  surest  way  for  the  weaker  party  to  neutralize  the 
enemy’s  ships  was  to  watch  them  in  their  harbors  and  fight 
them  if  they  started.  The  only  serious  objection  to  doing 
this,  in  Europe,  was  the  violence  of  the  weather  off  the  coasts 
of  France  and  Spain,  especially  during  the  long  nights  of 
winter.  This  brought  with  it  not  only  risk  of  immediate  dis¬ 
aster,  which  strong,  well-managed  ships  would  rarely  undergo, 
but  a  continual  strain  which  no  skill  could  prevent,  and  which 
therefore  called  for  a  large  reserve  of  ships  to  relieve  those 
sent  in  for  repairs,  or  to  refresh  the  crews. 

The  problem  would  be  greatly  simplified  if  the  blockading 
fleet  could  find  a  convenient  anchorage  on  the  flank  of  the 
route  the  enemy  must  take,  as  Nelson  in  1804  and  1805 

1  Burrows :  Life  of  Lord  Hawke. 


528 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1778. 


used  Maddalena  Bay  in  Sardinia  when  watching  the  Toulon 
fleet,  —  a  step  to  which  he  was  further  forced  by  the  excep¬ 
tionally  bad  condition  of  many  of  his  ships.  So  Sir  James 
Saumarez  in  1800  even  used  Douarnenez  Bay,  on  the  French 
coast,  only  five  miles  from  Brest,  to  anchor  the  in-shore  squad¬ 
ron  of  the  blockading  force  in  heavy  weather.  The  positions 
at  Plymouth  and  Torbay  cannot  be  considered  perfectly  satis¬ 
factory  from  this  point  of  view  ;  not  being,  like  Maddalena 
Bay,  on  the  flank  of  the  enemy’s  route,  but  like  Sta.  Lucia, 
rather  to  its  rear.  Nevertheless,  Hawke  proved  that  diligence 
and  well-managed  ships  could  overcome  this  disadvantage, 
as  Rodney  also  afterward  showed  on  his  less  tempestuous 
station. 

In  the  use  of  the  ships  at  its  disposal,  taking  the  war  of 
1T78  as  a  whole,  the  English  ministry  kept  their  foreign  de¬ 
tachments  in  America,  and  in  the  West  and  East  Indies,  equal 
to  those  of  the  enemy.  At  particular  times,  indeed,  this  was 
not  so  ;  but  speaking  generally  of  the  assignment  of  ships, 
the  statement  is  correct.  In  Europe,  on  the  contrary,  and 
in  necessary  consequence  of  the  policy  mentioned,  the  British 
fleet  was  habitually  much  inferior  to  that  in  the  French  and 
Spanish  ports.  It  therefore  could  be  used  offensively  only 
by  great  care,  and  through  good  fortune  in  meeting  the 
enemy  in  detail ;  and  even  so  an  expensive  victory,  unless 
very  decisive,  entailed  considerable  risk  from  the  consequent 
temporary  disability  of  the  ships  engaged.  It  followed  that 
the  English  home  (or  Channel)  fleet,  upon  which  depended 
also  the  communications  with  Gibraltar  and  the  Mediter¬ 
ranean,  was  used  very  economically  both  as  to  battle  and 
weather,  and  was  confined  to  the  defence  of  the  home  coast, 
or  to  operations  against  the  enemy’s  communications. 

India  was  so  far  distant  that  no  exception  can  be  taken  to 
the  policy  there.  Ships  sent  there  went  to  stay,  and  could  be 
neither  reinforced  nor  recalled  with  a  view  to  sudden  emer¬ 
gencies.  The  field  stood  by  itself.  But  Europe,  North  Amer¬ 
ica,  and  the  West  Indies  should  have  been  looked  upon  as  one 
large  theatre  of  war,  throughout  which  events  were  mutually 


DISTRIBUTION  OF  THE  BRITISH  NAVY. 


529 


dependent,  and  whose  different  parts  stood  in  close  relations 
of  greater  or  less  importance,  to  which  due  attention  should 
have  been  paid. 

Assuming  that  the  navies,  as  the  guardians  of  the  communi¬ 
cations,  were  the  controlling  factors  in  the  war,  and  that  the 
source,  both  of  the  navies  and  of  those  streams  of  supplies 
which  are  called  communications,  was  in  the  mother-countries* 
and  there  centralized  in  the  chief  arsenals,  two  things  follow  *. 
First,  the  main  effort  of  the  Power  standing  on  the  defensive, 
of  Great  Britain,  should  have  been  concentrated  before  those 
arsenals  ;  and  secondly,  in  order  to  such  concentration,  the 
lines  of  communication  abroad  should  not  have  been  need¬ 
lessly  extended,  so  as  to  increase  beyond  the  strictest  ne¬ 
cessity  the  detachments  to  guard  them.  Closely  connected 
with  the  last  consideration  is  the  duty  of  strengthening,  by 
fortification  and  otherwise,  the  vital  points  to  which  the  com¬ 
munications  led,  so  that  these  points  should  not  depend  in 
any  way  upon  the  fleet  for  protection,  but  only  for  supplies 
and  reinforcements,  and  those  at  reasonable  intervals.  Gib¬ 
raltar,  for  instance,  quite  fulfilled  these  conditions,  being 
practically  impregnable,  and  storing  supplies  that  lasted 
very  long. 

If  this  reasoning  be  correct,  the  English  dispositions  on  the 
American  continent  were  very  faulty.  Holding  Canada,  with 
Halifax,  New  York,  and  Narragansett  Bay,  and  with  the  line 
of  the  Hudson  within  their  grip,  it  was  in  their  power  to 
isolate  a  large,  perhaps  decisive,  part  of  the  insurgent  ter¬ 
ritory.  New  York  and  Narragansett  Bay  could  have  been 
made  unassailable  by  a  French  fleet  of  that  day,  thus  as¬ 
suring  the  safety  of  the  garrisons  against  attacks  from  the 
sea  and  minimizing  the  task  of  the  navy  ;  while  the  latter 
would  find  in  them  a  secure  refuge,  in  case  an  enemy’s  force 
eluded  the  watch  of  the  English  fleet  before  a  European 
arsenal  and  appeared  on  the  coast.  Instead  of  this,  these 
two  ports  were  left  weak,  and  would  have  fallen  before  a 
Nelson  or  a  Farragut,  while  the  army  in  New  York  was 
twice  divided,  first  to  the  Chesapeake  and  afterward  to 

34 


530 


DIS  C  U  SSI  ON  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1778. 


Georgia,  neither  part  of  the  separated  forces  being  strong 
enough  for  the  work  before  it.  The  control  of  the  sea  was 
thus  used  in  both  cases  to  put  the  enemy  between  the 
divided  portions  of  the  English  army,  when  the  latter,  un¬ 
divided,  had  not  been  able  to  force  its  way  over  the  ground 
thus  interposed.  As  the  communication  between  the  two 
parts  of  the  army  depended  wholly  upon  the  sea,  the  duty 
of  the  navy  was  increased  with  the  increased  length  of  the 
lines  of  communication.  The  necessity  of  protecting  the 
seaports  and  the  lengthened  lines  of  communication  thus 
combined  to  augment  the  naval  detachments  in  America,  and 
to  weaken  proportionately  the  naval  force  at  the  decisive 
points  in  Europe.  Thus  also  a  direct  consequence  of  the 
southern  expedition  was  the  hasty  abandonment  of  Narra- 
gansett  Bay,  when  D’Estaing  appeared  on  the  coast  in  1779, 
because  Clinton  had  not  force  enough  to  defend  both  it  and 
New  York.1 

In  the  West  Indies  the  problem  before  the  English  govern¬ 
ment  was  not  to  subdue  revolted  territory,  but  to  preserve  the 
use  of  a  number  of  small,  fruitful  islands  ;  to  keep  possession 
of  them  itself,  and  to  maintain  their  trade  as  free  as  possible 
from  the  depredations  of  the  enemy.  It  need  not  be  repeated 
that  this  demanded  predominance  at  sea  over  both  the  ene¬ 
my’s  fleets  and  single  cruisers,  —  “  commerce-destroyers,”  as 
the  latter  are  now  styled.  As  no  vigilance  can  confine  all 
these  to  their  ports,  the  West  Indian  waters  must  be  patrolled 
by  British  frigates  and  lighter  vessels  ;  but  it  would  surely  be 
better,  if  possible,  to  keep  the  French  fleet  away  altogether 
than  to  hold  it  in  check  by  a  British  fleet  on  the  spot,  of  only 
equal  force  at  any  time,  and  liable  to  fall,  as  it  often  did, 
below  equality.  England,  being  confined  to  the  defensive, 


1  Of  this  Rodney  said  :  “  The  evacuating  Rhode  Island  was  the  most  fatal 
measure  that  could  possibly  be  adopted.  It  gave  up  the  best  and  noblest  harbor 
in  America,  from  whence  squadrons,  in  forty-eight  hours,  could  blockade  the 
three  capital  cities  of  America,  namely,  Boston,  New  York,  and  Philadelphia.” 
The  whole  letter,  private  to  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  is  worth  reading. 
(Life  of  Rodney,  vol.  ii.  p.  429.) 


FAULTS  OF  THE  ENGLISH  POLICY. 


.  531 


was  always  liable  to  loss  when  thus  inferior.  She  actually 
did  lose  one  by  one,  by  sudden  attack,  most  of  her  islands, 
and  at  different  times  had  her  fleet  shut  up  under  the  batteries 
of  a  port ;  whereas  the  enemy,  when  he  found  himself  in¬ 
ferior,  was  able  to  wait  for  reinforcements,  knowing  that  he 
had  nothing  to  fear  while  so  waiting.1 

Nor  was  this  embarrassment  confined  to  the  West  Indies. 
The  nearness  of  the  islands  to  the  American  continent 
made  it  always  possible  for  the  offence  to  combine  his  fleets 
in  the  two  quarters  before  the  defence  could  be  sure  of  his 
purpose  ;  and  although  such  combinations  were  controlled  in 
some  measure  by  well-understood  conditions  of  weather  and 
the  seasons,  the  events  of  1780  and  1781  show  the  perplexity 
felt  from  this  cause  by  the  ablest  English  admiral,  whose 
dispositions,  though  faulty,  but  reflected  the  uncertainties  of 
his  mind.  When  to  this  embarrassment,  which  is  common 
to  the  defensive  in  all  cases,  is  added  the  care  of  the  great 
British  trade  upon  which  the  prosperity  of  the  empire 
mainly  depended,  it  must  be  conceded  that  the  task  of  the 
British  admiral  in  the  West  Indies  was  neither  light  nor 
simple. 

In  Europe,  the  safety  of  England  herself  and  of  Gibraltar 
was  gravely  imperilled  by  the  absence  of  these  large  de¬ 
tachments  in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  to  which  may  also  be 
attributed  the  loss  of  Minorca.  When  sixty-six  allied  ships- 
of-the-line  confronted  the  thirty-five  which  alone  England  could 
collect,  and  drove  them  into  their  harbors,  there  was  realized 
that  mastery  of  the  Channel  which  Napoleon  claimed  would 
make  him  beyond  all  doubt  master  of  England.  For  thirty 
days,  the  thirty  ships  which  formed  the  French  contingent 
had  cruised  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay,  awaiting  the  arrival  of  the 
tardy  Spaniards  ;  but  they  were  not  disturbed  by  the  English 
fleet.  Gibraltar  was  more  than  once  brought  within  sight  of 
starvation,  through  the  failure  of  communications  with  Eng- 

1  The  loss  of  Sta.  Lucia  does  not  militate  against  this  statement,  being  due  to 
happy  audacity  and  skill  on  the  part  of  the  English  admiral,  and  the  professional 
incapacity  of  the  commander  of  the  greatly  superior  French  fleet. 


532 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1778. 


land  ;  and  its  deliverance  was  due,  not  to  the  power  of  the 
English  navy  suitably  disposed  by  its  government,  but  to  the 
skill  of  British  officers  and  the  inefficiency  of  the  Spaniards. 
In  the  great  final  relief,  Lord  Howe’s  fleet  numbered  only 
thirty-four  to  the  allied  forty-nine. 

Which,  then,  in  the  difficulties  under  which  England  labored, 
was  the  better  course,  —  to  allow  the  enemy  free  exit  from  his 
ports  and  endeavor  to  meet  him  by  maintaining  a  sufficient 
naval  force  on  each  of  the  exposed  stations,  or  to  attempt  to 
watch  his  arsenals  at  home,  under  all  the  difficulties  of  the 
situation,  not  with  the  vain  hope  of  preventing  every  raid,  or 
intercepting  every  convoy,  but  with  the  expectation  of  frus¬ 
trating  the  greater  combinations,  and  of  following  close  at 
the  heels  of  any  large  fleet  that  escaped  ?  Such  a  watch  must 
not  be  confounded  with  a  blockade,  a  term  frequently,  but 
not  quite  accurately,  applied  to  it.  “  I  beg  to  inform  your 
Lordship,”  wrote  Nelson,  “  that  the  port  of  Toulon  has  never 
been  blockaded  by  me  ;  quite  the  reverse.  Every  opportunity 
has  been  offered  the  enemy  to  put  to  sea,  for  it  is  there  we 
hope  to  realize  the  hopes  and  expectations  of  our  country.” 
u  Nothing,”  he  says  again,  “  ever  kept  the  French  fleet  in 
Toulon  or  Brest  when  they  had  a  mind  to  come  out ;  ”  and 
although  the  statement  is  somewhat  exaggerated,  it  is  true 
that  the  attempt  to  shut  them  up  in  port  would  have  been 
hopeless.  What  Nelson  expected  by  keeping  near  their  ports, 
with  enough  lookout  ships  properly  distributed,  was  to  know 
when  they  sailed  and  what  direction  they  took,  intending,  to 
sise  his  own  expression,  to  “  follow  them  to  the  antipodes.” 

I  am  led  to  believe,”  he  writes  at  another  time,  “  that  the 
Ferrol  squadron  of  French  ships  will  push  for  the  Mediter¬ 
ranean.  If  it  join  that  in  Toulon,  it  will  much  outnumber  us  ; 
but  I  shall  never  lose  sight  of  them,  and  Pellew  (commanding 
the  English  squadron  off  Ferrol)  will  soon  be  after  them.” 
So  it  happened  often  enough  during  that  prolonged  war  that 
divisions  of  French  ships  escaped,  through  stress  of  weather, 
temporary  absence  of  a  blockading  fleet,  or  misjudgment  on 
£he  part  of  its  commander ;  but  the  alarm  was  quickly  given, 


ENGLISH  NAVAL  POLICY  IN  OTHER  WARS.  533 


some  of  the  many  frigates  caught  sight  of  them,  followed  to 
detect  their  probable  destination,  passed  the  word  from  point 
to  point  and  from  fleet  to  fleet,  and  soon  a  division  of  equal 
force  was  after  them,  “  to  the  antipodes  ”  if  need  were.  As, 
according  to  the  traditional  use  of  the  French  navy  by  French 
governments,  their  expeditions  went  not  to  fight  the  hostile 
fleet,  but  with  “  ulterior  objects,”  the  angry  buzz  and  hot 
pursuit  that  immediately  followed  was  far  from  conducive  to 
an  undisturbed  and  methodical  execution  of  the  programme 
laid  down,  even  by  a  single  division  ;  while  to  great  combi¬ 
nations,  dependent  upon  uniting  the  divisions  from  different 
ports,  they  were  absolutely  fatal.  The  adventurous  cruise  of 
Bruix,  leaving  Brest  with  twenty-five  ships-of-the-line  in  1799, 
the  rapidity  with  which  the  news  spread,  the  stirring  action 
and  individual  mistakes  of  the  English,  the  frustration  of 
the  French  projects  1  and  the  closeness  of  the  pursuit,2  the 
escape  of  Missiessy  from  Rochefort  in  1805,  of  the  divisions 
of  Willaumez  and  Leissegues  from  Brest  in  1806,  —  all 
these  may  be  named,  along  with  the  great  Trafalgar  cam¬ 
paign,  as  affording  interesting  studies  of  a  naval  strategy 
following  the  lines  here  suggested  ;  while  the  campaign  of 
1798,  despite  its  brilliant  ending  at  the  Nile,  may  be  cited 
as  a  case  where  failure  nearly  ensued,  owing  to  the  English 
having  no  force  before  Toulon  when  the  expedition  sailed, 
and  to  Nelson  being  insufficiently  provided  with  frigates. 
The  nine  weeks’  cruise  of  Ganteaume  in  the  Mediterranean, 
in  1808,  also  illustrates  the  difficulty  of  controlling  a  fleet 
which  has  been  permitted  to  get  out,  unwatched  by  a  strong 
force,  even  in  such  narrow  waters. 

No  parallel  instances  can  be  cited  from  the  war  of  1778, 
although  the  old  monarchy  did  not  cover  the  movements  of 

1  The  plan  of  campaign  traced  by  the  Directory  for  Bruix  became  impossible 
of*  execution ;  the  delay  in  the  junction  of  the  French  and  Spanish  squadrons 
having  permitted  England  to  concentrate  sixty  ships  in  the  Mediterranean.  — 
Troude,  vol.  iii.  p.  158. 

2  The  combined  squadrons  of  France  and  Spain,  under  Bruix,  reached  Brest 
on  their  return  only  twenty -four  hours  before  Lord  Keith,  who  had  followed 
them  from  the  Mediterranean.  (James :  Naval  History  of  Great  Britain.) 


534 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1778. 


its  fleets  with  the  secrecy  enforced  by  the  stern  military 
despotism  of  the  Empire.  In  both  epochs  England  stood  on 
the  defensive ;  but  in  the  earlier  war  she  gave  up  the  first  line 
of  the  defence,  off  the  hostile  ports,  and  tried  to  protect  all 
parts  of  her  scattered  empire  by  dividing  the  fleet  among 
them.  It  has  been  attempted  to  show  the  weakness  of  the 
one  policy,  while  admitting  the  difficulties  and  dangers  of  the 
other.  The  latter  aims  at  shortening  and  deciding  the  war 
by  either  shutting  up  or  forcing  battle  upon  the  hostile  navy, 
recognizing  that  this  is  the  key  of  the  situation,  when  the  sea 
at  once  unites  and  separates  the  different  parts  of  the  theatre 
of  war.  It  requires  a  navy  equal  in  number  and  superior 
in  efficiency,  to  which  it  assigns  a  limited  field  of  action, 
narrowed  to  the  conditions  which  admit  of  mutual  support 
among  the  squadrons  occupying  it.  Thus  distributed,  it 
relies  upon  skill  and  watchfulness  to  intercept  or  overtake 
any  division  of  the  enemy  which  gets  to  sea.  It  defends 
remote  possessions  and  trade  by  offensive  action  against 
the  fleet,  in  which  it  sees  their  real  enemy  and  its  own 
principal  objective.  Being  near  the  home  ports,  the  relief 
and  renewal  of  ships  needing  repairs  are  accomplished  with 
the  least  loss  of  time,  while  the  demands  upon  the  scan¬ 
tier  resources  of  the  bases  abroad  are  lessened.  The  other 
policy,  to  be  effective,  call  sfor  superior  numbers,  because  the 
different  divisions  are  too  far  apart  for  mutual  support.  Each 
must  therefore  be  equal  to  any  probable  combination  against 
it,  which  implies  superiority  everywhere  to  the  force  of  the 
enemy  actually  opposed,  as  the  latter  may  be  unexpectedly 
reinforced.  How  impossible  and  dangerous  such  a  defensive 
strategy  is,  when  not  superior  in  force,  is  shown  by  the  fre¬ 
quent  inferiority  of  the  English  abroad,  as  well  as  in  Europe, 
.despite  the  effort  to  be  everywhere  equal.  Howe  at  New  York 
in  1778,  Byron  at  Grenada  in  1779,  Graves  off  the  Chesa¬ 
peake  in  1781,  Hood  at  Martinique  in  1781  and  at  St.  Kitt’s 
in  1782,  all  were  inferior,  at  the  same  time  that  the  allied  fleet 
in  Europe  overwhelmingly  outnumbered  the  English.  In  con¬ 
sequence,  unseaworthy  ships  were  retained,  to  the  danger  of 


TWO  NAVAL  POLICIES  COMPARED. 


535 


their  crews  and  their  own  increasing  injury,  rather  than  di¬ 
minish  the  force  by  sending  them  home  ;  for  the  deficiencies 
of  the  colonial  dock-yards  did  not  allow  extensive  repairs 
without  crossing  the  Atlantic.  As  regards  the  comparative 
expense  of  the  two  strategies,  the  question  is  not  only 
which  would  cost  the  more  in  the  same  time,  but  which 
would  most  tend  to  shorten  the  war  by  the  effectiveness  of 
its  action. 

The  military  policy  of  the  allies  is  open  to  severer  condem¬ 
nation  than  that  of  England,  by  so  much  as  the  party  assum¬ 
ing  the  offensive  has  by  that  very  fact  an  advantage  over  the 
defensive.  When  the  initial  difficulty  of  combining  their 
forces  was  overcome,  —  and  it  has  been  seen  that  at  no  time 
did  Great  Britain  seriously  embarrass  their  junction, — the 
allies  had  the  choice  open  to  them  where,  when,  and  how  to 
strike  with  their  superior  numbers.  How  did  they  avail 
themselves  of  this  recognized  enormous  advantage  ?  By  nib¬ 
bling  at  the  outskirts  of  the  British  Empire,  and  knocking 
their  heads  against  the  Rock  of  Gibraltar.  The  most  seri¬ 
ous  military  effort  made  by  France,  in  sending  to  the  United 
States  a  squadron  and  division  of  troops  intended  to  be  double 
the  number  of  those  which  actually  reached  their  destination, 
resulted,  in  little  over  a  year,  in  opening  the  eyes  of  England 
to  the  hopelessness  of  the  contest  with  the  colonies,  and  thus 
put  an  end  to  a  diversion  of  her  strength  which  had  been 
most  beneficial  to  her  opponents.  In  the  West  Indies  one 
petty  island  after  another  was  reduced,  generally  in  the  ab¬ 
sence  of  the  English  fleet,  with  an  ease  which  showed  how 
completely  the  whole  question  would  have  been  solved  by  a 
decisive  victory  over  that  fleet ;  but  the  French,  though  fa¬ 
vored  with  many  opportunities,  never  sought  to  slip  the  knot 
by  the  simple  method  of  attacking  the  force  upon  which  all 
depended.  Spain  went  her  own  way  in  the  Floridas,  and 
with  an  overwhelming  force  obtained  successes  of  no  military 
value.  In  Europe  the  plan  adopted  by  the  English  govern¬ 
ment  left  its  naval  force  hopelessly  inferior  in  numbers  year 
after  year ;  yet  the  operations  planned  by  the  allies  seem  in 


536 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1778. 


no  case  seriously  to  have  contemplated  the  destruction  of  that 
force.  In  the  crucial  instance,  when  Derby’s  squadron  of 
thirty  sail-of-the-line  was  hemmed  in  the  open  roadstead  of 
Torbay  by  the  allied  forty-nine,  the  conclusion  of  the  council 
of  war  not  to  fight  only  epitomized  the  character  of  the  action 
of  the  combined  navies.  To  further  embarrass  their  ex¬ 
ertions  in  Europe,  Spain,  during  long  periods,  obstinately 
persisted  in  tying  down  her  fleet  to  the  neighborhood  of 
Gibraltar ;  but  there  was  at  no  time  practical  recognition  of 
the  fact  that  a  severe  blow  to  the  English  navy  in  the  Straits, 
or  in  the  English  Channel,  or  on  the  open  sea,  was  the  surest 
road  to  reduce  the  fortress,  brought  more  than  once  within 
measurable  distance  of  starvation. 

In  the  conduct  of  their  offensive  war  the  allied  courts 
suffered  from  the  divergent  counsels  and  jealousies  which 
have  hampered  the  movements  of  most  naval  coalitions.  The 
conduct  of  Spain  appears  to  have  been  selfish  almost  to  dis¬ 
loyalty,  that  of  France  more  faithful,  and  therefore  also 
militarily  sounder ;  for  hearty  co-operation  and  concerted 
action  against  a  common  objective,  wisely  chosen,  would  have 
better  forwarded  the  objects  of  both.  It  must  be  admitted, 
too,  that  the  indications  point  to  inefficient  administration 
and  preparation  on  the  part  of  the  allies,  of  Spain  especially ; 
and  that  the  quality  of  the  personnel 1  was  inferior  to  that  of 


1  The  high  professional  attainments  of  many  of  the  French  officers  is  not 
overlooked  in  this  statement.  The  quality  of  the  personnel  was  diluted  by  an 
inferior  element,  owing  to  the  insufficient  number  of  good  men.  “  The  person¬ 
nel  of  our  crews  had  been  seriously  affected  by  the  events  of  the  campaign  of 
1779.  At  the  beginning  of  1780  it  was  necessary  either  to  disarm  some  ships,  or 
to  increase  the  proportion  of  soldiers  entering  into  the  composition  of  the  crews. 
The  minister  adopted  the  latter  alternative.  New  regiments,  drawn  from  the 
land  army,  were  put  at  the  disposal  of  the  navy.  The  corps  of  officers,  far  from 
numerous  at  the  beginning  of  hostilities,  had  become  completely  inadequate. 
Rear-Admiral  de  Guichen  met  the  greatest  difficulty  in  forming  the  comple¬ 
ments,  both  officers  and  crews,  for  his  squadron.  He  took  the  sea,  Feb¬ 
ruary  3,  with  ships  ‘badly  manned/  as  he  wrote  to  the  minister.”  (Chevalier  : 
Hist,  de  la  Marine  Fran^aise,  p.  184.)  “During  the  last  war  [of  1778]  we  had 
met  the  greatest  difficulty  in  supplying  officers  to  our  ships.  If  it  had  been 
easy  to  name  admirals,  commodores,  and  captains,  it  had  been  impossible  to 


MISTAKES  OF  THE  ALLIES . 


537 


England.  Questions  of  preparation  and  administration,  how¬ 
ever,  though  of  deep  military  interest  and  importance,  are 
very  different  from  the  strategic  plan  or  method  adopted  by 
the  allied  courts  in  selecting  and  attacking  their  objectives, 
and  so  compassing  the  objects  of  the  war ;  and  their  exami¬ 
nation  would  not  only  extend  this  discussion  unreasonably, 
but  would  also  obscure  the  strategic  question  by  heaping  up 
unnecessary  details  foreign  to  its  subject. 

As  regards  the  strategic  question,  it  may  be  said  pithily 
that  the  phrase  “  ulterior  objects  ”  embodies  the  cardinal  fault 
of  the  naval  policy.  Ulterior  objects  brought  to  nought  the 
hopes  of  the  allies,  because,  by  fastening  their  eyes  upon  them, 
they  thoughtlessly  passed  the  road  which  led  to  them.  De¬ 
sire  eagerly  directed  upon  the  ends  in  view  —  or  rather  upon 
the  partial,  though  great,  advantages  which  they  constituted 
their  ends  —  blinded  them  to  the  means  by  which  alone  they 
could  be  surely  attained ;  hence,  as  the  result  of  the  war, 
everywhere  failure  to  attain  them.  To  quote  again  the 
summary  before  given,  their  object  was  “  to  avenge  their 
respective  injuries,  and  to  put  an  end  to  that  tyrannical  em¬ 
pire  which  England  claims  to  maintain  upon  the  ocean.” 
The  revenge  they  had  obtained  was  barren  of  benefit  to  them¬ 
selves.  They  had,  so  that  generation  thought,  injured  Eng¬ 
land  by  liberating  America ;  but  they  had  not  righted  their 
wrongs  in  Gibraltar  and  Jamaica,  the  English  fleet  had  not 
received  any  such  treatment  as  would  lessen  its  haughty  self- 
reliance,  the  armed  neutrality  of  the  northern  powers  had 
been  allowed  to  pass  fruitlessly  away,  and  the  English  em¬ 
pire  over  the  seas  soon  became  as  tyrannical  and  more  abso¬ 
lute  than  before. 

Barring  questions  of  preparation  and  administration,  of 
the  fighting  quality  of  the  allied  fleets  as  compared  with 
the  English,  and  looking  only  to  the  indisputable  fact  of 
largely  superior  numbers,  it  must  be  noted  as  the  supreme 

fill  the  vacancies  caused  by  death,  sickness,  or  promotion  among  officers  of 
the  rank  of  lieutenant  and  ensign.”  (Chevalier:  Marine  Franfaise  sous  la 
R£publique,  p.  20.) 


538  FUNDAMENTAL  ERROR  OF  THE  ALLIES. 


factor  in  the  military  conduct  of  the  wars  that,  while  the  allied 
powers  were  on  the  offensive  and  England  on  the  defensive, 
the  attitude  of  the  allied  fleets  in  presence  of  the  English 
navy  was  habitually  defensive.  Neither  in  the  greater  strate¬ 
gic  combinations,  nor  upon  the  battlefield,  does  there  appear 
any  serious  purpose  of  using  superior  numbers  to  crush  frac¬ 
tions  of  the  enemy’s  fleet,  to  make  the  disparity  of  numbers 
yet  greater,  to  put  an  end  to  the  empire  of  the  seas  by  the 
destruction  of  the  organized  force  which  sustained  it.  With 
the  single  brilliant  exception  of  Suffren,  the  allied  navies 
avoided  or  accepted  action  ;  they  never  imposed  it.  Yet  so 
long  as  the  English  navy  was  permitted  thus  with  impunity 
to  range  the  seas,  not  only  was  there  no  security  that  it  would 
not  frustrate  the  ulterior  objects  of  the  campaign,  as  it  did 
again  and  again,  but  there  was  always  the  possibility  that  by 
some  happy  chance  it  would,  by  winning  an  important  vic¬ 
tory,  restore  the  balance  of  strength.  That  it  did  not  do  so 
is  to  be  imputed  as  a  fault  to  the  English  ministry  ;  but  if 
England  was  wrong  in  permitting  her  European  fleet  to  fall 
so  far  below  that  of  the  allies,  the  latter  were  yet  more 
to  blame  for  their  failure  to  profit  by  the  mistake.  The 
stronger  party,  assuming  the  offensive,  cannot  plead  the 
perplexities  which  account  for,  though  they  do  not  justify, 
the  undue  dispersal  of  forces  by  the  defence  anxious  about 
many  points. 

The  national  bias  of  the  French,  which  found  expression  in 
the  line  of  action  here  again  and  for  the  last  time  criticised, 
appears  to  have  been  shared  by  both  the  government  and  the 
naval  officers  of  the  day.  It  is  the  key  to  the  course  of  the 
French  navy,  and,  in  the  opinion  of  the  author,  to  its  failure 
to  achieve  more  substantial  results  to  France  from  this  war. 
It  is  instructive,  as  showing  how  strong  a  hold  tradition  has 
over  the  minds  of  men,  that  a  body  of  highly  accomplished 
and  gallant  seamen  should  have  accepted,  apparently  without 
a  murmur,  so  inferior  a  role  for  their  noble  profession.  It 
carries  also  a  warning,  if  these  criticisms  are  correct,  that 
current  opinions  and  plausible  impressions  should  always  be 


FALLACY  OF  COMMERCE-DESTROYING.  539 

thoroughly  tested ;  for  if  erroneous  they  work  sure  failure, 
and  perhaps  disaster. 

There  was  such  an  impression  largely  held  by  French  offi¬ 
cers  of  that  day,  and  yet  more  widely  spread  in  the  United 
States  now,  of  the  efficacy  of  commerce-destroying  as  a  main 
reliance  in  war,  especially  when  directed  against  a  commercial 
country  like  Great  Britain.  “  The  surest  means  in  my  opin¬ 
ion, ”  wrote  a  distinguished  officer,  Lamotte-Picquet,  “  to  con¬ 
quer  the  English  is  to  attack  them  in  their  commerce.”  The 
harassment  and  distress  caused  to  a  country  by  serious  inter¬ 
ference  with  its  commerce  will  be  conceded  by  all.  It  is 
doubtless  a  most  important  secondary  operation  of  naval  war, 
and  is  not  likely  to  be  abandoned  till  war  itself  shall  cease  ; 
but  regarded  as  a  primary  and  fundamental  measure,  sufficient 
in  itself  to  crush  an  enemy,  it  is  probably  a  delusion,  and  a 
most  dangerous  delusion,  when  presented  in  the  fascinating 
garb  of  cheapness  to  the  representatives  of  a  people.  Espe¬ 
cially  is  it  misleading  when  the  nation  against  whom  it  is  to 
be  directed  possesses,  as  Great  Britain  did  and  does,  the  two 
requisites  of  a  strong  sea  power,  —  a  wide-spread  healthy  com¬ 
merce  and  a  powerful  navy.  Where  the  revenues  and  indus¬ 
tries  of  a  country  can  be  concentrated  into  a  few  treasure- 
ships,  like  the  flota  of  Spanish  galleons,  the  sinew  of  war  may 
perhaps  be  cut  by  a  stroke  ;  but  when  its  wealth  is  scattered 
in  thousands  of  going  and  coming  ships,  when  the  roots  of  the 
system  spread  wide  and  far,  and  strike  deep,  it  can  stand 
many  a  cruel  shock  and  lose  many  a  goodly  bough  without 
the  life  being  touched.  Only  by  military  command  of  the  sea 
by  prolonged  control  of  the  strategic  centres  of  commerce, 
can  such  an  attack  be  fatal ; 1  and  such  control  can  be  wrung 

1  The  vital  centre  of  English  commerce  is  in  the  waters  surrounding  the  Brit¬ 
ish  Islands;  and  as  the  United  Kingdom  now  depends  largely  upon  external 
sources  of  food-supply,  it  follows  that  France  is  the  nation  most  favorably  situated 
to  harass  it  by  commerce-destroying,  on  account  of  her  nearness  and  her  posses¬ 
sion  of  ports  both  on  the  Atlantic  and  the  North  Sea.  From  these  issued  the  pri¬ 
vateers  which  in  the  past  preyed  upon  English  shipping.  The  position  is  stronger 
now  than  formerly,  Cherbourg  presenting  a  good  Channel  port  which  France 
lacked  in  the  old  wars.  On  the  other  hand,  steam  and  railroads  have  made  the 


540 


CONDITIONS  OF  PEACE ,  1783. 


from  a  powerful  navy  only  by  fighting  and  overcoming  it. 
For  two  hundred  years  England  has  been  the  great  commer 
cial  nation  of  the  world.  More  than  any  other  her  wealth  has 
been  intrusted  to  the  sea  in  war  as  in  peace  ;  yet  of  all  nations 
she  has  ever  been  most  reluctant  to  concede  the  immunities  of 
commerce  and  the  rights  of  neutrals.  Regarded  not  as  a 
matter  of  right,  but  of  policy,  history  has  justified  the  refusal ; 
and  if  she  maintain  her  navy  in  full  strength,  the  future  will 
doubtless  repeat  the  lesson  of  the  past.  1-JT 

The  preliminaries  of  the  peace  between  Great  Britain  and 
the  allied  courts,  which  brought  to  an  end  this  great  war, 
were  signed  at  Versailles,  January  20,  1783,  an  arrangement 
having  been  concluded  between  Great  Britain  and  the  Ameri¬ 
can  Commissioners  two  months  before,  by  which  the  indepen¬ 
dence  of  the  United  States  was  conceded.  This  was  the  great 
outcome  of  the  war.  As  between  the  European  belligerents. 
Great  Britain  received  back  from  France  all  the  West  India 
Islands  she  had  lost,  except  Tobago,  and  gave  up  Sta.  Lucia. 
The  French  stations  in  India  were  restored ;  and  Trincomalee 
being  in  the  possession  of  the  enemy,  England  could  not 
dispute  its  return  to  Holland,  but  she  refused  to  cede  Nega- 
patam.  To  Spain,  England  surrendered  the  two  Floridas  and 
Minorca,  the  latter  a  serious  loss  had  the  naval  power  of  Spain 
been  sufficient  to  maintain  possession  of  it ;  as  it  was,  it  again 

ports  on  the  northern  coasts  of  the  United  Kingdom  more  available,  and  British 
shipping  need  not,  as  formerly,  focus  about  the  Channel. 

Much  importance  has  been  attached  to  the  captures  made  during  the  late  sum¬ 
mer  manoeuvres  (1888)  by  cruisers  in  and  near  the  English  Channel.  The  United 
States  must  remember  that  such  cruisers  were  near  their  home  ports.  Their 
line  of  coal-supply  may  have  been  two  hundred  miles ;  it  would  be  a  very  different 
thing  to  maintain  them  in  activity  three  thousand  miles  from  home.  The  fur¬ 
nishing  of  coal,  or  of  such  facilities  as  cleaning  the  bottom  or  necessary  repairs, 
in  such  a  case,  would  be  so  unfriendly  to  Great  Britain,  that  it  may  well  be 
doubted  if  any  neighboring  neutral  nation  would  allow  them. 

Commerce-destroying  by  independent  cruisers  depends  upon  wide  dissemina¬ 
tion  of  force.  Commerce-destroying  through  control  of  a  strategic  centre  by  a 
great  fleet  depends  upon  concentration  of  force.  Regarded  as  a  primary,  not  as 
a  secondary,  operation,  the  former  is  condemned,  the  latter  justified,  by  the  experi¬ 
ence  of  centuries. 


CONDITIONS  OF  PEACE ,  1783. 


541 


fell  into  the  hands  of  Great  Britain  in  the  next  war.  Some 
unimportant  redistribution  of  trading-posts  on  the  west  coast 
of  Africa  was  also  made. 

Trivial  in  themselves,  there  is  but  one  comment  that  need 
be  made  upon  these  arrangements.  In  any  coming  war  their 
permanency  would  depend  wholly  upon  the  balance  of  sea 
power,  upon  that  empire  of  the  seas  concerning  which  noth¬ 
ing  conclusive  had  been  established  by  the  war. 

The  definitive  treaties  of  peace  were  signed  at  Versailles, 
September  3, 1783. 


\ 


INDEX. 


Alberoni,  Cardinal,  minister  to  Philip 
V.  of  Spain,  233 ;  naval  and  general 
policy  of,  234-236;  failure  of  his 
schemes,  238;  dismissed,  239. 

Anson,  British  Admiral,  expedition  to 
the  Pacific,  261 ;  captures  a  French 
squadron,  271. 

Arbuthnot,  British  Admiral,  engage¬ 
ment  with  French  fleet  off  the  Chesa¬ 
peake,  385-387. 

Armed  Neutrality,  the,  of  the  Baltic 
powers,  405. 

Arnold,  Benedict,  treason  of,  382 ;  ex¬ 
pedition  to  James  River,  385. 

Barbadoes,  strategic  value  of,  348, 
393,  518 ;  ineffectual  attempt  of  the 
French  against,  469. 

Barrington,  British  Admiral,  energy  of, 
365;  takes  Sta.  Lucia  and  resists 
an  attack  by  superior  French  fleet, 
366 ;  second  in  command  at  battle  of 
Grenada,  368 ;  refuses  the  command 
of  the  Channel  fleet,  404 ;  a  whig  in 
politics,  500. 

Battles,  Land,  Austerlitz,  24,  47 ;  Blen¬ 
heim,  213 ;  Boyne,  41,  185-187 ; 
Camden,  382,  384;  Ciudad  Rodrigo, 
storming  of,  475  (note);  Jena,  47; 
Metaurus,  19,  20;  Plassey,  306; 
Savannah,  assault  on,  376;  York- 
town,  capitulation  of,  390. 

Battles,  Naval  ( the  list  of  the  principal 
naval  battles,  with  plans,  will  be  found 
on  pp.  xxiii,  xxiv),  Actium,  13; 
Agosta,  165 ;  Boscawen  and  De  la 
Clue,  299 ;  Byng  off  Minorca,  286, 
plan  265 ;  Cape  Passaro,  63,  237  ; 
Chesapeake,  372-374,  389,  391  ; 


Copenhagen,  361 ;  La  Hougue,  189- 
191,  plan  183;  Lepanto,  13,  50; 
Lowestoft,  108;  Malaga,  110,  211, 
229;  Mobile,  287,  354,  355,  361; 
Navarino,  13  (note) ;  New  Orleans, 
354-356;  Nile,  10,  11,  80,  81,  358, 
361,  366,  633;  Pocock  and  D’Ache, 
307-310,  plan  162 ;  Port  Hudson,  355, 
361;  Rio  de  Janeiro,  expedition 
against,  230;  Rodney  and  Langara, 
404,  500  (and  note);  Schone veldt, 
152;  Sta.  Lucia,  366,  425,  478;  St. 
Vincent,  11,  356,  358,  476  (note),  plan 
146;  Suffren  and  Hughes,  fifth  ac¬ 
tion,  463 ;  Trafalgar,  9,  11,  12,  23 
(note),  24,  47,  85,  353,  354,  357,  438; 
Vigo  galleons,  207. 

Benbow,  British  Admiral,  sent  to  West 
Indies,  207 ;  treason  of  his  captains, 
207 ;  killed  in  battle,  207. 

Bickerton,  British  Admiral,  conducts  a 
powerful  convoy  to  the  East  Indies, 
452;  arrived  in  India,  458;  activity 
of,  458,  520;  effects  of  arrival  of, 
459,  461. 

Blane,  Sir  Gilbert,  physician  to  British 
fleet,  letters  of,  497, 499, 500  (note) ,  501 . 

Blockade,  of  French  ports  by  English 
fleets,  23  (note),  30, 210, 296,  297, 383, 
397, 402  (and  note),  413,  525-527,  532, 
533;  of  Southern  coast  of  United 
States,  43,  44,  87  (note);  Napoleon 
forces  England  to,  81 ;  with  conse¬ 
quent  effect  on  American  privateer¬ 
ing,  137;  definition  of  efficient,  85; 
dangers  to  United  States  from,  86, 
87 ;  offensive  and  defensive  use  of, 
87  (note) ;  declaration  of  the  Armed 
Neutrality  concerning,  405 ;  position 


544 


INDEX. 


taken  off  an  enemy’s  port  not  neces¬ 
sarily  a  blockade  in  strict  sense  of 
the  word,  632. 

Boscaiven,  British  Admiral,  expedition 
to  India,  failure  of,  277  ;  intercepts 
French  ships  off  the  St.  Lawrence, 
284 ;  takes  Louisburg,  294 ;  disperses 
or  destroys  French  fleet  from  Toulon, 
298. 

Burgoyne ,  British  General,  expedition 
from  Canada,  343 ;  effect  of  his  sur¬ 
render,  346. 

Bussy ,  French  General,  second  to  Du- 
pleix  in  India,  305 ;  intrigues  with 
nabob  of  Bengal,  306;  invades  Orissa, 
307  ;  again  sent  to  India  during  Amer¬ 
ican  Revolution,  459 ;  delayed  en 
route,  460;  reaches  India,  461;  be¬ 
sieged  in  Cuddalore  by  the  English, 
462 ;  relieved  by  Suffren,  463. 

Byng ,  Sir  George,  British  Admiral, 
sent  to  Mediterranean,  236 ;  destroys 
Spanish  fleet  at  Cape  Passaro,  237 ; 
policy  at  Messina,  238. 

Byng,  John,  British  Admiral,  sails  to 
relieve  Port  Mahon,  286  ;  action  with 
the  French  fleet,  286-288 ;  returns  to 
Gibraltar,  is  relieved,  tried,  290,  and 
shot,  291. 

Byron,  British  Admiral,  commander-in¬ 
chief  at  Battle  of  Grenada,  367-371. 

Cape  of  Good  Hope,  a  half-way  naval 
station,  28,  514 ;  discovery  of  pas¬ 
sage  round,  37,  38,  141 ;  acquired  by 
Holland,  97 ;  acquired  by  England 
during  the  Napoleonic  wars,  327 ; 
English  expedition  against,  421 ; 
saved  by  Suffren,  422-425,  427 ; 
utility  to  France,  460,  520  ;  Suffren’s 
reception  at,  464,  465. 

Carlos  III.,  King  of  the  Two  Sicilies, 
248, 249 ;  enters  into  Bourbon  Family 
Compact,  249 ;  forced  to  withdraw 
his  troops  by  a  British  commodore, 
252,  264,  304;  succeeds  to  the  Span¬ 
ish  throne,  304 ;  enters  into  secret 
alliance  with  France,  312, 313  ;  losses 
in  Seven  Years’  War,  315,  317 ;  again 
enters  alliance  with  France  against 
England,  401,  402. 


Charles,  Archduke,  claimant  to  Spanish 
throne  as  Carlos  III.,  206 ;  lands  at 
Lisbon,  208 ;  lands  in  Catalonia  and 
takes  Barcelona,  213  ;  takes  and  loses 
Madrid.  214;  antipathy  of  Spaniards 
to,  214,  216;  inherits  empire  of  Aus¬ 
tria  and  elected  Emperor  Charles  VI. 
of  Germany,  217 ;  makes,  as  king  of 
Spain,  secret  commercial  treaty  with 
England,  221 ;  discontented  with 
Treaty  of  Utrecht,  222,  234 ;  re¬ 
nounces  claim  to  Spanish  throne, 
235 ;  joins  Quadruple  Alliance,  236  ; 
obtains  Naples  and  Sicily,  239;  loses 
Naples  and  Sicily,  248;  dies,  leaving 
no  son,  262;  succeeded  by  Maria 
Theresa,  262. 

Charles  II.,  naval  policy  of,  60,  61 ; 
restoration  of,  90 ;  political  motives, 
100;  cedes  Dunkirk,  105;  policy  of 
commerce-destroying,  131 ;  bargains 
with  Louis  XIV.,  143;  declares  war 
against  Holland,  144;  makes  peace 
with  Holland,  158 ;  forms  alliance 
with  Holland,  166;  dies,  175. 

Choiseul,  minister  to  Louis  XV.,  j?97  ; 
plans  for  invading  England  and  Scot¬ 
land,  297,  300 ;  makes  close  alliance 
with  Spain,  311-313;  policy  after 
Seven  Years’  War,  330-336;  naval  re¬ 
forms,  331-333 ;  supports  Spain  in 
dispute  with  England  over  the  Falk¬ 
land  Islands,  336;  dismissed,  336. 

Clerk,  John,  work  on  Naval  Tactics, 
77  (and  note),  163-165,  289. 

Clinton,  Sir  Henry,  British  General, 
expedition  up  the  Hudson,  343; 
comuiander-in-chief  in  America,  360, 
365,  401 ;  opinions  as  to  influence  of 
sea  power,  385,  401  ;  sends  detach¬ 
ments  to  the  Chesapeake,  385,  387 ; 
directs  Cornwallis  to  occupy  York- 
town,  387  ;  outwitted  by  Washington 
and  Rochambeau,  387. 

Clive ,  Robert,  afterward  Lord,  letter 
of,  275  (note) ;  Indian  career' begins, 
282 ;  retakes  Calcutta,  305 ;  defeats 
nabob  of  Bengal,  takes  Chander- 
nagore,  and  wins  battle  of  Plassey, 
306 ;  reduces  Bengal,  306. 

Colbert  becomes  minister  under  Louis 


INDEX. 


545 


XIV.,  70 ;  commercial  and  naval 
policy,  70-74,  105,  106,  169,  174; 
thwarted  by  the  king,  170;  his  trust 
in  the  resources  of  France,  198. 

Collingwood,  British  Admiral,  leads  a 
column  at  Trafalgar,  353 ;  his  con¬ 
duct  at  battle  of  Cape  St.  Vincent, 
355,  356;  reverses  Nelson’s  orders 
after  his  death,  358 ;  loss  in  his  ship 
at  Trafalgar,  438  (note)  ;  blockading 
duty  off  French  coast  (letters),  526. 

Colonies :  origin  of,  27 ;  character  of, 
28 ;  effect  on  England  of,  29,  82,  83, 
255,  326-328,  392-394,  396,  414; 
weakness  of  Spain  through,  30,  41, 
42,  202,  261,  312,  327,  345,  346  ;  effect 
of  national  character  on,  55-58,  255, 
256  ;  growth  of  English  colonial  sys¬ 
tem,  60,  62,  64,  217,  220,  228,  251, 
291, 305-307,  310,  321,  327 ;  Colbert’s 
policy,  TO,  71,  106;  navy  essential  to 
security  of,  41,  42,  74,  75,  82,  329, 
367,  373,  401,  416,  424,  434,  511,  529, 
541 ;  support  to  sea  power  by,  83, 
212,  329,  415,  510,  511,  514,  520,  521; 
Dutch,  96,  97,  258 ;  New  York  and 
New  Jersey  seized  by  English,  107, 
132 ;  loss  of  French  colonies,  219, 
291,  294,  295,  304,  314,  321,  322 ;  loss 
of  Spanish  colonies,  219,  315-317, 
321 ;  French  colonial  policy,  242, 

254,  255,  257,  258,  273-278,  282,  283, 
306 ;  Spanish  colonial  policy,  245- 
247,  250;  colonial  expansion  the 
characteristic  motive  of  the  wars 
from  1739  to  1783,  254,  281-284,  291, 
508-510  ;  value  of  smaller  West  In¬ 
dia  islands,  256,  374,  512,  513;  the 
English  in  India,  257,  282,  305,  307, 
348,  349,  419,  420,  459;  Vernon’s  and 
Anson’s  expedition  against  Spanish, 
261 ;  Florida  and  the  Bahamas  re¬ 
covered  by  Spain,  517  (note).  Brit¬ 
ish  North  American,  character  of, 

255,  283 ;  extension  over  all  the  con¬ 
tinent  east  of  the  Mississippi,  65, 
321 ;  quarrel  with  mother-country, 
334,  341;  military  situation  of,  341- 
344  ;  alliance  with  France,  350 ;  effect 
of  sea  power  upon  their  struggle, 
397,  524 ;  object  of,  507,  508 ;  policy 


of  France  in  their  struggle,  359,  511, 
612;  distribution  of  colonial  posses¬ 
sions  at  peace  of  1783,  540. 

Commander-in-chief  \  position  of  a  naval, 
in  battle,  353-358;  question  raised 
by  action  of  the  Due  de  Chartres, 
352  ;  illustrated  by  practice  of  Howe, 
Nelson,  Farragut,  353-358  ;  orders  of 
French  government,  353. 

Commerce ,  attempts  to  control  by  force, 
1,  62,  63,  100,  101,  107,  245,  247; 
trade  routes,  25,  32,  33,  37,  38,  141, 
142 ;  water  carriage  easier  and 
cheaper  than  land,  25 ;  advantages 
of  rivers  and  inlets  to,  25,  35,  36 ; 
secure  seaports  and  a  navy  neces¬ 
sary  to  security  of,  26-28,  74-76,  82, 
83,  134,  135;  the  basis  of  a  healthy 
navy,  28,  45,  46,  82;  war  upon  (see 
commerce-destroying) ;  influence  of 
Baltic  trade  upon  sea  power,  32,  62, 
239,  240, 405 ;  effect  of  Central  Ameri¬ 
can  Canal  on,  33,  325 ;  effect  of  phys¬ 
ical  conditions  on,  36-39;  decay  of 
Spanish,  41,  50-52  ;  effect  of  national 
character  on,  50-55 ;  solicitude  of 
English  government  concerning,  60» 
62,  63,  65,  66,  143,  206,  218,  220,  240, 
241,  247,  269,  270;  the  Navigation 
Act,  60 ;  influence  of  the  wealth  of 
England  on  history,  64, 187,  197,  216, 
218,  227,  279,  295 ;  commercial  spirit 
of  the  Dutch,  49,  52,  55,  57,  68,  69, 
98 ;  Colbert’s  policy  for  developing, 
70,  71,  101,  102,  105,  106,  169 ;  decay 
of  French,  under  Louis  XIV.,  73, 
107,  167,  169,  170,  198,  199,  219,  226- 
228 ;  improvement  of  French,  under 
Louis  XV.,  74,  242,  243 ;  government 
influence  on,  70,  71,  82, 101, 105,  106  ; 
dangers  to  United  States,  by  block¬ 
ades,  84-87;  commercial  policy  of 
United  States,  84,  88  ;  French,  in 
1660,  93  ;  Dutch,  in  1660,  95-97, 131 ; 
rivalry  of  English  and  Dutch,  100, 
107 ;  Leibnitz’s  proposition  to  Louis 
XIV.  to  seize  Egypt,  141,  142 ;  in¬ 
fluence  of  Dutch  wealth,  167,  176, 
187,  197,  270,  279 ;  sufferings  of 
Dutch,  38,  160,  167,  168 ;  gains  to 
English,  by  policy  of  Louis  XIV, 


546 


INDEX. 


167,  170 ;  effect  of  injury  to,  in  has¬ 
tening  war,  176,  177  ;  bearing  of,  up¬ 
on  War  of  Spanish  Succession,  201- 
204,  207,  209;  Methuen  Treaty  of, 
with  Portugal,  206,  228 ;  concession 
to  England  of  the  Asiento,  or  slave 
trade,  217,  220,  245  ;  growth  of  Eng¬ 
lish,  during  eighteenth  century,  220, 
223-226,  228,  229,  233,  241,  245,  319, 
323,  328  ;  secret  treaty  of,  made  with 
England  by  claimant  to  Spanish 
throne,  221 ;  decay  of  Dutch,  in  early 
part  of  eighteenth  century,  69,  220- 
222,  224 ;  English,  contraband  with 
Spanish  America,  240,  241,  245-247  ; 
sufferings  of,  1740-1748,  279,  280; 
sufferings  of,  1756-1763,  311,  312, 
317-319  ;  prosperity  of  English  com¬ 
merce,  1756-1763,  297,  318,  319,  323 ; 
effect  of  commercial  interests  on  the 
results  at  Yorktown,  392 ;  great  cen¬ 
tre  of  English,  539  (note);  policy  of 
Great  Britain  as  to  neutral,  540. 

Commerce- Destroying  (  Cruising  War¬ 
fare),  a  strategic  question,  8;  de¬ 
pendence  on  geographical  position, 
31 ;  diffusion  of  effort,  31 ;  disadvan¬ 
tageous  position  of  United  States, 
31,  540  (note) ;  Spanish  treasure- 
ships,  41,  51,  207,  262,  313,  316;  Eng¬ 
lish  and  Dutch  commerce  defy,  51, 
133,  134,  135,  206,  229,  297,  317,  318, 
319,  539,  540 ;  Charles  II.  resorts  to 
it  as  a  substitute  for  great  fleets,  131 ; 
disastrous  results,  132  ;  discussion  of, 
as  a  principal  mode  of  warfare,  132- 
136 ;  dependent  upon  a  near  base  or 
upon  powerful  fleets,  132,  196,  230, 
314;  illustrations,  1652-1783,  133- 
136 ;  injurious  reaction  on  the  nation 
relying  upon  it,  136 ;  illustrations, 
136-138 ;  mistaken  conclusions  drawn 
from  American  privateering  in  1812, 
and  from  the  Confederate  cruisers, 
137,  138 ;  effect  of  great  navies,  138 ; 
illustrations,  after  battle  of  Solebay, 
148 ;  after  battle  of  Texel,  154 ;  de¬ 
cline  of  Dutch  navy,  160,  and  conse¬ 
quent  increase  of  commerce-destroy¬ 
ing  by  French  privateers,  167  ;  in  the 
war  of  1689-1697,  discussion,  193- 


196 ;  in  the  war  of  1702-1713,  228^ 
230 ;  in  war  of  1739-1748,  280 ;  in 
Seven  Years’  War,  295,  297,  311,  314, 
316,  317-319  (discussion),  329  (note); 
in  American  Bevolution,  344,  382, 
392,  400,  404,  408  (and  note),  409, 
443,  445,  452,  460,  530,  539,  540  (and 
note) ;  French  privateering,  133,  135, 
167,  195,  196,  229,  280,  314,  317-319; 
peculiar  character  of  French  priva- 
teering,  1689-1713,  194-196,  229,  230. 

Conjlans,  French  Admiral,  commands 
fleet  intended  for  invasion  of  Eng* 
land,  300 ;  sails  from  Brest,  301 ;  en¬ 
counters  Hawke  and  is  defeated  by 
him,  302-304. 

Cornwallis ,  British  General,  wins  battle 
of  Camden,  382 ;  overruns  Southern 
States,  384;  marches  into  Virginia, 
385 ;  takes  position  at  Yorktown, 
387;  surrounded  by  enemies,  389 * 
capitulates,  390. 

Cornwallis,  Captain  British  navy,  gal¬ 
lant  conduct  in  Hood’s  action  at  St. 
Christopher,  472. 

Corsica,  island  of,  naturally  Italian,  32; 
a  dependency  of  Genoa,  201 ;  Genoa 
cedes  fortified  harbors  to  France, 
292 ;  whole  island  ceded  to  France, 
334  ;  strategic  value,  335. 

Cromwell,  Oliver,  naval  policy  of,  60 ; 
issues  Navigation  Act,  60  ;  condition 
of  navy  under,  60, 61, 101, 127  ;  takes 
Jamaica,  60;  takes  Dunkirk,  105. 

D’Ache',  French  Commodore,  reaches 
India,  307 ;  first  and  second  battles 
with  Pocock,  308 ;  ill-will  to  the 
French  governor,  Lally,  307,  309; 
goes  to  the  Isle  of  France,  309 ;  re¬ 
turn  to  the  peninsula,  and  third  bat¬ 
tle  with  Pocock,  310 ;  abandons  the 
peninsula,  310. 

De  Barras,  French  Commodore,  com¬ 
mands  French  squadron  at  Newport, 
and  takes  part  in  operations  against 
Cornwallis,  389-392. 

De  la  Clue,  French  Commodore,  sails 
from  Toulon  to  join  Brest  fleet,  298  ; 
encounters  and  beaten  by  Boscawen, 
299. 


INDEX. 


547 


D’Estaing,  French  Admiral,  transferred 
from  the  army  to  the  navy,  371 ; 
long  passage  from  Toulon  to  the 
Delaware,  359 ;  fails  to  attack  the 
British  fleet  in  New  York,  361 ;  runs 
British  batteries  at  Newport,  361 ; 
sails  in  pursuit  of  Howe’s  fleet,  and 
receives  injuries  in  a  gale,  362  ;  goes 
to  Boston,  363  ;  foiled  by  Howe  on 
all  points,  363,  364;  goes  to  West 
Indies,  365;  failure  at  Sta.  Lucia, 
366 ;  capture  of  St.  Vincent  and 
Grenada,  367 ;  action  with  Byron’s 
fleet,  367-371 ;  professional  charac¬ 
ter,  371,  375 ;  ineffectual  assault  on 
Savannah,  376 ;  return  to  France, 
376. 

D’Estrees,  French  Admiral,  commands 
French  contingent  to  the  allied  fleet 
at  Solebay,  147 ;  at  Schoneveldt, 
151 ;  at  the  Texel,  152 ;  equivocal 
action  at  the  battle  of  the  Texel, 
153,  155;  notice  of,  170. 

De  Grasse,  French  Admiral,  sails  from 
Brest  for  West  Indies,  383 ;  partial 
action  with  Hood  off  Martinique, 
383,  384 ;  takes  Tobago,  and  goes 
thence  to  San  Domingo,  384 ;  deter¬ 
mines  to  go  to  Chesapeake  Bay, 
388 ;  thoroughness  of  his  action,  388, 
392 ;  anchors  in  Lynnhaven  Bay, 
388;  skilful  management  when  op¬ 
posed  by  Graves,  389  ;  share  in  re¬ 
sults  at  Yorktown,  399 ;  declines  to 
remain  longer  in  the  United  States, 
400,  418,  469  ;  return  to  West  Indies, 
and  expedition  against  St.  Kitt’s 
Island,  469  ;  outgeneralled  by  Hood, 
470-476;  criticisms  upon  his  actions, 
392,  476-478,  483,  489,  494 ;  return 
to  Martinique,  479 ;  in  command  of 
combined  fleet  in  expedition  against 
Jamaica,  479 ;  sails  from  Martinique, 
480 ;  partial  action  of  April  9,  1782, 
481-483 ;  battle  of  the  Saints,  486-. 
490;  surrenders  with  his  flag-ship, 
489 ;  later  career  and  death,  501-503 ; 
findings  of  the  court-martial  on,  503. 

De  Guichen,  French  Admiral,  wary 
tactics  of,  7,  413,  433;  takes  com¬ 
mand  in  West  Indies,  376;  actions 


with  Rodney,  378-381;  returns  to 
France,  381,  405  ;  chief  command  of 
allied  fleets  in  Europe,  407,  408 ; 
abortive  action  at  Torbay,  408  (and 
note) ;  injuries  to  convoy  under  las 
care,  408  ;  Rodney’s  opinion  of,  499 ; 
difficulty  in  manning  his  fleet,  536 
(note). 

D’Orvilliers,  French  Admiral,  instruc 
tions  to,  339,  340;  appointed  to 
command  Brest  fleet,  339 ;  com- 
mander-in-chief  at  battle  of  Ushant, 
350-352 ;  commands  allied  fleets  in 
English  Channel,  1779,  402  (and 
note)  ;  retires  from  the  navy,  403. 

De  Rions,  d’Albert,  Captain  in  French 
navy,  leads  in  the  attack  on  Hood’s 
position  at  St.  Kitt’s,  474;  Suffren’s 
opinion  of,  474  ;  gallantry  at  time  of 
De  Grasse’s  defeat,  502  (note). 

De  Ternay,  French  Commodore,  com¬ 
mands  fleet  which  convoys  Ro- 
chambeau  to  America,  382 ;  posi¬ 
tion  occupied  in  Newport,  394-396 ; 
Washington’s  memorandum  to,  397. 

De  Vaudreuil,  French  Commodore,  sec¬ 
ond  in  command  to  De  Grasse,  494  ; 
conducts  partial  attack  of  April  9, 
1782,  482,  494;  assumes  command 
after  De  Grasse’s  capture,  497. 

Derby ,  British  Admiral,  relieves  Gib¬ 
raltar,  407,  414  (note) ;  retreats  be¬ 
fore  superior  allied  fleet,  408. 

Destouches,  French  Commodore,  en¬ 
gagement  with  English  fleet  off  the 
Chesapeake,  385-387. 

Douglas ,  Sir  Charles,  Captain  British 
navy,  chief  of  staff  to  Rodney,  485 
(note) ;  letters  of,  486  (and  note), 
490,493;  credit  of  breaking  French 
line  claimed  for,  490 ;  opinion  as  to 
Rodney’s  failure  to  pursue  his  suc¬ 
cess,  496. 

Dubois,  Cardinal,  minister  of  Philippe 
d’Orleans,  233 ;  his  policy,  233,  235, 
237,  239,  241 ;  death,  241. 

Duguay-Trouin,  French  privateer,  ex¬ 
pedition  against  Rio  de  Janeiro,  230. 

Dupleix,  advances  the  power  of  France 
in  India,  243 ;  his  ambition  and 
policy,  258,  274, 282 ;  problem  before 


548 


INDEX. 


him  in  India,  275;  foiled  by  lack  of 
sea  power,  276,  278 ;  quarrel  with 
La  Bourdonnais,  276  ;  seizes  Madras, 
276;  successful  defence  of  Pondi¬ 
cherry,  277 ;  extends  his  power  in 
the  peninsula,  282 ;  is  recalled  to 
France,  282. 

Duquesne,  French  Admiral,  compares 
French  and  Dutch  officers,  129 ; 
commands  at  battle  of  Stromboli, 
160-162 ;  tactics  of,  163-165 ;  com¬ 
mands  at  battle  of  Agosta,  165. 

Egypt,  Napoleon’s  expedition  to,  10, 
11 ;  Leibnitz  proposes  to  Louis  XIV. 
to  seize,  141 ;  commanding  com¬ 
mercial  and  strategic  position  of, 
141,  142  ;  occupation  of,  by  England, 
22,  328;  importance  of,  to  India, 
328. 

Elliott ,  British  General,  commands  at 
Gibraltar  during  the  great  siege,  411. 

England.  See  under  Colonies,  Com¬ 
merce,  Commerce-Destroying,  Geo¬ 
graphical  Position,  Government,  In¬ 
habitants,  character  and  number  of, 
Naval  Policy,  Naval  Tactics,  Sea 
Power,  Strategy. 

Extent  of  Territory ,  its  effect  upon  the 
sea  power  of  a  country,  42-44. 

Falkland  Islands,  dispute  concerning, 

335. 

Farragut,  American  Admiral,  at  Mobile, 
164,  287,  361 ;  at  Port  Hudson,  361 ; 
at  New  Orleans,  354,  356 ;  practice 
of,  as  to  his  position  in  order  of 
battle,  354-356. 

Fleuri,  Cardinal,  minister  of  Louis  XV., 
241 ;  peace  policy,  241,  243,  253 ; 
commercial  expansion  of  France  un¬ 
der,  242,  243;  accord  with  Walpole, 
241,  244,  252;  policy,  continental 
rather  than  maritime,  243,  244,  251, 
253;  supports  claimant  to  Polish 
throne,  247  ;  arranges  Bourbon  Fam¬ 
ily  Compact  with  Spain,  244, 248  ;  ac¬ 
quires  Bar  and  Lorraine  for  France, 
249;  allows  the  navy  to  decay,  244, 
249,  252,  253  ;  death,  253. 

France.  See  under  Colonies,  Com¬ 


merce,  Commerce  Destroying,  Geo¬ 
graphical  Position,  Government,  In¬ 
habitants,  character  and  number  of 
Naval  Policy,  Naval  Tactics,  Sea- 
Power,  Strategy. 

Frederick,  King  of  Prussia,  seizes  Silesia, 
262 ;  Silesia  ceded  to,  278 ;  opens 
Seven  Years'  War,  292;  desperate 
struggle  of,  295,  305 ;  losses  in  the 
war,  324;  results  of  the  war  to,  324; 
partition  of  Poland,  336. 

Gardiner's  Bay,  Long  Island,  useful  as 
a  base  of  operations  to  an  enemy  of 
the  United  States,  212 ,  station  of 
English  fleet,  386. 

Geographical  Position,  its  effect  upon 
the  sea  power  of  countries,  29-35. 

Gibraltar,  strategic  question,  12  ;  taken 
by  Rooke,  210;  strategic  value,  212; 
value  to  England,  29,  32,  220,  298, 
328,  414 ;  offers  to  restore  to  Spain, 
236,  298 ;  attacks  on,  212,  245,  411 ; 
siege  of,  403-412. 

Government,  character  and  policy  of, 
effect  upon  the  sea  power  of  coun¬ 
tries,  58-88  ;  English,  59-67  ;  Dutch, 
67-69;  French,  69-82 ;  United  States, 
83-88. 

Graves,  British  Admiral,  commanding 
in  New  York,  sails  to  relieve  Corn¬ 
wallis,  389;  out-manceuvred  b}'  De 
Grasse,  391 ;  criticisms  on,  390,  391. 

Graves,  British  Captain,  afterward  ad. 
miral,  urges  Rodney  to  attack  French 
squadron  anchored  in  Newport,  396  ; 
second  to  Nelson  at  Copenhagen, 
396  (note) ;  blockading  on  French 
coast,  526. 

Great  Britain.  See  England. 

Hannibal.  See  Second  Punic  War, 
13-21. 

Havana,  strategic  value  of,  315,  617, 
519 ;  taken  by  the  English,  315 ;  re¬ 
stored  at  Peace  of  Paris,  321,  322. 

Hawke,  Sir  Edward,  afterward  Lord, 
British  Admiral,  distinguishes  him¬ 
self  at  the  battle  of  Toulon,  266 ; 
captures  a  French  squadron,  271- 
273 ;  seizes  French  shipping  in  the 


INDEX. 


549 


Atlantic,  285 ;  relieves  Byng  in  the 
Mediterranean,  290 ;  blockade  of 
Brest,  300,  527;  brilliant  action  in 
Quiberon  Bay,  300-304;  maxim  as 
to  strength  of  English  fleet,  523. 

Henry  IV. ,  of  France,  policy  of,  59,  69, 
92,  93. 

Herbert,  British  Admiral,  commands 
allied  English  and  Dutch  fleets  at 
battle  of  Beachy  Head,  182. 

Holland.  See  under  Colonies,  Com¬ 
merce,  Commerce-Destroying,  Geo¬ 
graphical  Position,  Government,  In¬ 
habitants,  character  and  number  of, 
Naval  Policy,  Naval  Tactics  (Ruy- 
ter’s),  Sea  Power,  Strategy. 

Hood,  Sir  Samuel,  afterward  Lord, 
British  Admiral,  trait  of  subordina¬ 
tion  in,  356  (note) ;  action  with  De 
Grasse  off  Martinique,  383 ;  sent  by 
Rodney  to  America  with  fourteen 
ships,  389,  390 ;  second  in  command 
in  action  off  Chesapeake,  391  ;  tem¬ 
porary  chief  command  in  West  In¬ 
dies,  469;  brilliant  action  at  St. 
Christopher’s  Island,  470-476 ;  junc¬ 
tion  with  Rodney,  479 ;  partial  action 
of  April  9,  1782,  481-483 ;  at  battle 
of  the  Saints,  486-490,  491-493  ;  De 
Grasse’s  flag-ship  strikes  to  his,  489; 
opinion  as  to  Rodney’s  failure  to 
pursue  his  advantage,  496  ;  captures 
four  French  ships,  498;  later  career 
and  death,  504. 

Hoste,  Paul,  work  on  naval  tactics,  77, 
147,  182,  184. 

Howe ,  Lord,  British  Admiral,  naval 
policy  of,  9;  at  Philadelphia,  860; 
at  New  York,  360 ;  at  Newport,  361 ; 
energy  and  skill  of,  363,  364 ;  com¬ 
mands  Channel  fleet,  408;  relieves 
Gibraltar,  412;  a  whig  in  politics, 
500  ;  opinion  as  to  blockades,  526. 

Howe,  Sir  William,  British  General, 
commander-in-chief  in  America,  343  ; 
expedition  to  the  Chesapeake,  343, 
468,  529,  530  ;  indolence  of,  364. 

Hughes,  Sir  Edward,  British  Admiral, 
arrives  in  India,  349;  takes  Negapa- 
tam  and  Trincomalee,  349 ;  first  meet¬ 
ing  with  Suffren,  427  ;  task  in  India,  J 


428;  first  battle  with  Suffren’s  squad* 
ron,  430-434;  second  battle  with 
Suffren,  437-441 ;  contemporary  crit¬ 
icisms  on,  442;  third  battle  with 
Suffren,  446-448 ;  tactics  of,  431,  449, 
453,  456,  462 ;  slowness  of,  loses 
Trincomalee,  450,  451 ;  fourth  battle 
with  Suffren,  453-455 ;  praise  be¬ 
stowed  by,  upon  his  captains,  456; 
goes  to  Bombay  from  Coromandel 
coast,  458  ;  returns  to  Madras,  461 ; 
supports  English  siege  of  Cuddalore, 
462 ;  fifth  battle  with  Suffren,  463  ; 
abandons  the  field,  463  ;  death,  467. 

Hyder  Ali,  Sultan  of  Mysore,  419  ;  war 
upon  the  English,  420;  denied  t lie 
aid  of  the  French  squadron,  421 ; 
Suffren  communicates  with,  443  ; 
visited  by  Suffren,  450  ;  negotiations 
of  Suffren  with,  459,  460;  death  of, 
461. 

Inhabitants,  character  of,  effect  upon  the 
sea  power  of  a  country,  50-58. 

Inhabitants,  number  of,  effect  upon  the 
sea  power  of  a  country,  reserve 
strength,  44-49. 

Italy,  geographical  position  of,  32; 
physical  conformation  of,  39,  40; 
necessity  for  a  navy,  40;  Sicilian 
revolt  against  Spain,  1674,  159; 
Spanish  possessions  in,  1700,  201  ; 
Sardinia  taken  by  allied  fleets,  215 ; 
disposition  of  Spanish  provinces  in, 
at  peace  of  1713,  219;  Sicily  trans¬ 
ferred  to  Austria,  and  Sardinia  to 
House  of  Savoy,  1719,  239  ;  Spanish 
expedition  into,  248  ;  foundation  of 
Bourbon  Kingdom  of  the  Two  Sicilies, 
248  ;  Spanish  operations  against  Aus¬ 
tria,  1741,  263,  264  ;  King  of  Naples 
forced  to  withdraw  troops  from  Span¬ 
ish  army  by  English  fleet,  263  ;  dis¬ 
position  of  provinces  of,  at  peace  of 
1748,  278 ;  transfer  of  Corsica  to 
France  by  Genoa.  292,  334  ;  acquisi¬ 
tion  of  Malta  by  England,  327. 

Jamaica,  taken  by  English,  under 
Cromwell,  60;  wish  of  Spain  to  re- 
J  cover,  345,  510,  512;  strategic  value 


550 


INDEX . 


of,  394,  517,  518  ;  combined  expe¬ 
dition  against,  479 ;  frustrated  by 
Rodney’s  victory  over  De  Grasse, 
495;  Rodney  repairs  to,  after  his 
victory,  501,  517. 

James  11.,  a  seaman  by  profession,  61, 
115;  commands  at  battle  of  Lowes¬ 
toft,  as  Duke  of  York,  109  ;  com¬ 
mands  at  the  battle  of  Solebay,  147  ; 
deprived  of  the  command,  151 ;  suc¬ 
ceeds  to  the  throne,  175;  interest  in 
the  navy,  175,  177,  178  ;  flight  from 
England,  178;  lands  in  Ireland,  179; 
defeated  at  the  Boyne,  186 ;  at  Cape 
La  Hougue,  188 ;  death,  205. 

Jenkins,  captain  of  a  merchant  brig,  the 
story  of  his  ears,  250. 

Jervis,  Sir  John,  afterward  Earl  St. 
Vincent,  British  Admiral,  naval  pol¬ 
icy  of,  9 ;  tactics  at  Cape  St.  Vincent, 
11, 147,  157,476  (note) ;  testimony  at 
Keppel’s  court-martial,  352. 

Johnstone,  British  Commodore,  sails  for 
Cape  of  Good  Hope,  421 ;  commis¬ 
sioner  to  American  Congress,  421 
(note) ;  attacked  by  Suffren  at  the 
Cape  Verde  Islands,  421-425;  antici¬ 
pated  by  Suffren  at  the  Cape,  427  ; 
returns  unsuccessful  to  England,  427. 

Kempenfeldt,  British  Admiral,  cuts  off 
part  of  De  Guichen’s  convoy,  408, 
414,  417,  475. 

Keppel,  Lord,  British  Admiral,  ap¬ 
pointed  to  command  Channel  fleet, 
341 ;  battle  of  Ushant,  350-352  ;  head 
of  admiralty  and  disapproves  treaty 
of  peace,  499 ;  a  whig  in  politics, 
500. 

King,  British  Commodore,  stubborn 
defence  of  the  “  Exeter,”  449 ;  visits 
Suffren  at  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope, 
465. 

La  Bourdonnais,  governor  of  the  Isle  of 
France,  243,  273;  his  active  admin¬ 
istration,  273 ;  prepares  to  attack 
English  commerce  in  the  East  Indies, 
273 ;  takes  and  ransoms  Madras, 
quarrels  with  Dupleix,  squadron 


wrecked,  returns  to  France,  and 
dies,  276. 

U Etenduere,  French  commodore,  brill¬ 
iant  defence  of,  272. 

Lafayette,  Marquis  de,  arrival  in  Amer¬ 
ica,  345 ;  operations  in  Virginia,  385  ; 
expressions  of  Washington  to,  as  to 
necessity  of  naval  help,  397,  400; 
associations  of  his  name  to  Ameri¬ 
cans,  501. 

La  Galissoniere,  French  Admiral,  com¬ 
mands  the  fleet  in  the  expedition  to 
Minorca, 285 ;  defeats  Byng’sattempt 
to  relieve  Port  Mahon,  286-288. 

Lally,  French  governor  of  India,  reaches 
India,  307 ;  quarrels  with  Commo¬ 
dore  D’ Ache,  .307;  takes  Fort  St. 
David,  308 ;  besieges  Madras,  but 
fails,  310 ;  fall  of  French  power  un¬ 
der,  310. 

Langara,  Spanish  Admiral,  defeated 
and  captured  by  Rodney,  403,  404, 
499  ;  action  at  Toulon  in  1793,  156. 

Leibnitz,  proposes  to  Louis  XIV.  the 
occupation  of  Egypt,  106,  107,  141, 

142. 

Louis  XIV,  growth  of  French  navy 
under,  72  ;  enmity  to  Holland,  73 ; 
policy  of,  73,  103-105,  140,  143,  205 ; 
naval  policy  of,  72, 74,  107,  133,  141- 

143,  155,  159,  166,  174, 178-181,  194- 
196;  assumes  personal  government, 
90 ;  initiates  general  wars,  91  ;  con¬ 
dition  of  France  at  accession  of,  93 ; 
commercial  policy  of,  54,  105,  167, 
169,  170,  176;  aggressions  of,  139, 
173;  declares  war  against  Holland, 
144;  campaign  in  Holland,  149-151 ; 
evacuates  Holland,  158 ;  Sicilian 
episode,  159-166 ;  peace  with  Hol¬ 
land,  168  ;  declares  war  against  Ger¬ 
many,  177  ;  against  Holland,  178 ; 
supports  invasion  of  Ireland,  179— 
186  ;  plans  invasion  of  England,  188- 
191 ;  concessions  by,  at  peace  of  Rys- 
wick,  197  ;  effect  of  policy  of,  on 
sea-power,  198-200  ;  accepts  bequest 
of  Spanish  throne  to  his  grandson, 
203;  reduced  to  extremities  in  War 
of  Spanish  Succession,  215,  216  ;  hu¬ 
miliating  concessions  at  peace  of 


INDEX. 


651 


Utrecht,  219-221 ;  exhaustion  of 
France  under,  227  ;  privateering  un¬ 
der,  133, 134,  195,  230  ;  death  of,  232. 

Louis  XV.,  ascends  throne,  232;  condi¬ 
tion  of  French  commerce  under,  74, 
242-244,279,  280,  311,  318;  condition 
of  French  navy,  74-77,  244,  252-254, 
259,  276,  279,  280,  288,  291,  311; 
restoration  of  the  navy,  76,  331-333; 
defensive  alliance  with  Spain,  248, 
263-268 ;  offensive  alliance  with 
Spain,  313,  333;  death,  336. 

Louis  XVI.,  begins  to  reign,  336  ;  naval 
policy  of,  78-80,  337-340,  402,  403, 
452 ;  general  policy  of,  336,  337,  345, 
359,  382,  419,  509-512,  535-540; 
treaty  with  the  United  States,  346 ; 
breach  with  England,  350. 

Louisburg,  Cape  Breton  Island,  strategic 
importance  of,  28,  294,  328  ;  retained 
by  France  at  Peace  of  Utrecht,  219  ; 
taken  by  New  England  colonists,  269 ; 
restored  to  France  at  peace  of  Aix- 
la-Chapelle,  277  ;  taken  by  Boscawen, 
294. 

Madras,  capital  of  a  British  presidency 
in  India,  257  ;  taken  by  French,  276  ; 
exchanged  for  Louisburg  at  peace  of 
1748,  277 ;  besieged  by  French  in 
1759,  310 ;  danger  from  Hyder  Ali 
in  1780,  420;  principal  British  naval 
station  during  the  struggle,  1781- 
1783,  429,  437,  444,  450,  451 ;  danger 
of  roadstead,  in  northeast  monsoon, 
458,  518,  519. 

Mahrattas,  the,  position  in  India  of, 
and  war  with  English,  419,  420; 
peace  with  the  English,  459,  461. 

Maria  Theresa,  ascends  Austrian 
throne,  262 ;  war  with  Prussia, 
France,  and  Spain,  262,  263 ;  war 
with  Prussia,  in  alliance  with  France 
and  Russia,  292. 

Martinique,  French  West  India  Island, 
base  for  commerce-destroying,  31, 
135,  314;  taken  by  the  English,  135, 
314;  effects  of  this  conquest,  318; 
restored  to  France  at  peace  of  Paris, 
321 ;  principal  base  of  French  navy 
in  West  Indies,  348,  366,  469,  479 ; 


actions  near,  378,  383  ;  strategic 
position  of,  480,  517,  518,  523. 

Matthews,  British  Admiral,  commander- 
in-chief  in  the  Mediterranean  and 
minister  to  Sardinia,  263 ;  action 
with  combined  French  and  Spanish 
fleets,  265-267  ;  court-martialled  and 
cashiered,  268. 

Mazarin,  Cardinal,  policy  of,  70,  93 ; 
death,  90. 

Mediterranean  Sea,  control  of,  influence 
on  Second  Punic  war,  14-21 ;  strate¬ 
gic  points  in,  13,  20,  22,  23,  32,  62,  63, 
82,  141,  142,  202,  203,  215,  220,  285, 
298,  327,  328,  335,  393,  515 ;  advan¬ 
tage  of  strategic  study  of,  33 ;  anal¬ 
ogy  to  Carribean  Sea,  33 ;  increase 
of  English  power  in,  206,  210,  212, 
215,  219,  220,  229,  235,  239,  263,  322, 
327,  328  ;  Austria  established  in, 
239 ;  Sardinia  given  to  House  of 
Savoy,  239  ;  foundation  of  Bour¬ 
bon  Kingdom  of  Two  Sicilies,  248, 
strengthens  France  in,  249  ;  English 
navy  in,  193,  206,  208,  210-216,  263- 
268,  286-291,  296,  298,  412,  515,  532, 
533;  France  acquires  Corsica,  334, 
335 ;  England  loses  Minorca  in 
American  Revolution,  409,  540. 

Monk,  British  General  and  Admiral, 
saying  about  Dutch  trade,  107  ;  com¬ 
mands  English  fleet  in  the  Four 
Days’  Battle,  117-126;  tactics  of, 
121,  124  ;  merits  of,  126  ;  opposition 
to  laying  up  the  heavy  ships,  131 ; 
death,  127. 

Morogues,  Bigot  de,  work  on  Naval 
Tactics,  10,  77,  288. 

Napoleon  I.,  recommends  study  of  mil¬ 
itary  history,  2 ;  Egyptian  expedi¬ 
tion,  10,  107 ;  Trafalgar  campaign, 
11,  12,  23,  24  (note),  119,  532,  533; 
favorite  objective,  47 ;  naval  policy, 
81,  506 ;  influence  of  French  navy  on 
American  privateering  in  1812,  137. 

Naval  Policy,  value  of  reserve  force, 
48  ;  colonial,  56  $  in  peace,  82  ;  in 
war,  82  ;  soldiers  commanding  shipg, 
127  ;  commerce-destroying  and  priva¬ 
teering  (see  Commerce-destroying) 


552 


INDEX. 


Bourbon  Family  compact,  248,  313; 
significance  of  the  wars  from  1739  to 
1783,  254 ;  Dutch,  67-69,  96-99,  108, 
109,  126,  174,  201-204,  217,  218,  222, 
406 ;  English,  59-67,  78,  100, 101,  105, 
107,  131,  140,  143,  174,  175,  192-196, 
201-204,  206,  224,  225,  229,  238-241, 
244,  245,  264,  293,  326-328,  406,  417, 
442,  451,  452,  505,  540 ;  French,  29, 
64,  69-81,  93,  104,  105-107,  166,  167- 
170,  177,  187,  197,  199,  212,  226,  238, 
242-244,  252,  282,  287-290,  291,  309, 
311,  322,  331-334,  337,  340,  359,  382, 
408  (and  note),  451,  452,  459,  460, 
606,  510,  511 ;  maritime  inscription, 
45 ;  Leibnitz’s  proposition  to  Louis 
XIV.,  141, 142;  Italian,  39,40;  Span¬ 
ish,  41,  51,  94,  156, 246,  312,  333,  348, 
401,  407,  510,  517  (note),  535,  536; 
United  States,  26,  33,  34,  38,  39,  42, 
49,  83-88,  325,  326,  539,  540  (note). 

Naval  Tactics,  unsettled  condition  of 
modern,  2  ;  qualities  of  galleys, 
steamers,  and  sailing-ships,  3-5  ; 
windward  and  leeward  positions,  6  , 
change  of,  from  age  to  age,  9,  10,  22, 
130,  506;  fireships,  109,  110,  113, 
114  ;  torpedo-cruisers,  111  ;  group 
formation,  112  ;  close-hauled  line-of- 
battle,  115;  breaking  the  line,  124, 
147,  265,  268,  286,  380,  381,  488,  491 ; 
refusing  the  van,  148,  152,  157,  183, 
190,  266,  432,  434  ;  concentration  by 
defiling,  308,  387,  470,  492;  concen¬ 
tration  by  doubling,  125,  147,  183, 
272,  378,  379,  432,  433,  438-441 ;  gen¬ 
eral  chase  with  melee,  3,  4,  184,  237, 
271,  299,  302,  303,  367-369,  404,  481, 
482,  486;  French,  in  eighteenth  cen¬ 
tury,  79,  80,  114,  163,  164,  287-290, 
338,  340,  351,  372,  383,  425,  426,  431, 
474  (and  note),  476,  478,  482,  483, 
486-488,  494,  538  ;  English,  in  eigh¬ 
teenth  century,  127-129,  163,  211, 
237,  265,  268,  271,  286,  287,  299,  303, 
307,  350,  352,  369,  377-381,  386,  389, 
391,  404,  412,  442,  447,  449,  453-455, 
462,  463,  470-473,  476  (and  note), 
486-490  ;  Monk’s,  121 ;  Ruyter’s,  145, 
147,  148,  152,  154,  157,  161;  Du- 
quesne’s,  161-163,  165 ;  Herbert’s, 


182;  Tourville’s,  182,  184,  185,  187, 
189;  Rooke’s,  211;  Byng’s,  286; 
Hawke’s,  271,  272,  303  ;  Keppel’s 
and  D’Orvilliers,  351 ;  Barrington’s, 
366;  Byron’s,  367-369  ;  D’Estaing’s, 
369,  370;  Rodney’s,  377-379,  404, 
488,  491 ;  De  Grasse’s,  383,  389,  471- 
474,  481-483,  485-489 ;  Arbuthnot 
and  Destouches’s,  386 ;  Graves’s, 
389,  391 ;  Suffren’s,  425,  426,  432, 
433,  439,  455,  465  ;  Hood’s,  472, 
473  ;  Clerk’s  work  on,  77,  163,  211  ; 
Hoste’s  work  on,  77 ;  Morogues’  work 
on,  77 ;  position  of  commander-in¬ 
chief  in  battle,  353-358;  effect  on, 
of  changes  in  naval  material,  2-5,  9, 
10,  22,  109,  116,  384  (note),  386 
(note),  493-495. 

Navies,  condition  of : 

British,  under  Cromwell,  62  ;  under 
Charles  II.,  61,  101 ;  character  of 
vessels,  1660,  101 ;  qualities  of  offi¬ 
cers,  1660, 126-129;  decline  of,  under 
Charles  II.,  174;  improvement  of,  by 
James  II.,  175 ;  numbers  in  1691, 
187  ;  deterioration  under  William 
III.,  192  ;  improvement  under  Anne, 
209,  220,  224,  225,  229  ;  numbers  and 
condition  of,  in  1727,  1734,  and  1744, 
259,  260  ;  inefficiency  of  officers, 
1744,  265-269;  numbers  of,  1756- 
1763,  291  ;  numbers  of,  in  1778,  337, 
341  ;  professional  skill  of  officers 
in  American  Revolution,  379  (and 
note),  401,  412,  449,  456,  497  ;  admin¬ 
istration  of,  417,  452,  523,  527. 

Dutch,  prior  to  1660,  68,  98,  99 ; 
character  of  ships,  102 ;  professional 
qualities  of  officers,  109,  126,  127, 
129,  157  ;  Duquesne’s  estimate  of 
Dutch  officers,  129;  decline  of,  after 
1675,  160,  174 ;  decline  of,  during 
War  of  Spanish  Succession,  221, 
222  ;  practical  disappearance  of,  after 
1713,  222. 

French,  53;  numbers  in  1661,70; 
numbers  in  1666,  72;  numbers,  1683- 
1690,  72,  178,  179,  180;  administra¬ 
tion  of,  1660-1695,  72  ;  condition  of, 
at  end  of  Louis  XIV.’s  reign,  74, 191 ; 
character  of  vessels  in  1660,  101; 


INDEX. 


553 


professional  qualities  of  officers  in 
seventeenth  and  eighteentli  centu¬ 
ries,  129,  161,  170-172,  185;  decay- 
in  number  and  condition,  1713-1760, 
74-76,  209,  216,  244,  252,  259,  260, 
279,  280,  288,  291,  311,  312 ;  revival 
of,  1760,  76-78,  331  ;  numbers  of,  in 
1761  and  1770,  331  ;  discipline  during 
war  of  1778,  332,  333;  numbers  in 
1778,  45,  337 ;  superior  to  British  in 
size  and  batteries  of  ships,  338,  493, 
494 ;  professional  skill  of  officers, 
365,  412,  435,  436,  447,  457,  484,  497, 
527,  536  (note) ;  administration  of, 
402  (and  note),  403,  452,  536,  537 ; 
numbers  of,  in  1791,  338;  numbers 
of,  in  1814,  81. 

Spanish,  condition  of,  anterior  to 
1660,  41,  50,  94,  95 ;  in  1675,  160, 
165 ;  restoration  by  Alberoni,  234 ; 
destruction  of  ships  at  Cape  Passaro 
and  of  dock-yards,  237,  238 ;  numbers 
of,  1747,  259 ;  numbers  of,  1756, 
291 ;  numbers  of,  in  1761,  331 ;  num¬ 
bers  of,  in  1779,  337  ;  superior  to 
British  in  size  and  batteries  of  ships, 
338 ;  administration  of,  402  (and 
note),  403,  536 ;  character  of  the 
personnel,  527. 

Nelson,  Horatio,  afterward  Lord,  Brit¬ 
ish  Admiral,  tactics  at  the  battle  of 
the  Nile,  10 ;  Trafalgar  campaign, 
11,  23  (note),  527,  532,  533;  tactics 
at  Trafalgar,  12,  354,  459 ;  enforces 
Navigation  Act,  60,  251 ;  orders  at 
Trafalgar,  112,  434 ;  at  battle  of 
Cape  St.  Vincent,  157, 355,  368  ;  cele¬ 
brated  sayings  of,  185,  362,  435,  525, 
527,  532 ;  attachment  of  subordinates 
to,  267  ;  position  assumed  by  him  in 
battle,  353-358. 

Nile,  Battle  of  the,  tactical  principles, 
10  ;  strategic  effect,  11 ;  French  rear 
at,  80 ;  Nelson  at,  358. 

Opdam,  Dutch  Admiral,  commands  at 
battle  of  Lowestoft  and  is  killed,  108, 
109. 

Orleans,  Philippe  d\  Regent  of  France 
during  minority  of  Louis  XV.,  74, 
232 ;  insecurity  of  position,  232 ;  con¬ 


cessions  to  England,  233 ;  policy  of, 
235 ;  alliance  with  England  against 
Spain,  235-238  •  death,  241. 

Peace : 

Aix-la-Chapelle,  1748,  277. 

Breda,  1667,  132. 

Nimeguen,  1678,  168. 

Nystadt,  1721,  240. 

Paris,  1763,  321. 

Ryswick,  1697,  197. 

Utrecht,  1713,  219. 

Versailles,  1783,  541. 

Philip,  Duke  of  Anjou,  afterward 
Philip  V.  of  Spain,  Spanish  throne 
bequeathed  to,  202 ;  war  declared 
against,  by  England,  Holland,  and 
Germany,  205  ;  loses  Gibraltar,  210; 
besieges  Gibraltar,  212 ;  loses  Bar¬ 
celona  and  Catalonia,  213;  driven 
from  Madrid,  214 ;  recovers  all  Spain, 
except  Catalonia,  214 ;  acknowl¬ 
edged  King  of  Spain  by  Treaty  of 
Utrecht,  219;  deprived  of  Nether¬ 
lands  and  Italian  dependencies,  219 ; 
enmity  to  the  regent  Orleans,  232 ; 
seizes  Sardinia,  235 ;  attacks  Sicily, 
236 ;  brought  to  terms  by  France 
and  the  Sea  Powers,  239;  makes 
alliance  with  the  Emperor  Charles 
VI.,  244 ;  attacks  Gibraltar,  245. 

Physical  Conformation ,  its  effect  upon 
the  sea  power  of  countries,  35-42. 

Pitt,  William,  dislike  of  George  II.  to, 
270;  becomes  prime  minister,  293; 
policy  of,  295,  296 ;  prosperity  of 
commerce  under,  297 ;  offers  to  re¬ 
store  Gibraltar  to  Spain,  298 ;  respect 
for  Portuguese  neutrality,  299,  300 ; 
declines  mediation  of  Spain,  304 ; 
waningof  his  influence, 305;  purposes 
war  against  Spain,  313 ;  resigns  his 
office,  313 ;  his  plans  adopted  by  suc¬ 
cessors,  314,  317  ;  opposes  the  peace 
of  Paris,  322  ;  effect  of  his  policy  on 
the  history  of  England,  326. 

Pococlc,  British  Admiral,  commands 
British  fleet  in  India  and  fights  three 
battles  with  French  fleet,  307-310; 
commands  fleet  in  combined,  exper 
dition  against  Havana,  314,  315. 


554 


INDEX. 


Port  Mahon  and  Minorca,  lost  to  Spain 
frequently  through  maritime  weak¬ 
ness,  42,  215,  541 ;  ceded  to  England 
in  1713,  02,  219 ;  strategic  impor¬ 
tance  of,  62,  220,  393,  515;  French 
expedition  against,  285 ;  Byng  de¬ 
feated  in  his  attempt  to  relieve,  286- 
288 ;  surrender  of,  to  France,  291 ; 
Pitt’s  offer  to  exchange  Gibraltar 
for,  298 ;  restored  to  England  at 
peace  of  1763,  322  ;  taken  from  Eng¬ 
land  in  1782,  407,  409 ;  ceded  to 
Spain  in  1783,  540 ;  again  taken  by 
England,  541. 

Portugal,  decay  in  sea  power  and  wealth, 
52;  cedes  Bombay  and  Tangiers  to 
England,  104;  dependence  on  Eng¬ 
land,  105,  208,  315,  320,321 ;  Methuen 
treaty,  206 ;  alliance  with  England 
and  Holland,  1704,  208 ;  advantage 
of,  to  England,  208,  213-215,  220, 
228;  French  and  Spaniards  invade, 
315,  316,  321 ;  England  repels  the 
invasion,  316 ;  benevolent  neutrality 
of  colonial  ports  to  England,  520, 
521. 

Ramatuette,  work  on  Naval  Tactics,  287, 
290,  371-374. 

Rhode  Island,  occupied  by  the  English 
in  the  American  Revolution,  346 ; 
attack  upon  by  French  and  Ameri¬ 
cans,  361-364 ;  English  evacuate, 
376,  530;  French  occupy,  382,  394; 
French  position  in,  394 ;  strategic 
value  of,  519,  529,  530  (note). 

Richelieu ,  Cardinal,  policy  of,  59,  70,  92, 
93  ;  alliance  with  Spain,  94. 

Rochambeau,  French  General,  arrival  in 
America,  382 ;  despatches  to  De 
Grasse,  384,  388 ;  consultation  with 
Washington,  387,  399 ;  marches 

against  Cornwallis,  389. 

Rodney ,  Sir  George  B.,  afterward  Lord, 
British  Admiral,  commands  squadron 
in  reduction  of  Martinique,  314 ; 
commander-in-chief  in  West  Indies, 
377  ;  takes  or  disperses  a  Spanish 
squadron,  377,  404,  500  (and  note)  ; 
personal  and  military  character,  377, 
378,  380,  397,  498-500 ;  actions  with 


De  Guichen,  378-381 ;  divides  his 
fleet  and  goes  to  New  York,  382; 
seizes  Dutch  West  India  islands, 
382  ;  sends  Hood  with  fourteen  ships 
to  New  York,  and  returns  to  England, 
389 ;  returns  to  West  Indies,  479 ; 
sails  in  chase  of  De  Grasse,  480; 
action  of  April  9,  1782,  481-483; 
battle  of  April  12,  1782,  485-490; 
criticism  upon  his  tactics,  490-493 ; 
criticism  upon  his  failure  to  pursue 
the  beaten  enemy,  496,  497  ;  his  suc¬ 
cesses,  500 ;  rewards  and  death,  503 ; 
opinion  as  to  evacuation  of  Rhode 
Island,  530  (note). 

Roolce,  Sir  George,  British  Admiral, 
relieves  Londonderry,  180 ;  burns 
French  ships  at  Cape  La  Hougue, 
190;  unsuccessful  expedition  against 
Cadiz,  207 ;  destroys  the  galleons  at 
Yigo  Bay,  207  ;  takes  Gibraltar,  210  ; 
commands  at  the  battle  of  Malaga, 
211. 

Rupert ,  Prince,  at  Four  Days’  Battle, 
124,  125;  commands  English  fleet 
at  battles  of  Schoneveldt  and  of  the 
Texel,  151,  152. 

Russell,  British  Admiral,  commands 
allied  English  and  Dutch  fleets  in 
1691,  187 ;  at  battle  of  La  Hogue, 
189. 

Ruyter,  Dutch  Admiral,  greatest  naval 
officer  of  seventeenth  century,  117  ; 
commands  at  battle  of  the  Four  Days, 
117-126  ;  badly  supported  by  his  offi¬ 
cers,  122,  126,  127 ;  tactics  of,  130, 
144-148,  152,  157,  161, 164 ;  destroys 
English  slopping  in  the  Thames,  132 ; 
strategy  of,  144, 151, 152;  commands 
at  the  battles  of  Solebay,146,  Schone¬ 
veldt,  152,  Texel,  152-154  ;  military 
character,  157 ;  sent  to  Mediterra¬ 
nean  with  inadequate  force,  160; 
commands  at  battle  of  Stromboli, 
160-162;  killed  at  battle  of  Agosta, 
166. 

Sea  Power,  a  history  of  conflicts,  1 ; 
elements  of,  25.  Affected  by  geo¬ 
graphical  position  of  countries,  29- 
35 ;  by  physical  conformation,  35-42; 


INDEX. 


555 


by  extent  of  territory,  42-44;  by 
number  of  population,  44-50 ;  by  na¬ 
tional  character,  50-58 ;  by  policy  of 
government,  58.  Policy  of  England 
as  to,  58-67 ;  policy  of  Holland,  67- 
69;  of  France,  69-81.  Influence  of 
colonies  on,  82  (see  also  Colonies)  ; 
weakness  of  the  United  States  in, 
83 ;  dependent  upon  commerce,  87, 
225  (see  also  Commerce) ;  strategic 
bearing,  88  (see  also  Strategy) ;  pol¬ 
icy  of  Richelieu,  93;  Spanish,  in 
1660,  94 ;  Dutch,  in  1660,  95 ;  Eng¬ 
lish,  in  1660,  101 ;  mistakes  of  Louis 
XIV.,  104 ;  Colbert’s  measures,  70, 
105  ;  effects  of  commerce-destroying 
on,  132,  179,  193,  229,  317,  344,  400, 
408  (note),  539.  (See  also  Commerce- 
destroying.  )  Influence  of,  upon  Na¬ 
poleon’s  expedition  to  Egypt,  10; 
upon  Second  Punic  War,  14 ;  upon 
Third  Anglo-Dutch  War,  148,  154; 
upon  English  Revolution,  177,  178, 
180,  181,  191,  197 ;  upon  France, 
198,  199  ;  upon  War  of  Spanish  Suc¬ 
cession,  203,  206,  209,  213,  214,  223- 
229  ;  upon  Alberoni’s  ambitions,  237, 
239 ;  upon  Peter  the  Great,  239 ;  in 
India,  243, 258, 273-278,  306,  309,  310, 
316,  328,  349, 424,  428,  445,  452,  459- 
464,  466,  513,  520,  521;  upon  War  of 
Austrian  Succession,  263,  264,  279, 
280;  upon  Seven  Years’  War,  291, 
293-295,  304,  311,  314-317;  upon 
Portugal,  320,  321 ;  at  Peace  of  Paris, 
321 ;  in  remote  and  disordered  coun¬ 
tries,  324—326 ;  upon  British  policy 
since  1763,  326-328.  Washington’s 
opinions  as  to,  397-400 ;  American 
Revolution,  347,  468 ;  influence  of, 
upon  conditions  of  peace,  1783,  498. 

Spain,  geographical  position,  32;  re¬ 
sults  of  maritime  weakness  of,  41,  42, 
193,  313-317,  327,  345,  346,  541  ;  de¬ 
pendence  of  finances  upon  treasure- 
ships,  41,  244,  313,  346,  539;  effect 
of  national  character  upon  sea  power, 
50-52,  54;  unity  of  aim  with  Aus¬ 
tria,  91,  92 ;  policy  of  Richelieu 
toward,  93 ;  condition  of,  in  1660, 
94,  95 ;  condition  of  navy,  in  1660, 


94 ;  aggressions  of  Louis  XIV.  on, 
104,  139 ;  failure  of  the  Austrian 
line  of  kings,  140,  201,  202 ;  alliance 
with  Holland  and  Germany  against 
France,  158 ;  revolt  of  Sicily  against, 
159  ;  territory  lost  at  Peace  of  Nime- 
guen,  168;  joins  League  of  Augs¬ 
burg,  176 ;  dependence  upon  Dutch 
and  English  fleets,  193 ;  possessions 
in  year  1700,  201 ;  throne  of,  be¬ 
queathed  to  Philip,  Duke  of  Anjou, 
202 ;  war  of  the  succession,  201-231  ; 
Bourbon  line  of  kings  established, 
219 ;  losses  of  territory  at  peace  of 
1713,  219 ;  Alberoni’s  ministry  in, 
233-239 ;  grievances  against  Eng¬ 
land,  1720-1739,  240,  241,  244-251 ; 
conquers  the  Two  Sicilies  in  War 
of  Polish  Succession,  248 ;  Family 
Compact  with  France,  248,  311,  313; 
war  with  England,  250  ;  possessions 
in  1739,  256 ;  Peace  of  Aix-la-Cha- 
pelle,  278  ;  lack  of  results  from  war 
with  England,  278 ;  enters  Seven 
Years’  War  as  the  ally  of  France 
against  England,  313 ;  loss  of  colon¬ 
ies  and  treasures,  314-317 ;  loss  of 
possessions  by  Peace  of  Paris,  1763, 
321,  322 ;  political  relations  with 
France,  333 ;  dispute  with  England 
over  Falkland  Islands,  335 ;  objects 
in  the  war  of  1779-1782,  347,  348, 
509,  510,  513 ;  rupture  with  England 
and  alliance  with  France,  401 ;  in¬ 
efficiency  of  navy,  402  (and  note), 
407-409,  411,  412,  506,  527  ;  policy 
in  war  of  1779,  517  (note),  535-538  ; 
territorial  gains  by  peace  of  1783. 
(See  also  Colonies,  Commerce,  Naval 
Policy.) 

Sta.  Lucia,  West  India  Island,  taken 
by  English,  314;  ceded  to  France  at 
Peace  of  Paris,  321 ;  strong  harbor 
and  strategic  position,  348,  366,  377, 
393,  415,  513,  516,  518,  523;  taken 
by  Admiral  Barrington,  348,  365, 
366,  512,  531  (note) ;  Rodney  watches 
De  Grasse  from,  479,  480 ;  an  ad¬ 
vanced  strategic  position,  518,  528  ; 
restored  to  France  at  peace  of  1783* 
540. 


556 


INDEX. 


Strategy,  permanence  of  its  principles, 
7-9,  88,  89 ;  illustrations,  10-22 ; 

t  definition  of  naval,  22 ;  Trafalgar 
campaign,  23  (note)  ;  bearing  of 
geographical  position  on,  29-33 ; 
Mediterranean  and  Carribean  Seas, 
33-35 ;  bearing  of  physical  confor¬ 
mation  of  coast  on,  35-42 ;  blockade 
of  coast  of  Confederate  States,  43, 
44 ;  value  of  commerce-destroying 
(see  Commerce-destroying)  ;  word 
“  defence  ”  two  distinct  ideas,  87 
(note) ;  naval,  of  the  British,  6,  9,  22, 
24,  30,  118,  125,  136,  143,  182,  206, 
208,  210,  212,  224,  229,  239,  260,  269, 
284,  285,  296,  314-317,  320,  326-328, 
339,  342,  343,  363,  375,  376,  385,  390- 
397,  412-417,  428-430,  468,  523-535  ; 
naval,  of  the  Dutch,  144,  145,  151, 
154  ;  naval,  of  the  French,  6,  12,  23 
(note),  179-181,  191,  347,  371-374, 
383,  388,  392,  401,  433,  459,  460,  476, 
483,  535-539;  features  of  War  of 
Spanish  Succession,  201-206  ;  silent 
action  of  sea  power,  209 ;  general 
military  situation,  in  1740,  255  ;  Eng¬ 
land  in  Seven  Years’  War,  296  ;  mu¬ 
tual  dependence  of  seaports  and  fleets, 
31,  83,  132,  212,  329,  430,  453,  529; 
value  of  colonies,  27,  28,  65,  83, 
135,  136,  510,  511  ;  importance  of 
coal,  31,  329  (note),  540  (note) ;  mil¬ 
itary  situation  in  America  in  1777, 
341-343 ;  general  strategic  situation 
in  1778,  347-349;  British  difficulties 
in  American  Revolution,  392-397, 
412-419,  522-533;  Suffren’s  naval, 
424,  425,  433,  450,  465 ;  situation  in 
India,  349,  428-430 ;  Hood’s  naval, 
476  ;  Rodney’s  naval,  381,  392,  496- 
498,  523  ;  influence  of  trade-winds  and 
monsoons,  315,  458,  517,  518 ;  ele¬ 
ments  essential  to  all  naval  wars, 
514  ;  difficulty  of  procuring  informa¬ 
tion  at  sea,  521 ;  general  discussion 
of  war  of  1778,  505-540.  (See  also 
Naval  Policy  and  Sea  Power.) 

Sufjfren,  French  Admiral,  criticism  on 
D’Estaing’s  conduct  at  Sta.  Lucia, 
366,  426,  478 ;  commands  leading 
French  ship  in  D’Estaing’s  battle  off 


Grenada,  371 ;  criticism  on  D’Es¬ 
taing’s  conduct  in  the  battle,  371: 
sails  from  Brest  in  company  with 
De  Grasse’s  fleet,  383,  421  ;  parts 
company,  off  the  Azores,  for  India, 
383,  407,  421 ;  orders  to  secure  Cape 
of  Good  Hope,  421 ;  action,  with 
British  squadron  at  the  Cape  Verde 
Islands,  422,  423;  military  discussion 
of  his  conduct,  423-425 ;  arrival  in 
India,  427 ;  lack  of  seaports  on 
which  to  base  operations,  349,  429  ; 
first  battle  with  squadron  of  Sir 
Edward  Hughes,  430-432  ;  tactics  in 
the  action,  432-435;  estimate  of  the 
strategic  situation  in  India,  424,  433, 
444,  445,  464,  466 ;  second  battle 
with  Hughes,  437-439 ;  tactics  in  it, 
439-441  ;  strategic  action,  443,  445, 
446,  450-453,  458-460,  462-464,  466, 
522  ;  military  character,  445,  416, 
450,  456,  465,  466  ;  third  battle  with 
Hughes,  446-448;  takes  Trincoma- 
lee,  450 ;  activity  of,  450,  451,  456, 
462,  466  ;  fourth  battle  with  Hughes, 
453-456;  wreck  of  two  of  squadron, 
457  ;  goes  to  Sumatra,  460 ;  returns 
to  Trincomalee,  461 ;  relieves  Cud- 
dalore  besieged  by  the  English,  462  ; 
fifth  battle  with  Hughes,  463;  con¬ 
clusion  of  peace,  464 ;  return  to 
France,  465;  rewards,  465;  later 
career  and  death,  466. 

Tourville ,  French  Admiral,  commands 
at  the  battle  of  Beachy  Head,  181 ; 
sluggish  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  184  ; 
military  character,  185 ;  celebrated 
cruise  in  1691,  187  ;  commands  at 
battle  of  La  Hougue,  189  ;  tactics 
and  brilliant  defence  at  La  Hougue, 
190;  destruction  of  French  ships, 
190  ;  supports  the  army  in  Catalonia, 
193 ;  destroys  or  disperses  a  great 
English  convoy,  194  ;  death,  210. 

Trafalgar ,  Battle  of,  final  act  of  a 
strategic  combination,  11,  23  (note) ; 
tactics  at,  12,  354,  459 ;  effects  of, 
47 ;  Nelson’s  position  at,  353,  357 ; 
Collingwood’8  action  after  Nelson’s 
death,  358. 


INDEX. 


557 


Trincomalee,  in  Ceylon,  Dutch  influence 
in,  97 ;  passes  into  the  hands  of  the 
English,  349,  428 ;  effect  upon  the 
contest  in  India,  349,  427  (note),  429, 
430  (note),  433,  437,  442,  451,  453, 
458,  462  ;  strategic  value  of,  428,  429, 
436,  444,  451,  458,  518,  519,  520; 
taken  by  Suflren,  450 ;  restored  to 
Holland  at  peace  of  1783,  540. 

Two  Sicilies,  the,  acquired  by  Austria, 
239;  foundation  of  Bourbon  King¬ 
dom  of,  248 ;  forced  by  British  fleet 
to  withdraw  troops  from  Spanish 
army,  264,  304. 

United  Provinces.  See  Holland. 

Vernon,  British  Admiral,  takes  Porto 
Bello,  is  repulsed  from  Cartagena 
and  Santiago  de  Cuba,  261. 

Villeneuve,  French  Admiral,  Trafalgar, 
campaign,  23,  24  (note),  525 ;  at  the 
battle  of  the  Nile,  80 ;  suicide,  403. 

Walpole,  Sir  Robert,  prime  minister  of 
England,  239,  241 ;  peace  policy  of, 
241,  243,  244  ;  naval  demonstrations, 
244 ;  struggle  with  the  war  party 
in  England,  247, 249,  250  ;  neutrality 
causes  Austria  to  lose  the  two 
Sicilies,  248;  forced  into  war  with 
Spain,  250 ;  accord  with  Fleuri,  241, 
243,  244;  confidence  betrayed  by 
Fleuri,  248 ;  driven  from  office,  253, 
262 ;  death,  253. 


War,  Second  Punic,  influence  of  sea 
power  upon,  13-21. 

Wars,  American  Revolution,  341-397  ; 
Anglo-Dutch,  second,  107-132;  An- 
glo-Dutch,  third,  England  in  alliance 
with  France,  144-158  ;  Austrian  Suc¬ 
cession,  262-277  ;  France  against 
Holland,  Germany,  and  Spain,  1674-1 
1678,  158-168 ;  Great  Britain  against 
Spain,  250-277 ;  League  of  Augs¬ 
burg,  176-197 ;  Maritime  war  of 
1778,  350-540 ;  Polish  Succession, 
247  ;  Russiaand  Sweden,  231 ;  Seven 
Years’,  291-321  ;  Spanish  Succession, 
1702-1713,  205-218. 

Washington,  George,  at  Pittsburg  and 
in  Braddock’s  expedition,  284  ;  opin¬ 
ion  as  to  the  line  of  the  Hudson,  342 
(note)  ;  comments  on  D’Estaing’s 
cruise,  364  (note)  ;  despatches  to  De 
Grasse,  384 ;  meeting  with  Rocham- 
beau,  387  ;  result  of  their  delibera¬ 
tions,  388 ;  marches  from  New  York 
to  Virginia,  389 ;  opinions  as  to  the 
influence  of  sea  power  on  the  Ameri¬ 
can  Revolution,  397-400. 

William  III.,  naval  policy  of,  68,  192  ; 
becomes  ruler  of  Holland,  150  ;  gen¬ 
eral  policy,  68,  167,  168,  174,  176, 
177,  191,  202-204,  207 ;  expedition 
to  England,  178 ;  becomes  King  of 
England,  61,  178 ;  difficulties  of  his 
position,  179 ;  goes  to  Ireland,  181  ; 
wins  the  battle  of  the  Boyne,  188 ; 
dies,  205. 


THE  END. 


p 


